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Battles and leaders of the Civil War (vol. 4)... : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers : based upon "The Century War series" / edited by R.U. Johnson and C.C. Clough Buel.

Battles and leaders of the Civil War (vol. 4)... : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers : based upon "The Century War series" / edited by R.U. Johnson and C.C. Clough Buel. 400dpi TIFF G4 page images University of Kentucky, Electronic Information Access & Management Center Lexington, Kentucky 2002 b92-74-27213332v4 Electronic reproduction. 2002. (Beyond the shelf, serving historic Kentuckiana through virtual access (IMLS LG-03-02-0012-02) ; These pages may be freely searched and displayed. Permission must be received for subsequent distribution in print or electronically. Battles and leaders of the Civil War ... (vol. 4) : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers : based upon "The Century War series" / edited by R.U. Johnson and C.C. Clough Buel. Century, New York : [1887-88] 4 v. : facsims., illus., maps, port. ; 29 cm. Coleman Microfilm. v. 1-4. Atlanta, Ga. : SOLINET, 1993. 2 microfilm reels ; 35 mm. (SOLINET/ASERL Cooperative Microfilming Project (NEH PS-20317) ; SOL MN02822-2823 KUK) Printing Master B92-74. Vols. 1-2 on Reel 2822; vols. 3-4 on Reel 2823. IMLS This electronic text file was created by Optical Character Recognition (OCR). No corrections have been made to the OCR-ed text and no editing has been done to the content of the original document. Encoding has been done through an automated process using the recommendations for Level 1 of the TEI in Libraries Guidelines. Digital page images are linked to the text file. United States History Civil War, 1861-1865 Campaigns.Johnson, Robert Underwood, 1853-1937. Buel, Clarence Clough, 1850-1933. BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR VOLUME FOUR I- I t- U-. I l 0 I l - 3 U:5 _z I- z 0o I BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CI VIL WAR BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS. BASED UPON "THE CENTURY WAR SERIES." EDITED BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON AND CLARENCE CLOUGH BUEL, OF THE EDI- TORIAL STAFF OF "THE CENTURY MAGAZINE: NEW-YORK TDe Centurp Lo. ..v -1 Copyright, 1884, 1888, By THE CENTURY Co. THE DE VINNS PRES8. CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR) PAGA FRONTISPIECE, "WITH FATE AGAINST THEM." By Gilbert 4Gaul. ....... ......... VI LIST OF MAPS.................................................................... XVIII LIST OF ARTISTS .......................................................x. . .. XIX LIST OF DRAUGHTSMEN .... . ................... .......x......................... XIX LIST OF ENGRAVERS ...... .. . ...................x................. ............. XIX EDITORS' NOTE ........ . .... .....................x.......................... xx INDEX TO THE FOUR VOLUMES .................... ......... .......... .......... 769 CHARLESTON. THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON ... . ............ GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD ..... . I ILLUSTRATI-y8: On the Union Picket Li.e - Relieving Pickets (WV. Taber) -Map of Charleston Harbor and Vicinity(Jacob vells)- Map of the Soth Carolina Coast(Jacob Wells)-CastlePinckneyCharleston Harbor, from sketch by R. K. Snuede (C. A. Vanderhoof) - Interior of Fort Potnan and Soath-east Angle of the Confederate Fort Marshall, from Brady photos. (J. 0. Davidson) - Colonel D. B. Harris, C. S. A.. from photo. lent by MaJor John Johnsion-The Monitor "' Weehawken," and Effect of the Shot from Fort Sumter on the Plating and 8moke-tack of the "Weehawken" (XoanthIu Smits)-Charleston under Fire (Thea. R. Davis) -The First Breach in Fort Sumter, from Cook photo.- "The Battery," Charleston (J. Wells C:amppey) - General Quincy A. Gillmore, from Brady photo. THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSE OF FORT SUMTER .. MAJOR JOHN JOHNSON. ..... 23 ILLUSTRATION: Captain Thomas A. Huguenin in the Headquarters-room, Fort Sumter, from sketeh lent by Captain Hluguenn (E. J. Meeker). MINOR OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH AT- I PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY 27 LANTIC SQUADRON UNDER DU PONT. . ILLUSTRATIONS: The Union Tug "Plato " (with Torpedo Rake at the bow) in the Stono River, near Charleston, from sketch by Horatio L. Wait (E. J. Meeker) -The Mouitor "M ontauk " destroying the Confederate Privateer " Nashville" near Fort McAllister, Ogeechee River, Georgia (J. 0. Davidson). THE EARLY MONITORS ................... CAPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON .......... 30 ILLUSTRATIONS: Interior View of the Turret of a Sea-going Monitor, from litho. ient by Capt. Erics- son - Section of the null of a Sea-going Monitor, from plan lent by Capt. Ericsonu. DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON ........... REAR-ADMIRAL C. R. P. RODGERS .. 32 ILLUSTRATIONS: The Monitor "M Montauk" beached forRepairs (.1. 0. Davidson) -Mapof the Blockade of Confederate Ports (Jacob Wells) - Rear-Admiral C. R. P. Rodger., from Brady photo. - Bombard- ment of Fort Sumter and Adjacent Forts by the Union Fleet, April 7th, 1863 (J. 0. DavidsonJ - Rear- Admiral D. M. Fairfax, from photo.- The Monitor " Weehawken " capturing the Confederate Iron-clad Ram "Atlanta" (J. 0. Deaidsa-)-Rear-Admiral Daniel Ammen, from photo.-Rear-Admiral J. A. Dahlgren, from photo. tent by Horatio L. Wait. THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER ................ REAR-ADMIRAL THOS. H. STEVENS . 47 ILLuSTBRATIONS The Boat Attack on Fort Suniter (J. 0. Davidso-)0 THE SOUTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON ......: ............................... of THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863 ....... GENERAL QUINCY A. GILLMORE .....5. 52 Il.L.USTRATIOsN: Thirty-pounder Parrott Rifles in Battery Hlays, fron- photo. Icut by Colonel W. S. Stryker (W. Tab,-) -The Night Assault on Battery Wagner (J. 0. Daeidson) - Colonel Robert G. Shaw, from photo. lent by Mrs. Charles Russell Lowell -The Marsh Battery after the Explosion of the 1' Swamp Angel," from photo. lent by Colonel W. S. Stryker (WV. Tabe) - Brevet Brigadier-Generni E. W. Serrell, from photo,. let by Colonel W. S. Stryker (V. Gribayedoff) -Tue Marsh Battery armed with Mortars, after the Explosion of the "S wamp Angel," from sketch by Horatio L. Wait (E. J. JMfeetrk). THE "SWAMP ANGEL" ............. ........... COLONEL WILLIAM S. STRYKER... 72 ILLUSTRATIONS: The "Swamp Angel" in position (The.. R. Daris)-The "Swamp Angel" mounted as a Monument, In Trenton, New Jersey (Thco. R. Davis). THE OPPOSING LAND FORCES AT CHARLESTON . . .... .... ......... ............ 7-d ) In order to save much repetition, particular credit is here given to the Massachusetts Commandery of the Loyal Legion, to Colonel Arnold A. Rand, General Albert Ordway, nmd Charles B. Ball for the use of pbotogrnphs and drawings. War-time pbotographers, whose work is of the greatest historical value and has been freelv di-iwvn upon in the preparation of the illustrations, are M. B. Brady, Alexander Gardner, and Captain A. J. Russell in the North; and D. H. Anderson of Richmond, Va., and George S. Cook of Charleston, S. C.- the latter, since the war, having succeeded to the ownership of the Anderson negatives. Ix x CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. OLUSTEE. THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE, OR OCEAN POND ..... GENERAL SAMUEL JONES ...........7.G . THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE, FLORIDA . ....... . GENERAL JOSEPH R. HAWLEY. 71) OPERATIONS AFTER GETTYSBURG. FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT .GENERAL MARTIN T. MCMAHON .... I LLUST"ATIIIN: I'rovot (;uard at tbe llc'dcjnartirs of the Army of the 1'otoeaa 1114t h t'ena. tfalctry), fromt Gardier phboto. (WI. Tecber)-Fort Ramsey, Ulpton,,'s Hill, Virgioi:a, and VI-v ,ef Aldie (;ap, fro.m sketches ily B. K. Stieden (C. A. l'Vccderhoof)- Map ot Northern Virginia fJaoob IWels) -On the Rond to Warrenton (Edceit F-obes)-Warreoiton J.unctiou, from ketvh by It. K. S,,edeu (C. A. i'accdrr- htotf) -Army Ftcrgc, Brandy, Station. from Gardier photo. (W. Taber) -CampI of the Military Telegraph Corp, Brandy Station, from. G.rdner pboto. (Tle.s. Hogoan,) -Map of the Field of Operactimnsof Noteoc- ber. 1863 (Jacob Wells) -1. "The shebang," (uarters of the Unitet State-i Sacietary Com-iasioo- 2. General l'oat-Otliee, Arm.yof Potsseoae, Deecocber, 1863,.at Branedy Station. fio-c (;ardnI ephbtos. (J. D. Wodtaeftrd)-cta)or-(Generat John Sedgwick, front Brady photo.- Fugiti-e Negroes at the Rapidan, from G ardner photo. (W. Tucbes'). KILPATRICK'S AND DAHLGREN'S RAID TO GEORE E. POND ....... .. . ... 95 RICHMOND ...GEORGE....OND.9 ttLU.TRATOIIN: C.aeeIp ofI the 18th t'ennsylvania Cavalry. Kilpatrick's l)ivision. on tbe Union Left, ee- tween the Rappahannoek and the taptetan (February or Mareh. 1864), from Garducer tbhota. (Wt. Tobe-). THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '04 .....GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT . 97 ILLVsTa'TMoNS: Hlteadquecartere of the Army of the Potoinae at Brandy Station, from Gardner pbloto. (E. J. Meeker) - lteadqnarter. Flag, Army of the Potomac (A. R. laetd) - lie'toe Station and Brandty Station, Orange and Alexandria Railtway. fromn ketebes by R. K. 8neden (C. A. V-,, nderleof) - Geeerlt lMeade's lteadquarter. at Cnllecler,from eboto. lent by W. H. Whbit. (C: A. I1V ,herh flOo)-Major.Gecect George G. Meade, from Br.tdy photo. Ient by Colonel George Mleade - General U. S. Grant, froeme Brady photo.-BrevetMajor-Gecneral M. C. leigs, Quartenu-ter-General, U. S. A., from Brady photo.- General W. T. Sherman, froee, photo. by Geo. 14. Bei-Genertel P. 11. Sheridan, from pheeto. by C. D. Mosicer- Fac-simile of Lincoln's Godit-peed to Grant - Major-Generttl A. A. Hutmphrcys, front Anthony phito. FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR ......G ENERAL E. M. LAW .....1. ...... IJ1 ILLUsTaATIoNSe: Watering Horses iii the Rapidan, ftomn keteh by C. W. Reed (W. Taber)-Unibn Troops croesing the Rapidan at Germanna Ford (LFdeeice Forb,.e)-Map of the Field cf the Wilderness- Brevet Major-General Alexander S. Webb, fromn Brady lphoto.-Confederate LIne waiting Orders in the Wildernets W. L. lceppeerd)-Capture ofa part of theburning Union Breastworksou the Brock Road on the afternoon ef May 6th (A. R. iW..d)-Brigadler-General Mie.ah Jenkns., C. S. A., from a tiectype- lre-astworka of Hancock's Cortes on the Brock Road on the morning of May 7th rfEdein Forbs) - McCool'8 Farm-bouse within the 'Bloody Angle," Spotsylvania, froto photo. (Hlurry Fcnn) - MeCool's House in 1B8 (Joseph uelnl,) - Map of the field of Spotaylvania - SpItsylvania Conrt Hou1 e and Spot- sylvania Tavern, from photos. r W. Taber) - Four views of Confederate Intrenehmecets at 8potsylvania, from photos. (J. 1). Woodleard)- Confederate Trenches at Chesterfield Bridge ceo the North Anna, from Gardner photo. (A. C. Red eoo) -Map of the North Anna-Jericho Mills-Unlen Eegineer Corps at work, frt- Gardner tphoto. (H-arry Fen) -The Pennsylvania Reserves resisting a Confederate attack near the Bethesda Cbhrch, Jane 2d (Edwin Forbe) - Map of Cold Harbor - The Ta-e at New Cold Hlarbor (IW. L. Sheppard) - Extreme Right of the Confederate Line, Cold Harbor. fro.. G rdier lehotee. (J. D. odea'o/rtd) - A Rabbit in a Confederate Camp ( W. L. Slheppord). GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN (EXTRACT FROM HIS REPORT 145 DATED JULY 22d, i865) .,. . . ..... ........................... .. .... I.I.UsTRtATI1!N8: Secocid Day (If the Battle of the Wilderne.s (Ederici Forbes) - (tC'eerocl Grant whittliing during the Battle ot the Wilderness (C. W'. Reed) - Todd's Tavern in war-timn, frecoc photo. (J. D. Wooct- e.r...) -The Wilderness Tavern in 1885, fro. photo. (W. Taber) - Brass Coelcorns itt ,ise 0t Celd Harbor (A. It. IaV-dl)- Mat-ision and (trotndts cn oMaryc's Bill, Frederieksbtrg, frolic .i.. to. lent by W. H. Whiit-, ( 11. PMber) - Greaerl ent a..id Staff cit Betheela Churnb, fromc (;taietoer lehceto. (It. Tobc). THROUGH THE WILDERNESS ..........G... ..... GENERAL ALEXANDER S. WEBB .. 1,52 tI.IX-TiT.AloN-: Up-hill Work (W. Tiser) -Mapof thc Bilative P-itimi-4e Forccs, Mcerniccgaed Ev-e- hii, May 4th, 184-Toled's Tvc-r in 188 (Josepl Ie,-,elt)-.1I Mic cf the Wilderces., May .,th, 1864-Threlen- il ecp Brecatxwocks iJ. tixic Wilderecc-s (A. R. Wfaeec0-Map .cf the Wilhnicre.s, May 4the, IWA4-Brig'.cdh-r- G;ene rall Jaicles Sl. Waewucrtl. trcc llr dy lehoto.-Distrili tin-- Aeceicic-ition . .c...Ir Fire te) Warren's Fifth Corles, May lth (A4. le. WuVed) -Thce Betrniig W(oeI.-, May 6th- cniecah.g the Wocnudlect (A. R. Wreed) - View frccen cair the Wild-iceun Tavern Ie ....king toward the Batth--tietld, 2 P. s1., ltay 7th (Edl( i,, Forbes) - Out of the Wiildrness, Sceeciay Morecitect, May 8th-The Mlareh to Slpet.oylycecia ,E(dcrir Forbes.) - Otlhlfe Mapof Lee's heositions in the Wilderness and at Spotaylvauia (Jeejor Jed. Ufohek!iss) -Map of the Relative CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. xi PAGE Positions of the Oppoosing Corps at Spotaylvania - Major-(;eneral John Nf. Jones, C. S. A., from Antlerson- Cook !,hoto.- rnjsir-(ieneral Johut C. Btlttsot-u, fronm Brady phofo.-Gernral ltnrnsile aleatdiuarters at ilethlt Clhurth, May 22d, 1864, fl ot (ardiner phottt. ( W. Tubel). HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING AT SPOTSYLVANIA ..... G. NORTON GALLOWAY .1 0 IIt.t.ITRITIrONs: Strugglitig forthe Works at the '1hlAly A.n,.de (Il. T. Trego)- Upton', Brigade at the 'Bloody Atigle," frtoou sketch by G. N . Gallowvay (Fi: II. ,Scelll) -Brev -t Mtajor-iletterall Emuory Ufttott, frto' Birlady phltut.- Cuit lIteolpitat at Al-ps 'e Farin-hoti-s uear the Br-ek road, fro..t Gardner photo. IV. rAber). THE DEATH OF GENERAL JOHN SEDGWIC(K... GENERAL MARTIN T. M'4MAHON... 1 7.5 Mt.ALLISTERS BRIGADE AT THE "BLOODY GENERAL ROBERT MCALLISTER ..... ANGLE " I. ..... ...... GNRLRBRTMALSE . 7 IILICITRAfTI t Cetter of the Uttit- position at Spotasytania, May 10th, 1864 (Edtrin rbes) EDWARDS'S BRIGADE AT THE " BLOODY ANGLE " . JAMES L. BOWEN . .. ....... 177 ILI.I.STR1 MTI II: General (;rat reconnoit-ring the Coufelerate position at SIpotsylvattia Court lhouse (C. IV. ffi- 0. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND 179 LLI.8THIATtON: Beathig the Long Boll (Wi-lso- Hostet'). THE OPPOSING FORCES AT COLD HARBOR, JUNE ist, 1804.185 SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID ... .......... GENERAL THEO. F. RODENBOUGH 188 ILLUITttATItNS: Ulinhwrsd Troopers retiring front Sheridaute Raid (Wnhsltow Homer) -Major-General George A. C('ter, frottt Gardn,-e photo.- Map of the Klilpatriek-Dahlgreu Raid, ,,f Sheridan's Richmomd Raid, an-t of Sherilan's Trevillan Raid (Jacob Wells) - portrait groult of General P. H. Sheridan, General D. MeNM. Gregg, General A. T. A. Torbert, General Jaues lH. Wilson, (leneral Henry E. Davies, Jr.. and Generatl WsIey Merritt, from Gardner photo. i BY A PRIVATE OF THE SIXTH VIR- 1 THE DEATH OF GENERAL J. E. B. STUART i GINIA CAVALRY .. .. 194 ILLtSTRATION: Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, C. S. A., fromt Anderson-Cook photo. THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF . ... ... GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD . 195 ILLUSTRATIONS: Looking for a Friend (W . aber) - Map of Operatiouts at Drewry'a Bluff, Bermuttda Hundred, atttt Deet Bottom in 1814 (Jacob Wells) -Major-General R. F. Hoke, C. S. A., from photo.- Coutfederate Roll-Call (A. C. Red-'ood). BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF . ...... GENERAL WM. FARRAR SMITH . ... 206 ILLUSTRATIONS: A Fifteen.-neh Gun, from Gardner photo. (O. R. ilalta) -Ma.or-tGeneralJohn A Di., from photo. bty J. W. Black-Brevet Major-General Joseph R. Hawley, froin photo. by Prescott Gage - Major-General Go.ifrey Weitzel, from Anthony photo. COLD HARBOR ...... ............. . . GENERAL MARTIN T. McMAHON.. 213 ILLUSTRATIoNs: Fording the Mtattapoty, front sketch by C. W. Reed (W. Taber) -AMap of Confederate Positions at the North Autna and at Cold Harbor (Major Jed. Hlotchkiss) -Map of Cold Harbor- Major- General Francis C. Batllow, frottt Brady photo.-C old Harbor, June 3d, Bomb-Proofs on the line of the S-eittd Corps (Edtria Forbes). THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR.... GENERAL WM. FARRAR SMITH ...... 221 ILLUSTRATIONS: Explosiou of a Bomnb-shell nn'ter an Artillery Cam-fi4re at Ctldd Harbor, from sketch by C. W. Reetl (IF. Tabe) - View of the Uniolt Breastworks on the Cold Harbor Line, June It (Edwin Forbes) - Major-General Horatio G. Wright, from Brady photo. NOTES ON COLD HARBOR .... GEORGE CARY EGGLESTON ....-.... 230 SHERIDAN'S TREVILIAN RAID . .GENERAL THEO. F. RODENBOUGH ...233 ILLUs TRATION: Map of the Battleof Trevilian Station (Jacob Wells). THE CAVALRY FIGHT AT TREVILIAN STATION. GENERAL M. C. BUTLER ... -........ 237 ILLUsTRATIONS: Major-G(eneral Thomas L, Po-ser, C. S. A., fro-o photo. lettt by James Blair (Wyalt ELtoti) - Waiting for his Breakfast ( Wins.1ee .oote.r). GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN .... COLONEL CHARLES S. VENABLE.... 240 ILLUsTRATIoNs: tniform of the Mary-land Guard, C. S. A. (A. C. Red-ood) -MIajor-Gener.l C,. W. C. Lee, C. S. A., frotm Andtersnn-Cook photo.- Major-General Stephen D. Ratmseur, C. S. A., fromit photo. -5Major-General Edward Johnson, C. S. A., from photo.-Brigadler-Geteral George H. Steuart, C. S. A., frotil Atltersomt-Cok photo.- A Call for Reouforeenuts, Fac-simile of a Dispatch from General Lee to General Beauregardl-View of Belle PlaIn, Potomac Creek, a Union Base of Supplies, in May, 1864, from photo. lent by W. H. Wtlbittm (C. A. I'asderhoof). ATLANTA. THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR . GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN . 247 OF THE WAR .....GNRL..T.SEMA . 4 ILLUSTRATIONs: A Shtell at Heatquarters (W. Taber) - Map of tte Atlanta Cattpaign - General William T. Shertt-an at Atlanta, from photst.- Ration Day at Chattanooga in 1864 (Theo. R. Davis) -The "Calico xii CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. PAGZ House," General Shertnan'a First Headquarters in Atlanta, from photo. lent by Miss Orelia Key Bell (W1. Taber). OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA,.. GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.....2(0 ILLUSTRATIO2s: Buzzard-Roost (ap (Theo. R. Laris) -The Battle of Resaen, Ga., May 14th, 1864, and Confederates dragging (;nns up Kenesaw Mountain, fromn The Mountain Camipaign in (;eorgia - (;eu- eral Sherman and Geeral Thom-a during the assault at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27th, 1864 (Theo. Rf. Duris) - Geueral John B. IHood, C. S. A., from Auderson-Cook photo. THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN ..... COLONEL W. C. P. BRECKINRIDGE . 277 ILLUSTRATION: I'art of the Confederate Intrenebmeuts at Resaa, fronl photo. by G. N. Bairuard (C. A. THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH IN THE ATLANTA M,JOR E. C. D,4WES ..... .81 CAMPAIGN A................... ........ ILLUSTRATI,,N: Coufederate Defenses at the Bridge over the Etowab, froum photo. by G. N. Barnard (E. J. Meeker). THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN ......... ..... .......... 2s4 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA ...... . ......... GENERAL OLIVER 0. HOWrARD . 93 ILLUsTRATIONIS: Saving a tGun (11: Taber)-Map of the Region trom Chattanooga to t alhoun-M-ajor- General John M. Pt',her, frnnm axulimotype lent by hi son -Part of the Battle-field of Be,.nca, froi.. photo. by G. N. Barnard (E. J. eeker) - Extreme left (view looking South) of the Confederate Lines at Besena, from photo. by t;. N. Barn.ard ( WV. Tabor)-Mapof the Region from Resacato Vauwert-Brevet Brigadier- General Benjamin nHarri-on, from photo. lent by Mrs. Benjamin Harrison - Najor-General E. C. Wadthall, C. S. A., fro ..photo.-Map of the Region from Rome to Marietta, Ga.- Major-Geueral Jacob D. Cox, from photo.- Confederate lutrenemheuts near New Hope Church, from Brady photo. (P. J. Xeeker)-olion Eartih-work, in front of Big and Little Kenesaw, and Confederate Works on the Sotith Bank of the Chat- tahooebee, from photos. by (I. N. Barnard ((. A. laderhqof) - Map of the Siege of Atlanta - General Sbhermans Ilenfdquarn rs at the Htoward H.oue in front of Atlanta (Tlea. R. koris) - Sprague's Brijade Protecting the Wagon Trains of Sherman s Army at lDecatur, Ga., July 22d, 1864 (The It. D-.-ira) -S-enet of General MePher.on's Death, on the Battle-tield of July 22d, 18C4, from Brady photos. (E. J. Meeker) - Major-Geueral Ja..mes B. McPherson, from Brady photo.- Battle of Atlanta, July 22d, 1864-The Contest on Bald Hill, Fourth Division, Fifteenth Corps iD the PForeground, from the Patmoratna of Atlanta - Major-(;en.eral John A. Logan, trome Brady photo.- The Battle of Ezra Church, July 28th, 1864 (Thea. R. DVria) - MaJor-General Joln M. Curse, who" held the fort" at AllatoRna, fri photo.- Allatoona Pass, looking North, from photo. by G. N. Barnard (W. Tabr)-The Battle ofAllat-ooa, Octobersth, 1864 (frou - TIe Mouittain eCmpaigsu in Georgia )-Brevet Major-General Tru-an E. (l. ansom., fro.. photo. lent by Norman Williams. HOOD'S SECOND SORTIE AT ATLANTA ........... MAJOR W. H. CHAMBFRLIN...3.26 ILLtUSTRATION8: The Battle of Atlanta, July 22d, (James E. Taylor) -Recaplture fro.. the Confederates of De Gress's Battery (two ustl, from the Panorama of Atlanta. THE GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA.....GENERAL GUSTTAVUS W. SMITH ...331 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA.....G ... ... ...E..GFNERAL JOHN B. HOOD ... , 336 ILLUsTHATIONS: View of the Battle of Peach Tree Creek from General Hooker's Position (The.. B. Dars)-Lieulten.at-General Alex. P. Stewart, C. S.A., fro. photo.-Ma.,or-General W. Et. T. Walker, (. S. A., from lihoto.- Effect of the Union Fire on the Potter House, Allauita, frnio photo. by G. N. Barnard; View of the ('outefrerate Line at the Potter Ilomtse, looking Eastward, uid View of Confeder- ate Defenses or Atlanta, loking North-east, from photos. (E. J. Meeker) -Union Defenses at Allatoona Pass, from photo. ly (I. N. Baroard (C. A. Vander-hof). FINAL OPERATIONS IN ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI. THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. . .............. COLONEL RICHARD B. IRWIN . 34r ILLUSTRATIONIS: A. J. Smith's and Porter's ExpeditIon Starting train Vickeburg for the Red Ei-er, from sketeh by Wear-Adomiral Walke (F H. Sehell and Thomas Hogan) -Map of the Red River, and Arkansas and Missouri Campaigns of 184 (Jatob Welt )-Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks, from photo.- Major-General A. J. Smaith, from Brady photo.-Major-General J. A. Mower, from Brady lphoto.-Alexanitria, on the Red River, from photo. lent by Linyall Farr.,gut (W. Taber) -Brevet Major- General Josetih Bailey, fr-m photo. lent by R. T. H Moleombe-Map ad Sections of the Red River Dams above Alexandria (Oregor Noetfzl)- Setion of the Bracket Damn, Crib of Stone mmmd Brick, Seetlon of the Tree Dam, from prints lent lir General J.a.e Grant Wilson (A msft Wilf) - The "Lexington" pasing over the Falls at the Daui,, from sketch by James M. Alden (A. 41. Turner) - United States Hospital Ship, 1' Red Rover," fro., lihoti.. lent by M.jor J. H. Benton (J. 0. Daridson). THE NAVY IN THE RED RIVER .................. CAPT7AIN THOS. 0. SELFRIDGE, Jr.. 362 ILLUSTRATION: The Fight at Blair's Plantation, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H. Sehelland Thomas Hogan). THE MISSISSIPPI FLOTILLA IN THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION .. 366 .LLrsTRATIOI: On the mNiegssippi River Hospital-boat" D. A. January" (Theo. B. Davis). CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. xiii POE THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN . . ... ......... ............... B67 THE OPPOSING FORCES IN ARKANSAS. (April 20th, 1864) . ...........3...... 368 THE DEFENSE OF THE RED RIVER . GENERAL E. KIRBY SMITH . . .369 tLLtUTRAT-o'SP: Lienteitant-Gettral tichard Taylor, from Brady photo.-The Cnufederate Fort De Iussy, ahoutt Ten Miles below Alexandria, from sketch by James M. Aiden (C. A. anderhoof) -Briga- dier-G-n-ral C. J. Polignac, C. S. A., from photo. RESUME OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MIS- WILEY BRITTON.'174 SOURI AND ARKANSAS, i864-65 .I....... MOBILE AND THE GULF. FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY ....... . . LIEUT. JOHN CODDINGTON KINNEY.379 ILLUSTRATOI NS: SlBrrejider of the ' Tennesee Battle of Mbile Bay (J. 0. Daid-.)-The Brook- lyn" after tbe Battle of Mobile (Xaulh-. Smifh)-The Richmond" and the -Laekawana" .tripped for the Fight (XanIaha Suith) - Fort Morgan (Light-house, The Sooth-ast Bastion, The Citadel from the north sidet, from photos. by McPherson and Oliver, lent by Loyall Farragut (C. A. Vasdferhof) - Mapof the Battle of Mobile Bay (E. E. C.urt)-The Battle of Mobile, and The Battle of 3Mlte lookinkg sooth and eastward, frotil sketches by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H. Schell and Thon..a Hog,-) -The "Caintsa" after tie Fight in Mbilte Bay (Xlnthus Smith) - Captain Tnis A. M. Craven. from Brady pho o.- UnitedStates Steamship "Mononigaheln,"lahowinginjorie. receivedinthe Fight (X.a fhu Sd fh) - Rta.- Adnliral Thornton A. Jenkins, from photo.-Capture of Confederate Gn-hoat "Selma" by the -Meta01onet" (Xofnhtsat ,snffh)-Captaln George H. Perkins. from photo. lent by Miss Ssan G. Pe rkis - tear-Adirtal James E. Jouett, from photo. by Benedict - Fight between the "Chlckasaw aiud Fort Powell, Auguet 5th, 1864, from sketch by E. B. Hough (F. H. Schell). THE OPPOSING FORCES AT MOBILE . .......... ........ .. .. . . 400 THE RAM "TENNESSEE" AT MOb:'E BAY COMMANDER JAMES D. JOHNSTON 401 ILLISTRATIPNS: The Confederate Iron-elad "1Tennesee" (Xof thn .t uifh)-The "Monongahela" ranimning the " Tennesee" (.sfth-a 8.mih) -The "lHartford in Collision with the "Tennessee" (F. HI. I.hef) -esurrender of the Tennessee" (Xmsfht Smlth )-Coumander J. D. Jouhnston, C. S. N., from ,I4-paintflg by V. L. de Glillanmce. THE LASHING OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT IN THE i. CAPT. J. CRITTENDEN WATSON .406 RIGGING .. ... .. .......... LIEUT.-COM. JOSEPH MARTHON 407 THE DEFENSE OF FORT MORGAN . . . ...... GENERAL RICHARD L. PAGE . .408 ILLIIsTRATIU)NA: Fort Morgan, Mobile Bay, from sketch by R. K. Snedenl (W. H. Goater) -Brigadier- General Richard L. Page, C. S. A., from photo. LAND OPERATIONS AGAINST MOBILE . ...COLONEL RICHARD P. IRWIN . . 410 CLOSING OPERATIONS IN THE GULF AND I... RFSOJ4E USL OE 1 WESTERN RIVERS POES. U L.. O 412 CAVALRY OPERATIONS ON THE TENNESSEE LINE. CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN THE WEST UNDER CAPTAIN THOMAS SPEED. 413 ROSECRANS AND SHERMAN II.LUJYThAr)NS: The Le-ee at Nashvlie, looking down the Cuimberland, from photo. by R. Poole (W. Taber) - Map of Operations in Middle Tennesee and North Alabama (Jaeab WeUx) - Lient.-General . B. Forrest. C. S. A.. fron phi'h . THE SOOY SMITH EXPEDITION. (February, 1864) COLONEL GEORGE E. WARING, Jr 416 THE CAPTURE OF FORT PILLOW. (April 12th, 1864) . ... ....... I.......... 418 FORREST'S DEFEAT OF STURGIS AT BRICE'S UTXNT E HUNN HANSON 419 CROSS-ROADS. (June 10th. 1864)..... ADJTN E.H NHASN 41 A. J. SMITH'S DEFEAT OF FORREST AT TUPELO. C,4PTAIN W. S. BURNS . . .421 (Julyv 14th, 1864) ...... ...... JOHN MORGAN IN , 864 ..G. ...... . ....... . GENERAL BASIL W. DUKE .. .. 422 HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE . I . GENERAL J. B. HOOD 425 ILLUSTRATIOXS: Major-General WilUlam B. Bate, C. S. A., from photo.- A Southern Private, from ambrotype (ff. A. Ogden) - Map of the Battle-fteld of Franklin, Tenesee - Major-General Patrick B. Cleburne, C. M. A., killed at Franklin, November seth, 1864, from photo. lent by (eneral Marcus J. xiv CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. PAta Wright -Map of the Battle-Deld of Nauthville, Deeember laith-ltith, 1864- Overton's House. Hoodl Head- quarters at Nashville, front photo. (Harry Fen) - MaJor-General J. B. Steedtuan, front Brady photo. GENERAL CHEATHAM AT SPRING HILL ......... . GENERAL B. F. CHEATHAM .... 438 THE DEATH OF GENERALS CLEBURNE AND ADAMS ............ . .. .. ....... 439 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE ... . COLONEL HENRY STONE . 44t ILLUSTR ATIONS: Defending an Emibrasure (W. Taber) - Major-General George B. Tho.uas, from photo. - View of the Winstead Hill., Franklin, where Hood formued his Line of Battle, from photo. (Harry Frea)- Brevet MaJor-Geueral Emerson Opdyeke, from photo. by Kurtz -The Battle-tleld of Franklin, Te.neasee, from photo. by L. T. Shull (Harry F-a) - M)ajor-General D. S. Stantey, fromi. photo, by Teeple Co.- The Carter House from the side toward the tow., the Carter House fro- the Confederate si , and Front View of the Carter House, fIr photos. (W. Taber) - Frout View of the Gin-House, atd View of the inu-HBouse from the Pike, frot photos. (W. Taber) - Bridge at Frauklin ov,'r the Harpeth River, l1-king up-stream, from photo. (W. Taber) -Hill near Nashille from which Bate's Confederate Divitsin was driven, on December 16th, from photo. (Harry Fen) -The Capitol, Nashville, from war- time pho.to. (11. Taber) - Views of Fort Negley on the left of the Union Intrenehotenta, Nashville, between the Fraklikin and Nolen-ville Pikes, from photos. (Harry Penn) - View of a part of the Uniou Lines at Nashville, from Qiardner photo. (W. Taubr) - South-west Front of the Capitol at Nasiville., from war- time photo. (W. Taber). THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN GENERAL JAMES HARRISON WILSON. 465 ILLIs'TRa ITIS.: Bridge over the Cumberland at Nashville, fi-r. war-time photo. ()V. Tuber) - Maj,,r- General James H. WUilon, from photo. by William Klanser. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NASHVILLE, DECEMBER i5th-ioth, 11864 ... ... ....... 472 UP AND DOWN THE SHENANDOAH. OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE AND SOUTH- I REV. EDWARD O. GUERRANT 75 WEST VIRGINIA .TH.RE..EWAR.0.GUERAN....7 ILLIJSTtATINSr: Reveille, fron sketch by C. W. Beed (W. raber)-BriKdicr-tieneraIJ. M. Sbackelford, from Brady pho to.-Brigasier-(len.eral Jaeob Ammen, from photo. by P. Ball-Map of Operations against the Virginia an-i Tennessee Railroad (Jacob WcUs). THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET. VA., MAY 15th, GENGENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN 480 1804 ....-..GE.RL.OH.1. M..E..48 ILLUSTRATI(ONSn: Casdet of the Virginia Military Institute in Marching Outtit (W. Taber) -map ,f the Battle-tleld of New Market. Va. (Jaeob Wells) - Brevet Major-General William W. Averell, from photo. by Gurtey - Majtr-fteneral (leorge Crook, front photo. SIGEL IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY IN 1804 .... GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL ....4.8....... 47 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MARKET, VA ............. ............ ...... 491 THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE LYNCHBURG EXPEDITION . .....4. . ...... 492 EARLY'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN i864 ....... GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY. . . 492 ILLUsTRATION-: Mal of the Virginia Campaigns of 1864-l. and Maltof the Battle of Monoeaey (Jacob Ilfs) - Map of the Defenses of Washington (Jacob WUs) - Fort Stevens, Washington, froto Gardner photo. (F. H. .hcU and Tho,,a Hogan). THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE MONOCACY, MD ................. ....... ... 499 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.... GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT . ,00 ILLUSTRATIONS: Part of Sheridan's Wagon Train (A. R. Wand) - Major-(General Wesley Merritt, frot Brady photo.- Breet Major-General David A. Russell. from Brady photo.- General Philip H. Sheridan, from photo. Ient by Robert W. Traver-Map of the Battle of Winchester-Sproat's Spring Mill, Opequn. River, Va., Hospital of the Sixth Army Corps during the Battle of WUincheter, September 19th, 1864, fronm sketeh by R. K. Sneden (Hughaon Hawlky) - Fae-simile (reducesl of President Lincoln's Letter to (Geeral Sheridat -The Battle of Winchester; Ricketts's Advance against Rodess Division on the Morning of September lath, 1864 (A. R. W. and) - Map of the Battle of Fisher's Hill, September 22d. 1864- The Rear-Guard; (leneral Custer's Division retiring from Mount Jackson, October 7th, 1864 (A. R. Wand) -The Surprise at Cedar Creek (A. R. Wand) - Hill at Cedar Creek oeeupieI by Sheridan's left, October 19th, 1864, as seen from Kershaw's Ford, from photo. taken In Issby W-n. G. Reed (OU.o M. B-her) - Map of the Battle of Cedar Creek (Jaeob Well) - Reduced Fac-louile of Presiden.t Lincoln's Congrattilations to Ceneral Sheridan on the Battle of Cedar 'reek - Colonel Charles Russell Lowell, from Brady photo.- Brigadier-General Bradley T. Johnson, C. M. A.. from lhoto. by DuSey. WINCHESTER, FISHER'S HILL, AND CEDAR CREEK GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY. 522 ILLUSTRATIONS: View on the Valley Turnpike ,here Sheridan Joined the army at Cedar Creek, from photo. taken in 185 by Wm. 41. Reed (C. A. Vuaderhof) - LleetenantGeneral John B. Gordon, C. S. A., from photo.- Lieutenant-Geoeral Job.l. A. Early, C. S. A., from photo. by Lee. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CEDAR (:REEK ......... ....................... .... . 530 CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. Xv PETERSBURG. O .G ENERAL AUGUST V. KAUTZ.. .,3 OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE JAMES RIVER i i. GEN'ERAL R. E. COLSTON . 5 3.5 ILLI Y1RATIONH: t'Uuhb Battery near Dunn's house Petersburg, fro Gardner photo. (W. Taber) - MaJor-G.eueral M. C. Butler. C. S. A., from photo. by C. M. BeU - Reservoir Hill where Kautz's ad,-an-, its stoplped Jle 9th, 184, from. sketeh made in 1886 (J. 1). Woodward)-T To wMaps of the Siege of Peters- burg, Va. (Jacob WellS). FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE AT PETERSBURG ...... GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD. 5-1, ILLUSTiATIONS: View of the Coufederate tine taken up by (eneril Beatiregard, June isth (J. . D. Wioodieard) - Interior View of the Confederate line at Grae's faltent, from Gardner photo. (E. J. -eeker). THE BATTLE OF THE PETERSBURG CRATER .... MAJOR WILLIAM H. POWELL ..545 ILLUsTRAToNS: The approach to the Crater as seen from a point south-east of the mouth of the Mine (.d. D. W-ood-erd)- Prolile of the Ground betwtveeu the Crater and the mouth of the Mine: two views (J. D. Woodward) - Brevet Brigadier-General Henry Pleasant., from photo.- Details of the Mine - Dia- grub of the Crater (J. . Rustnge) -Carrying Powder to the Mine (A R. Waud) -The Charge to the Crater (A. R. Wa f) - The Confederate side of the Crater, looking toward the Unioft li-es (J. D. Wood- ward5) -The Crater, as seeli ftrm the Utnion ide (W. L. Sheppard)-The Confederate line, as recon- str-cetd at the Crater, fron sketch by Lteutesn t Henderson (E. J. Meeker) - Major-Gelneral Robert B. Potter, from Brady lhoto.-Ifelics in the Crater Museum (J. D. Wlrodon.d d)- Sides nd edge of two Bulletsthati..et point tO pOintat the Crater, from photos. (W. Tabeer.-TheSiegeof Petersburg: 1. Sharp- shooters on the tine of the Eighteenth Corps. i . Bivouac ofthe Fifth Corpatuthe Rifle-pits (A. R. Wand). IN THE CRATER ....... MAJOR CHARLES H. HOUGHTON 561 ILLUSTRATION: Expl-iion of the Mine (A. R. Wand) THE COLORED TROOPS AT PETERSBURG . GEN. HENRY GODDARD THOMAS. .. 563 ILLiJBTBATtONs: Gntdon of Thomas's Brigade of th - Colored Division (Fred E. Sists) - Song of the Col- ired Division before (harging Into the Crater (C-eeral H. a. Thoma.) -Brevet Major-General Henry (G. Thomas, from pihoto.-The Battle of the Crater, from an oil-painting (.J. A. Elder)- Ueuttenant Christopher Pennell, fro, plhoto. lent by l-eueral R. G. Thomas. ACTIONS ON THE WELDON RAILROAD .... G... ENERAL ORLANDO B. WILLCOX . 5ti ILLUSTRATIONS: Ulilon pieket post in ftrot of Fort Medgwriek and factng the Confederate picket line in front of Fort Maho-e, fr on Brady photo. (W. Taber) - Map of the Petersburg asnd Appomattox Cam- plaig-o (.eeob WMell) - Major-General Henry Heth, C. s. A.. from Anderson-Cook photo.- Major-4;elm-r.l W. H. F. Lee, C. S. A., from photo.-General Warren's Headquarters at Globe Tavern (A. R. Waud)- Ma.lor-tenerll John. Glbblo., tro.u Brady photo. GENERAL GRANT ON THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. (Extract from Lieut.-General U. 8. Grant's Report) ..5 ........ .......... ............. .74 ILLUSTRtATIONS: Map of the Defenses of Richmond - Excavating tie Dutch Gap Canal (A. R. Waud) - Vertical Plan1 of the Dnteh Gap Canal - Headquarters of Gelleral Grant and Base of Supplies, City Point. ol- the James River. from oil-painting by Edward L lenry in possession of the Union League Club - Utim Railroad Battery, Peter-burg, lenin Gardner photo. (W. Taber)- Major-General Orlando B. WillcOx, from Anthony photo. GORDON'S ATTACK AT FORT STEDMAN . .... GEORGE L. KILMER ......... . 579 ILLUsTHATIO1s: Men f the Second (Vnion) Corps who fought at Petersbnrg (Winslo.e Homserj-Dla- grain of the Union Lines at Frt. taskell and Stedmaln - Fort Haskell from Grane' Salient, and Fort St--dnan ftoill t''lquitt's Salienit (J. 1). W.oodarlt)- General Hospital at City Point. from Gardner pilotil. (W. Tobet ), THE RECAPTURE OF FORT STEDMAN ... ..... GENERAL JOHN F. HARTRANFT 584 ILLI'STRWTIoN8: Major-(te-eral John1i. Parke, from Brady photo.- Interior of Fort Stedman, from Gardner photo. (Ef. J. Jeeker) - Brevet Major-General John F. Hartrauft, fro. photo. by F. Gutek.nst. lent by C. N. Farr. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. . 5t( THE CONFEDERATE CRUISERS. THE CONFEDERATE CRUISERS ................. PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY. 395 IlLLUCTRATIoNS: Captain James D. Bulloch, C. S. N., from photo. by Kurtz-Coinmander John M. Brooke. C. S. N., from photo. by Vanmerson Jones. CRUISE AND COMBATS OF THE "ALABAMA" ..CAPTAIN JOHN McINTOSH KELL.... 600 ILLUSTRATUINS: Initial (A. C. aedeood) -The Confederate crulser Alabaul," after a war-time sketch (W. Tabe,) - Rear-Adi.tral Raphael Semmes, C. 4. N., Captanh of the Alabama," from photo. tent by Mrs. Joh1n M cIntosh Kell- Chart of the Crusle of the Alabama " (Jacob Well.) -Captain Johil McIntosh KelI, Exective Oficerof the .' Alabama." from photo.- Chartof the Action off Cherboorg (Jaob Wells) - Fighting in a Circle (J. 0. Darldso.j - Assitant-Surgeon David Herbert Llewellyll, rom portrait in xvi CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. PAGE. "Illutrated London Nerws -"Retnrning for the Wounded (M. J. B-ras)-The tinkingof thi' "Alabalma" (J. 0. Daeidao)-The United ltates Screw-sIoop "Kearsarge" at the tbice of the Encounter with the Alahamna, fromi -ar-timue drawing ( '. Taber). THE DUEL BETWEEN THE " ALABAMA AND THE I JOHN M. BROWNE "KEARSARGE".T . ....RE........... . ILLUNTRATIONN: Initial (W'. T'aber)-The Crew of the" Kearsarge" at Qu.arter , froic phot.W. lent by Henry McConnell - Rear-Adniral John A. Wiunlow, Captain of the Kearsarge ' - Captain Thom..a. S. Thornton, Executive Offieer of the Kearsarge "-Wlltanu Smith, Quarteru..cer ift lie' Kearsarge" aud Captain of the After Pivot-gua- Jamec B. Wheeler, Acting Master of the "Keir.ierge," from photos. lent by SurgeoN John M. Browue - The Eleven-ineh Forward Pivot-gnu on the" Keare-.c.-g In action (J. 0. Davids.) - Peaman Willia.. Gounl, -ortally wounded on the "Kearrge," frucc i photo. by Taylor, lent by Henry A. Chaney - Close of the Combat - The "Kearsarge" getting intic liosticm to rake the "Alabama" (J. 0. Dsaedso.) - The Boat from the "Alabama" announlng the inrrewkcer nd asking for Aasitanee (J. 0. Davidso.) -The Shell in the Stern-pott of the" Kearsarge," front photo. (WI. Taber). THE CONFEDERATE RAM "ALBEMARLE." THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE CONFEDERATE RAM ALBEMARLE" ............GILBERT ELLIOTT .... ... ILLUsTRATIoNS: Building the "Albemarle" at Edwarda's Ferry, after sketch by Mias M. H. Hoke (J. 0. Davicfso.j-Planof the Albemarle -Captain J. W. Cooke, C. S. W., from photo. by Walter-Comn,.,ander C. W. Flunser, U. S. N., from tintype. THE "ALBEMARLE" AND THE "SASSACUS" . EDGAR HOLDEN ... ... . .... 628 ILLUSITRATION11: The Making of the BSouthfleld" 4April l8th, 18644 (J. 0. David-s.c) --Nalc ci the Coaat of the Carolinas (Jacob WeUa) -Rear-Admiral F. A. Roe, U. 8. N.. fr.cm photc.- Chart of the Engagement in Albemarle Sund, May 5th, 1864, from drawing lent by CommanderJcchc R. Bartlett-The z S.acacus " ramitungthe IAlbwearle" (J. 0. Daeidbo.) -The "S-assaus" disabled after ra.i..c.i.ig (J. 0. D.ccidsoc) - Paymaster George de F. Barton, Acting Aide and Signal Officer to Comimander lBne -durin the Engage- ment with the " Albemarle," fro. photo. by Ludovici-Acting Matter Charlea A. BMictielle, U. Ft. Wf., from photo.-Commander W. B. Cushlig, U. S. N., from Brady phccto.-The "Albencarh "' ready for action (M. H. HIke). THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "ALBEMARLE" .....COMMANDER W. B. CUSHING...34 ILLUSTRATIONS: Part of the smoke-stack of the "Albemarle," from photo. (W. Taber) - Cuohig' Luinch and Torpedo. ihowing Methods of Working, and Sectional Viewo cf Torldic, two vih'wv, fron drawings lenutby CommanderJohn B. Bartlett.-The Blowing-up of the "Albemarle" (.1. 0. Daridaon) -The Wreck of the "Albemarle." from photo. Ientby William L. Welch (.. 0. Dcridaon) -Captain Alexander F. Warley, C. S. N., from photo. lent by Mis M. D. HBger (VF. Gribayreoff). NOTEONTHEDESTRUCTIONOFTHE"ALBEMARLE" CAPTAIN A. F. WARLEY.. .41 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER. THE DEFENSE OF FORT FISHER .. . .... COLONEL WILLIAM LAMB . f 42 ItLUsqurtoNs: Map of the Naval acid Miltary Attak.nFort Fisher, January 11th, 1861, howingdirec- tion of fire of Union ve-iels, and Plan and Sections of Fort Fisher (E. E. ('drt) - Colonel Wilianm Lmb, C. S. A., from photo. by C. M. Van Oridell (Wtyatt Eafoa)-View of the land Front from the Se-ond Traverse of the North-west Salient and Interior View of the three Traverses of the North-west Salient, front Gardner photo. (5W. Taber) -Lieutenant Wiley H. Williford, C. S. A.. from photo. lent by Colonel William L mb-Interior View of the North-east Angle, from Gardner phito. (W. Taber)-The Butt- bardment of Fort Fisher. a. seen froto the Mound Battery, from lithograph by Endicott Co., lent by Colonel William Lambb-The Mound Battery from the Fort tide, the Sea-face of the Sixth to the Eleventh Traverses, and Battery Buchanan, from Gardner photos. (W. Taber) -Brevet Major-General Newton M. Curtis, from pthoto. by Dow - Brevet Major-General Galusba Pennypacker, from photo. by F. Muluier- Brevet Major-General Adelbert Ames, from Brady pboto.- Colonel Louis Bel, from photo. THE NAVY AT FORT FISHER ...... ...... ... CAPT. THOS. 0. SELFRIDGE, Jr 4155 I LLUSTRATIONs: Interior View of the first six Traveres on the Sea-face of Fort Fisher, from Gardner photo. ( W. Taber) -Captain T. 0. Selfridge, Jr., from photo. by Bachrarh -The Bombardlnent of Fort Fisher, January 11tb, 1865, from lithograph by Endicott Co. (J. 0. David.on) -Captain K. R. Breese, from photo. by D. Fowler -Major-General A. H. Terry, from Brady photo.- Assault of the Naval Col- umn on the North-east Salient of Fort Fisher (5W. Taber) - Commander James Parker, tro-. photo. by W. R. Tobias - North-east Salient of Fort Fisher, showing on the left the (Ground over which the Naval Col- umn cbarged, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber)-LieAtenant Samnuel W. Preston, from Brady photo.- Lieutenant Benjamin H. Porter, from Brady photo. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FORT FISHER, N. C ......... .... .. ...... ..1 . .6 SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH THE CONFEDERACY. SHERMAN'S ADVANCE FROM ATLANTA. . ...GENERAL OLIVER 0. HOWARD. (663 ILLU'sTRATIONS: Marching through Georgia (WV. aber) - Hook lsed by General Sherman's Army for twicdtl.cu and destroying Bailriua- Iron, from print lent by General 0. M. Poe - Sheruan'e Troops destroy- CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. xvii PACE tng Railroads at Atlanta, from photo. (W. Taber) - General Sherm.an sending his L.ast Telegram before rItting the wires and abandou.lg all .o..un.ucation vwith the North (The B. D-ris) -Sbrrinau's Arumy leaving Atlanta (Teo. It. Daris). THE GEORGIA MILITIA DURING SHERMAN'S I GENERAL GUSTA V'S W. SMITH .... 7 MARCH TO THE SEA ........... ILLUSTit4TI-)N: Ite ideAt of ShermanI's ..arIh -the Fate of a Rail-fence (A. R. Wa,,d). MARCHING THROUGH GEORGIA AND THE CAPTAIN DANIEL OAKEY ........... 671 CAROLINAS .... ........ I.I.USTRATinONS: Matp of SherMan's Mlarc fronm Atlanta to Savatlnah -CamIp of the 2d Ma-s., City Hall sqoare, Atlnta, front, photo. (W. Tuber) - Bivouac among the Georgia Pines, aned Detroying a Railro-d ( It.L. ,S/eppord)- Shermna's FoTragers on a Georgia tlnitatln (Jam-es i. Taylor))-Map ot Ro-tes of Sherman's Army from Favannah to Columbia-Tie Road fron- McPhersonville - Sherman Iand his Rtaff passing through water and immie (d. RWand)-The Stor-nIg of tne Little Saikehatehie Ri-er by Wever's Brigade of the Fifteenth Corps (A. R. Wood) - Sherman's . -Buumers" rapturing Fayette- yille (Court Itouse, N. C. (Th-teo. R. Doris). THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE HARDEE ..... .... COL. ALEX. ROBERT CHISOLM . 679 SHERMAN'S MARCH FROM SAVANNAH TO GENERAL HENRY W. SLOCUM G81 BENTONVILLE.... . ...... . . ILLFSTRATI)NS: AitVa1 udittg under DlifaeUtled (IV. Tabe) - Geiterals W. T. Sberman, 0. 0. Itowaril, Joltu A. Logan, Jeff. C. Davit, J. A. MIower, Willi.m. B. Ilazen, anid Henry W. Stloeum, frontI Bradly tlmoto. -- iFrt MrAllistcr, mtftcra war-timie sketch (1, Hi. aoler) - Railway Destrurtluim as a Military Aft (WI. Tabr)-Hkirtilshers Crossi.ig the North Edist, S. C., on a Floating Foot-bridge (A. R. Wa,,d)-The Right Wintg unit.ler ltowatrdl er-ssinig tht Saluda River, fromi a sketeh it "Frauk Leslie's Ilbustratmsd Ncwsliapi'r" (J. E. Tiiyl.o) - Sherman's Soldiers gunidimig the Palmetto Mtilmmtent, Ctlunubla (Tho. R. LiNi. -Raisiig the Utltiti Flaig oi-er the oltd State-hoCse, Cmailitibitt (A. R. Wo'a-d) - (ontrabaids iil the w-tke of Sherman's Army (E. W. Kemmmbfe)-Views of the Ruins Of ('olnubia. front Brady photos. (C. A. Va-ide-'hoof) - Arsenal tit FayettevIlle, a,,d Sherman's men mlriviig the ettemy out of Fayette-ille. from sketches ill "4Froilk Leslie's Iltistrated Newspaper" (E. J. - feekei)-The Fourteenth Corps eit-ittg Fayettevitle (Th-eo. R. Doris)--Map t the Routes of Shheruan's Arimty from Columbia to Goldsboro' aitd Raleigh - Beuitonville them Morning after the Battle, frouil a sketch In "XFrank Leslie's Iilutrated Ne-pslalter" (E. J. Jeeker). THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS ..... ................... 696 THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE ..................G ENERAL WADE HIAMPTON ..... 70...0 ILLUsTRATlONs: 51ap of the Battle of Beuttonville, N. C. (Jacob Wells)-Lieutenant-General Wade Hampton, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo. FROM THE JAMES TO APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE. CLOSING OPERATIONS IN THE JAMES RIVER ...... PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY. 705 FIVE FORKS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEE . ......G ENERAL HORACE PORTER . 08 ILLIt-TRATIONS: Mtsiae on Sherid"n's line of Battle (W. Taber) - l'nion Artillery at Petersburg pro- tected by Mantelets (A. iR. 'W.od)-Mp of Mte Battle of Five Forks. Va. (J-cob W1el)-Vlew on the Confederate Lines civrilng Petersburg, from Gardumer photo. (E. J. MIfeee) - Fort Seilgwiek, knowit as 11 Fort llell," opposite the Colnfederate Fort M5ahone - Oter Works of Fort Sedgwlek - Botub-proosf inside Fort Sedgwklk, fromi Gardner photos. (W. Tther) - Interior View ois the Confederate Works cover- iug Peterslburg, fro-t Gar-tner photo. (If. Taber) - Lielt.iant-General Ricaird H. Aid.erson, C. S. A., from. photo.- Capture of Gnus and the Destrnetlto of a Confederate Wagoit-trai. at Paineville, Aprit ath, by Davies', Cavalry Brigade of Crook's Division (A. It. Waod) - Captahi John R. Tucker, C. S. N., frois ploto. lenit by James Blair-The Capture of Ewell's Corps, April 6th, 1865 (A. R. Wo-d) -Confederates destroying the RalIloaI from Aplpo-iattox toward Lynhbulrg, and Artillerymen destroying Gun- carriages, at Itightfall, Saturday, April 8th (W. L. Sheppardl). GENERAL WARREN AT FIVE FORKS, AND THE COURT OF INQUIRY .... ............... 723 LEE'S REPORT OF THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX ....... .................. 724 THE FALL OF RICHMOND. i. THE EVACUATION .................. CAPTAIN CLEMENT SULIVANE . 725 i. THE OCCUPATION ...T............ M S THOMAHATCHER GRAVES . 726 IL.CO-TR MTNoS: The Ruins of Riebiaund between the Canal Basin and Capitol Square, fromu Brady photo. (W. Tobem')-Citizeits of Richmond in Capitol 'quarc during the Contlagration (W'. L. Sheppar d) - Presldent Lincoln leaving the Dlas Mansion (W. L. Slepmard). THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE GENERAL HORACE PORTER .. ...... 729 ILLUSIRATIONS: Apponmattox Court Houes, from Gtmrdner photo. (W. Tobet-) -The Village of Apipo- mattox Court House, from sketch by R. K. Sneden (Hugkho. Hoawlecy) -McLean's House, Appomattox xviii CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. PAGE Court House, from Gardner photo. (1W. Tabr) -The Surrender at Appomuattox (W. Tabr,) - Fae-simtle of the 'onelunijn of Notbte from General Grant to Mr. T. D. Jeffres in replyto a question-tieneral Lee and Colonel Miarshbll 1-eavg Mi eSan- Honse after the Surrender (A. R. Waud)-UUnion Soldler-shari. g their Ratiou with the Confeierat' (A. R. Waud)- General Lee's return to his Lin-e after the Surrender (v. L. 8hep-drd). GENERAL LEE'S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY. COLONEL CHARLES MARSHALL. ... 747 THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN ............ . ............. 748 ILLLUrTRAT)ON: Graver of Union Soldiers at City Point, fronm arnnrer photo. (E. J. Meeke-). CLOSING OPERATIONS. FINAL OPERATIONS OF SHERMAN'S ARMY ....... GENERAL H. W. SLOCUM ..... . ... 7 .-4 ILI.XTRATI1)N.: Vliev of Goldhborn', North Carolinla, from sketeh in '- Frank Leslie llultrated News- paper" (E. J. Mee-er)- Granlt Reviewing-at-nd in front of the White louse, Washington, on May 23d and 24th, 1865, front Gardner photo. (E. J. Mseeker). OPPOSING FORCES IN WILSON'S RAID, MARCH 22d-APRIL 20th, r8 . .7. . 75-9 WILSON'S RAID THROUGH ALABAMA AND GEORGIA ... .... .... . ...... 79 . ,.,9 LAST DAYS OF THE CONFEDERACY . ....... GENERAL BASIL W. DULKE. . 762..... 76: NOTES ON THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES . . 767 ILLU.sTRATION: Fort Sun-ter at the close of the War (Then. R. lari.J. INDEX TO THE FOUR VOLUMES .. ............. ............ 769 MAPS. CHARLESTON HARBOR AND VICINITY ................. .... ...... ... .......... 3 THE SOUTH CAROLINA COAST . THE BLOCKADE OF CONFEDERATE PORTS .. . . .. ................. .......... 3-1 NORTHERN VIRGINIA . .. .......................4...... ..... . 84 THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS OF NOVEMBER, i8t,3 ............ . .... ... ....... S9 THE WILDERNESS .. ........... ... ....... .............. .... ....... . ...... 120 SPOTSYLVANIA. ..... .. ....... .... .... ..... .... . I...... .. .. ............ 13:1 NORTH ANNA 0................. .................. .. .....I 3 COLD HARBOR .............. ...... .140, 216 RELATIVE POSITIONS OF FORCES, MORNING AND EVENING, MAY 4, 1864 ... . 153 THE WILDERNESS, MAY 5, ,864 ..... ....... 1.....551 " " MAY o, , 864 ...159 ......... .... ... ... I....... .... I59 OUTLINE MAP OF LEE'S POSITIONS IN THE WILDERNESS AND AT SPOTSYLVANIA 166 RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING CORPS AT SPOTSYLVANIA, MAY 8-21, i864.. 167 THE KILPATRICK-DAHLGREN RAID; SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND AND TREVILIAN RAIDS 190 OPERATIONS AT DREWRY'S BLUFF, BERMUDA HUNDRED, AND DEEP BOTTOM .. .. 198 CONFEDERATE POSITIONS AT THE NORTH ANNA AND AT COLD HARBOR. 214 THE BATTLE OF TREVILIAN STATION, VA . . ........ ...... .. ............. 23.5 THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN . . . ....2.1.... ...................... ............ 251 ROUTES OF SHERMAN'S ARMY FROM CHATTANOOGA TO RESACA. . 295 RESACA TO ALLATOONA .300 ROME TO MARIETTA .304 SIEGE OF ATLANTA, GA.. ......... . ... I.... ......... ............... 312 THE RED RIVER, AND ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI CAMPAIGNS OF 3864 . 348 MAP AND SECTIONS OF THE RED RIVER DAMS ABOVE ALEXANDRIA ............. . 38 THE BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY ........... ................. . I... ..... I .. OPERATIONS IN MIDDLE TENNESSEE AND NORTH ALABAMA, i86;-k. .......... BATTLE-FIELD OF FRANKLIN, TENN. .... ...... ... ........................ BATTLE-FIELD OF NASHVILLE, TENN..... ...... . ...... .... OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VIRGINIA AND TENNESSEE RAILROAD . .. .. .. BATTLE-FIELD OF NEW MARKET, VA . . ............................ .... ..... THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS OF ,864-65 .... ....... . ........ . THE BATTLE OF THE MONOCACY .......... ..... ............................ . . 384 414 430 434 478 482 494 495 CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOUR. THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, D. C. . . ...... ............... THE BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, VA... ...... ......... THE BATTLE OF FISHER'S HILL, VA ......... .. .. . ...... THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, VA...... .. ........ ... .... SIEGE OF PETERSBURG, VA., MAP No. I.......... .................. s i . 'MAP No. 2...... . ....... .............. THE PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGNS ................... THE DEFENSES OF RICHMOND, VA . .......... .. CHART OF THE CRUISE OF THE "ALABAMA". CHART OF THE ACTION OFF CHERBOURG, FRANCE. .... . . THE COAST OF THE CAROLINAS .. ........... ... . ....... ....... CHART OF THE ENGAGEMENT IN ALBEMARLE SOUND, MA' 5 864................ THE NAVAL AND MILITARY ATTACKS ON FORT FISHER, N. C., JANUARY 15 , i805 PLAN AND SECTIONS OF FORT FISHER, N. C ...... ..... ... ........ . . ROUTES OF SHERMAN'S ARMY FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH, GA.............. SAVANNAH, GA., TO COLUMBIA, S. C.... .. COLUMBIA, S. C., TO RALEIGH, N. C ...... THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE, N. C ........................ ..... ... THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS, VA .................. ........... ................ ARTISTS. BACHER, OTTO H. GOA TER, WALTER H. BURNS, M. J. GRIBA YEDOFF, V. CHAMPNEY, J. WELLS HALM, GEORGE R. DAVIDSON, J. 0. HAWLEY, HUGHSON DAVIS, THEO. R. HENRY, EDWARD L. EATON, WYATT HOGAN, THOMAS ELDER, J. A. HOKE, M. H. FENN, HARR Y HOMER, WINSLOW FORBES, EDWIN KEMBLE, E. W. GAUL, GILBERT MEEKER, EDWIN J. OGDEN, HENRY A. PENNELL, JOSEPH REDWOOD, ALLEN C. REED, C. W. RUNGE, J. F. SCHELL, FRANK H. SHEPPARD, W. L. SITTS, FRED. E. SMITH, XANTHUS TABER, WAL TON TAYLOR, JAMES E. TREGO, W. T. TURNER, A. M. VANDERHOOF, C. A. WAUD, A. R. WILL, AUGUST WOODWARD, J. D. DRAUGHTSMEN. HOTCHKISS, JED. NOETZEL, GREGOR ENGRAVERS. AITKEN, PETER ANDREWS, JOHN ATWOOD, K. C. BARTLE, GEORGE P. BUTLER, T. A. CLEMENT, E. CLOSSON, W. B. COLLINS, R. C. COUGHLAN, J. A. CULLEN, CHARLES DANA, W. J. DAVIDSON, H. DAVIS, JOHN P. ENGBERG, J. ERTZ, EDWARD EVANS, J. W. FAY, GASTON HEINEMANN, E. HELD, E. C. JRWIN, ALLEN JOHNSON, T. JONES, M. JUNGLING, J. F. KLASEN, W. KRUELL, G. MORSE, WILLIAM H. MULLER, R. A. NAYLOR, JESSIE A. NAYLOR, OLIVIA NICHOLS, DAVID OWENS, MARY L. POWELL, C. A. REED, C. H. SCHUSSLER, T. SCHWARTZBURGER, C. SPIEGLE, CHARLES SYLVESTER, H. E. TIETZE, R. G. TYNAN, JAMES UNDERHILL, M. J. VARLEY, ROBERT VEL TEN, H. WELLINGTON, F. H. WINH.4M, E. A. WITTE, W. B. WOLF, HENRY WRIGHT, CHAUNCEY xix PAGE 496 5111 r517 5318 539 574) (104 (129 6.34 (140 145) (194 7o2 77 12 COURT, E. E. WELLS, JACOB EDITORS' NOTE. li addition to the acknowledgments made in the preface to Volume I. (to which the reader i. referred) the XdItors are under obligations to Professor James. Russell Soley, U. S. N., for expert aid of an editorial character relating to naval operations; to Colonel Richard B. Irwin, and George L. Kilmer, a veteran of the Army of the Potomac, for historical research and careful and unstintedwork upon the proo-f , and for other daily assistance sinice the second volume was begun; to Mr. Allen Thorndike Rice, Editor of the "North American Bteview," and to the Editors of the Philadelphia " Press " and ' Times," forperuis.sion to use articles from those sourees; and to Mr. W. Di. Griswold for the preparation of the Index. Credit should have been given to the Philadelphia " Press " for the letter from General Meade to Colonel Benedict, psge 413 of Vol. Il., and for the articlel by Captain William E. Miller, on page 397 of the same volume. The editing of the work In book form was begun in April, 1881. Volume I. .as flnished in November, 1SM; Volume It. In April, 1888; Volume III. in August, 18M, and Volume IV. in January, 1899. CORRECTIONS IN VOLUME IV. Page 60, 5th line fron the top. For - Colonel John S. Chatfield," read " Colonel John L. Chatfield." Page 59, 7th tis. For "A. H. Terry's division," read ",H. D. Terry's division." Page 91, 4th line from the last. For "coiiseriptlon ays- tem," read " draft system." Page 187, second column, 3d line from top. For " Briga- dier-General James t. Martindale," read " Brigadier- General John H. Martindale." Puge 247, second note. That portion beginning with "' A foree of cavalry," to the end of the note, should read: "' A mounted column, numbering about 7000 effectives, and cumumauded by General W. Sooy Smith, set out fro. Memphis on the 11th under In- structions to drive the Confederate cavalry In north- ern Mississippi southward, and sweep down the Mobile and Ohio railroad from the north toward Meridian. This column failed to reach Meridian [see p. 4161. and on the 20th Sherman abandoned the ex- pedition, and put his troops in motion toward cen- tral Mississippi, whence they were transferred, later, to Vicksburg and Memphis." Page 257, second column of note, 9th line. For " an army of 65,000." read " an army of 60,0W0." Page 277, under title. For "By W. P. C. Breckinridge," read '"By W. C. P. Breckinridge." Page 335, first column, 39th line. For "seventy-five days," read" forty-five days." Page 342, add as foot-note to third paragraph: " General WVheeler reported the breaking up of the raiding party under General MeCook, and the capture of some 950 of his men, two piece of artillery, and 1-200 horses. General Iverson reported the surrender of Stoneman with 500 mn, and the subsequent capture of some of his eomwand who were flying toward Eatonton." Page 401, first column, 9th line from the last. For "M Mr. Henry Pearc," read "1 Mr. Joseph Pearce." Second rolumn, 24th line. For "Naval Constructor, Thomas Porter," read "Sidney D. Porter, a naval arehitect." Page 536, first colamn. 32d and 33d line. For " bring back his brigade," read "bring up the reserve infantry." Page 579, second article, second column. For " 1mall field redoubt mounting 6 gunsi" read "strong field redoubt mounting 4 rifled guns." Page 6W9, first column, third line from the last. Captain James Parker writes: -I did not waive my rank. My language to Breese when he showed me Admiral Porter's letter was, 'I have nothing left to do, ex- cept to go into the fight at the head of my men. trusting that you will make the situation as little disagreeable as possible."' Page 747. The account of the preparation of the Fare- well Address of General ee to his army, Is taken from a letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's staff, to General Bradley T. Johnson, dated September 27th, 1887. ADDITIONAL CORRECTIONS IN VOLUME Ill. Page 31, second column, 26th line from the last. For "Shaler's and Canda's," read "' Shaler's and Caudy's." Page 327, 3d line. For " Generals J. B. Andersen and G. T. Robertson," read " Generals G. T. Anderson and J. B. Robertson." Page 336, 13th line from bottom 1al0o page 437, first cdelunmn, 14th line fr.,li bottomi). For " Colonel W. G. de saussure," readm "Colonel W. D. de Saussure." Page; 69,4th line from the last. For "on the 9th," read ",omi the Stb." Page 399, roster, second column. For "11th Coun., Lieut.- CoL. Mason C. Wild," read 25th Con-., Lie-t -Vol. Mason C. Weld." Page 620, 9th line from last. For " Colonel Bradley of the b2d Illinois," read " Colonel Bradley of the 51st Illinois." Page 635, third mnte. For "' November 26th," read "1 November 27th." Page 729. second columnl, 9th line. For "5 82d ludisna," read " 83d Indiana." Page 730. second column. For "Maj.-Gen. Ambrose P. Stewart," read "MaJ.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart." ADDITIONAL CORRECTIONS IN VOLUME II. Page152, 6th ulne. For "(Mycommandwastbe2d,10th, Page 404. the last line of text. For " 10,0W" read and9tb New York, and the 9th Massachusetts.) " read " 6000." "(My command as the 2d, 7th, and 10th New York, and the 29th Massaebusett".)" Page 459, first column, 5th line from the bottom. For Page 270. 2d line from bottom. For "Captain John "J. -. Archer and E. C. Thomas," read "J. J. Wilkes," read " Captain Charles Wilkes." Archer and E. L. Thomas." ADDITIONAL CORRECTIONS IN VOLUME 1. Page 317, 8th line from the bottom. Fur " Major Meza- Page 420, 2d line from bottom. For " Colonel John A. -ns," read "M Major Mesraros." Thayer," read " Colonel John M. Thayer." Pag,- 393, 6th line from bottom. For "Colonel John H. Page 637, 7th line from the bottom. For "the 8th Trigg," read " Colonel Robert C. Trigg." Georgia," read " the 3d Georgia." Page 677, 19th line. For "C. A. Boutelle," read "C. 0. Boutelle." Ox / / THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTONJ 1IY (.. T. BEAUREGARO), GENERAL, C. S. A. A TELEGRAM from General Cooper, dated Richmond, September 10th, 1862, reached me on that day in Mobile, J, and contained the infor- mation that, by special orders issued August 29th, I had been assigned to the command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, with head- quarters at Charleston. The next day I left for my new scene of action, where I arrived on the 15th of September, relieving General J. C. Pemberton. The work before me was serious; all the more so that it had to be executed without loss of time. Rumors and threats were afloat, filling the columns of the Northern journals, to the effect that preparations were being made for such a land and naval attack upon the city of Charleston as would prove irresistible. This, at the North, was deemed all the more easy of accom- plishment because the harbor and inner defenses were believed to be insuffi- cient to withstand a well-directed and prolonged assault; and for the further reason that there existed several avenues of approach, by any of which, it was thought, the ulterior object aimed at could be attained. That there was ample cause for apprehension on our part became apparent to me upon my first conference with General Pemberton, in which I learned that by his orders a complete abandonment had been made, not only of the Condensed from the "North American Review" Bragg in temporary command of the Western De- for May, 1886. See also articles in Vol. I., pp. partment and of the army which had been with- 40-83, on the operations in Charleston harbor drawn from Corinth before Halleck. Beauregard in 1861.-EDITORS. having reported this action to the War Depart- Z It was to Bladon Springs, 75 miles north of ment, Bragg's assignment was made permanent Mobile, that, on the 17th of June, 1862, General by Mr. Davis on the 20th of June. On the 25th Beauregard had gone from Tupelo for his health, of August General Beauregard officially reported on a certificate of his physicians, leaving General " for duty in the field."-EDITORS. VOL. IV. 1 2 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. system of coast defense devised by me as early as April, 1861, but also of the one said to have been projected by General R. E. Lee while in command of the same department from December, 1861, to March, 1862. For these had been substituted another and an interior system, rendering our lines vulnerable at various points, and necessitating more labor and a greater armament than we could command. The inspection made by me a few days later confirmed that opinion; for the works in and around Charleston, most of which had been badly located, were not in a state of completion, nor was their armament 1 y any means adequate to the dimensions of some of them. The defenses of the harbor existing at that time consisted of: 1. Fort Sumter, with an armament of 79 guns of diverse caliber, from 32-pounders to 8-inch Columnbiads, and seven 10-ineh mortars, and manned by 350 effectives of the First South Carolina Artillery (regulars). 2. Fort Moultrie, with 38 guns, ranging from 24-pounders to 8-inch Columbiads, and having a garrison of 300 effectives belonging to the First South Carolina Infantry (regulars). These works were in very good condition, though repairs were then in prog- ress in the former. 3. Battery Beauregard, across Sullivan's Island, the loca- tion of which I had selected in the spring of 1861, in advance of Fort Moultrie, with a view to protect the approach from the east. It was aimed with five guns. 4. Four sand batteries, en barbette, erected at the west end of Sulli- van's Island, and bearing on the floating boom then in process of construction across the Fort Sumter channel. These batteries were not completed, and had at the time only four guns, two of them being 10-inch Columbiads. No magazines had been constructed for them. 5. The " Neck "battery, on Morris Island, afterward called Battery Wagner, an open work erected to defend the approaeh to Fort Sumter. It was intended for eleven guns, and was not entirely finished, even as originally designed. 6. A small work (Fort Ripley) equidis- tant from Castle Pinckney and Fort Johnson, not yet armed, but planned for four heavy guns en barbette [only two put in.-EDITORS]. 7. Castle Pinckney, armed with nine 24-pounders and one 24-pounder rifled, a work of no value for the defense of the city. S. Fort Johnson, near the north-east end of James Island, with one rifled 32-pounder, likewise of very little importance. Some batteries had also been arranged and begun for the defense of the city proper, but no heavy guns had been procured for them, and none were disposable. The floating boom was incomplete, and was destined to remain so. I never looked upon it as a serious barrier to the enemy's fleet. The defensive line on James Island from the Wappoo to Secessionville consisted of " a system of forts, redoubts, redans, and creinail!es," very injudiciously located, except Fort Pemberton on the Stono and some few of the redoubts. There were also two batteries on the Ashley River, for its protection and that of the entrance of Dill's Creek and the Wappoo. One of them had no guns; the other, at Lawton's, was armed with four 32-pounders, but could be of lit- tle use. The works at Secessionville, which were poorly devised and poorly executed, were still unfinished. Their armament was two 8-inch naval guns, one 18-pounder howitzer, six 32-pounders, one 32-pounder rifle, two 24- pounder rifles, and two 10-inch mortars. THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. 3 There were fmnr liatterles on Sullivan's T1l4-1l be- twt'en Battery ltu'au-rtgant and Fort Mrlsioill, the latter lis-tg at the eastern extremity of the, Mai. jn.-t .ot- .idk the limits of th e "nap. tetwvet- Ba1ttery` iet std Mtloltrie wan Battery Marion, anti another work. eatled Battery Rutiledge, wai elose to Fort Moultri ton the tat. Scesetiotiville, ntear the tenter of James Llauat. all iws foitod on the tialp of Jane.s -td Follyv i.tland. When, Ct:'inita tg's PeiWoit a as , batttat t'l t the t Ctifefildet-,' tlattery ireaga was tainted t'ottnatu, ter Cid)antl tittiti- ..adti S. Pu'tna-a, ;iol the nark t ;i t of llattry (- tegg, ilut ftatitig tthe oitaiti eta-itte. aVas d eit Batters (1:-y lt- tielt, after Ctoloetl Jolt.. L. Ctait 5. itt; toth lo-t tlio. 1i-st itt itt tasatuit tiu on Fort WV. goe,. The line of defenses constructed on the Neck to protect the city from a land attack on the north side, was made up of a continuous "bastion line," whiith was not suitable to the site where it had been located. The total number of troops of all arms in South Carolina at that time wVas: infantry, 6564; artillery in position, 1787; field artillery, 1379; cavalry, 2817,-total, 12,547. Adding the number of troops then in the State of Georgia, 7189, the aggregate force in the -whole department amounted on the 24th of September, 1862, to 19,736 men. Before being relieved, General THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. Pemberton, at my request, gave an estimate of the minimum force requisite, in his opinion, for the department, namely, 43,650 men of all arms, which I adopted as the basis of my future calculations. On the 30th of September, and again on the 2d of October, I urgently called on the War Department for an increase of heavy ordnance for the works intended to command the anchorage in the Charleston harbor and the entrance into the Ashley and Cooper rivers. I asked for twenty 10-inch Columbiads, five banded rifled 42-pounders, and five banded 32-pounders; or " fifteen of the first quality, ten of the second, and five or more of the third." The Secretary of War, Mr. Randolph, had used every endeavor to assist me in my efforts to be ready for the impending attack of the enemy; but he had just at this time, unfortunately, tendered his resignation, and had been suc- ceeded in office by Mr. Seddon. From that moment my demands on the War Department seemed to meet with much less favor, and I had to rely, in a great measure, on the scant resources of my command to accomplish the work necessary for the safety of the city of Charleston. The State authorities, and in fact the whole people of South Carolina, were equally anxious with myself for the rapid completion of my preparations, and afforded me every assistance in their power, though I was never able to proeure the necessary amount of slave-labor required for work on the fortifications. By great exertion, and with no assistance from the Government, was executed under my orders the rifling and banding of guns otherwise too inferior for the proper armament of our works. This was done at the rate of one gun in two and a half days, whereas it had required thirty-five days to remodel each gun under the super- vision of the War Department. My anxiety was all the greater since the enemy, before making his final attack upon Charleston, and with a view, no doubt, to distract attention from it, had been for some time past preparing a descent along the Southern Atlan- tic coast, though he afterward appeared to have altered his original purpose and to be directing his course toward Cape Lookout, on the coast of North Carolina. With the inadequate force under me, my only hope was to endeavor to frustrate any demonstration that might be attempted within the limits of my own extensive command; and yet the War Department, through the new Secretary of War, was at that very time, and against repeated pro- tests on my part, depleting it of troops to reenforce other points. The approaches to Charleston were five in number: 1. The enemy could land a large force to the northward, at or in the close vicinity of Bull's Bay, and from thenep, marching across the country, could take possession of Mount Pleasant and all the north shore of the inner harbor. 2. A large force of the enemy could also land to the southward, destroy the Charleston and Savan- nah railroad, and invest Charleston in the rear. These two avenues of approach, however, were not likely to be adopted by the enemy, as the strength of his land force would not have justified such an attempt, unaided by his iron-clads and gun-boats. The cooperation of the Federal fleet was possible for any one of the other three modes of approach, namely: James Island, Sullivan's Island, and Morris Island. 3. Of these, the approach by THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. James Island was unquestionably the one to be most apprehended. The Con- federate troops stationed there were insufficient in number and had to defend " a long, defective, and irregular line of works." The enemy, after overpow- ering them, could have constructed batteries which would have controlled the inner harbor, taken in rear our outer lines of defenses, and opened fire directly against Charleston itself, thus forcing an almost immediate surrender. 4. By Sullivan's Island the approach was also a very important one. In taking it, Fort Sumter might have been silenced and the inner harbor thrown open to the enemy's iron-clad fleet. 5. The approach by Morris Island was, as after- ward proved, the least dangerous to us. It involved none of the contingen- cies threatened by the other modes of attack. It had always been my opinion, however, that the enemy would elect to make his approach by that route, for the reason that, being already in possession of Folly Island, which was in close proximity to Morris Island, he would thereby enjoy certain facilities for the movements of his troops, while close at hand lay the harbor of Edisto, con- venient as a shelter for his fleet. The seizure of Morris Island would also be a great encouragement to the North. The preparations of the North were upon a scale of such magnitude-with engines of war "such as the hand of man had never yet put afloat"- that they had consumed more time than was at first anticipated. Thus an opportunity was afforded me to perfect our means of resistance. Weeks and months went by, during which I succeeded in nearly doubling the strength of Sumter, of Moultrie, and of all the defensive works of the har- bor, including Battery Wagner, which was thus almost entirely rebuilt. I also established along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida a continuous line of signal (flag) stations, by means of which constant informa- tion was furnished department headquarters of the exact movement and of the least change that took place in the Federal fleet. I multiplied the laying out of torpedoes in all navigable streams liable to be ascended by Federal gun- boats and other craft, and gave close attention to the rope obstructions divid- ing the outer and inner harbors. I likewise used my best endeavors, and importuned the War and Navy Departments, to have constructed a few " tor- pedo-rams," on the model by Captain F. D. Lee, with which it was my firm conviction more injury could be inflicted upon the Federal fleet than could be hoped for from all such gun-boats as the Government was then having 5 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. built for the protection of Charleston harbor. That this appreciation was not exaggerated has been shown by many results accomplished at a subsequent date by torpedo-boats in our own war and in naval encounters between foreign nations, notably during the late Franco-Chinese war. 4 There were two Confederate gun-boats (iron-clad rams) at that tine in Charleston, the Palbeetto State and the C/dicora. Lieutenant-Commander John Rutledge, C. S. N., commanded the first, and Captain John XI. Tucker, C. S. N., commanded the second. Besides these there were three small liar- bor steamers, to be used as ten- ders for them. The Palmietto . i State and the C ico)ra were, uni- fortunately, of too heavy a draughit to be of much practical use in the defense of the harbor. They were also lacking in mo- tive trower, consequently in speed ; and their guins-, onl ac- count of the smallness of the port-holes, could not be suffi- ciently elevated, and were of but very short range. Ably officered and manned as they were known to be, they proved of real service only once during- the whole siege of Charleston. While our work of armament and of general preparation was progress- ing oIn all points of the department, it occurred to me that our two gun- boats, inferior as they were in many respects, could, nevertheless, by a bold night attack onl the wooden fleet of the enemy, cause considerable damage and eompel it to leave its anchorage outside the bar; and the time to do it, I suggested, was before the threatened arrival of the Fed- eral mnonitors.t Commodore Ingraham\ agreed with me, and immediately ordered the attack. It took place oln the early morning of January 31st. The Palmetto State, onl board of which, for the occasion, was Commodore Ingraham himself, steamed out directly toward the Federal fleet, followed by the Chieora, and fell upon and fired into the steamer lerced1ita before the latter had fully realized the peril she was in. Disabled and reported to be 4 It is but simple justice to add that from the first experiments made, in April, 1861, against Fort Sumter with an iron-clad floating battery and an iron-el-(d land battery, the respective inven- tions of !Captain) John Randolph Hamilton, for- merly of the U. S. N., and of Mr. C. H. Stevenls, afterward brigadier-genend in the Colnfederate army, and both from South Carolina, is attributa- bld also the revolution in naval architecture and arinarments by which iron-clad war vessels have entirely superseded the now almost obsolete wooden men-of-war.-(I. T. B. The blockadinig-fleet off Charleston consisted, at this time, of the I'oPrhlatoa, (Cawoudaiqmmcv, Heuea- tomjie, Umledilla, Mercedita, Keystonie State, Meinphis, Sttttin, Ottae-a, Flag, Qaaier City, and Aiugusta. The P'oirlatan, ('aul edaigwe, am-d Housatoouie were the strongest vessels in the fleet.- EDITORS. \Commodore Duncan N. Ingraham, formerly of the United States Navy. He was at one tihe Chief of the Bureau of Orduammee and Hvyrograplhy in the Navy Department, and was popul arly known for his successful interference, while in command of the St. Louis, in the harbor of Smyrna, resulting in the release from a Turkish prison of Martin Koszta, a Hungarian refugee who had declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States.-EDITORS. The Porlusteau and anaudarigua wewere absent at the time, coaling, at Port Rloyal.-EDITORS. 6 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. sinking, the Mlercedita immediately surrendered. The Palmnetto State left her and went in pursuit of two other Federal steamers, but was soon distanced. The Chicora, meanwhile, set fire to a schooner-rigged pro- peller, engaged and crippled the Quaker City, and ran into and fired the Kerystowe State, which then and there struck her flag.) The other vessels composing the blockading squadron, seeing the fate of their consorts and fearing the same one for themselves, hurriedly steamed out to sea and entirely disappeared. The outer harbor remained in the full possession of the two Confederate rams. Not a Federal sail was visible, even with spy- glasses, for over twenty-four hours. It is, therefore, strictly correct to state that the blockade of the port of Charleston had been raised, for the time being, as was certified to by Commodore Ingraharn, by the foreign consuls then in Charleston, and by myself. ; It is evident that had the seaworthy qualities of the two Confederate gun- boats been greater, and could we have given them the cooperation of the torpedo-rams I had anxiously endeavored to have constructed, the blockade of Charleston would not have been at that time, and for months afterward, an impediment to our free and open intercourse with the outer world. And it is simple history to add that, even as it was, through private enterprise which should have tempted our Government to a bolder course, lines of bloekade-running steamers entered and left the port of Charleston at regular, stated intervals, up to nearly the very close of the war. Almost at the moment of this naval attack on the Federal fleet occurred another incident of note in the operations around Charleston. General Pemberton had caused to be removed from Cole's Island eleven guns of heavy caliber which served to guard the entrance of the Stono River. This barrier removed, the Federal gun-boats had free ingress to the river, and as often as they chose to do so plied with impunity as near to Fort Pemberton as safety allowed, harassing our camps on James and John's islands, by the fire of their long-range rifled guns. The Isaac SWith, carrying nine heavy guns, was one of these. Desirous of putting a stop to such incursions, I called the commander of the First Military District [Gen- eral R. S. Ripley] to a conference at department headquarters, and instructed him at once to organize an expedition and have masked batteries erected at designated points on the banks of the Stono, near where the Federal gun- boat habitually passed and occasionally remained overnight. The instrue- tions were to allow her to steam by unmolested as far as she chose to go, then to open fire and cut off her retreat. The expedition was intrusted to Lieu- tenant-Colonel Joseph A. Yates, First South Carolina Artillery (regulars), and was most successfully conducted. On the evening of January 30th the Isaac ) Commander Le Roy, of the Keystone State, re- of the Housatonic, Flag, Qacker City, Augesta, Mete- ported officially that the colors of his vessel were phis, and Stettin), and indorsed by Rear-Admiral run up, after being lowered, and her guns re- Du Pont, sets forth that only the Keystone State sumed firing, because the Chicora did not respect and Mercedita were seriously damaged; that no the signal.-EDITORS. vessels were much burned, and that none of the Z, This view of the affair is strenuously disputed. fleet abandoned the blockading line except on A statement to the Secretary of War, signed on duty; they also state that the Confederate rams the 10th of February, 1863, by the commanders retreated to the cover of the forts.-EDITORS. 7 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. Smnithi came up the Stono, and leisurely anchored just above our masked bat- teries. Fire was now opened upon her. She endeavored to make her escape, returning our fire as she passed, but was so roughly handled, and at such close range, that she dropped anchor and surrendered. Her armament con- sisted of one 30-pounder Parrott and eight 8-inch heavy Columbiads. Her crew was of 11 officers and 108 men. Upon examination the damage she had sustained was found to be slight. She was thoroughly repaired and, under the name of the Stono, became a guard-boat in the Charleston har- bor, with Captain H. J. Hartsteue, C S. N., as commander. -As a corollary to this engagement on the morning of February 1st another Federal iron-clad, after- ward ascertained to be the sin- gle-turreted monitor Molntauk, appeared before Fort McAllister, at Genesis Point in the Georgia district, and, accompanied by 81, TH-EAST OF an, ll. (30 FEDERATE VC,1T ALLF three gun-boats and a mortar- Gu THE R EN IF LLiM. ISA. boat, approached to within a short distance of the work, and opened a heavy fire upon it. The action was very brisk on both sides. The parapet of the fort was breached, and both guns and gunners were fully exposed. Nevertheless, after a four-hours' combat the monitor slowly retired, evidently in a damaged condition. The importance of the success of this engagement lay in the demonstrated fact that iron-clads were not as formidable as they were supposed to be against land-batteries. As yet, their final test of invulnerability had not been fully ascertained. Reflecting upon the result of that encounter, I wrote to Briga- dier-General Ripley, February 8th, 1863, minute instructions, 4 because, 4 " But I consider also that the attack on Sumter, angle, and east face,-taking their position close whenever it takes place, will probably be made at along the eastern shore of Morris Island, after si- long range with their heaviest guns and mortars. lencingWagner. Byadoptingthisplantheirsteam- This being admitted, they will necessarily attack it ers, gun-boat8, etc., would be, moreover, farther where it is weakest,-i. e., the gorge, south-east removed from the batteries of Sullivan's Island. 8 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. though he was an able artillery officer, I knew that he possessed but scant knowledge, and no experience, of military engineering. My best and almost only assistant for planning the construction of batteries and making the selection of the sites on which they were to be erected was Major D. B. Harris, the chief engineer of the department, on whom I placed the utmost reliance, and who always thoroughly understood and entered into my views. It is an error to state, as I am informed one or two writers have done, even in South Carolina, that the erection of batteries along the shores of the inner harbor, and in the city of Charleston itself, was due to what has been termed the untiring zeal, forethought, and engineering ability of General Ripley. My letters of instruction and my official orders to General Ripley, from his arrival in my department up to the time of my leaving it in April, 1864, con- clusively show that those batteries were all planned and located by me, and that I passed upon all questions relative not only to their armament, but even to the caliber of the guns that were to be placed in them. My fear was that an attack upon Sumter might be attempted at night. One or two monitors, I thought, during a dark night could approach the fort within easy range, and open fire upon its weakest face with almost certain impunity. Sumter, even at night, could be sufficiently seen by the monitors to be seriously damaged by their fire; whereas the monitors, being very low in the water, could only be visible from the fort by the flash of their guns. To guard against such an attempt of the enemy, on the 1st of March I wrote to Commodore Ingraham: " I must therefore request that the Confederate steamer Stono should take her position as a guard-boat, in advance of the forts as far as practicable, to-night, and thereafter every night for the present." I also caused a train of cars to be held in readiness at the Pocotaligo Station, to bring such reenforcements as might be drawn from the military district [lying between the Ashepoo and Savannah rivers] commanded by General W. S. Walker. On the 28th of February the enemy attacked Fort McAllister with an " The enemy may also establish land rifled and mortar batteries on the sand-hills along the sea- shore of Morris Island, at the distance of from one to two miles from Sumter. He might possibly send one or more monitors during the night to take a position in the small channel north of Cum- ming's Point, within close range, to batter down the gorge of Sumter and endeavor to blow up the magazines. " That mode of attack, being the one most to be apprehended, should be guarded against as well as our limited means will permit-first, by trans- ferring as many heavy rifled guns as can be spared from the other faces of the fort to the gorge, angle, and face already referred to; and the Brooke's rifled gun now on its way here from Richmond must likewise be put there, substituting in its place at Fort Johnson the ten-inch gun now ex- pected from that city, so locating it as to fire toward Morris Island when required; secondly, a VOL. IV. 2 strong field-work should be thrown up as soon as sufficient labor can be procured on Cumming's Point, open in the gorge toward Fort Sumter -to act, besides, as a kind of traverse to this work from the fire of the batteries located by the enemy along the sea-shore of Morris Island. The Cum- wing's Point battery should be armed with the heaviest and longest-ranged guns we may be able to obtain for that purpose. " The introduction of heavy rifled guns and iron-clad steamers in the attack of masonry forts has greatly changed the condition of the problem applicable to Fort Sumter when it was built, and we must now use the few and imperfect means at our command to increase its defensive features as far as practicable. The chief engineers of this department and of the State will be ordered to report to you at once, to confer with you, so as to carry out the views expressed by me in this letter." 9 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. iron-clad, three gun-boats, and a mortar-boat, anid also, oil the .1d of Malellh, with three ionitors. lie was evidently trying his hand before his final veli- ttiare agatinst Fort S-umiiter. But tie result must sorely have dlisaploinited llim; for notwithstauding the vigor of these two engagementes - the first lastilg more thaii two holrs, the second at least seven-the Confederate battery was found, after inspection, to have sustained no material damage. Onhi tile 5th of April the enemy's force had materially inereased in the Stono and the North Edisto. His iron-dlads, including the frigate Nelwf I;hen- sides and eight mloluito)rs, had crossed tile outer bar and cast anchor in the main channel. No doubt could be had of their intentioll. Two days later,- on the 7tth,-ta late ever memorable in tile animals of the late war, the signal for the attack on1 Fort Sumter, so long anticil)ate(l and so long delayedl, was finally given. First steamed up, in line, one following the other, the Iece/ irken,, the J'at;aie, thie Alontaik, and the Patapsco, four single- turreted monitors. The iNewi Iroetnsides, the flag-ship of the fleet, came next. Then came the Catskill, the Nauet(ket, the No- 13. R.ARIS, C.S.S . hunt, three other single-turreted monitors. XFrvOM A rI'YTrOGRA. The double-turTeted Keokik was the eighth, and (losed the line. Experienced and gallant officers commanded them all. Rear-Admniral Du Pont was on board the flag-ship. Other Federal steamers stood outside the bar, but evidently with no intent to take part in the action. They were the Cnawlda2i(q, the Hoiusatonie, the Unadillh, the 11"issahickonl, and the Hletonw. The armament of all the iron-clads that were to take part in the engagement consisted of 33 guns "of the heaviest caliber ever used in war" up to that time, to wit, 13 and 11 inch Dahlgren guns and -inch rifled pieces. To oppose this formidable array of new, and it was thought invulnerable, floating batteries, prepared at such heavy cost and with every anticipation of success by the Federal Government, we had on our side: 1. Fort Sumter, under Colonel Alfred Rhett, with a garrison of seven companies of the 1st South Carolina Artillery (regulars); the guns it brought into action on that day being two 7-inch Brookes, two 9-ineh Dahlgrens, four 10-inch Colum- biads, four inech navy guns, four 8-ineh Columbiads, six banded and rifled 42-pounders, eight smooth-bore 32-pounders, and three 10-inch sea-coast mor- tars,-in all, thirty-three guns and mortars. 2. Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, with five companies of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (regu- lars); the guns engaged being nine S-inch Columbiads, five banded and rifled 32-pounders, five smooth-bore 32-pounders, and two 10-inch mortars,- in all, twenty-one guns and mortars. 3. Battery Bee, on Sullivan's Island, under I 0 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. Lieutetiant-Colonel J. C. Simakins, with three companies of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (regulars) anld six guns: five 10-ineh and one S-ineh Colunibiads. 4. Battery Beauregard, under Captain Julius A. Sitgreaves, with two companies of regulars-one from Suniter and one from Moultrie- anldl three gUns: anl S-inch C(lunibiad and two 32-pounders, rifled. 5. Bat- tery Wagnler, under Major C'. K. Huger, with two companies of regulars from Sumter. There four guns weore used: one 32-pounder, rifled; one 224- pollll(ler, rifled; and two smooth-bore :32-pounders. 6. Gumming's Point Bat- tery, under Lieutenant Henry It. Lesesne, with a detachment of regulars from Fort Sumter. Two guns were engaged: one 10-inch Columbiad and one S- ineh Dalflgreil. The number of gulls actually engaged on our side against the iron-elad fleet, on1 the 7tIh of April, was therefore 69, of which five were mortal-s. Two conlanies of infantry had been plaeed onl Sullivan's and Morris islands, to guard against a land attack. Commodore Ingraham had also been cautioned to hold the gun-boats Palmetto State and ('hicora in readiness to assist our batteries in case of need; but they were not needed. The approach of the monitors was slow and cautious. They dreaded the rope obstructions which were known to be connected with heavily charged torpedoes. t But the report afterward circulated,- to which Mr. Seward gave the weight of his official name,- that the "rope obstructions in the channel fouled the screws of the iron-dlads," was entirely erroneous. Not one of the iron-clads ever approached nearer than 600 yards to any of these obstructions, with the exception of the Keoknk-, which dropped in to about 300 yards of them before being able to get under way again. The first shot was fired at 3 o'clock P. zi. It came from Fort Moultrie, and was aimed at the Veehatch-en. No heed was taken of it. \ The turreted iron- clad kept on her way until within fourteen hundred yards of Fort Sumter, when she paused a moment and opened fire on it. Fully two minutes elapsed, and then Sumter replied, filing by battery. The other monitors now steamed up, taking their respective positions, but with apparent hesitation and as far out of range as possible. The action had become general, Suimter being the central point of the attack. An occasional shot was sent at Moul- trie, anl occasional one at Batteries Bee and Beauregard. The spectacle of this singular combat between the fort and what appeared to be nine floating iron turrets-for the hulls of the monitors were almost wholly submerged -was, indeed, an impressive one, not to be easily forgotten. After a lapse of about threequarters of an hour, Admiral Du Pont's flag- ship, the Newt Ironsidles, advanced to within some seventeen hundred yards of Sumter, evidently with a view to breach its walls. But the conu- centrated fire from our batteries forced her to withdraw hurriedlv out of range, as the Passaic had already done, in anl apparently crippled condition. The fire of Sumter was so accurate that two other monitors were compelled I In commenting on this passage Major John '\ Captain Percival Drayton, of the Passair, see- Johnson says in a letter to the editors: " After the ond in line, reported that the opening shots came most thorough study of all the evidence, I am con- from Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Sullivan s vinced that there were no torpedoes in connection Island, and that his vessel replied to them in pass- with those rope obstructions until a later date." ing " and pushed on for Sumter.'-EDITORS. I I THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. to retire. At 4 o'clock P. h. the Keokuk advanced to within nine hundred yards of Sumter, but with no better success than her consorts. She soon withdrew, badly worsted. The whole attacking squadron now slowly with- drew from an engagement which had lasted not more than two hours and twenty-five minutes, but which had been, for the enemy, a most disastrous defeat. A [See also papers to follow.] In the communication sent by me to the War Department, dated May 24th, with regard to the attack of April 7th, I made the following statement: ' The action lasted two hours and twenty-five minutes, but the chief damage is reported by the enemy to have been done in thirty minutes. The Keokuk did not come nearer than nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter; she was destroyed. The New Irongides could not stand the fire at the range of a mile; four of her consorts (monitors) were disabled at the distance of not less than thirteen hundred yards. They had only reached the gorge of the harbor - never within it-and were baffled and driven back before reaching our lines of torpedoes and obstructions, which had been constructed as an ultimate defensive resort as far as they could be provided. The heaviest batteries had not been employed. Therefore it may be accepted, as shown, that these vaunted monitor batteries, though formidable engines of war, after all are not invulner- able nor invincible, and may be destroyed or defeated by heavy ordnance properly placed and skillfully handled. In reality they have not materially altered the military relations of forts and ships. On this oeasion the monitors operated under the most favorable cireumstances. The day was calm, and the water, consequently, was as stable as that of a river; their guns were fired with deliberation, doubtless by trained artillerists. According to the enemy's statements, the fleet fired 151 shots. . . . Not more than thirty-four shots) took effect on the walls of Fort Sumter. - . . Fort Moultrie and our other batteries were not tonched in a way to be considered, while in return they threw 1399 shots. At the same time Sumter discharged 810 shots; making the total number of shots fired 2209, of which the enemy reports that 520 struck the different vessels; a most satisfactory accuracy when the smallness of the target is considered." The repulse had not been looked upon as a thing possible by the North, and when the news reached that section it engendered a heavy gloom of disap- pointment and discouragement-a feeling not unlike that which had prevailed there after the Confederate victory at Manassas on July 21st, 1861. It was clear to me, however, that the enemy, whose land forces had not cooperated in this naval attack, would not rest upon his defeat, but would soon make another effort, with renewed vigor, and on a larger scale. I was therefore The following are extracts from reports of oftieers in command or on duty that day. Colonel Rhett said: ", The enemys fire was mostly ricochet and not very aceurate; most of their shot passed over the fort, and several to the right and left. The greater portion of their shots were from 1300 to 1400 yards distant, which appeared tobe the extent of their effective range. Some shots were from a greater distance, and did not reach the fort at all." General Ripley said: " The action was purely of artillery,- forts and bat- teries against the lron-clad vessel. of the enemy,-other means of defense, obstructions and torpedoes, not ha.v- tog come Into play. " Fort Sumter was the principal object of the attack, and to that garrison . . . special credit io due for sustaining the shock, and, with their powerful arma- ment. contributing principally to the repulse." Major Echols, of the Corps of Engineers, in his report to Major Harris, Chief Engineer of the de- partment, used this language: "She [the ekokkl ank of the south end of Morris Island at halt-past eight o'clock the following morning (April 8). Her smoke-stack and turrets are now visible at low water. From her wreck foated ashore a book. a py-glas, and pieces of furniture bespattered with blood, and small fragments of iron stecking in them . . . The total number (of hot.] fired by the enemy (was] about 110 [in fact, 151 to 164.- G. T. B.]. which were prin- cipally directed at Sumter. Her wails show the effect of fifty-five missiles-hot, shells, and fragments . . . The casualties are slight. At Sumter five men were wounded by fragments of masonry and wood.... At Moultrie one man was killed by the fa'ing of the flag- staff when shot away. At Battery Wagner an annumni- tion chest . . . exploded from the blast of the gun. killing three men, mortally wounding one, slightly wounding Lientenant Steedman, in charge of the gun, and three men." G. T. B. ) Major Echols's report puts the number at fifty- fire,whichit is coucededisthe correctone.-G. T.B. 1 2 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLES TON. very much concerned when, scarcely a week afterward, the War Department compelled me to send Cooke's and Clingman's commands back to North Carolina, and, early in May, two other brigades [S. R. Gist's and W. H. T. Walker's], numbering five thousand men, with two batteries of light artillery, to reenforce General Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, Mississippi. The fact is that, on the 10th of May, Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, had even directed that still another force of five thousand men should be withdrawn from my department to be sent to Vicksburg to the assistance of General Pemberton. But my protest against so exhaustive a drain upon my com- mand was fortunately heeded, and I was allowed to retain the reduced force I then had under me, amounting on the 1st of June, for the whole State of South Carolina, to not more than ten thousand men. With these, it was evident, I could not protect every vulnerable point at the same time; and thereafter, whenever the occasion arose, I had to withdraw troops from one quarter of the department to reenforce another. The fact that a new commander of high engineering repute, General Gillmore, had been sent to supersede General Hunter 1, confirmed me in the opinion that we would not have to wait long before another and more serious attack was made. A further reason for such a belief was the presence at that time of six Federal regiments on Folly Island, under Brigadier-General Israel Vogdes, an officer of merit, perfectly familiar with Charleston and the surrounding country, having been stationed at Fort Moultrie before the war. On the 7th of July four monitors were seen off the Charleston bar. The fleet had not otherwise increased up to that day. During the night of the 8th the noise, apparently made by extensive chopping with axes, was distinctly heard from the extreme southern end of Morris Island. The sand-hills, so numerous on Little Folly Island, afforded much facility to the enemy for keeping us in the dark as to his ulterior designs, although nothing indicated any effort on his part at concealment. 4 Z General Hunter was transferred from the De- partment of Kansas to the command of the Depart- ment of the South on the 31st of March, 1862, relieving Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sherman, and was himself relieved by General Quiney A. Gillmore on the 12th of June, 1863. Among the chief events of General Hunter's administration were the capture of Fort Pulaski, April 11th, 1862 (see General Gilimore's description of these operations, Vol. IL, p. 1); the declaration of free- dom (April 12th, 1862) to slaves in Fort Pulaski and on Cockspur Island, Ga.; a similar declaration (May 9th) to slaves in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, which was annulled, ten days later by President Lincoln; and the enlistment of the first colored troops, called the 1st South Carolina regi- ment.-EDITORS. 4The following is an extract from my official report to the War Department upon this important event in the siege of Charleston: i At 5 o'clock on the morning of the leth of Tuly the enemy's attaek commenced by a heavy fire On our posi- t-on from a great number of light gnus, apparently placed during the preceding forty-eight hours in the works lately thrown up on Little Folly Island. Three monitors about the same time erosed the bar and brought their formidable armaments to bear on the left flank of our position, while several barges with howitzers, in Lighthouse Inlet, flanked our right. For two hours the enemy kept up the fire from these three different point, our batteries replying vigorously. "I The barges of the enemy, filled with troops, having been seen In Lighthouse Inlet in the direction of Black Island, and Oyster Point being the nearest and most ac- cessible spot for debarkation from them, it was Justly considered the one most necessary to protect, and there- fore the infantry, consisting of the 21st South Carolina Volunteers, about 350 effective men, were stationed by Colonel R. F. Grabam, the Immediate commander of the island, on the peninsula leading to that point. Inl this position the infantry were unavoidably e.- posed to the fire of the boat howitzers, but sheltered by the nature of the ground from that of the gus on Little Folly Island. "About 7 o'clock the enemy advanced on Oyster Point in a flotilla of boats containing between two and three thousand men, a considerable portion of whonm endeavored to effect and hold a landing, in which they were opposed by the infantry until about s o'clock, when another forc of two or three regiments made good a land- ing in front of our batteries on tile south end of Morris Island proper. These formed in tine of battle on thie beach, and advanced directly upon our works, throwing 1 3 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. It is not true that this attack was a surprise. The commander of Morris Island and all the troops on it knew that the enemy was preparing to make one from Little Folly. I knew it as well. The real cause of the Federal suc- cess on the 10th of July was the insufficiency of our infantry force on Morris Island, let alone the fact that I could not, for want of necessary labor, com- plete the battery already referred to, and which was of no service whatever to us on that occasion4 Nor should it be forgotten that the enemy, in order to divert our attention from the main object he had in view, was not only landing troops at the southern end of Morris Island, but was also seriously threatening James Island, and had made a strong demonstration against it by the Stono River. It is clear to me that, but for my determination not to weaken my force there for the support of Morris Island, this demonstration would have been converted into a real attack, the results of which might have been far more disastrous; for, as I have already stated, James Island was the avenue of approach I dreaded the most to see selected, and which on that account I feared the enemy would select. It was, in reality, the gateway to the avenue which would have almost assuredly led into the heart of Charleston. The enemy had preferred breaking in through the window, and I certainly had no cause to regret it. He was held in check there, and never got in until we finally opened the gate ourselves toward the end of the war. On the evening of July 10th detachments from various Georgia reg- iments which I had called for began to arrive. I pressed the War Depart- ment for Clingman's brigade. Part of it came on the 12th. The day before, at early dawn, the enemy assaulted Battery Wagner, but was repulsed with great loss to him. Two Federal officers and some 95 men were killed within pistol-range of our works. We captured six officers and about 113 men. Most of them were wounded. Three monitors and three wooden gun-boats assisted the Federal land forces on that occasion. Battery Wagner was again shelled on the 12th by part of the fleet, while the out on each flank numerous skirmishers, who very soon succeeded in flanking and taking the batteries in re- verse. After an, obstinate resistane. our artillery had to abandon their pieces,- three 5-inch navy shell guns, two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, one rifled 24-pounder. one 30-pounder Parrott, one 12-pounder Whitwortb, three 10-inch sea-co-at nnortars,-eleen in all, and fall back. Two companies of the 7th South Carolina Battalion, which arrived about this tiue, were ordered to the sup- port of the batteries; but they could not make head against the overwhel ing numbers of the enemy. This sueccas of the enemy threatened to cut off our infantry engaged at Oyster Point from their line of retreat; and, consequently, about 9 o'cloek Colonel Graham gave the order to fall back to Battery Wagner. which was accomplished under a severe flanking fire from the mondtors. The enemy thus gained possession of the south end of Morris Island by rapidly throwing a large onuber of troops across the inlet, which it was impossible for the avaslable infantry on the spot, about four hundred effective liken. to resist. It was not the erection of works on Uittle Folly Island that caused. the abandonment of our position; it was clearly the want on our side of infantry suplort, and the enemy's supe- rior weight and number of guns, and the heavy 5up- porting brigade of infantry that swept away our feeble, .tinted means of resistance." G. T. B. The following table shows what force I could dispose of, at the time, in and around Charleston, that is to say, in all the First Military District of South Carolina. I had: 1.-On James Island- Infantry ..... ......... Heavy and light artillery Cavairy .... 2.-On Morris slandd- ... 1184 . 1569 . 153 uses0 Infantry 612 Heavy and light artillery. 289 Cavalry....... 26 - 927 3,-On Sullivan's Island- Infantry .2a Heavy and light artillery ... 726 Cavalry. 228 4.-In Charleston proper - Infantry .462 Heavy and light artillery 235 Cavalry...... 153 50 Total .842 G. T. B. 14 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. land forces were engaged in putting up works near the middle of Morris Island. They were very mueh disturbed by the accurate firing of Fort Sumter and of Battery Gregg. On the arrival of the remainder of Clingman's brigade and of other troops called from the Second and Third Military Districts of my department, I was about to issue an order for an attempt in force to expel the enemy from Morris Island. But the configuration of that island, its proximity to the Federal monitors, and the fact, no less important, that fully four thousand men would have been re- age. ! A - quired for that purpose, convinced me that no step of that kind could then have been successful. Our ited means of transportation was also a great drawback to us. Upon further reflection I came to the conclusion that we could do more toward checking the progress of the enemy by erect- ing new batteries on James E OECT OF IBLAKELY SPOT FROM FORT SUMTER ON TR E Island, and by strengthening PLATINT AND THE, .MO.KE-STACK OF THE MONITOR others already in position there WEIHAWKEN." FROM PHOTOGIRAPHIS. and elsewhere. I issued orders to that effect, and they were vigorously carried out. Battery Simkins, in advance of Fort Johnson, on Shell Point, was one of these new batteries. It was armed with one 10-inch Columbiad, one 6.40 Brooke, and three 10-inch mortars; and guns were taken from Sumter to increase the arma- ment of Moultrie. The damages in Battery Wagner were soon repaired, and the fire of the monitors and gun-boats was regularly answered. Three guns, instead of two, were mounted at the Shell Point Battery; and I also caused gun-batteries of 10-inch Columbiads to be substituted for the mortar-batteries at Fort John- son. I ordered the forces on Morris Island to be reduced to a number strictly sufficient to hold our works there; and, the enemy's pickets along the Stono having been increased at that time, I instructed General Johnson Hagood to advance at once on the position occupied by the Federals, and thus ascertain what was their real intent as to James Island. This was done with General 1 5 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. Hagood's usual promptitude of action, and on the 16th the Federal forces were driven to the shelter of their gun-boats, our troops occupying the ground they had lost on that occasion. My order to Major Harris, Chief Engineer, was, nevertheless, "to increase the batteries on James Island bearing on Morris Island by at least twenty guns on siege-carriages, so as to envelop the enemy with a 'circle of fire' whenever he might gain possession of the north-east end of Morris Island; all works to be pushed on day and night." On the 18th the Federal troops crowded the south end of Morris Island and took position behind their breastworks. It was clear that another attempt was about to be made against Wagner, and it was made with no less vigor than obstinacy. The NXew Ironsides, five monitors, and a large wooden frigate joined in the bombardment. The firing of the enemy was more rapid on that occasion than it had ever been before. General W. B. Taliaferro, of Virginia, the gallant and efficient officer in command of Battery Wagner at the time, estimated " that nine hundred shot and shell were thrown in and against the battery during the eleven hours that the bombardment lasted." Wagner answered but slowly to this terrible onslaught. Not so, however, with Sum- ter and Gregg, which fired with even more rapidity than the enemy, and, as ever, did splendid work. After dusk on the same evening the Federal fleet was seen to retire, and the land forces advanced to attack Wagner. They displayed great determination. A portion of them succeeded in crossing the ditch and actually gained a foot-hold on the southern salient of the battery. General Hagood, with Colonel G. P. Harrison's 32d Georgia, arrived oppor- tunely at that hour, in obedience to my orders, and was of great assistance in precipitating the flight of the enemy, though it had fairly begun before his arrival. My report says: " The assault was terribly disastrous to the enemy. His loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners must have been 3000, as 800 bodies were interred in front of Battery Wagner on the following morning. . . . Our own loss during the bombardment and assault was 174, killed and wounded." From that time up to the evacuation of Morris Island the enemy scarcely allowed a day to pass without heavily firing upon our works-sometimes with his land forces alone, at other times with these and his fleet combined. He was also busily engaged on his batteries and trenches, while, on our side, we were straining every nerve to repair the damages done to our works and to strengthen the weakened walls of Sumter, whose disarmament was carefully carried on at night, in view of the disastrous effects of the enemy's heavy guns, from stationary batteries, which would eventually render it untenable as an artillery post. That such a result was inevitable no one could possibly doubt, and that the whole of Morris Island would sooner or later fall into the hands of the enemy, was no less evident. But, so long as the batteries in process of construction on the mainland were unfinished, I had resolved to hold Wagner and Gregg to the last extremity. Every movement of the enemy was in the meantime watched with the utmost vigilance, while the aecurate firing of Sumter, Gregg, and Wagner continued seriously to inter- fere with the working parties engaged on his lines of gradual approaches. THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. ... "'l I a... 'l "I'l _,. _11--. _.._a.. _6.... t_8. a....._:At _e....._o_..__._a. -( _ -I'l IIt._ __ -e Ad -TS t-o CASA -U" OF. Stn SED -in It-I. -HK eae k CfflARLP15TON UNDER FIRtE-VlIEW ON MARKElT STIlEs.T. FROMD it WA.si-TlMR sKhor Among the most memorable incidents of this period of the siege was the seven days' bombardment of Fort Sumter, which commenced on the 17th of August and lasted up to the 23d. It appeared to be, on the part of the Federals, a desperate and final attempt to force the surrender of the fort, and thus effect the reduction of Morris Island, and even of the city of Charles- ton. This was evidenced by the peremptory demand which I received from General Gillmore on the 91st for the "immediate evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter," followed by the threat that if, within " four hours" after the delivery of his letter into the hands of the commander of Battery Wagner, no reply was had, he would "open fire on the city of Charleston from batteries already established within easy range of the heart of the city." This communication reached me after the time specified. [See p. 66.] I protested against the bombardment of a city filled with old men, women, and children before giving the customary notice of three or four days in which to allow them to escape from danger. From a work whieh was called the " Swamp Angel," because of the spot where it had been erected, the enemy, with an 8-inch Parrott rifle-gun, and before receiving my answer, did open fire upon "the heart" of the city. I have reason to believe, however, that the energy of my protest, which in due time reached the headquarters of the Federal commander, forced him to recede somewhat from the position he had at first taken, for he ultimately ordered the firing upon the city to be suspended for the space of two days. When resumed it was not continued long; the " Swamp Angel" gun, after 36 rounds, very fortunately burst, and none other was mounted in that locality to take its place. The result of the seven days' bombardment of Sumter was to convert that historic fort into a confused mass of crumbling d6bris, but without altogether impairing its capacity of resistance. The greatest danger threatening the garrison just then, and one no doubt counted upon by the enemy, was the probability of the explosion by shot and shell of its powder magazine, which was, indeed, momentarily apprehended by the gallant men within the work. 1 7 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. In the meanwhile, General Gillmore's working parties, ever on the increase, were gradually but surely extending their trenches and mining opera- tions nearer and nearer to Battery Wagner. On the 26th our rifle-pits in front of the work were assailed by an overpowering force and taken, and on the 1st of September the fire on Sumter was so intense as to effect its virtual destruction. The following extract from the Engineer's report, forwarded at that time to the War Department, will give an idea of the coidition of the work: ` Toward noon the effect of the fire was to carry away at one fall four rampart arches on north-east front, with terre-pleian platforms and guns, thus leaving on this front only one arch and a half, which are adjacent to the east spiral stair. Some of the lower casemate piers of same front have been seriously damaged, rendering unsafe the service of two guns hitherto available in that quarter. On the exterior, the chief injury done is to be noticed at southeast mpxw-cotipi and two next upper casemates on east front. From these localities the scarp wall has fallen away completely and left the arches exposed, as well as the sand filling half down to the floor of the second tier." The next day six monitors, together with the Ironsides, opened fire on the fort, using the heaviest projectiles, namely, 8-inch Parrotts, rifle-shells, and 11 and 15 inch smooth-bore shot and shell. Sumter remained silent. It had not one single gun in working order with which to reply. The following is an extract from my report to the War Department: " The north-east and north-west terre-pleins had fallen in, and the western wall had a crack entirely through from parapet to berme. The greater portion of the southern wall was down, the upper east magazine penetrated, and lower east magazine wall cracked; the eastern wall itself nearly shot away, and large portions down; ramparts gone, and nearly every casemate breached. The easemates on the eastern face were still filled with sand, and gave some pro- tection to the garrison from shells. Not a single gun remained in barbette, and but a single smooth-bore 32-pounder in the west face that could be fired as the morning and evening gun." While Sumter had thus been made a mass of crumbling ruins, the enemy, except at short intervals, spared no effort to effect the demolition of Wagner also. In spite of the ability and determination of the several commanders- TaliaferTo, Hagood, A. H. Colquitt, Clingman, R. F. Graham, Harrison, and L. M. Keitt-who, in turn, were placed there; in spite of the almost super- human energy and pluck of its garrison and working parties to repair, at night, the damage done during the day, it became evident, on the 5th of September, that any further attempt to retain possession of it would result in the useless loss of the garrisons of both Wagner and Gregg. The enemy's sap had reached the moat of the former work. The heavy Parrott shells used against its parapets had breached them and knocked away the bomb-proofs. It had become impossible to repair the damages done. Colonel Rhett and his artillery command of regulars had already been transferred to the batteries forming the inner defenses, which were now almost entirely completed, and mostly armed with the very guns of Sumter. Major Stephen Elliott, with an infantry force taken from various regiments in and around the city, had been put there to hold the ruins of the fort against any storming parties of the enemy, and to give the morning and evening salute to the Confederate flag, still floating to the breeze. Major THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. THIE FIRST BREACH IN FORT SUMTER. FROM A PIHOTOGRAPH. Mk-or Johln JohIl-onl writs tI the edttors, that the Slumter hId OreI eek ,eed for a ,eek prior to that dare. plofogratdI wIll talkenl 011 Fseptellawr 8thl, Il8tI, dollIng a The loettore sllows the fill heglht olf the xv all ot title pxar- he-lvy elga .e-iieut betweell the iron-ell lld eet av,)d tile Ilpet, tile first brearh, an10 the ftlleasealates of the forts -1 Solhe.a's Islan-d, lIluedilIg Fort Motlrle. north-w-tern allof Feort Stllt-r. Elliott had been selected by me with care for that post of honor and danger. He proved himself worthy of the confidence placed in him; as did, later on, Captain John C. Mitchel, who relieved him on the 4th of May, 1864, and lost his life while in command there on the 20th of July, 1864; he was succeeded by another brave officer, Captain T. A. Huguenin, who was fortunate enough to escape uninjured and only left the fort at its final evacuation on the 17th of February, 1865. Another gallant officer, Major John Johnson, of the Con- federate States Engineers, was of much assistance in the defense of the ruins, and remained therein while they were held by us. The instructions for the evacuation of Batteries Wagner and Gregg had been prepared by me with much deliberation and thought. The withdrawal of the troops began as previously agreed upon, and was conducted in silence, with great coolness and precision. My orders were carried out almost to the letter. Owing to some defect in the fuses, however, the powder magazines of neither Wagner nor Gregg were exploded, although they had been lit, with all due precaution, by able officers. The wounded and sick had been first removed; then the companies were marched by detachments to the boats prepared to receive them, and embarked under the supervision of the 19 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. "TNUR U,4,TR CHARLESTON. FR1OM A 1KE.H MADE IN 1.3. naval officers in command. Two companies remained in Battery Wagner, as a rear-guard, until all the others were embarked, when they also were with- drawn. Our loss was slight both in men and materials, and the Federal victory was barren.\ I have dwelt somewhat at length upon the details of the gradual destruc- tion of Fort Sumter for the reason that, apart from the high interest of the recital, the matchless spirit and discipline displayed by its commander and garrison reacted upon all the commands in my department, and aroused a feeling of pride and emulation among the troops defending Charleston, which resulted in the greatest heroism. And it is history to say that the defense of Sumter and Wagner are feats of war unsurpassed in ancient or modern times. I now propose, before closing, to review a few passages of General Gill- more's book, published just after the war, and, as appears on its title-page, " by authority." Most of its errors have already been refuted in my " Morris Island Report," which is given, in extenso, in the second volume of the "Military Operations of General Beauregard" (Harper Brothers: pp. 102 et seq.) It only remains, therefore, to comment briefly upon certain inisap- prehensions and false conclusions of the author. General Gillmore was considered during the war the first engineer officer in the Federal service. Such is his standing up to this day. He had evi- dently been sent in command of the Department of the South, to effect what General Hunter had failed to do, to wit, the capture of Charleston. \ In General Gillmore's dispatch to Admiral Dablgren, dated September 7 th, 5): 10 A. M., he said: "The whole island is ours, but the enemy have escaped us."- G. T. B. See paper by General Gillmore, written in 1887, to follow.-EDITORS. 20 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. General Gillmore's book is valuable in many respects. It furnishes new and important information to the student of military history. Its tabular statements are generally accurate; the plates, drawings, and carefully pre- pared maps annexed to it are interesting and instructive. The description he gives of the city of Charleston, and of the fortifications in and around its harbor, is exact. But the inference to be drawn from the paragraph num- bered nineteen in the book [p. 11] is exceptionable. It reads as follows: " The strength of the James Island works was tested by a bold but unsuccessful assault upon them by our forces under Brigadier-General [H. W.] Benham on the 16th of June, 1862." I deem it necessary to place the facts of this attack in their proper light, because that is the reason assigned by Gillmore for not having attacked by James Island in July, 1863, when he attempted the Morris Island route. The truth of the matter is, that the point attacked by Generals Benham and I. I. Stevens near Secessionville J was the strongest one of the whole line, which was then unfinished and was designed to be some five miles in length. The two Federal commanders might have overcome the obstacles in their front had they proceeded farther up the Stono. Even as it was, the fight at Secessionville was lost, in great measure, by lack of tenacity on the part of Generals Benham and Stevens. Their troops outnumbered ours more than two to one, and fought with considerable dash. Some of them, in the impetus of the assault, went even inside one of the salients of the work. It was saved by the skin of our teeth. General Benham's attack was, therefore, hardly a " test" of the possibility or impossibility of carrying the James Island works. The failure in June, 1862, was no good reason for not making the attempt over again in July, 1863-1. Because that point of the attack was the strong- est instead of the weakest of the line, other parts of it, further west, being but feebly guarded and poorly armed. 2. Because the forces under me in July, 1863, were much less than those under General Pemberton in June, 1862. 3. Because in July, 1863, I had only 1184 infantry on the whole of James Island; whereas, in order to guard the defensive lines properly, I should have had a force of at least 8000 men there. General Gillmore says, p. 12: " A land attack upon Charleston was not even discussed at any of the interviews to which I was invited, and was certainly never contemplated by me." His reasons for not having contemplated such a movement are shown in paragraph 27 of his book, where he asserts, in substance, that beyond the capture of Morris Island and the demolition of Fort Sumter he never intended, with an army of only 11,000 men, and with so many difficulties in his way, to undertake any operations against the land defenses of Charleston, knowing as he did how superior my forces were to his own, and what facili- The assault at Secessionvifle was made by report of General David Hanter, who commanded Stevens's division of about 3500 men, supported the department, the attaek was made by General by General H. G. Wright's division, numbering Benham in violation of his instructions. 3 1 00. Wright's troops were not seriously engaged. The Confederate force engaged was commanded The aggregate Union loss was 683, of whom 529 by General N. G. Evans, and sustained a loss of belonged to Stevens's division. According to the about 200.-EDITORS. 2 1 THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. ties I had "for concentrating troops by railroad." " The capture of Charles- ton" was, after all,- and General Gillmore admits it,-" the ultimate object in view." The possession of Morris Islauld and the demolition of Sumter by the Federal land and naval forces were mere incidents in the drama. These (lid not cause the fall of the much hated and much coveted rebel city; and General Gillmore, " though lie had overcome difficulties almost unknown in modern sieges," 4 did not achieve " the ultimate object in view." The fact is that on or about the 10th of July, 1863, the Confederate forces available for the defense of the exterior lines of Charleston did not exceed 6500 men, distributedt to the best advantage for the protection of James, Sulli- van's, and Morris islands, and of the city proper; whereas General Gillmore had at that time, ac- cording to his own estimate, 11,000 men, whom he might have easily concentrated against any special point. Supposing that point to have been the James Island lines, the weak Confederate force there stationed: 1184 infantry, would have had to withstand an overwhelminbg assault. gNERAL. QUINCY A. GILLMORE. Transportation was altogether inadequate, and all effort made to reimnforee any of the above- named localities would have necessarily uncovered some other points equally liable to attack. General Gillmore exaggerates "the formidable strength of ' Fort' Wagner," as he persistently calls it, and explains how "its position, trace, armament, an(1 interior arrangements " compelled him to change the plan of operations first adopted against it. He says, p. 43 of his book: "It had an excellent command and a bold relief. . . . It was constructed of compact sand. upon which the heaviest projectiles produce but little effect, and in which damages could be easily and speedily repaired. It was known to contain a secure and capacious bomb-proof shelter for its entire garrison, and to 1e armed with between fifteen and twenty guns of various calibers, nearly all bearing upon and completely covering the only approach to it, which was over a shallow and shifting beach, of scarcely half a company front in width in many places, subject to frequent overflow by the tides, and swept by the guns of not only Fort Wagner itself. but of Battery Gregg, Fort Sumter, and several heavily armed batteries on James Island." " Battery" Wagner, as it should be called, for it never was a " fort," had successfully repulsed two assaults by overpowering numbers, and with such bloodv results as to deter the enemy from again attempting the same mode of attack. It withstood and baffled the combined efforts of the Federal naval and land forces during fifty-eight consecutive days. Indisputably General Gillmore's sucees on Morris Island was tardy and barren of the fruit expected and sought. Battery Wagner was originally an ordinary field-battery, erected, as General Halleck's report of November 15th, 1863. 22 THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSE OF FORT SUMTER. already stated, by General Pemberton to prevent a near approach from the south end of Morris Island. It was pierced for eleven guns, only three of which were heavy pieces. These were two 10-inch Columbiads and one 32- pounder rifled, which was of but slight service, for it burst after filing a few rolilnls all( was itever replaced. The other guns were 32-pounder carronades anld 12-pounder mortars, placed on the "curtain" of the battery, facing the aplproach from the south. Most of these had been disabled by the terrible fire opened upon them. The remaining ones were field-pieces and two 8 and 10 inch mortars, the latter being used as "coehorns" against the enemy's trenches. The work was strengthened and improved, its plan gradually modi- fied; traverses and merlons, an(l bomb-proofs capable of sheltering some 730 men (not 1600, as General Gillmore says, p. 74 of his book), were added to it by my orders, partly before the attack, partly after, and while the enemy was still making his advance. By the addition of a light parapet which I had caused to be thrown across its gorge, Wagner had thus become a closed battery, protected from a surprise on the rear. But it never was a "formidable work"; and, in fact, it fought the enemy from the 10th of July, 1863, to .the 6th of September of the same year, with men, artillery, algal with sand. The defense of Battery Wagner, with the great difficulty of access to it and the paucity of our resources, while those of the enemy were almost unlim- ited, will bear a favorable comparison with any modern siege ou record. The last bombardment of Wagner began on the morning of the 5th of Sep- tember, and lasted 42 hours, during which were thrown by the Federal land-batteries alone 1663 rifle projectiles and 1533 mortar-shells. The total number of projectiles thrown by the land-batteries against Fort Sumter up to September 7th was 6431, and against Battery Wagner, from July 26th to Sep- teniber 7th, 9875, making in all 16,326. And yet only Wagner was taken. Sumter, though a mass of ruins, remained ours to the last, and Charleston was evacuated by the Confederate troops near the close of the war, namely, on the 17th of February, 1865, and then only to furnish additional men to the army in the field. THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSE OF FORT SUMTER. BY MAJOR JOHN JOHNSON, C. S. ENGINEERS. -M1Y first recollections of Fort Sumter date back manded by Colonel Alfred Rhett, Lieut.-Colonel L to my boyhood, about 1844, when the walls Joseph A. Yates, and Major Ormsby Blanding. had not yet been begun, and the structure was The drill, discipline, and efficiency of the garri- only a few feet above high-water mark. Captain son were maintained at the height of excellence. A. H. Bowman, of the Corps of Engineers of the A spirit of emulation existed between this garrison United States Army, was in charge of works in and that of Fort Moultrie, on the opposite side of C'harleston harbor, and it was my fortune to the channel, consisting of the Ist South Carolina visit the fort very frequently in his company. Infantry (regulars), commanded byColonel William A year and three months of my life were after- Butler. The people of the State and city were ward spent in the fort, as engineer-in-charge, dur- proud of the two regiments; and the Charlestoni- ing the arduous and protracted defense by the ans thought of no greater pleasure for their visitors Confederate forces in the years 1863 and 1864. than to give them an afternoon trip down the har- In the beginning of 1863 the fort was garri- bor to see the dress-parade and hear the band play soned by the greater part of the 1st South Carolina at Fort Sumter. The fine record of this garrison, regiment of artillery, enlisted as regulars, and com- beginning with the 7th of April, 1863, when Rear- 2 3 THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSE OF FORT SUMTER. CAFTAlN T1iNMA A. Ii1GUE"IN :iN THE HIATqUARTguo-ROOM. FORT UXTER, DECEMBER 7, iMs. FROM A WAR-TIMR SKETCH. Admiral Du Pont's attack with nine iron-clad ves- sels was repulsed, continued until September of the same year, when the fort, silenced by Major- General Gillmore's breaching batteries, had no fur- ther use for artillerists, and was thenceforth de- fended mostly by infantry. One or two companies of artillerists would serve their turns of duty, but the new garrison was made up of detachments from infantry regiments of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, relieving one another every fort- night. The walls of the fort rose, on all its five sides. to a height of forty feet above high-water in the harbor; but they varied in material and thickness. The materials used were the best Carolina gray brick, laid with mortar, a concrete of pounded oys- ter-shells and cement, and another and harder sort of concrete known as Wdon, and used only for the embrasures. The searp wall was five feet in thickness, but as it was backed by the piers and arches of the case- mates, "the walls of Fort Sumter," as they are popularly called, varied from five to ten feet in thickness. The damage done to Fort Sumter by Du Pont's naval attack was severe in a few places. [See p. 19.] The combined effect of two shells, 11-inch and 1 ri-inch, respectively, striking near together on the outer eastern wall, or sea-front, was to make a eomplete breach on the interior of the upper ease- mates, and to show a crater six feet in height and eight feet in width, on the exterior of the wall. In another place the parapet was loosened for twenty- five feet of its length, some of the bricks falling out and exposing the gun-carriage behind it. The magazines of the fort naturally gave the de- fenders special concern. There were four, situated at the extremities of the gorge, nearest to Morris Island, and in pairs, one over the other. The stone- work built for their protection externally had been carried up only to the tops of the lower magazines. All were used in the naval fight of April 7th, forthey were not then so imperiled by a naval fire as later when the eastern wall became reduced in height, and the monitors could look into the arches of the western easemates. Before Gillmore'sguns opened, on the 17th of August, his operations on Morris Island caused the uppermagazines tobe abandoned and partly filled with sand to protect the lower ones. Only the eastern magazine then became endangered by his fire, and that so gradually as to allow ample time for the removal of its contents. It was my duty to examine and report the condition of these magazines almost hourly, and I well re- member how, by the aid of a little bull's-eye lan- tern hanging from my finger, and casting fantastic shadows on the piled-up kegs of cannon powder, I would enter the chamber, apply my ear close to the surface of the massive wall, and await the coming of the next rifle-shell, to hear how much more it shook the fort than the last, and to esti- mate its gain of penetration. Then, at night, when the firing slackened, I would take a rod and tape-line and inspect the damage from the outside. The time came at length when it appeared prudent to remove the 11,000 pounds of powder from the eastern lower magazine, but it was never breached, and was even used as a store-room to the last. The western magazine was less exposed to the direct fire from Morris Island; and on only two 24 THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSE OF FORT SUMTER. occasions was it in any great danger from the fleet. The fort had been nearly silenced by the land- batteries, when there occurred two night attacks on the part of the iron-clad squadron, and shells were thrown over the sea-wall into the vicinity of the only remaining magazine. One shell, well aimed, was stopped by sand-bags in the gallery Opening on the parade; one exploded near he closed copper doors of the outer chamber; another sent its smoke down the ventilator, and one set fire to some combustibles in the adjacent room used for charging shells. After that night of the lHt and 2d of September, the magazine was emptied of all but small-arnis ammunition, the last of soini 70,004) pounds of caltion-polowder being removed from the fort under fire without accidlent. But on the morning of the 1 Ith of Deeemiber, 1863, this sinall-arnis miagazine was blown up with disastrous effects. There had been qdite a lull in the bombardnient, and no firing on the fort for several days. The cause of the explosion was never discoverel. A lower casemate on the west- ern or city front, near the south-western angle, where the magazine lay, was occupied by Lienteii- alit Colonel Stephen Elliott (who had succeeded Colonel Rhett in command) and myself. As duty required night to be turned into day, we had not long turned day into night, but were fast asleep, when we were aroused by the noise of a great ex- plosion, the dull sound of heavy falling masses, ald the rush of sulphurous smoke into our quar- ters. I jumped out of bed and made for the eni- brasure, closed in wintry weather with a heavy oaken shutter. The casemates were so dark ill winter mornings as to require lighting; and now every light had been extinguished by the explosion. We were well-nigh suffocated, but, quickly raising and propping up the heavy shutter, jumped out through the opening upon the rocky foundation of the fort, all awash with a high tide that chilled our bare feet. On reaching the new sally-port, oin the city front, near the north-western angle, we found the smoke decreasing, but as no entrance into the magazine through those casemates could yet be effected, we were obliged to work our way around the outside of the fort nearly half of its entire circuit, and enter by another embrasure on the front opposite Sullivan's Island. Hastening into the parade of the fort, we found that the shelling hadbeen resumed by the enemy as soon as they per- ceived the explosion; and, in crossing the parade diagonally to the point where the magazine-gal- lery had its entrance, the commander was slightly wounded on the head. Entering the narrow gal- lery, that grew darker as we penetrated into it, we met scorched men jostling us as they hurried to the light and the air. Nearing the magazine, be- fore we were aware of it we trod in the dark- ness on the dead bodies of others tumbled together in the narrow gang-way. When the last body had been removed, and the passage once more was re- gained, it was seen that a fire was burning fiercely JNovember 27tb, 1863, the hot-marker at the look- alit on the western extremity of the gorge, Private James Tupper, Jr., of the Charleston Battalion, seeing VOL. IV. 3 in the outer chamberof the magazine, used for pro- visions. Here Captain Edward D. Frost, then serv- ing as post-commissary, must have been engaged at the moment of the explosion, issuing rations. He was instantly killed, and others with him; their bodies were never recovered. The gathering smoke and flames soon drove us back again to the parade. Efforts were made to confine the flames to the magazine, by erecting some barricades; but no good came of it; and the only success that I remember at this juncture was achieved by the telegraph operator, Mr. W. R. Catheart, who gathered up his wires, rescued his apparatus, and remounted it within another quar- ter of the fort. The fire, now beyond all control, spread rapidly upward, by the stairway, into the soldliers' quarters of the upper easemates, aid swept destructi ely through the lower ones. Many were scorched its their bunks, and some were cut off from the stairway and had to be rescued through an opening in the wall, by a long ladder. By this accident 11 risen were killed and 41 injured. For several nights, everything-provisions, water, even the reliefs of fresh troops-had to be brought in by ladders from the wharf to the upper caseniates; then it was necessary, after this level was gaiiied, to ascend yet higher, to the top of the massive embankment of sand and debris that closed and protected these high-arched casemates from the fire of the fleet and batteries. Thence, from the crown of those arches, and through a small opening, men, boxes, and barrels had to be brought by ladder, down fully thirty feet to the interior of the fort. It was weeks before the burnt quarters could be reoccupied. The use of the calcium light was resorted to by Major-General Gillmore in his siege of Fort Wag- ner, and again from Cumming's Point. Consider- ing the distance, three-qarters of a mile, the illuminating power at Fort Sumter was very great. The first night the light was displayed, in the win- terof 1863, I read by it the largest type of a news- paper. Our selitinels on the wall were dazzled and annoyed by it. The darkness of the night and of the waters around the fort was seemingly increased tenfold by the contrast. The appearance of this light, thrown upon the battered walls and arches of Fort Sumter, was always striking and beautiful. Its the days of Fort Sumter's prime, a conspic- uous object was the great flag-staff in the northern angle. Rising to a height of 80 or 100 feet above the harbor, it received the bolts and shells of Gill- more's first bombardment, until, splintered to a stump, it ceased to be used, and a smaller flag was displayed on the walls. Before that, the large gar- rison flag had been cut away seven times, and re- placed by climbing. This I saw done repeatedly by Private John Drury, and once by Sergeant Schaffer, both of the 1st South Carolina Artillery. After- ward, when the flag was flown from the south-east- ern angle, and again from the center of the gorge- wall, I witnessed feats of replacing it under fire. the flag shot away, walked, exposed the whole length of the crest, to the point where he was met by three others of the same command, C. B. Foster, W. C. Buck- 25 26 THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSE OF FORT SUMTER. It is a great mistake to suppose that Fort Sum- ter owed its proteetion mainly to the accumulation of its own debris. The bursting of a single large sbell on the exterior slopes would often be attended with the absolute loss to the fort of a ton's weight of material. The waste of material from the com- bined effects of battering missiles, bursting shells, scatterilig winds, and boisterous waves was simply enormous. The excavation of the parade, carried dowis four or five feet, at first furnished the mate- rial needed for the Irecaultionary filling of passages and casemates. But it soon became necessary to supply the fort almost nightly with large quantities of and in bags, ready to be placed wherever it was needed. And whenever this source faileul, resort was had to scraping up sand and gathering debris from the water's edge on the exterior. To keep the fort from going to pieces under its terrible bombardments was not the only concern of its defenders. They had nightly to take every precaution against attack by small boats landing columns on the two fronts most exposed to assault. This mode of attack, tried by Rear-Admiral Dahl- gre" on the night of Septemnber Sth, S163, failed in twenty minutes, with loss of life and the capture of 10 officers and 92 men. [See p. o5.] Afterward, when thewalls, were battered down much lower, and the task of climbing the exterior slopes was made much easier, it became necessary to anchor a boom of heavy logs off the exposed slopes, to spread wire entanglements near the base of them, and to place abristling array of fraises-sharpened wooden pikes, set in frames, all along the crest. Theseobstructions had tobe removed in daytime, or they would have been destroyed. The exposure of the men assigned to this duty was very great; they were always personally directed by Lieutenant John H. Houston, of the Engineer troops. It was while engaged inspecting these obstructions that Captain Frank Huger Harleston, of the 1 st Artil- lery, was mortally wounded on the night of No- vember 24th, 1 8(13. A complete system of interior defense was per- fected as early as December, 1S 63, consisting of barricades and blindages of sand-bags or logs as the case required, loop-holed for infantry and pierced for howitzer fire, searching every part of the interior of the fort. The garrison, in event of being driven to take refuge in the casemates and bomb-proofs, could thus protect itself, while all the Confederate batteries around the harbor could be signaled to open on the fort. htister, and A. J. Bluett. who lad clambered up by the ladders. But his cosmrades were ready, and with their assistanee he managed to display the flag in about twelve minutes. They were al exposed to great danger. One shell struck the flag-staffout of theJrhands. January 29th. 1864, the flag was shot away at the same loeality. and replaeed by Privates Shafer and Banks, assisted by Corporal Brassiugham. all of Lucas's Bat- talion of Artillery, and greatly aided by the acting adjutanzt of the post, H. Bentivoglio Middleton of the Signal Corps. Later in the same year. the flag of the post was moved to the eenter of the gorge-watt, at a point on the crest. aeessible by a short ladder from the torp of the bomb- proof quarter". The practice with two 30-pounder Par- rott rifles, at Cummning'sPo tnt, distant three-uarters of The successor of Lieutenant-('olonel Elliott in command of the fort was Captain John C. Mitehel, of the old garrison, viz., the 1 st South Carolina Ar- tillery. Few young Confederate offieers impressed me more favorably. He was a born soldier, a man of nerve, finely tempered as steel, with habits of order, quick perception, and decision, and he had been earnestly recommended for promotion. A lit- tle after noon on the 20th of July, 1 864, he took with him up to the highest point in the fort, the soutlh-western angle, his favorite telescope, which he was using to observe the enemy's works on Morris Island, when he was mortally wounded. When demolished by land-batteries of unprece- dented range, the fort endured for more than eighteen months their almost constant fire, and for a hundred days and nights their utmost power, until it could with truth be said that it at last tired out, and in this way silenced, the great guns that once had silenced it. From haiing been a desolate ruin, a shapeless pile of shattered walls and casemates, showing here and there the guls disabled and half-buried in splintered wrecks of carriages, its mounds of rubbish fairly reeking with the smoke and smell of powder, Fort Sumter under fire was transformed within a year into a powerful earth-work, impregnable to assault, and even supporting the other works at the entrance of Charleston harbor with six guns of the heaviest caliber. Thus it was not until February, 1865, a few months only before the war came to an end, that General Sherman's march through the interior of South Carolina obliged the withdrawal of Confed- erate garrisons and troops from Charleston and its vieinity. I had been sent elsewhere on duty, and was glad to be spared the leave-taking that fell to others. On the night of the 17th of February, 1865, the commander, Captain Thomas A. Hu- guenin, silently and without interruption effected the complete evacuation. He has often told me of the particulars, and I have involuntarily accom- panied him in thought and feeling as, for the last time, he went the rounds of the deserted fort. The ordered casemates with their massive guns were there, but in the stillness of that hour his own footfall alone gave an echo from the arches over- head. The labyrinthine galleries, as he traversed them, were lighted for a moment by his lantern; he passed out from the shadows to step aboard the little boat awaiting him at the wharf, and the four years' defense of Fort Sumter was at an end. a mile, was so fine that more than three shots were el- dom required for cutting down the staff; sometimes a singleahot sufliced. June20th, 1864, the flagwasreported shot away. The larger part of the staff remainedfast in the crest of the gorge, while the splintered spar, hearing the flag, was thrown inwardly to the ground. But siome slight delay arising in the planting, Lieutenant Charles B. Claibourne, of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (regu- lars,, mounted the wall with the c,,lor-, and in full view of the enemy, and under a rapid fire. lashed the two parts of the staff together with the halyard ropes, assisted by two brave, spirited men of the Engineer Departusent. Sergeant Nicholas F. Devereux and Corporal B. Branuon.-J. J. Z Fifty-one heavy rifle cannon were expended on Morris Island by the Union batteries.-J. J. MINOR OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON UNDER D1 PONT. BY PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, V. S. N. D URINO the six months immediately following the battle of Port Royal [see Vol. I., p. 671] Du Pont was principally engaged in reconnoitering and gaining possession of the network of interior waterways which extends along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, from Bull's Bay to Fernandina. Detachments of vessels under Com- mander Drayton visited the inlets to the northward, including St. Helena Sound and the North and South Edisto, while other detachments, under Com- manders John and C. B. P. Rodgers, examined the southerly waters, especially those about Tybee Roads and Wassaw and Ossabaw sounds. Nearly all the fortifications in these waters, with the excep- tion of Fort Pulaski on the Savannah River, were found abandoned. The coast blockade was thus partially converted into an occupation. In March an expedition on a large scale proceeded farther south, to attack Fernandina and the neighboring posts; bitt before it reached the spot the greater part of the troops garrisoned there had been withdrawn, under an order of February 2:d, issued by General R. E. Lee, at that time in command of the district. The expedition therefore met with little opposition, and occupied all important points in the neighbor- hoodof Cumberland Sound andthe St. Mary's River, including Fernandina and Fort Clinch, St. Mary's, and Cumberland Island. Subsidiary expeditions were sent out from this new base, and St. Augus- tine and Jacksonville to the south, and Brunswick and St. Simon's Island to the north, also came into the possession of the Union forces. The remainder of the year 1862, after the fall of Fort Pulaski [see Vol.1H., p. I],was passed by Du Pont's squadron in maintaining the blockade and itt strengthening the extended line of maritime occu- pation, which now reached from Georgetown, in South Carolina, to Mosquito Inlet, in Florida. Small encounters were frequent, and important captures of blockade-runnerswere made from time to time, but nothing occurred in the nature of a sus- tained offensive movement. A boat reconnois- sance in April from the P'enguin and Henry Andrew, at Mosquito Inlet, resulted in the capture of the party and the death of Budd and Mather, the com- manding officers of the two ships. A small flotilla occupied the St. John's River, and was constantly engaged in conflicts with guerrillas on the banks of the stream and its tributaries. In one of these en- counters Lieutenant John G. Sproston, of the Sea- eca, an officer of high reputation for gallantry, was killed. The yacht America, the famous winner of the Queen's Cup, was found sunk in one of the neighboring creeks and was recovered. In the North and South Edisto Lieutenant Rhind was actively occupied, and on April 29th, in the E. B. Hale, he captured and destroyed a battery. On the 13th of M1ay the Confederate army steamer Planter was brought out of Charleston Harbor, in broad daylight, by the colored pilot Robert Smalls, and delivered to the blockading squadron. A week later, the Albatross and 2Yorwich, under Commander Prentiss, steamed up to Georgetown, S. C., and, finding the works deserted, passed along the city wharves. No attack was made on the vessels; but Prentiss did not land, as he had no force of troops to hold the city. Toward the end of the same month Commander Drayton, in consequence of information given by the pilot Smalls, ascended the Stono River with a force of gun-boats, occasionally engaging the enemy. In September, 1 562, the Confederates in Florida attempted to regain possession of the St. John's River, and for this purpose constructed a fort at St. John's Bluff, arming it with heavy rifles. Com- mander Steedman, of the Pant Jonev, then in com- mand in the St. John's, supported by a force of troops under General John M. Brannan,l attacked and eaptured the battervon the 5th of October. The expedition then made a demonstration two hundred ) Later a divllnn conunander in the Army of the Cumul-eland, to which he was tran-ferred in April. 1863.- EDITORS. 27 - - - 'I--- (.- __ - .1 - .. . - - -.1 --- - - -1. - . -- 28 MINOR OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON. miles up the river Later in the year a combined expedition, also under Steedman and Brannan, made an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the bridge over the Pocotaligo River in South Carolina. The first month of the year 186;3 witnessed two serious disasters in the South Atlantic squadron. Toward the close of the month the force in Stono Inlet was coniposed of the Commodore Mclionough, Lieuteuant-Commander George Bacon, and the Isaa.csmith, Acting-Lieutenant F. S. Conover. On the afternoon of the 30th Bacon sent the Smith up the Stono River to Legareville on a reconnois- sance. Notwithstanding the vigilante of the look- outs, the Smith passed, without observing them, three batteries which the enemy had planted under a thick cover of trees at a bend in the river. The Smith was lying at anchor six hundred yards above the highest battery when it suddenly opened fire. The gun-boat replied, and Contover, seeing that le was caught in a trap, attempted to run dowVn past the batteries, but upon reaching a point at the center of the enemvy's conentrateld fire, his vessel received a shot in the steam-chimney vhielh dis- abled the engine. As there was neither wind nor tile to hellp him, Conover surrendered, after losing 8 killed and 17 wounded. The impossibility of bringing off the wotndetld prevented him from de- stroying the vessel. Upon hearing the firing, Bacon moved up the river in the Commuoblre Mcliogosqh to assist his consort, but when he arrived she listl already surrendered. and he was compelled to withdraw to avoil a similar fate. On the following day, the 31st, a second disas- ter overtook the squadron. Before daybreak on this date the force blockading Charleston was attacked by two Confederate iron-clad rams, the Palmetto State and (Chicora, commanded by Flag-Officer D. N. Ingraham. The blockading vessels included the sloop-of-war Homawt-aic, the gun-boats I sa- diltl and Otth,,a, and seven altered merchant vessels, of which the principal ones were the Atr- redita, _4,qjosta, Key8stne State, M.llemphis, and Quaker City, none of which was fitted to engage a ship-of-war, even an unarmored one. The night was dark and thick, the blockading line was strung out over several miles, with long intervals between the vessels, and the arrangements for signaling were imperfect. The first attack was made on the Mercedita by the Patmetto State. Approaching under cover of the darkites, the assailant was not observed un- til she was close aboard, and the guns could not be depressed sufficiently to reach her. At the mo- ment of being hailed she fired her heavy rifle, and the shell passed through the creedita.s condenser and steam-drum, exploding on the opposite side of the vessel. Stellwagen, the commander, finding his ship disabled, surrendered, and in response to a demand from the ram the first lieutenant, Ab- bott, was sent in a boat to her and gave a parole for the officers and crew. The Palmetto St/atP now joined the Chieora, which had already attacked the Keystopse State, Com- mander Le Roy. The latter vessel, having been set on fire by the explosion of a shell in her hold, withdrew to extinguish the flames, but, returning presently, renewed the contest, looking for an op- portunity to ram one of the Confederates. Her tire produced no impression on the rams, but, after a short struggle, she received a shot in both steam- drums which filled the ship forward with steam and rendered the engine useless. At the same time the ship was filling rapidly from the shot- holes already opened in her side, and Le Roy. hauled down his flag and prepared to abandon her. No notice being taken of the surrender, Le Roy presently hoisted his colors again, anti gradually withdrew from the scelme of action. Of the other ships, the .Mlemtphis, Q(aker City, and Asgbqtta took but slight part in the engagement, anti the two latter only toward the eld. Itt close action they would have rtmn the risk of being dis- tlbled in the same manner as their consorts. The Iloasatonic, the largest vessel present, was at the other end of the blockading line, anmd, under the supposition that the firingg was caused by blockade- runners, was not aware tmnmil daybreak of the ne- c-s--ity for her presence. By this time the rams had discontinued their attack and were returning to Charleston. The Houtsttonic exchanged shots with them at long range, but without inflicting material injury. A proclamation was issued on the same afternoon by General Beauregart and Flag-Officer Ingraham to the effect that the block- ade was raised, and that the rams had sunk, dis- persed, or driven off or out of sight the blockading fleet. Counter-statememits were made by the cap- tains of the squadron, showing that there had been no cessation of the blockade. The attack of the rams disclosed the necessity of a more powerful squadron on the Charleston blockade, and the Navy Department had already taken steps to this end, having also in contempla- tion an active offensive movement against Charles- ton. Z; The great broadside iron-clad -Me-e Irontides had already arrived at Port Royal, and during Jan- uary and February several monitors joined the station. The original Monitor, sent down for the same purpose at the close of December, had found- ered off Hatteras,asalreadyrelated. [SeeVol.L, p. 745.] The Montallk and P'aasaic had reached their destination safely, and they were followed by the P'atapsco, Nahant, Wefhawuken, C(atskill, and Noen- tmeiket, and by the experimental iron-clad Keokutk. In view of the contemplated movement, Du Pont desired to give the monitors a preliminary trial, and forthis purpose the aonatatk, Commander John L. Worden, was sent to attack Fort McAllister, on the Great Ogeechee River. A line of obstructions had been placed in the river opposite the fort. The first attack was made January 27th, 1863. The enemy's range-marks having been removed by a party in boats, under Lieutenant-Commander Davis, the Mfontamuk steamed up to a position 150 vards below the obstructions and came to anebor, her attendant gun-boats, the Seneea, fissalie7kon, Dares, and Williammus, anchoring a mile astern of her. The bombardment continued for four hours, until all the Yoataaik's shells bad been expended. Lying thus close under the fire of the fort, the The history of the 1iroiected attack en Charlesth, Is Riven by Admiral C. B. P. Rodgers in a following artile. MINOR OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON. THlE MONITOR "MONTAUK" DESTROYING THlE CONFEDERATE PRIVATEER NASiVILE," NEAR FORT M'ALLI5TEiR, OGEECIIEE RlVER, GEORGIA, FEBRUARY 28, 1MO. ,.on.itor was repeatedly hit, and nearly all the en- emv's shot that did not hit came within a few feet of her. She was entirely uninjured. On the other hand, it was not apparent that any serious damage had been done to the fort, though its fire gradually slackened. The attack was renewed on the 1st of February, but at a greater distance, owing to the state of the tile. The monitor's shells appeared to do good execution in tearing up the parapets, bitt the Confederates, by constantly moving their guns, thwarted Worden's attempts to disable them. The Montaukd was struck by heavy projectiles forty-six times, but still remained uninjured. At the time of these attacks, the Confederate steamer Nasrillet which had already done consid- erable service as a cruiser and as a blockade-run- ner, was lying in the Ogeechee waiting for an opportunity to run out. The prospect of her es- eaping and attacking the commerce of the United States gave the Government no little uneasiness. She had been sighted from time to time at her anchorage above the obstructions, but these pro- tected her from capture, and upon the approach of the Montan,' she always fled out of range. Her movements were closely watched, however, and late on the 27th of February Worden discovered that she had run aground a short distance above the barrier. Waiting until the next morning (29th), in order that he might have daylight for the work, Worden steamed up as close to the bar- rier as he thought it safe to go. From this point, directly under a hot fire from the fort, to which he made no reply, he attacked the Nashrille. Only her upper works were visible across the interven- ing neck of land. Obtaining the range accurately, Worden opened upon her with his two guns, the 11-inch and the 15.-inch, and the exploding shells soon set her on fire. After a short time a fog shut out the Confederate vessel from view, but the Moslask continued firing at intervals, according to the elevation and direction that had been al- ready ascertained. When the fog lifted, the Natsh- ville was discovered to be in flames, and just an hour after the beginning of the engagement her destruction was completed by the explosion of her magazine. The artillerymen in the fort did not fire with their usual accuraey, for the Montank was struck only five times. In descending the river subsequently, she ran upon and exploded a torpedo which blew a hole in her bottom, and she was beached in the muid. Some days later, she was repaired and her efficiency was completely restored. On the 30th of March a more protracted attack was made on the fort by the monitors l'cscoic, Patlapeo, and Mhaat, under Commander Drayton. The bombardment lasted eight hours, but, as Drayton said in his report, "no injury was done which a good night's work would not repair." After Drayton's bombardment, all attempts on Fort McAllister were abandoned, and the efforts of the squadron were directed wholly to the at- tack on Charleston. 29 THE EARLY MONITORS. The only event of importance during the re- mainder of Du Pont's command was the capture of the Confederateiron-clad Atlanta. Thisvessel, formerly known as the Fisjal, an English blockade- runner, had been converted at Savannah into an armored ram of the Memrnac type, armed with six heavy Brooke rifles and a spar-torpedo, and placed under the command of Commander William A. Webb. She was met on the 1 ,th of June, in Wassaw Bound, by the monitors Wechawiken, Cap- tain John Rodgers, and Nahapit, Commander John, Downes. The Weehawken engaged her, firing five shots, of which four struck the Atlanta. The injury inflieted by these was enough to show that a pro- tracted action would end in the demolition of the Confederate vessel, and she accordingly surren- dered. She was towed to Port Royal, where the damages received were readily repaired. THE EARLY MONITORS. BY CAPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON. IMPREGNABILITY, proved by capability to keep out Confederate shot, being demanded by President Lincoln and promised by the constructor of the monitor fleet which was built during the early part of I S62, it will be proper to inquire how far the performance accorded with the anticipation. Ad- miral Dahlgren, the distinguished naval artillerist, commanding the blockading fleet at Charleston, INiTEltUOtt VIEW OF THE TtURi-T OF A SE A-InN M The eomipart fos-ni of the gun-eanrriages, the Amopliy mwa.ive, ltort-eioppse-iu and tine en ruinmotu ize of the spi je-tile- (I-leth diauseter) were curpriseI to naval exler reported to the Navy Department that from July 18th to September 8th, 18sc, a period of 52 days, the monitors JF.e(hake4e`, PatIpeSeo , MOutaul-, Naiahnt, Catskill, and Passaic engaged Forts Sum- ter, Moultrie, Wagner, Gregg, and the batteries on Morris and Sullivan's islands, on an average ten times each, the Montauk going before the muzzles of the enemy's guns fifteen times during the stated period, while the Patapsco was engaged thirteen times and the WI eehatL-en twelve times. The num- ber of hits received bv the six vessels mentioned amounted to 629; yet not a single penetration of side armor, turret, or pilot-house took place. Ad- miral Dahigren observes that the Montauk was struck 154 times during the engagements referred to, "almost entirely," he states, "by 10-inch shot." Considering that the hull of the Mostauk was nearly submerged, and hence presented a very small tar- get, the recorded number of hits marked splendid practice on the part of the Confederate gunners. The report of the experienced commander con- cludes thus: "What vessels have ever been sub- jected to such a test f ' It merits special notice that the same monitors which Admiral Dahlgren found to possess such remarkable power of endurance had led the unsuccessful attack at Charleston three months before,-a circumstance which shows that difficulties presented themselves during that attack which had not been foreseen, or the magnitude of which had not been properly estimated. The following facts rebut the allegation that injudicious advice to certain officers induced the Navy Department to adopt thazardous expedients in connection with the attack on Charleston. A letter from the Assistant-Secretary of the Navy to me in reference to the contemplated attack, written before the news of its failure had been received, contained the following sentence: " Though everybody is despondent about Charleston, and even the President thinks we shall be defeated. I mnust say that I have never had a shadow of a doubt as to our uc- ess.. andi this contidence arises from careful study of your marvelous vessels." is-iTOn. To this letter I sent the following reply the next day: Deity of the eersial pro- "I confess that I cannot share ti your con- Is.-J. E, fIdence relative to the eapture of Charleston. I am so much in the habit of estimating force and resistance that I cannot feel sanguine of success. It ye sacceesi, it will not be a mechanical consequence of your 'mareelous vessels.' hut because you are nnnar- velou..ly hfu-tunaie. The most I dare hope is, that the contest will emnl without the lo.s of that prestige which your Iron-lods have conferred on the natiou abroad. A sngle shot may slnk a ship, while a hundred rounds eannot silence a fort, as you have proved on the Ogeechee. The Immutable laws of force ad resistance do not favor your enterprise. Chance, therefore, can alone save you." The discomfiture of the "marvelous" vessels before Charlestoni, however, did not impair their fitness to fight other battles. It will be recollected that the Weehawken, commanded by the late Ad- miral John Rodgers, defeated and captured the Confederate ram Atlasnta, in Wassaw Sound, June 17th, 1863, ten weeks after the battle of Charles- ton, consequently precious to the engagements in 30 THE EARL Y MONITORS. 3' , 1 i SATCON SOF THE HULL OF A SEAL-eitNtG MONOR. Thee ut represents a transverse section through the center-line of thit turret and pil.t-house of the 3eatisto -1ui .ther tar-going -essels of the -onitor tyi e. For an aeount, of the original -liftw gaeee VOL 1, p. -30. which this monitor participated, as reported by Athdiral Ilahigren. The splendid victory inWassaw Sound did not attract much attention in the United States, while in the European maritime countries it wavs looked upon as an event of the highest im- portanee, since it established the fact, practically, that armor-plating of the same thickness as that of Lu Moire and the Warrior could be readily pierced, even when placed at an inclination of only twenty- nine degrees to the horizon. Moreover, the shot from the !ce/eltairkea struck at an angle of fifty degrees to the line of keel, thereby generating a compound angle, causing the line of the shot to ap- proach the face of the armor-plate within twenty- two degrees. The great amount of iron and wood dislodged by the 15-inch spherical shot entering the citadel, protected by 4-inch armor-plating and 1 S-inch wood backing, was shown by the fact that forty men on the Atlantea's gun-deek were pros- trated by the concussion, fifteen being wounded, principally by splinters, a circumstance readily explained, since penetration at an angle of twenty- two degrees means that, independent of deflection, the shot must pass through nearly five feet of ob- structio.,-namely, eleven inches of iron and four feet of wood. Rodgers's victory in Wassaw Sound, therefore, proved that the 4 '-i.ch vertical plating of the magnificent Warrior of nine thousand tons - the pride of the British Admiralty- would be but slight protection against the 1 5-inch monitor guns. The destruction of the Confederate privateer Xashrille by the Monltauek, February 28th, 1863, also calls for a brief notice. The expedient by which this well-appointed privateer was destroyed, just on the eve of commencing a series of depreda- tions in imitation of the Jilabaoe, must be regarded as a feat which has no parallel in naval annals. The commander of the Montfuk, now Rear-Ad- miral Worden. having received stringent orders to prevent the Nashrilif from going to sea, devised a plan for destroying the privateer (then occupy- ing a safe position beyond the torpedo obstruction on the Ogeechee River), by means of the 15-inch shells which formed part of his equipment; bitt in order to get near enough for effective shelling, he was compelled to take up a position under the guns of Fort McAllister, then commanded by tap- tain G. W. Anderson, a Confederate officer of dis- tinguished ability. Obviously, the success of the daring plan of not returning the concentrated flanking fire from the fort while shelling the priva- teer depended on the power of endurance of the Moatauk, then for the first time subjected to such a crucial test. The result proved that Worden had not over-estimated the resisting power of his vessel. The fifth shell had scarcely reached its destination when signs of serious damage on board the priva- teer were observed; a few additional shells being dispatched, a volume of black smoke was seen ris- ing above the doomed Xashrile. The shelling was continued for a short time, with the result that the entire hull of the intended depredator was envel- oped in flames. The magazine ultimately exploded with terrific violence, tearing part of the structure into fragments. The gunners in the fort had in the meantime continued to practice against the Montaed-; but no serious damage having been inflicted, the anchor was raised and the vietor dropped down the river, cheered by the crews of the blockading fleet. I DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. BY C. R. P. RODGERS, REAR-ADMIRAL, 1-. H. N.,-DURING THE ATrACK klIlEF-OF-STAF. AS Boston was regarded as the cradle of American liberty, where the A infancy of the Union was nurtured, so Charleston, in later days, came to be considered the nursery of disunion. Therefore, during our civil war, no city in the South was so obnoxious to Union men as Charleston. Richmond was the objective point of our armies, as its capture was expected to end the war, but it excited little sentiment and little antipathy. It was to South Carolina, and especially to Charleston, that the strong feeling of dislike was directed, and the desire was general to punish that city by all the rigors of war. Charleston too, in spite of ail energetic blockade, conducted with great hardihood and patience, was one of the two chief points through which munitions of war and other supplies from Europe found entrance to the Confederate States. Naturally, then, the Government of the Union looked longingly for its capture, to give fresh hope and much-needed encouragement to the North, and to strike a heavy blow at the rebellion. The most dramatic conflict between the Xonitor and the Merrinac, with its incidents and consequences, gave to the Navy Department the hope that its turret vessels might do what unarmored ships could not attempt. Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a skillful and well-tried naval officer, a man of much ability and energy, pushed the new monitors forward with his whole power, having formed the highest opinion of their irresistible force and invulnerability. The first monitor had done so much, had saved such great interests in a moment of supreme peril, that Mr. Fox's strong imagination led him to hopes that were not destined to be fully realized. To carry them into execution he now addressed himself with his usual vigor; the preparation of 32 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. the armored ships for the attack on Charleston was hastened, their com- manders were selected by Mr. Fox himself, who knew the navy well, and he chose the best commanding offieers in it who were available for the great work he had so much at heart. Percival Drayton, John Rodgers, Worden, Ammen, George Rodgers, Fairfax, Downes, and Rhind were chosen for the turret ships, and Commodore Thomas Turner for the Ironsides. It would have been diffi- cult to find in the navy men of higher reputation for skill and courage, of better nerve, or more fully possessing the confidence of the service. As fast as their ships were ready, they were hurried to Port Royal, where they found in command Rear-Admiral Du Pont, who, by his skillful capture of Port Royal and his vigorous repossession of the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, had won the thanks of Congress and the complete confidence of the Navy Department. He had not only its confidence, but also to an extraordinary degree that of the commanding officers under him. Few com- manders-in-chief have had the good fortune to inspire the same admiration, affection, and trust that the officers who came in contact with Admiral Du Pont felt for him. The M11ontank, Captain John L. Worden, was the first monitor to arrive, and as months would pass before all the others could be expected, Admiral Du Pont, on the 1st of February, 1863, sent that officer in the MIontalk, sup- ported by the gun-boats JWissahickon, Lieutenant-Commander John Lee Davis; the Seneca, Lieutenant-Commander William Gibson; and the Datcn, Lieutenant-Commander John S. Barnes, to try her powers against the earth-works of Fort McAllister, on the Ogeechee River, behind which the Confederate steamer lNash uille was waiting for an opportunity to sail, on a cruise of pillage and destruction, against our ships of commerce upon the high seas. On the 28th of February, 1863, Captain Worden was so fortunate as to find the Nashville, aground, near Fort McAllister, and to approach within twelve hundred yards of her. He was able to set her on fire and destroy her with his shells, while he patiently endured the fire of the batteries, giving his whole attention to the cruiser. The so-called Alabamna claims were much diminished by this episode of Worden's, characterized by his usual skill and judgment. The Mlontauk, iii retiring from the fort, was injured by a torpedo and compelled to run upon a bank to repair damages, her pumps keeping her afloat with difficulty. The injury was at once repaired, temporarily, and more permanently upon her return to Port Royal. Still desirous to measure the iron-clads against forts on obstructed chan- nels, Admiral Du Pont sent Captain Drayton with the Passaic, accompanied by the Patapsco, Commander Ammen, and the Na hanut, Commander Downes, to try the batteries of these three monitors against Fort McAllister; with them were three gun-boats and three mortar-schooners. The result of this attack by the monitors, conducted by one of his ablest officers, led Admiral Du Pont to say to the Navy Department that "whatever degree of impene- trability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of destructive- ness as against forts." 3 3 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. The two operations left the admiral impressed with the great value of the resisting power of the monitors, but revealed some of their points of weak- ness, and satisfied him that their power had been overrated by the Navy Department, and that he should need as many of them as the department could give him to take Charleston. He fully appreciated the great desire of the Governmeat to repossess that city, and he addressed himself earnestly and loyally to carry out his Government's wish. He expressed no doubts even to his most confidential officers, and did his best with the means sup- plied. The Assistant Secretary had written to him repeatedly that such ves- sels could steam into Charleston harbor and come out unharmed, that even the original monitor could do so; to use his own words, "a an go all over the harbor and return with impunity. She is absolutely impregnable." His sanguine temperament had led him to imaginations that were not destined to be fulfilled; for even after Admiral Du Pont's brave and ambitious suc- cessor, Admiral Dahlgren, the foremost gunnery officer of the navy, had secured a greater number of monitors, and after the army had taken Battery Wagner by regular approaches, had captured all the batteries on Morris Island, and had reduced Fort Sumter to a heap of ruins, no monitor ever ventured to pass into the harbor and attempt to take Charleston bJy the purely naval attack which Admiral Du Pont had declared impracticable. It had always been the opinion of Admiral Du Pont that the attack on Charleston should be a combined effort by the army and the navy, and when he visited Washington, in the fall of 1862, he stated to the Navy Department MAP OF TILE BLOCKADE OF CONFEDERATE PORTS. i ! Jr I X jr 34 w:vt or 3= . Ads .1 I ' 1'' . , "2 \ 'ct 'r ' ", " F, I '3' --I 0 'k " , W " , r S1.1--l-11 I 'g 0 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. that at least twenty-five thousand troops should attack from James Island, while the fleet attacked the harbor. No such force could be spared. Assistant Secretary Fox, the executive officer of the Navy Department, patriotie, fertile of resource, full of zeal, resolute, and always able, rendered great service to the Union in creating so rapidly the new navy that did such good work in crushing the great rebellion; for this the country owes him a lasting debt. He now did his best to strengthen Admiral Du Pont's squad- ron, and in March, 1863, the Catskill, the last available iron-clad, reached Port Royal. The others had been - - somewhat strengthened and improved by tse light of tle Ogeeclhee experience, and the naval force was ready for the attack. The monitors assembled at North Edisto, and on the 6th of April crossed the Charleston bar and an- chored off Morris Island; for after crossing, the weather had become so hazy that the pilots could not see the landmarks to direct their course, and the attack was necessarily deferred until the following day. On the 7th at noon the signal was made to weigh anchor; it was the REAR-AL1ItR C. R. P. RODLERS. earliest hour at which the pilots would FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. consent to move, owing to the state of the tide. The movement was still further delayed by the JVeehaiwken, whose chain became entangled with one of the grapnels of the cumbrous torpedo raft devised by Mr. Ericsson, and it was a quarter-past one when the iron-clads left their anchorage, in the following order: the Weehaiwket, Captain John Rodgers; the Passaic, Captain Percival Drayton; the Montauk, Captain John L. Worden; Patapsco, Commander Daniel Ammen; N.eiv Irwnsides, Commodore Thomas Turner; C(atskill, Commander George W. Rodgers; Nantucket, Commander Donald M. Fairfax; lNahant, Commander John Downes; and Keokuk, Commander Alexander Rhind. The admiral had arranged to lead in the Ironsides, but, much against his will, after earnest persuasion from his captains, consented to occupy the center. As the fleet slowly passed near the beach of Morris Island, no shot was fired from ship or shore; Battery Wagner was also silent as it was passed; but as the leading monitor came within range of Fort Moultrie the Confederate and Palmetto flags were hoisted on the batteries, and a salute of thirteen guns was fired. It was 3 o'clock when the first shot was fired from Moultrie and returned by the Weehawken. Then Sumter and Batteries Bee and Beauregard, Cum- ming's Point, and Wagner opened fire, and the action became general. The Ironsides, flat-bottomed and with greater draught than the monitors, found 35 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. herself within one foot of the bottom, and under the influence of the current steered so badly that it became necessary to drop an anchor to bring her head to tide. The anchor was quickly raised, and she was again under way, but the delay threw the line into some unavoidable confusion, and two of the following monitors came in harmless collision with the flag-ship. They were directed to go on, disregarding the order of sailing, and the Ironsides quickly followed them; but when it was fifteen hundred yards or less from Sumter, the same difficulty in steering occurred, and the anchor was again dropped to prevent stranding and to bring the ship's head in the right direction. As the Ironsides swung to the tide into deeper water, she came directly over a huge torpedo, made from an old boiler, filled with gunpowder, and connected with Battery Wagner by an electric wire; but, fortunately for those on board, the electrician at Battery Wagner, to his great disgust, could Dot send the electric spark to the powder. The officers of the ironsides were unaware of their danger until a letter from Mr. Cheves, the electrician in charge, to an officer on board the Atlanta, and captured in that vessel, revealed the fact, stating that had he himself been allowed to place the Yankee flag-ship, he could not have put her more precisely over his great torpedo. [See map, p. 3.] In his order for the day, Admiral Du Pont had planned to deliver his first attack upon the north-west face of Sumter, passing inside the gorge of the harbor for that purpose, and lingering before the fort until he should have reduced it, or at least silenced its fire. The OIechaiwken, the leading monitor, pressing forward with this view, came to the floating obstructions between Sumter and Moultrie, and the probability of her screw being entangled and the vessel held immovable under a fire more deadly than any ship had ever before encountered led her commander to turn from the obstructions and begin the attack short of the place designated in the plan of battle. As he turned, a torpedo exploded under him, giving a shock but no serious injury to the monitor. In the whole navy there was no cooler, more gallant, more judicious man than John Rodgers. It was he who had fought the (hdlena so desperately under the fire at Drewry's Bluff, and continued the action until his ammunition was exhausted, his ship riddled, and his loss of men very severe. [See Vol. II., p. 270.] It was he to whom Secretary Welles wrote, June 25th, 1863: "To your heroic daring and persistent moral courage, beyond that of any other individual, is the country indebted for the development, under trying and varied circumstances on the ocean, under enormous batteries on land, and in successful rencontre with a formidable floating antagonist, of the capabilities and qualities of attack and resistance of the monitor class of vessels and theii heavy armament." No officer in the navy was better qualified to command its confidence when he decided not to attempt to force the obstructions. He was followed by Percival Drayton, Farragut's trusted and well-tried chief-of-staff, by John Worden, of monitor fame, and by that grim, true-hearted, fighting man, Daniel Ammen. These, all turning short of the obstructions, threw the vessels following into some confusion, and caused the Ironsides to lose her steerage-way and to anchor as already mentioned. DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. While the anchor was being lifted to move forward, Admiral Du Pont turned to his chief-of-staff and asked the time. Upon being told that it was nearly 5 o'clock he quietly said, "Make signal to the ships to drop out of fire; it is too late to fight this battle to-night; we will renew it early in the morning." At that time he had not the slightest thought of abandoning the attack; no such idea had occurred to him or to any of his staff who were with him. He had chosen the north-west face of Sumter as his point of attack, because after careful study he found it the point where his ships would be least exposed to the enemy's fire from the surrounding batteries. The north- east face was struck, as was afterward learned, fifteen times, the attacking vessels never having reached the position chosen by the admiral; the east lpan-eoul)6 five times, the east face thirty-one times. Very few shots were aimed at Moultrie. Admiral Diu Pont (lid not wish the fronusides to fire until very close to Sumter, and her fire was accordingly withheld; but after he had made the signal to retire for the night, he was asked to permit the men to try their guns, and with his habitual consideration for the feelings and wishes of those under his command, lie allowed them to fire one broadside, eight guns, at Moultrie. This caused the enemy to open a heavy fire on the flag-ship, and as it was coineident with her retirement, it was supposed at Fort Mloultrie to have injured her and caused her withdrawal. The (lay on which this engagement took place was very beautiful; there was little wind and the sea was smooth. When the Confederate guns of 10-inch, 9-inch, 8-inch Columbiads and 7-inch Brooke rifles, with many other rifled and smooth-bore guns, were turned upon the iron-clads, the sight was one that no one who witnessed it will ever forget; sublime, infernal, it seemed as if the fires of hell were turned upon the Union fleet. The air seemed full of heavy shot, and as they flew they could be seen as plainly as a base-ball in one of our games. On board the Ironsides, the sense of secur- ity the iron walls gave those within them was wonderful-a feeling akin to that which one experiences in a heavy storm when the wind and hail beat harmlessly against the windows of a well-protected house. This, however, was not equally felt in the monitors; for in their turrets the nuts that secured their laminated plates flew wildly, to the injury and discomfiture of the men at the guns, while the solid plates of the Ironsides gave no such trouble; and although she was reported to have been struck ninety-five times, she was uninjured except by the loss of a port shutter and the piercing of her unarmored ends. In fact the Ironsidles may be considered to have taken no active part in the attack, for she fired no shot except as she passed out of action, although she fairly tested her endurance. As the Ironsides lifted her anchor to drop down to the anchorage for the night, the admiral meaning to close with the enemy and force his way into the harbor the next morning, the other vessels, retiring from closer action in obedience to his signal, came near, some of them within hail. The first was the Keokitk [see p. 11], riddled like a colander, the most severely mauled ship one ever saw, and on her deck the daring and able Rhind, than whom no braver man ever commanded a ship, and who came limping forward, wounded, 37 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. BOMBARDMENT OF FOIRT S-MTER AND ADJACENT FORTS BY THE UNION FLEET, APRIL 7, 1iSE. The monitors engagrd were the We-Aawke.. Paak, Montauk, (aiul, Nahala, Pa.apaeo, and Nan-'ket. to tell in a few emphatic words that his ship was disabled. Then followed two or three of the monitors, their captains telling the story of disabled guns or crippled turrets. The others reported by signal. Orders were at once given to the mechanics of the squadron to work all night in repairing damages, and after dark the commanding officers, having made their ships secure, came on board the flag-ship to report in person. They assembled in the large cabin of the Ironsidles and sat at the table where the admiral had already taken his seat. Each captain then told the story of his ship, its action and its condi- tion, and when they had done, Admiral Du Pont went to his state-room and, having already given his orders to his staff, he was seen no more that night. The approaching darkness, and the difficulties presented by the outer obstructions in the channel, had decided Admiral Du Pont to defer the attempt to reach the city or pass inside Sumter until the following morning should give him a long day for such serious work. Before the morning came, he had learned the crippled condition of his iron-clad ships, and had become convinced that the force given him could not accomplish the end desired. His effort, therefore, on the evening of the 7th of April, may be looked upon as a reconnaissance in force, showing that the plan he had formed for the capture of Charleston was impracticable. During the war there had been instances of similar reconnoissances by land, where deference to the public clamor for action at any cost had pro- duced hopeless but very bloody and disastrous battles; and perhaps the public mind had been more sympathetically thrilled by them and better satisfied than if those in command had been guided by wiser and more pru- dent conclusions, and had spared the lives of their men, hopelessly hurled 38 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. against insurmountable barriers. Admiral Du Pont never showed greater (courage or patriotism than when he saved his ships and men, and sacrificed himself to the clamor and disappointment evoked by his defeat. In the brief engagement of the 7th of April, the K'okuk, the iron-clad that was nearest to Sumter, was struck ninety times; nineteen shots pierced her armor at or below the water-line; both her turrets were pierced in many places; the forward gun was disabled early in the contest, and the vessel was with great difficulty kept afloat until the next morning, when she fell over on her side and sank at the lower anchorage. No ship was ever more gallantly fought or better handled. The IWeehairken was struck fifty-three times; her deck was pierced so that the water ran through it; her side armor was in one place so shattered by repeated blows that it only remained in splintered fragments which could be picked off by hand, and at one time the turret revolved with difficulty, owing to heavy blows. The Passaic was struck thirtv-five times. Early in the action, shot striking the turret disabled the 11-inch gun, rendering it useless for the remainder of the engagement. Soon after, the turret was found to be jammedl, and for a time immovable, but this injury was so far repaired that it could be revolved, although for a time irregularly. In his report, Captain Drayton says, " A little after, a very heavy rifle-shot struck the upper edge of the turret, broke all its eleven plates, and then, glancing upward, took the pilot-house, yet with such force as to make an indentation of two and a half inches, extending nearly the whole length of the shot. The blow was so severe as to considerably mash in the pilot-house, bend it over, open the plates, squeeze out the top, so that on one side it was lifted up three inches above the top on which it rested, exposing the inside of the pilot-house and rendering it likely that the next shot would take off the top itself entirely." The Montauk was struck fourteen times but was not materially injured. The Patapsco, the fourth vessel in the line, was struck forty-seven times, and her 150-pounder rifle was disabled at its fifth discharge and could not be used again during the action, and that monitor was able to fire only five shots from each of its two heavy guns. The Catskill was struck twenty times, but was in no point disabled. The ANantucket was struck fifty-one times, and its 15-inch gun was disabled after its third discharge, by shots received on its port-stopper and turret, driving in the plating, and rendering the gun useless for the rest of the day. The turret was jammed for a time, so that it would not turn; the deck was much cut, and the side plates so much injured in one part that, in the opinion of the reporting officer, another blow in that quarter would have knocked them off. The Nahant was struck thirty-six times and was badly mauled. The turret was jammed by the blows of heavy shot so that it was disabled and could no more be revolved during the day. A piece of iron weighing seventy-eight pounds was broken from the pilot- house and thrown across it, deranging the steering gear, killing the quarter- master at the helm, striking down the pilot, and leaving the commander alone in the pilot-house. The vessel was entirely disabled and was compelled to drop out of action, as were the Passaic and Keokuk also, before the signal to retire 39 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. was made. These statements are taken from the official reports of the corn- manders of the vessels engaged, which give much more elaborate and striking statements of the injuries received; they are significant of what would have happened in a prolonged conflict. The Confederate officers, in prepar- l ing for the defense, had moored buoys l at proper places to give them accurate - D. Nfranges, and as the Union ships came in line with these buoys, the forts fired alredy tehby batteries with perfect precision and have given carefu ttremendous effect. Each ship was only renew the a Drig te ewmiabout forty-five minutes under the o heavy fire, and they encountered only the outer line of defense, but their bat- force ou ayitotetered armor, their crippled turrets, and take, and we can h communicatheir disabled guns proved the power RuAR-ADgIhAL D. M. FAIFIAX. I of the forts and the coolness and skill A Pin ITthehIand of the Southern gunners. At daylight, when the chief-of-staff went on deck, he found the admiral already there, who said to him, with his usual straightforward frankness, " I have given careful thought (uring the night to all the bearings of this mat- ter, and have come to a positive determination from which I shall not swerve. I ask no one's opinion, for it could not change mine. I have decided not to renew the attack. During the few minutes we were under the heaviest fire of the batteries we engaged, half of our turret-ships were in part or wholly disabled. We have only encountered the outer line of defense, and if we force our way into the harbor we have not men to occupy any forts we may take, and we can have no communication with our force outside except by running the gauntlet. In the end we shall retire, leaving some of our iron- clads in the hands of the enemy, to be refitted and turned against our block- ade with deplorable effect. We have met with a sad repulse; I shall not turn it into a great (lisaster." Grieved as was his listener by the thought of losing a success which had been looked forward to with great hope, he was compelled to admit that the reasoning and the conclusion were sound and wise. And so it was announced to the fleet and to the army that the attack would not be renewed. The mon- itor Patapsco was sent at once to Port Royal to make that place secure, and the other monitors were ordered to be ready to sail as soon as the Ironsides could cross the bar. As the morning passed the captains of the iron-clads came on board the flag-ship in a body to pay their respects to the admiral. He asked for no expression of their opinion, but they took occasion to assert it frankly and fully, and all concurred in the belief that it would be useless and unwise to 40 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. renew the attack with the existing force. This unasked opinion was, of course, gratifying to Admiral Dn Pont. It came from men of recognized judgment and experience, and they never flinched from it in later days when they might have won favor in high places had they wavered in their disinterested allegiance to their old leader. The iron-clad captains stood like a wall of iron about Admiral Du Pont's reputation, and there was no joint to be pierced in their armor. While still at anchor inside the bar, and near Morris Island, Admiral Du Pont received the following order, brought with all speed by Colonel John Hay, the President's private secretary, and delivered on the 8th of April, the day after the battle: "(Confidential.) NAVy DEPARTMENT, April 2d, 1863. " SIR: The exigencies of the public service are so pressing in the Gulf that the Department directs you to send all the iron-clads that are in a fit condition to move, after your present attack upon Charleston, directly to New Orleans, reserving to yourself only two. Very respect- fully, GIDEON WELLES." There came also at the same time this informal letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy: " NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 2d, 1863. "DEAR ADMIRAL: Matters are at a standstill on the Mississippi River, and the President was with difficulty restrained from sending off Hunter and all the iron-clads directly to New Orleans, the opening of the Mississippi being considered the principal object to be attained. It is, however, arranged, as you will see by to-day's order, that you are to send all the iron-clads that survive the attack upon Charleston immediately to New Orleans, reserving for your squad- ron only two. We must abandon all other operations on the coast, where iron-clads are neces- sary, to a future time. We cannot clear the Mississippi River without the iron-clads, and as all the supplies come down the Red River, that stretch of the river must be in our possession. This plan has been agreed upon after mature consideration and seems to be imperative. " With my sincere prayers in your behalf, my dear Admiral, I remain, sincerely, yours, " G. V. Fox. " REAR-ADMIRAL S. F. Du PONT, Commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Port Royal." These communications made it still more necessary to get the monitors ready for service with the least possible delay, and oin the 11th, there being a sufficient depth of water, the Iropisides and the monitors crossed the bar: the former resuming her station on the blockade, the latter returning to the workshops at Port Royal. Late at night on the 8th of April, after Admiral Du Pont had received the letters just quoted, General Hunter sent his chief- of-staff and his chief-of-engineers to propose to the admiral that the army should land on Morris Island and occupy it, supported by the naval force. Admiral Du Pont showed these officers the order he had received from the Navy Department, and declined the proposition they brought him. After leaving the admiral's cabin, these distinguished staff-officers sought the naval chief-of-staff and wished him to urge their proposal. He again showed them the order from the Navy Department directing the transfer of the iron-clads to the Mississippi, and asked them if any right-minded officer in his position, in the face of such an order, could urgeohis chief to do what they proposed. The ehief-of-engineers, Colonel Duane, replying, frankly admitted he could not. VOL. IV. 4 41 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. THE MONITOR "WEFRIAWEEN" CATURING oTHE CONFEDERATE IRON-CLAD RXM "ATLANTA" (FORMERLY THE BLOCKADE-RUWNER "FINGAL")I WASSAW SOUND, GEIIRGIA, JUNE 17. 186. Before leaving Port Royal, General Hunter had constantly insisted that with his force he could do nothing until the navy should put him in possession of Morris Island by the capture of its batteries. At that time [Spring, 1863] it was known that thirty thousand or more troops were at Charleston and its immediate neighborhood. These, by interior lines covered by strong defenses, were in easy communication with Morris Island. The island itself had at its north end the Cumming's Point battery, and it was completely crossed from sea to marsh by Battery Wagner, that strong work which the army attempted to carry by assault in July, and from which it was repulsed with great slaughter. The inland side of Morris Island is in some measure protected from a naval fire by sand dunes and ridges forming in places a natural parapet; and when General Hunter, on the 8th of April, proposed to occupy that island, the Confederate troops, in force three times greater than his, passing to the island by their well-protected interior lines, might have overwhelmed the Union troops by their superior numbers, and have captured them, or driven them to their ships. In July, when General Gillmore, who on the 12th of June had succeeded General Hunter, executed his very skillful and well-arranged movement upon Morris Island, the thirty thousand troops who were present in April, and had witnessed Admiral Du Pont's attack and stood ready to oppose it, had been withdrawn from Charleston to distant fields of service. [See p. 13.] In fact, so small a force was left for its occupation as to create the gravest apprehension in the minds of its defenders, who were very anxious lest a night landing should be made at Sullivan's Island, for the defense of whose long line only about six hundred Confederate troops could be made available. Upon the failure to carry Battery Wagner by assault, General Gillmore besieged it until it was at last taken by regular approaches, the enemy evacuating it and the whole island on the 7th of September, when our 42 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. engineers had pushed their trenches up to its ditch. During all the opera- tions against Wagner, Admiral Dahlgren [succeeded Du Pont, July 6th, 1863] gave the army his most vigorous support by the fire of his monitors and the Irosis ides. On the 17th of August, in one of the many engagements with this fort, Commander George W. Rodgers, Admiral Dahigren's chief-of-staff, was killed, while temporarily commanding the Catskill, the same monitor he had (onhlmanded under Admiral Du Pont in the action of the 7th of April. He had taken his ship very close to the enemy, resolved that no one should be closer than he, when a heavy shot struck the pilot-house and, breaking through its armor, instantly killed him and Paymaster Woodbury, who was standing 1)y his side. Commander Rodgers was an officer of great courage and rare skill in his profession, a man of very pure and devout character. Cumming's Point and Battery Wagner having been occupied by General Gillmore, that skillful officer turned his increased fire upon Sumter; the fleet battered it with heavy guns, and the fort became in appearance a heap of ruins. Its artillery fire ceased, but its garrison held the ruins with tenacious grasp; the attempt to occupy it by our forces was repulsed with heavy loss, and it remained in the possession of the rebels until General Sherman's march to the sea and through the Carolinas in February, 1865, placed him in the rear of Charleston and compelled the evacuation of that city and its defenses. This was nearly two years after Admiral Du Pont had declared it (o0ld(1 not be taken by a purely naval attack, and had declined General Hunter's proposal to make Morris Island his base of operations. Admiral Du Pont believed that the troops should attack from James Island with at least double the force General Hunter could put in the field. Events proved the wisdom of this belief, but it brought the admiral professional mortifiea- tion and great wrong. History abounds in examples of the anger and bitter- ness with which, under popular governments, ministries have been ready to sacrifice commanders who have not strengthened their administration by success in war. The great President was superior to such littleness; so much cannot be said for his Navy Department. Admiral Du Pont's failume to take Charleston with the means allotted for its capture occurred before General Grant's magnificent strategy and persistence had defeated the rebel armies in the field and taken Vicksburg, and before Meade and Hancock with the Army of the Potomac had broken the back of the rebellion at Gettysburg. It was of immense importance that some great feat of arms by land or by sea should cheer the supporters of the Union, strengthen our Government, and discourage the friends of our dismembepent on the other side of the ocean. Iron-clads and fast cruisers were being built in England and France for the so-called Confederate States, the French Emperor was seeking opportunity to declare against us, and the ruling class in England was too ready to join hands with him. The "plain people" of that country were steadfastly our friends, a fact we should never forget. The Navy Depart- ment had formed extravagant ideas of the power and invulnerability of what Mr. Fox called " these marvelous vessels," ideas not fully shared, while they were in their tentative and undeveloped state, by their great designer, as 43 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. may he seen in his paper on the monitor class of vessels in "The Century" magazine for December, 1885. [See p. 31.] On the 31st of January the Secretary of the Navy had sent the following hedging letter to Admiral Du Pont, a letter contradictory in its terms, but declaring that the necessity for the capture of Charleston had become imperative, and that the de- partment would share the re- sponsibility with commanders who made the attempt: " SIR: Your confidential dispatch, No. 36, dated the 14th instant, has been received. "The department does not desire to urge an attack upon Charleston with inadequate means; and if, after careful examination, you deem the number of iron-cads insuflicient to render the capture of that port reason- ably certain, it must be abandoned. The department is not acquainted with the harbor obstructmoes eon- structed by the rebels, and therefore cannot advise with you in regard to those obstacl S. f they are not con- sidered sufileient to prevent your entrance, it is not believed possible for the rebels to prevent your success RAaUAT MIIAL DARNIEL AME FROM A PfloTc.kading with all other means combined. The five iron-cads sent you are all the department has completed on the Atlantic coast, with the exception of one retained at Newport News to watch the iron-clad Richmond. No others are likely to be finished and sent to sea within the next six weeks. A large number of our best wooden vessels, necessary for the blockade. but not for the attack, are unfortunately required in the West Indies to pursue the Florida anSI A Iahaera. This withdrawal of blockading vessels renders the capture of Charles- ton and Mobile imperative, and the department will share the responsibility imposed upon the commanders who make the attempt. Inclosed is a copy of a memorandum furnished by the Secretary of War. Very respectfully, GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. "REAR-ADI-1RAL S. F. Du PONT, commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Port Royal, S. C." It was impossible for an admiral to decline the responsibility which the Secretary offered to share, or to consider discretionary what the Secretary told him was imposed, or to abandon what the Secretary told him was impera- tive. Oi the 26th of March Assistant SecretaryFox wrote toAdmiral DuPont: " General Halleck told the President that you had serious doubts as to the capture of Charleston. In our department, where we know best your charae- ter and the skill and judgment you bring to bear upon the great undertaking, there does not exist a doubt of your complete success." Fox had always favored a purely naval attaek, with the army looking on, as at Port Royal. The Richlnond was built in l s62 with means raised by subscription, and was the first fully armored ship put afloat on James River by the Confederates. She remained in the James River Squadron to the end of the war.- EDITORS. 44 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. The attaek was delivered as the Navy Department wished. That it was earnestly and loyally delivered, those accomplished and well-tried fighting men who commanded the iron-clads have established by their testimony. That Admiral Du Pont was right in his decision not to renew the attack, the events of the next two years conclusively proved. No ship of the navy entered the harbor of Charleston, even after Sumter was in ruins, its fire silenced, and the batteries of Morris Island in our possession. The harbor was a c(l-de-sar, a circle of fire not to be passed. It was not the same problem so magnificently solved by the great sea king, Farragut. He passed the guns of his enemies, and having passed, his fleet was in a place of safety, whence he compelled surrender. Admiral Dahlgren, an officer of great personal intrepidity, long our chief of ordnance, goaded by newspaper attacks, chafed under his inability to do what had been expected from him; but his judgment concurred with that of his predecessor, and he recognized the fact that his force could not take Charles- ton. The councils of war that he called on the 22d of October, 1863, and on the 12th of May, 1864, advised against the attempt, and it was never made. Since his death, we learn from his biography, written by his most trusted confidante, his very clever and devoted wife, that he addressed a long letter to the Navy Department, justifying his course and vindicating the navy from the unfair attacks made against it. The biographer goes on to say: "i But the Navy Department seems to have lacked, at the time, the moral courage to assume fearlessly the full responsibility of its action which this publication would have involved, and the letter was read and returned to Admiral Dahigren. We hold the manuscript in our posses- sion, thus indorsed by the admiral, 'Withdrawn November 8th, 1865, the department objecting to the introduction of Du Pont and the opinion of the officers, and to those parts where it is assumed, or seems to be so, that the department did not send vessels enough.-J. A. D.' The department was too inimical and revengeful to Du Pont to be just or to be willing to have him relieved in any measure, through any act of theirs, of any possible effect of their continuous displeasure." The journal kept by Admiral Dahlgren during his service before Charles- ton, recording from day to day the difficulties he encountered month after month, against which he struggled manfully but hopelessly, is the perfect vindication of Admiral Du Pont's sound judgment and wise discretion. The story of the first attaek upon Charleston is finished. Grieved by his unsuccessful effort to take that city, Admiral Du Pont was deeply pained by the attitude of the Navy Department toward him. Swift stories of harsh comment, perhaps exaggerated, were brought to him from Washington, wounding him to the quick, as did also the significant silence of the Secre- tary in relation to his reports. A correspondence followed that at last became acrimonious. He did not ask to be relieved from his command, but in one of his letters to the Navy Department, in speaking of an implied cen- sure, he said, "I have the honor to request that the department will not hesitate to relieve me by any officer who, in its opinion, is more able to exe- cute the service in which I have had the misfortune to fail-the capture of Charleston." Anxious to throw the blame upon any shoulders but its own, the brave veteran was deprived of his command by the Navy Department. 45 DU PONT'S ATTACK AT CHARLESTON. It was the old story, but a very sad one. Adlmiral Di Pont took with him to his retiremient the respect and sympathy of those who had been with him in his active service. In the words applied to another commander- in-chief, by the historian, Oen- eral Sir William Napier, they "had served long enough unu- der his command to know why the soldiers of the tenth legion were attached1 to Csar." Arriving at Port Royal, Ad- miral Du Pont hurried forward the repairs of the monitors with the view of sending them to the Gulf, as directed by the Secretary of the Navy. On the 16th, however, came orders to renew the menace against Charleston, but his monitors were not repaired, -nor could the Ironsides cross the bar until the next spring - tides. UEA-ADRALJ.A. DAflLOUM AUO PHOT1CGRAI'H Meanwhile, the dispatches re- citing the details of the battle of the 7th of April had, on their way north, crossed the orders from the Goverunent, and after they were received with their development of weak- ness in the attacking force, the obstructions in the channel, and the strength of the defenses to be overcome, the order for continuing to menace Charles- ton was not reiterated, nor was the proposal of the admiral to make the next demonstration from Edisto, instead of Morris Island, rejected, approved, or made the subject of the Department's letters. The plan of sending the monitors, to the Gulf was abandoned, and the Navy Department sent a large body of workmen to strengthen the monitors, work that was estimated to require twelve weeks' labor. General Gillmore, General Hunter's successor, began his preparations to occupy Morris Island, and while they were in progress Admiral Du Pont received notice that Admiral Foote had been appointed to succeed him. This distinguished officer dlied on the 26th of June, and Admiral Dahlgren, who was to have been Foote's second in command, was appointed commander-in-chief. It is curious to observe in Admiral Dahlgren's biography how little he approved the scheme of attacking Charleston by Morris Island, and how inadequate he thought the force assigned for this important undertaking. One notes also how sanguine of success he found the high functionaries of the Navy Department. 46 THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER. Awaiting the arrival of his successor, Admiral Du Pont would not commit hitl to a plan that (lifl not conimend itself to his own judgment. He had always thought ('harleston could not le taken from Morris Island, but, with the loyal fidelity that had always characterized him, he put his whole force ill prepartation to move at a day's notice if his successor should so elect. The ammlunition and coal vessels were made ready, the repairs onl the mollitors were hleld in readiness to be ended at a day's notice, preparatory orders were senit to the force off Charleston, andl had Admiral Dahlgren so desiredl, the fleet could have moved to tlh attack the moment his arrangements with Genieral (Gillmore were completed. Tlie new and the old admirals exchanged cordial greetings; they were old frielns, and the good feeliiig between them was iiot disturbed. Both had the samie object at heart, the suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of the Union. Admiral Dahlgreti assumed command on the 6th of July, and Admiral Du Pont left forever the active service of the navy. When, some- what later, lie was offered the command of the Pacific Squadron, far from the seat of war, lhe repelled with indignation the proposal that he should be employed anywhere but in the face of the enemy. Those who (lid him great wrong have passed away, but his statue in imper- isliable bronze stands to-day in one of the most conspicuous quarters of the capital of the Republie, a quarter called by his name, to show how highly the country valued his services. THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER. BY THOMAS H. STEVENS, REAR-ADMIRAL, r. S. N. BYJuly 10th, 1863, a combined movement of the United States land and naval forces in the neighborhood of Charleston had giveti them a footing on the south end of Morris Island, and active preparations followed for the reduction of Batteries Wagner and Gregg. The results of the movement referred to, and the establishment of batteries, gave General GJillmore's command a position about half a mile from Wagner. For two months operations were conducted against the en- etny, and during this period one or two unsuccess- ful sorties) were made from Wvaguer. On July 1 xth the second of two assaults was made against that fort, which resulted in a loss to us of from six to seven hundred men out of four regiments.t Of this affair Rear-Admiral Dahlgren says in his "Memoirs": About sunset an aide brought a note from General Gitiute on halt a blank leaf, writtemi in pencil, saying thalt hi' hat ordlered an aissallt; annd iy the waiting tight We could see the masses conl- g along the heach, but thre d-irkness shut them in cre they reached the fort. Pr-- Kitly caine the flasbes of light and the sharp rattle trroul mekets and cannon. There could be no telp from tUa,fovit, uroedrka -tl te g htg kill frie-ld as eettagfoe. t the " Milittry Operations of Gent-rat Beaure- garul"d Iloeti is made of a r.eounssauce in snmo:all forte tin the night of July 14th-lth.-EEDITOts. Teu regiments participated in the attack. The All we co.ld do was to took on anl await an issue not In o.arco-Atrol. The coutestwe-mt on .fr an hlilmrnndahalf and then died away. It wa.s oer; Ilu.t whit had won 1I This and other statements in the N Memoirs" show the lack of mutual support between the two commanders. Without such support failure was inevitable. Had the time for the assault been fixed so that the navy could have supported the move- ment ,-as, later, at Fort Fisher, when the fire of the ships was directed by signal,- it is fair to pre- sume that the effect of our supporting fire wouli have been most demoralizing. and might have been enough so to have produced a different result. From this time until the abandonment of Wagner and Gregg, hardly a day passed without urgent appeals for the assistance of the fleet from the commanding general, who was at times apprehen- sive of a sortie from the fort. Now aid was asked to intercept probable re;nforcing expeditions of the enemy, and agaiti the vessels were called tn to interpose for the protection of the forces engaged iii the trenches and approaches to Wagner. To all of these appeals the navy responded promptly and zealously, and undler the protection of our fo.,r asfferlng the greatest Ih-ies were the 54th MAasa- c Iusetts olored), 272; the 4sth New York, 24-2 the 7th New Hatnipal.re. 216: atid the iOtli New York, 175 = 903. The total Ution toI. was 1515.- EDITORs. 47 THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER. guns work on the trenches went on steadily until September 6th, when they were pushed up to the ditch of Wagner. All that day we cannonaded the fort, preparing the way for an assault to be made the next day at 9 A. M. Wagner was soon silenced, and thereafter the men worked in broad daylight without molestation, whereas, before that time, as Admiral Dahigren states, ' a man could not show a finger." About daylight on the 7th a message was re- ceived by tie admiral from army headquarters, stating that the enemy had evacuated Wagner and Gregg, and that Morris Island was in our posses- sion. The news spread quickly, and afloat and ashore speculation was rife as to what the next move would be and how the great advantage gained would be improved. "On to Charleston!" was the prevailing sentiment. General Gillmore, anticipatingan attempt of the enemy to recover a footing on Morris Island, re- quested the admiral to send a monitor up as near as practicable to Battery Gregg to frustrate any at- tempt in this direction, and the present Rear-Ad- miral E. B. Colhoun with the Weekawkeu was finally selected for the duty. In carrying out these orders the monitor grounded badly within easyrange of the Confederate batteries on Sullivan's Island. About 5 o'clock all the other iron-clads came up to engage the batteries on Sullivan's Island, while an exam- ination was being made of the obstructions across the channel-way, two hundred yards above Sumter, as the admiral was desirous of learning if there was a passage on either side of them, and also, what was the condition of Sumter's channel-face. For this duty my command, the P'atapsco, was des- ignated, with the Lehigh as a support. We had to run some fifteen hundred yards of batteries on Sullivan's Island before Sumter could be reached. Realizing the insignificant power of two monitors against the force of the enemy's batteries, and the fact that the more quickly the duty was performed the fewer were the chances of disaster, I determined not to jeopardize the Liiylq'x safety as well as the P'atapsce's, and orders were given to get up a good head of steam, to load the guns with grape and canister, and to turn the turrets fore and aft in a line with the keel, the guns pointing forward. Waiting until the iron-elads were hotly engaged with the enemy, the order '1four bells and a jingle " (full speed ahead) was given, and, not waiting for her consort, the Patapsco dashed forward. When the enemy perceived the object of this movement, many of their batteries openedpsm us heavily, but it was not until we had reaehed a point about 150 vards from Sumter and the like distance from the obstructions, that we encountered the terrific con- verging fire from Fort Moultrie, Batteries Bee and Beauregard, and the batteries still farther up the bay. To make an examination of Sumter and the obstructions occupied 25 or 30 minutes, during which time we were struck 25 times by the heaviest projectiles of the enemy, and suffered serious dam- age. We fired several rounds of grape and canister at bluoys supporting the obstructions, supposed to be of rope and extendimg from shallow water at a point two hundred yards above Sumter, in a north- easterly direction, to the shoals on the Sullivan's Island side. Wedid not see a man on Sumternor any sign of a gumi on the channel-face, which seemed to be intact. Having accomplished the object of our mission, the bow of the JPatapsco was turned seaward to run the gauntlet again and report to Admiral Dahlgren the result of our examination. The iron-clads were still heavily engaged when we came up to the Iroisides, to which vessel the ad- miral had gone at the beginning of the engage- muent; I found him in the gangway, looking ill and anxious, but evidently much relieved at the Patapsco's safe return. Many officers of the vessel and the fleet shared in this feeling. When it is remembered that, since the first attack on Sumter by Du Pont, no demonstration had been made, except in full force and under cover of the night, that the enemy had exact range to cover with their guns the approach to the obstructions, and that while making the examination we were enduring the converging fire of the enemy's heaviest bat- teries, only about eight hundred yards distant, our escape from more serious results seems re- markable. As soon as my report was made the iron-clads withdrew from action and took up their usual an- chorage for the night. The morning of the next day (September 8th) found the )Vekhairkea still aground and the enemy pounding away at her. About 10 A. M. signal was made from the flag-ship, " Iron-clads assist Wee- haarl'e'." Slipping the moorings of the Patapsco we hastened to the relief, but before we had gath- ered headway a shot from the grounded monitor landed ill Moultrie and exploded a magazine; this elicited loud cheers from sailors and soldiers, and the admiral signaled, "Well done, Jleehawrk-en." Colhoun was defending his vessel vigorously and valiantly when, by 11 A. M., the iron-clads moved into position and opened a strong fire on the Sulli- van's Island batteries. Colhoun was then left in peace and afforded an opportunity to arrange for the liberation of his vessel from her extremely perilous position. About 4 P. t. she floated. About 1:30 P. x., as we were heaving up the I'caapecf)8 anchor, in obedience to the signal, "Withdraw from action," our engine was disabled from the effect of our own fire. I hailed the Nahcat and directed Lieutenant Cornwell, her commamiding officer, to drop down to our assistance and take us in tow. This order was given through our sur- geon, Dr. Wheeler, who, at great personal risk, went forward and passed it along. Coruwell was prompt and efficient in obeying the order, under a heavy fire, and he soon had us within easy hail of the present Vice-Admiral Rowan's vessel, the Ironsides, which had taken up her anchorage beyond the range of the enemy's gIns. As we approached, Rowan made a welcome signal for me to come on board his ship to dinie, as usual. His views and mine in regard to the situation, and our ideas as to future operations, were in perfect har- mony. He had had a large professional experience, and I never saw his equanimity or judgment dis- turbed under the most trying circumstances; while the intelligent handling and fighting of his ship 48 THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER. showed conclusively that a master of his art was in command. In the incomparable Belknap-the present commodore-he had an executive always ready to do his will, and in the best possible way. We had just lighted our pipes on the Ironisides for an after-dinner chat when Flag-Lieutenant S. W. Preston was announced, with orders for the commander of the Patapsco to report on board the flag-ship. On our way to the vessel Preston in- formed me that it was the intention of the admiral to attack Sumter that clight in boats, and added: "You are selected to conmuand." This informa- tion was corroborated by the admiral. My judg- ment opposed the movement on the grounds that we were without reliable knowledge of the in- ternal or external condition of the fort, and of the practicability of scaling the walls, for which no provision had been made; that sufficient time had not been allowed for the proper organization of a force for service of so desperate a character; that the enemy had been fully notified that some dem- onstration was to be made by the gathering of boats around the flag-ship, in open daylight; that they would naturally conclude Sumter to be the objective point anil would defend it to the last ex- tremity; and, finally, that if a lodgment were by ally possibility effected on the fort, and the fort taken, we could not hold it so long as the obstruc- tions remained in the channel. For the enemy's iron-clads and batteries above and around Sumter, being unmolested and beyond our reach, would sever our communications and starve our people out. I made these representations and asked per- mission to decline the command. To this no direct response was given, but, in the course of conver- sation, the admiral said: "You have only to go and take possession. You will find nothing but a corporal's guard to oppose you." Going down to the wardroom, my decision was briefly made known in reply to the interroga- tionis of friends. Within half an hour Preston joined us; he had evidently been conversing with the admiral, for he was thoroughly informed on the situation and used his best efforts to alter my determination, urging among other reasons that the army was organizing for an independent dem- onstratini to be led by General T. G. Stevenson, an officer of tried valor and established reputation for whom we all had a great personal liking. As Stevenson was the ranking officer, General Gill- more contended that the expedition should com- bine under his leadership. The admiral would not consent to this, on the ground that it was a boat expedition and purely naval in its character. After giving me this information, Preston added: "If you do not go, the naval demonstration will fall through and the army will reap all the glory." My convictions of the impracticability of the assault were unshaken, but my reasons could not he made known without injurious results. I was in a quandary and saw no way out of it, but per- sonal appeals from such men as Lieutenants B. H. Porter, Preston, and Moreau Forrest, with other considerations, finally had their effect, and I relue- tantly consented to go. By the time the watchword for the night had been arranged it was half-past ten o'clock. As we were taking leave of our friends, the present Rear-Admiral Rhind suggested to me that one division of boats should be sent around Sumter as a feint, while the remainder should wait within easy distance of the fort for the order to advance. This suggestion was adopted, and Lieutenant (now Captain) Francis J. Higginson was selected for the command of the party. His demonstration, among other things, was to develop the extent of the enemy's defensive preparations. The admiral's barge was placed at my disposal, and Lieutenant Forrest, an officer of rare judg- ment, intelligence, and merit. was appointed as my aide. Final instructions were given to the officers commanding divisions to make the best of their way to the fort when the divisions were formed and the order was given to advance. Instructions of a general character were given to Lieutenant Higginson, and a tug having been brought into service, its commander was directed to lie by the Patapsco on leavingthe flag-ship. The barge was to stop alongside the formervessel for Dr. Wheeler, as we had no medical officer with us. We finally shoved off, and after the necessary short delay by the Pa lapsco while the surgeon was making his preparations, were towed by the tug toward the picket monitors Moswack and Lehigh, which I instructed to move up to our support, as the admiral, at my request, had authorized me to do. We moved slowly on our way to the fort. It was a calm, clear, starlight night. The only sound was the steady thumping of the tug's propeller, and nothing was seen ahead but the grim, half-de- fined outline of the fort. When the master of the tug reported that he could go no farther, the boats were cast off, the divisions were formed, and Hig- ginson, an officer of courage and judgment. was directed to carry out the instructions previously given him. He accordingly moved off to do so, and most of the division commanders dashed off also, under the impression that his movement was a general one, and that the order to advance had been given. Efforts to recall them were made, but in vain. Nothing remained to do but to give the order for the remaining boats to make the best of their way to the fort.- Through this misappre- hension all the good effects of Higginson's demon- stration were lost. On our way to the fort in the barge, fairly flying under the strokes of the oars- men, we observed a large number of boats lying on their oars; we hailed them and directed them to pull in, but as no sign of a movement was made by them, then,-or, indeed, during the whole affair,- we concluded that it was the army foree awaiting the result of our demonstration. As we neared Sumter we were hailed loudly by the enemy, but no answer was returned. Simultane- ously a rocket was sent up from the fort, and al- most as it exploded the air was filled with hissing, shrieking missiles from the Jamnes and Sullivan's Island batteries, which seemed alive with fire, while an iron-clad was pouring grape and canister into the boats and sweeping the approaches to the gorge. The parapets and crown of Sumter were 49 THE BOAT ATTACK ON SUMTER. THE BOAT ATTACK ON FORT SUMTER. filled with men pouring a murderous fire down on our defenseless party, and heavy missiles and hand- grenades helped on the work of destruction. Be- fore this fire had fully developed, two boats from the Powihata and others had effected a landing. As was subsequently learned, their crews and officers were driven to shelter and taken prisoners. All these things were evidences of the enemy's foreknowledge of our purpose and complete prep- aration to frustrate it. The "corporal's guard" that we were to have eneountered proved to exceed our own numbers. Under these conditions but one expedient was left-to effect an early withdrawal. The order to retire was accordingly given through Lieutenant Forrest, andwas several times repeated. Admiral Dahlgren, who was watching the opera- tions from a boat in the distance, says in his jour- rnal, " Moultrie fired like a devil, the shells break- ing around me and screaming in chorus." What must have been the impression in the midst of the cyclone, where the air was blazing with bursting shells, and the ear was deafened with the roar of cannon, the rattle of musketry, the whistling of grape. and the explosion of hand-grenades! Withdrawing in the barge from the vortex of the fire. we remained near the fort to afford assist- ance to aiy di-bled comradea, and about 4 o'clock, as day broke, we pulled to the flag-ship to report the results of the assault and determine the extent of our loss. We found this amounted to 124 killed, wounded, and missing, out of 400 men. Among the killed was Lieutenant C. H. Bradford : OL the 13th of April, 18in, Beauregard announced to the War Depa.rtm,,ent that he had obtained a key to the signal., but suspected deception. Major John John- son writes to the editors that advantage was taken of the signals in pre-plngto resist the assault on Wagner, July 18th, and the bolt aIttactks on Cnnn...W's . Pofint ..nd of the Marines. Lieutenant E. P. Williams, Execu- tive of the Powhatafn, a brave and dashing officer, and Lieutenants B. H. Porter and S. W. Preston were taken prisoners. They were all exchanged, and Porter and Preston were killed in the second attack on Fort Fisher. Preston, Porter, and For- rest - the last of whom died of yellow fever in the West Indies-were close friends, and alike in those qualities that adorn humanity and make heroes of men. Lieutenant F. W. Dunce and Dr. Wheeler, both of the Patapaco, in this affair sustained the high reputation they had already earned on every occasion when the Patapsco had been engaged on perilous service. Conspicuous, also, were the serv- ices of Daniel Leech, Acting Paymaster of the Patapsco, who at the same time performed the duties of signal officer. There was material in the command, both in officers and men, that would have insured success, had this been within the range of human endeavor. Five thousand men could not have captured the fort that night. After the war General Beauregard wrote me two letters on the subject of the attack, in which he "ays, in effect: "After the fall of Wagner and Gregg, acting under the belief that our forces were thereby demoralized, the enemy would doubtless make a demonstration against Sumter. Our im- pression to this effect was strengthened by the number of armed boats seen to be gathering around the flag-ship, from vessels inside and outside, dur- ing September 5th. We were, moreover, able to read all the signals made that day. 4 Sumter was Fort Sumter, in September. On the other hand. General W. B. Taliaterro, who commanded on Morris Island at the time of the attack on Battery Wagner referred to by Major Johnson. states in the "Philadelphia Times," Noveniber 1lth, 1882, that the Union signals were net interpreted on that o-easton.-EnrToas. 50 SOUTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON. accordingly rehnforeed,k and, when attacked, con- taimed 450 men. One of oar iron-clads was ordered to take up a position to sweep the ap- )roaches to the gorge with canister and grape. The guns in the shore batteries were loaded amnl trained upon the approaches to the fort, and the men were ordered to stautd by their guns, lock-strings in hand. At the given signal of a rocket from the fort, all the batteries were to open." And farther: if our guns had not opened so soon and fired so rapidly, we would have captured or destroyed your whole command." This is true. In the "Memoirs" of Admiral Dahlgren I find, under the date of November 20th, 1863, the following: "Last night the army undertook to feel the force in Sumter, and sent two hundred men in boats for that purpose. About thirty yards from the fort a dog barked and aroused the garrison, which fired, wounding two of our men. The rumor was, the night before, that an attack was to be made, and I ordered the monitors on picket to cover our men. A few shots were fired by the fort and then there was quiet." I think this was the last demonstration of the kind attempted. M Major John Johusoit says of this tatemnent: "Snot- relieved by Major Elliott and the Charleston Battalion ter was lint reinforced; but tn the night of Set- of infantry, 320 strong. No, troops after that date were temht.r 4th-6th, Rhette enfeebled garristmn had been sent to the fort before the boat attack on September 8th." SOUTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON. (January-July, 1863.) Rear-Admiral S. F. Du Pont, commauding. Comuantder C. R. P. Rodgers, Chief-of-Staff. SCaEW-FRIGATE.-Waftbh, Coiti. T. G. Corbin, 1 150- ptdi-r Parrott, 1 I1-inich, 1 3e-pkler Parrott, 42 9-iitehi. SCiIIW-sLOttPs.-Pwalene, Coin. 0. 1i. Balch, s 9-inch, I loo-pottuder Parrott, 1 60-pounder Daihigren; Comait- ifoigtoa. CaIpt. J. F. Gree-i, 2 11-itieh pivot, I 150-pounder Parritt pivitt, 3 20-pounder Parrott, 2 12-polidtier rifle howitzers, 2 12-pounder 8. B. howitzers; Hotsatolic, Capt. W. R. Taylor, 1 11-inch, 1 loo-pounder PFrtott, 3 30- pounder Parrotts, 4 32-piunders, 1 12-poulder S. B. how- itzer. 1 12-1ioit-der rifle howitzer; Mahaek, Coo.. A. K. hlughes, 6 32-piders, 1 24-p'der S. B., I 12-p'der howitzer. SiDE-WHEeL SrEaxsa.-Poirhntaa, Capt. S. W. Go- do.., Caitt. Charles Steedman, 7 9-inch, 1 100-pounlder Pu-rott pivot, 1 21-inch pivot. GTs-toATs.-W issohiekaol, Licut.-Ctiltn. J. L. Davis, 1 151-pounder PFrrott pivot, 1 20-pounder Parrott pirtit, 2 24-plauoder S. B. howitzers, 1 12-isountler rifle howitzer; Set...e Lient.-Cou. Williami Gibson, 1 11-inch pivot, 1 20-pounder Parrott pivot, 2 24-pounder S. B. howitzers; V-adiito, Lieot.-Cor. S. P. Quackenbush, 1 11-ich pivot, I 20-pounder Parrott pivot, 4 24-pounder S. B. howitzers, 1 12-pounder S. B. howitzer; Marblehead, Lieut.-Co-u. R. W. Scott, 1 11-inch pivot, 1 20-pounder Parrott pivot, 2 24-poituder S. B. howitzers; Ottawa, Lieut.-Com. V. D. Whitiiig, 1 11-inch, 1 29-pounder Parrott, 2 24-pounder hoiwitzers; WIatr Witch, Lent.-Coot. A. Pendergrast; H-ren, Lieut.-Coni. G. A. Stevens, 1 11-inch pivot, 1 20- pounmder Parrott rifle, 2 24-pounder S. B. howitzers. DOaUBLE-ENDoRs.-Sebags, Cor. J. C. Beau.mont, 1 100- pounder PFarritt pivot, 6 9-inch, 2 24-pounder S. B. how- itzers; Citarrea, Cor. A. G. Drake, 1 100-pounder Par- rltt, 1 9-ieh, 2 9-inch pivot, 4 24-pounder s. B. howitzers; Cs.-saatzgh, Coi. Reed Werden, I 100-pounder Parritt pivot, 4 9-lo-, 2 24-pounder S. B. howitzers 1 l-inch pivot; Patti J-O--, Cor. Charles Steedman; Cor. A. C. Rhind; Lieut.-Com. E. P. Williams, 1 1100-pounder Parrzitt itiv-t, 1 I-inch pivot, 4 9-inch, 1 12-pounder S. B. light. PUuRi-HAED STEAMERS.-.Sooth 0arolinta, Coot. 1. J. Ailiy, 1 2pounder Parrott, 1 24-punder S. B. ht-iwtzer, 4 -inch, 2 32-pounders; I)onr, Act. Lieut. JohnS. Banies, Att. Muster James Bri.wn. 2 32-pounders, 1200-pounder PFra tt, 1 20-1siunder Parrott, 1 12-pounder howitzer; 11erredit, Citi. H. S. Stellwagen; Quaker City, Coi. J. M1. Frailey; Catttmsdare MrDsmissgh, Licit.-Coi.. George Bc:-on, 1 9-1ich pivot. I 100-ptunder Parrott, 2 50-siontdlr Dahlgr-n riflt, 224-pounder S. B. howitz-rs; Pat-itsaks, Act. V.-Lteut. William Bttdd, 5 gns.; E. B. Hnlr,Act. Lieut. E. Brodhead, 432-pounders, 1 30-pouulder Pat-rott pivot; Lactose, Coin. E. R. Colhonit, 1 100-poon-ler Put-nut tivot, 1 30-poluder Parrott pivit, 1 -itich, 4 24- itilidor S. B. howitzers; Xorwich, Coot. J 3t. Iliitea-n, 4 8-iucb, 13G-pounder Parrott, 1 12-pounder rifle howiltzer; Wr ma.smtl, Act. V.-Libut. J. W. KittreIlgW, 4 32-potinth-ra., I 20-po.unler Parrttt, 1 12-pounder rifle howitzer; Key- ste11 S.tle, Com. WV. E. Le Rly, 6 S-inch, 2 32-punuder., I 50-tPounder Dahlgren, 2 3-pounder Parrotts, 212-pounder rife howitzers; Madgic, Act. Master F. B. Mertam, 130- pounder Parrott pivot, 1 20-pounder Partrot llivot, 2 24-pounder S. B. howitzers, 1 12-pounder S. B. how- itzer; Isaac S.,ith, Act. Lieut. F. S. Conover; Ja-es Adger, Cor. T. H. Patterson, 1 9-inch. 6 32-pounders, 1 20-pounder Parrott, 1 12-pounder S. B. howitzer; Au- as-ta, Cor. E. G. Parrott, 6 8-inch, 1 100-potuder Parrott rifle, 2 30-pounder Parrott rifles, 1 12-pounder rifle how- itzer; Flag, Cor. J. H. Strong, 4 8-inch, 1 1o-inch pivot, 2 30-pounder Parrotts; Flitmheao, Lieut.-Com. J. H. U-l ahbtr, 1 30-tpunder Parrott pivot, 1 29-pounder Parrott pivot, 2 12-pountier heavy howitzers; atettin, Act. Mas- ter C. J. Van Alstine., I 30-pounder Parrott pivot. 4 24- pounder S. B. howitzers; ar.a-, Act. Master William Watson. 4 32-poulders, 1 20-pounder Parrott; Memphis, Lieut.-Coin. P. G. Watmough, Act. 3taster C. A. Curtis, 4 24-pouiider S. B. howitzers,1 30-pounder Parrott rifle, 2 12-pounder rifle howitzers. MONITORs.- (I 15-inch, I 11-inch. each.) Pstapseo, CoIn. D. Arnine- ; Passaic, Captain P. Drayton; Nahant, Cor. John Downes; J3ondtaik, Cor. John L. Worden Cor. D. M. Fairfax.; antte-, Con. D. M. Fairfax, Lieut.-Comn. L. H. Nenwman, Cor. J. C. Beau..ont; Weeha.eken, Captain John Rodgers; Catskill, Cor. George W. Rodgers. OTHER IRON-LADS.-Keekttk. Cor. A. C. Rhind, 2 11- inch S. B.; New Irnsides, Coiii. T. Turner, 14 11-inch, 2 190-pounder Parrotts, 2 90pounder Dahlgreus. HuI.tING VEssELs (Barks).-Kiagjslher, Act. Master J. C. Dutch. 4 9-inch; Braidiera, Act. Master W. T. Gil- lespie, 6 32-pounders; Restless, Act. M.aster W.R. Browiie; Midaight, Act. Master N. Kirby, 1 20-pounder Parrott pivot. 6 32-pounders; Fe-na-di i s, Art. Master E. Moses, 6 32-pounders, 1 20-pounder Parrott pivot, 1 24-pounder S. B. howitzer. WOiRTAR-8CHooNERS.- C. P. Williats, Act. tMaster, S. N. Freeman, 2 32-1pontders, 1 2e0-p1otider PFrrrott rifle, 1 13-ineh mortar; Para. Act. Master E. G. Furber, Act. Master Edward Ryan, 2 32-poutiders, 1 13-inch mrtar; .Vorfolk Pacet, Act. Ensign G,-urge W. Wood, 2 32- potunders, 1 13-i-leh mortar, 1 12-pon-d-r rifle howitzer. SToRE8sIP8.- rerViel-. Coot. William Ru-ynolds, 10 8- in l, 8 32-p ders; ralparnisu. Act. Master A. s. Gardiuct-. Tuos, TENDERs, AND Disp.xTrc BO.Ts.- 0. Jt Peltit, Act. Ensign T. E. Raldwio, 1 20-poutler lPar-ott, 1 30- potit.der Parrott; R .eare, Act. Elsigi C. A. BlHieharil., 1 20-pounder Parrott, 1 12--ounder rifle towitzer: Ho-w, Act. Master J. E. Rockwell, 1 2o-pititder Patrrott pliilt; Dao tfil, Art. Master E. 31. Baldiwi, 1 20o-pon-der Par- rott rifle, 1 20-pounder Dahlgreit rifle: ot)tdeftioea, Au-t. Ensign Williai BaTymnlore,2giiii; tColostbie Act. Mas- ter J. S. DIeitnia, Act. Ensign E. Daly, 2 20-1outder P:tr- rotts; G. W. Bliul. Act. Master J. R. Beers, 1 12-pontnder rifle howitzer, 1 12-1o-undr S. B. howitzer; Aeis-ir, Act. Master J. Baker; Olestidee, Act. Master J. S. Dennis, 2 30-pounder Parrott pivots. 5' THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1 863. BY QtUINCY A. GILLMORE, BREVET MAJOR-1ENERAL, U. S. A. 1HARLESTON HARBOR somewhat resembles the harbor of New York ' inl general outline, and is about half its size. The city itself, occupying the lower end of a narrow peninsula between two navigable rivers, is distant about seven miles from a bar which obstructs the entrance from the sea, stretching bow-slhaped from Sullivan's Island on the north side to Morris Island on the south side of this approach. These islands and others adjacent to them are separated from the main-land by soft alluvial marshes that range in width from one to three miles, and in depth from about fifteen to eighteen feet, and are cut up by numerous creeks and deep bayous, and are submerged by all tides higher than an ordinary flood. The width of the throat of the harbor between Sullivan's and Morris islands is 2700 yards, which is practically narrowed to about one mile by a shoal that makes out from the south side, on the northern edge of which stands Fort Sumter. The position in its general features seemed to invite an assault by water, and to present a peculiarly attractive field for naval heroism and prowess; while its approaches by land from the sea islands which we occupied were practically closed by impassable swamps to any but a greatly superior force. The defenses which had been constructed by the United States for the har- bor and city of Charleston were designed to resist a naval attack only. They comprised: (1) Fort Sumter, a strong brick work, as strength was reckoned in those days, mounting two tiers of guns in casemates and one tier ( A biarbette. It stands on the southern edge of the channel, distant three and one-third miles from the nearest point of the city. It was planned for 135 guns, but never received its full armament. The embrasures or ports of the second tier, not having been finished when the war began, were bricked up by 52 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. Major Anderson's command early in 1861, and were left in that condition until destroyed by our fire from Morris Island. When this fort fell into the enemy's hands, April 14th, 18631, it contained seventy-eight pieces of service- able ordnance, all smooth-bores, ranging from 24-pounders to 10-inlch Colum- l)iads. (2) Fort Moultrie, a brick work located oii Sullivan's Island about one mile from Fort Sumter, mounting one tier of guns ept barbette. Before the outbreak of the war its armament consisted of fifty-two pieces, of which the heaviest were 10 and 8 inch Coluinbiads and the lightest a battery of field-guns. (:) Castle Pinckney, an old brick fort one mile east of the city on Shutes Folly Island. Its armament at the beginning of the war comprised twenty-eight pieces of rather small calibers. At the outbreak of the war the Confederates began to add largely to the strength of the existing defenses by constructing strong and well-armed earth-works at the upper and lower ends, as well as at intermediate points, of both Sullivan's and Morris islands; by reenforciug the walls of Fort Sumter adjacent to the magazine; by increasing the armament of that work and of Fort Moultrie with heavier calibers, including large rifles; by rebuilding and rearming old Fort Johnson, on James Island, on the south side of the inner harbor west of Fort Sumter; by constructing several batteries on the shell beach south-east of Fort Johnson; by mounting some heavy rifles, including 13-inch Blakely guns, upon the lower water-front of the city; by building a new battery at Mount Pleasant, and by the construction of iron- clad rams. Ample preparations against a land attack were also made. On James Island strong works were built to close the approach from Stono River. Stono inlet and harbor were occupied by an inclosed fort on Cole's Island, which held under control all the anchorage ground and landing-place inside the Stono bar. This advanced position was abandoned by the enemy prior to the naval attack on Fort Sumter, giving us the possession of Folly Island and the lower Stono and inlet. The upper Stono was held by a heav- ily armed earth-work called Fort Pemberton, and the water approach to Charleston by Wappoo Cut, west of James Island Creek, was defended by powerful earth-works, while strong batteries on the eastern shore of James Island swept all the practicable water routes from Morris and Folly islands. North-east of the city a line of intrenchments reaching from Copahee Sound to Wandoo River guarded the land approaches from Bull's Bay. Suitable works were also built on the peninsula in the rear of the city, covering the roads from the interior. Indeed, no avenue of attack, by land or water, was left without ample means of protection. General R. S. Ripley, who had immediate command of the defense, recently stated that he had under his control 385 pieces of artillery of all calibers, including field-batteries, and an ample force of skilled men to serve them. When the position was evacuated by the Confederates, February 18th, 1865, 246 guns were left behind in the several works. The James Island defenses were especially strong. They had repulsed a bold and spirited assault upon them from the Stono River side, made by 53 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN i86;. forces under General H. W. Benham, oln the 16th of June, 1862, and had been greatly strengthened since that time. A gallant and well-directed attack upon Fort Sumter on April 7th, 1863, by a squadron composed of nine iron-clad vessels, under command of Rear-Admi- ral Du Pont, had signally failed, after a sharp engagement lasting about one hour. [See p. 32.] The squadron carried 15-inch and 11-inch shell guns and 150-pounder Parrott rifles. Five of the iron-clads were reported by their respective commanders to be wholly or partly disabled in their power of inflicting injury by their guns. They had been under the concentrated fire of some of the most destructive guns of that period for nearly one hour, although they did not advance far enough to draw the fire of some of the heaviest pieces in Fort Sumter. The thin-armored Keoktk- was so seriously injured that she sank the following morning off Morris Island, and her arma- ment fell into the hands of the enemy. The fleet received the fire from the Sullivan's Island, the Morris Island, and the Mount Pleasant batteries, as well as from Fort Sumter, and during the attack divided its own fire between Fort Wagner, Fort Sumter, and Fort Moultrie. After this repulse Admiral Du Pont expressed the opinion that Charleston could not be taken by a purely naval attack, and some of his subordinate commanders held similar views. At Washington it was deemed of so much importance to present an actively aggressive front in this quarter in aid of projected operations elsewhere that orders were issued by the President himself to hold the position inside of Charleston bar, and to prevent the erection of new batteries and new defenses on Morris Island, and if such batteries had been begun by the enemy to " drive him out." A keen sense of disappointment pervaded the Navy Department at the repulse of April 7th, finding expression, among the higher officials, in a determination to retrieve the fortunes of that day, and reinstate the iron- clads in the confidence of the country at the earliest possible moment. The gallantry of the attack, the skill with which the fleet had been handled, the terrific fire to which it had been exposed, and the prudence that prompted its recall before a simple repulse eould be converted into overwhelming disaster were measurably lost sight of in the chagrin of defeat. The disheartening fact was that the iron-clads had conspicuously failed in the very work for which they had been supposed to be peculiarly fit, and the country had nothing whatever to take their place. Late in May I was called to Washingtonjl and was informed at the consul- tations which followed that it was the intention to make another attack with the iron-clads, provided Fort Sumter, which was regarded as the most for- midable obstacle and the key of the position, could be eliminated from the conflict, so that the fleet could pass up on the south side of the channel, leav- ing Fort Moultrie and the other Sullivan's Island works nearly a mile to the right. The army was therefore asked if it could cooperate to the extent of destroying the offensive power of Fort Sumter. I expressed the opinion that Fort Sumter could be reduced and its offensive power entirely destroyed with JGeneral Gillmore was on leave of absence at this time. From September 18th, 1862, toApril, 1863, he had held important commands in Kentucky and West virginia.-EDITORS. 54 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. rifle guns, planted on Morris Island, and that beyond the capture of that island and the demolition of the fort, the available land forces, numbering scarcely eleven thousand men of all arms, could not take the initiative in any opera- tion against Charleston that would involve their leaving the sea islands, upon which the enemy derived no advantage from his superior strength or from the railroad facilities under his control for concentrating troops and bringing reinforcements from the interior on short notice. It was finally decided that the army should undertake the capture of Morris Island and the reduction of Fort Sumter, unless it should become necessary, before preparations for the attack were completed, to detach some of the troops for the purpose of rein- forcing General Grant or General Banks, then operating on the Mississippi; and it was announced with emphasis that no additional troops would be sent to South Carolina. The capture of the city by a land attack was not, in any sense, the object of these operations. No project of that nature was dis- cussed or even mentioned at the conference. The following general plan of campaign was agreed upon, comprising four distinct steps, and the army was to take the lead in executing the first, second, and third. First, to make a descent upon and obtain possession of the south end of Morris Island, then held by the enemy with infantry and artillery; second, to lay siege to and reduce Battery Wagner, a strong and well-armed earth-work, located near the north end of Morris Island, about 2600 yards from Fort Sumter; with Battery Wagner the works at Cumming's Point, the extreme north end of the island, would also fall; third, from the position thus secured on Morris Island to destroy Fort Sumter with breaching batteries of rifle guns, and afterward by a heavy artillery fire cooperate with the fleet when it should be ready to move in; fourth, the fleet to enter, remove the channel obstructions if any should be encountered, run by the batteries on James and Sullivan's islands, and reach the city. For the special purpose of this con- templated attack Rear-Admiral Andrew H. Foote, an officer of tried bravery and cool and mature judgment, was assigned to the command of the South Atlantic blockading squadron, comprising the naval forces available for operations against Charleston; but he was not permitted to enter upon this new field of labor, his sudden and untimely death leaving the command with Rear-Admiral John A. Dahigren. [See p. 46.] Charleston was located in the Military Department of the South, compris- ing the narrow strip of sea-coast held by the Union forces in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Upon relieving General David Hunter and assuming command of this department in June, I found our troops actually occupying eleven positions on this stretch of coast, while a small blockading squadron held a variable and more or less imperfect control of the principal inlets. In the neighborhood of Charleston we held all the coast line south of Morris Island, while all the other islands around the harbor, and to the northward, were either controlled or occupied by the enemy. It was found, after abol- ishing some of these detached posts and reducing the force at others, that the aggregate means for carrying on the contemplated operations against Charles- ton comprised only about 10,000 effective volunteer infantry, 600 engineer 5 5 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. TIM UUNIG ASSAULT i1 BATTERY JAitMU, JULY la, 1M. troops, and 350 artillerists. The ordnance on hand, deemed more or less suitable for our purpose, consisted of 200-pounder, 100-pounder, and 30- pounder Parrott rifles, and some 13-inch, 10-inch, and 8-inch mortars. The projectiles for the 200-pounders, however, weighed only 150 pounds, and those for the 100-pounders only 80 pounds. With this feeble array of guns-feeble because largely wanting in the strength required for throwing, with a breaching velocity, even the light projectiles provided for them-the great work of the siege was begun. During the operations fifty-one of these Parrott rifles were expended by bursting, most of them prematurely. Meanwhile between the middle of June and the 6th of July preparations for the descent upon Morris Island went quietly forward. It was deemed necessary that this attack should be a surprise in order to insure suc- 56 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. cess. On the extreme northern end of Folly Island forty-seven field and siege guns and mortars were quietly placed in position, screened by thick under- growth from the view of the enemy on the opposite side of Light-House inlet. They were intended to operate against his batteries there, protect the column of boats in its advance across the stream, or cover its retreat in case of repulse. The entrance to Stono inlet was lighted up at night, and all trans- ports bringing troops were ordered to enter after dark and leave before morn- ing. All appearance of preparations for offensive operations was carefully suppressed, while upon General Israel Vogdes's defensive works on the south end of Folly Island a semblance of activity was conspicuously dis- played. Brigadier-General A. H. Terry's division, about 4000 effective, and Brigadier-General George C. Strong's brigade, numbering about 2500, were quietly added to the Folly Island command under cover of darkness. The project for securing a lodgment on Morris Island comprised, as one of its features, a demonstration in force on James Island by way of Stono River, over the same ground where Brigadier-General Benham had met with repulse the year before. The object in the present case was to prevent the sending of reenforcements to the enemy on Morris Island from that quarter, and possibly to draw a portion of the Morris Island garrison in that direction. Everything being in readiness, the character of the assault about to be ordered, the risk involved therein, and the magnitude of the interests at stake became for the moment subjects of grave consideration. For if this assault failed, the promise to demolish Fort Sumter failed also, carrying in its train the failure of the naval project to capture Charleston and inflict punishment in the place where the rebellion had its birth, and the further failure to destroy this great blockade-running thoroughfare, and to restore confidence in the efficiency of the iron-clads, upon which special stress had been laid. The storming of a position strongly held by both artillery and infantry, is always an operation attended with imminent peril in its execu- tion, and great uncertainty as to results. The best troops can seldom be made to advance under the fire of even a few well-served pieces of artillery sup- ported by the fire of small-arms. No lesson of our great civil war was learned at greater cost than this. But the hazard of such an undertaking, great as it is under ordinary circumstances where the aggressive force operates on firm ground, becomes greatly and painfully intensified when the assaulting column has to approach in small boats from a distant point, exposed to full view and constant fire, to disembark and form upon an open beach in the presence of an enemy covered by parapets, and finally to advance to the attack against the combined fire of artillery and small-arms. Yet this was the work we had set out to do, and it was believed we had the men to do it. The demonstration up the Stono River was begun in the afternoon of July 8th, by Brigadier-General Terry, who landed on James Island with about 3800 men. The effect as subsequently ascertained was to draw a portion of the enemy's forces from our front on Morris Island. Z On the evening of July 9th a small brigade was silently embarked in row- Z It is understood that General Beauregard denies this.-Q. A. G. But see p. 14.-EDITORS. VOL. IV. 5 57 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARIESTON IN 186;. boats in Folly River behind Folly Island. It was commanded by Brigadier- General George C. Strong, who had received orders to carry the south end of Morris Island by storm. By break of day the leading boats had reached Light-house inlet, where the column was halted under cover of marsh grass to await orders. The point where the landing was to be made was still nearly a mile distant, and this stretch of river had to be passedl in full view unuder fire. All our Folly Island batteries opened before sunrise, and soon after this four iron-clad monitors, led by Rear- Admiral Dahlgren, steamed up abreast of Morris Island and took part in the action. After the cannonade had lasted nearly two hours General Strong was signaled to push forward andI make the , attack. This was promptly and gal- lantly done under a hot fire. The men 4XK did not hesitate or waver for a mo- ment. All the enemy's batteries on the south end of the island, containing eleven pieces of artillery, were captured in succession, and by 9 o'clock we oc- NEL HtOBERT 14. S . U4TU MASSACi1USETT cupied three-fourths of the island, with WtLOiLiEDO VOLTEERaS-KILLEO IN THE ..1tiT our skirmishers within musket-range t. -ITTIRY WAI;2bNER. 'M A PHOTOGR.11. of Battery Wagner. Thus was the first step in the plan of joint operation successfully taken. The intense heat, which prostrated many of the men, forced a suspension of operations for the day. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to carry Battery Wagner by assault. In the first, which took place at daybreak on the morning of July 11th, the parapet of the work was reached, but the supports recoiled under the heavy fire of grape and canister that met them, and the advantage gained could not lie held. This repulse demonstrated the remarkable strength of the work and the necessity of establishing counter-batteries against it, which, with the cooperation of the fleet, might dismount the principal guns and either drive the enemy from it or open the way to a successful assault. After the first assault Battery Wagner was inclosed [see p. 23]; it reached entirely across the island from water to water; it mounted some heavy guns for channel defense, and several siege-guns that swept the narrow beach over which we would have to approach from the south; and a large bomb-proof shelter afforded the garrison absolute protection when the fire became so hot that they could not stand to their guns or man the parapet. 4 To us the place presented the appearance of a succession of low, irregular sand-hills like the rest of the island. Battery Gregg, on the north end of the island at Cumming's Point, was known to be armed with guns bearing on the channel. Of one important 4 Major John Johnson writes to the editors that the " heavy guns for channel defense " consisted of two 1 0-inch Columbiads; also, that absolute protection was afforded to about 6300 men, little more than half the garrison. THE ARMY BFFORE CHARLESTON IN ,863. s9 topograplical change we were entirely ignorant. We did not know that the island at its narrowest point between us and Battery Wagiier, and quite near to the latter, had been worn away by the encroachments of the sea to about one-third the width shown on our latest charts, and so much reduced in height that during spring-tides or heavy weather the waves swept entirely over it to the marsh in rear. Against us the fort presented an armed front about SO0 feet in length reaching entirely across the island, while our adlanee must be made over a strip of low shifting sand only about 80 feet wide, and two feet above the range of ordinarv tides. Between the 16th and 18th of July, as preliminary to a second attempt to get possession of Battery Wagner by assault, 41 pieces of artillery, comprising light rifles and siege-mortars, were put in position on an oblique line across the island at distances from the fort ranging from 1300 to 1900 yards. The rifles were intended principally to dismount the enemy's guns. Early in the afternoon of the 18th all these batteries opened fire, and the navy closed in on the fort and took an active and efficient part in the engagement. In a short time the work became absolutely silent on the faces looking toward us, and practically so on the sea front, from which at the beginning of the aetion a severe fire had been delivered against the fleet. The work was sileneed for the time at least, but whether this was due to the injury inflicted on its armament, or to the inability of the men to stand to their pieces, or to these two causes combined, we had no means of knowing. An assault was ordered. The time of evening twilight was selected for the storming party to advance, in order that it might not be distinctly seen from the James Island batteries on our extreme left, and from Fort Sumter and Sullivan's Island in our distant front. Brigadier-General Truman Seymour organized and commanded the assaulting column, composed of Brigadier- General G. C. Strong's brigade supported by the brigade of Colonel Haldimand S. Putnam. As the column left the line of our batteries and began its advance along the narrow strip of beach, a rapid fire was opened upon it from Fort Sumter and from the works on James Island and on Sullivan's Island. When it reached a point so near to Battery Wagner that the fire from our own guns and those of the navy had to be suspended from fear of destroying our own men, a compact and deadly sheet of musketi'y fire was instantly poured upon the advancing column by the garrison, which had suddenly issued forth from the security of the bomb-proof shelter. Although the troops went gal- lantly forward and gained the south-east bastion of the work and held it for more than two hours, the advantages which local knowledge and the deepen- ing darkness gave the enemy forced a withdrawal. The repulse was complete, and our loss severe, especially in officers of rank. The gallant Strong, who had been the first man to land on Morris Island a few days before, actually leading his entire command in that descent and in the daring assault that followed, was fatally wounded. As he was being conveyed to the rear I stopped the ambulance for a moment to ask if he was badlv hurt. He recog- itized my voice, and replied, " No, General, I think not; only a severe flesh- wound in the hip." He was taken to Beaufort that night and placed in (to THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. hospital under excellent attendance. But he was seized with a yearning desire to go home, acd, without my knowledge, took the first steamer folr the Nortlh. Being the senior officer on board, the excitement of the trip, aggravated by the ehiase and capture of a bloekade-rumner, brought on lock-jaw, of which he died shortly after reaching New York. Colonel John S. C'hatfield was mortally wounded; Colonel lialdimand S. Putnam and Colonel Robert (. Shaw were killed; and Brigadier-General Truman Seymour and several regi- mental commanders were wounded. It may be said that in making this assault the traditions and maxims of the engineer and his reverence for the spade and shovel as weapons of war were placed in abeyance. Although no dissenting voice was raised among the subordinate commanders called into council, it may be doubted by some whether a step so grave in character and so uncertain il results was the unquestionable outcome of existing military necessity. Perhaps only an engi- neer would doubt this. At all events its full justification was assumed to rest on the presumption that Fort Sumter must be destroyed by guns placed as near to it as to the site of Battery Wagner, and that every hour's delay in cap- turing that work permitted the enemy to strengthen his interior defenses, and thus render the entrance of our fleet more difficult. To meet the contingency brought on by the failure it was determined to change slightly the prearranged order of operations by attempting the demo- lition of Fort Sumter with our heavy rifles, at a distance of two miles and upwarl, by firing over Battery Wagner and its garrison from ground already in our possession. It was urged adversely to this plan that there existed no precedent for it. This was true, the nearest approach to it being the reduction of Fort Pulaski ; the year before by breaching at the distance of one mile and more. [See Vol. II., p. 9.] But the fact that we eould throw heavier metal and do heavier work now than we could then, promised success, and the placing of grns in position against Fort Sumter was promptly begun. For this purpose 16 Parrott rifles and two Whitworth rifles were placed in batteries at distances from Fort Sumter ranging from 3428 to 4290 yards. The slow, tedious, and hazardous labor of moving into position and mounting these heavy guns and their carriages could be performed during the night-time only, under a constant and galling fire from the front and one flank. There was great danger that guns and carriages, as well as the appliances for putting them in position, would be destroyed. As contemporary with these operations, arrangements had been perfected for pressing the siege of Bat- tery Wagner, and the work was fairly under way. And here the limitations of the books had to be irreverently set aside. Instead of our being able to envelop any portion of the work, we were practically enveloped by it. It presented to us an armed front of four times the average width of the low beach over which we had to foree our way, and as we neared the work this ratio reached as high as ten to one. It was now known, from the latest infor- j At that siere the engineer and his devices had our men was struck during the eight weeks of prep- full sany. So perfect, indeed. were the arrange- artion and the two davs' engagement, and he lost ments for the safety of the troops, that only one of his life through disregard of instructions.-Q. A. G. THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. mation, to contain a rather heavy armament, of which at least a dozen pieces eould be trained upon our itarrow, shifting line of approaeh-in many places scarcely half a company front in width, subject to frequent overflow by the waves and tides, and swept not only by the guns of Wagner itself, but also by those of Cummning's Point and Fort Sumter and several batteries on James Island. Indeed, the ground over which our men had to force their way, under sueh meager cover as could be made by sinking trenches to the water-level, and gaining the requisite height with sand and other material brought by hand from the rear, was seen by the enemy's batteries in front, flank, and reverse. Havimig its communications open with Charleston and the interior, the armamient and garrison of Fort Sumter could always be maintained at the maximum state of efficiency. The first parallel was established, July 19th, on the line occupied the dlay before by our batteries against Battery Wagner, and the second parallel on the night of the 23d by the flying sap, about six hundre d yards in advance of the first. Eleven of the breaching guns against Fort Sumter were located in these two parallels, and the other seven to the left and rear of the first parallel. Those in the second parallel were perilously near to Battery Wagner, the most advanced piece being only 820 yards distant ftrou the guns of that work. One of the batteries was efficiently commanded by Commander Foxhall A. Parker, U. S. N. On the night of August 9th the position selected for the third parallel was reached by the flying sap, 330 yards in advance of the right of the second parallel. It was deemed inexpe- dlient to push the approaches beyond this point until after the breaching batteries should open on Fort Sumter. From this time forward the fire from the enemy's guns in our front and on our extreme left was severe and almost uninterrupted. So incessant had it become that many officers and men, especially those who did not carry their sense of responsibility very lightly, could not sleep at night if from any cause the cannonade was suspended. For a while the advance of our trenches was entirely stopped by it, and it became a question of the gravest doubt in some quarters whether any farther progress was possible, and, what was of infinitely greater importance, whether we could complete the erection of any of the breaching batteries, or serve them when erected. It is a pleasure to be able to state without qualification that the officers and men were fully equal to the extraordinary demands made upon them. Not a murmur of discon- tent was heard on the island. Finally some of the breaching batteries opened fire on the 17th of August, and by the 19th all were in successful operation. The result was soon clearly foreshadowed. Nothing, indeed, but the destruc- tion of our guns, either by the enemy's shot or through their own inherent weakness, would long delay it. About 450 projectiles struck the fort daily, every one of which inflicted an incurable wound. Large masses of the brick walls and parapets were rapidly loosened and thrown down. The bulk of Iur fire was directed against the gorge and south-east face, which presented thiemselves diagonally to us. They were soon pierced through and through, anld cut down on top to the casemate arches. The shot that went over them took the north and north-west faces in reverse. 6, 02 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. The condition of the work, as it appeared to us after six days' bombard- ment, is thus described by General J. W. Turner, chief of artillery: - The fire upon the gorge had by the morning of the 23d succeeded in destroying every gun upon its parapet, and as far as could be observed had disabled or dismounted all the guns upon the parapet of the two faces looking toward the city which it had taken in reverse. The parapet and rampart of the gorge were for nearly the entire length of the face completely demolished, and in places everything was swept off down to the arches, the debris forming an accessible ramp to the top of the ruins. " The demolition of the fort at the close of this day's firing (August 23d) was complete so far as its offensive powers were considered. Every gun upon the parapet was either dismounted or seriously damaged. The parapet could be seen in many places both on the sea and channel faces conmpletely torn away from the terre-plein. The place, in fine, was a ruin, andi effectually disabled for any immediate defense of the harbor of Charleston. Having accomplished the end pro- posed, orders were accordingly issued on the evening of the 23d for the firing to eease, having been continuously sustained for seven days. There had been thrown 5009 projectiles, of which about one-half had struck the fort." Colonel Alfred Rhett, C. S. A., commanding Fort Sumter, reports, August 24th, " One 11-inch Dahlgren, east face, the only gutl serviceable"; and on September 1st, " We have not a gun en barbette that can be fired; only one gun and casemate." General Stephen Elliott, C. S. A., writes as follows: " When I assumed command of Fort Sumter on the 4th of September, 1863, there were no guns in position except one 32-pounder in one of the north-west casemates. This gun was merely used for firing at sunset, and was not intended for any other purpose. Early in October I mounted in the north-east casemates two 10-inch Columbiads and one 7-inch rifle. In Janu- ary one S-inch and two 7-inch rifles were mounted in the north-west easemates.' The seven (lays' service of the breaching batteries, ending August 23d, left Fort Sumter in the condition of a mere infantry outpost, without the power to fire a gun heavier than a musket, alike incapable of annoying our ap- proaches to Battery Wagner, or of inflicting injury upon the fleet. In this condition it remained for about six weeks. A desultory fire was kept up to prevent repairs, and on the 30th of August another severe cannonade was opened and continued for two days at the request of the admiral command- ing, who contemplated entering the inner harbor on the 31st. Some time before this the enemy began to remove the armament of Fort Sumter by night, and many of its guns were soon mounted in other parts of the harbor. During the progress of the operations thus briefly outlined, the navy had most cordially cooperated whenever and wherever their aid could best be ren- dered. The service of the monitors was notably efficient in subduing the fire of Battery Wagner, which at times not only seriously retarded the labors of the sappers, but threatened the destruction of some of the most advanced of the breaching guns. While the breaching of Fort Sumter was still in progress, attive work was resumed on the approaches to Battery Wagner by pushing the full sap from the left of the third parallel. Meanwhile the spring-tides had lome with easterly winds, flooding the trenches to the depth of two feet and washing down the parapets. The progress of the sap was hotly contested with both artillery and sharpshooters. The latter had taken possession of a THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. be ridge about 240 yards ill advance of the main work, where they had placed themselves undler such cover that they could not be dislodged by our fire or the flank fire of the fleet, while that froom their own guns in rear passed harm- lessly over their heads. An attempt to (apture this ridge having failed, a fourth parallel was established on the night of August 21st, about five hundred yards in advance of the third. From this point the ridge was carrie d [by the 24th Mlassachusetts] at the point of the bayonet om the 26th, under the direction 4ot Brigadier-General Terry, and the fifth parallel was established thereon. The resistance to our advance now assumed a most obstinate and (letermined character, being evidently under skillful and intelligent dlirection, while the firing from the James Islantd batteries becamne more steady and accurate. Over the narrow strip of shallow shifting beach between us and the fort, the flving sap was pushed forward from the right of the fifth parallel. An ingenious system of subsurface torpedo mines, to be exploded by the tread of persons walking over them, was soon encountered, and we learned from prisoners that they were planted thickly over all the ground in our front. But the mines were a defense to us as well as to the besieged garrison, as they brought a sense of security from sorties which the enemy's broader development and converging fire would otherwise have enabled him to make with nearly every condition in his favor. The sappers soon reached a point only one hundred yards from the ditch of the work. Beyond this our progress became exceed- ingly slow and uncertain. Our daily losses were on the increase. The con- centric fire from Battery Wagner alone almost enveloped the head of our sap, while the flank fire from the James Island batteries increased in power and accuracy every hour. To push the work forward by day was found to be im- possible, while a brilliant harvest-moon, which seemed to shine with more splendor than ever before, rendered an advance at night almost equally hazardous. Matters seemed to be at a stand-still. A sense of gloom and despondency began to pervade the command, under the impression that all the expedients of the engineer had been exhausted. In this emergency it was determined, as well to hasten the final result as to revive the flagging spirits of the men, to carry on simultaneously against Battery Wagner two distinct kinds of attack: First, to silence the work by an overpowering bombardment with siege and Coehorn mortars, so that our sap- pers would have only the James Island batteries to annoy them; and, second, to breach the bomb-proof shelter with our heavy rifles, and thus force a sur- render. During the day-tinme the New Ironsides, Captain S. C. Rowan, was to cooperate with her eight-gun broadsides. These operations were actively begun at break of day on the 5th of September. Seventeen siege and Coehorn mortars dropped their shells unceasingly into the work over the heads of our sappers; ten light siege-rifles covered and swept the approach to the work from the rear; fourteen heavy Parrotts thun- dered away at the great bomb-proof shelter; while, during the daylight, the Newi Ironsides, with the most admirable regularity and precision, kept an almost continuous stream of 11-inch shells rolling over the water against the sloping parapet of Battery Wagner, whence, deflected upward with a low THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. remaining velocity, they dropped vertically, exploding in and over the work, mercilessly searching every part of it except the subterranean shelters. The calcium lights turned night into day, throwing our own works into obscurity and bringing the minute details of the fort into sharp relief. t For forty-two consecutive hours this work went on, presenting a spectacle of remarkable magnificence and splendor. As a pyrotechnic achievement alone, the exhi- bition at night was brilliant and attractive, while the dazzling light thrown from our advanced trenches, the deafening roar of our guns, and the answer- ing peals from James Island added sublimity and grandeur to the scene. The imagination was beguiled and taken captive, and all the cruel realities of war were for a time forgotten in the unwonted excitement of this novel spectacle. The garrison soon sought safety in the bomb-proof shelter, and the fort showed but little sign of life. Occasional shots were delivered at the New 01o ndides, and a few sharp-shooters from time to time opened a harmless fire upon the head of the trenches. But the engineers rapidly pushed forward their work. They suffered principally from the James Island batteries, which iight and day maintained a most annoying fire upon our mortar-batteries and the head of the sap, following the latter in its progress toward the fort until it reached a point so near that friends and foes were alike exposed to the perils of the cannonade. It then ceased entirely, and our men pushed for- ward the trenches with entire immunity from serious danger. Their sense of seeurity was so sudden and complete, and their position so novel and exciting, with the entire garrison, once so defiant, now helplessly at bay only a few feet distant, that the reliefs of sappers off duty mounted the parapet of the trenches, or wandered forward into the ditch of the work to take a survey of the surroundings. A formidable line of frise work, consisting of pointed stakes alternating with boarding-pikes or lances, was removed from the ditch of the sea front. Early on the night of September 6th our sap was pushed forward entirely beyond the south front of the work, and between the sea front and the water, crowning the crest of the countersearp at the north or farthest end of that front, and completely masking all the guns of the work. An order was issued to carry the place the next morning by assault on the north front at the time of low tide when the width of beach would be the greatest, and the troops could promptly pass beyond the work to the point of attack. On the north side the work was closed by an ordinary infantry parapet. During the night the fort was evacuated with such celerity that only two boat-loads of men were captured. The north end of the island was at once occupied by our forces. Eighteen pieces of ordnance were found in Battery Wagner, and seven in Battery Gregg on Cumming's Point, most of them being compara- tively large, as calibers were estimated in those days. Battery Wagner was found to be a work of greater defensive strength than the most exaggerated statements of prisoners and deserters had led us to expect. Its bomb-proof shelter, affording a safe retreat to its entire garrison, remained practically intact after perhaps the severest cannonade to which any earth-work had ever been subject. Its covering, composed of sea-shore sand;, L The calcium light was so strong that the garrison was prevented from making repairs.-EDITORS. 64 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. had been struck by sixty-one net tons of metal, thrown with a breaching charge at comparatively short ranges, and yet the injury inflicted could easily have been repaired in eight or ten hours. These operations left the whole of Morris Island in our possession, and Fort Sumter in ruins and destitute of guns. A powerful armament was mounted on the north end of the island, to cooperate with the monitors when they should move in, and to prevent the remounting of guns on Fort Sumter. Early on the morning following the capture of Battery Wagner, the admiral, under a flag of truce, demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter. It was refused. On the night of the 8th a naval assault was made on the work about midnight, and repulsed with considerable loss. A prominent historian of the war states, on the alleged authority of the naval commander, that army cooperation was expected in this assault in compliance with previous arrangement. As this statement is entirely desti- tute of truth, the admiral could not have made it, and must have been misunderstood in what he did say. Although I had ordered an assault for the same evening by two small regiments, before the admiral's intentions were known to me, he was told, in response to a request for information on that point, that the boats with the storming party could not leave their ren- dezvous in the small creek behind Morris Island until midnight, on account of low tide; and yet at 10 P. M. the naval column left the fleet, advanced quickly to the attack, and by midnight had been repulsed.\ No assistance from the land forces was expected or desired. In point of fact, it was declined. Each party was organized without any expectation of aid from the other, and no reference to any expected cooperation from the army was made by the admiral, or by any of his subordinate commanders in their official reports of the assault. General Elliott [Confederate] reports in his journal, November 20th, that "' at 3 o'clock a detachment of the enemy's barges, variously estimated at from four to nine in number, approached within three hundred yards of the fort and opened fire with musketry. Most of the troops got into position very rapidly, but in spite of all instructions commenced a random fire into the air on the part of many, at the distant boats on the part of others." And the General adds afterward that " no rockets were sent up because positive attacks were not made." From this Colonel Alfred Roman, in his " Military Opera- tions of General Beauregard," makes the statement that "another boat attack was made by General Gillmore's forces against Fort Sumter resulting in utter failure, as had been the case with the former attempt"; and another writer, going still further, asserts that the admiral ordered his pickets to cover the assaulting party-in sharp contrast with the behavior of the commanding general at the time of the naval repulse on September 9th. This may enliven what would otherwise have been dull reading, perhaps, but nevertheless it is pure fiction. No such attack was ordered, attempted, or even contemplated by The attack seems to have been made soon tary of the Navy, 1863; and also official corre- affter midnight. The Confederates place it be- spondence in "Engineer and Artillery Operations tween 1 and 2 A. M.-EDITORS. against the Defenses of Charleston Harbor in See papers accompanying report of Secre- 1863."-Q. A. G. 65 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLES TOM IN ,86a. TIM MARD1Xl1 1TTi ERY AFTER THU. EXPLOWItS OF TIL "'WAIMP ANGEL_" PROM A PHOTOG.RAPMt. the land forces after the naval repulse in September. General Elliott's state- ment that " positive attacks were not made" is strictly true, of course, b-ecause no semblance of an attack was made. The boat party seen was doubtless the regular patrol, larger probably than usual, according to the duty required of them that partieular night. There existed no military reason at that time for risking an assault. The fort was destitute of cannon, could take no part in a defense against a fleet, and as an infantry outpost could lbe of no value to us if captured. It was heroically held by the enemy in a spirit of eommendable pride and audacity, and hadl been made very strong against capture by assault. An attacking eolumn, eveen if it should gain possession of the parade of the work, could not reach the garrison in their subteiTanean galleries, protected by heavy loop-holed doors, and, moreover, would b e at the merev of the enemy's (gunls on0 Sulliva.i's Island andi those on the east front of James Island1. The con- trolling oliditions differed essentially now, from those which obtained when the surrender of the place was demanded by the admiral early in September. At that time the capture of the paratle carried with it that of the work. While Fort Sumter was rapidly crumbling under our first cannonade the evacuation of that work and of Morris Island was demanded, the condition of refusal being that fire would be opened on the city of Charleston. Existing circumstances furnished a full justification for this step. Charleston had l)eell besiege l for seven weeks, was occupied by the enemy's troops and batteries, gumn-boats had been built and were then building along its water front, and the avenue of escape for noni-eombatants was open and undisputed. The demand being refused [see p. 17], the marsh battery, containing one 8-inch Parrott rifle, previously referred to as the " Swamp Angel," opened fire on the night of August 21st. The gun burst on the second night at the thirty-sixth round. Some of the projectiles reached a distance of about five and three-quarter miles. Firing on the city was subsequently resumed from Cumming's Point. Fort Sumter was subjected to another severe cannonade of some days' dura- THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. tion,1 beginning October 26th, dlirected mainly against the south-east face, o01 a report from deserters, afterward found to he untrue, that the garrison was elmotllitilng guiis thereon. In a short time that face was more completely a ruiml than the gorge wall. Throughout the length of both those faces the dl6hris fornied. a ltracticaIble raimp from the water to the summit of the breaeh. This ended all aggressive operations against thei defenses of Charlestoni,j, although a desultory fire was maintained against Fort Sumter during the mouths of November anld December to prevent the remounting of gillns, pending the comnpletion of the naval lpreparations for passing into the inner lharibor. It was not entirely suspellde(l until the idea of removing the ehan- nel obstructions antid running the James and Sullivan''s islands batteries appeared to be indefinitely postponed. No official notification of this aban- dounient of plan was made by the naval authorities. On October 20th I was verbally informed by the admiral that he would probably await the arrival of more monitors, which were exl)ected in a few days; and as early as Sep- tember 29th a couple of weeks was thought to be needed to complete the repairs to the monitors before operating against the channel obstructions. In point of fact there were no formidable obstructions in Charleston harbor. The popular ideas with regard to them which pervaded the public mind, and even influenced and directed official action in some quarters, were erroneous in a most notable degree. The belief entertained at the time by many practical men, whose official relations reqluire(l them to form opinions on the subject, that they were either flimsy counterfeits or in large degree mythical, has been fully confirmed. Brigadier-General Ripley, C. S. A., and other officers of the Confederate service, whose positions enabled them to speak from positive knowledge, have furnished some interesting information on this subject. From their statements, some of which are written, it appears to have been tile constant and studied practice of the Confederate commanders to spread exaggerated and incorrect reports concerning this special means of defense. To such extent and with such skill was this ruse made use of that, with few exceptions, neither the inhabitants of the city nor the troops defending it pos- sessed any knowledge of the channel obstructions. Such a semblance of necessary and systematic labor in their construction, management, and repair was kept up, and such an affectation of secrecy concerning their character and of confidence in their efficienev was assumed in order to keep all knowledge of the huge fiction from us, that the blockade-runners themselves, although making frequent and regular trips, were kept in the profoundest ignorance of the harmless character of the dangers they were told to avoid. The credulous commander of a foreign man-of-war who in 1863 was permitted to go up to the city in a small boat, returned to his ship outside the bar filled with the most extravagant admiration for the extensive scheme which he believed to he in constant readiness for conducting a defense by submarine mines; and, although he had really seen nothing except a few harmless barrels floating on ) The bombardment continued forty days and dueted by himself, for the third great bombardment iights without intermission.- EDITORS. of Fort Sumter took place after his assignment to S, The author doubtless refers to operations eon- another field in the spring of I S64.- EDITORS. 6'7 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. the water, reported the entire channel to be literally filled with fixed and floating obstructions and subaqueous mines and torpedoes. When the harbor and its defenses came into our possession on the 18th of February, 1865, and the novel spectacle was presented of a large fleet, comprising gun-boats, army and navy transports, a coast-survey steamer, dispatch boats, tugs, sutlers' and traders' vessels, passing up to the city and dispersing themselves at pleasure over the harbor without encountering any of those hidden objects of terror whose existence in formidable shape no one, except civilians on shore, had ever shown any disposition to doubt, the question naturally arose whether at any previous time during the war the various channel obstruc- tions, mines, and torpedoes had in reality been in a more efficient condition than we found them at that time. Among the troops, down to the lowest private, the belief was expressed with a freedom which the Union soldier claimed to be his inalienable right that the practice of running the blockade at night, which was constantly and most successfully carried on at Charles- ton throughout the years 1863-64, proved the existence of a wide and prac- tieable channel up to the city; and steamers bearing flags of truce had not unfrequently come down to the outer harbor and returned to the city during the day-time, and the route they took was well known. Efforts made soon after the close of the war to obtain full and exact information concerning the obstructions, from officers of the Confederate service who put them down and had them in charge, met with a cheerful response. From the concurrent tes- timony, written and oral, thus procured, it appears that there were no chan- nel obstructions or torpedoes in 1863 and 1864 that would be expected to prevent or even seriously retard the passage of a fleet up to Charleston city and above it, or likely to afford any effective protection in the event of an actual attack; that the main channel next Fort Sumter was never obstructed by torpedoes or otherwise until the winter of 1864-65, a few months before the close of the war, and that at no time was the condition of this auxiliary means of channel defense any better, or its efficiency any more to be relied on to stop or delay the entrance of a hostile fleet, than at the time the city and its defenses were evacuated in February, 1865. General Beauregard, in correcting what he calls errors in the preliminary official dispatch sent from the field, takes exception to the statement therein made that Battery Wagner was a most formidable kind of work, and claims that it was " an ordinary field-work, with thick parapet and ditches of little depth." To this it may be said that within certain limits, embracing all works of the Battery Wagner type and many others, the elements of defensive strength are determined more by the environment and approaches than by the dimen- sions, trace, and relief of the work itself. No one should concede the sound- ness of this principle more freely than an engineer of General Beauregard's attainments and varied experience. Measured by this, the only appropriate standard, Battery Wagner was beyond question a work of the most formi- dable kind, while if it had stood upon a site practically approachable on all sides, or on two sides, it would not be classed as such. In point of fact, it presented a case of the defense of a narrow causeway swept by both an 68 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. enfilading and a cross-fire of artillery and small-arms. All things con- sidered, it should be regarded as a very formidable work. With regard to the character of the Confederate defense, Colonel Alfred Roman [" The Military Operations of General Beauregard"] aptly says: " It is a matter of history to-day that the defense of Fort Sumter and that of Battery Wagner are looked upon as two of the most desperate and glorious achieve- ments of the war. They stand unsurpassed in ancient or modern times." Without altogether adopting the superlative tone of this statement, it may be conceded that the defense of Fort Sumter in 1863, when the garrison burrowed in the ruins of the work as it rapidly crumbled over their heads, was a notable one. The claim has been made, by those who like to indulge in comparisons, that this defense stands in sharp contrast to the apparently feeble effort to provision and hold tile place in 1861. Many of the popular fallacies of the day with regard to harbor defenses are based upon just such operations as those developed in the conflict before Charleston, and formerly in the " Battle of the Earth-works" on the Crimea. The defensive strength of Battery Wagner throughout the siege, and the alleged strength of Fort Sumter after it had been battered into a shapeless mass of ruins, are mistakenly cited as evidence that earth-works are better than forts of brick or stone, and are quite sufficient to meet any expected naval attack. Of torpedoes it has been claimed that if averyimperfect system, existing largely in the imagination only, succeeded in keeping a powerful fleet at bay for half a year, it would be entirely safe to depend on a well-equipped torpedo defense for the protection of our important harbors; and many professional men, mostly of naval tendencies, drawing a comparison between the thin-plated and weakly armed iron-clads of 1863 and the powerful men-of-war of more recent type, look upon an armored navy as the only safe means of sea-coast protection. These points will bear a brief discussion. It will doubtless not be denied that the requirements of a good defense are determined by the character and magnitude of the attack. If an enemy brings heavy guns against us, we must of course protect our own guns from heavy shot, or they will be destroyed. If his vessels are incased in thick armor, we must use heavy pro- jectiles against it, or our defense is worthless; for where a crushing blow from a large gun is needed, no possible accumulation of smaller guns will suffice. Cumulative force implies unity of mass and impact. A thousand pounds of grape-shot, even if fired at short range in one volley, can be stopped by a 1-inch steel plate; but the same weight, sent as a single ball, will shatter the best 12-inch armor. We must, therefore, have heavy guns, and they must be so mounted as to be measurably safe from the enemy's fire. If to these conditions we add one more, that the gnus shall have time to do their work,-that is, that the hostile fleet cannot run past them at full speed, but will be arrested by torpedoes,- we have the whole theory and practice of harbor defense by fortifications and their auxiliary submarine mines. It is an error to suppose that a defense by torpedoes, however perfect in itself, can stand alone. To be of any practical use, the torpedoes must be protected from removal by the enemy, the only efficient protection yet devised 69 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. being shore-batteries of heavy guns. Otherwise they are a harmless and therefore a worthless obstruction. Fortifications and chainnel torpedoes mutually supplement and support each other. If the torpedoes be omitted, an armored fleet can run by the forts without stopping, and plrobably with- out suffering serious injury. If the forts be omitted, the enemy would stop anid remove the torpedoes at his leisure, and then pass on. Our own great mixvil war, and other wars of more recent date, bear ample testimony to the fact that torpedoes exposed to unmolested hostile approach afford no defense to a channel, and cause but a trifling delay to the passage of the fleet. It is unquestionably true that casemated forts built of stone or brick after the old types do not fulfill the requirements of a good defense against an armor-plated navy. The walls which should protect both guns and gunners are too thin to sustain the shock of heavy projectiles, and in most cases would be pierced through and through by a single shot from a heavy rifle. The obvious and commonly adopted remedy for this weakness is to strength- en the walls with metal shields or armor plating, rather than discard all protec- tion by resorting to open batteries or earth-works, in which both guns and gunners are in full view of the enemy. It might be impossible to serve guns so exposed, even for a brief period, against armored or iron-clad ships showering DREEU RIGPTsEU-1ENUA4IL El W. Li grape and canister from large calibers, ROM A P111T(-UAP 1. and leaden bullets from machine-guns and sharp-shooters. The protection of the men at their guns is beyond question a consideration of the highest moment; it is indeed an essential consideration. Even in our casemated works special precautions are taken to prevent the entrance of missiles. In those last built the embrasures were supplied with iron shutters to stop grape, canister, and rifle bullets, so that the men might not be driven from their guns. The lessons of all modern wars, so far from justifying a dependence on open batteries for channel defense, all point the other way. At Port Royal our fleet of wooden vessels drove the enemy precipitately from their guns on both sides of the harbor; and in the operations before Charleston it was no uncommon exploit for the New Iron- sides alone to silence the fire of Battery Wagner. From the very beginning of the war, " running a battery" became almost an every-day affair, the most important question being whether the channel itself was free from obstruc- tions. A proper defense, therefore, requires that the shore-batteries should be armed with heavy guns, that the guns should be protected from the enemy's fire, and that the auxiliary defense by torpedoes should be of such magnitude that no fleet could attempt to run the gauntlet through them without immi- 70 THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863. nent risk of destruction. A defense of this potential character is calculated quite as much to prevent an attack as to defeat it. It is a most powerful con- servator of international quiet and good-will. Indeed, the chief office of permanent fortifications is to avert war. They are the guardians, rather than the champions, of the public good and of the prosperity of the people. A coiifusioii of ideas seems to prevail with regard to the appropriate work of a leavy in a. scheme of national defense, frequently taking form ill the asser- tion that an iron-clad navy alone-a navy of cruisers as distinguished from non-seagoing batteries, rams, and the like-will furnish a sure defense. This sentiment, although both attractive and popular, finds no practical existence amiong naval powers. A home fleet, if as powerful as the enemy's, would be expected to make, and no doubt would make, a good defense. But in that case, at the very best our chances of victory would be only equal to those of the enemy, while the risks taken and the consequences to ensue from failure would be largely unequal. Where interests of great magnitude are at stake, ordinary prudence would suggest that as little as possible l)e left to the caprice of chance. A trustworthy defense of this character, therefore, implies a harbor fleet a little more powerful than the enemy's. It implies, further, that such a fleet must be provided for each locality to be protected. Not knowing where the enemy will strike, we must be prepared for him with a fleet at all impor- tant points. But no antagonist, especially if he be on the defensive, can wisely place his main reliance upon a weapon which can be as readily procured and as skillfully used by his adversary as by himself. Destructive energy of the same denomination is neutralized when placed in opposing hands. Fleet arrayed against fleet leaves too much to risk and accident, with our stake on the issue immeasurably greater than the enemy's. These maxims unmistak- ably point to the necessity of depending mainly upon those agencies, exclu- sively our own, which cannot be neutralized or duplicated by our antagonist, and will therefore always keep him at disadvantage, to wit: permanent shore- batteries and their accessory channel torpedoes. Auxiliary rams, torpedo- boats, submarine guns, and other forms of naval power may in great measure be counterbalanced by others of like character from beyond the seas. Indeed, all naval power possessing sea-going qualities may be neutralized entirely. Our main reliance, after all, must be upon shore-batteries and channel torpedoes, and the combined strength of these must be as great as if no float- ing auxiliary aid were employed. Otherwise, when these auxiliaries fail, no adequate defense would remain, and the position would be lost. 7 1 THE " SWAMP ANGEL." BY WILLIAM S. STRYKER, BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, U. S. V., A. D. C. TO GENERAL GILLMORE. T HE Confederate attack on Fort Sumter marked the beginning, and the second and third bom- bardments by the Union guns the middle period of the civil war. Morris Island and Folly Island, two low sand-reefs, constitute the southerly bounds of the outer harbor of the eitv of Charleston. Morris Island. which is nearly four miles long, contains about four hundred acres of sand dunes and salt marshes: the portion of the island lying toward James Island being formed almost entirely of very soft morasses. and traversed by deep bayous and crooked creeks in everv direction. The Union troops under Major-Genieral Quincy A. Gillmore, the Tenth Army Corps, in the early morning of July l1th, I S63, crossed Light-house Jnlet from Folly Island and captured a large por- tiont of Morris Island. [See p. 5.8.] The Confeder- ate force, still held Cummings Point Battery and Battery Wagner on that part of Morris Island near- est to Fort Sumter and to Charleston. (On the I 3th day of July. 1 6 i3, General Gillmore directed Lieu- tenant Peter S. Michie, United States Corps of En- gineers- now Colonel Michie, a professor in the Military Academy at West Point,- to make an ex- amin.ation of the marshes on the left of our position toward Charleston and ascertain if it were possible to construct a battery from which to fire into that city. In compliance with this order he spent some time in the examination of the swamp district of Morris Island, and then reported the result of his investigations to the commanding general. On the morning of July 16th General Gillmore, while at breakfast, told Colonel Edward W. Rer- rell, Volunteer Engineers.- now General Serrell, the distinguished civil engineer of New York City.- of the great desirability of securing a posi- tion from which fire could be opened upon the city of Charleston, and directed him to inquire into the matter. As soon as breakfast was finished, Colonel Serrell and Lieutenant Nathan M. Ed- wards, of his own command, started across the nmarsh, carrying a fourteen-foot plank between them. When the mud would not bear them they sat on the plank and pushed it forward between their legs. When, again, the soil appeared stiffer, they carried the plank until they reached the soft mud once more. And so the first examination was made in open view of three Confederate forts and twelve batteries, and on a day of most intense heat. However, a spot was found where the mud seemed of slight depth and where the city of Charles- ton could be distinctly seen. A position was se- lected by Colonel Serrell, as he says in his official report, "at a point bearing from the south-west- erly end of the hard ground a course by magnetic compass north 400 west, to a point from which the bearing to Fort Sumter is north 12 east, and to the old beacon-light south 860 east." This place was about 7900 yards from Charleston. In the evening Colonel Serrell reported to General Gillmore that he believed a battery could be con- structed at a place which he indicated on the map, and suggested that it be made of sand-bags with a platform of grillage. He thought a gun weighing not over 10,000 pounds could be placed on skids having a bearing of 100 square feet and taken across the marsh, in the same manner in which Bonaparte took his field-pieces over the Alps on the snow. He estimated that 2300 men could earry, in one night, filled sand-bags sufficient in number to make the battery; that 60 soldiers could carry the platform; that 450 men could put the gun into the battery, and 35 men could carry the magazine. For several days after the report was prepared careful examinations were made by Colonel Serrell, 72 THE 'SWAMP ANGEL.' llnd variolls experiments tried under his direetion to ascertain tue b earing qualities of the marsh. Many solIndilIgs wvrt made ait various points with a thirty-foot iron rod, anild the iilud was found in pIae" to he twv ntv feet leep, the rodl being pushed l1own to that depth with ease. The mwamp was, covere l with wild grass; Ibuit this grass had no stu- taliing powvrl wilatever, 111111 it wats (litl easy for men on i a plank to start waves of 1m1d aeross the sllrfase of the marsh. A platform was constriuted. :1lid pileso f sall l-bags, regularly laid, were mounted till it. It was flIllId tilhlt the platforml held 600ii pll. ...Is to thil sqml lre foot, ullifrmly distributed, llut at 9414)0 poulnlsll to tile fo . t thtl pll tfornll sanik (t ((ne cormler, 111 the asalId-blags slid off and ValliShed ill tile 1(imi. A stiry wll.s eurrellt ill tile department at till' tinie that it leqllisitioll hal been selIt to Colonel S,-rrell by some olle, Imore of a wit thanll all offier, ill whiell a dletail wIas called for (If twelnty bell eighteen flet long to dh diIuty ill fif- teell feet of -l0li." OQi the morning, of the 2d of August a general plian for the l ollstrlletion of the marsh batter" was sullbmitted by Colonel Serreli to General Gili- more. It received his immeliate approval, al4l preparations were begull for clutting the timber a(lId building a trestle-work roadlway al-ross the marsh. This road, some two alId a hlalf miles long, was made diIurilIg the following week, and then the difficult construction of the marsh battery was commellced un1der the direct fire of Batter- ies Haskell, Cheves. aIlId Simkins and the other slualler Confederate works on James Islana. A very large party of soldiers was detailed to make alId fill salId-bags. A mock battery was built 111e1r Colonel Serrell's orders to the left of the proposed marsh battery by Lieutenants Edwards allil Charles V. Hartman, of the Volunteer Engi- neers, for the puIrIose of drawing the Confederate fire froml olr working pIarties. This plall was successful. Tile foundatiom for tie rell battery was coInmenlced under the di- reetioln of Colonel Serrell by placing two large platforbns on the surface of the marsh. Sheet pilillg was drivell to surroulId the gun-platform. The piling to be pressed down into the mud, pointed at one end, was fastened crosswise to a long pole by a rope. The shorter end of this pole having been attached to olle of the plat- forms loaded with sallnl-bags, a party of men on the other platform, pulling on the long elId of the pole, pushed the piling down the twenty feet to the sand substratili. In this way much of it was done, but it wvas found most convenielnt to work about fifteen soldiers at each enl, alid by the weight f thirty mlien pIlsIs tile pile down. Vhen this foundation of piling had all been pressed down ilIto place sllrrounding what was to be the gun- deck, a grillage of pine logs was bolted securely together surrounduilg three sides of it. On this constructioll of cross-beams 1:3,000 sand-bags weighing over 800 tons were placed, having been carried from the camp of the Volunteer Engineers al-ross the trestle work, and aL parapet with epalule- nelIt was built llpon it. ()In the 12th (lay of Autgust a careful picketing of all the streams andl illets therealbolut was made hv boats armed with naval howitzers, so that the soldiers lit work ill the mIlrsh sh-oldlf not be sur- prisem. and Onl the I 7th an ,-illch 200-pounder Iarrott rifle gun, was sllcessfillly transported over the marmh adlll molunte4 in tile tlattery. J It was ilmllnediately ehristenl-d the "Swanmp Aligel " by tilt- sol-licrs in the eamp. ()nt the morning of August 21 .t General Gillmore sent a eom-mlileatioll to Gielleral teallregard, wito was ill commlalld of the Confederate troops in the Illitary li.strict of Clharlestn, with the dlemand for the immellillte evaclaltion of tMorris Islandl :1an d Fort ulnmter, 1i1d statilng that Ilulle-s this was lolle thle city itself wvolIld be ,;helled from " hat- tI-ries already establishied Witilill easy alId effective ranoge of tile hleart of the city." No attelItioll was laid to this notiec, alnd thlat Ilight (..elleral Gilimore orderedl Lielltenant Charles Sellmer, I Ith Regi- Inealt Maine Xolulteers, wito hall been a sergealnt of artillery in tIle old army before the war, and is (low a captain ill the :d Regiment Ullitedl States Artillery, to take a letacllment of his command to the battery and Sight the guln jIlst to the left of tile steeple of St. Miehael's Church in Charleston. (Colonel Serrell, assisted by Lieutenant Edwards, had laid the line of fire in the afternoon. They were kept in the battery for over three hours under a tremendolls fire from the enemy while putting in range stakes to fire by in the (light. as no part of the city could then be seen. Thle guln was given an elevation of :311 34)', Colonel Serrell having had the top carriage altered to etlable this to be done; and it was charged, by speeial instructions, with twenty pounds of powder, being four pounds greater than the orlinary service charge. At half-past one Onl tie morning of August 22d the first shell with percussion-fuse was fired from the - Swamp Angel." The noise madle by bells anl whistles ill the midlIle of the (light told the Union soldiers that tIle shell hadl fallen into the city. Sixteen shells were firedl that early morning hour. Twelve of the shells fired were of Mr. R. P. Parrott's own l-onstricetion at the West Point foundrv and filled with a fluid eomposition. and the other four shells were filled with " Short's Solidified Greek Fire." General Beauregard wrote General Gilimore on the morning of August 22d, saying, "Your firing a number of the most lestrue- tive missiles ever used in war into the midst of a city taken unawares and filled with sleeping women and chillren will give you a ball eminence in history." The general repliel, and on August 2:3d twenty more shells. filled with -. Greek fire." were fired from the gun in the marsh. Six of these shells exploded ill the gIn, doubtless shortelling the life of the piece to some extenit. On the thirty- sixth discharge of the "Swamp Angel," the bree-h of the gun just behind the vent blew Oult of its jacket and the gun was thrownl forward on the ) This gun (lever was used in lreaehing thev wall (If Fort Smlot-r. alId tie great .oOpoulder rifle gun which lid ilIch execution on that fort (lever fired intl ChalrlestoI.- EDITOlS. VOL. I V. 4 73 THE OPPOSING LAND FORCES AT CHARLESTON. parapet. The gun as it appeared on the parapet seemed to the Confederates as if in position for firing, and a large amount of ammunition was needlessly expended upon it. From the hour of 1 o'clock on the afternoon of Augiust 1Ist, when Lieuteuuauut Sellmer's detach- unent started for the batterv, thirteen guns and mortars, among which were two 10-inch Colum- ntH 1SWAMP AN'(EL" M-OUNTED AS A MONUM:ENT, IN T5K.NTN', NEW JEAEY. biads and two 10-inch sea-coast mortars, were try- ingto prevent the manning of the gun, and, after it had commenced firing, to silence it. But they did little damage to the battery and none to the men. The mortar shells, with log-time fuses, did not explode until they had stuck in the mud, and the After the capture of Batteries Wagner and Gresm, guns were mounted on the bitter fortitfiation.. Genera l (illmore, in his e-haustive work ou -'Engineer and Artillery Operations against the Defenses of Charleston shells from the Columbiads burst in front of the parapet and did no damage. No other guns were mounted in the marsh bat- tery until September 7th, when Battery Wagner surrendered to the Union troops. J Then two 10- inch sea-eoast mortars were placed there to draw off the fire of the batteries on James Island. Colonel Serrell says that the distinctive features of the marsh battery as a work of etugineering were "that the gun-platform was placed upon a gun-deck resting upon vertical sheet piling, outside and around which there was a grillage of logs. If the gun and the other weights upon the gunl-deek were heavy enough to tend to sink in the mud, the weight upon the grillage, in. the form of sand in bags, which formed the parapet and epaulement of the battery, by being increased, counterpoised the gun-deck. It was simply a force meeting another force of a like amount in an opposite di- reetion." The English journal, "Engineering," in its review of the operations of the Federal and Confederate armies at the close of the war, speaks of the construction of this battery as one of the most important engineering works done by either army. It was a successful piece of difficult engineering, and a practical method of inflicting damage on a city nearly five miles distant. regard- less of its army, its cannon, and its great fortifica- tions, which were within close sight and easy range. The "Swamp Angel" was purchased after the war with some condemned metal and sent to Trenu- ton, New Jersey, to be melted, but, having been identified, was set up on a granite monument in that city on the corner of Perry and Clinton streets. in 1863-- (New York, Van Nostrand, IH65., gives the re,- ord of one 30-pounder Parrtt that sent 4253 shells to- ward the city of Charleston, many of them reaching it, others faliing short.- W. S. S. THE OPPOSING LAND FORCES AT CHARLESTON, S. C. Thje e.st.uustli n.tIc, u-.. ant stren- th of ,-ac0l armyt- a lcre state.l gi-e the gist of alt thle iata btai hi-be ii thlue offciat 1rco-rt-. K stan.dt f-r kiltet: w fr ....... le.t. . n w for tlortat3 woumlet In fur cajttred dr msfingre r, fr capturetl. talon: Maj.-Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore., ommanding Department of the South. CeOa dcrai: General G. T. Beauregard. commanding Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Floridaq Battery Wagner, July 18th. UNION. FIRsT DivisioK, Brig.-Cen. Truman Seymonr (w). First Briyde,. Brig.-Gen. George C. Strong (m wr): 6th Conn., Col. John L Chatfield to. w), Capt. John N. Tlmi-y; Pth Me.. Col. Sabine Emery (w); 54th Mas.. colored). Col. Robert G. Sbhw iki, Capt. Lns F. E.uilio: 3d N. HT.. Col. Jobn 1t. Jackson 4W); 48th N. Y., Col, William B. Barton (W.; 76th Pa.. Capt. John S. Littell. Jim-road Brigad, Cot. Hltlunand 9. P n am 4k) 7th N. H., Lletit.-Coi. Jomseph C. Abbott; 1(0th N. Y.. CotL George B. Dandy; 62d Ohio, Cot. Francis B. Pond; 67th Ohio. Col. Alvin C. Voris. Arliffery, Lieut.-Col. Richard W. Jacksrn and Capt. Loomis L. Langdon (in charge of siege-batterica): C, 3d R. L., Capt. Charles R. Brayton; E, 3d U. S., Lieit. John R. Myrick. Total Union loss: killed, 246; wounded, 880; captured or missing. 389 = 1515. The strength of the assaulting column (exclusive of Stevenson's brigade, held in re- serve) is estimated at 5600. CONFEDERATE. Gtrrison, Brig.-(en. William B. Taliaferro: 32d Ga., Cu. George P. Harrison. Jr.; 314t N. C.. Lieut.-Col. C. W. Knight; 51st N. C.. Col. Hetor rleKethan; Charles- t.... (S. C., Rattalitn. UAett.-Col. P. C. (asitlard w v); 7th S. C. Batt1tion. Mal. J. E. Ri.o. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. J. C. Simkins (ki: 63d Ga. (2 cu's). Capt.. J. T. Bnckner and W.J. Di.on; 1st S.C. (2 coboCapts. W. T. Tatom k) and Warren Adaun; S. C. Battery, Capt. W. 1L De Pass. Total Confederate loss: killed and wounded, 174. Total futree guarding fortification around Charleston. about m5m0. Total engaged at Battery Wagner, asout 10010. 4 That tart of Florlda east of the Apalarhicola River was added to O-ueral Beauregard's command October 7th, 1862. 74 THE OPPOSING LAND FORCES AT CHARLESTON. Siege Operatiotns, Augtust-September, 1863. UNION.- MORRIS ,Brig.-flea. Alfred It. Terry. 'irhgt Brigade, C0l. 1lenry R. (In-s: 9th Mc., Lient.-Cal. Z. 11. RobInson; 31 N. H., Capt. Janus .s F. Randlett; 4th N. II., Liitt.-(ol. soois. Bell; D7th Pa., MlJ. Gualnah i'eoi ypacker. 'S1o40 d 1i Bgaue, Cal. Joahua B. Howell: lJit!, Ill., Ci. Thoma. 0. Oshorn; 62d Ohio, CaI. F. B. l'onI; 67th OhIlo, Mi,". Lewis Butler; 85th Pa., Maj. Ed- ward Campbell Third Brigade, Brig.-Gea. Thom.as 0. tevellRon: 7th t('nn., Ct. Joseph H. Ilawley; 10th Couti.. L t0. EKwi, S. G1reetey; 24th MassC..Col. Francis A. O.WI.orn; 7th N. ft., Libet -Col. J. C. Abbott; 100t1 N. Y., Cal. GI. B. Dauidy. Fourth Brigade, Col. James Mottgoiaery: 54th Mas. (eolared, Cot. M. S. Littlefield; td S. C. (eolored), Libent.-Cot. W. W. M-arpl; 3t U. H. C. T., Col. B. C. TilgIhx ma. Fifth Brigade, Col W. W. 11. D:ats: 47th N. Y., Ma). C. I. MeDonatd; Independent Slattalbiu N. Y. Capt. SM. Schmitt; i2d Pa., Lieat.-C0l. It. M6. Hoyt; 10411th ', Makj. E. L. Rogers. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. H. W. Jackson and Capt L. L. Lanngdi: B, .t1 R. I., Ciipt. Albert E. Green; C, 3d It. I., Capt. Charles R. Brayto;: 11, 3d H. t., Capt. Richardl G. Shaw; 11, 3.1 R. 1., Capt. August.. W. Ciitwell; 1, 3d R. I., Capt. Utartes t;. Sttrahan; M, 3d R. 1., Capt. Joseph J. Cani- stock. Jr.; B, lt U. S., Lleut. flay V. Henry; C, 1st U. S. Idtacohmcnti, Lient. James E. WIlson; E, 3d U. M., Gent. Johnl R. Myrick; B, 3d N. Y., Capt. James E. Ash- croft; F. 3di N. Y., Lenut. Panl Blrehmeyer. tisei..t.- Means: D'taebn.ent 11th Me., Lleit. Cbarles Seltibter; 1Ditac ia.e..t 1, 1st Mass. Carv., lent. Charles V. Halt; Itt N. Y. Engineers, Cal. Edward W. Serrel. sifiRThI END OF FOLLY IsLAND, Brig.-Gen. Israel Vogdes. African Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Edward A. Wild: 65th Mass., CVl. Norwood P. Hallnwell; 1st N. C., Col. James C. Beedher; 231 N. C. (detaehtnen., Col. Alonzo G. Iraper; 3d N. C. (detaehment), Capt. John Wilder. Foser' Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. S. Foster: 13th Ind., Col. Cyrns J. Doibs.; 112th N. Y., Col. Jeremiah C. Drake; 169th N. Y., Col. Clarence Bell-. Alfore's Brigade, Cal. Satinel M. Alford: 3d N. Y., Lleut.-Col. E. G. Floyd; 89th N. Y.. Col. Harrison S. Fairchild; 103d N. Y., Cal. William HUine; 117th N. Y., Col. Alvin White. Artitiry: 1st ('oan., Capt. A. P. Rockwell. .01117T END (IF FOLLY ISLAND, Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Gordon. First Brigade, Brig.-Gea. A. Sehimmelfenuig: 41st N. Y., Lient.-Col. Detleo van Elosiedet; U4th N. Y., Capt. Clemens Knipsehild; 127th N. Y., Lient.-Cal. Stewart 1,. Woodford; 142d N. Y., Col. N. Martia Curtis; 107th ohh,, Capt. William Smith; 74th Pa., Capt. Henry Krausenjeek. S-coad Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Atic: 17th Coon., Col. W. H. Noble; 40th Mass., Lient.- Cot. Joseph A. Dalton; 144th N. Y., Cal David E. Greg- ory; 157th N. Y., MaJ. James C. Carmichael; 21th Ohio, ('atpt. Nathaniel Haughito..; 75th Ohio, Col. A. L. Harris. Rerapitulation of Union losses, July 10th-Sept. 7th: SNti . ris llanil, Joly 0o . ........... 15 IBLttery Wnagne.r, Jl-y 11 ..... ... 49 Bailty Wagir,, Jmils 18 -... . 2411 siege operationus., Jaily lS-Sciqt. 7 71 Total on. Mo-rlo Islaul ........ 381 4 91 123 880 278 167 :389 9 137 2 -- 5121 The effeetIve streigth of the lattd forces emphlyed itt the direct operations agalinst Charleston, ranged from 11,000 to 16,000. The loass fro, Sept. Sih to Dc. 31st, 1863, was 14 killed ;iiiil 42 wounded = 56. CONFEDERATE.-FIRST MILITlRY DISTRICT, Brig. (en. R. S. Ripley. First WiaieisioaBrig.-t;en.WiliamB. Tallaferrtt; 6th Ga., Col. John T. Lofton; lath Ga.. Col. A J. Hattchhis; 32d1 Gia., Col. George P. HarrIson. Jr.; 54th (la., Col. C. H. Way; 31st N. C., Col. John V. Jordon; 21st S. C., Cal. R. F. Graham; 35th S. C., Col. C. Ht. Simonton; Marion (S. C.) Arty, Capt. E. L. Parker; Chathai l(Ga.) Art'y, Capt. John F. Wheaton; Palmetto S. C.) Battalion Arty, Lient.-Cot. E. It. White; S C. Batt'y, Capt. J. T. Kan.apatt; A, 1st 9. C. Art y, Capt. F. D. Blake; (Ia. and S. C. Siege Train, bMaJ. Edward Mnnigatilt; 2d S. C. Art y, Col. A. D. Frederick; S. C. Art'y, Capt. John R. MLthewes; (liat .aCr iS- C.) Art'y, Capt. C. E. Chic!hester; 5th S. C. Ca-. 14 ca's, Col. John D,,n.ov.at; Lcas.'s S. C.) Battalion, Mo,). 3. J. Lucas; 23d Ga., Maj. M. R. Ballenger; 27th Ga., Maje. James Gardner; 28th Ga., Capt. W. P. Crawford; 1st, 12th, and 18th (Ga. Battalions, Col. C. It. Olmstead; C, F, and 1, 1st S. C. Art'y, bleIt.-Cid. J. A. Yates; Savannah RIver Batteries, Capt. W. W. 1111op; 11th S. C., CoL F. H. Gantt. sciond Snbdieiusa, Brig.-fen. Thomas L. Clingman: 7th S. C. Battalion, Lient.-Col. P. H. Nel- sil; Sth N. C., Col. H. M. Shaw; list N. C., Col. HI. Me- Kethan; 61st N. C., Col. J. D. Radcliffe; 20th S. C., Col. L. M. Keitt; Genman Art'y, Capt. F. W. Wagener; ligi.h (S. C.) Artly, Capt. W. E. Charles; lot 59. C., CoL Willham Botter; S. C. Car.. Capt. A. D. Sparks; E, 5th S. C. Car., Capt. L. A. Whilde..; It and K, 1st S. C. Artly, Capta. H. R. Lesesne and A. S. Gaillard. Third Sob- dirision (Morris Island), Brtg.-Gen. A. H. ColquttI: [The troops of this command were drawn from other slib- dIvisions and appear In the commands to which they properly belonged.] Feurth StdirisonlFlirt Snmterl. Col. Alfred Rhett, MAJ. Stephen Elliott, Jr.: B, D, and E, l1t S. C. Art'y; B. 27th Ga.; F, 28th Ga. Castle Plack- ney and Fort Ripley: G, I1t S. C. Art'y, Capt. W. H. Peronneanu. [Subsequent to the fall of Morris Island other troops were detailed, in tarn, to garrison Fort Sumter.] Fifth Sabdirisi.., Brig.-Gea. W. G. DeSans- sore: 1st S. C. (Mil., Col Ed. Magroth; ist S.C. Art'y (Mil.), Col. J. A. Wagener; 18th S.C. (Mil.), Col. J. F. Carew; Battalion State Cadets, Ma). J. B. White; D and U, 5th S. C. Cav., Lieut.-C ol. R. J. Jeffords; K, 4th S. C. Coa., Capt. B. II. Colcock; S. C. Battery, Capt. W. E. Earle; Charleston Battalton, Maj. Jliuns A. Blake. E.-aWs' Brigade. Z3 Brig.--ea. N. G. Evans; 17th S. C., CaL F. W. MeMaster; 18th S. C., CoL W. H. Watlace; 22d S. C., Col. S. D. Goodtett; 23d S. C., Col. 1. L. Ben- bow; 26th S. C., Col. A. D. Smith; HIolconbe Legion, Lient.-CoL W. J. C-awley. Aadersona Brigade4 JBrig.- flen. G. T. Anderson: 7th Ga., Col. W. W. White; 8th Ga., Col. John h. Towers; 8th Ga., CoL B. Beek; 11th Ga., Cl. F. H. Little; 19th Ga., Col. Jack Brown. Wise's Bri- gade, BrIg.-Gen. Henry A. Wise: 26th Va., Cal. P. R. Page; 4th Va. Heavy Art'y, Col. J. T. Goode; 46th Va., Cal. I. T. W. Duke; 69th Va., Col. W. B. Tabb. General Beauregard, In hise aical report, say.s: 4 The total loss in killed and wounded on Morris tsland from Julyloth to Sept. 7th wasonly 641 men; and dedocting the killed and wounded due to the landing on July 11th and 18th, the killed and wounded by the terrible bhombard- ment, which lasted almost uninterritptedly, night and day, during fifty-eIght days, only amounted to 296 men, many of whom were only stightly wounded. It is still mare remarkable that during the same period of time, when the enemy fired 6202 shots and shells at Fort Sumter, varying in weight from 30 to 300 pounds, only three men were killed and 49 wounded." The entire loes it. the defenses of Charleston ft-al July 10th to September 7th was 157 killed, 674 wottded, and 119 captured or missing =900. See Official Rec- ords," Vol. XXVIII., Part L., P. 409.1 It Is estimated that the force defending the Imtimediate approaches to Charteston ranged from 62,0M to 18,600. Tue troopo and cnoiinaolrlrs eniplaycit n the defenseaof son Itageai, Brig-len. A. It. CoIqititt. (I'. 11. F. Graham, Morris Ilani w-ere r-eli.-et from tiic.e to tinis. The cam. Cal. Oeiirge P. Harrtsen, Jr., n-d CoA. L. St. lKeitt. manilers were Brig.-Gu . W. B. Taliferro, Brig.-Gen. John - Joinel after capture of Morris Island by UnIon force. 75 THE 13ATTLE OF OLUSTEE, OR OCEAN POND, FLORIDA. BY SAMUEL J11NES, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A. rI HE fourth year of the war was al.o the year I for the election of a President of the United States, and it would have been strange if an event of so much importance had not it, some measure shaped the conduct of the campaigns of that year. If any one of the Southern States couldl b- brought so effectually under the control of the Union army as to give plausible pretext to any considerable portion of the inhabitants, white autd black, to form a quasi State government recognizintg the author- itv of the United States, it would not only be received as an earniest of the success of the Union armts, hut the State could be represented in the approaching convention for the nomination of a eandidate for President, and take part in the elec- tion to follow. Florida appeared to offer better prospect of success in such an undertaking than any other Southern State. Its great extent of coast and its intersection by a broad and deep river, navigable by vessels of war, exposed a great part of the State to the control of the Union forces whenever it should be thought desirable to occupy it. The ex- igeneies of the Confederate service had in a great measure stripped Florida of troops. If a column of Union troops could penetrate the country west- ward from Jacksonville, occupy a point in the in- terior, and break up communication between east, middle, and west Florida by the destruction of the railroad and bridges about the Suwanee River, the Southern Confederacy would not only be deprived of a large quantity of the food drawn from east and south Florida, but a jIut (dI' appe would be established for anty of the inhabitants who might be disposed to attempt the organization of a State acknowledging allegiance to the United S4tates. President Lincoln's views on the subject are expressed itt the followiutg letter: EXECCTIVEV M.1s11 nt. WAslsNGToo," January 13th, 1WJ4. MAJOR-(GEN'ERAL (ILLM1oRE: 1 I u.derstamrt an efiort is te-ing made by some worthy gentlemen- tl reconstruct a loyal State gov-raiment in Florida. Florida is )n your department. taud it is not unilikely that you may be there in perR.I I haive given Mr. Hay a commissionf mao ki-r and sent hiim to you with .un...e t.bltiuk-uook attl other blanks to aid in the rn'onstruetion. He wilt explain as the manner of using the hlanik., and also iuy genteral views on the sub- jeet. It i desirabWle for all to oihs'r-te; but if irre- eon-ft.blte differences t opinion shall ari-e, yon are master. I wish the tbing uione in the Im.oat sleedy way possible. s that when dne it will bse within the range of the hlte proelanitiot on the subject. The detail lastor of (-ours' will have to tN- done by others.: but I sh.alt b areatly obliged if von will give it anulb general suluerslsinna ,o.a tanlutd convenient with your mole strictly muilitary dutie-. Yours ery truly. `A. LNcoLN." Under these instructions General Gillmore, on the 5tb of February, ordered General Truman Seymour to proceed with a division of troops from Hilton, Hea l to Jacksotuville, Florida. Admiral l)abigren. who seems to have been alwavs readv to eooperate with the land forces, sailed with the expedition with a squadron of five gun-boats, and was in readiness, if needed, to cover the landing. No opposition was met with, however, and out the th General Seymour's force of about seven thou- sand men landed at Jacksonville. The objects of the expedition as reported by Gen- eral Gillmore to the general-in-ehief (who did iwt approve it) were: I'irst. To procure an outlet for eotton, lumber, timber, etc. tcopd. To clit off one source of the enemy's commissary stores. Third. To obtain recruits for the negro, regiments. Fourtlh. " To inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her allegiance," etc. It was known that the few Confederate troops in east Florida were widely scatteted, and no oppo- sition was auuticipated until reiliuforeemeuuts could arrive. Celerity of movemenit was therefore im- portatit. General Seymour promptly niarched in- lanl,-Colonel lMcCormniek, comitmanding a picket at MeGirt's Creek. retiring,- captured five field- pieees which the Confederates could not move for want of horses, and reached Baldwin, twenty miles from Jacksonville, February 0th, where he was joined by General Gillmore. Colonel Guy V. Hetnry, commanding a small brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry, marched westward, encountered a picket of about 1 50) men at the crossing of the south fork of the St. Mary's River, which, with the loss of twenty-five of his men, killed and wounded, and without loss to the Confederates, he dislodged, and proceeded to within three miles of Lake City, when he was recalled, and on the I th joitned the main body. which had reached Barber's plantation on the south fork of the St. Mary's. Here the command was delayed for the lack of transporta- tion. The railroad had been relied on for trans- portatiout, but there was only one engine on the road, and that in such wretched condition that it could not be used within several days, if at all. From Baldwin General Gillmore returned to Jaeksonville, and on the 1'3th to Hilton Head, whence he issued a proclamation announeing his occupanty of Florida, calling on the people to take the oath of allegiattee to the Union, assuring them that the State had been recovered from rebel rule, and would not again be abatidotued. the United States being able to protect all loyal citizens. There seems to have been some vacillation in the execution of the expedition. General Seymour, on whom the execution of General Gillmore's plans devolved, whollv disapproved it. The movement on Lake City he regarded as in opposition to sound strategy, and inadvisable, and be had discovered that what had been said of the desire of Florida to eome back into the Union was a delusion. IIDo not." be writes to Gillmore, "fritter away your infantry in the interior," but at once withdraw the whole force back toJacksoniville and Palatka,points which could be easilv held and woould serve as rendezvous for such Floridians (if any) as should desire to form a new State government under the Union flag. To this Gillmore replied telling him not to risk a repulse by an advance on Lake City; if he met serious opposition he should concentrate at T6 THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE. Saliderson's or the St. Mary's. But how was lie to advance at all without risking a repulse, seeing that there was an enemy in his path f Nor could lie remlnain at Salderson's with entire safety, for seymour reported that Sanderson's could not be fortitied to advantage or the troops supplied there. uillimore then directed him to concentrate without dlelay at Baldwin, bult that point offered scarcely more advantages of strength than Sanderson's, and was. besides, twenty miles from his supplies at Jacksonville, and he had but little transportation. Whilst General (Gillnmore was at his headquar- te-r at Hilton Head and the army in the interior of Florida was beyond the reach of telegraphic communication, much of necessity was left to the discretion of General Seymour. Having ob- tained reliable information that the strength of the enemy in his front did not exceed his own, the excellent character of his own troops, as he reports to his chief, forbade any doubt as to the propriety of a conflict on equal terms. Accord- iugly he resolved to carry out the general plan on which he supposed the occupation and con- trol of east Florida had been based, by marching at once to the Suwanee lRiver and destroying the bridges and railroad, thus breaking up communi- cation between east and west Florida. On the receipt of Seymour's letter communicating his de- termination, Gillniore promptly returned a sharp and emphatic disapproval; but it was too late. On the landing of Seymour's expedition at Jack- sonville, Brigadier-General Joseph Finegan, the Confederate commander of east Florida, immedi- ately telegraphed to Savannah and Charleston for reenforcements, and by February 10th had col- lected at Lake City 490 infantry, 1 10 cavalry, and two field-pieces of his own widely scattered force. That night lie placed the men in position two and a half miles east of that town, and reentforcements were sent to him from Charleston and Savannah. Demonstrations were made by the Union com- manders at these points, but they failed to pre- vent the departure of reenforcements for Florida. By the 13th a Confederate force of about 4600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and three field-batteries (12 guns) was concentrated near Lake City. This force was organized into two brigades; the first, A. H. Colquitt's,madeupof the 6th, 19th, 23d, 27th, and 28th Georgia regiments, the 6th Florida, and the Chatham battery of Georgia artillery. The second brigade was composed of the 32d and 64th Georgia Volunteers, 1st Regiment Georgia Regulars, 1st Florida Battalion, Bonaud's Battalion of Infantry, and Guerard's Light Battery. Colonel George P. Harrison, Jr., of the 32d Georgia, commanded the brigade. The cavalry was commanded by Colonel Caraway Smith, and the Florida light artillery was unattached and in reserve. The whole force num- bered about 5400 men at Ocean Pond on the Olustee, 13 miles east of Lake City. The country along the railroad from the Suwanee River eastward is low and flat, without streams to ) Hawley'. brigade was composed nf the 7tll Con- neetilejt, Captain Skinner commanding; 7th New Hanp- -hire. Colonel J. C. Abbott; and 8th United States Colored Troops, Colouel Charles W. Fribley. Barton's, ofthe47th delay the march of an army, and covered with open pine forests unobstructed by undergrowth. The only natural features which could serve any pur- poses of defense were the lakes and ponds scat- tered over the country. The position at Ocean Pond offered these advantages. From the 13th to the 201th some defensive works were begun, but little progress was made toward completing them. on a line extending from Ocean Poold on the left, a sheet of water of about four miles in length by from two to two and a half miles in width, to an- other pond about two miles long, on the right and to the south of the railroad. A short distance in front of the left was another pond, andl in front of the right a bay or jungle, passable only withii two hundred yards to the right or sooth of the railroad. The position possessed strength pro- vided the enemy would attack it directly in front, but could be readily turned. Early on the morning of February 20th, Sey- mour marched westward from his camp on the south fork of the St. Mary's River, to engage the enemy near Olustee, about eighteen miles distant. The country over which he marched was open and level, presenting no strategic points, and the ground was firm, offering no difficulty to the march of troops of any amount. Colonel Henry was in advance with his small brigade of cavalry and Elder's Horse Artillery (Battery B, First U. S. Artil- lery). Though there was no lack of general officers in General Gillhnore's command, on this expedition the three infantry brigades were commanded by colonels. Colonel (afterward General and United States Senator) J. R. Hawley led in three parallel columns, marching by flank, the center one on the road, the other two dressing on it. Colonels W. B. Barton's and James Montgomery's brigades fol- lowed in the same order of march. Captain John Hamiltonm's Light Battery " E," 3d United States Artillery, and Captain L. L. Langdon's " M, 1st United States Artillery, and a section of Rhode Island Artillery, under Lieutenant Metcalf, fol- lowed. One regiment, the 55th Massachusetts, was left in camp. which, with other regimentsdetached, reduced the force engaged to about 55t)0 men, with 16 field-pieces. ) General Finegan had thrown forward Colonel Smith's cavalry, supported by the 64th and two companies of the 32d Georgia regiments, to skir- mish with the advancing enemy and endeavor to draw them on to attack ill the selected position. Apprehending, however, that the Union com- mnander would be too cautious to attack a rela- tively strong position which could be so easily turned, lie ordered forward General Colquitt with three of his regiments and a section of Gamble's artillery to assume command of all the troops in front. About two miles east of Olustee Colquitt found the enemy, who had driven in the pickets. advancing rapidly. The colonel of the 64th Georgia, a new regi- ment, never before iii action. supposing that only New York, Colonel Henry Moore; 48th New York. Major W. B. Coan; and 115th New York. Colonel Simeon Sant- muon. Montgomery's.of the 54th Mass., Colonel E. N. Hal- lowell; and 1st North Carolina, Lieut.-Col. W. N. Reed. 77 THE BATTLE OF OLUS TEE. mounted troops were advancing against him, had formed square to resist cavalry. Colquitt ar- nved just iil time to save the square from being ripped open by the enemy's artillery. He threw forward skirmishers and quickly formed line of battle tinder aL brisk fire, the 19th Georgia onl the right, the stlh on the left, with the section of Gamble's battery in the center. The 64th and the two cotupaniesof the 32d Georgia were formed on the left of the '2th. The 6th Georgia was thrown still farther to the left to check any move- ment by that atank; the eavalry was divided and thrown to the two flanks. In, this order the line advanced, the enemy yielding slightly but stub- bortily contesting the ground. Finlding the enemny ill foree in his front, ('tlquitt called for reitnforce- ments, bitt G.eneral Finegan had anticipated him and Colonel Harrison was at hand with his bri- gadle. The 6th Florida Battalion was pitt inl line onl the right of the 19th Georgia, and the 23:d on the left of the 64th Georgia. Colonel Harrison with his own regiments, the :t2d Georgia and 1st Georgia Regulars, took position between the --:,d and 64th Georgia, and by Colquitt's order assumed direction of affairs on the left of the line. Instead, therefore, of attacking the Confederates in a se- lected position strengthened by field-works as the Union officers supposed, the battle was joined about : o'elock P. 3. on level ground covered with open pine forest, offerintg no advantage of position to either. General Seymour's plan was to concentrate his artillery ill the center, strongly supported onl both flanks lay the first brigade, and while the two brigades ill rear were hastening into position, to overwhelm his enemy by a rapid fire of his supe- rior artillery, and then charge. Hamilton's and Langdot's batteries were hurried forward to join Elder's, which had been ill advance with the eav- alry. The, th Connecticut, which so gallantly had led the first assault on Battery Wagner, July 11th, 18 63, had first felt and driven back the advanced Confederates, and in turn had itself yielded ground, was withdrawn to unmask the line; the 7th New Hampshire moved forward into line on the right and the 8th United States Colored Troops on the left of the batteries. The fire of the latter was eceeeditigly effective. The section of Gam- ble's battery was soon put hors (le conibat. It was replaced by the Chatham Artillery of Savannah, whieh, under Captain John F. Wheaton, was drawn from the right to the cetter under a galling fire. The whole Confederate forec on the field moved forward and the action became general along the whole liue. The 7th New Hampshire, a veteran regiment armed with superior rifles. broke and fled in eotifusion; not. however, until it had suf- fered severely in killed and wounded. The most strenuous efforts of its colonel, Abbott, and of Colonel Hawley. aided by staff-officers, could not stem its fight atid reform it. The Sth Umuited States The old regular soldiers of the artillery seem to have imormue thleel-ves with -oospicututs gallantry. t'ptalin Lanedon speaks of a driver, whoe name surely de-serviid tio lie recorded, who, with his life-blood stream- ilg from a mortal wound, straggled to extricate his (colored) on the left experienced the same fate. Its colonel, Fribley (white), had fallen mortally wounded; other commissioned officers and many of the rank and file had fallen, when it too fled and did not appear again as a regiment ott the field. Barton's brigade replaced the 7th New Hampshire and Moimtgomery's the Sth United States Colored Troops, but the flight of those regi- ments had greatly exposed the artillery. Though it couitittued its fire with admirable effect, the men and horses were falling fast, and some of these, becomimig unmanageable, dashed and locked their carriages against the trees, until so maty of the men and horses were killed and wounded that five guns were abandoned to the advancitig Confederates. ;Z By that time the Confederates had exhausted their ammunition, and there was none near at hand. The regiments were halted, the few men who had ammunition returning a slow fire to the very brisk fire from the other side, while staff-officers, couriers, atnd orderlies were riding at utmost speed between the line and all ammunition-car on the railroad some distance in the rear, bringing up cartridges in haversacks, pockets, caps, in anything itnto which they could be crammed, and distributing them along the line. To hold aline inder a heavy fire which it cannot return is a severe tria' to the steadiness of the best troops. During this trying pause Lieutenant Hugh H. Colquitt of the gen- eral's staff was a conspicuous object to the troops in both lines as he galloped in front of the Confed- erates, waving a battle-flag and exhortitg the men to stand fast, not to lie down or shelter them- selves behind the pine-trees, lest the enemy should suppose the line had broken and melted away, and assuring them that their cartridge-boxes would soon be replenished.4 The men were equal to the emergency and stood fast until they were sup- plied with ammunition. In the meantime the 27th Georgia Regiment, Bolaud's Battalion, the 1st Florida Battalion, and a section of Guerard's Bat- tery arrived from the intrenched lines in the rear. They were put in position near and a little in advance of the center, to hold the enemy in cheek until the other commands could be supplied with ammunition. By direction of General Colquitt, Colonel Harrison had formed the 6ith and 32d Georgia regiments on the extreme left, thus secur- ing an effective cross-fire on Seymour's right. A general advance along the whole Confederate line followed, and the Union line vielded ground, first reluctantly and sullenly, then with some precipi- tation which presently became a confused flight. When the Union line gave way, the Confederates sprang forward with a yell and pursued the enemy several miles and until night closed in on the scene and stopped pursuit. During the engagement Colonel Smith's cavalry had guarded the flanks, Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. McCormick, 2d Florida Cavalry, on the right, and Colonel Duncan L. Clinch, 4th Georgia Cavalry, on team and carry off the gun until he fell dead in the res- olute but vain, attemnpt.- S. J. jsenator Hawley told me that he was imupressed with the daring gallantry of the yong halde-de-anp, and sub- sequeutlylearnedhis name from SenatorColquitt.- 8.J. 78 THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE. the left. Early in the action Colonel Clinch was so severely wounded as to necessitate his removal from the field, and was succeeded by Captain N. A. Brown. When the Union line finally gave way and the flight cmmenced, the cavalry was ordered to pursue and seize every opportunity to strike the retreating enemy. But from some excess of cau- tion, or other unexplained cause, the pursuit was net vigorous, and thus the full fruits of a dearly won victory oln a well-eontested field were not gathered. The retreat was covered by Colonel Henry's cavalry and the 7th Connecticut Volun- teers, which halted for a time at the St. Mary's and Baldwin, but the main body of the shattered army continued its flight until it gained the shelter of the guil-boats at Jacksontville. As so often hap- p)ened Iluring the war, the victors were ignorant of the full extent of thle victory, which, on this occasion, was so complete that a vigorous pursuit eould scarcely have failed at least to double the already heavy Union loss. General Seymour, who throughout the day had shown his usual coolness and gallantry, attributed his disaster to the " great numerical superiority of the Confederates," an opinion which doubtless le held with sincerity at the time, but which was soon found to be entirely erroneous, the numbers engaged being nearly equal. General Gillmore and his staff sharply criticised the whole affair, and even charged Seymour with disobedience of orders, but did not give the specifications. In the Union camps in the Department of the South the affair was char- acterized as a second Dade's massacre, or Brad- dock's defeat. It was, however, a fair fight in an open field. The tenacity with which the Union troops contested the field is shown by the losses on both sides. Theirs was about one-third of their number engaged, and 120 horses killed. It was especially heavy in officers: Colonel Fribley was mortally wounded and died on the field, Lieuten- ant-Colonel Reed was mortally, and the major of his regiment, Boyle, severely wounded, as were Colonels Moore of the 47 th, Sammon of the 115th New York, and the chief of artillery, Captain Hamilton. Captain Vandervere of the 115th New York was killed. General Seymour commended the good conduct of all the troops engaged except the 7th New Hampshire and 8th United States Colored Troops. The former's misconduct he attributed to the presence in the ranks of a num- ber of inferior conscripts and substitutes. It lost in the engagement 209), and the 8th United States Colored Troops : l a, officers and nien. In addition to five or six field-pieces, the Confederates cap- tured 1600 rifles and muskets, a flag, and a quan- tity of ammunition. The Confederate loss was 940 killed and wounded. The 32d Georgia had suffered most severely, losing 164 officers and men. Among the killed or mortally wounded were Lieutenant- ('olonel James Barrow and Lieutenant P. A. Waller, 64th Georgia; Captain H. A. Cannon, commanding the 1st Georgia Regulars; Adjutant William H. Johnson, 19th Georgia; Lieutenant W. H. Combs, 6th Georgia; Lieutenant Thomas J. Hill, 6th Florida; and Lieutenant W. W. Hol- land, 28th Georgia. Lieutenant R. T. Dancey, 32d Georgia, on Colonel Harrison's staff, was killed by the side of his chief early in the action. This expedition to Olustee, the only one of any magnitude which General Gillmore had undertaken beyond the range of the gun-boats, terminated his campaign in the Department of the South. [See papers on Drewry's Bluff, to follow.] COMMENTS ON GENERAL JONES'S PAPER, BY JOSEPH a. HAWLEY, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V. I HAVE read General Jones's paper upon the bat- tle of Olustee with much interest. It is clearly his sincere endeavor to write an impartial state- ment of the facts; it is amusing to see how widely he varies from the exaggerated reports of Generals Beauregard and Finegan. He fairly presents the differences between Gen- erals Gillmore and Seymour. At Baldwin, a night or two before the battle, General Seymour called together six or eight of his officers for consulta- tion. Some were cautious, others were outspoken, but it was decidedly the general opinion that it would be impossible to hold permanently a position out toward the center of the State, having for its line of communication a rickety railroad with one engine running fifty or sixty miles back to the base at Jacksonville. It would take more than our whole little army simply to hold the line against the force that would certainly soon be collected against us. The Confederates could have ruined us by letting us march one more day without in- terruption and then sitting down on the railroad between us and home with their rapidly increasing force. Most of us thought it would be sufficient to attempt to make the St. John's River our main western line, but Seymour thought it his duty to go on. He was, and is, a brave and honorable patriot and soldier. General Jones shows that the Confederates had chosen a strong position. They had their line of battle fully formed to meet us. My old regiment, the 7th Connecticut Infantry, about 330 strong, armed with Spencer carbines, led the advance guard, commanded by Colonel Henry, and com- posed of the mounted 40th Massachusetts Infan- try (a small regiment), Captain Samuel S. Elder's regular battery, and a detachment of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry. Between 2 and 3 P. M. they met and drove back the enemy's cavalry, and soon found the main line, striking up a vigorous combat. Our troops were stretched along the road in the order General Jones describes. When the artillery opened, General Seymour told me the enemyhad but a section of artillery "up there "and that it eouldbe captured. Under his orders Iput the 8th United States Colored Troops, Colonel Fribley, in line and sent them up the road and led the 7th New Hampshire to the right, moving around to strike the enemy's left flank. Our artillery began to work fast. My little regiment of three hundred, 79 THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE. deployed as skirmishers ill rather close order, went straight into the fiee if 6eneral Colquitt's brigade in full line waiting for us. Suddenly the 7th New Hampshire. moving in colunmn of companies. saw the solid gray line about v3t1 yards ahead. A heavy tire ws.. opened on us. Colonel Abbott mis- lulnderstood my order of ieliloyvment ; I uilnertook to -erre t the error, and the regitnelit broke. Itere t4eneral Jones is ill errr; they re-formed anld lid excellent service onl our right Hank, aid latelr rejoined the 7th Connecticut inl the center. They lost inl all 2011; there were i.ever braver men. InI tihe' ulea.time Colonel Fribley's black tmet mlet ti e nmy at short range. They had reported to Inc only two or three days before I was afterward told that they frisl never had a day's practice ill loading and firing. Old troops. findintg themselves so greatly overmatehed. would have rtmn a little anid re-foritued-with orwithiout orders. The black men stood to be killed or wounled - losing more than :1101) out of 551). 6eneral Jones is again ill error; they fell back and reorganized. Colonel Fribley's monument shows where he fell. The 7tbth Connecticut assembled on their colors ill response to their btugle-call, and I placed them in the center of the field opposite to my friend tieneral Colquitt, and they were supplied with amtmunaition. Several times they checked the ,nemny with their seven-shooters, and they did tot stir from their position until they received a econtld order from General Seymour to fall back. The 54th Massachusetts (colored) aftera time came and stood on their left. The next brigade, under Colonel Barton, of the 4sth New York, came ulp and deployed. But the whole Cotfederate fores of five thousand was there. Barton's brigade suf- fered frightfully. Montgomery's two regiments, both colored, were heavily punished. Omitting further details of the battle, which lasted over three hours, hortly after sunset Gem. eral Sevmour ordered us to fall hack to a new linle. We did so. auit several regiments site- c-essively gave three cheers. This was the oeca- siomi of the report to the Confederate commandler that we had formed a new litme. Their cavalry so reportedl. and, though six hiuindred strong, never fired a shot at us, or caine within our sight. Be- hind uIs was a small body of water-ami acre, it may b-beside which were gathered a large number of our wotiuded, nuder the care of surgeon-s. All who could walk or be put into wagons were started off. and several surgeon.s were ordered to stav with the remainder. Our whole eolumtm was put in motion deliber- ately. Seymour took my regiment from me again, to serve as infantry skirmishers iti the rear-guard with Henry's muotmuted metl. The 34th Massa- chusetts was sent to report to me, and with three regiments. movitig by the flank. in parallel lines tiy brigade marched eastward. with our iiimrades General Jotmes says the Ution forces ' yielded tround first reluctamitly and sullenlv, then with some precipitation. which presently became a con- fused flight. When the Union line gave way, the Confederates sprang forward with a yell and pursued the eneumy several miles, and until night closed iti on the scene and stopped pursuit." This mtust have been borrowed fromma some of the wild reports tmade by the enemy immuediately after the battle. Our last formation in line of battle (just referred to) was a few hundred yards in rear of the center of the field. It was fast growing lark ill the pine woods. Not ai yell nor a shot pursued us that long mlight. Wheum umy command racheil Baldwin on the 2ist, we picked up some iif our equipments, left there two or three days before, destroyed some stores, loaded up the cars anti moved on to MeGirt's ('reek. Crossing oti the narrow road through the swramp, we forned line on the eastern bank, put out pickets, and took a good sleep. Colonel Henry and his mounted men and the 7th Connecticut stopped at Baldwin over the night of the 21st. General Finegan's report of the 23d (three days after the battle) says: "I occupy Barber's place this mormitug and my cavalry are in the vicinity of Baldwin." He says, also, " I left Ocean Pomid [the battle-field] yesterday"-that is to say, two days after the fight. The reports of Generals Colquitt, Finegan, Gard- ter, and others give reasons for the feeble pus suit - "'fatigue, absemice of rations, disadvantages of pur- suit in the dark," etc. It is stated that the order to pursue was withdrawn "itl consequence of a report from the advanced cavalry picket that the enemy had halted for the night and taken a position (subsequently ascertained to be imacorreet)." Gen- eral Colquitt says he seint " repeated orders to Colonel Smith of the cavalry to continue the pur- suit, but only two companies on the left, and those but for a short distance, followed the enemy." Smith was relieved from his command, and he re- quested a court of inquiry. Fineganwasrelieved by Gardner. General Beauregard, reporting to Rich- mond, March 2.-th, says " the fruits of the victory were comparatively insignifieatint," laying the blame on the eavalry commander, through " whose lack of energy and capacity for the service no serious at- tempt was made to pursue with his command, while the exhaustion of the infantry . . . and our want of subsistence supplies and ammunition made an immediate pursuit by them impracticable." It was a fair, square, stand-up fight in pine woods, just there not very thick, aind having little utmdergrowth, save about an occasional swampy hole. There was probably a difference of less than five hundred ill the numbers engaged. The Confederates knew the ground and were formed for battle. We rushed in, not waiting for the proper full formation, and were fought in detail. The enemy had the great advantage, with modern weapons, of being on the defensive and ready. There was absolutely no pursuit of the defeated party until the next day. The Confederate loss was 940; the Union loss 1861. This left the former with say 4500; the latter with about 3700, or in about that proportion. It was one of the side- shows of the great war, but the loss on the Union side was proportionately about three times as great as at Buena Vista. I suppose it did help to whit- tle away the great rebellion. So FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. BY MARTIN T. WcMAHON, BREVET MAJOR-GENEBRAL, 1'. S. V. THE chief events of this chapter in the history of the Army of the Potomac were the pursuit of Lee to Virginia, the affair of the Vermont brigade at Beaver Creek, in Maryland, the cavalry engagements at Hagers- town and Williamsport, the action at Bristoe Station, the taking of the Rappahaunock redoubts, the movement to Mine Run, and the Kilpatrick- Dahlgren raid to Richmond. After the battle of Gettysburg two corps of the army, the First and the Sixth, under Major-General John Sedgwick, pressed Lee's retreating forces to the pass at Fairfield. [See maps, Vol. Ill., pp. 381 and 382.] A strong rear- guard held the pursuit in check, compelling frequent formations of the lead- ing brigades in line of battle. Every house and barn along our route of march was filled with wounded Confederates. Lee passed through the mountains in the night of July 5th. One brigade, General T. H. Neill's, was detailed by General Sedgwick to follow and observe the enemy's movements, and the rest of the corps rejoined the main body of the army in the neighbor- hood of Emmitsburg, crossed the Catoctin range at Hamburg, and came upon the enemy at Beaver Creek July 10th, 1863. At this point it seemed that Lee intended to make a decided stand. His position was a strong one, and apparently was held by a sufficient number of troops. The Vermont bri- gade, under Colonel L. A. Grant, was ordered to the front as skirmishers and deployed in a piece of woods covering a front of about half a mile. The rest of the command was massed in readiness, and a general engagement was con- fidently expected. The enemy advanced in line of battle upon the woods 81 82 FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. where the Vermonters with one battery, somewhat in the rear of their skirmish-line, were posted. In general, a skirmish-line, upon being con- fronted by the advance of a line of battle, is expected to retire. The Ver- monters, however, did not so understand it, and, each one holding his position, they delivered such a steady and telling fire that the enemy's line was twiee repulsed. The history of war furnishes few instances such as this, vet the Vermonters did not seem to think that they had accomplished any- thing out of the usual line of duty. The enemy, moving from Beaver Creek, took position on the 12th in the neighborhood of Fuukstown and fortified heavily. His line ran in general to the right from Funkstowni, forming the arc of a circle, the right resting near the field of Antietam. The country was familiar to many of us, who had served in the South 'Mountain and Antietam campaign. A council of war was called that night at General Meade's headquarters, and the question was discussed whether an attack should lye ventured on the following morning upoon Lees intrenched position. Our right covered Hagerstown without occupying the eity. Our general line extended to the left, following the direction of the enemy's position. General Sedgwiek proposed at the council to take the Sixth and Eleventh corps from our right and, moving by night through and beyond Hagerstown, to occupy by daylight a position upon the enemy's flank and rear, and by a determined attack cut him off from the P'otomac while the rest of the army moved directly on his front. This propo- sition, it appears, was negatived in the council. [See Vol. III., p. 382.] The next day was passed in observation and in preparations for an attack. In the night- time (July 13th) Lee's army withdrew, and, falling rapidly back, crossed the Potomac in safety. Longstreet's corps moved up the valley, crossed the Blue Ridge by way of Chester Gap, and proceeded to Culpeper Court House, FOUT A1XAY, ITUJTN'tS HILL, VIRGINIA, bUUlWING MM, FORNEY'S HOUSE AND SIGNAL OBSERVATORY, 183 FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. VIEW OF ALDIE GAP, VIrGINIA. where it arrived on the 24th. Hill's corps followed closely by the same route. Ewell, delayed by a fruitless pursuit of General Kelley's force west of Martins- biurg, found the Gap obstructed by Meade, crossed the mountains farther up at Thornton's Gap, and joined the other corps in the vicinity of Culpeper. Kilpatrick's cavalry, which had been sent by way of the Monterey pass, destroyed some of the enemy's trains but had accomplished little in the way of interrupting the passage of the river. The pontoons were again brought into use, and once more the Army of the Potomac entered upon "the sacred soil." The men were in excellent spirits and condition, and as they marched over the bridges of boats at Harper's Ferry and Berlin the men broke out into the refrain, " Carry me back to old Virginny." Meade advanced to Warrenton and the Rappahannock, where he took position confronting Lee. Before the season for operations had finally closed, Meade had pushed his advance to and beyond the Rapidan, the enemy giving up Culpeper Court House, which Meade occupied as headquarters September 13th. J On the 7th of October the enemy's signal-flags, which were read by our signal-officers on Pony Mountain as ours no doubt were read by the enemy, communicated intelligence which indicated that General Lee was making a formidable movement. This proved to be a movement to his left with the evident purpose of turning our right flank. For reasons never fully explained nor understood, the whole Army of the Potomac, which had marched all the way from Gettysburg for the purpose of engaging Lee, was ordered to retreat. It fell back in good order, certainly, but without apparent occasion. After passing the Rappahannock, General Meade ordered a halt and directed )It was on the 25th of September, on receipt of Army of the Potomac for service in Tennessee the news of Rosecrans's defeat at Chiekamauga, under Hooker. The transfer of these troops that the Government withdrew the Eleventh Corps was a notable achievement of the Quartermaster- (Howard's) and the Twelfth (Slocum's) from the General's Department.- EDITORS. 83 84 FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. MAsP OF 501GINTIIRI VIM01'1A. General Sedgwick to recross in the direction of Brandy Station and give battle. The movement was executed; but General Lee was not found in the position indicated, being actually engaged in crossing the Rappahannock some miles above. at the Sulphur Springs. General Sedgwiek desired and proposed to move ill that direction and attack him while crossing. General Meade did not approve of the suggestion and the retreat continued. On the 14th Warren was attacked at Bristoe Station and won a brilliant vie- tory. I The situation at that time was singularly precarious. All the trans- portation of the arm. was massed in fields off the road, and a breaking of our line at any point would have inflicted incalculable damage. A panic among teamsters is a thing greatly to be dreaded in all army. Wlwen we reached the vicinity of Centreville the army was halted and took position to await attack. Lee had followed closely, destroying the rail- road as he advanced. After a brief reconnoissance he started in his turn to retreat to the Rapidan. Meade pursued, pressing him closely and rebuilding ; The ondfederate troops engaged at Briatoe were the divisions of Heth and Anderson of A. P. Hill's eorps. On the Uniou side the action was sustained by the divisions of Hays and Webb. The main attack was made by Heth's division and fell upon the first and third brigades of Webb's division and the third brigade of Hays's. (olonel James E. Mallon, commanding a brigade under Webb, was among the killed. The following order shows the importance of the action: "HEAEQVAETEus. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Of1t. 15, 1853. 'The Major-General commanding aunounces to the army that the rear-guar., consistingof the Seeond Corps, was attacked yesterday while onarching by the flank. The enemy, after a spirited contest, was relpulsed, losing a hattery of ave guns, two colori, and 450 prisoners. The skill and promptitude of Major-General Warren. and the gallantry and bearing of the Amcer. and soldlers of the Second Corps., are entitled to high commendatlon. By command of Major-General Meade. S. WILLIlms, A-at. Adjt.-General. The Union loss was 50 killed, 333 wounded, and 161 captured or missing=546. The Con- federate loss was 136 killed, 797 wounded, and 443 captured or missing = 1378.- EDITORS. I y L--7 X- k , __ A /-j N a P I E .. ..I I-, I , 0 , I, - I , ,, i "`, 2, I, , 7,- , ,Z, , z I I, 1, 11 i V .4 - - _k et.i FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. the railroad as rapidly as he marched. At Gainesville, or Buckland Mills, on october 19th, there was an affair with the cavalry advance in which both Custer and Kilpatrick distinguished themselves, each in his own way. Custer with one brigade became engaged with part of Fitzhugh Lee's eommand, which retired before himi after crossing the stream at Gainesville. The rest of Lee's command had been drawn off to the left for the purpose of attacking in the rear in case Kilpatrick afforded the opportunity, which he promptly did. With his second brigade he moved forward in support of Custer, who needed no support, however, and the enemy's cavalry came in upon Kilpatrick's rear and scattered him. Kilpatrick believed and reported that he had been routed by infantry. (General Custer and the evidence were to the contrary however; those who came in upon the rear were dismounted cavalry. Some sensation was created throughout the army by this repulse of the cavalry and by the reports of General Kilpatrick, and an order was issued by General Meade, evidently in anticipation of a general engagement the next day. One division of infantry sent over the stream at nightfall, however, developed the fact that all of Lee's army except Stuart's cavalry had already recrossed the Rap- pahannock. The next day Warrenton was occupied and the Army of the Potomac halted for some time in the vicinity of the river. On the 7th day of November there was a general movement. The Fifth and Sixth corps under Sedgwick were directed to the redoubts of the Rappa- hannock near the site of the old railroad bridge, which hal been destroyed. The rest of the army, under General French, was to force the passage at Kelly's Ford, some distance below. Sedgwick's orders were to "push the enemy across the river before dark, if possible." The redoubts of the Rappa- ON THE ROAD TO WARRENTON. 86 FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING G. GRANT. W,.ttRENTON JUIT'10N, '1RIONIA, (U'TtlER, 1863, The no ike ,hon o in tibe piture wu eatsed by bunreniitx buihlnirg and plesw of railway ties tired by the Confed- ente. when they iba wtinne thii region. (See p. S4.1 The troopr on the left tre Birney's division, Third Union Corpa. hannock were two formidable works, both on the left of the railroad, and connected by a curtain or chain of rifle-pits; a further line of rifle-pits ran left from the left redoubt some distance along the river. Two brigades of General Early's corps held the works. The Sixth Corps went into position about midday to our right of the railroad and opened fire from its batteries. The Fifth Corps occupied the river-front below the line of the railroad. The batteries made but little impression. Daylight was fast disappearing. Gen- eral Sedgwick asked the writer for the order of the day; he read it through, and, riding slowly forward, joined General Wright, commanding the Sixth Corps. "Wright," he said, " what (1o you think are the chances of an assault with infantry on that position i" General Wright replied, somewhat incon- sequently, " Just as you say, General." "What does Russell think about it I " asked Sedgwick. Russell's division was in line of battle upon the rough and somewhat stony slope leading up to the works, one brigade, Colonel Upton's, being deployed as skirmishers. "Here comes Russell; he can speak for himself," answered Wright. As Russell joined the group, Sedgwick asked, "Russell, do you think you can carry those works with your division t" Russell replied very quietly, " I think I can, sir." " Go ahead and do it." In less than five minutes Russell's line was seen advancing at trail-arms, picking up the skirmish-line as it was reached, and moving forward until lost in the smoke and the darkness. The enemy's fire was steady, destructive, and continuous, and was accompanied by derisive yells. The 6th Maine and the 5th Wisconsin, moving directly upon the redoubts, broke over the parapet. A sergeant of the 6th Maine, who was the first man inside the works, finding FROM Gh 'YSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. iiinmself surrounded called out that he surrendered, but instantly seeing men lf his command tumbling over the parapet, he yelled, "I take it back," and uade a dash for the colors, which lie secured. He was mentioned ill orders the itext day. Upton's men had swarmed over the rifle-pits and rapidly advanced to the head of the pontoon-bridges, thereby cutting off the enemy's retreat. This affair was singularly brilliant. More than 1600 prisoners, eight colors, -ill the guns, 2000 stand of small-arms, and the pontoon-bridges were cap- tured.1 Colonels D. B. Penn and A. C. Golw in, commanding the two brigades of Hays's Confederate division, shared the fate of their men. They break- fasted with ine on the following morning, and were both very complimentary to our troops in speaking of the engagement. One of theni described it as the most brilliant feat of arms he had yet seen, and said, with some mixture of humor and pathos, that less than half an hour before our attack lie made reply to a question from General Lee, who had ridden over to the works with General Early, that lie wanted no more men, and that lie could hold the posi- tioIn against the whole Yankee army. Tie position captured was commanded, Iand ill some sense supported, by works on the farther side of the river, but the capture of the redoubts was so quick and complete that the eneniy's guns on the right bank were of no service to him. They could indeed have swept the interior of the redoubts, which were open in the direction of the river, but it would have been very destructive to the garrison. t The loss of the Unlion Army was 83 killed, 330 wounded, and 6 missing =41 9. The Confederate loYss (as reported by General Lee) was 6 killed, 39 wounded, and 1629 captured or missing= 1674. But General Lee says, " Some reported as missing were probably killed or wounded and left in the hands of the enemy."-EDITORS. k The brilliant affair of the Rappahannock re- doubts was very gratifying to the commanding gen- eral, and the captured flags, eight in number, were ordered to be formally presented at headquarters by General David A. Russell, escorted by one company of each of the regiments engaged, the column under the command of Colonel Emory Up- ton. It was an interesting occasion. The flags of all the regiments represented were carried in the same group with the captured colors, preceded by the band of the New Jersey brigade. General Meade ordered General Russell to Washington, accompanied by the sergeant of the 6th Maine (Otis 0. Roberts, of Company H), to present the flags formally to the Government. In the armies of civilized nations such a mission, when intrusted to such an officer, bearing the trophies of a victory won by his skill and courage, particularly when suffering from a painful wound received in the ARMY FOOROE, BRANDY STATION. FROM A PHOTtOGRAPH. 87 88 FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. At Kelly's Ford, on the same day, a slight success was achieved, and the Army of the Potomae on the next day effected the passage of the Rappahannock.\ Headquarter-s were es- tablished at Brandy Sta- tion and pickets thrown out over forty miles of territory. There was a period of inaction, of fun and festivity, until the 26th of November, when the through hern y MI ergI IitAI an an1. Ial t erimpass armly crossed the Rap- idan at Germnanna and other fords and moved in the directioir of Mine Run. The season was not fa orable. The weather was bitterly cold and the roads were difficult. fen- eral French wpoith the Third Corps, crossing the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, became engaged with the enemy on the 27th at Payne's Farm. He advanced through heavy undergrowth and an almost impassable tangle and was sharply resisted by the enemy- Edward Johnson's division and Gordon's brigade. French's advance was checked. Part of the Sixth Corps was hurried forward to French's support but took no part in the action. Night coming on, a further attempt to advance was deemed unadvisable. Meanwhile, and several miles to the left, on broader and better roads, the other corps of the army had passed the Rapidan and had moved out to the position of Mine Run. This little stream runs north ward into the Rapidan through a valley bordered on both sides by gradual slopes more or less wooded, with here and there a farm-house. The enemy occupied the crest of the western slope. Our position was naturally on the eastern ridge. During the night Sedgwick was ordered to withdraw his own corps and French's and join the main body of the army, connecting with Warren's light at Locust Grove. This movement was completed by action where the trophies were won, results, as a War Department and rejoined his command by the matter of military etiquette, in his promotion. next train, but his wound proving more serious Russell was also offered a leave of absence after than lie was willing to acknowledge, he was sub- the presentation of the flags, although he insisted sequently sent to the hospital. Having remained that his wound was so slight as not to require care there more than the sixty days' limit, it required or treatment. He returned in three days. His the combined influence of Generals Wright, Sedg- experience was interesting if unsatisfactory. Upon Sick, and Meade to prevent his being mustered arriving in Washington he addressed the Secretary out under an arbitrary rule then in force. Gen- of War, informing him of his mission and asking at eral Russell was subsequently killed in battle at the what time it would be agreeable to him to receive Opequon, in the Shenandoah Vallev. He was one of the flags. After waiting the entire day and re- the bravest and most beloved of officers.-M. T. M. ceiving no answer he called in person at the War k At Kelly's Ford the Union loss was 6 killed Department, sent in his name, and was promptly and 36 wounded, and that of the Confederates informed that the Secretary was busy and could 5 killed, 59 wounded, and 295 captured or miss- not see him. He thereupon sent the flags to the ing.-EWITOaS. FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. daylight ou the morning of the 28th of November. An angry skirmish-fire continued all day, and upon our part reconnoissances were made in various directions. On the evening of the 28th a council of war was called, and at this council it was decided that a flank movement to the left under the command of General Warren, who had proposed and advocated it, should be attempted. The troops assigned to this duty under Warren were his own corps, A. H. Terry's division of the Sixth, and 300 cavalry, reenforced later by the di- 6isions of Prince and Carr of the Third Corps. It was generally understood that Warren's movement as a flank operation was to have been upon a much wider scale than it subsequently proved to be. It was thought that he was to make a circuit of perhaps several days' march, cutting Lee off from all communication, and coming in not so much upon his immediate flank as upon his line of communication and his rear, while Meade with the rest of the army moved upon his actual front. Warren's command marched in the night-time. D)uring the next (lay, November 29th, Sedgwick, holding our right, discovered that the enemy's left flank was unprotected by earth-works, slashings, or abatis, and reported to General Meade that a movement during the night of a strong body of troops, massing them before morning upon the enemy's left, might by a MAP OF THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS OF NOVEMBER, 1863. VOL. IV. 7 89 90 FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. sudden attack at daylight reach his flank and rear and double him up on Warren, who was expected to come in on his extreme right. After some delay and further examination of the position this movement was ordered, and two corps, the Fifth and the Sixth, under Sedgwick, proceeded during the night to the position indicated, and were massed in the woods without having attracted the at- tention of the enemy. Meade's orders were to ' open with artil- lery at 7, and at 2. GENERAL POST-OFTICE, ARMY OF POTOMAC, MCUMBEH, 18552 which had ap- AT 1WANIDY STAT10N.Z, proved it. It was, moreover, antieipated or discovered by the enemy, who diligently and heavily fortified to resist it. Upon reaching the position he sought, Warren, with the good instincts of a soldier, recognized that an attack upon a position so defended would be foolish and disastrous, and so reported to General Meade. In the meantime Sedgwiek opened fire with all his batteries at the hour indicated. The enemy replied with spirit, but in such a manner as to confirm Tle object of the Sanitary Commission was to alleviate the hardships of soldier life, to afford physical comfort to the sick and wounded, and supply such of the well as were needy with suit- able underclothing, etc. The funds of the com- mission were raised by means of sanitary fairs in the principal cities, and by voluntary subscrip- tionI. The report of the treasurer shows that from June 27th, 1 61. to July 1st, 1S65, the receipts were 4,813, 750.64, and the disbursements 44,53.0,774.95.-EDITORS. :, In the Army of the Potomac each regiment had a post-boy, who carried the letters of his com- mand to brigade headquarters. There the mails of the different regiments were placed in one pouch and sent up to division headquarters, and thence to corps headquarters, where mail agents received them and delivered them, at the principal depot of the army, to the agent from general headquarters. The cases for the letters were made of rough boards, which on a march were packed away in the bottom of an army wagon, one wagon being sufficient to carry the whole establishment, includ- ing the tent and its furniture.-EfITORS. 1. --.- - "-- ____ I FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. the view that his line at this point was not strongly held. Our infantry as vet were concealed in the woods, the two corps massed in column of brigades, and held like hounds in the leash. There was much rivalry between these two corps, and between the divisions and the brigades of each, and they sent Committees inviting each other to a reunion in the enemy's works, each one )romising to he there first to receive the others. The fire of the batteries prevented anything looking to the reenforcement of the enemy's position, which was in our left front. Our right, when deployed, would have overlapped them. Suddenly over the wires came a message from General Meade, " Suspend the attack until further orders." We stopped firing. The enemy did likewise, gun for gun. Meade had heard from Warren that his movement had failed. Sedgwiek, Sykes, and Wright lbelieved, however, that their movement on the right, if it had not been sus- pended, would have been completely successful. A few minutes later another dispatch directed Sedgwick to report at the headquarters of the commanding general. I accompanied him. We found General Meade evidently greatly disappointed and angry at the failure of Warren's movement. He had sent for Sedgwick to take command at headquarters while he rode to join Warren, who could only be reached by a long and somewhat difficult route. He returned later in the day in the worst possible humor and ordered the with- drawal of the troops of the Fifth and Sixth corps to the position held by them the day before, closer to the center of the line. That night he asked Sedgwick by telegraph as to the chances of success of an attack in his immediate front, or of an attack upon that part of the enemy's lines which had been threatened by him in the morning. Sedgwick replied that the line threatened by him in the morning had been so heavily intrenched and fortified after the suspension of his fire that he deemed it now the least available point of assault, and that the chance of carrying the position then ill his front, moving across the open valley and up the other slope against well-constructed lines of rifle-pits, was not encouraging. In this movement the men suffered greatly from the rain, which froze as it fell; they were without shelter, and had had long marches and severely trying ones; yet they were in excellent spirits and physically in good condition; but the heart was taken out of everybody when on the 1st of December the order came to retire across the Rapidan and resume the camps from which we had started out so gayly a week before. 4 The troops burrowed in the earth and l)uilt their little shelters, and the officers and men devoted themselves to unlimited festivity, balls, horse-races, cock-fights, greased pigs and poles, and other games such as only soldiers can devise. At this time the abuses of the conscription system were made manifest to the men at the front by the character of a large part of the recruits who were sent through that agency. The professional bounty-jumper and the kid- niapped emigrant and street boy, who were " put through " the enlistment 4 During this campaign the Union army lost 173 killed, 1099 wounded, and 381 captured or iissing-1653; and the Confederates 98 killed, 610 wounded, and 104 captured or missing= ' 12.-EDITORS. 91 MAJO13LklEIlRAL JOHN SEDGWICK, KILLED AT SPOTSYLVANIAA IN THE WILDRNRESS CAMPAIGN, MTY 9, 14. FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. offices in New York and elsewhere, came in large numbers, the professionals swith the intention of deserting at the earliest opportunity and repeating the profitable experiment of enlisting for large bounties. Their favorite time for leaving was during their first tour of picket duty, and it was found jecessary to throw a cordon of cavalry outside our own 1)icket lines. A gallows an(1 a shooting-ground were provided in each corps, and scarcely a Friday passed during the winter while the army lay on Hazel River and in the vicinity of Brandy Station that some of these deserters did not suffer the death penalty. During the winter the army grew again into stlperb) condition, and awaited with high spirits the opening of the slpring campaign. (In the 23d of March a reorganization of the Army of the Potomac took place, when its five corps were consolidated into three. The First Corps was transferred to the Fifth; two divisions of the Third were incorporated with the Second, but permitted to retain their distinctive flag and badge; the other division of the Third Corps was transferred to the Sixth, hut directed to abandon its own flag and badge and assume that of the Greek cross. The corps commanders retained were--of the Second, General W. S. Hancock; of the Fifth, General G. K. Warren; of the Sixth, General John Sedgwick. The First and Third corps thus passed out of existence. The only other event of note, before the arrival of General Grant, was the Kilpatriek-Dahlgren raid upon Richmond. It was authorized directly from Washington, and was not the suggestion of General Meade, nor did it have his approval; however, lie set about carrying it into effect with all proper spirit and energy. The movement depended largely for its success upon its secrecy, and, therefore, when Colonel Dahlgren arrived from Wash- ington before the preparations were completed, and asked to be permitted to accompany Kilpatrick, Meade was annoyed to learn that the expedition was currently discussed in the capital. The plan was for Kilpatrick to move generally from our left, passing the right flank of Lee's army, and to pro- ceed to Richmond by as direct routes as possible, while, as diversions, and to cover his movement, Custer, with 2000 cavalry, was to make a raid beyond Gordonsville, and the Sixth Corps and Birney's division of the Third were to move in support of Custer to Madison Court House on Robertson's River. No effort was made to conceal this movement, as it was intended to convey the impression to the enemy that a formidable attempt was to be made upon his left flank. Upon the arrival of Sedgwick and Birney at Robertson's River at nightfall of the 27th of Febrnary, Custer went by with his command, with instructions to proceed toward Charlottesville, and, if possible, to destroy the railway bridge near that place. While his command was passing, Custer inquired of Sedgwick as to the relative importance of his movement as compared with that of Kilpatrick, and asked whether in the council at which the movement was discussed it was stated or understood that the bridge-head near Charlottesville was fortified and defended with infantry; also whether it was known that Rosser with 5000 Confederate cavalry was in the valley through which Custer might be 93 94 FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE COMING OF GRANT. obliged to return after doing his work, and that, moreover, probably the road by which he advanced would be occupied in his rear by Stuart and the main bo(ly of the cavalry of Lee's army. Sedgwick assured him that all these points hlla been discusse(l and considered. Custer thought a moment and said, "Well, then, I may have to do one of two things: either strike boldly across Lee's rear and try to reach Kilpatrick, or else start. with all the men I can keep together and try to join Sherman in the south-west." Upon reaching the neighborhood of Charlottesville he found, as he expected, that the bridge-head was heavily held by infantry and artillery, and retraced his muarch. Stuart meantime had placed his troops across the road by which Custer had advanced, and was awaiting him. Through the treachery of a guide the heail of Custer's columni was turned off to the right for the purpose, it was lbelieve(l, of bringing it in upon the main body of Lee's infantry, where its capture would be certain. Custer discovered the attempt in time and retraced his steps to the main road which he had left. Stuart meantime had learned of the departure of Custer from the direct route, and at once moved his colmman(l to intercept him. This cleared the way for Custer an(l enabled him to return within the lines of the Sixth Corps, with only an affair with a rear-gnard. His movement had certainly had the desired effect as a diversion. While these operations were taking place Kilpatrick had advanced in the direetion of Richmond and had divided his forces, sending a portion under I)ahlgren to strike the James River above Richmond, retaining the main body unledr his own command until he was satisfied that the experiment was not feasible. He made his way down the Peninsula in the direction of Butler's eommandl, and was subsequently transferred by boat to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, or more properly the horse-hospital camp, near Washington. Aside from our losses in ment, and among them the gallant and heroic Dahlgren, the result of this movement w as to disable for. the time being 3000 or 4000 of the very flower of our cavalry. KILPATRICK'S AND DAHLGRREN'S RAID TO RICHMOND. BY GEORGE E. POND. ON the night of Sunday, the 28th of February, 18614, General Judson Kilpatrick, leaving Stevensburg with four thousand cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford, surprised and captured the enemy's picket there, and marched rapidly by Spotsylva- nia Court House toward Richmond. His object was to move past the enemy's right flank, enter the Confederate capital, and release the Union captives in its military prisons. This bold project had grown out of President Lincoln's desire to have his amnesty proclamation circu- lated within the Confederate lines; arnd General Kilpatrick, with whom Mr. Lincoln directly con- ferred, had reported to General Meade, on this officer's application, a plan which included the re- lease of the Richmond prisoners and a raid upon the enemy's communications and supplies. His force was to be chosen from the cavalry corps, mostly from his own -the Third-division; anti Colonel Ulrie Dahlgren, separating from him near Spotsylvania, with five hundred picked men, was to cross the James, enter Rlichmo-d on the south side, after liberating the Belle Isle prisoners, and unite with Kilpatrick's main force entering the city from the north at 1t) A. m. of Tuesday, March 1st. General Meade aided the enterprise with simultaneous demonstrations of the Sixth Corps and of Birney's division of the Third against Lee's left, and of Custer's cavalry division toward Charlottesville. Reaching Spotaylvanlia Court House at early dawn of February 29th, Kilpatrick moved south through Chilesburg to the Virginia Central Rail- road, which he struck during the day at Beaver Darn Station. The telegraph operator was seized, the wires were cut, the track was destroyed, and the station buildings were burned. Detachments were also sent to destroy bridges and track on the Fred- ericksburg Railroad, and during the raid the am- nesty proclamation was distributed. At nightfall the main body moved forward and crossed the South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge. Early on Tuesday, March 1st, the column was again in mo- tioni, and by 10 o'clock faced the northern lines of Richmond, on the Brook pike, five miles from the city. Its arrival was wholly unexpected; still a telegraphic dispatch that Union cavalry were raid- ilg south of the Rapidan having reached Richmond the day before, General Elzey had that morning, as a precaution, sent out troops to the west of the city under General G. W. C. Lee. and to the north under Colonel Stevens, those sent to the Brook road consisting of five hundred men and six guns. Kilpatrick's advance quickly drove back the pick- ets of this last force and their supports, and thus found itself close up to the inner lines of the Rich- inond defenses. Some skirmishing with artillery firing went on for several hours, Kilpatrick mean- while awaiting signs of the approach of Dahlgreri. The latter officer, on separating from the main body below Spotsylvania, moving south-westerly, had, before noon of the 29th, struck and broken the Virginia Central Railroad a little east of Fred- erick's Hall Station, capturing a detachment of Maryland artillerymen and also about a dozen commissioned officers, who were holding a court- martial. At Frederick's Hall Station were eighty oir more pieces of Lee's reserve artillery, and the news that it was exposed to attack created some excitement in Richmond; but Colonel talrlgreni's information and purposes determined him not to risk an attack on the artillery camp. At night he crossed the South Anna, and early the next morn- ing reached the James River canal, about eight miles east of Goochland. There he directed Cap- tain J. F. B. Mitchell to take the detachment of one hundred men of the 2d New York, and, proceeding down the canal, to destroy locks anti burn mills, grain, and boats, and then to send the ambulances and prisoners to General Kilpatrick at Hungary Station. Meanwhile Dahlgremi himself was to cross the river at a ford which a negro guide had prom- ised to indicate. Captain Mitchell destroyed six grist-mills, a saw-mill, six canal-boats loaded with grain, the barn of Secretary Seddon, and the coal- works at Manikin's Bend, with a neighboring lock. But Colonel Dahlgren did not find the expected fording place, and proceeded instead on the north side of the river. About eight miles from Rich- mond he was overtaken by Captain Mlitctell, at 3:30 P. m. A pieket of Custis Lee's city battalion had there been captured, and during a halt the men had coffee and the horses were fed ott cap- tured corn. Guns supposed to be Kilpatrick's were heard, and Dahlgren, moving forward, about five miles from the city encountered sharp musketry. The resistance grew heavier, darkness came on, and the firing attributed to Kilpatrick ceased. In fact, the latter officer, ignorant how small a force Ie really had in his front, wondering what hall be- come of Dahlgren, and seeing what he took to be reinforcements for the enemy, had now abandoned the attempt to enter the city, and had fallen back several miles to camp at Atlee's Station. Dahlgren, on his part, fteling it to be hopeless at that hour and with his small force to advance, gave the order to withdraw. The attempt to release the Union prisoners had failed. Extrication from this position was the next step. Bradley T. Johlnson's cavalry had followed Kilpatrick down from Beaver Dam, and, uniting with Wade Hanmpton's, now sharply attacked him late at night at Atlee's Sta- tion. The following day his rear-guard was har- assed somewhat as he moved down the penins.ula. According to the original plan he proceeded to Williamsburg, within the lines then occupied by the troops of General B. F. Butler. Dahlgren was less fortunate. Putting Captain Mitchell in charge of the rear-guard on Tuesday night. he, with Major Cooke, had gone forward with the art- vance. In the darkness the colhnnmn became seat- tered, and Captain Mitchell found himself in charge of the main portion, about three hundred strong, Dahlgren having moved with the remainder in a direction unknown to him. By great exertions 95 qb KILPA TRICK S AND DAHLGREN'S RAID TO RICHMOND. and with sharp skiriuishinig, Captain Mitchell broke his way through the enemy, and joined Kilpatrick the iBext day, the 2d, at Tunstall's Station, near WVhite- h1ous. Mleawhile Dahigren had crossed the l'l.i.t...key at Hanovertown and the Matta- pony ait Aylett'.; but late on Wedntesday night, Mfarch 2d, he fell into an amibush near Walker- tol,. f-rmed by Captain Fox with home guards of King and Queen 'ounlty, furloughed muen, and Magruder's squiiadron, and by Lieutenant Pollard with a company tf the 9th Virginia. Dahligren, at the head of hi. meni, fell dead, pierced With a bullet. The greater part of his command was captured. On the second morning after Colonel IDahlgren', death, Lieutenant Pollard carried to Gtenmeral Fitz- hugh Lee. in Riehlunid, some papers which he said had been taken from Dahligren's body, together with the artificial leg which the young officer wore in place of a limb amlittaed a short timie before. The doeumenta were published in the Rielimonid newspapers, and afterward in the newspapers at the North. )Hue of them, signed Ulric Dalilgreim. pitrportiog to be an addrn ss to his melt, contained this pa;ssage: "WVe hope to release the prisoners frotm Belle I1le tirst, -dmtzt having sn th-.. fairly started, we will cross the James River into Rich- inooid. destroying the bridges after us, and exhort- ing the released primsoners to destroy and bttrn the hateful city; and do not allow tbe rebel leader. Davis. anid his traitorous crew to escape." The second document, a. paper of instruetionis not signed, declared that '- oncee in the city it must be destroved. and Jeff I)avis and cabinet killed. Pioneers will go along with combustible mate- rial." On observing these publicatiouts, General Meade at once, on the 14th of March, directed an inquiry to be made into their an- thentticity. On the 1 6th, General Kilpatrick, having carefully ex- amited officers and me who accompanied (olonel Dablgren, aitd having received a written aecoumt from Captain Mitchell, reported to Genteral Meade that the unanimous testimonv was that Colonel l)ahligremm "published no address whatever to his commanid, nor did he give aity inatriuctioni "; bit he added that Colonel Dahlgreit had subiuitted to him aim address which he had aecordingly inidorsed itt red ink "approved" over his official signature. This address, he said, coniformed to the otte piub- lished it the Richmond newspapers, "save so far as it speaks of 'exhortinig the prisoners to destroy and burn the hateful city and kill the traitor Davis and his cabinet.' All this is false, and published oily as sit excuse for the barbarous treatnment of the remains of a brave soldier." A fortnight later, General R. E. Lee sent to General Meade pboto- graphic eopies of the two documenits, with R letter making the extracts already quoted with their con- text, atid requesting to know whether these alleged designs anti instructiomis of Colonel Dailgrext were authorized by the Untited States (;overnment, or by his superior officer, or were now approved by them. This letter being referred to General Kilpatrick, he replied substantially as iii his previous report, adding, however, that the photographic papers " do itot contain the indorsemenit referred to as having been placed by me on Colonel Dahligreit's papers. Colonel Dahlgren received no orders from me to pillage, burn,, or kill, nor were ayv such instrue- tions given me by my superiors." This letter was inclosed by General Meade to General Lee with the statemetit that ' neither the lTnited States Government, myself, norGeneral Kilpatrick author- ized, sanctioned, or approved the burning of the city of Richmond and the killing of Mr. Davis and his cabinet, nor any other act not required by military necessity and in accordance with the usages of war." Ct l41 ,F THE Pro PENNSYLVANIA lAVALUY, KILPATRICK'S D.IVISION. 0N TIIE Usosn LEFiT, BETWEEN TIIF RAPPIIAHANOCK ASND THE RAPIDAN (FEBRtUARY OR MARIcI, 16). FaOM .A POnTOGRAPH. PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64.4 BY ULYMSSER r. IRANT, (;ENERtAL. 1. S. A. ] Y commission as lieutenant-general was given to me oii the Add 9th of March, 1864. On the following day I visited Gen- eral Meade, commanding the Ar-my of the Potomac, at his headquarters, Brandy Station, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac; I might say to all except the officers of the regular at-my who had served in the Mexican war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. Meade evidently thought that I " a. might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. General Weade adopted He said to me that I might want an officer who had served -olferin.o as the color of hilsb..dqnarter fg. ad with me in the West, mentioning Sherman especially, to a golden eagle In . aller tk i , i wreath sa the emblem. take his pla(e; if so, he begged me not to hesitate about the latter having Iee making the change. He urged that the work before us in nae -a a badge for beadquartera lde.. It wa.s was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the a ahowy atantldatl, tid A B. Wand, the wa artiat, feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the reaenmbers that Gel r t p- (eraUt, when he teat aw way of selecting the right men for all positions. For it unfrIled, na tiey brokek himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever .arn.p for the Wilderes ailt aapalwgn. excl aimed: placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substi- What's thisi -Is mI- l-erbil -aesar nywhere tuting any one for him. As to Sherman, he could not be shlt here C'- EaToas. spared from the West. This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to be selected, ) " Personal Memoirs of UI. S. Grant." Copyright, I 885, by U. S. Grant. All rights reserved. 07 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. Meade's position afterward proved embarrassing to me if not to him. For nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies he had been at the head of the Army of the Potomac, commanding an army independ- ently. All other general officers 7777y 0 E Add0 f d occupying similar positions were independent in their com- mands so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or BEAL.T01 STATION, ORANG.E AN ,X 'IXANIIII. IA RAILWAY. Ni FIIWM A WAII-TVME SKUTCII. any other place away from his command. I therefore gave all or- ders for the move- ments of the Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of havi ng to give orders MADYSTTI011 (IRA.GE A.tI ALEXANDRIA, RAILWAY. diret, I established my FRMA WAR-TIMESKTH headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the 11th of March I returned to Washington, and on the day after orders were published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies. I hal left Washington the night before to return to my old conm- mand in the West and to meet Sherman, whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville. Sherman assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had Sher- man accompany me that far on my way back to Washington, so that we could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first point which I wishted to discuss particularly was about the cooperation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There were also other and minor points,-ninor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war,-the restoration to duty of 98 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely, McClel- lan, Burnside, and Frdmont in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley, and Crittenden in the West. Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the general-in- chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable for the command under me - now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest part of which was sta- tioned at Dalton, about 38 miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junc- tion of the railroad from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta. There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad center, Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching cam- paign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign upon which he had been ordered Z before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to cooperate with the armies east of the Mississippi; his part in the pro- gramme being to move upon Mobile by land, while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. The plan, therefore, was for Sher- man to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east-and-west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done before. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circum- stances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterward made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded through- out all lands. In regard to restoring to duty officers who had been relieved from impor- tant commands, I left Sherman to look after those who had been removed in the West, while I looked out for the rest. I directed, however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the assurance that duty would be offered to him, and afterward the Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the latter declined it, saying that it would be a deg- radation to accept the assignment offered. I understood afterward that he refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both. Both were graduated before him, and ranked him in the old army. Sherman ranked him as brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse a soldier ean make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. ", The Red River campaign. See papers to follow.-EDITORS. 99 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. GKE311.AL MEAIDF. l 1EA4tUAiTE1S AT CULPEPER. FROM A WAR-TIME YKEOr4II. On the 23d of Marth I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Culpeper Court House, a few miles south of the head- quarters of the Army of the Potomac. Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieu- tenant-general. I knew him, however, very well and favorably from the aceounts given by officers under me at the West who had known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series of debates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident of Missouri, and by no means a "' Lincoln man " in that contest; but I recognized then his great ability. In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conductedl, and never wanted to interfere in them; but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the North and from Congress, uireil was xa/etrals irili hTim, forced him into issuing his series of "Military Orders"-No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, ete. He did not know that they were not all wrong, and did know that some of them were. All he wanted, or had ever wanted, was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed; he would pledge himself to use all the power of the Government in rendering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview ended. too PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew him better. While I had been commanding in west Tennessee we had held con- versations over the wires at night. He and Halleek both cautioned me against giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that lie was so kind- hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. t should have said that in our interview the President told me that lie did riot want to know what I proposed to do. But he submitted it plan of campaign of his own which lie wanted me to hear and then dispose of as I pleased. He brought out a map of Virginia, on which lie had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and Confed- erate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats ard landed between the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. I did niot com- municate my plans to the President or to the Secretary or to General Halleck. On the 26th of March, with my headquarters at Culpeper, the work of pre- paring for an early campaign commenced. When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: The Mississippi was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of that river. A few points in Louisiana, not remote from the liver, were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands, and also that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge. On the sea-eoast we had Fort Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne in North Carolina; Beau- fort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, and Port Royal, in South Caro- lina, and Fort Pulaski in Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West, and Pensacola in Florida. The remainder of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about Chatta- nooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the com- manders all reported to Sherman, and were subject to his orders. This arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of commumii- cation through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions, without waiting the orders of the division commander. In the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations toward each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were ,01 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It is true footholds had been secured bv us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but beyond that no substantial advantage 'had been gained by either side. Bat- tles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and the Chickahominy, near Rich- mond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confed- erate army, but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if not by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did not discourage their claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sin- cerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal arms, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidari. The Army of againstF, W GEORGE fo MEaDE. f trgsNorthern Virginia, confronting it on seemed almost imp11oGse. the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrentlhed. and was conunanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut np with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. The region is heavily timbered., and the roads are narrow and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with ade- quate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that, when driven from one fortified position, they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone, seemed almost impossible. System and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military di- vision. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command, and had no ter- ritorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these, various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity, often, of depleting one command, not pressed, to re,6nforce another more actively engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the Potomac as the center, 102 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. and all west to Memphis, along the line described as our position at the time, nind north of it, the right wing; the Army of the James, under General Butler, ; as the left wing, and all the troops south as a force in rear of the enlemy. Some of these last were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade-rullners; when they could not do this, their positions were abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in command.\ It was not contemplated that Gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to aecom- pany them, and was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; Concentratioli was the order of the day, and the problem was to accomplish it in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit. As a reenforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of it, the Ninth Army Corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General Burn- side, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was anl admirable position for such a reenforcemeuit. The corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact, up to the last moment Burnside and the War Depart- inent both thought the Ninth Corps was intended for such an expedition. My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north: the Army of Northern Vir- ginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Ar-my of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, j was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chattanooga. Besides these main armies, the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley - a great storehouse to feed their armies from - and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West, with a large force, making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy, because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion. But I From December 17th, 1862, when he was 7th of January, 1864, had been assigned to the superseded in command of the Gulf Department command of the Ninth Corps. This corps left by General Banks, General Butler was not in Knoxville, Tennessee, March l7th-23d, and was active service until November 11th, 1863, when reorganized at Annapolis for the spring campaign, he assumed command of the Department of Vir- and received an addition to its strength of five ginia and North Carolina (the Army of the cavalry and twelve infantry regiments and five James).-EDITORS. batteries of artillery.- EDITORS. \ These troops, the Tenth Corps, left the De- J General Johnston was relieved of the com- partment of the South during the month of mand of the Department of Tennessee by General April for rendezvous at Gloucester Point, Vir- Bragg, July 23d, 1863, and continued in com- ginia.- EDITORS. mand of the Department of Mississippi and East GeneralBurnside had been relieved of the com- Louisiana. On December 27th, 1863, he assumed mand of the Department of the Ohio on the 12th command of the Army of Tennessee, superseding of December, by General J. G. Foster, and on the Bragg.-EDITORS. low PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington, even while it was moving on to Lee, so all the forces to the West, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advan- cing from them as well as when remaining at them -better, indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources, at a greater distance from ours and, with a greater force, since small expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective points. General George Crook, commanding in West Virginia, I, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee railroad to be his objec- tive. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications or see them destroyed, and a large amount of forage and pro- visions, which they so much needed, would fall into our hands. Sigel, I who was in command in the valley of Virginia, was to advance up the valley, cover- ing the North from anl invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance bv the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective. Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort M1onroe. This was the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views. They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct, in writing, before leaving. General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that lie should be rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the objections to Smith's promotion were well founded. : General Crook was transferred from the com- mand of a cavalry division in the Army of the Cumberland Hnd assumed command of an infantry division in the Department of West Virginia, Feb- ruary 15th, 1 864.-EDITORS. 4 General Sigel succeeded General Benjamin F. Kelley ill command of the Department of West Virginia o the 10th of March, 18tI4. After the second battle of Bull Run Sigel hail been in com- mand of the Eleventh Corps, the Reserve Grand Division of the Army of the Potomac, and the Lehigh District in Pennsylvania.-EDITORS. I After the appearance of General Grant's paper in "The Century" magazine for February, 1886, General William F. Smith made the following reply, which was printed in that magazine for May, 1886: "- Gemeral Grant oalkes this general charge without asiguing a reson for it or attempting to Justify it by citing any instance in which I ba.t failed in any duty I had been called upon to perform. This gives Mue the right to call General Giant himself as a witness In my own behalf, and to asert that the reasons which moved him to say that ' the objections to my conufinmation were well founded' were of a pereonal., and not of a public nature. The battle of Chattanooga ended on the 25th of No- vember, 1863-toy name was not sent to the Senate till the 16th of March, 1864. On the 18th it was returned to the President, with the request that the date of rank ahould conform to the date of nomination. " On the 2ad of the same month it was again .ent to the Senate, and my nomination was confirmed on the same day. It was therefore nearly four mouths after the battle when my name was sent to the Senate for pro- motion, and In three days thereafter the Senate asked the Presdent to make the date of rank conform to the date of nomination; and on the same day that toy name was returned to the Senate my nomination was con- firmed. The question of my confirmation therefore was 104 VOL. IV. 8 105 Io6 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my dissatisfaetion with the lit- tie that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief tiat it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best manl in the army for that command. Halleck was present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheri- dan do I" I replied: "The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted. Slheri- dan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was as- signed to the command of be ie ItHVETMAJN-ENKAL. C MIGS QARTERMASTER IINEAL. cavalry corps with the Army U. S.A. FOM POTOGAPH.of the Potomac. This relieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection onl that officer, however, for as far as I knew he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all his troops at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his objective. At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy or by his left. Each nettled on the 18th of Mareh. when the request san made to have the date of rank eonform to the date of nomina- tion, and during thil time and up to the time of my eonfirmation General Grant wan not in the city of WashingtoD. "He left Washington on the night of the 11th of March for Nashville anddid not return till some time during the 2nd - the day on which the Prenident returned my name to the Senate and upon which final action was taken. Shortly thereafter I was Informed by a senator that my name had passed the Senate without having been re- ferred to the Military Committee, which he ntated to be a high compliment and one eldom paid by the Senate.' As to the fact whether thin confirluition wan made with- out a reference to the Military Committee, the records of the Senate will show. " But mubh more important to me in the fact that thin .weeping denunciation was not founded upon any fail- ure on my part to perform, the duty I owed to the coun- try, then in its atruggle for existence, and that no one knew thin better than the genernl who was in coutmand of its armies. On the 12th of November, 1863, General Grant had addresed the Secretary of War as follows: I wabl vrepectfiily recomnmend that BrigaiierGaeneral William F. Smitth be placed fist on the list for promotion to the rank of major-generl. He is ltoese-.-d of one of the lelarest m1ittary -ea.i in the army-is 'e-y praetical ano. indiustetus-no man in the service is better qualited th.n Ie for our largest co.imua.ld.' "On July 1st, 1864, General Grant, from City Point. Virginia, addressed a letter to General Halleck, chief- of-staff, from which the following extracts are taken: 'Mr. Dana, Assistant 8ecretary of War, has just returned. Ite informs me that I.e calimI attention to tls necessIty of sending -eneral Butler to anotler field of duty. ... have feared that it might become necessary to separate him and General Smith. The tatter is really one of the tont effi- cient uilcern in the service, readiest in e-pr lients, and liOsi skillful in the management of troops in action. I would ltis. lhke removing him from his present command unless it was to increase it, but, as I say, I may ha-e to do it if (t--eral butler remains.... I would feel strenKthened wit), Smith. FranklIn. or J. J. Reynolds conmauding the riglht wing of tilts army. - S Po that on the 1t of July, 1864, General Grant thought he would be strengthened with General Stuith commanding the right wing of that army. On the strength of that letter I was placed in comniand of the troops in the field belonging to the Army of the James, amid 0eneral Bntler was ordered back to administrative duty at Fort Monroe. "Being much out of health at this time, I had asked for a short leave of absence, to which this answer was returned: 'F.AIQA AIARrTF. Crry PoINT, July 21, 1864. "'To MAJO.IGENFRAL WIL.LIAM P. SMIrH: Your applica- ti,,n for leave of abence las Just c`,me to. . t-nless it is absolutely necessary that you shouti leave at this time, I wul. muc-h prefer not haxing you go. It will uot be nees- sarv for yon to expose yourself in the hot son, nd if it slotld PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. plan presented advantages. If by his right - my left - the Potomac, Chesa- peake Bay, and tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could oecupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee, if he chose, could detach, or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following. A movement by his left - our right - would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the sup- p)lies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West, FolTest made a raid in west Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and fol- lowed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city, he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sher- maii to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before lie got my order. Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navi- gation of the Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored infantry and a detachment of Teinessee cavalry. These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. " The river was dyed," he says, " with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed; but few of the officers escaped. My loss was about twenty killed. It is become necessary I can temporarily attach General tun. In "The Century" magazine for September, phreya to your coU.an. S. GRANT. 1886, Captain Joel B. Erhardt contributed the following extract from a letter that had never "As toy health did not Improve I repeated my request been made public: for leave, and on the 9th of July I received the follow- ing from General Grant at City Point: HoN. S. FOOT COLLEGE POINT, L. L, July 30th, 1864. 'General Grt an be a-aigned to thae comanil of yonr "DEAR SEtATOR: I am extremely anxious that tmy corpt dtring your absence it you think it advisable. friends i: niy native State (Vermont] ahould not think that the reason of General Grant relieving te fro.n I left my command oit that day, and City Point on duty was brought about by any miseonduct of mine. the following day, and it is manifest General Grant up and therefore I write to put you in posession of such to that moment had not changed the opinion he had ex- facts In the case as I am aware of, and think will throw pressed In recototuending my promotlon. I returned to light upon the subject.... the army on the l9thof July, tofind myself relieved front -On my return from a short leave of absence, on the my command. During this absence of ten days, .oth- lath of July, General Grant sent for me to report to ing connected with my military duties could have him, and then told me that he could not relieve Gen- occurred to impair the confidence in me expressed in eral Butler.' and that as I had so severely criticised General Grant's communication of the 9th. General Meade, he had determined to relieve me from [ sought an explanation from hi. on the day of my the command of the Eighteenth Corps, and order me to return and he was as reticent in assigning any canse New York City to await orders. The next morning the for his atiton then as he was twenty-one years after, generalgave someotherreasons, s.ch as anarticleinthe when. in preparing a contribtition to the history of the 'Tribune' refleeting on General Hancock, which I had war. he again passed sentence upon me without assign- nothing in the world to do with, and two letters which ing a reason of any kind for his condemnation. I am I had written, before the campaign began, to two of tn-day as ignorant of the caunes f r his action as I was General Grant's most devoted friends, urging upon then. That they were purely personal, and had not the them to try and prevent him from making the ca.U- remotest eonnuetion with my conduct as a soldier, I palgn he had just made. . . . Very truly yours, submit is proved by his own testimony, and it is upon WILLIAM F. SmITH, Major-General." this question alone that I care to defend myself." EDITORS. 107 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently Forrest made a report in which hle left out the part which shocks humanity to read. At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck that Ply- mouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to us, that it would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's com- mand. If success should attend our arms, both places, and others, would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out, the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth. \ I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential, because New Berne was a port into which blockade-runners could enter. Gteneral Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to general commiand. I had opposed the movement strenuously, 1 ut acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By direction of Halleck I had reenforced Banks with a corps of about ten thou- sand men from Sherman's command. This reenforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport, on the Red River, and turn over the line Gf that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged,) and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back in time to take part in the programmie as laid down; nor was Smith returned until long after the move- ments of May, 1864, had been beguni. The services of forty thousand vet- eran troops over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from Washington, and he wmas in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He opposed the expedition. By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. Onl that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy leade's Position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meade was nloti- fied and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance; on the following \ The engagemnent at Plymouth extended from General Halleek's instructions for this move- the 1 7th to the :20th of April, 1 564. The garrison nent were promulgated during January and Feb- consisted of four regiments of infantry, with detach- ruary, 1864.-EDITORS. ments of artillery and eavalrv. under command of ) The 10,000 troops under General A. J. Smith General H. W. wessells. The principal reliance that had been thus detached belonged to the 16th was the navy, which, however, was neutralized by and 17th corps (Sherman's army), at the time theConfederateram lbet nark. t[Seepapersonthe (March, 1864,) in the Mississippi Valley. Por- .A nwarie, to follow.] After repulsing five charges tions of these corps subsequently joined Sherman General Wessells surrendered, with about 1500 and Thomas. See also papers on the Red River men, to General R. F. Hoke. -EDIIOOS. Campaign, to follow.-EDI TORS. 108 109 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was direeted to move, the night of the same day, and get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to aecomplish the task given him. He Was also notified that rejinforcemeints were being eol- lected in Washington, which would be forwarded to him should the enemly fall hack into the trenches at Riehlmond. The same day Shermllan was directed to get his forces up ready to advanee on the 5th. Sigel, at Win- ehester, was notified to move in conjunction with the others. The eriticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by mov- ilg the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and intrenclhed so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to the James River by water, Lee could have moved a part of his forces back to Riehmond, called Beauregard from the South to reilnforce it, and with the remainder moved on to Washing- ton. Then, too, I ordered a move simultaneous with that of the Arly of the Potomac up the James River, by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. While my headquarters were at C'ulpeper, from the 26th of March to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with the Seeretary of War and the President. On the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the Armv of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road, as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. Arriving at the junction, the train was stopped and inquiries were made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosbv had erossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal cavalrv. Had he seen our train eoming, no doubt he would have let his pris- oners escape to capture the train. I was on a special train, if I remember correetly, without any guard. Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who eould have commanded successfully a separate detachment, in the rear of an opposing army and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire (eomman(l. (in this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the Presi- dent before reaching the James River. He had, of course, become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, 1 10 111 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and to hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back or else lay his own territory open to invasion. " Oh! yes, I see that," he said. "As we say out West, If a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." The following correspondence closed the first chapter of my personal acquaintance with President Lincoln: '1 EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, April 30, 1864. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT: Not expecting to see you again before the Spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know or seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster, or the capture of our men in great numbers, shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your atten- tion than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now with a brave army, and a just cause, may God sustain you. Yours very truly, " A. LINCOLN." HEADQLUARTERS, ARMIEs OF THE UNITED STATES, CULPEPER COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, 'May 1, 1864. "THE PRESIDENT: Your very kind letter of yesterday is just received. The confidence you express for the future and satisfaction for the past in my military administration is acknowledged with pride. It shall be my earnest endeavor that you and the country shall not be disappointed. From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint - have never expressed or implied a complaint against the Admin- istration or the Secretary of War, for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. And since the promotion which placed me in com- mand of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and the importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, with- out even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you. Very truly, your obedient servant, " U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General." The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was there- fore almost an independent objective. It was of less importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of Rich- mond, Lee and his army. All other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but eooperative columns. As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the Red River, and eliminated the use of 40,000 veterans whose cooperation 1 12 'Ira ' t "tt 6_ Xfa. Zts ttdd Ace Ax Atk . 4 ,va e V ja 2 ritZ he' /Zi, 71 r..t wp bOw V J ra-E4'f 4, A- m- He 9 A Le 40..X d A;- g Pt" fry7 / tcv4-c/c 0i wc- )Q e, C: A' / LINCOLN'S .OO-5'EED T', GRAN'T. (FAC-SIMIL OF T"lE ORIGINAL, SLIGHTLY RED(cCED 11N lCte. [This remarkable letter was received by General it iii my researches for my history of his cam- Grant on the 1st of May, three days before the paigns. He was so pleased at the discovery, or Wilderness campaign began. He was always care- recovery, that he gave me the original letter at less about his papers, and lpflvate or semi-official the time. It is may intention eventually to present ones were often thrust into his pockets, where they it either to the Government or to the family of remained for months. In some snch way Mr. Lin- General Grant. coln's letter was mislaid. General Grant had for- ADAm BADEALT. gotten its existence, until in 1866 I came across NEW YORK, November 10, 188.1 11'1 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. in the grand campaign had been expeeted-10,00() with Sherman an(d 30,000 against Mobile. Sioel's l'trveord is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true, accord- ing, to programme ; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done1 in the Vallev I received instead the following announcement front Hal- leek: "Sigel is in full retreat oit Strasburg. He will do nothing hut riun; nlever did any thiing else." The etiemV had intercepted him about New Market and handled blinil roughly, capturing 6 guns anal some 900 men out of 6000., The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forees in columns. Though the Wle unider his inmlediate command failed ingloriously, the other proved mnore fortunate. Inder C'rook and At-erell, his western column advanced front the (Gaulev in West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at Dublin, and destroyed a depot of supplies besides tearing up several miles of road andl burning the bridge over New River. Having accomplished this, they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs, and there awaited further orders. Butler enul tarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and by daylight Butler was far up the James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the dlay, without loss, and no doubt very much to the sur- prise of the enemy. This was the aecomplishmlient of the first step contemplated in my instruc- tiolls to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should Lee fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the Potomac and the James onl the James River. He was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. By the 6th of May Butler was in position and had begun intrenching, and onl the 7th he sent out his cavalr- from Suffolk to cut the Weldon railroad. He also sent out detaclunents to destroy the railroads between Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. He made nix gireat effort to establish himself on that road, and neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenseless. About the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drewry's Bluff, about half-way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the meantime Beauregard 4 had been gathering retinforcements. On the 16th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the Armv of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it t to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a suffieient , See papers to follow.- EDITORS. Department of North Carolina, which on Mtay 4 (On the 201th of April, 1 sit, ., General Beaure- 14th was extended to cover all of Virginia south gpird waF relieved of the command at Charleston, of the James, including Drewry's Bluff.- EDITORS. and on the 2Iid be assumed command of the ISmith'sisthCorpsandtwodi.isionsoftheloth. I I4 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. force with Butler to inti his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained, aitil maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate vaptlit'll. Trrie position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers,\ the .Jaines and Appoinattox, was one of great natural strength, and where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by ineatis of a single intrenehed ile, atInd that a very short oone in. comparison with the extent of territory ashiich it thoroughly protected. His right was protected by the James River, his left by the Appoinattox, and his rear by their junction -the two streams taitifing ear by. Tbe b)end of the two streams shortened the line thlart had been c'lioseli for intrenchiuient, while it in- creased the area whihli the lihe inclosed. Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent 'y chief engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the .James, to inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for General Butler's movement in cooperation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his position was strong enough to jus- tifv me in withdrawing some of his troops aiid having them brought round by water to White House to join me and reenforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the position M A. A. P very strong for defensive purposes, and CHIEF-OF-STAFF. AIMY OF THE POTOMAe. that I could do the latter with great FRt)M A PHOTINRAPU. security; but that General Butler could not move from where he was, in cooperation, to produce any effect. He said that the general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indef- iuuite length of time against a superior; but that lie could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle, and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was, therefore, as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the FE See map of Bermuda Hundred and papers, to follow.- EDrToRs. 115 PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. enemy had corked the bottle, and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particu- larly when I saw the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention, as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler, and I know very much to my own. I found afterward that this was mentioned in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. A I make this statement here because, although I have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct his- tory; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally toward the suppression of the rebellion. The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so inti- mately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. I will briefly mention Sheri- dan's first raid upon Lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness, and when we were moving on Spotsylvania, I directed Sheridan, verbally, to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry; to cut the two roads-one running west through Gor- donsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond; and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butlers supplies. This move took him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in writing through Meade. The object of this move was threefold: 1. If successfully executed-and it was-he would annoy the enemy by cutting his lines of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up; 2. He would draw the enemy's cav- alry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear, and trains than by remaining with the army; 3. His absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more The words used ill General Grant's report, been In a bottle strongly corked. . The army sent dated July 22d, 1865, are these: tooperateagainst lichmond hanheretialy eealed Itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enasbled His IButler'.] army. therefore. though in a position tobringthe iostit not allotftherefntorcements brought of great eeurity. was as completely shut off tromn fur- from the South by Beauregard against the Army of the ther operations directly before Richmond as if it had Potomac." EDITORS. PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS OF '64. than was expected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac. I Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army; encountered his cavalry in four engagements and defeated them in all; re('aptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry for more than two weeks. I fixed the (lay for Sherman to start when the season should lie far enough attvanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to imarch. General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigne(l him to accomplish in the spring campaign. The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting, some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles; neither were positions gained in a single day. On the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed. Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position north of the Rapidan, to start upon that memorable cam- paign destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the army defending it. )From "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant" (New York: C. L. Webster Co.) we take this ac- count of the raid: The course Sheridan took was dire-tly to Rich- li.ontd. Before night Stuart, con.n.nding the Confeder- at cavalry, caie on to the rear of his command. But the avnce kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured f oir hundred Union prisoners on their way to Riehmond, destroyed the road, and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. "Stuart, seemiic that our cavalry was pushing toward Riclntond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th, and by a detour and au exhausting march, inter- posed between Sherldan and Iiclihmond at Yellow Tav- eirn, only about six miles north of the eity. Sberida destroyed the railroad and inure suliplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in Stuart's front. A severe en- gagellent ensued, ill which the losIse were heavy on hith sides, hut the rebels were beaten, their leader Imor- tally wounded, and some guns anti many prisoners were captured. " Sheridan passed through the outer defenses otf Rich- mood, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones; but, having no supports near, he eoildt not have remained. After caring for hisnvounded. lie strucek fur the James River below the city, to communlieate with Butler, and to rest liIa -en tuid horses as well as to get food and forage for them. "lBe R.moved flrst between the Chiekahomuiny and the Jamnes, bitt in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanieiville. He then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadzow Bridge. lIe found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cav- alry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created iy his first entrance within the outerworks of Richnmond having subsided, troops were sent out to attack his rear. "-He was now il a perilous positlitn; tile from which but few generals could have extricated thenIselves. The defenses of Richmond, manned, were to the right, theChickahominy was tothe left, with no bridge remain- lug, and the opposite bank guarded; to the rear was a firtce from Eichmtndl. This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahomiy inder the slre of the etiemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The entmy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not en- gaged in bridge-building. "On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chiekahominy. On the 14th he crosed this stream, and on that day went into camp -n the James.. Rtier at Hal- all's L'nding. He at once put himself into contmitti'a- tiMti with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. Sheridan had left the Army of the Potottiac at Spot- sylvanla, bitt did not know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great eaution therefore hild to be -xer- elsed in getting back. Oii th 1ith. after restimig lhis ent- mmiii forthree days, he started ni his return. He tioved by the way If White louse. The bridge over the Pamun- key had been horned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily hnprovised, and the cavalry crocsed over it. On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Nattapony, wlhere he learned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he J.Ined us ott the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield." 117 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. BY r M. LAV, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A. 0N the 2d of May, 1864, a group of officers stood at the Confederate signal 0 station on Clark's Mountain, Virginia, south of the Rapidan, and exam- ined closely through their field-glasses the position of the Federal army then lying north of the river in Culpeper county. The central figure of the group was the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, who had requested his corps and division commanders to meet him there. Though some demon- strations had been made in the direction of the upper fords, General Lee expressed the opinion that the Federal army would cross the river at Ger- manna or Ely's. Thirty-six hours later General Meade's army, General Grant, now commander-in-chief, being with it, commenced its march to the crossings indicated by General Lee. The Army of the Potomac, which had now commenced its march toward Richmond, was more powerful in numbers than at any previous period of the war. It consisted of three corps: the Second (Hancock's), the Fifth (WVarren's), and the Sixth (Sedgwiek's); but the Ninth (Burnside's) acted with Meade throughout the campaign. Meade's army was thoroughly equipped, and provided with every appliance of modern warfare. On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had gained little in numbers during the winter just passed, and had never been so scantily supplied with food and clothing. The equipment as to arms was well enough for men who knew how to use them, but commissary and quartermasters' supplies were lamentably deficient. A new pair of shoes or an overcoat was a luxury, and full rations would have astonished the stomachs of Lee's ragged Confederates. But they took their privations cheerfully, and complaints were seldom heard. I recall an instance of one hardy fellow whose trousers were literally "worn to a frazzle" and would no longer adhere to his legs even by dint of the most 118 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. i19 persistent patching. Unable to buy, beg, or borrow another pair, he wore instead a pair of thin cotton drawers. By nursing these carefully he man- uge(l to get through the winter. Before the campaign opened in the spring a small lot of clothing was received, and he was the first man of his regiment to be supplied. I have often heard expressions of surprise that these ragged, barefooted, hialf-starved mnen would fight at all. But the very fact that they remained with their colors through such privations and hardships was sufficient to prove that they would be dangerous foes to encounter upon the line of battle. The iiioraief of the army at this time was excellent, and it moved forward con- fidently to the grim death-grapple in the wilderness of Spotsylvania with its old enemy, the Army of the Potomae. General Lee's headquarters were two miles north-east of Orange Court House; of his three corps, Longstreet's was at Gordonsville, Ewell's was on and near the Rapidan, above Mine Run, and Hill's on his left, higher up the stream. When the Federal army was known to be in motion, General Lee prepared to move upon its flank with his whole force as soon as his oppo- lient should clear the river and begin the march southward. The route selected by General Grant led entirely around the light of Lee's position on the river above. Grant's passage of the Rapidan was unopposed, and lie struck boldly out on the direct road to Richmond. Two roads lead from Orange Court House down the Rapidan toward Fredericksburg. They follow the general direction of the river, and are almost parallel to each other, the "Old turnpike" nearest the river, and the "Plank road" a short distance UNION ThOUOI CROSSING THE RAPT)AN AT GERMAN AA FORD, MAY 4, 1 FROM A SKETCH MA!DE AT THE TIME. I I 9 11 II 'll L- .. v. 120 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. south of it. The route of the Federal army lay directly across these two roads, along the western borders of the famous Wilderness. About noon on the 4th of May, Ewell's corps was put in motion on and toward the Orange turnpike, while A. P. Hill, with two divisions, moved parallel with him onl the Orange Plank road. The two divisions of Long- street's corps encamped near Gordonsville were ordered to imove rapidly across the country and follow Hill on the Plank road. Ewell's corps was the first to find itself in the lpresence of the enemy. As it advanced along the turnpike on the morning of the 5th, the Federal column was seen crossing it from the direction of Germanna Ford. Ewell promptly formed line of battle across the turnpike, and communicated his position to General Lee, who was on tile Plank road with Hill. Ewell was instructed to regulate his move- ients by the head of Hill's column, whose progress he could tell by the firing in its front, and not to bring on a general engagement until Longstreet should coloie up. The position of Ewell's troops, so near the flank of the Federal line of march, was anything but favorable to a preservation of the peace, and a collision soon occurred which opened the campaign in earnest. general Warren, whose corps was passing when Ewell came up, halted, and turning to the right made a vigorous attack upon Edward Johnson's division, l osted across the turnpike. J. M. Jones's brigade, which held the road, was driven back in confusion. I Steuart's brigade was pushed forward to take its place. Rodes's division was thrown in on Johnson's light, south of the road, and the line, thus reestablished, moved forward, reversed the tide of battle, and rolled back the Federal attack. The fighting was severe and bloody while it lasted. At some points the lines were in such close proximity in the thick woods which covered the battle-field that when the Federal troops gave way several hundred of them, unable to retreat without exposure to almost certain death, surrendered themselves as prisoners. Ewell's entire corps was now up-Johnson's division holding the turnpike, Rodes's division on the right of it, and Early's in reserve. So far Ewell had been engaged only with Warren's corps, but Sedgwick's soon came up from the river and joined Warren on his right. Early's division was sent to meet it. The battle extended in that direction, with steady and determined attacks upon Early's front, until nightfall. The Confederates still clung to their hold onl the Federal flank against every effort to dislodge them. When Warren's corps encountered the head of Ewell's column on the 5th of May, General Meade is reported to have said: " They have left a division to fool us here, while they concentrate and prepare a position on the North Anna." If the stubborn resistance to Warren's attack did not at onee Major Je d. Hotehkiss, Topographical Engi- from the G-ernana road, intersects the old tirnpike, uewer of the Confederate Second Corps, who wit- but keeping his skirmishers engaged. It was not untit itessed this movement and mapped it at the time, a1t era that Wex arresi turned his right and drofe lti writes to the editors: division, who was in support. then -oved forward, bit iThe attack ws. made by Jones, nt by Warren. was confused by Jone.s- retreating men and als- forced Early ill thie day Jones drove the Federal flanking back; then Gordon's brigade,. of Ear-y' division, which "idette- back very near Wilderness Run; then, having had been formed facing sottlth-east, its left on the turt- develop)ed the Federal ma.rch, Jones ftell back about pike, advanced and drove back the Federaladvance and twto mile, and took position where the Flat Rim road, reestablished the line as first held by Jones." Vo 1. IX. 9 121 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. convince him of his mistake, the filing that announced the approach of Hill's corps along the Plank road, very soon afterward, must have opened his eyes to the bold strategy of the Confederate commander. General Lee had deliber- ately chosen this as his battle-ground. He knew this tangled wilderness well, and appreciated fully the advantages such a field afforded for concealing his great inferiority of force and for neutralizing the superior strength of his antagonist. General (Grant's bold movement across the lower fords into the Wilderness, in the execution of his plan to swing past the Confederate army and place himself between it and Richmond, offered the expected opportunity of striking a blow upon his flank while his troops were stretched out on the line of march. The wish for such an opportunity was doubtless in a measure "father to the thought " expressed by General Lee three days before, at the signal station on Clark's Mountain. Soon after Ewell became engaged on the Old turnpike, A. P. Hill's advance strutck the Federal outposts on the Plank road at Parker's store, on the out- skirts of the Wilderness. These were driven in and followed up to their line of battle, which was so posted as to cover the junction of the Plank road with the Stevensburg and Brock roads, on which the Federal army was moving toward Spotsylvania. The fight began between Getty's division of the Sixth Corps and Heth's division, which was leading A. P. Bill's column. Hancock's corps, which was already onl the march for Spotsylvania by way of Chancellorsville, was at once recalled, and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon was ordered to drive Hill " out of the Wil- 5 waderness." Cadmus Wilcox's division went to Heth's support, and Poague's battalion of artillery took position in a little clearing on the north side of the Plank road, in rear of the Confederate infantry. But there was little use for artillery oi such a field. After the battle was fairly joined in the M R J' B '. IOR )U RALX '.N1EXSSDR KWEBB. WLtFNDED AT SPiOSYLVANIA. thickets in front, its fire might do as much damage to friend as to foe; so it was silent. It was a desperate struggle between the infantry of the two armies, on a field whose physical aspects were as grim and forbidding as the struggle itself. It was a battle of brigades and regiments rather than of corps and divisions. Officers could not see the whole length of their commands, and could tell whether the troops on their right and left were driving or being driven only by the sound of the firing. It was a fight at close quarters too, for as night came on, in those tangled thickets of stunted pine, sweet-gun, scrub-oak, and cedar, the approach of the opposing lines could be discerned only by the noise of their passage through the underbrush or the flashing of their guns. The usually silent Wilderness had suddenly become alive 1 22 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. CONFEDERATE LINE WAITINO ORDERS IN THE VILDERNESS. with the angry flashing and heavy roar of the musketry, mingled with the vells of the combatants as they swayed to and fro in the gloomy thickets. Among the killed were General Alexander Hays, of Hancock's corps, and general J. M. Jones, of Ewell's. When the battle closed at 8 o'clock, General Lee sent an order to Long- street to make a night march, so as to arrive upon the field at daylight the next morning. The latter moved at 1 A. M. of the 6th, but it was already dLaylight when he reached the Plank road at Parker's store, three miles in rear of Hill's battle-field. 4 During the night the movements of troops and prep- arations for battle could be heard on the Federal line, in front of Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, which had so far sustained themselves against every attack Lv six divisions under General Hancock. But Heth's and Wilcox's men were thoroughly worn out. Their lines were ragged and irregular, with wide inter- vals, and in some places fronting in different directions. In the expectation that they would be relieved during the night, no effort was made to re- arrange and strengthen them to meet the storm that was brewing. As soon as it was light enough to see what little could be seen in that dark forest, Hancock's troops swept forward to the attack. The blow fell with greatest force upon Wilcox's troops south of the Orange Plank road. They made what front they could and renewed the fight, until, the attacking column overlapping the right wing, it gave way, and the whole line " rolled up" from the right and retired in disorder along the Plank road as far as the position of Poague's artillery, which now opened upon the attacking force. 4 The right of Ewell's corps formed a junction with the left of A. P. Hill's at a point about half-way between Parker's store and the Orange turnpike on the afternoon of the 5th.- EDITORS. 123 124 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. The Federals pressed their advantage and were soon abreast oif the artillery onl the opposite side, their bullets flying across the road among the gulls where CGreneral Lee himself stood. For a while matters looked very serious for the Confederates. General Lee, after sending a messenger to hasteni the march of Longstreet's troops and another to prepare the trains for a move- ment to the rear, was assisting in rallying the disordered troops and direct- ing the fire of the artillery, when the head of Longstreet's corps appeared in double columnii, swinging down the Orange Plank road at a trot. In perfect order, ranks well closed, and no stragglers, those splendid troops came on, regardless of the confusion on every side, pushing their steady way onward like "a river in the sea" of confused and troubled human waves around them. Kershaw's division took the right of the road, and, coming into line under a heavy fire, moved obliquely to the right (south) to meet the Federal left,whieh had "swung round" in that direction. The Federals were checked in their sweeping advance and thrown back upon their front line of breastworks, where they made a stubborn stand. But Kershaw, urged on by Longstreet, charged with his whole command, swept his front, and captured the works. Nearly at the same moment Field's division took the left of the road, with Gregg's brigade in front, Benning's behind it, Law's next, and Jenkins's fol- lowing. As the Texans in the front line swept past the batteries where General Lee was standing, they gave a rousing cheer for " Marse Robert," who spurred his horse forward and followed them in the charge. When the men became aware that he was " going in " with them, they called loudly to him to go back. " We won't go on unless you go back," was the general cry. Onie of the men dropped to the rear, and taking the bridle turned the gen- eral's horse around, while General Gregg came up and urged him to do as the 'K K' 'V CAFTVRE OF A PARIT OF TIHE BtRNING UNION BREASTWORKS ON THE adsCK. ROAD ON THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 6. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME. 1 i ti C I FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. men wished. At that moment a member of his staff (Colonel Venable) directed his attentioli to (leneral Longstreet, whom lie had been looking for, aimd who was sitting on his horse near the Orange Plank road. With evident disappointluelit General Lee turned off and joined General Longstreet. The ground over which Field's troops were advancing was open for a short listance, and fringed on its farther edge with scattered pines, beyond which began the Wilderness. The Federals [Webb's l)rigade of Hancock's corps] were adlvancing through the pines with alpparently resistless force, when Gregg's eight hundred Texans, regardless of numbcrs, flanks, or supports, dashed directly upon them. There was a terrific crash, miogledl with wild yells, which settled down into a steady roar of musketry. It less than ten minutes one-half of that devoted eight hund(lred were lying upon the field dead or woundIed; but they had delivered a stagger- iiig blow and broken the force of the Federal advance. Benning's and Law's brigades came lromptly to their support, and the whole swept forward together. The tide was flow- ing the other way. It ebbed and flowed many times that day, strewing the Wilderness witil human wGrecks. Law's brigade captured a line BRIGA PGE A Cii l . .A., of log breastworks in its front, but had held K "lt D MAY 61 64. FROM A T INTYPE. them only a few moments when their former owners [Webb's brigade] came back to claim them. The Federals were driven back to a second line several hundred yards beyond, which was also taken. This advanced position was attacked in front and on the right from across the Orange Plank road, and Law's Alabamians "advanced backward " without standing on the order of their going, until they reached the first line of logs, now in their rear. As their friends in blue still insisted on claiming their property and were advancing to take it, they were met by a counter-charge and again driven beyond the second line. This was held against a determined attack, in which the Federal General Wadsworth was shot from his horse as he rode up close to the right of the line on the Plank road. The position again becoming untenable by reason of the movements of Federal troops on their right, Law's men retired a second time to the works they had first captured. And so, for more than two hours, the storm of battle swept to and fro, in some places passing several times over the same ground, and settling down at length almost where it had begun the day before. About 10 o'clock it was ascertained that the Federal left flank rested only a short distance south of the Orange Plank road, which offered a favorable opportunity for a turning movement in that quarter. General Longstreet at once moved Mahone's, Wofford's, Anderson's, and Davis's brigades, the whole under General Mahone, around this end of the Federal line. Forming at right angles to it, they attacked in flank and rear, while a general advance 1 25 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. was made in front. So far the fight had been one of anvil and hammer. But this first display of tactics at once changed the face of the field. The Federal left wing was rolled up in confusion toward the Plank road and then back upon the Brock road. This partial victory had been a comparatively easy one. The signs of demoralization and even panic among the troops of Hancock's left wing, who had been hurled back by Mahone's flank attack, were too plain to be mlis- taken by the C'onfederates, who believed that Chancellorsville was about to be repeated. General Longstreet rode forward and prepared to press his advantage. Jenkins's fresh brigade was moved forward on the Plank road to renew the attack, supported by Kershaw's division, while the flanking column was to come into position on its right. The latter were now in line south of the road and almost parallel to it. Longstreet and Kershaw rode with Gen- eral Jenkins at the head of his brigade as it pressed forward, when suddenly the quiet that had reigned for some moments was broken by a few scatter- ing shots on thle north of the road, which were answered by a volley from Mahone's line on the south side. The firing in their front, and the appear- aniee of troops on the road whom they failed to recognize as friends through the intervening timber, had drawn a single volley, which lost to them all the fruits of the splendid work they had just done. General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously wounded by our own men. The troops who were following them faced quickly toward the firing and were about to return it; but when General Kershaw called out, "They are friends!" every musket was lowered, and the men dropped upon the ground to avoid the fire. The head of the attack had fallen, and for a time the movements of the Confederates were paralyzed. Lee came forward and directed the dispo- sitioDs for a new attack, but the ehange of commanders after the fall of Longstreet, and the resumption of the thread of operations, occasioned a delay of several hours, and then the tide had turned, and we received only hard knocks instead of victory. Wlihei at 4 o'clock an attack was made upon the Federal line along the Brock road, it was found strongly fortified and stub- bornly defended. The log breastworks had taken fire during the battle, and at one point separated the combatants by a wall of fire and smoke which neither could pass. Part of Field's division captured the works in their front, but were forced to relinquish them for want of support. Meanwhile Burnside's corps, which had reenforced Hancock during the day, made a vigorous attack on the north of the Orange Plank road. Law's (Alabama) and Perry's (Florida) brigades were being forced back, when, Heth's division coming to their assistance, they assumed the offensive, driving Burnside's troops beyond the extensive line of breastworks constructed previous to their advance. The battles fought by Ewell on the Old turnpike and by A. P. Hill on the Plank road, on the 5th of May, were entirely distinct, no connected line exist- ing between them. Connection was established with Ewell's right by Wil- cox's division, after it had been relieved by Longstreet's troops on the morning of the 6th. While the battle was in progress on the Orange Plank road, on the 6th, an unsuccessful attempt was made to turn Ewell's left next the river, i26 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. BREASTWORKS OF HACOCK'S CORPS O0 THE BROOK ROAD-MORNING OF MAY 7. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME. and heavy assaults were made upon the line of Early's division. So persist- ent were these attacks on the front of Pegram's brigade, that other troops were brought up to its support, but the men rejected the offer of assistance. Late in the day General Ewell ordered a movement against the Federal right wing, similar to that by which Longstreet had "doubled up" Hancock's left in the morning. Two brigades, under General John B. Gordon, moved out of their works at sunset, and lapping the right of Sedgwiek's corps [the Sixth] made a sudden and determined attack upon it. D Taken by surprise, the Federals were driven from a large portion of their works with the loss of six hundred p)risoners,-among them Generals Seymour and Shaler. Night closed the contest, and with it the battle of the Wilderness. When Lee's army appeared on the flank of the Federal line of march onl the 5th of Mlay, General Grant had at once faced his adversary and endeavored to push him out of the way. Grant's strongest efforts had been directed to forcing back the Confederate advance on the Orange Plank road, which, if successful, would have enabled him to complete his plan of "swing- ing past" that army and placing himself between it and Richmond. Onl the other hand, Lee's principal effoit had been to strike the head of Grait's I In this inovement General Early was in com- General A. A. Humphreys (" The Virginia Canm- mand, and all of his division shared in the attack paign of 1864 and 1865." New York: Charles except Johnston's brigade, which was to the west Scribner's Sons), "General Early drew back hi, of Flat Run. The Confederate brigades confront- brigades and formed a new line in front of his old. ing Sedgwick on the east of the run were Gordon's, During the night an entirely new line was taken Pegram's, and Hays's. Gordon, on the left, began up by the Sixth Corps, its front and right thrown the movement against Sedgwick's right, and Hays back-a change which the right of the Fifth Corps and Pegram followed up the attack. According to conformed to."- EDITORS. 127 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. column a crushing blow where it crossed the Plank road, in order to force it from its route and throw it in confusion back into the Wilderness. Both attempts had failed. What advantages had been gained by the two days' fighting remained with the Confederates. They held a position nearer the Federal line of march than when the battle began, and had inflicted losses iiicomparably heavier than they had themselves sustained. Both sides were now strongly intrenched, and neither could well afford to attack. And so the 7th of May was spent in skirmishing, each waiting to see what the other would do. That night the race for Spotsylvania began. General Lee had been informed by " Jeb " Stuart of the movement of the Federal trains south- ward during the afternoon. After dark the noise of moving columns along the Brock road. could be heard, and it was at once responded to by a similar movement on the part of Lee. The armies moved in parallel columns sep- arated only by a short interval. Longstreet's corps (now commanded by R. H. Anderson) marched all night and arrived at Spotsylvania at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, where the ball was already in motion. Stuart had thrown his cavalry across the Brock road to check the Federal advance, and as the Federal cavalry had failed to dislodge him, Warren's corps had been pushed forward to clear the way. Kershaw's, Humphreys's, and Law's brigades were at once sent to Stuart's assistance. The head of Warren's column was forced back and immediately commenced intrenching. Spot- sylvania Court House was found occupied by Federal cavalry and artillery, which retired without a fight. The Confederates had won the race. The troops on both sides were now rapidly arriving. Sedgwick's corps joined Warren's, and in the afternoon was thrown heavily against Anderson's right wing, which, assisted by the timely arrival of Ewell's corps, repulsed the attack with great slaughter. Hill's corps (now under command of Gen- eral Early) did not arrive until the next morning, May 9th. General Lee's line now covered Spotsylvania Court House, with its left (Longstreet's corps) resting on the Po River, a small stream which flows on the south-west; Ewell's corps in the center, north of the Court House, and Hill's on the right, crossing the Fredericksburg road. These positions were generally maintained during the battles that followed, though brigades and divisions were often detached from their proper commands and sent to other parts of the field to meet pressing emergencies. No engagement of importance took place on the 9th, which was spent in intrenching the lines and preparing places of refuge from the impending s orm. But the 10th was "a field-day." Early in the morning it was found that Hancock's corps had crossed the Po above the point where the Confed- erate left rested, had reached the Shady Grove road, and was threatening our rear, as well as the trains which were in that direction on the Old Court House road leading to Louisa Court House. General Early was ordered from the right with Mahone's and Heth's divisions, and, moving rapidly to the threatened quarter, attacked Hancock's rear division as it was about to recross the Po -driving it, with severe loss, through the burning woods in its rear, back across the river. 128 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. Meanwhile General Grant was not idle elsewhere. He had commenced his otfforts to break through the lines confronting him. The first assault was iniade upon Field's division of Longstreet's corps and met with a complete and bloody repulse. Again at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the blue columns pressed forward to the attack, and were sent back torn and bleeding, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded. Anticipating a renewal of the assaults, many of our men went out in front of their breastworks, and, gathering up the muskets and cartridge-boxes of the dead and wounded, brought them in and distributed them along the line. If they dlid not have repeating-rifles, they had a very good substitute-several loaded ones to each m1an. They had no reserves, and knew that if they could not sufficiently reduce the number of their assailants to equalize matters somewhat before they reached the works, these might become untenable against such heavy and determined attacks. A lull of several hours succeeded the failure of the second attack, but it was only a breathing spell preparatory to the culminating effort of the day. Near sunset our skirmishers were driven in and the heavy, dark lines of attack came into view, one after another, first in quick time, then in a trot, and then with a rush toward the works. The front lines dissolved before the pitiless storm that met them, but those in the rear pressed forward, and over their dead and dying comrades reached that portion of the works held by the Texas brigade. These gallant fellows, now reduced to a mere handful by their losses in the Wilderness, stood manfully to their work. Their line was bent backward by the pressure, but they continued the fight in rear of the works with bayonets and clubbed muskets. Fortunately for them, Anderson's brigade had cleared its own front, and a portion of it turned upon the flank of their assailants, who were driven out, leaving many dead and wounded inside the works. While this attack was in progress on Field's line, another, quite as deter- mined, was made farther to the right, in front of Rodes's division of Ewell's corps. Doles's brigade was broken and swept out of its works with the loss of three hundred prisoners. But as the attacking force poured through the gap thus made, Daniel's brigade on one side and Steuart's on the other drew back from their lines and fell upon its flanks, while Battle's and Johnston's brigades were hurried up from the left and thrown across its front. Assailed on three sides at once, the Federals were forced back to the works, and over them, whereupon they broke in disorderly retreat to their own lines. The next day was rainy and disagreeable, and no serious fighting took place. There were movements, however, along the Federal lines during the day that indicated a withdrawal from the front of Longstreet's corps. Late in the afternoon, under the impression that General Grant had actually begun another flanking movement, General Lee ordered that all the artillery on the left and center that was " difficult of access " should be withdraw-n from the lines, and that everything should be in readiness to move during the night if necessary. Under this order, General Long, Ewell's chief of artillery, removed all but two batteries from the line of General Edward 1 29 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. tenOWFI rAIIM-HllOUSF, WITUN THIE "BLOOIYll ANCILV," PTSILhNAIA. FROM A WAU-TI.IE PHOTOGRAM. Johnson's division, for the reason given, that they were " difficult of access." Johnson's division held an elevated point somewhat advanced from the gen- eral line, and known as "the salient" [or "Bloody Angle"; see map], the breastworks there making a considerable angle, with its point toward the enemy. This point had been held because it was a good position for artil- lery, and if occupied by the enemy would command portions of our line. Such projections on a defensive line are always dangerous if held by infantry alone, as an attack upon the point of the angle can only be met by a diverging fire; or if attacked on either face, the troops holding the other face, unless protected by traverses or by works in rear (as were some of the Confederates), are more exposed than those on the side attacked. But with sufficient artil- lery, so posted as to sweep) the sides of the angle, such a position may be very strong. To provide against contingencies, a second line had been laid off and partly constructed a short distance in rear, so as to cut off this salient. After the artillery had been withdrawn on the night of the 11th, General Johnson discovered that the enemy was concentrating in his front, and, con- vinced that he would be attacked in the morning, requested the immediate return of the artillery that had been taken away. The men in the trenches were kept on the alert all night and were ready for the attack, when at dawn on the morning of the 12th a dense column emerged from the pines half a mile in the front of the salient and rushed to the attack. They came on, to use General Johnson's words, "in great disorder, with a narrow front, but extending baek as far as I could see." Page's battalion of artillery, which had been ordered back to the trenches at 4 o'clock in the morning, was I to 131 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. .just arriving and was not in position to fire upon the attacking column, which offered so fair a mark for artillery. The guns came only in time to be captured. The infantry in the salient fought as long as fighting was of any use; but deprived of the assistance of the artillery, which constituted the chief strength of the position, they could do little to check the onward rush of the Federal column, which soon overran the salient, capturing (Gen- eral Johnson himself, 20 pieces of artillery, and 2A 2800 men-almost his entire divi- sion. The whole thing happened so quickly that the extent of the disaster coul(l not be realized at once. Hancock's troops, who made the assault, had recovered their formation, and, extending their lines across the works on lath, .;A"o 0. f i the salient, had resumed their SPOTS LVANIA COURT HOUSE; advance, when Lane's brigade of Hill's corps, which was immediately on the right of the captured works, rapidly drew back to the unfinished line in rear, and poured a galling fire upon Han- cock's left wing, which checked its ad- vanee and threw it back with severe loss. General Gordon, whose division oYTIIA:NIA TAVERN, NEAR THE CIURT aocUS. (Early's) was in reserve and under orders IkTH ROM WAU-TIME P0IIX'lAPUS. to support any part of the line about the salient, hastened to throw it in front of the advancing Federal column. As the division was about to charge, General Lee rode up and joined General Gordon, evidently intend- ing to go forward with him. Gordon remonstrated, and the men, seeing his intention, cried out," General Lee to the rear! " which was taken up all along the line. One of the men respectfully but firmly took hold of the gen- eral's bridle and led his horse to the rear, and the charge went on. The two moving lines met in the rear of the captured works, and after a fierce strug- gle in the woods the Federals were forced back to the base of the salient. But Gordon's division did not cover their whole front. On the left of the salient, where Rodes's division had connected with Johnson's, the attack was still pressed with great determination. General Rodes drew out Ramseur's brigade from the left of his line (a portion of Kershaw's division taking its place), and sent it to relieve the pressure on his right and restore the line between himself and Gordon. Ramseur swept the trenches the whole length of his brigade, but did not fill the gap, and his right was exposed to a terrible fire from the works still held by the enemy. Three brigades from Hill's corps were ordered up. Perrin's, which was the first to l 32 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. 1 33 arrive, rushed forward through a fearful fire and recovered a part of the line on Gordon's left. General Perrin fell dead from his horse just as he reached the works. General Daniel had been killed, and Ramseur painfully wounded, though remaining in the trenches with his mell. Rodes's right being still hard pressed, Harris's (Mississippi) and McGowan's (South Carolina) brigades were ordered forward and rushed through the blinding storm into the works on Ramseur's right. The Federals still held the greater part of the salient, and though the Confederates were unable to drive them out, the Fed- erals could get no farther. Hancock's corps, which had made the attack, had been reen- forced by Rus- sl' n hao' ii sionsof the Sixthll ad X heaton s divi Corps and one- half of Warren's corps, as the bat- tle progressed. Artillery had been brought up on both sides, the Confederates B using every piece that could be made available -upon the salient. Before 10 o'clock General Lee had put in every man that could be i spared for the restorationtof his broken center. It then became a Wi OF CmNFoDugATike fd oh s matter of endur- MET AT SPMSTLVAN Al FRO. WAII-TIM1F PHOTOA RAPHS aiice with the nien theniselves. All day long and until far into the night the battle raged with unceaso ing fury, in the space covered by the salient and the adjacent works. Every attempt to advance on either side was met amid repelled from the other. The hostile battle-flags waved over different portions of the same works, while the men fought like fiends for their possession. [See "Hand-to-Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania," to follow.] During the day diversions were made on both sides, to relieve the pressure in the center. An attack upon Anderson's (Longstreet's) corps by Wright's FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. Sixth Corps (Sedgwiek having been killed on the 9th) was severely repulsed, while, on the other side of the salient, General Early, who was moving with a part of Hill's corps to strike the flank of the Federal force engaged there, met and defeated Burnside's corps, which was advancing at the same time to attack Early's works. WHILE the battle was raging at the salient, a portion of Gordon's division was b)usily engagedl in constructing in rear of the old line of intrenchments a new and shorter one, to which Ewell's corps retired before daylight on the 13th. Never was respite more welcome than the five days of comparative rest that followed the terrible battle of the 12th to our wearied men, who had been marching and fighting almost without intermission since the 4th of May. Their coalfort was materially enhanced, too, by the supply of coffee, sugar, and other luxuries to which they had long been strangers, obtained from the haversacks of the Federal dead. It was astonishing into what close places a hungry Confederate would go to get something to eat. Men would some- times go oat mider a severe fire, in the hope of finding a full haversack. It may seem a small matter to the readers of war history; but to the 111akers of it who were in the trenches, or on the march, or engaged in battle night and day for weeks without intermission, the supply of the one article of coffee, furnished by the Army of the Potomac to the Army of Northern Virginia, was not a small matter, but did as much as any other material agency to sus- tain the spirits and bodily energies of the men, in a campaign that taxed both to their utmost limit. Old haversacks gave place to better ones, and tin cups now dangled from the accouterments of the Confederates, who at every rest on the march or interval of quiet on the lines could be seen gathered around small fires, preparing the coveted beverage. In the interval from the 12th to the 18th our army was gradually moving east to meet corresponding movements on the other side. Longstreet's corps was shifted from the left to the extreme right, beyond the Fredericksburg road. Ewell's corps still held the works in rear of the famous salient, when on the morning of the 18th a last effort was made to force the lines of Spotsylvania at the only point where previous efforts had met with even partial success. This was destined to a more signal failure than any of the others. Under the fire of thirty pieces of artillery, which swept all the approaches to Ewell's line, the attacking force \ was broken and driven back in disorder before it came well within reach of the muskets of the infantry. After the failure of this attack, the " sidling" movement, as the men expressed it, again began, and on the afternoon of the 19th Ewell's corps was thrown round the Federal left wing to ascertain the extent of this movement. After a severe engagement, which lasted until night, Ewell withdrew, having lost about nine hundred men in the action. This seemed a heavy price'to pay for information that might have been otherwise obtained, but the enemy had suffered more severely, and General Grant was delayed in his turning move- ment for twenty-four hours. He however got the start in the race for the \ The attacking column consisted of the Second and Sixth corps, the Second Corps leading.-EDITOR. 1 34 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. North Anna; Hancock's corps, leading off on the night of the 20th, was fol- lowed rapidly by the remainder of his army. Oil the morning of the 21st Ewell's corps moved from the left to the right of our line, and later on the same day it was pushed southward on the Teie- g rnap road, closely followed by Longstreet's corps. A. P. Hill brought up the rear that itight, after a sharp " brush " with the Sixth Corps, which was in the act of retiring from its lines. Lee had the inside track this time, as the T'elegraph road on which he moved was the direct route, while Grant had to swinig round o01 the arc of a circle of which this was the chord. About noon ,It the 22(d the heLad of our ecolumn reached the North Anna, and that night Iee's arny lay oin the south side of the river. We had womi the second heat aitd sef-ured a good night's rest besides, when the Federal armny appeared on the oth(r side in the forenoon of the 23d. Warren's corps crossed the river that afternoon without opposition at .Jerichlo Ford, four miles above the Chesterfield bridge on the Telegraph road; hIut as it moved out from the river it imtet C'admus Wilcox's division of Hill's corps, and a severe but indecisive engagement ensued, the confronting lines intrenching as usual. Meanwhile a small earth-work, that had been built the year before, covering the approaches to the bridge on the Tele- graph road and now held by a small (letaclunent from Kershaw's ilivision, was attacked and carried by troops of Hancock's corps, the Confederates retiring across the river with the loss of a few prisoners. It did not seem to be General Lee's purpose to offer any serious resist- CO H T(I1TETRENI1 ance to Grant's passage of the river at OtI URIit'- [SER MIP, NEXT VA:1r.t the points selected. His lines had been V1If)M A WAR-TIME PUOTi.slUAl. retired from it at both these points, but touched it at Ox Ford, a point inter- mediate between them. Haneock's corps, having secured the Chesterfield bridge, crossed over on the morning of the 24th, and, extending down the river, moved out until it came upon Longstreet's and Ewell's corps in posi- tion and ready for battle. The Sixth Corps (General Wright) crossed at .Jericho Mill and joined Warren. The two wings of Grant's army were safely across the river, but there was no connection between them. Lee had only thrown back his flanks and let them in on either side, while lie held the river lIetween; and when General Grant attempted to throw his center, under IBurnside, across between the ford and the bridge, it was very severely handled and failed to get a foothold on the south side. A detachment from Swiniton and others state that Lonigstreet moved on the night of the 20th, followed by Ewell. This is an error.-E. M. L. 3 5 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. os F1/rd i otherise known as Anderson Brilge and Ford. Andoersann Station ia Verdon. and the Clh. (lady hooe Io S J Anderaoi. Warren's corps was sent down on the south side to help Burnside across, J but was attacked by Mahone's division, and driven back with heavy loss, nar- rowly escaping capture. General Grant found himself in what may be called a military dilemma. He had cut his army in two by running it upon the point of a wedge. He could not break the point, which rested upon the river, and the attempt to force it out of place by striking on its sides must of neces- sity be made without much concert of action between the two wings of his army, neither of which could reenforce the other without crossing the river twive; while his opponent could readily transfer his troops, as needed, from one wing to the other, across the narrow space between them. The next two days were consumed lay General Grant in fruitless attempts to find a vulnerable point in our lines. The skirmishers were very active. often forcing their way close up to our works. The line of my brigade crossed the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad. It was an exposed point, and the men stationed there, after building their log breastwork, leant their /'rittonden's diviaion of BurnRide's corps forded the river on the 124th at Quarles's Mill, between Ox Fordl and Jericho Mill, and connected with Warren's left. Potter's division of this corps was with Hancock, leaving only one division, 0. B. Willeox's, at Ox Ford.- EDITORS. I fit FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. muskets against it and flJoved out on one side, to avoid the constant fire that was directed upon it. As I was passing that point on one occasion, the men called to me, " Stoop ! " At the same moment I received a more forcible ad- monition from the whiz of a minie-ball close to my head. Turning quickly, I caught a glimpse of something blue disappearing behind a pile of earth that had been thrown out front the railroad cut some distance in front. Taking Ine of the muskets leaning against the works I waited for the reappearance of my friend in blue, who had taken such an unfair advantage of me. He soon appeared, rising cautiously behind his earth-work, and we both fired at the same moment, neither shot taking effeet. This time my friend didn't "1 hedge," b)ut commenced reloading rapidly, thinking, I suppose, that I would have to do the same. But he was mistaken; for, taking up another musket, I fired at once, with a result at which both of us were equally surprised, he probably at my being able to load so quickly, and I at hitting the mark. He was found there, wounded, when my skirmishers were pushed forward. On the morning of May 27th General Grant's army had disappeared front our front. During the night it had "folded its tents like the Arab and as quietly stolen away," on its fourth turning movement since the opening of the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was already on its march for the Pamunkey River at Hanovertown, where the leading corps crossed on the morning of the 27th. Lee moved at once to head off his adversary, whose advance column was now eight miles nearer Richmond than he was. In the JERICHO MIfLS-V ION ENGINEER WUns AT AVORK. FROM A WAR-TUME PI01T(OGRAM. VOL. IV, 10 1 37 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. afternoon of the 28th, after one of the severest cavalry engagements of the war, in which Hampton and Fitz Lee opposed the advance of Sheridan at Hawes's Shop, the infantry of both armies came up and again confronted each other along the Totopotomoy. Here the Confederate position was found too strong to be attacked in front with any prospect of success, and again the "sidling" movements began - this time toward Cold Harbor. Sheridan's cavalry had taken possession of Cold Harbor on the 31st, and had been promptly followed up by two corps of infantry.4, Longstreet's and a part of Hill's corps, with Hoke's and Breekinridge's divisions, 4 were thrown across their front. The fighting began on the Cold Harbor line, late in the afternoon of the 1st of June, by a heavy attack upon the divisions of Hoke and Kershaw. Clingman's brigade on Hoke's left gave way, and Wofford's on Kershaw's right, being turned, was also forced back; but the further progress of the attaek was checked and the line partly restored before night. By the morning of the 2d of June the opposing lines had settled down close to each other, and everything promised a repetition of the scenes at Spotsylvania. Three corps of Grant's army (General W. F. Smith's Eighteenth Corps having arrived from Drewry's Bluff) now confronted the Confederate right wing at Cold Harbor, while the other two looked after Early's (Ewell's) corps near Bethesda Church. In the afternoon of June 2d, General Early, perceiving a movement that indicated a withdrawal of the Federal force in his front, attacked Burnside's corps while it was in motion, striking also the flank of Warren's corps, and capturing several hundred prisoners. This was accomplished with small loss, and had the effect of preventing the coopera- tion of these two corps in the attack at Cold Harbor the next day. Early in the morning of the 2d I was ordered to move with my own and Anderson's brigades, of Field's division, "to reenforce the line on the right," exercising my own discretion as to the point where assistance was most needed. After putting the troops in motion I rode along the line, making a personal inspection as I went. Pickett's division, the first on our right, held a strong position along the skirt of a wood, with open fields in front, and needed no strengthening. The left of Kershaw's division, which was the next in order, was equally strong; but on calling at General Kershaw's quar- ters I was informed of the particulars of the attack upon his own and Hoke's divisions the evening before, and requested by him to place my troops as a support to his right wing, which had been thrown back by the attack. On examining the line I found it bent sharply back at almost a right angle, the point of which rested upon a body of heavy woods. The works were in open ground and were ill-adapted to resist an attack. The right face of the angle ran along a slope, with a small marshy stream behind and higher ground in front. The works had evidently been built just where the troops found themselves at the close of the fight the previous evening. , The Sixth and Eighteenth coi ps reached Cold with about 2700 men. Hoke had just arrived from Harbor on the 1st of June.-EDITORS. Petersburg. Pickett's division. which had been 4 Breckinridge came from the Valley and joined serving in the Department of North Carolina, had Lee's army at the North Anna [Hanover Junction] also joined its corps at the North Anna.- E. M. L. 138 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. i 407SWkktS2Xw.Se ,i.I.''S;0'i W k : R'" ''g -'if EiI. .. \aftliiad es f.X THEl IVEIiNSYI. 'AIA REStERVES RESSTUIDS A -N-C- AR.TTACKs Ntl..A:R THE UEl ilDXt ( rRtI ,uJrE FRLUM ,A KETCH MiADE AT THlE IME. Convinced that under such assaults as we had sustained at Spotsylvania our line would be broken at that point, I proposed to cut off the angle by building a new line across its base, which would throw the marshy ground in our front and give us a clear sweep across it with our fire from the slope on the other side. This would not only strengthen but shorten the line consider- ably, and I proposed to General Kershaw to build and occupy it with my two brigades that night. Meanwhile the enemy was evidently concentrating in the woods in front, and every indication pointed to an early attack. Nothing could be done upon the contemplated line during the day, and we waited anxiously the coming of night. The day passed without an attack. I was as well satisfied that it would come at dawn the next morning as if I had seen General Meade's order directing it. That no mistake should be made in the location of the works, I procured a hatchet, and accompanied by two members of my staff, each with an armful of stakes, went out after dark, located the line, and drove every stake upon it. The troops were formed on it at once, and before morning the works were finished. Artillery was placed at both ends of the new line, abreast of the infantry. General Kershaw then withdrew that por- tion of his division which occupied the salient, the men having leveled the works as far as possible before leaving them. Our troops were under arms and waiting, when with the misty light of early morning the scattering fire of our pickets, who now occupied the aban- doned works in the angle, announced the beginning of the attack. As the assaulting column swept over the old works a loud cheer was given, and it rushed on into' the marshy ground in the angle. Its front covered little more than the line of my own brigade of less than a thousand men; but line followed line until the space inclosed by the old salient became a mass of writhing humanity, upon which our artillery and musketry played with cruel effect. I had taken position on the slope in rear of the line and was carefully noting the firing of the men, which soon became so heavy that I feared they 139 140 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. would exhaust the cartridges in their boxes before the attack ceased. Sending an order for a supply of ammunition to be brought into the lines, I went down to the trenches to regulate the firing. On my way I met a man, belonging to the 15th Alabama regiment of my brigade, running to the rear through the storm of bullets that swept the hill. He had left his hat behind in his retreat, was crying like a big bal)y, and was the l)loodiest man I ever saw. "Oh, General," he blub- btered out, " I am dead ! I am killed ! Look at this ! "1 showing his wound. LIie was a broad, fat-faced fellow, and a mninie-ball had lpassedl through his cheek and the fleshy part of his neck, letting a large amount of blood. Find- ing it was only a flesh-wound, I told him to go on; he was not hurt. He NTII E I.TNI W A CT L' uu . o I4A N') U NVR COtUNTY, looked at me doubtfully for a second V11llGINJA, A.s IT APPEARED IN IW4, NtT AFTER as if questioning my veracity or my (iENERAI GUANT'S A-k-. OF 1S.T1:M surgical knowledge, I tlon't know which; then, as if satisfied with my diagnosis, he broke into a broad laugh, and, the tears still running down his cheeks, trotted off, the happiest man I saw that day. On reaching the trenches, I found the men in fine spirits, laughing and talking as they fired. There too, I could see more plainly the terrible havoc made in the ranks of the assaulting column. I had seen the dreadful carnage in front of Marye's Hill at Fredericksburg, and on the "old railroad cut" which Jackson's men held at the Second Manassas; but I had seen nothing to exceed this. It was not war; it was murder. When the fight ended, more than a thousand men lay in front of our works either killed or too badly wounded to leave the field. P Among them were some who were not hurt, but remained among the dead and wounded rather than take the chances of going back under that merciless fire. Most of these came in and sur- rendered during the day, but were fired on in some instances by their own men (who still held a position close in our front) to prevent them from doing so. The loss in my command was fifteen or twenty, most of them wounded about the head and shoulders, myself among the number. Our artillery was handled superbly during the action. Major Hamilton, chief of artillery of Kershaw's division, not only cooperated with energy in strengthening our line on the night of June 2d, l)ut directed the fire of his guns, with great skill durig, the attack on the 3d, reaching not only the front of the attacking force, but its flanks also, as well as those of the supporting troops. While we were busy with the Eighteenth Corps on the center of the general line, the sounds of lbattle could be heard both on the right and left, and we I Fromn the close range of the artillery and the attack, at between 4000 and 5000. -E. Mt. musketry, there must have been a niRch greater L. [The G Official Records " ".how that the losses proportion of these than usual. I estimated the of that corps at Cold Harbor aggregated :t0 19.- whole loss cf the Eighteenth Corps, which made EDTORS.] 141 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. knew from long use what that meant. It was a general advance of Grant's whole army. Early's corps below Bethesda Church was attacked without success. On our right, where the line extended toward the Chickahominy, it was broken at one point, but at once restored by Finegan's (Florida) brigade, with heavy loss to Hancock's troops who were attacking there. The result of the action in the center, which has been described, presents a fair picture of the result along the entire line - a grand advance, a desperate struggle, a bloody and crushing repulse. Before 8 o'clock A. M. on the 3d of June the battle of Cold Harbor was over, and with it Grant's " overland campaign" against Richmond. When General Grant was appointed to the command of the Union armies and established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, we of the Army of Northern Virginia knew very little about his character and capacity as a commander. Even " old army" officers, who were supposed to know all about any one who had ever been in the army before the war, seemed to know as little as anybody else. The opinion was pretty freely expressed, however, that his Western laurels would wither in the climate of Virginia. His name was associated with Shiloh, where it was believed that he had been outgeneraled and badly beaten by Albert X 9 tSidney Johnston, and saved by Buell. The capture of Vicksburg and the battle of Chatta- nooga, which gave him . g / a brilliant reputation at the North,were believed by the Confederates to be due more to the weak- ness of the forces op.. posed to him and the bad generalship of their EXTREME IGHt1 oTHE CuF 'I"'An LIVEN COD t HAgatr. commandersthantoany FROM A WAWUNY. P1 OTOG APH.great ability on his part. That he was bold and aggressive, we all knew, but we believed that it was the boldness and aggressiveness that arise from the consciousness of strength. as he had generally managed to fight his battles with the advantage of largely superior numbers. That this policy of force would be pursued when he took command in Virginia, we had no doubt; but we were not prepared for the unparalleled stubbornness and tenacity with which he persisted in his attacks under the fearful losses which his army sustained at the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania. General Grant's method of conducting the campaign was frequently discussed among the Confederates, and the universal verdict was that he was no strategist and that he relied almost entirely upon the brute force of numbers for success. Such a policy is not characteristic of a high order of generalship, and seldom wins unless the odds are over- 142 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. whelmingly on the side of the assailant. It failed in this instance, as shown l)y the result at Cold Harbor, which necessitated an entire change in the plan of campaign. What a part at least of his own men thought about General Grant's methods was shown by the fact that many of the prisoners taken ,Luring the campaign complained bitterly of the " useless butchery " to which they were subjected, some going so far as to prophesy the destruction of their ormy. "He fights ! " was the pithy reply of President Lincoln to a deputation of influential politicians who urged his removal from the command of the army. These two words embody perfectly the Confederate idea of General Grant at that time. If, as the medieval chroniclers tell us, Charles Martel (the Hammer) gained that title by a seven days' continuous battle with the Saracens at Tours, General Grant certainly entitled himself to a like distinc- tion by his thirty days' campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. General Lee held so completely the admiration and confidence of his men that his conduct of a campaign was rarely criticised. Few points present themselves in his campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor upon which criticism can lay hold, when all the circumstances are considered. His plan of striking the flank of Grant's army as it passed through the Wilderness is above criticism. Fault can be found only with its execution. The two divisions of Longstreet at Gordonsville, and Anderson's division of Hill's corps left on the Upper Rapidan, were too widely separated from the rest of the army, and, as the event proved, should have been in supporting distance of A. P. Hill on the Orange Plank road on the afternoon of the 5th of May. That Lee did not strike Grant a damaging blow when he had him at such disadvantage on the North Anna may seem strange to those who had witnessed his bold aggressiveness at the Wilderness and on other fields. He was ill and con- fined to his tent at the time; but, as showing his purpose had he been able to keep the saddle, he was heard to say, as he lay prostrated by sickness, "We must strike them a blow; we must never let them pass us again."\ Whatever General Lee did, his men thought it the best that could be done under the circumstances. Their feeling toward him is well illustrated by the remark of a " ragged rebel " who took off his hat to the general as he was pass- ing and received a like courteous salute in return: " God bless Marse Robert! I wish he was emperor of this country and I was his carriage-driver." The results of the "overland campaign" against Richmond, in 1864, can- not be gauged simply by the fact that Grant's army found itself within a few miles of the Confederate capital when it ended. It might have gotten there in a much shorter time and without any fighting at all. Indeed, one Federal army under General Butler was already there, threatening Richmond, which was considered by the Confederates much more secure after the arrival of the armies of Lee and Grant than it had been before. Nor can these results be measured only by the losses of the opposing armies on the battle-field, except as they affected the miorale of armies themselves; for their losses were about proportional to their relative strength. So far as the Confederates were concerned, it would be idle to deny that they (as well as General Lee Statement of Colonel Venable of General Lee's staff.- E. M4. L. 143 FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOR. himself) were disappointed at the result of their efforts in the Wilderness on the 5th and 6th of May, and that General Grant's constant "hammering" with his largely superior force had, to a certain extent, a depressing effect upon both officers and mein. " It's no use killing these fellows; a half-dozen take the place of every one we kill," was a common remark in our army. We knew that our resources of men were exhausted, and that the vastly greater resources of the Federal Government, if brought fully to bear, even in this costly kind of warfare, must wear us out in the end. The question with us (and one often asked at the time) was, " How long will the people of the North, and the army itself, stand it i" We heard much about the demorali- zation of Grant's army, and of the mutterings of discontent at home with the conduct of the eampaign, and we verily believed that their p)atienee would soon come to an end. So far as the fighting qualities of our men were concerned, they were little if at all impaired by the terrible strain that had been put upon them. Had General Lee so ordered, they would have attacked the Federal army, after the battle of Cold Harbor, with the same courage, though perhaps more quiet, that they had displayed on entering the campaign thirty days before. The Army of Northern Virginia was so well seasoned and tempered that, like the famous Toledo blade, it could be bent back and doubled upon it-elf, and then spring again into perfect shape. It may justly be said of both armies that in this terrible thirty days' strug- gle their courage and endurance was superb. Both met " foemen worthy of their steel," and battles were fought such as could only have occurred between men of kindred race, and nowhere else than in America. A RABBIT IN A CO)NFEDERBATE CAMP. 144 Y GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. EXTRACT FROM1 HIS REPORT AS LIEUTENANT-OENERAL, DATED JULY 22D, 1865. T movement of the THArmy of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May. under the immedi- ate direction and orders of Major-GeneralMeade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (tile Fifth and Sixth corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second Corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, un- der Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance), with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance traveled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained: that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early on the 5th the advance corps (the Fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren command- ing) met and engaged the enemy outside his in- trenehments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappa- hannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By 6 o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was lead- ing his corps into action near the Wilderness Tav- ern, some of his troops having marehed a distance of ovrer thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahan- nock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accouterments of a sol- dier, this was a remarkable march. Tie battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and con- tinued with unabated fury until darkness set il, each army holding substantially the same position that they bad on the evening of the L5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was person- ally present and commanded that part of our line, soon re-formed it and restored order. On the morn- ing of the 7th reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in ,4a I "O" I"'i' awI 4 11,pwll" 146 GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNFSS (CAMPAIGN. i,: i ei, 4r 5 5 , :ERiX555151 .1 SW N 4 i the open fihl, notwithistanditig his ,advantage of positioti aitd that tie woul.d wait all atta-k behind his wirks. I thirtfore determinel to push on and pitt uty whole firer t etweeti hint and Richmond; sait utrders were at otite isseile for a movement lby hi, right flatik. Oln the-night tif the 7th the marc h was cominnened toward Spotsvivania Court Hiunse. tin Fifth Corps moving onl tl;e most direct roil1. Bitt the etienly, havitig become apprised of our motivement itnd havittg the shorter line, was enabled, to reach there first. (hi tile Sth General Warrn-i met a force of the enemy which had been setit out to oppose and delay his advance to gaii tinie to fortify the lihe taken up at Spotsylvanis. This forne was steadily driven hack on the main force, within the recently constricted works, after considerable fightitig, resulting in severe loss to both side-. On tin- nioriting of the tuth General Sheridan started Ott ti raiil a ailist the enemy's lines of communicatioti with Richmond. The Pth. 11th, and 11th were spent in manieuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-Genertl John Sedgwiek. command- ing the Sixth Army Corps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The Second Corps, Major- Genleral Haneock eummandine, earriei a salient of his line, capturing most of [Edward] Johnson's di- visioti of Ewell'rs orps sait twentv pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advan- tage gaitteu dil tiot prove decisive. The 13th. 1 4th, 15th. 1 6th, 1 7th, atit 1 91th were consumed in manlteuvrimig atid awaiting the arrival of reenforce- itettts from Wiashittgton. Deeming it impracti- eabht- to mnake atny further attack upotn the enemy ot Spotsyvautia ('ourt Hous, orders were issuedl Ott the 1 Ith with a view to a moovemenlt to the North Ainam to cotimenene at 1 2 o'clock on the night of the 1 9th. Late itt the afternoon of the I 9th, Ewell's corps came outt of its works onl oir extreme righit flank: liut the attack was promptly repulsed with heavy losIs. This de- lavet the mnovemetit to the North Attnta until the night of the 21 st, when it was commenced. But the enemy, again having the shorter line and beiig in possession of the main roads, was enalbled to reanh th- North Anna in ad- in:naee of us,, aitd too.k "positioi llehitidi it. The Fifth (Coips rnt-hut the North Anna ti the afternoon of the 23d, csixth followed lv thle 1ixhCorps,. The See-- got tp about t le stone time, the Seelond hold- bigthe railroad bridlge, ant the Ninth lyinglhe- tween that and Jerieho Fort. Generial War- ren effeeteul a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after getting into position lie was violently attacked, but repulsed the eni- emy with great slaughter. to the 2.5th General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spot- sylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver l)am and Ashland stations, four trains of ears. large supplies of rations, and many miles of rail- road-track; recaptiured shout tour hundred of our men onl their way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be earried by assault), recrossed to the north batik of tile (Chiekahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, Ol the James River. where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with the Tenth Corps. At the same time he sent a force of 1800 cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of :o00oo cavalry, uniter (Gen- eral Kautz, from Stiffolk, to operate against the roat south of Petersburg and Richmond. Otl the .5th he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 6th he was in posi- tion with his main army, atld -onimenced intrench- ing. 0n the 7th he made a reconnoissanlce agaimist the Petersburg anid Rtichmonid Railroad, destroyintg a portion of it after some fighting. Otl the 0th he telegraphed as follows: "ttEAD4IQJARTEaS, NEAR BERIMUDA LANDING, May 9tb, 18C4. Hon. E. M. STANTON, secretary of War: I Our tiperatiauto mnty bi sinmeil up itn a few words. With luoe cav-alry w e sI, irt- a i up the Peninsula, foteed the Chickahominiy, atidtittv safrity brtught them to their present positoun. These were colored cavalry, and are new holding our advance pickets toward Rich- muad. GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. -l4ciirnl Kalitz, with three tholu.and cavalry froni Sidfolk, on the sa (alily with our oi vement up the .iii j lter, M rie 1 the1 iack Water, burned the ituil- h, hilildgif it Stony Crc, k, la-low 1'tersliiirg, littili llt.. lleuLlriglil i forc at thiait poilt. ha- e Iiiiliil h1ere-. lit -ie eld ourselve. Ile- 1tri iii d illy . liles of ruilroail. uled got a positio- w hlce1, wit h 1,l s lililics, all - olii ohl t agafinst the whole ,,t 1.ees 1 1 . ithz i Irel - li tIn II ti pplies. ..i..it.igarti, ,iilt. a tl:ege piothln of his force was , a h bli yhit the euitti ing Of tlhe: raiiioail. by K otz. Th:t l1or1 I: iui i lihei relic l e tltrslnirg iuiiir Itill i ha- e ii hi 1,1511 tA n-y:,i killing .ilol wo" il.llin f mlianya mil takilig tili3 Ililso llira, ilter 1 5 sire ai- dl will- iiiiteeted fight. (ln ral (-r li.t will i t h! trooil eil witi alny farthb r eii fiire eiieuI ts to fel fc o il e irig uiril' force-. " HEN.I. F. BIUTLER, MLIir-GeneraL. ing in the seattered troops under Breckinridge fromn the western part of Virginia. The position of Bermu.da Handred was as easy to dlefend as it was diffiefflt to operate fr-io against the eniwty. I determiited, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained ; anwd acordiingly, on the 22d, I direeted that tbey be senit forwaril, nilder command of Ilajor-Geierail V. F. Smith, til joiin the Army of the Potomac. On the 24th of May the Ninthl Army Corps, commanided by Major-Genieral A. E. Biirnilide, was assigned to the Armloy of the Potomac, aiid from this time forward constituted a portill of Major-General Meade's command. Oii tIle evening of the Itli and morning of the Findiuig the enemy's position on the North Ann I 1 tt hle (arried a portion iif the enemy's first line stronger than either of his previoiis ones, I witl if ldefenses ti l)rewry's Bllff, or Fort larliig, with drew on the night of the 2tith to the north ban small loss. The time thu.s olnsumed from the 6th of the North Aima, and moved via Hanover Tow. lost to Ius the benefit of the surprise anid capture to turn the enemy's position hy his right. iif hIichlmnonid and Petersh'irg, enabling, a1s it did, Generals Torhert's and 'Merritt's divisions of cat lieauregard to cOllect his loose forces in North and alry, under Sheridan, and the Sixth Corps led th Suitlth(Caroliiia, -iitd briiig them to the itefense of advance; crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanoe tlhs.te places. Oii the lith, tlte eiiemy attacked Town, after consiilerahle fighting, and on the 2St l-t;eriil Butler in. his position itt front of Drewry's the two divisions of cavalry had a severe btut su, Bluff. He was forced back, or drewv back, into his eessful engagement with the enemy at Hawes ilttrenehnmerits between the forks of the James and Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, wit Appiomattox rivers, the enemy intrenchingstrongly heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House an ini his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, Cold Harbor road, and developed the ellemy' anid all that was valuable to him. His army, there- position north of the Chickahominy. Late on thI fore, though in a positioti of great security, was evening of the last day the enemy came nuIt an as completely shut off from further operations attacked our left, but was repulsed with very eot direetly against Richmond as if it had been in a siderable loss. An attack was immediately ordere bottle strongly corked. It requiired bitt a compar- by General Meade, along his whole lihe, whic atively small force of the eutemy to hold it there. resulted in driving the enemy from a part of hi On the 12th General Kautz, with his cavalry, intrenched skirmish line. was started on a raid against the Danville Railroaid, On the :31st General Wilson's division of cavalr which he strnek at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula destroyed the railroad bridges over the South Anti stations, destroying them, the railroad track, twit River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. teV freight trains, and oiie locomotive, together with eral Sheridan, on the same day, large quantities of commissary and other stores; reached Cold Harbor, atid held thence, crossing to the South Sile Road, struck it it until relieved by the Sixth at Wilsort's, WellsvUle, and Black's and White's Corps and General Smith's com- stations, destroying the road and station-houses; tllence he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the I1Sth. On the i Pth of April, and prior to the movement of Genteral Butler, the enemy, with a h.iiii fore. utnder General Hike and an irot-chad raiti. Al tiIekei Plymouth, N. C., commanded by Geinral II. W. - - Wessells, aiid our gutt-boats thtere ; and, after severe fightiitg, the place was carried by assault. andl the entire garrisoit and armameuit captureth. The gun-boat Xs itfhfield was sunk, and] tte MIioani disabled. The arnty selnt to operate against Itiehinond Ihavinig hermetically sealed itself up at Bertiuda Hwin- dred, the enemy was enabled to , bring the most, if not all, the retn- forcements brottght from the South by Beauregard against the Army of - - - thlo Potomac. In addition to this - reeitforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by call- TnH WILtiERNESS TAVEaN. FROnM X PHOTOGRhtAPH TAKEN IN 1584 a k a Ii 0 ii it it II d 147 148 GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. RRltP.. 4'4 RHOiT IN tUSE ST CoLto 1lAUiRC. TFROM . A WAR-TIPME SXTCrit. mand, which had just arrived, via White House, from General Butlers army. Oil the first dav of June an attack was made at . P. m. by the Sixth Corp. and the troops under tielneral Smith, the other corps being held in read- iness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted it, our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps, and in front of General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. Ol the :td of June we again assaulted the enemy's work, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compen- sate for our own losses. I would not be under- stood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon tile enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. From the proximity of the enemy to his defenses around Richmond, it was impossible by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city. I was still in a condition, either to move by his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to bold a line north and east of RWehmond that would protect the Freder- icksburg Railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea, from the start, bad been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible; then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or fol- low him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of tIhe first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be ac- complished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold sub- stantially the ground we then occupied, taking ad- vantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville to effect- ually break up the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley arid Lynch- burg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under G;en- eral Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Char- lottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions. On the 1Oth of June General Butler sent a force of infantry under General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg, if GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry car- rier1 the works on the south side, and penetrated -ell ill toward the town, but were forced to retire. General (lillinore, finding the works which he approlrhedl very strong, and deeming an assault irumrraeticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred with- o.. t attempting one. Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point (Greeral Smith's command by water via the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac. This was for the express jriripse of se(crririg Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of orrr intention, could reli-foree tire place. The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark orr the evening of the 12th. One di- vision of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the Fifth Corps crosseri the Chiekahominry at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to eover the crossings of the other corps. The ad- vance corps reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the right of the l 8th. During three long years the armies of the Po- tomac and Northern Virginia had been confront- ing each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without ma- terially changing the vantage-ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewd- ness than was displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march our to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought were by them set down as failures orr our part and vic- tories for them. Their army believed this. It pro- duced a unoral which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The bat- tles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna. anrd Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were orr our side, were even more damaging to the ecu- emy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the faet that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost in- variably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of tIre soldiery have rarely been sur- passed. are given ill the report of Major-General Meade and the subordinate reports accompany- ing it. During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James River, the army had to be sup- plied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot therefore be awarded to the quartermaster and commissarydepartments for the MAN105 AND GRotUNlDS ON MAfRY.' MLLM This ketch ois from a photograph taken during tre Wlldernes. campaign' when tir ansion and grounds were tillel with Unolu woundet. The portteo faces mdeekebuhrg, asda few pacn ilr front of it the hill dropr abruptly to the sunken Telegraph road and stone wtal. '49 150 GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. :ENERAL GRANT ANDi TAFF AT BIITHgJDA CHURCH, NORTU OF COLD HARBOR. FROM A WAAR-TIME PHOTOGRiAPII. General Grant is sitting with his baeck to the smaller tree. zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was ex- perienced in protecting them. The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns. giving one, com- posed of eavalry, to General Averell. Theyerossed the mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. near Wythe- ville, on the 10th, and, proceeding to New River and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several im- portant bridges and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenan- doah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and Major-General Hunter was appointed to super- sede him. His instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General H. W. Hal- leek, chief-of-staff of the army: "NEAR SPOTSYLVASIA Const HOUnE, VA., May 20th, 1554. "Theenemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move In that GENERAL GRANT ON THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. direction; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Char- lotteeville, if he does lnot mueet too much opposition. If hl-ra hold at bay a force equal to his owia, he will be doing gld service. "U. S. GRANT, Lilctenaut-General. MAJOR-GENERAL U. W. IIALLECK." "JJEIRICHtO FORD, VA., May 25th1, 1864. if Hunter can possibly get to Charlottcsville and lsn-bhimirg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possi- bility of n-pairs for weks. Completing this, he could tf Iul his way back to his original base, or from about tuordon.ssiIl lJoin this army. " U. S. GRAN'T, Liente-ant-GeneraL. M MAJOR-GENERAL U1. WV. HALLECK." General HuKnter immediately took up the offen- sive, amid, moving uip the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle 1500 men, three pieces of artillery, and 300 stand of small- arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place [Lynchburg] he reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very successful; and but for the diffi- culty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, Gen- eral Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time be- fore Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 1 8th, General Hunter, owing to a want of am- munition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defense of the North. Had General Hunter moved by way of Char- lottesville, instead of Lexington, as his instruc- tions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James River canal, on the main line of communication between Lynehburg and the force sent for its defense. I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instrue- tions and the interests of the service. The prompt- itude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. To return to the Army of the Potomac: The Sec- ond Corps commenced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wil- lox's Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda Hundred to give the neces- sary orders for the immediate capture of Peters- burg. The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immedi- ately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done; that we could rednforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as di- rected, andl confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next morning, but, for some reason that I have never been able to satis- factorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about 7P.M. Betweenthelinethuscapturedand Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had rednforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear- the moon shining brightly- and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But in- stead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at 6 o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth corps. It re- quired until that time for the Ninth Corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until a o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. The Fifth Corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then pro- ceeded to envelop Petersburg toward the South Side Railroad, as far as possible without attacking fortifications. 15! THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. BY ALEXANDER S. WEBB. BREVET MAJORA;ENERAL. 1.. A. TN '61, '62, and '63, the Army of the Potomac, under McClellan, Hooker, and Meade, had by constant attrition worn down Lee's command until, in the minds of many officers and men who were actively engaged in the front, there was confidence that Lee would not hold out against our army another year. On April 9th, 1864, General Grant instructed General Meade that Lee's army would be his objective. Meade had with him, according to his report of April 30th, 95,952 enlisted men, 3486 officers, and 274 gunls. Hancoek's corps contained 26,676 mlen; Warren's, 24,125 men; Sedgwick's, 22,584 men ;) while Sheridan controlled 12,525 in the cavalry. To guard all the trains there was a special detail of 1200 men. General Grant had also attached the Ninth Corps (an independent command) to the army op)erating under his eve. The total force under General Grant, including Burnside, was 4409 officers and 114,360 enlisted men. For the artillery he had 9945 enlisted men and 2S5 offleers; in the cavalry 11,839 enlisted men and 585 officers; in the provost guards and engineers, 120 officers and 3274 enlisted men. His 118,000 men, properly disposed for battle, would have (covered a front of 21 miles, two ranks deep, with one-third of them held in reserve; while Lee, with his 62,000 men similarly disposed, would cover only 12 miles. Grant had a train which he states in his " Memoirs" would have reached from the Rapidan to Richmond, or sixty-five miles. These three eorps had been increased by the in my opinion, was the indirect cause of much of consolidation with theni of the First and Third the confusion in the execution of orders, and in the eorps (see p. 91'). Besides causing great dissatis- handling of troops during the battles of the Wilder- faction throughout the army, this consolidation, ness.-A. S. W. 152 THROUGH THE WILDFRNESS. Of Lee's army, Longstreet's corps (two divisions) numbered about 10,000; Ewell's corps about 17,000. A. P. Hill went into the Wilderness witlh about 22,0( mnent for (luty in the ranks; "Jeb" Stuart's cavalry numbered about 8000, and. the artillery about 4800. Lee's total strength, as estimated by Oeiieral Ilumplireys, was 61,953; men, and the iiumher of field-guns 224. G Teneral ( Grant's aggregate over Lee was therefore 94 guns and 56,819 enlisted Iiltl; but theii Lee had, at the outset, his position in the Wilderness, and Grant did not know at that time, as did General Meade and General Hooker, to what advantage ._ l(,ee couldl till'I I-jtS gttk1 sRJ thle AWilderiless, with its woods, iravines, plank roads, andl (lirt roads. The Army of the Potomac be- gin to cross the Rapidan at midnight of May 3d1, after due ' lpreparation on the part of Sher- idan's cavalry to cover our front. A can- vas and a _ _ _ _ _ wooden pon- 1REL.AT1 TI ). ITION, OF FORCES. M0 NING toon bridge `ND E`-EN'IN. M.'VY 4, W4. were laid at Germanna Ford, similar bridges at Ely's Ford, ; and a wooden bridge at (ulpeper Mine Ford. These three fords cover about seven miles of the Rapidan Riveer, which in general flows south-east. Haileock, preceded by Gregg's cavalry, crossed at Ely's Ford and inoveed to Chancellorsville, which placed him on the left, or south-east, side of the Wilderness battle-field. Warren, with Wilson's eavalry in front (and fol- lowed by Sedgwick), crossed at Gerimauna Ford and followed the Germianna Plank road, due south-east, to Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick encampedl fort- the night three miles south of the ford. The sixty-five miles of trains were until 2' P. mI. of May 5th in passing over Culpeper Milie Ford aind Germanna Ford. General Humphreys, who was Meade's ehief-of-staff at the time, states that the halt of the infantry oln the 4th at Chancellorsville and thle WVilderness was caused by the difficultv in mrovinig the trains across thle Rapidan. (ieiieral Law, who commanded a brigade under Longstreet, states that oln the 2d of AMay General Lee, in the presence of a number of his officerls, Vo1. IV. 11 I ; 'A THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. expressed the opinion that the Union army would cross the river at Gernmanila or Elv's Ford. [See p. 118.] General Lee'sheadlquarters were at Orange (Court House; Longgstreet, with his corps, was distant at Gordonsville; Ewell was near at hand on the Rapidan, above Mine Run ; and A. P. Hill was oil his left, higher ulp the stream; and it seems that Lee intended to move with his whole force against Grant's light flank as soon as Grant was far enough adlvanced into the Wilderness on the road to Riehmond. As for the Wilderness, it was uneven, with woods, thickets, and ravines right and left. Tangled thiekets of pine, scrub-oak, and cedar prevented our seeing the enemy, and prevented any one in command of a large force from determining accurately the position of the troops he was or-dering to and fro. The appalling rattle of the musketry, the yells of the enemy, and the cheers of our T04L4) TAVERI A SKETCH M 1. own men were constantly in our ears. At times, our lines while firing could not see the array of the enemy, not fifty vards distant. After the battle was fairly begun, both sides were protected lby log or earth breastworks. For all understanding of the roads which shaped the movements in the Wilderness, cross the Rapidan from the north and imagine yourself standing on the Germanna Plank road, where the Brock road intersects it, a little south of Wilderness Tavern, and facing due west. In general, the Union right wing (Sedgwick) held the Germanna road, and the left wing (Hancock) the Brock road, while the center (Warren) stretched across the obtuse angle formed by them. At the Lacy house, in this angle, Grant, Meade, and Warren established their headquarters during the day of the 5th. If, stand- ing at the intersection of these roads, you stretch forward your arms, the right will correspond with the Orange turnpike, the left with the Orange Plank road. Down the Orange turnpike, on May 5th, Lee sent Ewell against Warren, while two divisions of A. P. Hill advanced by the Orange Plank road to cheek Hancock. Nearly a day later, Longstreet reached the field on the same road as Hill. The engagements fought on May 5th by Ewell oin the Orange turnpike, and by A. P. Hill on the Orange Plank road, must be regarded as entirely distinct battles. Warren received orders from Meade at 7:15 in the morning to attack Ewell with his whole force. General Sedgwick, with Wright's division and Neill's brigade of Getty's division, was ordered to move out, west of the Germanna Plank road, connecting with the Fifth Corps, which was disposed across the turnpike in advance of Wilderness Tavern. At this time also, General Han- cock, at Chancellorsville, was warned by General Meade that the enemy had been met on the turnpike, and he was directed to halt at Todd's tavern until further orders. Meantime, Crawford's division of Warren's corps, between the turnpike and plank road, in advancing, found Wilson's cavalry skir- mishing with what he supposed to be the enemy's cavalry. At 8 A. MI., under I1;4 THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. RELATIVE POSMTIONS IN THE WIIDERXE.S, MAY I. For the Y-oat part the troops are Wldicated by divia4hrn and when a t1ano deslgtiate. a brigade it il inclb0ed Ill pairentheaca.-ED1T it-S. orders, Crawford halted, and, hearing that our cavalry, at Parker's store, almost directly south of him, was in need of support, he sent out skirmishers to assist them. Those skirmishers struck Hill's corps, moving down the Orange Plank road toward the Brock road. Thus at 8 A. mI. General Grant and General Meade had developed the presence of Hill on their left and Ewell on their right. Getty's division of Sedgwick had reached Wilderness Tavern; and when it was learned that Hill was coming down the Orange Plank road, Getty was directed to move out toward him, by way of the Brock road, and drive Hill baek, if possible, behind Parker's store. On our right Johnson's division of Ewell was driven back along the Orange turnpike in confusion by General Griffin of Warren's corps. Ricketts and Wright of Sedgwick were delayed in reaching their position on the light of Warren, and for lack of such support Griffin's right brigade under Ayres was forced hack and two guns were abandoned. Wadsworth, with his division of Warren's corps, supplemented by Dennison's brigade of Robinson's divi- sion, of the same corps, had started forward in a westerly direction, until lie found himself with his left toward the enemy. McCandless's brigade of Craw- 155 THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. THROWING VP BXF STWORKS IN TI!E WIDERNESS. FROM A SKI.TR MAPIE AT THE TIME. ford's division (also of Warren's corps) had endeavored to obtain a position on the left of Wadsworth, but lost its bearings in the entangled woods so that its left came in contact with Ewell's right, and it, as well as Wadsworth's left, was driven in by Daniel's and Gordon's brigades, forming the right of Ewell. Thus Crawford was left with his left flank in the air, and he of necessity was drawn in about 2 o'cloek and posted about a mile south-west from the Lacy house, facing toward his first position at Chewning's house. Wadsworth finally took position on the left of Crawford, facing toward the south and west, with his hmack toward the Lacy house. Griffin, on Crawford's right, reached to the Orange turnpike. Wright's division of Sedgwick formed on the right of Griffin, with the left of Upton's brigade resting on the pike; then came the brigades of Penrose and Russell, then Neill's brigade of Getty's division. Soon after getting into position Neill and Russell were attacked by Johnson, who was repulsed. Still farther to the right, toward the Germanna Plank road, Seymour, of Ricketts's division, came up and took position. The entire Union front line was now rntrenehed. At this time on the center and right Warren and Sedgwick were securely blocked by Ewell's single corps. On the left of the line the situation was this: At 11 A. )i. Hancock, whose advance had passed Todd's tavern, received a dispatch stating that the enemy was coming down the Orange Plaiik road in full force, and he was directed to move his corps up to the Brock road, due north. He was further informed that Getty had been sent to drive the enemy back, and must be supported immediately; that on the turnpike Griffin had been pushed back somewhat, and that he (Hancock) must push out on the Plank road and connect his right with WalTen's left. 156 THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. Hanicock promptly started his column, and met General Getty at the june- tioll of the Planik and Germanna roads. Getty's division was then in line of battle, along the Brock road, with Grant's brigade on the left of the Plank road, awil Wheaton's and Eustis's brigades on the right of the road which the troops were ieitrenching. This was at 2 P. r. of the 5th. Getty informed Hancock that there were two divisions of A. P. Hill out in his front, and Hancock directed1 the finishing of the works that had been begun, before any advance should be made. Hancock placed Birney's division on the left of Getty, in two lines of battle along the Broek road, and Mott's and Gibbon's divisions onl Brtrney's left; Barlow's division held the extreme left and formed an angle oil the Brock road overlooking the bed of an unfinished railroad. Most of the artillery of Hancock's corps was posted with Barlow's division. J Frank's brigade of Barlow's division was stationed partly across the Brock road, near thie junction of the Brock road and a cross-road leading to the Catharpin road. All of Hancock's corps were directed to throw up breastworks of logs and earth, the intrenched line beginning at Getty's left and extending to Barlow's left, where it was refused to cover the flank. The second line, of the Second C'orps, also threw up earth-works, and a third intrenched line was formed behind Birney and Mott nearest the Plank road. At 4:30 P. M. Getty started to the attack, and marched but four hun- dred yards when he struck Heth's division of Hill's corps, and found the enemy in force, his right having been reenforced by Wilcox's division. Han- cock threw forward Birney and Mott on the left of Getty, and put a section of Ricketts's old battery on the Plank road. General Hancock says in his report: " The fight here became very fierce at once, the lines of battle were exceedingly close, the musketry continuous and deadly along the entire line.", Carroll's and Owen's brigades of Gibbon's division were sent in to support Getty, upon the Plank road. Colonel Carroll, an excellent fighting man, was wounded, but remained on the field. More to the left, Brooke and Smyth, of Barlow's division, attacked the right of Hill, and forced it back. About 4 o'clock, also, Wadsworth, who had been sent from his position near the Lacy house to strike across the country toward the Plank road, halted for the night in line of battle, facing nearly south between Tapp's house and the Brock road.+ This ended the operations of May 5th, leaving the Army of the Potomae in close contact with Ewell and Hil. ) Aceording to General Francis A. Walker's ac- troops; for in front of and around them was a connt, in the " History of the Second Army Corps," dense forest of saplings, the 20th Massaohnsetts Dow's 6th Maine Battery was placed in the second and other of our troops were in the thicket, not line onl Mott's left, and a section of Ricketts's " F'" more than twenty or thirty yards distant. Their 1st Pennsylvania Artillery was posted with the presence was made known by their advance troops of General Getty.-EDITORS. through the brush, and their return fire, aimed as Z, Colonel Theodore Lyman informs me that on they supposed at the enemy, had cut off the saplings a visit lie made to the battle-field of the Wilderness four and five feet above the ground, as regularly a- after the wvar, in going over the ground where on if they had been cut by a machine. Many of the May oth, the next day, the 20th Massachnsetts, of broken tree-tops were still hanging when Colonel my brigade, lost a third of its numbers, he found Lyman visited the ground.- A. S. W. the line occupied by the enemy to be just behind I Humphreys, to show how bewildering was the the crest of a slight elevation, where they had dense forest growth, savs. " Maniv men from both placed a row of logs, by which they were effectu- armies, looking for water during the night, found ally screened from the bullets and the sight of our themselves within the opposite lines."- A. S. W. ]:;7 THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. During the night of the 5th orders were given for a general attack by Sedgwick, Warren, and Hancock at 5 o'clock the next morning. Burnside, who, with his corps, had been holding the line of the Orange an(l Alexandria railroad back to Bull Run, set his corps in motion the after- noon of the 4th and made a forced march to the field. The leading division, under Stevenson, moving from Brandy Station, crossed at Germanna Fordl the night of the 5tb, was held in reserve at Wilderness Tavern, and joined Haneock on the Brock road at 8 A. It. of the 6th. Potter and Willcox, (0o11l- ing from Bealton and Rappahannock Station, reached the field about (lay- light, and were ordered to fill the gap between Warren and Hancock and join in the general attack. t Ferrero's colored division, after a forced march of forty miles, was held in the rear to guard the trains. Longstreet's arrival on the field was known and reported by General Han- cock to General Meade at 7 A. ms. on the 6th; indeed, it was found that Long- street was present when, at 5 o'clock, my brigade (of Gibbon's division) was ordered to relieve General Getty. When I advanced I immediately became engaged with Field's division, consisting of Gregg's, Benning's, Law's, and Jenkins's brigades, on the north side of the Orange Plank road. Just before 5 o'clock the right of the line under Sedgwick was attacked by the Confederates, and gradually the firing extended along the whole front. Wadsworth's division fought its way across Hancock's front to the Plank road, and advanced along that road. Hancock pushed forward Birney with his own and Mott's divisions, Gibbon's division supporting, on the left of the Plank road, and soon drove his opponents from their rifle-pits, and for the time being appeared to have won a victory. His left, however, under Barlow, had not advanced. From information derived from prisoners and from the cavalry operating in the vicinity of Todd's tavern, it was be- lieved at this time that Longstreet was working around the left to attack the line along the Brock road. Instead of attacking there, Longstreet moved to the support of Hill, and just as the Confederates gave way before Birney's assault, Longstreet's leading division, under General C. W. Field, reached Birney's battle-ground and engaged my line. Thus at 8 o'clock Hancock was battling against both Hill and Longstreet. General Gibbon had command on the left. Hancock himself was looking out for the Plank road. Warren's Fifth Corps, in front of Ewell, had obeyed the orders of General Grant, in making frequent and persistent attacks throughout the morning, without success. The same may be said of Wright, of Sedgwick's Sixth Corps, who was attacking Ewell's left; but Ewell was too strongly intrenched to be driven back from his line by the combined Fifth and Sixth corps. General Burnside, with the divisions of Willcox and Potter, attempted to relieve Hancock by passing up between the turnpike and the Plank road to I General Humphreys remarks in his account o'clock, I can state that it was never closed on the as follows: "For, so far as could be ascertained, part of the Union troops. My aide, Colonel W. T. the gap between Hill and Ewell was not yet closed, Simms, was badly wounded, on my right, while neither was that between Hancock and Warren." seeking to form a junction with the Ninth Corps As I held the right of Hancock on May 6th until 1 or with Crawford of the Fifth Corps.-A. 8. W. THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. THE WILDER NESS RELATIVE POSITIONS TN THEE WILDERNESS. MAY For the nost part the troop) are Indicated by divi-diision, coin ing into the ine in Gibbon's fristition, .ib , and wlbhetnaane IniutleateWah brigade it vs inelosed ads-anced north acros- Itanck's front to the Pt'nk in p.ar-teheses. It sho.Iil be noted, that tribilte lines fStaI. On the TII-Iiig of theo eioti day Welbb of (iidb ltctboty(4reinictiui Wright, es ended a ishorltdistanets itla-, fought on ,aid north of, the Plan1k road. wahile Mia parallel with the (orange turnpike. Wadsworth, early other tw.o brigades., Novei and C.arrlte, were iippaort-nlg in the morning, ad-anees stoth from near the Lacvy tetty on, tint north of, the Pltiik oad. OJllbbo titlh hose ts the Orange Plank road, and for-e-d acros tat , ,ierA I charg-e of tatni--ka left, and Biriney of IMta- r.t a itndiatet. st j tgael, of Steve--uW c- ek't right,- EDITOn. Chewning's farm, connecting his right with Warren and joining the right of Hancock, now held by my brigade.\ Burnside's other division, under Stev- enson, moved up the Plank road in our support, and I placed four of his regiments, taken from the head of his column, on my right, then pressed to the rear and changed my whole line, which had been driven back to the Plank road, forward to its original line, holding Field's division in check with the twelve regiments now under my command. Now, at this very moment, G-eneral Wadsworth (who had assumed command over me because he stated that Stevenson ranked me, and he must take us both ill his command) had given to me the most astonishing and bewildering order,-which was to leave The right of the column under Willcox ad- here was deemed impracticable, and Willcox was vanced beyond the Lacy house to Wilderness Run, moved to the left toward the Tapp house in sup- and found the enemy well posted on high ground, port of Potter. who had gone in near the Plank behind the swamps along the creek. An attack road.- EDITORS. 1;9 i6o THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. N N \ the twelve regiments under my N v command at 111s (Wadsworth's) disposal, aiid to go to the left, find four reginients, and stop the retreat of those troops of : the left of our lille who were fly- ing to the Broek road. When I rode off to oley this unfor- Ntunate order, General Wads- worth, in order to stop the eey's attack upon Birney upon his left, went to the 20th Massachusetts of my brigade N and ordered that regiment to leave its log-works and charge th enemy's line, a strong breastwork 011 the west side of m a ravine oil Wadsworth's fiont. \N General Wadsworth was told that the regiment could not safely be moved, that I had changed my front on that regiment and held the line by amtA',tilt4tA JAWA S. FOVM AxFitr WOUA ii means of it. Wadsworth an- swered that the men were afraid, leaped his horse over the logs and led them in the charge himself. He was mortally wounded,) and my line was broken by Field, and swept Of this incident, Col. C. H. Banes, in his" His tory of the Philadelphia Brigade" (Owen's), says: ,Webb's First Brigade of the Second Division was moved fro.. it. position on the Bro-k road, and quickly ad vanced on either ide of the Plank road. By 5 o'clock the lighting had becoue continuous along the entire front of the Second Corps, and ws raging at sone points with great fury. . . . Toward 9 ocloick there was an almost entire essation, followed soon after by furious asiausIt that expended their for-e before any- thing definite was a dnllshed. and these were fol- loweId in turn by desultory tiring. . . . A few moments before 12 o'-lok, ( Wencrail Iasl.worth, whose division had pushed its wa.y during the moring until it eon- n-eted with [Wlelb], . . . rode through the woods to the Plaik road, and beg1au to aseertain the location of th- corps with a view tocncerted aetioii. While Gei- erIi W:adsworth was no the edge of the road, near the line of battle, and engaged in niakiog these olerva- this, land before b.s command was really assured of its lio-iti,,ti, there occurred omit of the strangest cenes of army experience. Without any apparent cause that -uldi bie seen from tbe positioli of tbh- brigade the troop oi our left began to Frive war, alid conuni.eeed falling !':,m-k toward the Broek road. Tbhoe pressing p!.st the left flank of the Second Divisit d did not seem to be demoralized in manner. ..or did thley present the appearan-e of soldiers moving tinder orders, hut rather of a throng of anrmed men whoi were ret.r.in. gta dissatis- tied roum a muster. OGeasilimaly . ..... fellow, terror- stricken, would rush past as if his life depended on speed, but by far the larger number aeted with the utmost deliberation iD their -ovements. In vain were efforts put forth to stop this retrograde movenient: the men were alike indifferent to coiunanhd. or entreaties. . . . The division of Wadsworth, being on tMe right of the Plank road, wa the last to feel this influence; bit, In spite of the most gallaut efforts of its commander, it soon joined with the other troops In moving to the rear, leaving the brave Wadsworth niortally wounded" A. S. W. )General Wadsworth and myself had been dis- cussing why I did not have certain men carried off the field who had been shot in the head. I told him that from my observation I had never con- sidered it worth while to carry a loan off the field if, wounded in the head, he slowly lost his vertical position and was incapable of making a movement of his head from the ground. I considered such eases as past cure. When I was shot in the head in the works at Spotsylvania Court House ott the morning of the I 2th, at the Bloody Angle, the bul- let passed through the corijer of my eye and came out behind my ear. While falling fr)m the hlrse to the ground I recalled my conversatiomi with lGen- eral Wadsworth; when I struck the ground I made an effort to raise my head, aid when I found I could do so I made up my mind I was not going to die of that wound, and then I fainted.-A. S. W. THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. 161 off as by a whirlwind. Birney's line, as a consequence, was broken to pieces, andl back to the Brock road went the troops. This attack was directed by Lee in person. [See also p. 124.] When I came back from endeavoring to carry out the order that Wadsworth had given me, I found the 19th Maine, un(ler Colonel Selden Connor, on the Plank road. Another regiment also staid with me to hold the Plank road and to deeeive the Confederates, by fighting as though they had a continuous line. Colonel Connor was shot ill the leg after a long skirmnish; I offered him my horse, but his wounds lbeing such as to render him unable to mount, he had to be carried to the log- works. His regiment staid there until I gave the order to break like partridges through the woods for the Brock road. Burnside had finally become engaged far out on our right front; Potter's division came upon the enemy intrenched on the west side of a little ravine extending from Ewell's right. General Burnside says that after considerable fighting he connected his left with Hancock's right and intrenched. Hancock was out of ammunition, and had to replenish the best way he could from the rear. At 3:45 P. m. the enemy advanced in force against him to within a hundred yards of his log-works on the left of the Plank road. The attack was of course the heaviest here. Anderson's division came for- ward and took possession of our line of intrenchments, but Carroll's brigade was at hand and drove them out at a double-quick. Now let us return to our right, and stand where General Meade and Geti- eral Grant were, at the Lacy house. The battle was finished over on the left so far as Hancock and Burnside were concerned. Grant had been thoroughly 1MtTRIBUTLNG AMMUNITION UNUER FIRE To WA I l'.IT1I C1 B', '.".Y 6. lRIOM A S1iTCl I DI.E I. AT IIE F TIME. j 4", THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. defeated in his attempt to walk past General Lee on the way to Rich- mond. Shaler's brigade of Wright's division of Sedgwick's corps had been guarding the wagon-trains, hut was now needed for the fight and had returned to the Sixth Corps lines. It was placed on the extreme right on the (rermanna Plank road, due north from where General Grant was stand- ing. Slhaler's brigade was close up to the enemy, as indeed was our whole line. Shaler was busy building breastworks, when it was struck in the flank, rolled up in confusion, and General Seymour and General Shaler and some hundreds of his men were taken prisoners. But the brigade was not destroyed. A part of it stood, and, darkness helping them, the assailants were prevented from destroying Wright's division. Wright kept his men in order. [See p. 127.] This is in fact the end of the battle of the Wilderness, so far as relates to the infantry. Our cavalry was drawn in from Todd's tavern and the Brock road. The enemv's cavalry followed them. They were all intrenched, and General Grant decided that night that he would continue the movement to the left, as it was impossible to attack a position held by the enemy in such force in a tangled forest. To add to the horrors of war, we had the woods on fire all around us, and Humphreys estimates that about two hundred of our men were burned to death. The best possible proof that this was an accidental battle can be found in the movements of the troops. There was no intention to attack Lee in the Wilderness. i62 Tau BURIXNKI. WOOL., MAY THE W11VN11FD. FROM A I'KFTCU MU , m AT T11C TIA(F. THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. 163 The 6th of May was the last day of the battle of the Wilderness. Ewell liud most etrectually stopped the forward movement of the right wing of ALeade's army, and Hill and Longstreet defeated our left under Hancock. '[le fact is that the whole of the left was disorganized. From Hancock Iown through Birney and Gibbon, each general commanded something not strictly ini his command. Hancock had " the left," Gibbon " the left" of Han- co(k; Birney had his own and Mott's divisions, anti Wadsworth had Webb and Stevenson. The troops of these division commanders were without )roper leaders. We had seen the mixed Second and Ninth corps driven in, in detail, on our left. We knew that the Fifth and Sixth corps were blocked, and we felt dlee-ply the mortification consequent upon our being driven back to the Brock road. From personal contact with the regiments who did the hardest fight- ing, I declare that the individual men had no longer that confidence in their (commaniders which had been their best and strongest trait during the past year. We are told by General Badeau in his history that at the very time our men were being tossed about on the Plank road "General Grant lay under the trees awaiting Burnside's advance, and revolving the idea of a movement still farther to the Union left, thrusting his whole force between Lee and Richmond." We did move toward Spotsylvania. Warren's Fifth Corps was directed to withdraw from the Wilderness after dark on the 7th of May, and to move by the left behind Hancock on the Brock road, with Sedgwick (the Sixth Corps) following him, and to proceed toward the court house. [See map, yQ 2 ; '"... I : I I I: I =Ie0000 VIEW FROM NEAR THE WILDERNE T AVRN, LOOKING TOW'RD T11E BATTLEl-IELD-2 P. M., M.AY T. FROM A ZWET C MADE AT THE TIME. -I1 I I :O , THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. 0VT (IF THIE WIALUNEL'S SUNDAY MXORNUN, MNAY 8-TIl MARC,11 TE SPOTLVANIA. FROUM A SKFN'l l MADE AT Tll TIM-. p. 167.] This was attempted, but Warren found that he was required with his corps to help Sheridan's cavalry, which was detained by J. E. B. Stuart at Todd's tavern, or near that point. Warren gave the required assistance, driving out of his way Stuart, who was assisted by infantry. At 8: 30 P. x. Warren moved by the Brock road to the left of the Second Corps, and Sedgwiek moved by the pike and Germanna Plank road to Chlatcellorsville, thence by the Piney Branch Church road to the intersection of that road with the Brock road. At this point Sedgwick was ordered to leave a division, with another at Piney Branch Church, and a third midway between these two. Burnside started to follow Sedgwick, but early on the morning of the 8th he was ordered to halt at Aldrich's, where the Piney Church road leaves the main Fredericksburg Plank road, to guard the trains. Ferrero's division of this corps was now detached for this service. Warren was delayed by the blocking of the Brock road by the mounted troops of the provost guard, and this delay gave Longstreet's men, under R. H. Anderson, the opportunity to reach Spotsylvania in advance of Warren. Whlen Warren reached Todd's tavern at 3 A. MI., he found Merritt's cavalry engaging the Confederates. Hancock had waited for the whole army to pass, and reached the tavern at 9 o'clock on the 8th. I At 11 A. M., says General Humphreys, " Hancock sent his leading brigade under Miles to make a recounoissance downv the Catharpin road toward Corbin's Bridge, about two miles distant.' Miles had his own brigade, one battery, and one brigade ; My notes show that we of the Second Corps our place at 4 P. m. of the 8th of May on the obeyed orders implicitly. We waited to cover the Brock road, about one mile south-east of Todd's movements of the rest of the army. and then took tavern.- A. S. W. i64 THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. of Gregg's cavalry. He found Hampton's cavalry, and held them at bay until 3:30 P.. wI. While returning, Miles was attacked by Mahone's infantry, ;id] was compelled to call up reenforcements. At 1:3(0 P. x. Hancock sent (liblion east ten miles to support Warren and Sedgwick. About 8 A. M. On the 8th Warren's leading division, under General John C. Rpound;obinson, deployed into the clearing north of Spotsylvania Court House, and was fired upon by Confederates upon Spotsylvania Ridge. General Robinson was severely wounded in the first fire. Griffin's division advanced on the light of Robinson's; but the line, being unable to sustain itself, soon fell back until it was succored by the divisions of Crawford and Wadsworth, which now reached the front. A line was taken up east of the Brock road, near Alsop's. Sedgwick came up about noon, and the Fifth Corps, supported by Sedgwick, were at 1 P. .. directed to storm the Confederate position on Spot- sylvania Ridge. Sedgwick moved south to join Warren's left; but it was late in the dlay when Crawford's division of the Fifth and one of Wright's brigades under Penrose assaulted what proved to be Rodes's division of Ewell's corps in position and intrenched. On the morning of the 9th Buruside's corps moved across from the Plank road to the Fredericksburg road at the crossing of the Ny River. This brought him east of the court house one and a half miles. He pushed over the river one division under 0. B. Willcox. Stevenson's division came up at noon. Potter's division remained a mile in rear on the Fredericksburg road. Willcox fought a brigade of R. H. Anderson and some dismounted cavalry. Hancock moved east to the right of Warren, and intrenched overlooking the Po. On the morning of the 9th Sheridan started on a raid around Lee's army. 4 In front of Hancock the Po River ran from west to east, then it turned due south opposite Warren's right. The Confederate left rested for a time on this south bend, and the bridge over it at the crossing of the Shady Grove Church road was fortified by Longstreet. While the several corps were adjusting their lines on the 9th, General Sedgwick, our most esteemed general, was killed by a sharp-shooter, and Horatio G. Wright took command of the Sixth Corps. General Burnside had reported to General Grant on the 9th that he had met the enemy on the east of Spotsylvania Court House, and he had added to his report that he judged, from the indications in his front, that Lee was about to move north toward Fredericksburg. It was therefore determined that Hancock should make a reconnoissance toward Lee's left, crossing the east and west bend of the Po River, moving south as far as the Shady Grove road, turning the enemy's left; then to move east, and cross the Po River again by the Block House road bridge. Hancock crossed three of his divi- siOIs (Mott was with Wright) at different points at 6 o'clock in the morning, forcing the crossing, and meeting a very stubborn resistance in front of Barlow, who was on his left, and but little in front of Gibbon, who was on his right. He now laid three pontoon-bridges over the river, it being fifty feet wide and not fordable, and then pushed due south toward the Block House bridge, but reached that point too late that night to attempt a crossing. 4 See note, p. 117, and article to follow.- EDITORS. THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. During this night orders were issued from Meade for the operations of the next day: Hancock was to endeavor to find the position of the enemy's left, to force him from the position of his (Hancock's) front. The Sixth Corps was ordered to feel the intrenchments near the center. Mott's division of Hancock's corps, still kept north of the Po River with Wright, and on the left of the Sixth Corps, was to prepare to join Burnside, who with his corps (the Ninth) was to attack Early from the east on the morning of the 10th. But at dawn on the 10th an examination of the Block House bridge, made by Hancock, showed that the enemy was strongly intrenched on the east side of the Po at that point. However, Brooke's brigade of Barlow's divi- sion was sent down the Po River to a point half a mile below the bridge. Brooke discovered the enemy in strong force holding intrenchments extend- ing nearly half a mile below the bridge, their left resting on the Po River. But other arrangements had been made for the movement of the army, and Meade now ordered Hancock back. Meade was directed to arrange for the assault at 3 o'clock, under General Hancock's command, in the afternoon on the front of Warren and Wright. Birney, while withdrawing, was attacked; Hancock, who had started ahead with Gibbon to prepare for the attack, recrossed to the south bank of the Po and joined Barlow. Barlow was half a mile south of his bridges. His left, composed of Miles's and Smyth's brigades, was along the Shady Grove road, facing south, their left rested at the bridge. Brooke's and Brown's brigades were in front, or south of the Shady Grove road. North-east, and to their rear one and a half miles, Field's guns were planted in intrenchments, sweep- iIng the ground behind them and covering the pontoon-bridge over the Po. Hancock drew back Brooke and Brown to the right and to the rear; and then Miles and Smyth retired to the crest south of the pontoon-bridges. -_ -".8,b W , so---.'.f+'t'i '\\ I IW'e 41 ;;toeg\ / Ihb THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. RELATIVE tO'SITIONS OF THIE OPPOSING CORPS AT SPOTSYLVANIA, MAY 8-21, 14. These troops formed a tte-du- pont facing south. Heth's divi x sion, of lull's corps, attacked the two right brigades with vigor, but was twice repulsed. The Union loss was very heavy. Hancock, finding the enemy repulsed and the woods on fire in the rear of his line, crossed to the north side of the Po River. One gun, the first ever lost by the Second Corps, was jammed between two trees in the midst of this fire, and was abandoned by Birney's men. Many of our wounded perished in the flames. Of this battle on our right, General Hancock said, " The enemy regarded this as a considerable victory. Had not Barlow's division received impera- tive orders to withdraw, Heth's division would have had no cause for congratulation." Meanwhile, Warren had determined to make the attack, and at 3:45 he did so, directing it personally and leading in full uniform. I The assaulting column was composed of Crawford's division, Cutler's division (formerly Wadsworth's), and Webb's and Carroll's brigades of the Second Corps. The official diary of Longstreet's corps says that " some of the enemy succeeded in gaining the works, but were killed in them." We were driven back, however, with heavy loss, including Brigadier-Gelieral James C. Rice, of Cutler's division, killed. I Warren had made reconnoissances in force, with division front, twice. He knew his ground, as he always did.-A. S. W. '67 THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. General Hancock returned to us at half-past five, and we were ordered to make another attack at 7 P. x. with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions and part of the Fifth Corps. 'We made the as- sault, but we were driven back a second time. Our men were demoralized by fruitless work. Over on our left, in the Sixth Corps, General Wright had found what he deemied to be a vulnerable place in the Confederate line. It was on the right of Rodes's rebel division and on the west. face of the salient. Colonel Emiory Upton was selected to lead this attack. Upton's brigade was of the First Division, Sixth Corps. He had four regiments of Neill's brigade at- X y y m tached to his command; and General Mott, commanding a division of the Second Corps, had been ordered by General Wright to assault the works in BRIGADIV41VIEUYAL. JOHN M JONt F'. S. A. his front at 5 o'clock to assist and sup- port Upton's left. Upton formed in four lines. The Sixth Corps batteries played upon the left of the enemy's salient, enfilading it, and, as they ceased firing, Upton charged. Rushing to the parapet with a wild "Hurrah," heedless of the terrible front and flank fire he received, his men poured over the enemy's works; captured many prisoners, after a hand-to- hand fight; and, pressing forward, took the second line of rebel intrenchmeuts with its battery. Mott, who wah on Upton's left, did not supIport him. The enemy being rein- forced, Upton was ordered to retire, but lie carried back with him several stand of colors and 1200 prisoners.\ On the left Burnside made an attack in coni- junction with those onl the right. Ilie pushed close to the enemy, on the Fred- ericksburg road, and intrenched. Gen- eral T. G. Stevenson, commanding one of his divisions, was killed in making AT JOT-ECLJ"N c. HODINUNSN WOUNDED this assault. On the 10th of May the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps lost 4100 men killed and wounded. Not many were missing. The Confederates lost probably two \ For gallant conduct displayed during the assaults on the 1 0th, colonels Upton and Carroll were made brigadier-generals.- A. S. W. 108 THROUGH THE WILDERNESS. thousand men. On the 11th dispositions were made for the grand assault the next day on the "Bloody Angle." Of that assault I have little to write. Grant had his hack to the north, and eiiwrapped the V-shaped salient occupied by Lee. During the night three divisions of the Second Corps were to move to the left behind the Sixth and Fifth, and join the Ninth Corps in an assault at 4 A. iII. on the 12th. Warren and Wright were to hold their corps in readiness to take part. We moved to the attack at 4:35 A. Nr. on the 12th, and captured Johnson and four thou- sand men from Ewell; also twenty pieces of artillery. At this time I was shot in the head and went to the rear. Another will tell of the incidents of our bloody but fruitless assault. It was at this time that general Grant sent his famous "all summer" dispatch, in these words: "lHArQ1TARTERs. ARMIEs OF THE U. S.. SEAR SPOT- STI.VANIA CoURT HOUSE, May l1th, 1is4, 8:30 A. M. MAJ(OR-1EI.ERAL HALLECK, Chief-of-Staff of the Army. "'(ENBRAL: We have now ended the .sith dayof very heavy fighting. The resIt to this time Is ....uch in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general offlcers killed, woundedormissing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must he greater, we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken but few, exept stragglers I am now sending hback to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh ... pply of provisions and ammiunitlon, and pro- pose to fight it ont on this line it it takes all aumliel . -The arrival of reinforcements here, will be very en- couraging to the men, and I hope they will he sren as fast as po"sible, and in as great numbers. My bJeet in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use thenu as an escort to our supply train. If it is more eonventent to send them out by train to mr-arch from the railroad to Belle Plain or Frederiksburg, send them so. mI satlsfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept tip to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their offcers. and by keeping them intren-ch in every position they take. " Up to this time there io no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defense of Rithmniod. Very respectfully your obedient servant, C U. S. GRANT, Lientenant-(teneral." VOtL IV. 12 ,69 ,,, - -1 - .1 ... - 1- -1-1 .. -1 -_ - __'_ -,-- HAND)-TO-HAND FIGHTING AT SPOTSYLVANIA. BY 1;. NORTON GALLOWAY. G ENERAL HNCOCK'S surprise and capture of the larger portion of Edward Johnson's division, and the capture of the salient "at Spotsylvania Court House on the 12th of May, 1864, accom- plished with the Second Corps," have been re- garded as one of the most brilliant feats of that brilliant soldier's career; but without the substan- tial assistauez of General Wright, grand old John Sedgwick's worthy successor, and the Sixth Corps, a defeat as bitter as his victory was sweet would have been reeorded against the hero of that day. The storm which had set in early in the after- noon.i of the 11th of May continued with great severity, and but little rest was obtained during the night. Soon after dark, however, a remark- able change in the weather took place, and it be- came raw and disagreeable; the men gathered in small groups about half-drowned fires, with their tents stretched about their shoulders, while some hastily pitched the canvas on the ground, and sought shelter beneath the rumpled and dripping folds. Others rolled themselves up, and lay close to the simmering logs, eager to catch a few mo- nients' sleep; many crouched about, without any shelter whatever, presenting a pitiable sight. Throughout the day some skirmishing and sharp- shooting had occurred, but this had been of a spas- nodic character, and had elicited no concern. About dusk the Sixth Corps moved to a position on the right and rear of the army. The stormy night was favorable to Hancock's movement, and about 10 o'clock he put his troops in motion, marching to a point on the left of the Sixth Corps' former position in the neighborhood of the Brown house, massing his troops in that vicinity. [Sec map, p. 167.] General Grant's orders to Hancock were to as- sault at daylight on the 12th in cooperation with Burnside on his left, while Wright and Warren were held in readiness to assault on his right. The Con- federate army was composed of three corps-Long- street (now R. H. Anderson) on their left, Ewell in the center, and A. P. Hill (now under Early) on the right. The point to be assaulted was a salient of field-works on the Confederate center, after- ward called the " Bloody Angle." It was held by General Edward Johnson's division. Here the Confederate line broke off at an angle of ninety degrees, the right parallel, about the length of a small brigade, being occupied by General George H. Steuart's regiments. This point was apart or continuation of the line of works charged and ear- ried by General Upton on May 16th, and was con- sidered to be the key to Lee's position. Just as the day was breaking, Barlow's and Bir- ney's divisions of Hancock's corps pressed forward upon the unsuspecting foe, and leaping the breast- works after a hand-to-hand conflict with the be- wildered enemy, in which guns were used as clubs, possessed themselves of the intrenchments. Over three thousand prisoners were taken, including General Johnson and General Steuart. Twenty ) Steuart occulied only part of the right parallel; Jones, Stafford, and Hays were on his left, and Lane was on his right in that parallel.- EDlToas. 170 HAND - TO - HAND FIGHTING A T SPO TS YLVANIA. Conifederate cannon became the permanent tro- phies of the day, twelve of them belonging to Page and eight to (Catshaw. Upon reaching the second line of Lee's works, held by Wilcox's division, who by this time had become apprised of the disaster to their comrades, ilaiteock met with stern resistance, as Lee in the meantime had been hurrying troops to Ewell from tfill on. the right ind Andersonm on the left, andl these were sprung upon our victorious lines with such an impetus as to drive them hastily back toward the left of the salient. As soon as the news of Hancock's good all ill siltmees reached army hteadqjuarters, the Sixth ('carps - Upton's brigade being inl advance - was rordered to move with all possible haste to his sup- port. At a brisk pace we crossed a line of in- Ire nhments a short distance in our front, and, pasinig through a strip of timber, at once began to ralize our nearness to the foe. It was now about i; o'cloek, and the enemy, reenforced, were making dIesperate efforts to regain what they had lost. Our forces were hastily retiring at this point before the concentrated attack of the enemy, and these with our wounded lined the road. We pressed forward and soon cleared the woods and reached an insidious fell, covered with dense marsh grass, where we lay down for a few moments awaiting orders. I cannot imagine how any of us survived the sharp fire that swept over us at this point -a fire so keen that it split the blades of grass all about us, the minies moaning in a furious concert as they picked out victims by the score. The rain was still falling in torrents and held the country about in obscurity. The command was soon given to my regiment, the 95th Pennsyl- vania Volunteers, Captain Maefarlain command- ing,-it being the advance of Upton's brigade,- to arise up," whereupon with hurrahs we went for- ward, cheered on by Colonel Upton. who had led Is safe through the Wilderness. It was not long before we reached an angle of works constructed with great skill. Immediately in our front an abatis had been arranged consisting of limbs and branches interwoven into one another, forming footloeks of the most dangerous character. But there the works were, altI over some of us went, ;Of the UnIon tron.s nl. the left of Ha--!k, Gen- eral Grant (-Personal Menoirs," p. 231) says: -turtisteim on the left hail amivumieed mip east or thie salient In time" eivy paapetoat til enemy. Pitt-r ciiminanmllng oe of ].Il itlst1lmti, gmit -ver, hI t w.as nlot ule to reilim th -re. . . . allrm miml e er itil sireil lint little cmi o r lfrt mf a ta)iiti-e nau r-e. bilt i m miris- a iteeat teal. Its kept Lee ftens re- entircliig his center froM that qiaite-." EurToas. Thi.s Is, I believe, the otily Instance In the history of the war of a battery charging on brcastwnrks. It was comaunded by Lieutenant James Gilliss. and was at- tacliemI to the Second Corps. Sergeant William E. Lines, oni, of only two survIvors of tme section that went In on that day, ntid who e utinanded the right gun, has given the writer the following facts relative to the matter: " Aftter the captaire of time C'onfeeratle wMmrka. we were bit in i.ai.tlii Just mu ter thte 1ill I hmae tile .nmati pi-e-treea a0 muoch spoken oa. WVe fird .a few rnini ds lit ailidt stint. Of enurse wve ennui tint see tIme C'nmmeiler- te It"e tInt we elevated sir g as s.. as to clear atir o-wi Wtiantry. Wiile we w ere many nev ,r to return. At this moment Lee's strong line of battle, hastily selected for the work of retrieving ill fortune, appeared through the rain, mist, and smoke. We received their bolts, losing nearly one hundred of our gallant 95th. Colonel Upton saw at once that this point must le held at all hazards; for if Lee should recover the angle, he would be enabled to sweep back our lines right anti left, and the fruits of the morning's victory would be lost, The order was at once given its to lie down and commence firing; the left of our regi- ment rested against the works, while the right. slightly refused, rested upon an elevation in front. Attd itow began a desperate and pertinacious strttggle. Under cover of the smoke-laden rain the enemy was pushing large bodies of troops forward, de- terminet at all hazards to regain the lost groutnd. Could we hold on tentil the remainder of our bri- gade should come to our assistance Regardless of the heavy volleys of the enemy that were thinning our ranks, we stuck to the position and returned the fire until the 5th Maine and the 121st New York of our brigade came to our support, while the 96th Pennsylvania went in on our right; thus reenforced, we redoubled our exertions. The smoke, which was dense at first, was intensified by each discharge of artillery to such an extent that the accuracy of our aim became very uncer- tain, but nevertheless we kept up the fire in the supposed direction of the enemy. Meanwhile they were crawling forward under cover of the smoke, until, reaching a certain point, and raising their usual yell, they charged gallantly up to the very muzzles of our pieces and reoccupied the Angle. Upon reaching the breastwork, the Confederates for a few moments had the advantage of uis, and made good use of their rifles. Ourmen wvent down by the score; all the artillery horses were down; the gallant Upton was the only mounted officer in sight. Hat in hand, he bravely cheered his men, anti begged them to "hold this point." All of his staff had been either killed, wounded, or dismounted. At this moment, and while the open ground in rear of the Confederate works was choked with troops, a section of Battery C, 5th United States Artillery, under Lieutenant Richard Metcalf, waititig, a slaff-muicer smith a sixth Cnoms bamige ramie up tpy Liset-imant -ililas I call see they iiamt amnme argm -me.lt ormdatmpate, tam tilmemiieer unto evint away. Dire-tly anither fficer nate p tii (Willss. aimid lite sanme sammt ot colloquy tosmt place. time mifflcer ev.demmtly w. nlat g G libts tim ml snmetimitig tilat time latter wnadtt not di., Thi aitrer enie away. to.i very smmrt tim We Oener t Wrigimt. wbotm 1 them -.nmmanmed l time stail Cortis. co pm mini to GilltS. anmi mami am m nme at'scae i'ma. tinoi witht h.it. Lientenaint Mltcalf timeeanme-over to time fest sec niim ntd gave tile cimmmmmanmi 'Litmiter time gitn.u ' rivers .mont.' 'camm-itlet mmmnt 'casno rear. anti away W.e went, ip time hillt imat oamr infantry, anmi tlto Imi. timmlm. Time staf f-mitcmr wimo lei mis. wvasnitmhtot brfmu' we got lInt pmsitii I. imave mtften th ight mt was mmwle g tom that fact timlt we got sm close. ti ime imiml's, works. We were a . numi.imil able mllsistimee it front of miir ilaf tmry. anti of ctmmo ' artillery emunlitl not lIve loig mamier cili a a re as time eaaemy were immmt- tlng tironugih thoere o mir mmmcmi weimt dmtmmn iti sm mrt minter. Time iett I it l fir m mlnime omitmim ta. t time- fmoit rtren 'a itm h m ine. aimtg wras as istemt I1m time iat tmiur rimm ntl tiy an mmncer m, t a Venmont regimn-t, -ai by a-motlmlr frolmm time 95tlh P1eisyl. vatIa., both of wmow wvere sihot. The effect of our canister 171 172 HAND - TO - HAND FIGHTING A T SPO TS YLVANIA. MYS0 UUtA AT THE ItAItOtiY ME AFrT RAwrs 'ss it A r7rtTteIxANT was brought into action and increased the carnage by opening at short range with double charges of canister. This staggered the apparently exultant enemy. In the maze of the moment these guns were run up by hand close to the famous Angle, and fired again and again, and they were only abandoned when all the drivers and cannoneers had fallen. The battle was now at white heat. The rain continued to fall, and clouds of smoke hung over the scene. Like leeches we stuck to the work, determined by our fire to keep the enemy from rising up. Captain John D. Fish, of Upton's staff, who had until this time performed valuable service in conveying ammunition to the gaunners, fell, pierced by a bullet. This brave officer seemed to court death as he rode back and forth between the caissons and cannoneers with stands of canis- ter under his "gum" coat. "Give it to them, boys! I'll bring you the canister," said he; and as he turned to cheer the gunners, he fell from his upon the Confederates was terrible: they were evidently tryi ng to strengthen their frst line from the second when we opened on the, and you can iagitne the execution at that dittanoe. When Lieute.ant Mletealf n.d myself coud no longer serve the gone w e w ithidee. Our ectiun went into action with twenty-tbree menlsud one offier-Lieutenant etcal. The only ones who catuc out sound were the Ideu- tenant and myself. Every lo-rse was killed. seven of the men were killed outright. cixtern w.oluie; the gun-r- rlage were o cut with bullets as to be of no furthereryice. . . Twenty-.even balls pased through toe lid of the lImbercbheat white Number 811 wgasgettingot a -imunition. and be was wounded In tie face .ud neck by the fragmn.ts of wood and lead. The .pnge-bucket On my gun had thirty- horse, mortally wounded. Ill a few moments the two brass pieces of the 5th Artillery, cut and hacked by the bullets of both antagonists, lay un- worked with their muzzles projecting over the enemy's works, and their wheels half sunk in the mud. Between the lines atid near at hand lay the horses of these guns, completely riddled. The dead and wounded were torn to pieces by the can- ister as it swept the ground where they had fallen. The mud was half-way to our knees, and by our constant movement the fallell were almost buried at our feet. We 1o1w backed off from the breast- work a few yards, abandoning for a while the two 1 2-pounders, but still keeping up a fusillade. We soon closed up our shattered ranks and the bri- gade settled down again to its task. Our fire was now directed at the top of the breastworks, and woe be to the head or hand that appeared above it. In the meantime the New Jersey brigade, Colonel W. H. Penrose, went into action on our nine hles in. it. henlg perforated like a sieve. The force of the bails can be imagnet when I say that the bucket w- made of one-eighth-inch iron. One eurious ceenni1lstaite o0 the morning we captured the works [May 12ttlI wa. that musketry sints seemed to make s.c. a slight noise Instead of the sharp bfng of the shot, it was a dull thud. This may have ben n Imtportant aid to our succes, as the [Mm] firing of the enemy'. akinushers did not alarm their men in the brestworka." E. N. E. It so also claimed that a section of Brown's Rhode Island battery was run up to the brestworks In a similar manner.- Eurrots. HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING AT SPOTSYLVANIA. right, andl the Third Brigade, General Eustis'., was harl at work. The Vermont brigade, under Colnel Lewis A. Grant, which had been sent to lBarlow's assistance, was now at the Angle, and (leneral Wheaton's brigade was deep in the strug- gle. The Second and Third Divisions of the Sixth Corps wire also ready to take part. It will thus he seen that we had no lai-k of men for the defense or capture of this position, whichever it may be termed. The great diffieulty was iii the narrow limits of the Angle, around which we were fighting, which precliuled the possibility of getting more than a limited uiumber into action at once. At one time our ranks were crowded in some parts four deep liy .iecirforcemnents. Major Henry P. Truefitt, cor- Iiamndilog the 19th Pennsylvania, was killed, andl ('alitain (liarles P. Warner, who succeeded him, was shot lead. Later in the day Major William EllHis, of the 49th New York, who had excited our ailiiniratioi, was shot thromugh the arm and body with a ramrod during one of the sevi-ral attempts to get the men to cross the works and drive off the enemy. Our losses were frightful. What re- inained of many different regiments that had come to our support had concentrated at this point, and had planted their tattered colors upon a slight rise of ground close to the Angle, where they staid dur- ing the hItter part of the day. To keep up the supply of ammunition pack mules were brought into use, each animal carrying three thousand rounds. The boxes were dropped close behind the troops engaged, where they were quickly opened by the officers or file-closers, who se rved the ammunition to the men. The writer fired four hundred rounds of ammunition, and many others as many or more. In this manner a continuous and rapid fire was maintained, to which for a while the enemy replied with vigor. Pi nding that we were not to be driven back, the Confederates began to use more discretion, expos- ing themselves but little, using the loop-holes in their works to fire through, and at times placing the muzzles of their rifles on the top logs, seizing the trigger and small of the stock, and elevating the breech with one hand sufficiently to reach us. During the day a section of Cowan's battery took po- sition behind us, sending shell after shell close over our heads, to explode inside the Confederate works. In like manner Coehorn mortars eight hundred yards in iur rear sent their shells with admirable precision gracefully curving over us. Sometimes the enemy's fire would slacken, and the moments would become so monotonous that something had to be done to stir them up. Then some resolute fellow would seize a fence-rail or piece of abatis, and, creeping close to the breastworks, thrust it over among the enemy, and then drop on the ground to avoid the volley that was sure to follow. A daring lieutenant in one of our left companies leaped upon the breastworks, took a rifle that was I The stump of one of these trees Is preserved In WashIngton. In his oficial report, Brlgadier-Oeneral Samuel McGowan. who commanded a brigade in Wil- cox's Confederate dlvialon, says: " To give some Idea of the Intensity of the fire, an oak-tree twenty-two inches handed to him, and discharged it among the foe. In like manlier he discharged another, and was ill the act of firing a third shot when his cap flew rip in the air, and his body pitched headlong among the enemy. On several occasioiis squads of disheartened ('oil- federates raised pieces of shelter-tents above the works as a flag of truce; upon our sla,.kinug lire ald calling to thu-rm to come in, they woulul int- niediately jump the breastworks and siurrenld-r. One party of twenty or thirty thus signified their willingness to submit; but owing to the fact that their comrades oeccsionally took advantage of the BREVET MA.IOR5-ENERAL EMORY UPTON, U. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. cessation to get a volley into us, it was somne time before we concludeu to give them a chance. With leveled pieces we called to them to come in. Springing upon the breastworks in a body, they stood for an instant panic-stricken at the terrible array before them; that momentary delay was the signal for their destruction. While we, with our fingers pressing the trigger, shouted to them to jump, their troops, massed in the rear, poured a volley into threm, killing or wounding all but a few, who dropped with the rest and crawled in un- der our pieces, while we instantly began firing. The battle, which during the morning raged with more or less violence on the right and left of this position, gradually slackened, and attention was concentrated upon the Amigle. So continuous and heavv was our fire that the head logs of the breast- works were cut and torn until they resembled hickory brooms. Several large oak-trees, which grew just in the rear of the works, were com- pletely gnawed off by our converging fire, and about 3 o'clock in the day fell among the enemy with a loud crash. I In diameter, which stood just In rear of the right of the brigade, was cut down by the constant scaling of mus- ket-balls, and fell about 1i o'clock Thursday night, injuring by its fall several soldiers in the lot South Caro- lina regIment."- EDrroRs. '73 174 HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING AT SPOTS YLVANIA. UNION HOSPITAL AT At1O1S IARS-HIOVsE, NEAR THE BROCK ROAD. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH. Toward dusk preparations were made to relieve us. By this time we were nearly exhausted, and had fired three to four hundred rounds of ammu- nition per man. Our lips were incrusted with powder from "biting cartridge." Our shoulders and hands were coated with mud that had ad- hered to the butts of our rifles. E The troops of the Second Corps, who were to re- lieve us, now moved up, took our position, and opened fire as we fell back a short distance to re- arrange our shattered ranks and get something to eat, which we were sadly in need of. When dark- ness came on we dropped from exhaustion. About midnight, after twenty hours of constant fighting, Lee withdrew from the contest at this point, leaving the Angle in our possession. Thus closed the battle of the 12th of May. On the 13th, early in the day, volunteers were called for to bury the dead. The writer volun- teered to assist, and with the detail moved to the works near the Angle, in front of which we buried a number of bodies near where they fell. We were exposed to the fire of sharp shooters, and it was still raining. We cut the name, company, and regiment of each of the dead on the lids of ammunition-boxes which we picked up near by. The inscriptions were but feebly executed, for they were done with a pocket-knife. This work ended. we went close up where we had fought on Thursday and viewed the "Bloody Angle." A momentary gleam of sunshine through the, gloom of the sky seemed to add a new horror to the scene. Hundreds of Confederates, dead or dying, lay piled over one another in those pits. The fallen lay three or four feet deep in some places, and, with but few exceptions, they were shot in and about the head. Arms, accouterments, ammunition, cannon, shot and shell, and broken foliage were strewn about. With much labor a detail of Union soldiers buried the dead by simply turning the captured breastworks upon them. Thus had these unfortunate victims unwittingly dug their own graves. The trenches were nearly full of muddy water. It was the most horrible sight I had ever witnessed. The enemy's defenses at this point were elabo- rately constructed of heavy timber, banked with earth to the height of about four feet; above this was placed what is known as a head log, raised just high enough to enable a musket to be inserted between it and the lower work. Pointed pine and pin-oak formed an abatis, in front of which was a deep ditch. Shelves ran along the inside ledges of these works (a series of square pits) and along their flank traverses which extended to the rear; upon these shelves large quantities of "buck and ball" and "minie cartridges were piled ready for use, and the guns of the dead and wounded were still pointing through the apertures, just as the men had fallen from them. \ Our piec-s at ti ..-. would ldb--me choked witl The Coftedi-ratc M0-.1ral McGowan ofieally says: burnt poder, . ad .o-Id rc-i-lv the -artrldge but half "The trenches on the right in th,- Bloody Angle' ran way. This fct.0 Ih owever, did not interfere with their with blood and bad to be O-teared of the dead bodiea dleharge.-G. N. G. more than onec."- EDITOR. THE DEATH OF GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK.) BY MARTIN T. MCMAHON, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, t7. S. V.; CHIEF-OF-STAFF, SIXIR CORPS. ON May 8th, 1864, the Sixth Corps made a rapid march to the support of Warren, near Spot- sylvania Court House. We arrived there about 5 p. m., and passed the rest of the day in getting into position on Warren's left. After nightfall General Sedgwick rode back into an open field near General Warren's headquarters and, with his staff, lay down on the grass and slept until daylight. Shortly after daylight he moved out upon his line of battle. We had no tents or breakfast during that night or morning. The general made some necessary changes in the line and gave a few unimportant orders, and sat down with me upon a hard-tack box, with his back resting against a tree. The men, one hundred feet in front, were just finishing a line of rifle-pits, which ran to the right of a section of artillery that occupied an angle in our line. The 1st New Jersey brigade was in advance of this line. After this brigade, by Sedgwick's direction, had been withdrawn through a little opening to the left of the pieces of artillery, the general, who had watched the operation, resumed his seat on the hard-tack box and commenced talking about members of his staff in very complimentary terms. He was an inveterate tease, and I at once suspected that he had some joke on the staff which he was leading uip to. He was interrupted in his com- ments by observing that the troops, who dur- ing this time had been filing from the left into the rifle-pits, had come to a halt and were lying down, while the left of the line partly overlapped the po- sition of the section of artillery. He stopped ab- ruptly and said, "That iswrong. Those troops must be moved farther to the right; I don't wish them to overlap that battery." I started out to execute the order, and he rose at the same moment, and we saun- tered out slowly to the gun on the right. About an hour before, I had remarked to the general, pointing to the two pieces in a half-jesting manner, which he well understood, " General, do you see that section of artillery Well, you are not to go near it to- day." He answered good-naturedly, "McMahon, I would like to know who commands this corps, you or I f" I said, playfully, "Well, General, sometimes I am in doubt myself"; but added, " Seriously, General, I beg of you not to go to that angle; every officer who has shown himself there has been hit, both yesterday and to-day." He an- swered quietly, "Well, I don't know that there is any reason for my going there." When afterward we walked out to the position indicated, this con- versation had entirely escaped the memory of both. I gave the necessary order to move the troops to the right, and as they rose to execute the movement the enemy opened a sprinkling fire, partly from sharp-shooters. As the bullets whistled by, some of the men dodged. The general said laughingly, " What! what! men, dodging this way for single bullets! What will you do when they open fire along the whole line f I am ashamed of you. Th'y couldn't hit an elephant at this distance." A few seconds after, a man who had been separated from his regiment passed directly in front of the general, and at the same moment a sharp-shooter's bul- let passed with a long shrill whistle very close, and the soldier, who was then just in front of the gen- eral, dodged to the ground. The general touched him gently with his foot, and said, " Why, my man, I am ashamed of you, dodging that way," and re- peated the remark, " They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance." The man rose and saluted, and said good-naturedly, " General, I dodged a shell once, and if I hadn't, it would have taken my head off. I believe in dodging." The general laughed and replied, " All right, my man; go to your place." For a third time the same shrill whistle, closing with a dull, heavy stroke, interrupted our talk, when, as I was about to resume, the general's face turned slowly to me, the blood spurting from his left cheek under the eye in, a steady stream. He fell in my direction; I was so close to him that my effort to support him failed, and I fell with him. Colonel Charles H. Tompkins, chief of the artil- lery, standing a few feet away, heard my exclama- tion as the general fell, and, turning, shouted to his brigade-surgeon, Dr. Ohlenschlager. Major Charles A. Whittier. Major T. W. Hyde, and Lieutenant- Colonel Kent, who had been grouped near by, sur- rounded the general as he lay. A smile remained upon his lips but he did not speak. The doctor pouredwaterfrom a canteenover the general's face. The blood still poured upward in a little fountain. The men in the long line of rifle-pits, retaining their places from force of discipline, were all kneeling with heads raised and faces turned toward the scene; for the news had already passed along the line. I was recalled to a sense of duty by General Ricketts, next in command, who had arrived on the spot, and informed me, as chief-of-staff, that he declined to assume command of the corps, inas- much as he knew that it was General Sedgwick's desire, if anything should happen to him, that General Horatio G. Wright, of the Third Division, should succeed him. General Ricketts, therefore, suggested that I communicate at once with General Meade, in order that the necessary order should be issued. When I found General Meade he had al- ready heard the sad intelligence, and had issued the order placing General Wright in command. Returning I met the ambulance bringing the dead general's body, followed by his sorrowing staff. The body was taken back to General Meade's head- quarters, and not into any house. A bower was built for it of evergreens, where, upon a rustic bier, it lay until nightfall, mourned over by offi- cers and soldiers. The interment was at Corn- wall Hollow, Connectiemmt. ) Condensed from a letter to General J. W. Latta, President of the Sedgwiek Memorial AssociatIon. 175 41K 4 McALIASTER'S BRIGADE AT THE BIAX)DY ANGLE. BY ROBERT die ALLISTER. BRFVET MAJ)R-OENERAL. lr. S. V. TiE writer of the article ni1t H.a-l-to-hand Fighting at Spotsylvania " gives all the honor of holding the salient ' on MSay 12th, I 64, to the Sixth Corps. It was the Second Corps that made the grand charge of May 1 2th, anti my bri- gade) of that corps, the First Brigadle tf the Fourth Division, helped to defend the "Bloody Angle " front the first to the last of the fearful struggle. The brigade which I tonimanded during all these operations was cottposed of the 1s t and 1 6th Ma.- sachtmsetts, the 5th, tith, 7th. Sth, and I ith New Jersey, and the 2 6th and 11 .,th Pennsylvania. It, the great charge at dawn it was in the second line. At first we moved slowly up through the woods. When the first line reached the open field at the top of the hill, in sight of the enemy's works, the men rolled out a tremendous cheer which was taken up by the second line. Our boys started on a run. The first line parted in my front, Iearing a lolf) open xpare, and up to and partly into this space went my brigade, striking the enemy's works at th- salient. At this place the Confederates had a field-battery of eight or ten guns. I ordered some of my men to draw back these guns on our side of the works, and with the remainder of the brigade pushed on toward the enemy. But we soon dis- covered another line of works, and large reenforee- ments coming to the aid of the enemy. I ordered "about face," and retreated to the first line and completed the hauling off of eight guns, two of which we manned; we had not gunners to man all. By the time we got the guns on our side of the works and my line formed, the enemy came in force determined to dislodge us, and succeeded in carrying the works on my right uip to the salient. Encouraged by their success thus far, with traverses in their recaptured works behind which their sharp- shooters could be protected while taking deadly aim at us, the enemy kept the offensive, and our position became very critical. Besides all this the Confederates here were more or less protected by fire from their second line of works. Many officers without men and mcii without offieers who had been driven from our line on the right came to our assist- ance and fought nobly, many of these fromf the Sixth Corps, and all were inspired by the one serious thought that we must hold this point or lose all we had gained that morning. It was a life or death etmtest. Their massed columns pushed forward to the " Bloody Angle." The stars and stripes and the stars and bars nearly touched each other reross these works. Here were displayed on both sides of the breastworks more acts of ildivithual bravery and heroism than I had yet seen in the war during three years of hard service. The gray and blue coats with rifles in hand would spring oi top of the breastworks, take deadly aim and fire, then fall dead in the trenches below. This I saw again and again. More troops came to our aid and took a hand in the fight. A new line of troops from different commands was formed at an obtuse angle from this fighting line to stay the progress of the enemy on our right; but no sooner was it formed than it was swept away by the enemy's deadly fire. The 16th Mas- sachusetts, one of my regiments here on the left of my brigade, lost heavily, and its brave com- mander, Waldo Merriam, was killed. Here, also, Thomas W. Eayre, Assistant Adjutant-General of General Mott's staff, was killed. It was in our immediate front that the large tree was cut down by rifle-balls, the stump of which was exhibited at the Centennial Exposition at Philadelphia. As night closed about us, the mo- ment we would slacken fire the enemy would close in upon us, so determined were they to carry this point. Had they succeeded in driving us from it, all we had gained that morning would have been lost. Not till about 3 o'clock on the morning of the 1 3th did the battle cease. A dead and dying mass of hu- manity was lying in the Confederate trenches, while on our side the ground was covered with the dead. Never during the war did braver men meet each other in battle than here. ) On the 3ti came an order for consolidation, by which this brigade became the Third Brigade, Third Division, 8econd Corps, under which name it conthnued to the end of the war.- R. McA. 17I I "', i =4 (GENERA-L EDWARDS'S BRIGAI)E AT THE BLOODY ANGLE. BY JAMES L. BOWEN, HISTORILN OF THE .37TH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT. IN the article entitled "Hand-to-hand Fighting at Spotsylvania," the author, while generally ac-curate and graphic, omits any reference to that brigade of the Sixth Corps (Colonel Oliver Ed- wards's Fourth Brigade, Second Division) which was first engaged there, which was holding the key to the position when his own (Upton's) bri- gade came upon the field, and which fought longer than any other brigade of the Sixth Corps engaged. O-n that day the brigade had present for duty three small reginients, the 1 0th and 37th Massachusetts and the 2d Rhode Island. When the First and Second Divisions of the Sixth Corps, which had been massed the previous evening, were sumn- nioned to the support of Hancock, whose See- ond Corps had penetrated the Confederate lines, General Wright, who had just assumed command of the Sixth Corps, directed that the first brigade under arms and ready to move should lead the way. Edwards's brigade was first in line and led the march of the corps. It moved to the vicinity of the Landrum House, passing the Confederate gen- erals and some of the prisoners who had been cap- tured by Hancock, and, reaching the edge of the woods facing the scene of action, came into line of battle facing by the rear rank, and advanced to- ward the captured works with the 10th Massa- chusetts on the right, the 2d Rhode Island in the center, and the 37th Massachusetts on the left. The situation at this time was simply this: The force of the Second Corps' attack had of itself broken up the organization of that command; the mass of men had been withdrawn to the outer face of the Confederate works and re-formed as well as possible under the circumstances. By the time this was accomplished the Confederates were prepared to undertake the recapture of the works they had lost. Then it was that Edwards's brigade moved forward and occupied the outer face of the intrenchments, relieving some troops already there and connecting with the Excelsior Brigade. As it came into position, it covered the nose or apex of the angle with the Rhode Island regiment, the 10th Massachusetts extending along the right face. The brigade was scarcely in position when the Confederates advanced to the attack, the ground being extremely favorable for their purpose. On their side of the works it was wooded, and, in addi- tion, scarcely forty yards to the rear of the fortifi- cations was a hollow or ravine which formed a natural siege approach. In that ravine, almost within pistol-shot of the Union lines, they were enabled to form columns of assault entirely screened from view, and the resulting attack had the appearance of lines of battle suddenly spring- ilg from the bosom of the earth. Three times in rapid succession their columns formed and rushed upon the angle, and as often did Edwards and his 900 men repel them. To the right of Edwards's position, however, the defense was not so sue- cessful; the Union troops were driven back from the intrenebments, and the enemy, crossing the works and taking position in a piece of woods, gave an enfilading fire on Edwards's right, so severe and well directed that it threw the 10th Massa- chusetts into confusion. It was at this time that Upton's brigade came upon the field and, in the words of that officer himself, encountered so severe a fire that it was unable to occupy the intrench- ments, but resting its left on them, near Edwards's right, lay down and opened fire. As soon as the development of the Union line to the right relieved the flank fire somewhat, the 11th Massachusettswas returned to its place in the works, and throughout the remainder of that (lay the bri- gade held its position with a fire so deadly and well directed that no hostile lines of battle could live to cross the few yards between the works and the ravine spoken of. Once, indeed, by the use of :a white flag the Confederates came near acconi- plishing by stratagem what they had failed to do by force of arms. This emblem of peace bceing displayed in front of the Fourth Brigade, an offi- cer ranking Edwards, but himself ranked by Gen- eral Eustis, who was present, unjustifiably orderemi the Fourth Brigade to cease firing. Instantly the purpose of the movement was shown by the da.h of the Confederate line of battle for the covetedl works. Fortunately, however, Edwards and his command were on the alert, and repulsed the at- tack, but not until the hostile colors were for a moment planted on the works,-the only instantce during the day in which anything like a line of battle was enabled to advance so far at that point. Near night the brigade was relieved, but this 37th Massachusetts was almost immediately er- dered back to hold the works, which had been vacated by a regiment of the Second Corps that was out of ammunition. The guns of the 37th also were empty, but they pushed their bayonets under the head log, and held the works until a fresh supply of ammunition could be procured, when the firing was resumed and continued until 3 o'clock on the morning of the 13th. This regiment was in action continuall for more than twenty hours, during which time it fired over four hundred rounds per man. At one time its guns became so foul that they could no longer be used, many of them bursting in the hands of the men. As it was impossible to relieve the line, a regiment from the Second Corps exchanged guns with the 37th, enabling the latter to continue its fire. It was in front of the right wing of this regi- ment and almost directly in the rear of the apex that the oak-tree, twenty-one inches in diameter, was cut down by bullets and fell within the Con- federate lines. I believe every regiment that fought anywhere in that part of the field claims to have shot down this particular tree; but in truth no single organization is entitled to all the credit. The tree fell during the night, near mid- night in fact, and hours after the firing had virtu- ally ceased on all parts of the line save at this vital point. 177 GENERAL G(,ANT RECONNOJ1TERING THE CONFEDERATE POSITION AT SFPOTSLVANIA COURT HOUSE. F-OM A SKETCHI AIADE AT THEl TIME. Mr. Reed, the artist, lelongd to tigelow's 9th 3tass- his olswr-atioo. The troops seen in the hr.kgroand ehbsetta battery, which, with a battery of the 5th Reg.- are the 9th Ma-hae-hostts Votiniteer, who at the time lar Artillery, was holding the Fredertikab.rg road (see were erossing the road from the left towarl the right map, p. lt7 at the placei where Gtteeral Graunt made of the line.- EDmTos. 178 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND. 1-r )ii clici of the iotor.atio, contai-ed Io tub I. 1 anI iit . iUt."tIr lists t fl;I-aw, flu .,tit, dI aic 'iiite'ttl dil auva.c.I- ot til beilutcilcsizl f the Off1icial leio1uit ") to Bigarr-Oeiiernl Hicharit U. D-r11,, Aufjuitauittieir a the Arny. bol"riui the -1osiment to to"'ld H.lair cotlie consottuflatiWiti of turigautesani uivissitm.. m11de orga..id.atlio mu-ster.,it Ot anut I- I cu. nuts ru ceicet. F-r the comupoIttio of thle aruy, Juu-e 1st, ee pp. 134-87. Th.e imtsuitty of oItta-ftio c.nltlete data relative to the cas-aatieo among officers tn thili. apaign mak,. it liecus-ary to flimit .oc.i iiif, mt-tioi.- EDTlous. THE UNION ARMY - Lieutenant-General, Ulysses S. Grant. Escort. B, F and K, 5th U. S. Ca,., Capt. Jollhs W. Masen. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade. 1Prorost Guard, Brig.-Gen. Marsena R. Patrick: C and D, Itt Mass. Cav., capt. Edward A. Flint; 80th N. Y. Int. (20th Militial, Col. Theodore B. Gates; 3d Pa. Cav., M5IJ. James W. Walsh; 68th Pa. Int., Lieut.-Col. Robert E. Winslow; ldlth Pa. Inf., Co. Charles H. T. Colis. Votuafeer Engineer Brigale, ;I Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Benhan: lath N. Y. Engineers, Maj. William A. KIetehun; 50th N. Y. Engineers, Lieut-Col. Ira Spanld- ing. Battaffiui 17. S. Engineera, Capt. George H. Men- dell. GCoord, and Orderlies: Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Maim. SECOND ARMY CORPS, MoJ.-Gen. Wlntield S. H.a- cock. Estcor. M, lot Vt. Cav., Capt. John H. Elazelton. FIRIST DIVISION. Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow. First Brigade. Col. Nelson A. Miles: 2tth Mich., MaJ. Lemiel Saviera; 61t N. Y., Lient.-Col. K. 0. Broady; Slot Pa.. Clt. H. Boyd MeKeen; 140th Pa., Col. John Fraser; I8d Pa., Cal. George P. McLean. Serond Bri- gade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth: 28th Mass., Liett.-Col. Gco. W. Cartwright; 63d N. Y., MRJ. Thomas Tonhy; 69th N. Y., Capt. Richard Moroney; 88th N. Y., Capt. Dents F. Burke; 116th P.., Lttnt.-Col. Richard C. Dale. Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank: 39th N. Y., Col. Angus- tus Funk; 52d N. Y. (detachment 7th N. Y. attached), Maj. Henry M. Karples; b7th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Altord B. Chapman; 111th N. V., Capt. Aaron P. Seetey; 12bth N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Aaron B. Myer; 126th N. Y., Capt. Winfield Scott. Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke: 2d Del., Col. William P. Rally; 64th N. Y., MIal. Leman W. Bradley; 6fth N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John 8. HS. uimlll 53d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Richards MeMichael; 15th Pa., Col. Elram L Brown: 148th Pa.. Col. Janues A. Beaver. SECOND DIVIS10N, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon. 1-eo-at ruurdd 2Id Co. Minn. Sharp-hoot-rg, Capt. Mahlon Black. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Ale.. S. Webb: loth Mle., Col. Selden Connor; 1st Co. Andrew jMa:ssR- Sharp- ohooters, 1eLot. Samuel G. Gilbreth; 15th Mass., 3t aj. r. Harris Hooper; lath Mass., Maj. Ednund Riee; 20th Mass., Maj. Henry L. Abbott; 7th Mich.. MaJ. Syl; anus W. Curtis; 42d N. Y., Maj. Patrick J. Downing; 59th N. Y., Capt. William McFadden; 82d N. Y. t2d Militia), Col. Henry W. Hudson. Sconod Brigade, Brig.-Gent. Joaltua T. Owen: 152d N. Y., Lleut.-Col. .eorge W. Thompson: 69th Pa., M:kj. William Davis; 7lt Pa., LIeut..Col. Charles Kocheraperger; 72d Pa., Col. DeI Witt C. Baxter; 106th Pa., Capt. Robert H. Ford. Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll: 14th Coon., Col. Theo- dore G. Ellis; 1st Del., Lient.-Col. Daniel Wooodall; 14th Ind.. Col. Johr, Coons; 12th N. J., l.ient.-Col. Th.omas H. Davis; 10th N. Y. Battalion), Capt. George M. Dewey; W With fle excepttln of eleven companies of the 50th N. Y. mtdi-ter Lient.-Cnl. SpauIding, this eommanul, wtith ts com- Iuiaiuter, was at tIle EngIneer Depot, Washingto-, D. C. 179 I 8o OPPOSING FORCES IN GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND. lo8tb N. Y., Col. Charles J. Powers; 4th Ohlo, Lient.-Col. Leonard W. Carpenter; 8tb Ohio, Lient.-CoI. Frankli Salwye-r; 7th W. Va., Lieut.-Cot. J. H. Lockwood. THIRD DIVISION, MaJ.-tien. David B. Birney. First Brigade, Brig-t;e. J. H. H. Ward: 20th Ind., Vol. W. C. L. Taylor; 3d Me., Col. Moses B. Lakeman; 4eth1 N. Y., Vol. Th.olus W. Egan; 5Sth N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Jae-,h 11. Lansing; 124th N. Y., CoL. Francis M. Cunm- mlin.-; s9th P'., Lient.-Col. Edin R. Biles; l11th Pa., Lieit.-ol. Isaac Rogers; 141st Pa.. Lieut.-Col. Gay H. Watkins; 2d U. S. Sharp-shootcrs, Lieut.-Col. Homer R. tougbthon. Seeond Brigent, Brig.-4en. Alexander B.uys: 4th Me.. Col. Elijah Walker; 17th Me., Col. tleorge W. West; Id Hieb. ( fl. Byron R. Pieree; Uth Mihh.. Lient.-Vol. John Po lfiord; 93d N. Y., MaJ. Samuel Mle(o'nichc; 1Ith lPa., CVl. Peter Sides; sad lPa., Lieut.- Col. Joh.. A. Tanks; 105th Pa., CoL. CalvIn A. Craig; let t . K. Sharp-shooters, MaJ. Cbarles P. Mattocks. F1URTTH DIVISIO1N, Brig.-Gen. lersol U Mott. First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister: 1st Mass.. VoI. N . B. MeLaughlen; 16th Ma.. Lieut.-Col. Waldo Merriam; 5th N. J., Col. WIlliam J. Sewell; 6th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Stephen R. Gilkyson; 7th N. J., MaJ. Freder- ick Cooper; 8th N. J., Col. Johin Ranis-y; 1lth N. J., Lient.-Col. John Seboohover; 26th Pa., MaJ. Sanmnel t;. Moffelt; 115th Pa., Maj. Willibn A. Reilly. Second Bri- guIde. Col. Willia.o IL Brewster: llth Mas., Col. Will- ialmn Bliadeli; 70th N. Y.. Capt. William H. Hugo; 71et N. Y.. Lieut.- . Thomas Rafferty; 72d N. Y., LIent.- Col. John Leonard; 731 N. Y., LiUet.-Col. Michael W. BHrns; 74th1 N. Y., Lient.-Col. Thomas Holt; 120th N. Y.. Callt. Abram, L. Loekwood; uth Pa., Lilut.-Col. Milton ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Vol. John. C. Tidball; 6th M,,., Capt. Edwin B. DIow; loth IMase., Capt. J. Henry Sleeper; 1st N. H., Capt. Fred. M. Edgell; G. 1st N. Y., (apt. Nelson A.es; 4th N. Y. Hea, vy Third Batta.a11h), Lienlt.-Col. Th oa It. Alleoek; F, 1It Pa., Capt. aL Bruee Riekettl; A, 1st R. I., Capt. WiIlla- A. Arnold; B. let It. L.. Capt. T. Fred Brown; K, 4th U. S., Lieut. John W. Rosler; C and 1, 6th U. S., Lijat. James Gille. FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Gonverneur K. Warren. Provot Gisord: 12th N. Y., Battalion, Maj. Henry W. Rider. FIRST vIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griflin. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Rottieyn B. Ayres: 140th N. Y.. Col. George Ryan; 14tth N. Y.. Col. David T. Jen- kins; 91st Pa., Licnt.-Col. Joe-ph H. Sinex; 156th Pa., Lieut.-Vol. Alfred L. Pearon-; B, C, F, HU, , and K, 21 U. S., Capt. James W. Long; B. C, D. E, F. and 0, 1st Battalion 11th U. S.. Capt. Francis M. Cooley; A. B. C, D. and G. 1it Battalion, and A, U, D, F, and H. 2d Bat- talion 12th U. S., MaJ. Luther B. Bruen; lt Battalion 14th U. S.. Capt. R. MeK. Hudson; A, C, D. G, and H, tat Battalion, and A, B. and C. ad Battalion 17th U. S.. Capt. James F. Grime. Sleond Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer: 9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. Gainey; 22d Mass. '2d Co. Mama. S. S. attached). CoL Willia S. Tilton; 32d M.-., Cot. George L. Prescott; 4th Mich., Lient.-Col. George W. Lumbard; 62d Pa., Lleut.-Col. James C. Hull. Third Brigade, Brig.-(icII. Joseph J. Bartlett: 20th Me., Maj. Ellis Spear; 18th Mama., Col. Joseph Hayes; lot Mieb., Lieut.-Col. William A. Throop; lth Mich., Maj. Robert T. Elliott; 44th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Freeman CVo- ner; 83d Pa., Col. 0. S. Woodward; 115th Pa., CoL James Owyn. 0ECON8 DIVISION. Brig.-Gn. John C. Robinson. First Brigde. Col. Matuel H. Leonard: 16th Me., CoL Charles W. Tilden; 11th Mass., Capt. Charles H. Hovey; 29th Ma-s.. Cot. Phineas S. Davts; 104th N. Y., Col. G- bert G. Prey. Seond Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Bax- ter: 12th Mas., Col. James L. Rates; Sld N. Y. (9th Militirt. Col. Joseph A. Moesch; 97th N. Y., Col. Charles Wheelock; 11th Pa., CoL. Richard Coulter; Both Pa., Capt. George B. Rhoads; 90th Pa.. Col. Peter Lyle. Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison: lt Md., Maj. BenJ. H. Schley; 4th Md., VOL Richard N. Bowernan; 7th Md., Col. Charles E. Phelps; 5th Md., Lleut.-CoL John G. Johannes TIIIRD DIVISION (Peunsylvanla Reserves), Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. First Brigade, Col. William MeCandless: lst Pa., Col. William C. Talley; 2d Pa., Lient.-Col. Patrick MeDon- ough; 6th Pa., Col. Wellington H. Ent; 7th Pa., Maj. Leorand B. Speece; 11th Pa., Col. Samuel M. Jacksno; 13th Pa. (lst Hidles), M!aj. W. R. liartshorn. Thint lurf- gade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher: 6th Pa., Lieut.-Col. tiorgo Dare; 8th Pa., CoL Silas H. Bally; 1oth Pa., Lieut.-(ol. Ira Ayer, Jr ; 12th Pa., LIeut.-Col. Richard Ottutin. FOURTH DIvIsioN, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler: 7th hid., Col. Ira G. Grover; 19th Ind., Col. Samuel J. Willlatas; 24th Mleb., Vol. Henry A. Molrrow; 1st N. Y. Battalion Sharp-shooters, Capt. Volney J. Shipma.,; 2d WtI., lieut.-Col. John ManfielId; 6th Wis., Col. Edward S. Bragg; 7th WVit., Col. WIlliam W. Robinson. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice: 76th N. Y., Lient.- Col. John E. Cook: 84th N. Y. (14th Milt1w, Col. Edward B. Fowler; Oath N. Y., Col. Edward Pyc; 147th N. Y., Vol. Francis C. Miller; 56th Pa,., Col. J. W-u. Ilofotatin. Third Brigade, Col. Rey Stone: 121.t Pa., Capt. Samucl T. Lloyd; 1had Pa., Maj. Horatio N Warren; 143.1 I'a., Col. Edmund L. Dana; 14Rth Pa., Lieut.-Col. John Iriti;, 150th Pa., Capt. George W. Jones. NARTILLERY BRatoAt, Col. Charles S. Wainwright: 3d Mass., Capt. Augustus P. Martin; 5th MIt-., Capt. Charles A. Phillipe; D, 1st N. Y., Capt. George B. Win- slow; E and L, 1st N. Y., Lient. George Breck; H, 1st N. T.. Capt. Charles E. Mink; 2d Battal)l. 4th N. Y. Iteavy, Maj. William Arthur; B, lst Pa., Capt. Jan.ce 11. Cooper; B, 4th U. S., Lient. James Stewart; D, 6th U. S., Lieut. B. F. Rittenhoase. SIXTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-G-n. John Sedgwick. Esrort: A, 8th Pa. Cay., Capt. Charles E. Fellow.. FIRST DIVISION. Brig.-Geu. Horatio C. Wright. First Brigade, (ol. Henry W. Brown: 1et N. J., Lieut.- Col. William Henry, Jr.; 2d N. J., Lleut.-CoI. Charles Wiebecke; ad N. J., Capt. Samuel T. Du Bolh; 4th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Charles Ewing; 10th N. J., Col. Henry 0. Ryerson; l1th N. J.. Col. Willialm 11. Penrose. Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton: 5th He., Col. Clark S. Ed- wards; 121st N. Y., Liemtt.-Col. Eghert Olcott; 95th Pa., Lient.-Col. Edward Carroll; 90th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Will- iam H. Leasig. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. David A. Rasaell: 6th Me., MaJ. George Falter; 49th Pa., Col. Thomas M. Hulings; 119th Pa., Maj. Henry P. Trueiitt, Jr.; 6th Win., Lieut.-CoL. Theodore B. Catlin. Fourth Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler: 65th N. Y., Vol. Joseph E. Hamblin; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross; 122d N. Y., Lieut.-CoL. Angustus W. Dwight; 82d Pa. (detach- mnent,. SECOND DIVIS10N, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton: 62d N. Y., CoL David J. Nevin; 9ad Pa., Uiet.-Col. Jobn 8. Long; 98th Pa., Col. John F. Ballier; 103d Pa., Col. John W. Patterson; 129th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William H. Moody. Seeond Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant: 2d Vt., Col. New- ton Stone; ad Vt., Col. Thomas 0. Seaver; 4th Vt., Col. George P. Foster; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. John R. Lewin; 6th Vt., CoL Elsha L. Barney. Third Brigade, Brig.-(;cn. Thomas H. Neill: 7th Me., Col. Edwin C. Mason; 43d N. Y., Lient.-CoL John Wilson; 49th N. Y.. Col. DanIel D. Bidwell; 77th N. Y., Maj). Nathan S. Babcock,; 01st Pa., CoL George F. Smith. Purth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry I. EuntIs: 7th Mass., Col. Thomas D. Johns; lOth Maws., Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Parsons; a7th Mass., Col. Oliver Edwards; 2d IL L., Lleut.-oL S. B. 26. Read. THRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James B. Rieketts. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William H. Morris: 14th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Caldwell K. Hall; 106th N. Y., Lient.-Col. Charles Townsend; 151st N. Y., Lient.-Col. Thomas M. Fay; 87th Pa., Col. John W. fchall; loth Vt., Lieut.-Col. William W. Henry. Sand Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Troman Seymoar: 6th Md., Col. John W. Horn; 110th Ohio, Col. J. Warren Keier; 122d Ohio, Col. William H. Bal; 126th Ohio, Col. Ben,. F. Smith; 67th Pa. (detachment), Capt. George W. Guma; 138th Pa., Col. Matthew R. McClennan. ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Col. Charles H. Tompkins: 4th Me., Lieut. Melville C. Kimball; lst Mass., Capt- OPPOSING FORCES IN GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND. iSi William 11. MeCartney; tat N. Y., Capt. Andrew Cowan; 3d N. Y., Capt. William A. Hart,; 4th N. Y. Heavy (First BattallOn), Maj. Thomas D. Sears; C, let R. I., Capt. Richard Waterman; E, 1st .R I., Capt. William B. Rhodes; G, ltt ]R I, Capt. George W. Adams; M, 6th U. S., C(apt. James MeKnight. NINTH ARMY CORPS, 4 MaJor-General Ambrose E. Burnslde. fl-oost Guard: 8th U. B., Capt. Milton Cogawell. FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson. First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth: 35th Maws., MaJ. Nathaniel Wales; 56th Mass-, Col. Charles E. Griswold; fi7th Mass., Col. William F. Bartlett; 59th Mass._ Col. J. Parker Gould; 4th U. S., Capt. Charles H. Brightly; loth P. S., MN. Samuel B. Rayman. 8econd Brigade, Col. I)aulnel Leasure; 3d Md., Col. Joseph M. Sudsbnrg; 21st Mass., Lleu.t-Cl. (George P. Hawkes; 100th Pa., Lieut.- Ci. Matthew M. Dawsol. ArtiUlry: 2d Me., Capt. Albert F. Thomas; 14th Mw., Capt. J. W. B. Wright. stwt7oND vxsV8SON, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter. First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. BlIss; 36th Maws., Ma). William F. Draper; 58th Maws., Leut..-CoL John C. Whiton; 51st N. Y., Cot. Charles W. Le Gendre; 45th Pa., Cot. John 1. Curtin; 48th Pa., Lient.-Col. Henry Plea antS; 7th R. I., Capt. Theodore Wino. Second Brigade, Cot. Simon G. Griffin: 31st Me., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Hight; 32d Me., MaJ. Arthur Deerlng; 6th N. H., Llent.-CoI. H-nry H. Pearson; 9th N. H., Lient.-Col. John W. Bai- bitt; lth N. H., Col. Walter Harriman; 17th Vt., Lient.- Col. Charles C nmings. Artillery: l1th Mass., Capt. Edward J. Jones; 19th N. Y., Capt. Edward W. Rogers. tInRD DlVIStoN, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox. First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartrautt: 2d Mich., Col. William Humphrey; 8th Mich., Col. Frank Graves; 17th Mich., Col. Constant Luce; 27th Mich. (lst and 2d Co's Mich. Sharp-shooters attached), Maj. Samuel Moody; 109th N. Y., Col. Bcenjamin F. Tracy; 51st Pa., Lleut.-Col. Edwin Sehalt Seed Brigade, Col. Benjamin C. Christ: Iet Mich. Sharp-shooters, Col. Charles V. De Land; 20th Mleh., Lient.-CoL Byron M. Cutcheon; 79th N. Y., Col. David Morrison; 60th Ohio (9th and 10th Co's Ohlo Sharp-shooters attached), Llent.-Col. James N. McElroy; .50th Pa., Licot.-Col. Edward Overton, Jr. Artillery: 7th Me., Capt. AdeIhert B. Twitchell; 34th N. Y., Capt. Jacob Roemer. FOURTH DMvtoN, , rig.-G.en Edward Ferrero. First Brigade. Col. Joshua K. Sigfled: 27th U. S., Lieut.-Col. Charles J. Wright; 30th U. S., CoL Delavan Bates; 39th U. S., Col. Ozora P. Stearns; 43d U. S., Lient.- Col. H. Seymour Hall. Seond Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas: 30th Coon. (detachment), Capt. Charles Robin- 500; 19th U. S., Lieat.-CoL Joseph Perkins; 23d U. S., Lieut.-Col. Cleveland J. Campbell. Artilky: D, Pa., Capt. G-orge W. Durell; 3d Vt., Capt. Romeo H. Start. C kiALaY: 3d N. J., Col. Andrew J. Morrison id N. Y., Col. Samuel J. Crook.s; 2d Ohio, Liet.-Col. George A. PUriugton; 13th Pa., M.M. Mlchael Kerwin. REsEnvE ARTILLERY. Capt. John Edwards, Jr.; 27th N. Y., C apI. John B. Eaton; D, 1st R. L., Capt. William W. Buckley; H, let R. I., Capt. Crawford Allen, Jr.; E, 2d U. S., Lieut. James S. Dudley; 0, 3d U. S., Lieut. Ed- mnund Pendleton; L and M, 3d U. S., Lieut. Erskine Gittings. PROVIsMoNAL BRIGADE, Col. Elisha 0. Marshall: 24th N. Y. Ctmv. (dismounted), CoL William C. Ranlston; 14th N. Y. Heavy Art'y, Lieut.-Col. Clarence H. Corning; 2d Pa. Proe. Heavy Art'y, Col. Thomas Wilhelm. CAVALRY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. Escort: 6th U. S., Capt. Ira W. Claflin. FIRST DIVIsIow, Brig.-Oen. A. T. A. Torbert. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George A. Coster: 1st Mich., Llent.-Col. Peter Stagg; 5th MIch.. Col. Russell A. Al- ger; 6th MIch., Maj. James H. Kidd; 7th Mich., Maj. Henry W. Granger. Seod Brigade, Col. Thomas C. Berin: 4th N. Y. (guarding trains), Lleut.-Col. William R. Parnell; 6th N. Y., Lieut-CoL Williae H. Crocker; 9th N. Y., Col. William Sackett; 17th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James Q. Anderson. Resrere Brigade, Brig.-CGeu. Wes- ley Merritt: 19th N. Y. (Ist Dragoons), Col. Alfred Gibbs; 6th Pa., M3.6 James Starr; tst U S., Capt. Nel- son B. Sweitzer; 3d U. S., Capt. T. F. Rodenbough; 5th U. S., Capt.Abraham K. Arnold. SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gme. David eSct. Gregg. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies. Jr.: lt Mass., Mali. Lucius 3. Sargent; lt N. J., LienIt.-Cil. John W. Kester; 6th Ohio, Cot. William SstednIan; 1t Pa., Cal. John P. Taylor. Secoxd Brigade, Col. J. Ir-in Gregg: lat Me., Col. Charles IL. Smith; 10th N. Y.. Maj. M. Henry Avery; 2d Pa., Lieut.-Cot. Joseph P. Briluton; 4th Pa., ,ientt.-Col. George H. Covode; 8th Pa., Licut.- Cot. Samuel Wilson; 16th Pa., LieIt.-Col. Jobn K. Role ison . THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James H. Wilson. Escort: 8th III. (detachmeoti, Lieut. William W. Long. First Brigade, Col. Timothy M. Bryan. Jr., Col. John B. McIntosh: 1st Coon., Maq. Erastns Blakeslee; 2d N. Y., Col. Otto Harhans; 5th N. Y., Lient.-Col. John Hain- mond; 18th Pa., Lieut -Col. William P. Briaton. .erad Brigade, Col. George H. Chapman: 3d Ind., MaJ. Will- iam Patton; 8th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William H. Benjamin; let Vt., Lient.-Col. Addison W. Preston. ARTILLERY, Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Artillry Resrve, Col. Henry S. Burton. First Brigade, Col. J. Howard Kitching: 6th N. Y. Heavy, Lieut.-Col. Edmund R. Travis; 16th N. Y. Heavy, Col. Louis Sehirmer. Second Brigade, Maj. Johu A. Tomupkins: .ith Me. Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens; 1st N. J., Capt. William Hexamer; 2d N. J., Capt. A. Juillson Clark; Sth N. Y., Capt. Elijah D. Taft; 12th N. Y., Capt. George F. MeKnight; B, lt N. Y., Capt. Albert S. Shel- don. Third Brigade, Maj. Robert H. Fitrhugh: 9th Mass., Capt. John Bigelow; 15th N. Y.. Capt. Patrick Hart; C, lat N. Y., Lieut. William H. Philips; 11th N. Y., Capt. John E. Burton; H, 1st Ohio, Lieut. William A. Ewing; E, 5th U. S., Lieut. John R. Brinekle. RORSE ARTILLERY. First Brigade, , Capt. James M. Robertson: 6th N. Y., Capt. Joseph W. Martin; B and L. 2d U. S.. Lient. Edward Heaton; D, 2d Ut. S., Lieut. Edward B. Willis- ton; M, 2d U. S., Lient. A. C. M. Pennington; A, 4th U. S., Lient. Rufus King, Jr.; C and E, 4th U. S., Lieut. Charles L. Fitahugh. Second Brigade, Capt. Danbar R. Ransom: E and G, 1et U. S.. Lieut. Frank S. French; H and 1, Capt. Alanson 3M. Randol; K, 1st U. S., Lient. John Egan; A, 2d U. S., Lient. Robert Clarke; G, 2d U. S., Lleut. William N. Dennison; C, F and K, 3d U. S.. Lieut. James R. Kelly. ARMY OF THE JAMES, MaJ.-Gen. Benj. F. Butler. TENTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore. FIRlT DIVISION, Brig.-Ge.. Alfred H. Terry. First Brigade, Col. Joshua B. Howell: 39th fl., Cal. Thomas 0. Osborn; 62d Ohio, CoL Francis B. Pond; 67th Ohlo, Col. Alvin C. V 8.ris; 85th Pa., Lieut.-Coi. Edward Campbell; ond Brigade, Col. Joseph R. Hawley: 6th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Lorenzo Meeker; 7th Conn., I.ient.- Col. Daniel C. Rotdman; 3d N. H., Lieut.-Col. Josiah I. Plimpton; 7th N. H., Col. Joseph C. Ablbtt. Third Brigade, Col. Harris 3. Plaisted: 10th Coni., Col. Johin L. Otis; 11th Xe., Lleut.-Col. Winslow P. Spofford; 24th Mass., Col. Francis A. Osborn; 100th N. Y., Col. George B. Dandy. Artillery: Ist Conn., Capt. Alfred P. Rock- well; 5th N. J., Capt. Zenas C. Warren; 36, 1st U. S., Capt. Loomis L. Langdon. sECOND DIVItION, Brig.-Gen. John W. Turner. First Brigade, Col. Samnel M. Alford: 40th Mwa., CoL tiny V. Henry; 3d N. Y., Lient.-CoL Eldridge G. Floyd; 89th N. Y., Lieut-Col Theophilas L. England; 117th N. Y., Col. Alvin White; 142d N. Y.. Col. N. Martin Curtis. Second Brigade, Col. William B. Barton: 47th N. Y., Lient.-Col. Christopher R. McDonald; 48th N. Y., Lieut.- 4 TIde caerps partielpateil in the Wllderness and Fpatsylvsuanlaemptgna, nadertheiurect arders of Lient.-Gen UJ.S:. Granit. until Ma1y 24th, 1864, when it was assigned to the Army af the Potomac. X AU the infantry were colored troops , Detached with Cavalry Corps. 182 OPPOSING FORCES IN GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND. Col. Dudley W. Strickland; 115th N. Y.. Maj. Ezra 1. Walrath; 76th lP., a]o. Jouil C. ampbell. Artilery: 4th N. J., Capt. (:eorge T. Wousibory; BH, tt U. S., Capt. Samuel S. Elder; D. 1st U. M., lleltt. John S. (lbbh. THIRD DIVISION. Brig.-(Gen. Adelbert Atimes. Fir-t Brigd, Col. Richard White: 8th Me., LieuIt.. Cal. Itenry Boynton; 4th N. H., Cal. Louis Bell; 55th Pa.. Lientt.-Col. FriItk T. Bennett; 97tb Pit., Col. Henry B. tiusa. P -o1d Brigad,. Ctol. Jeremiah C. Drake: 13th Imid.. Col. Cyrus J. Dohbb; 9th Me.. CtL. Sabine Emery; 112th X. Y., Lient.-Col. Elial P. Carpeinter; 169th N. Y., Cal. Johtt SicConhe. Artillery: 33d N. Y., Capt. Alger It. Win-tier; C, 3d R. I.. Capt. Martin S. James; E, 3d U. S., Ll-ttt. Joseph 1'. Sanger. t'N;ATTACHRD TROOlS; 1l1 N. Y. Engineers (5 eos,. C '. EdwardI W. trr-ll; 4th MtS... Cal . (First Battalion), ('pi0. Leinla, Richmond. EEGIITEENTH ARMY CORPS. Maj.-Gen. William F. 8mith. 1I-IIST DtVISlto. Brtg.-Gen. William T. H. Brooks. Pirst Brigae, BrigG-Geu. (tiltuan Macstan: 51st N. Y.. Col Jcohb J. De Forest; 95th N. Y., Col. Edgar Mt. Cmii- len; 98th N. Y., C'l. Frederick F. Weftd; 139th N. Y., Cot. Stamunel H. Roberts. .1te-oud Briyade. Brig.-4elu. Hiram- Burnaham: 8th Conn., Cal. Johl E. Ward; l0th N. 11.. Lieni.-Col. Job.n 0sughlin; 13th N. B., Cil. Aaron F. stevens 118th N. T., C0i. Oliver Kee-e, Jr Thirst Brigade, Col. Horace T. Sanlera: 92d N. Y., Lient.-Col. Itlram Ander-un. Jr.: 61th Pi.. Lient.-Col. Montgomery Martin; 148th Pa., Liut.-Col. George K. Bowen; 19th Wi.., Liettt.-Cot. RP-lila Mt. Strong. ArjUkry rigade,. Mal. Theodore H. Si-henek: 4th Wia., Capt George B. Easterly; L, 4th U. S., LiemIt. John 8. Hummt; A, 6th U. F;.. Lietut. Charles 1. Mnhlcnhberg. 8ECOND DIVSlION, Brig.-Gen. Godfrey Weltzel. First Brigtde, Brig.-Gen. Charles A. Beckman: 233 Ma--s., Co. Autdrew Elwell: 25th Mass., Miii. Cornelias 4. Atwood; 27th 'Mass., Cal. Horae (. Lee; 9th N.J.. Vol. Abram Zabrmskh-. Seeos- Brigade, Ca.1 Griflti A. Stedmant: 11th tuonn., Lteut.-Col. Wm. C. Moegling; 2d S. H., Col. Edward L. Bailey; 12th N. H., Maj. John F. Laingley; 148th N. Y.. Col. Georg, M. Guioti. Artilerky Brigade, Capt Frederlek M. Follett: 7th N. Y., Capt. Peter C. Regan; E, Sd N. Y., Capt. George E. Ashby; F. 1t It. 1., Capt. James Belger; D, 4th U.S., Lieut. Janies Thompson. THIRD IIIvisION, Brig.-Gen. Edward W. Hlnks. Pirst Brigad,. Brig.-Gen. Edward A. Wild: Ist U. S., Col. John H. Holman; 10th U. S., Lieut.-Cul. Edward It. Powell; 22d U. S., Col. Jo.eph B. Kiddoo; 37th U. B., Lieut.-Co1. Ablel 0. Chamberlain. Soad Brigade, C.l. Samuel A. Duncan: 4th U. S., lIAut.-Cal. Gieo. Rogers; 5th U. S., Col. J`-es W. Canine; 6th U. S., Col. John W. Ames. Artller-y: K, 3d1 N. Y.. Capt. Jimes B. Angel; M. 3d N. Y., Capt. John II. Hovwll; B, 2d U. F. (colored), Capt. Francis C. Chsate. UNATTACHED TROOPM: 1st N. Y. Mounted Rifles, (01. Benjamin F. Onderdonk. CAVALRY DIVISION, Brig.-ten. Angust V. Kntitz. FY-rt Brigade, Col. Simon H. Mix: 1st D. C., Lcut.- Col. Everton J. Conger; 3d N. Y.. Liettt.-Col. George W. Lewis. Seeosd Brigade, Col. Samuel P. Spear: 5th Pa., Lleet.Col. Christopher Klelnz; 11th Pa.., Lenit.-Col. George Stetzel. ArtIitry: 8th N. Y. (section), Lieut. Peter Morton. UNATTACHED TROOPS: 1st U. S. Colored Cyv., Maj. Ilar-ey W. Brown; 2d U. S. Colored Ca,.., Coi. (,eorge W. Cole; 13th Co. Mass. Heavy Art y (pontotielr), Capt. John Piekering, Jr. The etfective Strength of the Uttion army iti the Wil- derness is esti"unted at 118,000 of all aios. The losses at thisn army (in-liidinr those attsialedl iy the re;nforeenentt reire H01 itoSpttylvtmti and Smith's corps at Colti Harbor). from Mlay 5th to J... 16th, were as follows: nATTI.E-. ET". The Wiblerness . . 2246 12.037 338317,t66 Yrtsotylvali1 225 13,416 2218 15,399 7Arth3Anna. -ld Twplostl ,.i.o M91 2.7341 t1l 3.986 (Cold Harbor tuild t l l S tiuirt 1144 9,)7 11816 12.737 Sheridan im'r- l- lI-ImI i4W 321 224 625 Sheridan' teeiuul I pulilt1r4t741 625 1516 Grand total from the Wilderne.s to the Janme......... . .. 3341 947 14,129 Dnring the same period Btiler's army on the James River line numbered at it. tmaximtbm about 36,600 effect- ise". Its lossesumounted to 034 killed, 3141 wounded and 1678 captured or missng = 6215, exclusive of the casual- ties sustained by W. F. Smith's command at Cold Harbor, which amounted to 448 killed, 2365 wounded, and 206 eap- lured or missing = 3019, and which are Included in tile atboe table. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA - General Robert E. Lee. FIRST ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-(en. James Lougatreet. XEkSHAW' DIVIsIO, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershuw. Eers.have' Brigade. CoL John W. Heuaga.n: 2d S. C., Lieut.-CoL. F. Gaillard; 3d S. C., Col. James D. Nance; 7th S. C., Capt. James Mitchell; 8th S. C., Lieut.-Col. E. T. ttackhou.e; 15th S. C.. Cal. John B. Dais; 3d S. 4'. Battalion, Capt. B. M. Whitener. Hai-phreys's Bri- gade, Brig.CGen. Benjamin G. Huiuphreys: 13th Miss.. Maj G. L. Donald; 17th Mina., - ; 18th Miss., Capt. W H. Lewis; 21st Miss., Col. D. N. Moody. ooffords Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William T. Wofford: 16th Ga., ; 18tb Ga., -; 24th (Ga.. -; Cobhb' Ga. Legion. - ; Phillips Ga. Legion, - ; 3d Ga. Batt.aomt Sbarp-shioters. -. Brya ' Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Gode Bryan: 10th Ga., Col. Willi" C. Halt; 50th Ga., Col. P. MeGlashan; 51st Ga., Col. E. Ball; 53d Ga., Col. Janmes P. SimmS. FIELD'S DIV1stON, Maj.-Gen. Charles W. Field. JeAlis. Brigde, Brig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins: Ist S. C., Col. James R. Hagood: 2d S. C. tRifles). Col. R. E. Bowen; 5th S. C., Col. A. Coward; 6th S. C., Col. John All the Intantry were colo-rd troops. Bratton; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters, Col. Joseph Walker. Asderaot-' Brigade, Brig.-Oen. George T. Anderson; 7th Ga., -; 8th Ga., -; 9th Ga., -; 11th Ga., -; 59th Ga., Lient.-Col. B. H. Gee. Lame's Brigad, Brig.-Gen. E. Mclver Law: 4th AWl., Col. P. D. Bowles; 15th Ala., ; 44th Ala., Col. W. F. Perry; 47th Ala., ; 48th Ala., LUeut.-Co1. W. M. Hardwick. Gregg, Brigade, Brlig.-Gen. John Gregg: 3d Ark., Col. Van U. Manning; 1st Te.., -; 4th Tea., Col. J. P. Bane; 5th Tex.. Lient.-Col. K. Bryast; Bes- iartt Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Bemming: 2d Ga., - ; 15th Ga., Col. D. M. Dunose; 17th Ga., --20th Ga., - ARTI.LLERY Brig.-G-n. E. Porter Alexander. HagVes Battaiclz. Lieat.-Col. Frank Huger: Fieldlng's /Va.) Batt'y; Moody's (La.) Batt'y; Parker's (Va.) Batt'y; J. D. Smith's (Va.) Batt'y; Taylor's (Va.) Batt'y; Wool- folk's (Va.) Batt'y. Haskela'. Bajalmon, Maj. Jobn C. Ha1kell: Flanne(s tN. C.) Batt'y; Gard2n'a (S. C.) Battly; Lamkin's (Va.) Hatt'y; Ramsay's IN. C.1 Batt'y. Cabetl's BatatWon, Col. Henry C. Cabell: CalawayY's Name not to be tound In the Ofielal Records." OPPOSING FORCES IN GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND. 183 (in.) Batt'y; (arnton's (ta.) BatCy; MoCarthys (Va.) Biatt y; Manly's (N. C.) Batty. SECOND ARMY CORPS, Lietit-Gen. Richard S. Ewell. F:1itt.Y' 8ilVISIitN, Met-Urn. Jubll A. Early. flfas's Brpound;igade , Brig.-en. harry T. flays; 5th La., t.'ioIt..th4il. Br.e, Menger; 6th 1Sa., MaJ. William 1I. NI...ilog; 7th L.., MaJ. J. M. Wilson-; 8th La., it bl ,:a., . Igrt's Brigade. Brig.-ken. John Peg- iii; lt1h V,,., Cal. James B. Terridl; 31st Va., Cal. John1 s. ltll'ii4:a; 4alth Va., Col. J. t. Glbson; 52d1 Va., - ; ,thl Vi... g. Gordde, Brig.-tfon. John It. I-,rila-i l3th (l:t., ; 2th (a., Cl. E. N. Atkittsot; :;lst ;tia.. CI,. C . A. EVIinsa 38th tia., 60th G;a., Iiiltzt.-t at. Thtlas .J. B-rry; 61st (Ia., .ri1tstNOI'9 IllVIS1tIN, MeAl.-(;n. Ediwacil John-on. Sto-e-Il Bltyrigiid, Brig.-Gin. J:ttars A. WaIker;: 2d VzI., Capt. (C. It. Sterwart; 4th Via., Col. Wihilan. Terry; Ut1 Vt., ; 27th Va., Fltout -Cal. Charles L. Haynes; 1iltVl. -. .'iteoarl's Itrigautr, Brig.-Ginl. G;eorge 11. stiotrt - Ist N. C., (iol. It. A. Brown; 3d N. C., (ol. P. I. lrirnsttn'; 10th Va., ; 23d1 Via., ; 37th Va., _ ones's Brigade, Brig.-len. Jihit M. Jones: 21st Va:1., -; 225th Va., Colt. ,r. C. Iliggibhotha-; 42dt Va., ; 44th Vii., ; 4tth VI., - ; 50th Va., tatrifdts .Brigde, llrig.-Gea. ,iroy A. Staflort;: 1st La., --; 2i1 L.a.. Cil. J. 3t. Willbanti; 10th L.., l4th IL., ; l5th La., - Dillitli VItIO'5l. MiaJ.-Gen. Robert E. Rodeo. iel's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. JiatinsI Dannlel: 32d N. C., ;43d N. C., -; 45th N. C., -; 53d N. C., 2d N. C. Battn, - . Ra.astr's Brigade, Brig.- S:t . tephen D. Ramsenr: 21 N. C., Col. W. R. Cox; 4th N. C.. Cil. Bryan Grimes; 14th N. C., Col. R. T. Bennett; 30th N. C., Col. F. M. Parker. Doles's Brigade. Brig.- (G',ti. G-orge Doles; 4th ;a., - ; 12th Ga., Col. Ed- wit-d Willis; 44th Ga., Col. W. H. Pi-itles. Battle's Br- gaIe, Brig.-Gen. Collen A. Battle: 3d Ala., Col. Chart-s Forsyth; 5th Ala., -; 6th Ala., -; 12th Ala., -; 26th Ala., -. .Johtastn's Brigad. Brig.-Geti. Rtihert D. Johnston: 5th N. C., Col. T. M. G arrett; 12th N. C., Col. H. E. Coleman; 20th N. (C., Cti. Thomas F. Toin; 23d N. C.,. AitTILLEtnY, Brig.-CGen. Armistend L. Long. 11firdaktey's Batldion, N Lleut.-Col. R. A. Rardaway: Daitee's (Va.s Batt'y; Grahami's i Va.) Batt'y; C. B. Grit- flit's (Va.) Battyv; Jones's (Va.) Batt'y; B. Ft. Smith's (Va.i Batt y. Nelson's Bsttaliota,\ Liet.-Col. William NiIsi.: Kirkpatrick's (Vn.. Batt'y; Masie's (Va.) BAtt'y; Mitledge's (Ga.) Batt'y. Braxton's Battalian, Litut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton: Carpenters. (Va.) Batt'y; Coiiprs (Va) Batt'y; Hardwieke's (V..) Batt'y. CtDt- ahair's Battalion, " MHa. W. E. Cutshaw: Carringto's (Vn.) Batt'y; A. W. Garbter's (Va.) Batt'y; Tanner's (Va., Batt'y. Page's Battaliot. ; Miii. R. C. M. Page: W. P. Carter's (Va.) Batt'y; Fr'f ' Va.) Batt'y; Page's (Vi.) Batt'y; Reese's (Ala.) Batt'y. THIFD ARMY CORPS, Lient.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill. ANDEIiIOIN'' DIVISION, MaJ.-Gett. RIcharld H. Anderson. Perrl's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Abner Perrin: 8th Ala.. 9th Ala., l lath Ala.,- ; 1ith Ala., 14th Ala., . MahoNe's Brigade, Brig.-Geti. Willian Mahone: 6th Va., Liet.-Col. El. W. Williami- son: 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger; 16th Va., Lient.-Col. B. 0. Whitehead; 41st Va., ;fllst Va., Col. V. D. Groner. Harris's Brigade, Brig.-Gial,. Nathaniel H. Harris: 12th Mlss..-; 16th Miss., Col. S. E. Baker; 19th Miss., Col. T. J. HIardin; 48th MIss..-. -Wright's Brigade, Brig.-Gen., Ambrose R. Wright: 3d Ga.,-; 22d Ga., 48th Ga., - ; 2d Ga. Batt'n, HaJ. C. J. itofrett. Perry's Brigade. Brig.-Ge,.. E. A. Perry: 2d Fla., - ; 5th Fla., ;Sth Fla., - IOETH'S DIVti.IN, MaJ.-Gen. Henry Beth. Davi's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jttseph R. Davis: 2d Hiss., - 11th Miss., - 42d Hiss., ; lath N. C., -. Cok's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John R. Cooke: 15th N. C., 27th N. C., - ; 46th N. C..- 48th N. C., . . irA-tans Brigade, Brig.-Gea. Williisit W. KirklaId: 11th N. C., -; 26th N. C., -; 44th N. C.. -; 47th N. C.,; 52d N. C., . Wfalk- er's Brigade, Brig.-G,.. Itetiry H. Walker: 40th Va., i_ 47th Va., ol!. R. M. mlayo; l5th Va., Col. W. S. Christian; 22d Vi,., Batt'n, . Arches. Brigade, Brig.-(en.LamesJ Arhber; 13th Ala., ; 1st Tenti (Pr-v Arnty), H.l. F. G. Boehanan; 7th Tenn., Lietit.- Col. S. a. Shepard; 14th Tenit., Col. Willi-a eCotail. WILCOX'S DIV11 i1N, Ma.J.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilox. L.ane' rigade, Brig.-,-en. Janes H. Lane: 7th N. C., I.eAit.-Col. W. Lie Davidson; 15th N. C., Col. Johi i). Barry, 28th N. C., - ; 33d N. C., Lieut.-Col. R. V. Cowat,; 37th N. C, C il. William M. Barbottir. Scales's BJrigadert Brig.;eti. Aitreti M1. Scal; lath N. C.. Ciil.J. 11. Hytlait; 16th N. C., Col. W. A. Stowe; 22d N. C., _ ; 34th N. C., ('ol. W. L. J. I owrance; 38tha N. t- Licitt.-.ol. Jlohn Asflord. 1!eo(ati's Brigad.. e, Bri'.- Ge-t. Satiiilti.h-tiowait: 1t5. C. Prtov. Arniev, Lhit.- (oIi. W. 1'. Shtiote-; 12th S. C., Col. John L. Stillr-; lIth S. C., fist. It. T. Broekiatit-; 14th s. C., Citl. Joseph N. iBrowit; 1It Y. C. (Ocr's) Rifles, Iient.-Cil G.M.cleD. Miller. Tho-aai's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Etlward 1. Thonta.: 14th Gal., ; I35th (i-., ,; 45th Ga., ; 49th tia L.ieit.-Ctil. J. T. Jordan. .AIMtLLERtY, Col. R. Linidsay Walker. Poagt-e's Battalion, Liefit.-Cil. William T Pone; Richarrds's (Mii.i Batt'y; Uttcrbaek1s (Va.) Batty; Willitnis's (N. C.) Batt'y; Wyatt's (Vat.i Batty. lic- Iatosh's Baltalisal, Liebit.-Col. D. G. Metntosh: 'hitter's (V..) Batt'y; Donald's (Va.o Batt'y; Hnlrt's Ala.) Batt'y; Price's (Va.) Batt'y. Pegrasa'saitoliioi, Liet.- Col. W. J. Pegrana: Brander's (V..) Batt'y; Cayce' (V..) Bawtty; Ellett' (Va.) Batt'y; Mtarye's (Vi,) Batt'y; Zimmermat's (S. C.), Batt'y. (Ctts's Battaion, Cil. A. S. Cltts; Patterson's t(is. Batt'y; Ro-s's Ga.l Batt'y; Wingfleld's (Ga.) Baitt'y. Riehardson's Balot. io-a, Lieiit.-Col. Charles Richardson: Grandy's (V.) Batt'y; L Il-dry's (t.a.) Batt'y; 5toore's (Va.) Batt'y; Penick's (Va.) Batt-y. CAVALRY CORPS, MHk. Gen. James E. B. Stuart. F.,YPTON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Wade Hampton. raIng Brigade, Brig.-len. P. M. B. YVong: ,th Ga. Col. W. P. White; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Col. G. J. Wright; Phillips (Ga.) Legion, -; 20th Ga. Battalhmn, Lieut.- Citl. John St. Hlltn; Jeff Davis llssu Legihn, Rosser's Brigade, Brig.-Gi'n. Thomas L. Rosser: 7th Va., Col. R. H. Dulany; 11th Va.. -; 12th Va., Lietit.- Cal. Thontis B. Massie; 35th Va. Batta.ota.- . Bfat- ter's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. M. C. Butler: 4th S. C., Col. B. H. Rotledge; 5th S. C., Col. John Dunovant; 6th S. C., C.l. Hogh K. Aiken FITZ. LEE'S DlVISION, fta.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee. Loai-e's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lonsfori L. L.max: sth Va., Cil. Henry C. Pate; 6th Va., ; 15th Va.,- Witckhat's Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Williams C. Wickhatn: 1st Va., -; 2d Va., Col. Thomas T. Munford; 3d Va., Col Thomas H. Owen; 4th Va., - W. 11. F. LEE'S tYVIstioa. Maj.-Gen. W. 1. F. Lee. Chaasbliss's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John R. Chambhiss, Jr.: 9th Va., - ; l1th Va., - ; 13th Va., Cordon's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James B. Gordon; 1st N. C., -; 2d N. C., CoL C. X. Andrews: Rth N. C., Cul. S. B. Evans. HORSE ARTILLERY, Maj. R. P. Chewi. Breateds Battalion, Haj. James Breathed: Hart's (S. C.) Batt'y; Johnston's (Va.) Batt'y; 3cGregor's iVi.) Batt'y; Shoemaker's (Va.) Batt'y; Thomson's (Va.) Batt'y. RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG LINES, Gen. G. T. Bea-regard. 4 RANSOI'S DIVISION, HaJ.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr. Graie's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Arehibald t.rnrie, Jr.: 41st Ala., ; 43d Ala., ; 69th Ala.. - ; 60th Ala., - . Kcoaper's Brigade, Col. Williana R. Terry: 1st Va., M.aJ. George F. Norton; 3d Va., - ; U nder tih directiott af tiasol J. T. Brawn. ruder the direetinttl CtClonel Thomas H. Carter. 4 SsJ(ir.Gottersl tiorge E. Piekelt commandeil at Petersitnrg. 184 OPPOSING FORCES IN GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND. 7th Va., Capt. W. 0. Fry; 11th Va., -; 4th Va., .trtoss Brigade, Brig.-en. Seth M. Barton: 9th V.. Col. James J. Phillips; 14th Va., CoL William White; 38th Va., Lleut.-CoI. J. R. C'abell; S3d V.. Col. Willu I. LAyhett; 57th Va., Col. C. R. Fontaine. laoke's (old) Brigade, Ltett.-CoL William (G. Lewis: 6th N. C., ; 2lt N. C.. --; 4th N. C., - ; 57thN. C.,- ; let N. C. Batt'n - . ArtiUery Bal- tali., Lieut.4'oL C. E. Lightfoot: Va. Battly, Capt. J. D. Hanlkins; V., Batt'y, Capt. J. H. Rtivee Va. Battly. C'apt. T. R. Thornton. HIME'a DIVIstofi, Maj.-Gen. Robert F. Hoke. Cor-e's Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Montgomery D. Come: 15th V.. Lieut.-Co. S. 6M. Morrison; 17th V., Lieut.- CoL Arthur Herbert; 18th Va., Lieut.-Col. (eorge C. Cabell; 29th Va., ; 30th Va., CoL A. T. Harrison. Climegasa's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Cingman: 8th N. C., -; 31st N. C., -; fet N. C., - ; 61et N. C., - . Johs.o' Brigade, Brig.Gen. Bushrod R. Jobson., Col. John S. Fulton: 17th and 23d Te-n., CoL. R. H. KIeeble; 25th and 44th Tenn., Col John S. Fulton, Llenit.-C,1. J. L. MeEwen, Jr.; 63d Tenn.. CoL. A. Fulker- sOI. Hagood' Brigade, Brig.-Cn. Johnson Hagood: llsth S. C.. Col. F. H. Gantt; 21st S. C., Col. Robert F. Graham; 25th S. C.. Lient.-CoL John 0. Pressley; 27th S. C.. Col. P. C. Gaillard; 7th S. C. Batthn, MaJ. J. H. Riois. ritiarXed: Slat N. C., CoL Hector MelKethan. Artilery Battfals-. LUeui.-Col. B. F. Eshlensan: Mar- tin's IV-.) Batt'y; Owen's (La.. Batt'y; Payne-' Batt'y. coulrr's DiVIsioN, Brig.-Gen. Alfred H. Colqultt. CotynifU's Brigade: 6th Gn., CoL John T. Loiton; 19th Ga.. ; 23d G a., Col. M. R. Bailenger; 27th Ga.. Lieut.-Col. Ja.n,-s Giarduer; 28th Ga., - . Baso' Brigade. J Artillery Batalio-, I Maj. W. M. Owen. Cavalry: 3d N. C., Col. John A. Baker; 7th S. C., Cel. W. P. Shingler. W HITINWS5 D1V1I8IIS, Ma.-Gen. W. H. C. Whiting. Wi-e' Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Henry A. Wise: 26th Va, Col. P. R. Page; 34th Va., ; 46th Va.,-; 59th Va.. Col. Willian, B. Tsbb. Jlartia'. Brigade, Brig.- (.en. James G. Martin: 17th N. C.. -; 42d N. C.. -: 66th N. C., -. Cavalry, Brig.-Gen. James Dearing: 7th Confederate, Col. V. H. Taliaferro; 8th Ga., Col. Joel R. Griffin; 4th N. C., Cal. Dennis D. Fer- rebee; 65th N. C., Col. G. N. Folk. Thirty-ighth Bet- talias ra. Artillery, Ma). J. P. W. Read: Blotmt's. Caskie'-. Macon's, and Marshall's batteries. Xi1 ELtN.IIEOUS: Elliott's Brigade, CoL Stephen El- liott, Jr.: 61st N. C., - Holeombe (S. C.) Legion, H-. .W 'sBrigade, Brig.-en. Eppa Hunton: 8th Va.. Capt. H. C. Bows; 19th V"L, Capt. J. G. Woodson; 25th Va. (Battalioni, Lient.-Col. W. M. Elliott; 32d Va., Col. E, B. Montague; 56th Va.. Capt. John Riehardson; 42d Va. Cay. Batt',n. Lient.-Col. W. T. Robins. Maryla.d Line. Col. Bradley T. Johnson: 2d Md. Int., Capt. J. P. Crane; lst Md. Ca,.. Lient.-Col. Ridgely Brown; lt Md. Batt'y. Capt. W. F. Desnentt 2d Mld. Batt'y, Capt. W. H. Grifits: 4th Md. Batt'y, -. Eagineers: D, lot Reg't, Capt. H. C. Derriek. RICHMOND DEFENSES, Col. W. H. Stevens. Nrst Diviaion, I.r Li-e, Lieut.-Col. J. W. Atkinson: 10th Va. H. A. Batt'n, Maj. J. 0. Henaley; 19th Va. H. A. Batt'n. MaJ. N. R. Cary. Seeod Dirie.o., Ilaer Li-e, Lieut.-Col. Jas. Howard: 18th Va. H. A. Batt'n. MaH. M. B. Hardin; 20th Va. H. A. Batt'n, MaJ. J. E. Robertson. UslaUaeced: La. Guard Art'y, Capt. C. A. Green. CIIAFFIN'S BLUFF, Lient.-Col. J. 26. Maury. Gtoochlaud (Va.t Art'y, Capt. Jonathan Talley; James City (V.) Art'y, Capt. L. W. Richardson; Lunenlhurg jVa.s Ar'y, Capt. C. T. Allen; Pamunkey (Vs.. Arty, Capt. A. J. Jone,. DREWRY'S BLUFF, MaJ. F. W. Smith. Johnston (Va.) Art'y, Capt. BranDh J. Epee; Neblett IVa.) Art'y, Capt. W. G. Coleman; Southbide oVa.) Art'y, Capt. J. W. Drewry; United (Va.) Artl', Capt. Thos.as Kevill. CHAFFIS'S FARM, Maj. A. W. Stark. Matthews's (Va.) Art'y, Capt. A. D. Armistead; Me- Comas's (Vs.) Art'y, Capt. D. A. Fren.h. AKTILLERY, CoL. H. P. Jones. aeley's Bafali-, Lieut.-Col. E. F. Moseley: Cua- ming's (N. C.) Batt'y; Miller's (N. C.) Batt'y; Slaten's (Ga.) Batt'y; Yomng's (Va.) Batt'y. Coil's Battldioa, Maj. J. C. Colt: Bradford's tMls.) Batt'y; Kelly's (S. C.) Batt'y; Pegramn's (Va) Batt'y; Wright's (Vs.) Batt'y. Unassigned: Sturdivant's (Va.) Batt'y. Lee's efetive force at the commencement of the cam- paign was not less than 61,t)00, and Beauregard's coin- mand about Richmond and Petersburg, including the troops sent from North Carolina and South Carolina up to May 15th, approxImated 30,000. The tosse of these armies arc only partially reported. In the Wilderness Ewellrs corps lost 1250 killed and wounmded; McGowan's brigade (Wilcox's division), 481 killed, wounded, and missing; Lane's brigade Wileox's ditlson), 272 killed and wounded, and 143 missing; Kershaw's brigade tunder Henagan), 57 killed, 239 wounded, and 26 missIng; Bryan's brigade (Ker-haw's divIsion), 31 killed and 102 wounded; Mahone's brigade, 20 killed, 126 wounded, and 7 Islsing; Gordon's brigade, 50 killed, wounded, and m-ssinig. The reported casualties at Spotaylvania are as follows: Ewell's eorps (May loth), 650, and (May 19th), 900; Ed- ward Johnson's division (May 12th), over 2600; and Me- (iowan's brigade (May 12th,, 86 killed, 248 wounded, and 117 missing. The following summary, aggregating 3507, exhibits the losses of Beauregard's fores- on the south side of the James fron. May 6th to June 2d, so far as reported: COMIMAN. DATE. t - Cohq Wltt' divisions. May 16 35. 1941 210 2566 Barton'. brigade May 10 36 179 34 249 Hagood'. brigade. May 6-9 54 i 253 37 344 B. Johnson'a brigade5 May 7-9 2 10 ... 12 Marttin' brigade... May 20 13 92 8 113 Wi-'. brigade.. May 16-20 18 162 18D Wiee's brigade. June 2 9 49 58 Fifty-ninth Virginia. May 8 3 22 20 45 b t'mpoltion not Indicated. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT COLD HARBOR. June 1st, 1864. THE UNION ARMY, Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. ARMY OF TIlE POTOMAC. Maj.or-General (George G. Meade. Pror-wt Guard, Brlg.-Ge,,. MNrsena It. Patrick: Cand D, 1st Mass. Cav., Capt. Chairl- F. Atains, .Jr.; 80th N. y. (211t1h Militila, Col. Thciso ier 1. Gates; al Pla. ('av., l.tit.-C.it Edwar S. J one; 68th 1a., Lhut.-Col. Robert i:. Wiass ow; 114th Pa., ('ol. Chl-es It. T. Collis. Vol- -swuer Engineer Briglade, Brig.-(-eti. Henry W. Ben- wliit: Seth N. Y., Lt-ut.-Col. Ira Spauliting. Battalion r. .. Engbineer,, CUpt. George H 51 Met1dell. Garst and t)rerties. (One1ida tN. Y.) Car., Capt. Daniel P. Mann. SEtOND ARMY CORPS, MaJ.-(ien. Winfield S. ItHn- i'iiik. Esort: M1, 1St Vt. Cav., Capt. Jothit 11. Hazeltan. rtnsvT itvIst oN, Brig.-Gen. F.raeis C. Barlow. Fi , Briade. ('ol. Nelson A. 51is: 26th M1ichl., Capt. .atin'- A. tLot-iiia; 21i N. Y. Arty. Col. Joseph N. G Wtlaitle,- 61st N. Y., Lletst.-Coi. K. O-s':ir Brondy; 81st Pa.. Capt Lwrence M1erc -r; 140th 1Pa., Capt. Smuel (;iuipi'll; lMid Pit., Capt. Jiho 3MI'Ctulluogh. Seco-d Brigade. CuL. Rilharil Byrnes: 28th Mass., Capt. Jamns Fleming; t l l N. Y., 'apt. John It. I.leassi,; 69th N. Y., MLj. Jitist (Garr-tt; 88th N. Y., Capt. Deail F. BHrke; 116th Pa,., ('a. St. Clair A. Miultiathitl, Ctspt. Ri-harl Miuruottay. Third Brigade, Cii. Clititon 1. acDongall: 3ath N. Y.. 31a). Jois-ph Hyde; a52t N. Y. (detachmient ,th N. Y. atttaietb, Capt. iltiry P. Ritztns; 111th N. Y, Capt. LI'wls W. Husk; 125th N. Y., Cut. Levin Cran- it'll; 126th N. Y., Lfiitt.-Cal. Willitiu 11. Baird. Foarth Bu'iqodr, Col. Johin R. Broake: 2d Iel., Maj. Peter Mfc- tlotigh; 7th N. Y. Art y, MaJ. Joseph 5t. MStrphy; 64th N. Y., Capt. William Glenny; 66th N. Y., Col. Orlando 11. M1orris; 53d Pa., Capt. Henry S. Ditom; 145th Pa., 5Maj. Charles M. Lynch; 148th Pa., Col. James A. Beav'-r. SECOND DIN VSION, Brig.-Gen. JohSn Gibbati. I -rorost Guard: 2d Co. Min.. Sharp-shooters, Capt. Mahltin Black. First Brigade., Col. Henry B. MSeKeen: 19th Me., Capt. Joeph W. Spaulding; 15th Mass., Ma). I. Harris Hooper; l9thMass.,Capt.Morcen.aDunn; 2lth MSas.,Capt. Henry L. Patthn; 1st Co. Mass. Sharp-shooters, tAet. Santuel G. GMiliretIs; 7th Mich., Maj. Sylvatins W. Cirtis; 42dN. Y., Lietit. John Maguire; 69th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Horace P. Rtigg; 82l1 N.Y. )battalion), Lietit. Thomas Huggins; 184th Pit., Maj. Charles Kleekner; 36th Wis., Col. Frank A. Hasell. Second Brigade, Brig.'Gen. Joshua T. (Owen: 152d N. Y., Capt. Wil1iam 8. Burt; 69th Pa., 11us. William DuIne; 71st Pa., Llent.-Col. Charles Kocher- eperger: t72d Pa., Llent.-Col. Henry A. Cook; 166th Pa., Capt. Jithn B. Breltenbach. Third Brigade, CoL Thomas A. S4myth: 14th Conn., Col. Theodore 0. Ellis; l1t Del., Maj. William F. Smith; 14th Ind., Lient.-Cal. Eltiah H. C'. Cas1'tu; 12th N. J., Capt. Jamies MeComb; 10th N. Y. (lbattalhsini, Maj. George F. Hopp.er; 1oth N. Y., Capt. Wililahn H. Andrews; 4th Ohio, Llent.-Col. Leonard W. Carpenter; 8th Ohio, Maj. Albert H. Wi.nslow; 7th W. Vii. (battalion), Capt. lsaae B. Fisher. Fourth Briqade, Rrig.-Gtn. Robert 0. Tyler; 8th N. Y. Art y, Col. Peter A. Port-r; 155th N. Y., Capt. Michael Doran; 164th N. Y., Col. Jaimes P. MeMahon; 170th N. Y., Col. James P. M[vIa-r; 18ed N. Y. (69th N. Y., N. 0. A.), LIeut.-Col. Thotitas 51. Reid. THIRD DatIStON, MaJ.-Gen. David B. Birney. Fir-s Rrigad, Col. Thomas W. Egan: 20th Ind., Col. Wilhlitin C. L. Taylor; 3d Me., Col. Moses B. Lakenan; 40t1s N. Y., Lient.-Cot. Aitgitug J. Warner; 86th N. Y., Maj. M511ihael B. Stafford; 124th N. Y., Capt. Henry S. Mtiarray: 99th Pit., Maj. John W. Moore; 110th Pa., Lieut.- Cot. Etioch E. Lewis; 141st Pa., Col. Henry J. Madlil; 2d IT. S. Shiarp-shaoters, Mal. Edward T. Rowell. Sectd Brigade, Col. Thomas R. Tannatt; 4th Bte., Capt. Arthur Liiiy; 17th Me., I.et.t-Col. Charles B. Merrill; 1t Mtass. Art'y, Muij. Nathaniel Shatswell; 3d Mich.. Col. Byron R. Ptere'; 5th Mich.. Lient.-Col. Moses B. Hotigh- tlis; 93d1 N. Y.. Lict.-Col. Beajaitou C. Ilithtr; 67th Pa., Capt. ANtiso. H. Nelson; 631d Pa., Capt. Isaiac More- head; 105th Pa., Mia. Levi B. Doff; I1t U. S. Sharp- shooters, Capt. JShn Wilson. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Gershani, Mlott: Ist Ste. Art y, Col. Danilel Chaplin ; 16th MIass., Maj. Saamuel W. Richtardsoti; 5th N. J., Capt. Ilenry H. Witolsey; 6th N. J., Capt. JSsiph Hays; 7th N. J., Maj. Frede-rick 'ooter; 8th N. J., Mtaj. Virgil t1. Itealy; 11th N. J., CI('. Robert McAllister; 115th Pa., Lilet.-Col. John P. Duane. Fourth Brigade, Col. Will- tam R. Hr iwsti'r: 11th Mass., Lilutt.-Col. Porter D. Tritip; 7oth N. Y., Capt. William H. Ililgo; 71st N. Y., Ll-eit.-CoL Th-onts. Rafferty; 7T11 N. Y., Litctt.-t'id. Miclhael W RHorns; 74th N. Y., Cid. Thonias Holt; 120th N. Y. (3 Co's 721 N. Y. attached,, 1.ieut.-Col. John R. Tappeti; 84th Pa., Capt. Jlahn R. Rss.. ARTILLERY nRIoADE, Cal. John C. Tidhall: 6th Ste. C(apt. EdswinB.Dow; lothMass..Capt.J. HenryFleeper; 1st N. It., Capt. Frederick Mt. Edgell; 2l N. J., Capt. A. J ISsin Clark; G, 1st N. Y., Capt. Nelson Anies; 4th N. Y. Itea-y, Liet.-Col. Thoiias. R. Allcoek; 11th N. Y., (tapt. John E. Burton; 12th N. Y., Capt Georgi' F Mc- Knight; F, 1st Pa., Capt. R. Braue Riekilts; A, ISt R. I., Capt William A. Arnold; B. 1st R. L., Capt. T. Fred Brown; K, 4th U. S., Lient. Jihm W. Roder; C and 1, 5th U. S., Iietit. William H. Beck. FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Gonvernetir K. Warren. Pronast Guard: 12th N. Y. battalton), Maj. Heitry W. Hider. FInrT DtVIStSiN, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres: 140th N. Y., LIettt.-Col. Elwell S. Otis; 146th N. Y., Mtzj. James Grtndlay; 91st Pa., Maj. John D. Lentz; 155th Pa., MaJ. John Ewing; 2d U. S. t6 cao'), Lieut. George H. Me- Laughlin; 11th U. S. (6 ca'8) Capt. Francis M. Cooley; 12th U. S. (10 ca'), Capt. Frederick Wlitthrop; lith U. S. (First Battalion), Capt. David B. McKibbin; 17th U. S. t8 c8), Capt. Walter B. Pease. Seeond Brigade,. CLl. Jacob B. Sweitzer: 9th Mass., Lleut.-Cel. Patrick T. Hanley; 22d Mass. i2d Co. Sharp-shooters attached), Col. Willins S. Tilton; 32d Mass., Col. George L. Pres- isitt; 4th Mich., Capt. David D. Sarshalt; 62d Pa.. Capt. WillIam P. 5taclay. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gtn. Joseph J. Bartlett: 20th Me., Maj. Ellis Spear; 18th MSass., MasJ. Thomas Weston; 29th Mams., Col. Ebenezer W. Peiree; 1st Mich., Lieat.-CoL Willinm A. Throop; 16th 51ich. (Brady's Co. Sharp-shooters attached), Capt. George H. Swan; 44th N. Y., Capt. Campbell Allen; 83d Pa., Lient.- Col. De Witt C. McCoy; 118th Pa., Lieut.-CoL Charles P. Herring. SECOND DIvi'10Y, Brig.-Gen. Henry H. Lockwood. First Briyade, Cid. Peter Lyle: 16th Me., Cal. Charles W. Tilden; 13th Mas.. Col. Samuel H. Leonard; 39th 'tass., Cii. Phinese S. Davis; 94th N. Y., Lieut.-CIl. Samnel A. Mofeltt; 104th N. Y., Col. Gilbert G. Prey; l0th Pa., Capt. William P. Davts; 107lth Pa., Col. Thomas F. 5teCoy. Se-mn Brigade, Cot. Jantes L. Bates: 12th Stass., Maj. Ben-. F. Cook; 8S3d N. Y. (9th 'Militian, Lietit.-Cid. William Chalmers; 97th N. Y., Capt. Delis E. Hall; 11th Pa.. Capt. Beijamiin F. Haines; 88th Pa., Capt. George B. Rhoads. Tird Brigade, Cal. Nathan T. Dnshane; 1st 5td., Lieit.-Col. JohIn W. Wilson; 4th Md., Col. Richard N. Bowerman; 7th 51d.. Malj. Edward St. 1tibsley; 8th Md., lient.-Col. Jshn G. Johannes; Pnrnell (Md.) Legiont, Col. Sa'l1 A. Graham. 185 VOL. [V. 13 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT COLD HARBOR. TIitiw nIVIslIsS. Brig.-4l.... Santu]t WV. Crawford as.- . -tgltei to S kaind Dl isi si- to l,, Jitti. 2). 1 er, SNcere lBrigade, Ml:j. Willi-an R. lftirtbhorne: 190th 1,., : - ; Ills i'a. ,-. lndedhp e det B rig de. t lt. .1. l1,w:trt Rit,-lug: 6tt] N. Y. Arty,. MIj. Atstiat, t n i ,k itt., , 1t hi N. V. Art y F l ir -i -t nt't tintrl l il atttt tosa). ( ,11..1 ". -1 -ht ..........'1 F-, ' l t t t B rig .-i -n. tx s aittttr ( titlte . G 1"": 21 W-, 0.1,1.l I--g, 11. (M., V ("'ltitI. Willil-I'l W. I"T1i""l: 'tit I"']. Li rst It ig a'illir, (t. W itilia I!i Ithl ., li- lt . J7 oh i d M . Ihkdhll !:40 -"I,-h1 . Ilt.tb. Wlilkiml W. Wighlt; 1.t iI;itt:iltiai N. Y. Shi:lrti-osoitlt-i , (lpt. A tfrtid I Parry; tl W i-.. Lii- t.-t ,t. Ritfits H. Il -; 7tt Wjs , . lit.--('al. M arkl not:i-tm.S Braqaite,(a 1..J.Wittianilint- litalitiI; 3d 1) 'I., i.hctnt -tIa. Williamitl 1i. Dorreli ; 46th N. Y.. Lient.-Cal. (Gleirge- W. Tras-ers; 76th N. Y., Capt. Ja.n..-. L. litaldarti; 9I 5th N. i. 314 Robert WV. Banit; 1471t4N. .. H -eot-Cal.ii-irgi-llitra y; sethPa,.,Iaj. Jot.i. T. Jitek. Thin Brigade. Ciil. Ewvari S. Itnagg: 121st r:.., Callpt. S itil T. Lloytt; 142!1 Pa.. Makl. Hon.tia N. Warr-ta ; l ast: Pa., Staj. J ml- s GI te it ; 149th Pl .. Lleait.-t ol. Johi lervi,; 11th 1i1a. Staj. (leorge W. Jane,. ARTllLLERtY ttIAIi.. Cotl. Chtiarles S. Wainwright: 3it Mas... Lient. Atarirn F. Wal-ott; lit, Mtass., Caipt. Chitrlts A. Phillips; 9th Ma.s., Capt. Joihn Btgelow; B, 1st N. Y.. Capt. Albert S. She-idn; C. lNt N. Y., Capt. Almont Barnes; D. Itt N. Y., Lient. LIeztr I. Rih-harltson; E aInt L, It N. Y., Lieut. George Breck; It, 1st N. Y., Capt. Charles E. Mink; 15th N. Y., Calpt. Patrick Hart; B, It Pa., Capt. James H. Cooper; B. 4th U. S., Lieit. James Stewart; D, 6th U. S.. Lieit. Benlaljin F. Rittenbuotle. SIXTH ARMtY CORPS, M5tj.-(-e. Horatio I. Wright. Esca: A, 8th Pa. C pi-. Ctit. Charles E. Fellows. FIRST DIVI1ioN, Brig.-(lien. David A. Rttss-II. First Brigade, Ciii. Willitim II. Penrose;: 1t N. J., LiHet.-Cot. William Henry, Jr.; 2d N. J., Cot. Samnet L. Back; Sd N. J., Col Henry W. Bronw; 4th N. J., Capt. Ianuuel t.M Gani; 10th NX J., Lieut.-CL Charles H. Toy; lath N. J. Lient.-Col. Edward L Camulbell. Second Bri- gade. 'ol Etizry U pton: 3d Con,. Art y, Col. Elisba S. Kellogg; 5th Mte.. Col.. Clark S. Edwardt; 121st N. Y, MJ. Hejiry M. GaipIt; 95th Pa... (ajt John G. C. Mac- tarlan; 96th Pa.. Lieut-Col. Wiltiani H. LHi-sig. Thirl Brigade. Brig.-ien. Henry L. Euitst: 6th Me., Capt. Theodore- Lincoln, Jr.; 49th Pol. N.aj. Ba.yuto J. Hick- man; 119th Pa.. Lient.-Col. Gideon Clark; 6th WIS., L-ent.-Col. The,,dorr B. Catlin. FPou. Brigade, Col. Nelson Cro: 65th N. Y., Cal. Joseph B. Hausblin; 67th N. Y., Lient-Cto. Henry L. Vast Ne-s; 1a1 N. Y., Lieut.- Col. Angastas W. Ilwhlght; 23d 1Pa., Col. John F. Glenn; 82d Pa., Col. 1iaac C. Baasett. SiECo7Ii lItViSION, Brig.-Gen. Thomias H. Neill. First Brigade. Brig.-Geu. Frank Wheaton: 6sd N. Y., Col. Da)Ivid J. Xevin; 9ad Pa., Lieut.-Col. Jobh S. L-Sg; 98th Pa.. Col. Jobh F. Bafller; 102d Pa., Liet.-Col. Will- iain MetIwaine; 139th Pa.' Lieut.-Ct. WhIiiani H. Moody. Scant! Brigade. Brig-Gen. Len is A. Grant: 2d Vt. MiiJ. Aniaat S. Traty; 3d V't., Cot. Thomas 0. Scaver; 4ti Vt., Licalt.-Cal. Stepbie, It. Pingree; 6th Vt., Col. John 1. owlis; 6th Vt.. Lient.-Col. Oscar A. Hale; 11th Vt. tlot tteaiy Art'y), C.t. James Mt. WXaner. Third Bry ,de, C.o. DanlI D. Bidwell: 7th Me., Capt. Jobh W. Chanil.ig; 43d N. Y., Lieut.-Ctl James- D. Visseher; 49th N. Y., Lieat.-Coi. George W. Johnsoon; 77th N. Y., LieUt.-Col. Win-ar B. French; 61,t Pa., Capt. Lewvis Redenubaih. Ihtiti Brigade, Col. Olver Edwards;: 7th Mass., Cot. Thaitts D. Johnls; 10th tM-, Lieut.-Cot. Joselph B. Pars....s; 17th tass.., Li-t.-Col. George L. Moattigag ; 2d i. I., Maj. Henry C. Jenekes. t1111ita idvtshi, Brig.-Gen. Jatnies B. Ricketts. First Brigade, Cit]. Willi;i..i FS. Troex: 14th N. J., Lieait.- Col. Caldwell KJ. llalt; 106th N. Y., Lient.-Coi. Charles Townsend; 151st N. Y.. Cot. William Emerson; t7th l'a., Col. Jobn V. KIhall; latIn Vt., Cal. Wiliamt W. Ieury. S-cond Brde, Col. Btjain F. Smith; 6th Md., CoL. John W. Horn; 9th N. Y. Art'y (First and Third Battalions), Lleat.-Col. Edward P. Taft; loth Ohio, Heat-Cot. Otho H. Binkley; laId Olio, Coa. Will- taml H. Balt; 126th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Aaron W. Ebright; 67th Pa., Cil. Joih F. Staatitufii,; 138th Pa., ('ol. Matthew R. MeCt.enna.,. ARTILLERY IBRI(iADE, totI. Chales 11. Tantpkin;: 4th Me., LHeit. C'harle W. Whiti-; 5th Cte.,Capt. I eenleat T. Ste-1clos; Ist Mass., (apt. iVitlihz, 11. ttatt:ei-; lt N. J., Calit. Willian. Itex-anir 1st 'N. Y., ('mtt .Atilew 0,waut; 3d N. Y., C -'`Ilt. WilhlIflu A. 1Il1.711; 2d1 Ba:t- t ian itth N. Y. Iteavy, M;a J;..ii.s W . 1- r; 11, lit Ohlo, Calpt. Sti ldcit W 1)--rs-l ; '. Ist t. I., Catipt. Rll halrd Wktc--al-.; E, 1-t It. I., C';lilt. W\illhl Bz. Rilt tes; G;, 1s.I i R 1.. Ialpt. (ii-,igi- W . A ttalin ; U. 5th U. S., tlic t. Jitlini t. I trtikh- ; 1, 'Il U .S., -Capit. J nuu s Sti-Kmlighit. NINTH ARMY CORP1S, MIljt-;it. Ati btnt- E Burnit- Side. 'rocoslt Guard: 8th Ut S., Capt. M1ilttn Cogevell. FItST DIVIt SWNi, Sta.-l;eii. Th i.i...s 1.. Crittenidet. First Brigade, Brig.-tb-mn. Jtiiiies 11. Ledlic: 56th Mas., Cul. Stephi- , M. Weld, Jr.; 57th Masls., Cot. Witlinn, P. Batrtl-tt; r9th Mass., Lih-at.-Cil. Jolhit ttdgi-, Jr.; 4th U. S t, Cpt. A,-ry B. ('ali; loill, 1. S., Heat. J-esse A. P. Iltamll-on. .Seeoit Brigade . t til. Josiph 31. StiillstsIir: lI Mitl., LHenit.-t'ol. (iiliseit l. Rottiosou,; 21st lass., Lieait.-Ctls. Gesirge- P. Hawkes; 100th Pa., Lleat.-Ct'. Mtatthew St. Dawson. P)roeisisat Brigade, Ci. Ellsia (. Ma-rsialt: 2d IN. Y. Mounted R1ifles (dlsmounted), Col. John Fisk; 14th N. Y. Art'y, Mta. William H. Reynoido; 24th N. Y. Cav. (dis.ounnted), Cot. William C. Ranltton; 2d Pa., Provisional Art'y, Col. Thonna.s Wlthelni. Acting Fngi.ners: 35th Mass., Capt. Edwardi G. Park. Artit- lery: 3d Me., Capt. Alinrt F. Tholn.as; 14th Mass., Capt. Joseph W. B. Wright. sacownD Dtmsno8s, Brig.-1en. Robert i. Potter. First Brigade, Cot. J,,his 1. Curtin: 326th Ma.s., Lieut.- Col. Arthur A. Goodiel; 58th Mass., Lient.-Cot. John C. Whiton; 45th Pa., Lient.-CoL Francis M. Hills; 48th Pa., Lient.-Col. Henry Pleasante; 7th R. I., Capt. Perey D.aniels. Send Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin: 2d Md., - ; 3lit Me , Col. Thomas Hight; 32d Me., Lleat.-Col. Jnihn Mt. Brown; 6th N. H., M.tj. Phin. P. Bixiy; 9th N. H., Capt. Andrew J. Hongh; 11th N. H., Capt. Ho1Is 0. Dndley; l7tti Vt.. HLeat.-Cot. Charles Cnmmiung. Adt- sg Engin : 6let N. Y., Capt. George W. Whitman. Artillery, Capt. Edwarid W. Rogers: 11th Mas., Capt. Edward J. Jones; 19th N. Y., Capt. Edward W. Rogers. THIRDi DVISI10N, Brig.-uen. Ot-lando B. Willex. First Brigade, Cal. John F. Hartratft: 2d Mich., CoL. William Humphrey; 8th Mis h., ieat.-ol. Ralph Ely; 27th Mich. tlt and 2d Co'- Sharp-shiioters at- tached), Ci. Dorm, St. Fox; 0lth N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Isaac S. Cath.; 51st Pa., Heat.-Col. Edwin Sc!ha.L See- Oat Brigatde. CaL. Ben.amin C. Christ: lst Mich. Sharp- shooters, Capt. Levant C. Rhines; 2oth Mich., CaL Byron M. Cutcbeon; 60th Olio t9th and 10th Co's Sharp- hooters attached,, Hent.-Co. Janiles N. Sti-Etroy; 50th Pa., Heat-Cal. Edward Ove rton, Jr. Acting Engineers: 17th mich., Cal. Constant Lace. Artilkry: 7th Se., Capt. Adelbert B. Twitchell; 34th N. Y., Capt. Jacob Roaitter. FOURT-r DIVIsitNE, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero,. Fs' t Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried: 27th t'. S. . T., Col. Charles J. Wright; aoth U. S. C. T., Col. DOelavn Bate,; 39th U. S. C. T.. Cot. Oora P. Stearns; iad U. S. C. T., LiHet.-Ctl. H. Seynn Ir Hall. Second Brigade, Col. Henry (G. Thomas: 19th U. S. C. T., Lieut -tot. Joseph G, Perkins; 23d U. S. C. T., Lieut.-Col. Cleave- land J. Campbell; 31st U. S. C. T., Maj. Theoi. It. Rock- wood. Artillr-y: D, Pa., Capt. George W. Dlaell; 3d Vt, Capt. Roeo H. Start. REsERVE ARTILLERY. Capt. John Edwaril., Jr.: 27th N. Y., Capt. John B. Eaton; D, 1st R. I., Cauit. Wh'1lluan W. Bnekley; H, lt R. L., Capt. Crawford Allen, Jr.; E, 2d U. S.. Lient. Sammlzi B. Mclttir-. CAVALRY CORPS. Maj.-Hei,. Phtit, 11. Sheridati. Escort: 6th U. S., Capt. Ira W. Cafltin. FIR3T sIlvltso, Brig.-Hen. Alfred T. A. Torlh-rt. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. (leorge A. Custer: 1t Mich., Lieut.-Col. Peter Stagg; 5th Mic!h., Col. RBssett A. Alger; 6th Mich., Maj. Jam-es H. Kidd; 7th Mich., Maj. Alex- ander Walker. Seond Brigade, Cal. Thomas C. Dviaa: 4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William R. Parnell; 6th N. Y., 18o) THE OPPOSING FORCES AT COLD HARBOR. Llcut.-C' l. William If. Croeker; 9th N. Y., Licnt.-Col. Seorge F. NicIols; 17t11 Pa., Elent-Cel. tames Q. Aniter- son. Res..re. Brigad. Ilrig.-tlen. Wsley Merritt: l9th N. Y. (IstD r:i o.....s , Ii.i. Ali, 1 Gibils; fitt Pla.. Ma:j. W illi..i.. 1P. (C. Trite in'!; st Ut. N., (aplt N elson B. Sw weit- eer: 2:1 U. H.. c(apit. T'fl ooihiliis F1. Roule nlsi ugt r ; 3th r. H., J S tijit. Ahir:tlt:ni 1;. Artnilil. S:, D t IiIi Izii , Iltig.-G ti. fia ii Mi1t, . Gregg. Iirws icig idclIrig.-!l.Ile-iryE . D avi es ,I.:1st Stias.. t.iiiit.-Ciil H;ali. ie. 1 1:. Chan mI: erlal i ln; lst N. J., lIiciit.- 'ol. JIhn: Kestir; 10th N. Y., Maj. 31. Henry Av I , `0 ;tll "h1i1 1' o. W\liillii SXtf l,,laal It Pla.. ,1l. ,1i t.. I1. rayltir. "--o od t rigode, C iii. J. Irvin iiri' g' It i'., Ciil. Charles It. Nmaith ; 2d I':., I.ui'it.-Ciul. Jii- orpli [I. llr litt tn ; 4th IPa., t.ie-itt.-t i . G eorg e It. ( o oil i' slit I' ., Cil. P tintielk liil.,-; 13th P'a., NI]j. Mi'i l K Ivwit; lot!: Pa., 1.ieit.-C fl. John . KRobisotin. Tihitli Dl- lViSIN, llrig.-tlei:. j.aiai. It. Wilson. Escsc 8ti Ill. (i li.tta \i i I. 1.ieiit. W ilt! lin X W . I.onig. First B "I d , ('ilt.J i . Ste tftital:h: lot C iton ., Mafl. (itirgre 0. Matrey; .ld . J., Al n Ad-rw J. Sorrison; 2It N. Y., Col. Ott.o lIt:rlala ; .,th N. Y.. Lh-it.-.Cil. John lIsiiitmond; 2d (lhii:, Lieiut.-tol. (t1'rgi', A. P fringtoan 18th I i., Mia. John W. lIhillilis. ,"--il Brigade, Col. (leiirge IT. Chal:ttan : 3d [nil., Maj. Williani Patton; 9th N. Y., Maj. Edmunlilid M. Pope; Ist Vt., Maj Willian: Wells. FrIRST liRFtADfl, IIORSE ARTILLEiIY, Capt. James M1. Rotbertio a: fith N. Y., Capt. Joseph W. Martin; B and L, 2d U. N., Lieut. Edward Iteato..; D, 2d U. P., Lieut. Eltward 1i. Williton; M6, 2d U. S., Lle-t. Carle A. Wood- ruff; A. 4th U. S., Lieut. Rufus King, Jr.; C and E, 4th U. S.. Lieut. Charles L. Fitzhugh. ARTILLERY, , Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Second Brigade, orse Artilery, Capt. Dunbar R. Ran- s11o: E and G, I1t U. S., Lieut. Frank S. French; H and 1. I1t U. S., Capt. Alanson M. Xandol; K, Ist U. S., Lieut. John Egan; A, 2d U. S., Lieut. Robert Clarke; G, 2d U. S., Lieut. WV. Nell Deanison; C, F, and K, 3d U. S., Lieut. George F. Barstow. A rtilery Park, Lleut.- Col. Freetoan MeGilvery: 15th N. Y. (Second Battalion(, Maj. Julitu Dieekmann. EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS, 4 MaJ.-Gen. William F. Smith. FIRST DItVIION, Brig.-Gen. William T. H. Brooks. Fird Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Gilman Marston: 81st N. Y., Col. Jacob J. DeForest; 96th N. Y., Col. Edgar 16. Cul- lea; 98th N. Y., Cffl. Fred F. Wead; 139th N. Y., Lieut.- Col. Edgar Perry. Sec-,n Brigte, Brig.-Gen. Hiram Burnham: 8th Coon., Capt. Charles 31. Colt; loth N. H., Lieut.-Col. John Coughlil; 13th N. H., Col. Aaron F. Stevens; 118th N. V., Capt. Levi S. Donuiny. Third Bri- gok, Col. Guy V. Henry; 21st Conn.. Lieut.-Col. Thomas F. Barpee; 40th Mass., Lseat.-Col. George E. Marshall; 92d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Hiram Anderson, Jr.; 58th Pa., Li-it.-Col. Ion.tgomery Martin; 18fth Pa., t.ient.-t il (iiiorge K. Ioen-. SECOIiD mnVIoIx1, llrig.-(len. Jaie9 ft. M.artinilale. F irst J iri o e, Ilrig.-i leti. tlcorg i .I. Ntannaril : ali asI , ., ( ol Ant ti ri v iw e t; a tiME la-lss (althit. Fra ncis E . tiO isl inII; 27th Sta a.S t Ailliiiin A. W al k er; Ot N. J., (ta t. Atulg ustu.s TY liipsoi ; 89th N. Y., Col. If. N. Fairchidi; 55th Pa., ('alpt Ge-orge H. Iill. ,Cccood Bri- ga"e, Cul. Griffm . Stedtai,:: 11th (' lint., I.h- t.-CiL W iili:iui 1. 3tis'gliug; 5th Ste., Staj. W illam S1. MStA r- thinr; 2.1 N. It., ('01. EdIward I.. Ilaily ; 12ath N. It, 3ita. .Joint F. t.: gt' ; issthI N. Y., ('ol. Geortge 3t. ai m m. T. Riltls 11iv- o \,I llrig.-4t-1'm . ( torie s J)rsin ..r. l'irstl 'I'iqoie,(ii.Willi-ai13.Ilirtu m :4lt Si N.I., ,icut.-Clc . (,. It. Macitdo alitd; 48th N Y . I.i et.A . U1. W. Strickl-adl; I15th N. Y., Mtj. Ezra L.. Walrath ; 76th t';., Ciil. Join: C'. Ca .i.. i eii. Ncesneld J ciqaIe,, ('i. .tere- ilaimh C. Drake: 13th Ind., -'Ii. tyrns J. Dititims;: 9 -th .. ('alit. REhert .T. Grayn 112t.i N. V., (alit. .J. . 3tatews.; lfith N. Y., (C;,. J hlio n3tConihe. Thiro Beigade , Bri.- (Gci:. Adetliert Anes: 4th N. It. CTii. r.dBis 13ell: :1Id N. Y.,'(ol. Nation St. Aifril; 1:7th N. Y., (ol. Alvin White; l42d N. Y., ('ol. N. Starti:, Curtis; 97th Pa., Cil. Itelry R. fuss. ARTiL.r.RY tRIGDe., Capt. Samuel N. Elider: B. 1st 17. 8.. Capt. S. N. Elder; L, 4th U. S., Licut. Elenry it. teecher; A. 5th U. S., Lient. James E. Wilon-. On the lt of J.iile the Army of the Potot ac, at and alont Cold Harisir, numbered 103,875 present for duty," and General W. F. Sniith brought from the Army of the James about 10,000, exclulsive of 2.a00 left to guard the landing at U hite House. The losse. of the Union army from June 1st to 12th were as fiillows: SO M - iN- Engineers .............. Seconil Army Corps Fifth Army Corps Sixth Army Corp.. .. Ninth Army Corps . Eighteenth Army Corps- Cav-alry Corps.... Aggregate .... 3 3 494 2441 274 3,110 149 749 441 1,340 483 10i4 168 2,715 219 1126 3.26 1,701 448 2365 20`i 3,019 51 :128 7o 449 1844 1J077 1818 12,737 J C'a' 1, F. an:!d1;, -ulietalpt. Julius V. M-as1o, ietatleil as eseset to Lie-t.-ien. U. S. -..ra t. t See also hatteriea w-ithdilliVisias a-id corps. 'Teaipnrarilyattae-hei to th i Army of the Potomac from the Army of tihe Jame. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY, General Robert E. Lee. Thie mrganization of the Army of Northern Virginia at Coldt Itarbor was substantially the same as at the Wild-erness (ce p. 183, with the exception of some trans. fi-rs antI c-nnsoidathons of brigades (notably those iif Ed. Jiihsiiu'.s division, which had been badly shattered at si otsylv ai.a and the acessIon of Hoke's old brigade ajid thle divisions of Piekett, Breekinridge, and Hoke. Insuhli'ieut data, however, prevent the preparation of a full list of the triiops and commanders. For the same reastin the edittirs have also found it impossible to give the str-ngih of the army. It is nowhere authoritatively stasted. U[pom: tils stibject Colonel Walter H. Taylor (' Four Yers with General Lee,' p. 136) remarks: The only reilnforcements received by General Lee were as follows: Near Hanover Junction he was joined by a smiall force under General Breekinridg,. . . . I-leo strong, and Pickett'. divistoit of tL.ugstreet's 'orps, which had been on detached duty in North Carolina. Hoke's brigade of Early's division, 11 strong, which, had been on detaehed duty at the Juuetion. here also rejoined its ivision: anid ait Cold Harbor Gele--l Lee received the division of General Hiike, also jitst from North Calrollita-the two diiisiones Pieki'tt's aiid Hoke's) nunibering 11,00 iiien. The aggregate i, thece rlenuforeemieuts 114.400 men)., added to t.eneral Lee- original strength [whielh Colommel Taylor estimates ait 64,000], would give 78,400 as the aggregate of all troops engaged under him from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor." i87 K SHEEIIIAN'S RICHMOND RiAID. BY T11EFn. F. RODENXB(1RuIU. BRtEVET BItO(DIER-GENERAL, V. s. A. T Army of the Potomac had beetn hibernlating onF,- thel left bank of the Rapidain River. when as the season for active operations was alnoot to open (April. 1 ,-t4) there arrived a lieutenant-gen- eri coniiandinig and :n chief of cavalry. The one vas no.t unknoosni to fame; the other was almost an entire stranger to his new command. Duinug the first two vears of the war the Union cavalry lacked the paternal care essential to its proper development. Its first father was General Hooker, who organized a multitude of detachments into a compact army corps of 1-2,4 44t1 horsemen ; transforming that which had been a by-word and a reproach into a force that, by its achievements in war, was ultimately to effect a radical change in the armament and use of mounted troops by the great military powers. The minter of I St6i3-4i4 brought little rest to the cavalry. While the artillery and infantry were comfortably quartered, the eavalry was " hutted" three miles in front of the infantry picket lines, and a part was distributed as escorts and orderlies at inifantry headquarters. Although the infantry inaintainned a picket line of its own, where it was usele.s,. the eavalry was compelled to keep up a chain of videttes sixty miles in length, besides the eneesary patrol duty and reeonnnoissances. Upon hi- arrival. Grant seennis to have noted this mal- administration and ti have takenn steps to correct it. For a chief sf his cavalry, he told the Presi- dent, lIe w anted the very best man in the army," unid few will denny that hIe got that man. I remennimer Shnerilan's arrival at the headquar- ters of the C avalry Corps. We all thought a com- nander noiilbt hav e been selected from home noaterinl]. Onne or two things that he did, how- ever. intt with warm approval. lHe set about refornintg the abuses above referred to. On one occasiol lie Was albonnt to seud a staff-officer to demand the inmmediate return to the corps of a 188 small regiment which had beeni acting as "hbody- guard" for an infantry general. The officer. de- siring for certaint reasons to seenre a modification of the order. sounded General Sheridan. who simply turned to him and in a low but distinet tone said: " Give my compliments to General X. and say that I have been Inlaced in command of the cavalry of this army, and by - I want it till." The 15. 414 't paper strength" of the corps was sifted to 12',424 effeetives. There were tilree di-isiouns. subdivided into seven brigades. Gen- eral A. T. A. Torbert was assigned to command the First Division, with Genteral G. A. Custer, Colonel T. C. Devin, and General Wesley Merritt as bnrigade commanders; General D. McM. Gregg to the Second Division, with General H. E. Davies and Colonel J. Irvin Gregg to brigades; General J. H. Wilson to the Third Division, with Colonels J. B. McIntosh and G. H. Chapmann to brigades. To each division were attached two batteries of horse artillery, with the same nuniber as a reserve. Sheridan's lieutetnatnts were well elosemn. Tor- bert had already distinguished himself as am in- fantry commander; Gregg had come fronn the regular cavalry and possessed the confidence of the wvhole corps for good judgmennt and coolness; Wilson, promoted fromn the corps of engineers, was very quick and impetuous; Merritt was a pupil of tine Cooke-Buford school, with cavalry virtues well proportioned, and to him was given the Reserve Brigade of regulars -the Old Guard. Custer was the meteorie abrrnir; McIntosh, the last of a fightinig race; Devin, the "Old War Horse "; Davies, polished, gemnial, gallannt; Chapman, the student-like; Irvini Gregg, tlne steadfast. There were, beside-s, GrahannWilliston, Buntler. Fitzhingh, Du Pont, Pennningtoi, C'lark, Ramndoiph. Brewerton, Randol, Denuison, Martin, a11 tried meni of tine horse artillery. The campaign was opened May 3d-4th, 1 81. SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. ,ith Ib bl, osr-ing otf the Itapttidai River cly tle army it t hnottilititins t (' (Ila e k a i'irti , rt're de 'il lie tii egg viti 'ttlry ilivis ti t Elw l l y's k'oril; lt heotlh r WX':r iii iiidl SMelgwi-ik), lIii Iy W ilson, tt (Ger- si t t:i F el. T' ite i.t...ys y pii'k ets wire bribrushel tihw:iyp, the 1tiiltO01i8s laid ltitiw , a1..1 the troops aind i.. li.. t '( trnitti ts- re ittiv ii to the souoth silde, tqji- 1,;,r , 13'ly itfii hL i it i' rettlitziil the fac t. (On the sito.i I l :1- Wani sea, s ntt i'-ki'tl aitd W ilson foundl hti.sl, I', f.ur the tib ', separtited frotic our itifantry utu Itt fremft td , tetir Todd's tavcrn by a strong force of cavailry u-tider Htcmpton, whiclh engaged Wil'ont vigorotusly atid after soite fighting began to tr' him hac bwk. rite opportu.ne reiiutforcemenet of two re(gi .i.... I from :regg turuted the table-s, and the enemy tis l drivn beyoilA Corbin's Bridge. Front the start Lee's cavalry was aggressive, and hy its ceaseless activity in that densely wooded regioic rentmildeti one of a swarm of bees suddenly ilistitrbed by strange footsteps. On tie 7th a more iletcrinieled effort was made by Stuart to get on the left aitd rear of Meade, tempted by the rich prize' of four thousand wagons. Torbert and Gregg were pitted against Hampton and Fitz Lee. The fight lasted from 4 P. M. until after dark, the field remaining in possession of the Union force; it was renewed early on the 8th, and after an obstinate struggle, in which the losses were heavy on both sides,-especially in officers,,-the Confederates gave it up and retired sucllenly. This was a cavalry tiffair, although in sight of the infantry of both armies. The curious blending of tragic and com- monplace elements in war was illustrated during the hottest of the fight on the second day. It was ragicig about a small farm-house apparently de- serteed; shells were bursting in the yard, especially around the old-fashioned "pole" well, bullets were pattering on the shingles, dead and wounded men and horses made the place a slaughter-house. As Captain Leoser, 2d United States Cavalry, was advancing his skirmishers near the house, the cellar door was slowly lifted and a barsh-featured woman poked her head out, looked at the well and then at the captain, and threw an empty bucket at him with the curt remark, " Yank, I reckon you kit tote me a pail o' water,' and promptly disappeared. General Grant states in his " Memoirs" that on the 5th of May he gave Sheridan verbal orders to start on act icidependent expedition toward Riehmond.) But he does not mention an inei- dent that may have precipitated that movement. It happened that on the 8th of May Grant, Meade, and Sheridan were together at army headquarters. Meade seemed somewhat acixious about his trains, acid said something to which Sheridact took ex- ceptioc. Mleade itistaittly remarked, " No, I tlon t miceact that," aind ptlt his hand, in frietidly fashion, itit Sheridant's shoulder. The cavalry general moved atside inipat iectly acid replied with spirit, "If I am li'rcuittcd to cut loo0e from this armytv I'll draw Sticart after me, and whip him, too." This was the princittal object of the Riel otoild raid: the dahicage to the eneitty was only incidemtlttl. MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE A. iUSTER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. A few hours were spent in preparation. The command was stripped of all impedimenta, such as unserviceable animals, wagons, and tents. The necessary ammunition train, two ambulances to a division, a few paek-mules for baggage, three days' rations and a half-day's forage carried on the saddlle, comprised the outfit. Torbert being h.isabled, 'Merritt assumed command of his elivi- sioII, antd Gibbs of the Reserve Brigade. On the 9th of May. 1.864, at ti A. M., this magnificent botly of 10,0040 horsemen moved out on the Tele- graph Road leading from Fredericksburg to Rich- mond. According to a Southern authority it took four hours at a brisk pace to pass a given point; to those who diewed it from behind barred win- dows and doors it was like the rush of a mighty torrent. The column as it stood, ' fours" well closed up, was thirteen miles long. It had been moving at a walk for two hours before the enemy caught up, and Wickham's brigade began to harass Sheridan's rear, It made no difference in the progress of the Union column, although numerous little brushes occurred. In one of these the 1st North Carolina Cavalry charged our rear-guard, eomisistimig of the 6th Ohio Cavalry acid a section of the 6th N Ye York Battery. In the melee a Confederate officer cut his way through the colucmn to the rear piece; plaeinrg his hand ott the gun he exclaimed, This is my piece." " Not by a d-I sight.' replied a can- noneer, as with a well-planted blow of his tiit he knocked the would-be captor off his hor-e atidi took him prisoner. Passing throicgh Chilesburg late in the aftermton. the leading brigade of Mterritt's 1livisioci ( 'itater's) took the trot atid charged ictO Beave r Dlm Statielt. oll the Virginia CecitreL Rtailroad, :It ait olitirtttmte mlloouent. Two traitis of cars carryimig woutided J "Me tnoirs," V eil. ti., 1i. 153. 189 SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. and prisoners from iSpotsyl- vania were about to start for Richmond. In a moment 37; Union captives rent the air with their cheers; ' the guard accompanying the trains escaped. leaving their armas behind, together with a large quantity of small- arms fro m the battle-field. , c"'v After reserving certain arti- , cles, the torch was applied to the trains and buildings, with 1.5,ot), 0t0 rations and _ medical stores for Lee's army. The railroad track and telegraph were destroyed s ' for some distance. the work being continued throughout the night while the main body rested. By the morning of the I0th Stuart had eoncen. trated a large force, and about breakfast-time he announced the fact by sending a few shells into Gregg's camp. A skirmish ensued, and the march was resumed to Ground Squirrel bridge over the Mouth Anna River, where all bivouacked. Even during the night the enemy buzzed about us, evidently trying to wear us out On the 11th, at 3 A. M., Davies moved to Ashland and, not with- out a severe encounter with Muuford's Vir- ginia cavalry, destroyed culverts, trestle- bridges, and six miles of track, besides a warehouse and a number of ears, losing thirty men. At . A. Yi. the main column moved on to Glen Allen Station. where Stuart's skirmish- ers were encountered and pressed back to ivithin two miles of Yellow Tavern. Here a determined stand was made for the right of way to the Confederate capital. distant only six miles. Deviii was first engaged, and soon the entire First IDivision went in. Several mounted charges were made, and two guns DTnwtddie CH. V 'k THIEKILPATRICK-DAHLGREN RAID ....". SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID ,aas-l-- SHERIDAN'S TREVI LIAN RAID -.!i"5-1 ---- HATTLpound;SO SCALE 51ISILES 15 i NOTE.- For an account of the Killatrick-DahbIgn Raid. see p. 95; and of the Trevilian Raid, see p. 233. 190 SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. and a number of prisoners were taken. A dis- patch from Stuart to Bragg asking for reenforee- inents was intercepted, disclosing the enemy's weakness. Under the circumstances the Confed- erates are entitled to the greatest credit for the pertinacity and pluck displayed. Finally Wilson with parl of his division was put in on Merritt's left, and the line, advancing, broke the enemy's grip and the fight was won. At this moment Stuart received his death-wouiid by a pistol-shot in the abdomen. Deep in the hearts of all true cavalry- men, North and South, will ever burn a sentiment of admiration mingled with regret for this knightly soldier and generous man. Sheridan had suc- ceeded in his purpose, but lie had found a foeman worthy of his steel. If defeated at this point the enemy was not an- nihilated. Richmond was awakening to its peril; and, aware of the weakness of the garrison, the Confederate authorities felt very uneasy. As when the Germans approached Paris or when Early men- aced Washington, a general call to arms was made. But Nature seemed rather favorable to defensive operations. For three days it had rained more or less, and a little rain in the region of the Chicks- hominy is known to go a great way toward making a mortar-bed of the roads and meadows. About midnight the column moved forward in the order: Wilson, Merritt, Gregg. Captain Field, 4th United States Artillery (then serving with Fitzhugh's bat- tery), writes of the experience of Wilson's command: "oWe marched all night, virtually. The halts were frequent and exasperating. It was so dark that we could only follow the cavalry by putting a bugler on a white horse directly in rear of the regiment in front of us, with orders to move on as soon as they did. Finally, whether the bugler felt asleep waiting or we fell asleep while watching the white horse, it happened that we found a gap of unknown dimensions in front of us and started at a trot to close it. I know of nothing which creates such an appalling sense of loneliness as the fact of being left behind in an enemy's country at night. It was a swampy region: the hoofs and the wheels made little or no sound. Once the deep blackness was pierced by a jet of vivid flame, and a sharp explosion on the road showed that we had sprung one of the torpedoes which had been to some extent planted there. While in doubt as to the road, we came upon s man wrapped in a blue ov-rcoat standing near a gate, who told us that General Sheridan had left him to show us the way. Of course we followed his directions and entered the gate. It was evident that we were very near the city, as we could see the lights and hear the dogs barking. The road became less plainly marked and seemed to lead into exteesive pleasure grounds, and finallywe brought up on the edge of a large fish-pond. At that moment half a dozen flashes came from what seemed to be an embankment, and we found that we were in a regular trap and immediately under the fire of one of the out- works of the ity. The guide who bad given us the di- rection w.s either a deserter or a rebel in our uniform, nd had deliberately misled us. He received the reward of his treachery, for Colonel McIntosh, who had from the first suspected him, kept bi i near him, and when their guns opened blew out his brains. with a pistol." About this time General Sheridan and staff, rid- ing in rear of Wilson's division, hearing the firing, became convinced that the Ifead of the column had passed the point where he had intended to turn in the direction of Mechanicsville. He sent off sev- eral of his staff to strike the road, which seemed as easily found as the proverbial needle in a hay- stack. But Captain F. C. Newhall did find the needle, and Merritt was sent down to Meadow Bridge to cover a crossing. In the meanwhile, as day broke, part of Wilson's command, including Fitzhugh's battery, found itself within the outer line of fortifications and threatened from all sides. South of them lay Richmond and its garrison; on the east a struggle for the bridge was going on between Merritt and an unknown force; while in a northerly direction, in rear of the main column, Gregg was standing off a force under Gordoln. It was the tightest place in which the corps ever found itself. Fitzhugh had just ordered his caissons to go down as near the bridge as he could get, as our only avenue of escape appeared to be in that direction, when upon the scene came the sturdy presence of Sheridan. He hailed Fitzhugh, "Hullo, Charley! What are you doing with your caissons "' Fitzliugh explained that if hard pressed he wanted them out of the way. With a hearty laugh Sheridan replied, "Pushed hard! Why, what do you suppose we have in front of us A lot of department clerks from Richmond, who have been forced into the ranks. I could capture Richmond, if I wanted, but I can't hold it; and the prisoners tell me that every house in the suburbs is loopholed, and the streets barricaded. It isn't worth the men it would cost; but I'll stay here all day to show these fel- lows how much I care Rr them, and go when I get ready. Send for your caissons and take it easy." As CaptainFieldsays, "It was alittle thing, but here was the spirit that burned so high at Winchester." The enemy had torn up the bridge, and were in some force on the opposite bank. Merritt dis- mounted all but three regiments, and Custer charged his men over the railroad bridge to cover the reconstruction, driving the enemy back some distance. As soon as the flooring was down the mounted force under Colonel Gibbs crossed. Gregg and Wilson covered the crossing of the ammunition and ambulance trains, and after a brisk affair with a brigade of infantry and cavalry under General Gordon, followed Merritt, to their common satis- faction. A small but enterprising Virginia news- boy had managed to slip into our lines with the morning papers, full of the alleged barbarities of the vandal horde. He seemed utterly indifferent to the horrors of war, crossed the bridge with the cavalry, and found his first Yankee customer in Lieutenant Whitehead, who eagerly exchanged a quarter for a Richmond " Inquirer," which he sent to General Sheridan. As soon as the head of our column turned to- ward the James it lost interest as an objective for the enemy. They were glad to watch us at a respectful distance, now that their beloved capital was once more safe. By way of Bottom's Bridge the corps moved to Malvern Hill and Haxall's, where much-needed supplies were procured from Butler's army; many of us exchanged our mud- stained garments for blue flannel shirts from the gun-boats lying in the James, and for the imonce became horse-marines. On the 21st Sheridan, continuing his march to rejoin Grant, crossed the Pamunkey near White House, on the ruins 191 SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. SHER11IDAN AID SOME OF HIS OENRIUALS. FPAC-SIILE OF A PHOTOSRAPIlH TAKXEN IN 1864. of the railroad bridge, after six hours' work at repairing it, two regiments at a time working as pioneers. The only incident of the crossing was the fall of a pack-mule from the bridge, from a height of thirty feet. The mule turned a somer- sault, struck an abutment, disappeared under water, came up and swam ashore without disturb- ing his pack. On the 23d the corps encamped at Aylett's, and at 5 P. m. I was sent with my regi- ment, 2d United States Cavalry, accompanied by Captains Wadsworth and Goddard of the staff, to open communication with the army, the sound of whose guns had been heard early in the day. After a forty-mile night march we had the good fortune to find General Grant near Chesterfield Station, where on the 25th the Cavalry Corps also reported, having fully performed its allotted task. It had deprived Lee's army, for the time, of its "eyes and ears," damaged his communications, destroyed an immense quantity of supplies, killed the leader of his cavalry, saved to our Govern- ment the subsistence of ten thousand horses and men for three weeks, perfected the morale of the cavalry corps, and produced a moral effect of in- calculable value to the Union cause. Sheridan's casualties on the raid were 625 men killed or wounded, and 300 horses. The Cavalry Corps returned in time to take part in an important flanking movement by the army, which in the meantime had fought the battle of Spotsylvania and had moved by the left to the North Anna River. On the 26th of May the army was posted on the north bank of that stream, withour left resting near Chesterfield bridge. [See map, p. 136.] Our infantry was now cautiously transferred from the right by the rear around the left of the line south of the river, crossing by Han- over Ferry. Sheridan, with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions, was to precede the infantry on the left, while Wilson's division threatened the enemy's left at Little River. On the 27th Torbert crossed at Hanover Ferry after some resistance by the 192 SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID. enemy's cavalry, and pushed on to Hanover Town, where he bivouacked, having captured sixty prison- ers. Having secured the desired position, Grant directed Sheridan to regain the touch with Lee's inain army. To this end Gregg was sent in the direction of Hanover Court House, but was op- posed at Hawes's Shop by the enemy's dismounted cavalry (including a brigade of South Carolina troops with long-range rifles) in an intrenched position. General Gregg writes: Inthe ehorteatpossible time both ofmy brigades were hotly engaged. Every available man was put into the tight, which had lasted some hours. Neither party would yield an inch. Through a staff-officer of General SherI- dan. I sent him word as to how we stood, and stated that with sonic additional force I could destroy the equilib- rium and go forward. Soon General Custer reported with his brigade. This he dismounted and formed on a road leading to the front and through the center of mny line. In column of platoons, with band playing, he ad- vanced. As arranged, when the head of hi. column reached my line all went forward with a tremendous yell, and the contest was of short duration. We went right over the rebels, who resisted with eourage and desperation unsurpassed. Our success cost the Second Division 256 men and officers, killed and wounded. This light has always been regarded by the 8econd Division as one of its scvereat." General Grant adds: - But our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers had been killed." A number of prisoners were taken by Gregg. On the 29th of May a reconnaissance in force was or- dered to locate the enemy's line. We could easily find his cavalry,- too easily sometimes,-but the main Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have hidden itself, andGrant'sinfantrymovedeautiously to the left and front. Sheridan was charged with the protection of our left while the general move- ment lasted. On the 30th Hancock and Warren discovered the enemy in position. Torbert was at- tacked by the Confederate cavalry near Old Church, at 2 P. x., and fought until 5 P. m., when he suc- ceeded in pressing the enemy toward Cold Harbor. Wilson had been sent to the right to cut the Virginia Central, and occupied Hanover Court House after a sharp skirmish with Young's cavalry. On the 31st Torbert saddled up at 2 A. X.; he moved toward Old Cold Harbor at 5 A. m., found the en- emy's cavalry in position, and drove them three miles upon their infantry. Retiring leisurely in search of a suitable camping-ground, Sheridanwas directed by Grant to return to Cold Harbor and "hold it at all hazards." So at 10 P. x., weary and disgusted, having been on duty for eighteen hours, we moved back and reoccupied the old rifle- pits-at least, part of the force did. The remain- der were massed in rear, lying down in front of their jaded horses, bridle-rein on arm, and gra- ciously permitted to doze. At 5 A. 1., as things remained quiet in front, coffee was prepared and served to the men as they stood to horse. Officers' packs appeared in an adjoining field, and the mess- cooks managed to broil a bone, butter a hoe-cake, and boil more coffee, and although the command remained massed the surroundings seemed more peaceful. My fourth cup of coffee was in hand when a few shots were heard in front, causing a general pricking up of ears. Soon skirmishers' compliments began to come our way and drop among the packs. Our line in the rifle-pits was at once reinforced. An amusing scene met the eye where the pack-mules had been standing: the ground was covered with the debris of officers' light baggage and mess-kits, mules were braying and kicking, and drivers were yelling, when, sud- denly, jackasses, mules, and contrabands made for the rear, encountering on the way the corps com- mander and staff, who only by turning into a convenient farm-yard escaped the deluge. The center of the line was occupied by the Re- serve Brigade (Merritt's): six hundred dismounted men of the lat and 2d United States, 6th Penn- sylvania, and 1st New York Dragoons, armed with Sharps breech-loading carbines-excepting the lot New York, which had Spencer magazine car- bines (seven-shooters). The brigade was posted on the crest of a ravine, with timber in front and rear, excepting opposite the regiment on the left where there was a clearing, and on the right which rested on a swamp. The enemy kept up a desultory fire until 8 A. M., when a compact mass of infantry, marching steadily and silently, company front, was reported moving through the timber upon our posi- tion. This timber consisted of large trees with but little undergrowth. Our men were not aware of the character of the force about to attack us. But the morale of the corps was so good and their confi- dence in Sheridan so great that when the order " to hold at all hazards " was repeated they never dreamed of leaving the spot. Foreseeing a great expenditure of ammunition, some of the cavalry- men piled even theirpistol-cartridges by their sides where they would be handy. On came the gray- coated foe, armed with Austrian muskets with sword-bayonets. These, flashing throughthe trees, caught the eye of a little Irish corporal of the 2d Cavalry, who exclaimed in astonishment, " Howly Mother ! here they come wid sabers on fut! " For a moment the skirmishers redoubled their fire, the enemy took the double-quick, and as they charged us the rebel yell rang through the forest. Then a sheet of flame came from the cavalry line, and for three or four minutes the din was deaf- ening. The repeating carbines raked the flank of the hostile column while the Sharps single-load- ers kept up a steady rattle. The whole thing was over in less than five minutes; the enemy, surprised, stunned, and demoralized, withdrew more quickly than they came, leaving their dead and wounded. We did not attempt to follow, but sent out parties to bring in the badly wounded, who were menaced with a new danger as the woods were now on fire. From prisoners we found that the attack was made by part of Kershaw's division (reported to be 1500 strong), and that they had advanced confidently, being told that "there was nothing in their front but oavalry." The tremendous racket we made hastened the ap- proach of the Sixth Corps on its way to relieve us. To them we cheerfully gave place, having taken the initiative in what was destined to be, before the sun went down, the bloody and historic battle of Cold Harbor. 193 THE DEATH OF GENERAL J. E. B. STUART. 4 BY A PRIVATE OF THE SIXTH VIRGINIA CAVALRY, C. S. A. XAJOR-GZNAL FuITHUGon LWE, C. 5. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPIL ON the morning of the fight at Yellow Tavern, May 12th, 1864, I was acting as one of Stuart's couriers. At the beginning of it I was stationed in front of the tavern, under one of a row of trees that lined the way close by. To my left, about four hundred yards off, the enemy could be easily seen emerging from a piece of woods and forming for battle. A short distance to my right I saw an irregular line of Confed- erates. Pretty soon from the enemy came lively volleys whistling through the trees and starting the dust in the road. In a few minutes I saw two horse- men approach from the Confederate side. As they drew near I recognized General Stuart and Colonel Walter Hullion. They halted near by in the road, and Stuart, taking out his field-glass, de- liberately watched the manmovres of the enemy, though balls were whizzing past him. Presently, regardless of the increasing fire, which was now accompanied with shouts, Stuart put his glass away, and taking out paper and pencil wrote an order. Handing it to Colonel Hullion, he told him to take it to General Lomax. That officer replied by pointing to me and suggesting that I should carry it. Stuart assented, and I rode off ill search of General Lomax. The firing continued to increase, and many squadrons were in sight. The enemy, awake to their superior numbers, seemed about to make a general advance, while our men were avail- ing themselves of the character of the ground to repel their attack. Aftergoing a few rods to the rear, my horse, excited by the filing, suddenly stopped anal refused to budge. After several vain attempts with the spur and the flat side of my sword to start him, I at last struck him with all my strength right between the ears. This ' downed " him, but he soon rose and ran off at the top of his speed. I soon came to where General Lomax was, and com- ing into collision with his horse gained his imme- diate attention. After reading the note he told me to go back and tell General Stuart that the order had been delivered. In a few moments I rejoined Stuart. He was sitting on his horse close behind a line of dismounted men, who were firing at the advancing Federals. The disparity of num- bers between the opposing forces was very great, to judge from appearances. Our men seemed aware of their inferior strength, but were not dismayed. The enemy confidently pressed forward with exultant shouts, delivering tremendous volleys. The Con- federates returned their fire with yells of defiance. Stuart, with pistol in hand, shot over the heads of the troops, while with words of cheer he encour- aged them. He kept saying: " Steady, men, steady. Give it to them." Presently he reeled in his saddle. His bead was bowed and his hat fell off. He turned and said as I drew nearer: "Go and tell General Lee and Dr. Fontaine to come here." I wheeled at once and went as fast as I could to do his bidding. Coming to the part of the line where General Lomax was, I told him Stuart was hurt and that he wanted General Fitz Lee. He pointed to the left and told me to hurry. Soon I found General Lee, and delivered the message. He was riding a light gray, if I remember, and instantly upon receipt of the news went like an arrow down the line. When I returned, Stuart had been taken from his horse and was being carried by his men off the field. I saw him put in an ambulance and I followed it close behind. He lay without speak- ing as it went along, but kept shaking his head with an expression of the deepest disappointment. He died the next day, May 12th. 4 Reprinted from the " Southern Bivouac " for September, 188I. THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF.) BY G. T. BEAUREGARD, GENERAL C. S. A. ON the 23d of April, 1864, at Weldon, N. C., I assumed command of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. It included "Virginia, south of the James and Appomattox, and all that portion of North Carolina east of the mountains." The War Department was closely engaged at that time with certain opera- tions against Plymouth and NewBerne,from which great results were expected at Richmond, but about which the enemy was not much concerned, as the main object of his campaign could in no wise be affected or seriously dis- turbed by such a diversion. I did not consider this move judicious on the part of the Government, because, irrespective of other considerations, it occasioned an untimely division of some of the most available troops in my new command, rendering their immediate concentration at any threatened point very difficult, if not impossible. The destination of General Burnside's corps was not, as yet, well defined. The opinion was entertained by many that it would march upon Richmond via Petersburg. Others thought its aim was Weldon. On either hypothesis we should have been prepared to meet the assault in time, and, clearly, we were not. Taken by permission from the "North American mand of the Department of SouthCarolina, Georgia, Review " for March, 1887, and condensed. and Florida (April 19th, 1S434) by Major-General ;j General Beauregard was succeeded in corm- Samuel Jones.- EDITORS. 195 TETE DEFENSE OF DREWR Y'S BLUFF. As a matter of faet, when the Ninth Corps, under General Burnside, came from east Tennessee, it simply went to increase the strength of the AWrmy of the Potomac. But the forces under General Butler, with the addition of the (orps conlmllladed by General Gilinore and by General Smith, amounted too abiout thirty thousand men, I and were evidently being prepared for a dieter- mined advance upon Petersburg. Thus was the projected cooperation of Meade's and Butler's armies to be inaugurated. This gave the clew of the situation to the immediate advisers of President Davis. They realized, at last, the uselessness of the Plymouth and New Berne expedition; and orders came, one hurriedly following the other, instructing me to withdraw General Hoke and his forces from the outworks of New Berne, which they had already taken, and to rush them on to protect Richmond. "There is not an hour to lose," said Mr. Davis in one of his telegrams to me [May 4th]. "Had the expedition not started, I would say it should not go." I Other troops were also being ordered from other directions, and notably from South Carolina, to assist in the defense of the Confederate capital: first, Hagood's brigade; next, Wise's; and soon afterward, Colquitt's. So great was the anxiety of the Administration at this juncture that Hagood's brigade, which General Pickett, then in command of Petersburg, desired to halt oln its passage through that city, was ordered to be pushed on to Rich- mond without an instant's delay.\ I succeeded, however, in having that order rescinded, and General Hagood was thus enabled to baffle General Butler's forces, May 6th and 7th, in their assault upon the Richmond rail- road above Petersburg. General Bushrod Johnson, who had hurried from Drewry's Bluff to take part in this action, was of material assistance, although, from the position he occupied with his troops, his services were less conspicuous. Petersburg would inevitably have fallen into the hands of the enemy had not General Hagood been halted there at that most opportune hour. The Federal loss was computed at about one thousand men. Ours was quite insignificant. General Hagood and his command became the heroes of the day, and were justly looked upon as the saviors of Petersburg on that occasion. The enemy, after this repulse, appeared to have relinquished all idea of striking another immediate blow at Petersburg, and seemed now to be aiming more directly at Richmond. I was pressingly urged to leave Weldon and repair to Petersburg, where all my available forces were being concentrated, with a view to cooperate with General Ransom for the defense of the capital. But, rapid as were the movements of our troops, withdrawn from North Carolina and other points, their celerity failed to satisfy or reassure the War Department, whose trepidation grew hourly more intense, and whose orders, telegrams, and suggestions became as harassing as they were numerous. The incursion of the enemy's cavalry at Jarratt's, and the burning of Stony 4 General William F. Smith estimates the force I Telegram from Mr. Davis to General Beaure- at forty thousand. [See p. 2017.) On the basis gard, May 4th, 1864.-G. T. B. of the - Official Records" it would appear to have \ Telegram from General Bragg to General been about 36, 000.-EDITORS. Beauregard, May 3th, 1864.-G. T. B. I C6 THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF. Creek bridge, prevented me from reaching Petersburg before the 10th of May. Hoke also arrived oin that (lay, and was placed by me at the head of our advanc- ing co lumn, consistingof six brigades of infantry and eight batteries of artillery, and began an immediate march toward Drewry's Bluff, with orders to form there, or thereabout, as early a junction as practicable with Ransom's forces. As other troops were still coming in from Weldon and elsewhere, whose Organization and assignment to duty I thought best to supervise personally, I 4'oncluded not to follow oIn with the forces under Hoke, but to await the arrival of Whiting, then on his way from Wilmington. He had been or lered to Peters- b)urg to take charge of the troops in that city and its vicinity, and to relieve l'iekett, who had reported himself ill, and was unable, for the time being, to perforin any duty in the field. Drewry's Bluff was in imminent peril; so were the as'enues leading from it to Riclhmond. Whiting reached Petersburg oin the 13th. After explaining to him what my intentions were, and what I expected him to do, should I assume conimaimd at Drewry's Bluff, and give the enemy battle there, I left for the front, taking with me some twelve bun- dre(l men of Colquitt's brigade and Baker's regiment of cavalry. The road was beset with difficulties; and it was by mere chance that I sue- ceeeded in passing safely between the enemy's extreme left and the river. Our exterior lines had already been attacked and partially carriedi by some of Butler's forces. It was 3 o'clock in the morning when I arrived at Drewry's Bluff. Without a moment's delay, I held a consultation with Colonel D. B. Harris and Colonel W. H. Stevens. The former was my chief engineer, a tried and most efficient officer, who served on my staff from the first Manassas up to the time of his death, which took place on the 10th of October, 1864; tile latter was also an able engineer on duty in and around Richmond. They acquainted me with the exact state of affairs in our immediate front, and described the encounter of the previous evening between part of Butler's forces and ours. The outlook was not encouraging, although the damage incurred might have been more serious, and even General Butler, I thought, could have done better under the circumstances. Colonel Stevens had also given me, that morning, a succinct account of the last engagements between General Lee and General Grant, up to the 12th, and of the relative position of their two armies. Nor, in enumerating the strength then available for the protection of Richmond, had he omitted to mention a reserve force of some five thousand men stationed in and near the capital, and acting, at that time, as a separate command. I was thus made conversant with many a fact which greatly assisted me in forming a more correct opinion of the situation before us. Colonel Stevens had likewise furnished me with a topographical map of that portion of Virginia covered by the Confederate forces. Upon carefully examining it I saw that, as General Lee's army and my forces were on nearly a right line passing through Richmond, with General Grant's army on the left, and Butler's on the right, we still held the interior lines; and that it was possible, by prompt and decisive action, and a combined movement on our part, first, to attack and defeat Butler, and next, to turn our entire forces against Grant. I hurriedly formed a plan to that effect, and sent Colonel 197 THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF. / I -i "I I -A:. X, \ i V , 0 , i , x r2 b / / ' / F MA, h\fS; t--- ,.ni e+-: id: W:4 ,= A f t . 3 \ .ttr - He ., t i" ' S do 4, .u2 A. '' ,,L,,,4,,,,,S,2 X He X X A,,,..= ;.-....ar'e:C.re..:,W'dX g - I;;;. lo A ''Dn'''''' /4s in \ i f a. :'\ X I,\. X rgry.Sm : r , . G ': L' A D t 1 t 04 f t:FOFSFATiOSA )F )M BERMUDAHUNDRED D Amp BilviM. Stevens to Richmond for the purpose of submitting it to Mr. Davis, and of asking his consent to carry it out. Mr. Davis could not be seen; but Colonel Stevens saw General Bragg [then Chief-of-staff, C. S. A.], who thought the plan a good one, and came at once to Drewry's Bluff to confer with me. I proposed that General Lee, who was said to be, at that time, near Guiney's Station, should at once move back to the defensive lines of the Chickahominy, or even to the intermediate lines of Richmond; that a force of 10,000 men be detached from his army and sent to me without the loss of an hour, if possi- ble; that the 5000 men kept near Richmond, under Major-General Ransom, be also ordered to report promptly to me. I stated that these forces, added to mine, would give me an effective of some 25,000 men, with whom, on the very next day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, I would attack Butler's right flank, with almost the certainty of separating him from his base at Ineluding the fortes at Petersburg, we estimate Genersl Beauregard's strength at 30,000.-EDITOEB. - I i i98 1" , , , I" 'N V - I - iiz: 4: 7t THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF. Bermuda Hundred, and thus obtaining an easy victory over him. I proposed also, as an essential feature to the entire success of my plan, that, while this ,aovemenet should be in progress, General Whiting, with all his available forces at Petersburg, amounting to about four thousand men, should march from P1ort Walthall Junctioa and fall upon Butler's right rear, forcing him to the N-ery banks of James River, somewhat abreast of Drewry's Bluff, andl by this IiahIVuvre insure his unconditional surrender. And I proposed, furthermore, that with my own forces, added to those temporarily taken from the Army of Northern Virginia and the environs of Richmond, I should cross the James after disposing of Butler, and by a concerted movement strike General Grant on his left flank, while General Lee should attack him in front. General Bragg, who certainly knew where and at what distance from Drewry's Bluff General Lee's army was at that moment, gave his unreserved approval to the plan thus submitted to him. He never said, nor did he inti- mate in any way, that the reenforcements I desired from the Army of North- ern Virginia would not be able to reach Drewry's Bluff in time. He simply stated that, while concurring with me as to the feasibility of the movement, he could not command its execution without first consulting the President, and he hurried back to Richmond for the purpose of seeing him and of urging a favorable decision of the measure. Mr. Davis arrived in person between 8 and 9 o'clock that morning. He listened to me with grave attention, and I did all in my power to convince him, not only of the advisability of my plan, but of its absolute necessity at that juncture. The substance of his reply was, that he could not be recon- ciled to the idea of ordering the Army of Virginia to fall back before the Army of the Potomac; that such a manceuvre would destroy the prestige of those heroic troops and create a feeling of distrust among the people which no after-event could mitigate or redeem. I remarked to him that, however pain- ful the fact might be, it was evident the Army of Virginia, though still a bar- rier to the Army of the Potomac, and resolutely facing it wherever it moved, was none the less forcibly losing ground before it, and that the latter was gradually and surely approaching its objective point -Richmond. That in my opinion it would be better for General Lee to take a voluntary step rearward through motives of strategy, and with a view to foil the designs of his adver- sary, as I proposed he should do, than to maintain the passive defensive, and merely to follow the movements of the enemy, without making any possible headway against him. I added that the confidence of the people, far from being impaired by the carrying out of such a plan, would, on the contrary, be enhanced by it, as its plain result would be concentration, not retreat; and that concentration was, for us at this crisis, the surest-if not the only- assurance of victory. But I argued in vain. Mr. Davis adhered to his former determination, and would only agree to send me the five thousand men under Ransom. They joined my forces on the evening of the 15th. In the meantime my command had been extended (May 14th) so as to include Drewry's Bluff and its defenses. I was also expected to protect Rich- mond, and to meet any sudden move against the city on the north side. '99 200 THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF. But Mr. Davis had also objected to the cooperation of General Whiting, which formed a salient feature of my plan, be- cause, as alleged in his book, " of the haz- ard during a battle of attempting to make a junction of troops moving from 01)1)- site sides of the enemy." ' I reluctantly yielded to the "1distitict o1jcction of the President and Commander-in-Chief of our armies, and, at his request, changed General Whiting's order of march from 20 . Petersburg. But, when realizing that Ransom's forces would only join me on enemy was already erecting batteries and rifle-pits about Drewry's Bluff, I saw how important it was to attack Butler the very next morning; and, in pursuance of my original plan, after informing the President of the fact, on the 15th, at MAJ-EVIERAL B. P. U1OSE. C . A. 10: 45 A. M., I sent a telegram to Gen- FROM A PHOTOGRAPH eral Whiting directing him to march to Port Walthall and join in the attack. I, To avoid all possible misconstruc- tion of the real import of the telegram, I intrusted it to General (then Colonel) T. M. Logan, of the " Hampton Legion," temporarily on duty with me as one of my staff. I also gave him, for General Whiting, a rough copy of my order of battle for the next day. My object was to separate Butler from his base and capture his whole army, if possible. The active cooperation of Whiting was, I thought, indis- pensable to attain such an end. I organized my forces into three divisions, under Hoke, Ransom, and Col- quitt, and called these officers to my headquarters to explain to them the part I expected each and all to play in the impending attack. General Ransom was ordered to attack the Federal right flank at daybreak, to drive back the skirmishers in his front, and, following almost simultaneously with his entire ),'Rise and Fall of the Confederate Govern- sary precautions to distinguish friends from foes. ment.' Vol. II., p. 512 .-G. T. B. Please communicate this to General Hill. This Z The text of the orders is as follows: revokes all former orders of movements. 'I shall attack enemy to-morrow at daylight "P. 8.-I have just received a telegram from by river road. to cut him off from his Bermuda General Bragg, informing me that he has sent you base. You will take up your position to-night orders to join me at this place; you need not on Swift Creek, with Wise's, Martin's, Dearing's, do so, but follow to the letter the above instruc- and two regiments of Colquitt's brigade, with tions."-G. T. B. about twenty pieces under Colonel Jones. At day- 41He delivered these papers during the night of break you will march to Port walthall Junction; May 15th, as he testifies in a letter to me bearing and when you hear an engagement in your front on this point, where he adds that "General Whit- you will advance boldly and rapidly, by the shortest ing read the dispatches, expressed himself as under- road, in direction of heaviest firing, to attack en- standing them entirely, and gave orders for the em-inrearorflank. Youwillprotectyouradvanee advance of his entire force by daylight the next and flanks with Dearing's cavalry, taking neces- morning."-G. T. B. THE DEFENSE OF DREWR Y'S BLUFF. force, to pivot at the proper time, and strike the enemy's flank and rear. His formation was to be in two distinct lines, supported by artillery and by Colonel Dunovant's regiment of cavalry. General Hoke, who occupied the trenches on the right of Ransom, was also to engage the enemy at daybreak with a strong line of skirmishers, and, upon causing him to fall back or waver, was to push on the whole of his coin- iniand and clear his entire front with rapidity and vigor. His orders were, likewise, to form in two lines, at an interval of four hundred yards, and abreast of the trenches, but in such a way as not to impede any of his after- movements. The use to be made of the artillery attached to his division and of Boykin's regiment of cavalry was left to his own judgment. General Colquitt's command constituted the reserve. It was composed of the only troops which I personally knew, and which had already served under me. They were ordered to form rearward of General Hoke's forces, with the center of each brigade resting on the turnpike. Their first line was to be some five hundred yards distant from Hoke's second line. The artillery attached to that division was to follow along the turnpike about three hun- dred yards in rear of the last brigade. General Whiting, with Wise's, Martin's, and Dearing's commands, with two regiments of Colquitt's brigade and twenty pieces of artillery under Colonel H. P. Jones, was to move from Petersburg, along the Petersburg and Rich- inond turnpike, and to strike the enemy's flank and rear. The substance of the above, thus orally given to the three division com- manders then with me at Drewry's Bluff, was also contained in a written circu- lar delivered to each of them,-as it had been previously outlined to General Whiting,- so that none could be taken by surprise, no matter what move- ments might be executed the next day on the different parts of the field. General Ransom began his advance at a quarter to 3 o'clock A. M. [of the 16th of May], but was much retarded by a dense fog of several hours' dura- tion. He had with him Gracie's brigade, Kemper's under Colonel Terry, Bar- ton's under Colonel Fry, and Hoke's old brigade commanded by Colonel Lewis. At 6 o'clock A. M. he had carried the enemy's breastworks in his front, tak- ing, it was claimed,-but this was afterward seriously contested,-several stand of colors and some five hundred prisoners. His troops had behaved with acknowledged gallantry Gracie's and Kempers commands having been mostly engaged, and the former having turned the enemy's right flank. But, for the purpose, it is alleged, of reestablishing his line and procuring a fresh supply of ammunition, Ransom now came to a halt, and, reporting " his loss heavy and his troops scattered by the fog," called for immediate assist- ance. At 6:30 Colquitt's brigade, except the two regiments with Whiting, went to reenforce Ransom, with orders to resume its former position as soon as its services should no longer be needed. Just at that time General Ran- som, upon being informed, as he alleged, that the enemy was driving Hoke's left, sent forward the right regiment of Lewis's brigade, which effectually checked the Federal advance until the reserve brigade came up and drove it back from our left center to the turnpike, over and beyond our works. Gen- VOL. IV. 14 201 THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF. oral Ransom was wrong in believing Hoke's left in danger. His error lay ill the fact that one of Hagood's advanced regiments, having unexpectedly come across the enemy, had been ordered back so as to give Ransom time to bring around his own left, in conformity with the order of battle already explained. The relative confusion and lull which followed these ill-timed evolutions necessitated a slight change in the original movement, in order, as stated in my report, " to relieve Hoke, on whose front the enemy had been allowed to mass his forces by the inaction of the left" Ransom was ordered to change the front of his right brigade and support it by another, en helon; then to push forward a third brigade toward Proctor's Creek and to keep a fourth one in reserve. This was to be temporary only, and the plan, as originally adopted, was to be executed as soon as we had taken possession of the river and of Proctor's Creek crossing. But the reserve brigade was already engaged with the enemy, and Ransom's own forces were advanced toward the firing of the center. He could not, therefore, carry out the order given to him, and he sent back Barton's instead of Colquitt's brigade; reporting, meanwhile, the necessity of straightening the lines he had stormed, and expressing the belief that the safety of his command would be compromised by a farther advance. Here ended the services of General Ransom and of his infantry on that day; for upon receiving the disappointing and unexpected report of the alleged situation in his front, I had ordered him to halt where he then was until further arrangements should be made to relieve him. His cavalry, however, and his artillery also, continued to do their full share of the work before them. The cavalry, under Dunovant, being dismounted, was de- ployed as skirmishers against a force occupying the ridge of Gregory's woods, the only hostile force - as afterward ascertained - which threatened the left of our line at that time. The right was seriously engaged; and there, early in the morning, Hoke had pushed on his skirmishers and freely used his artillery. The fog was all impediment for him, as it had been for Ransom, but be had none the less handled his command with that resolution and judgment for which he was conspicuous. I now quote from my official report of the battle: " Hagood and [Bushrod] Johnson were thrown forward with a section of Eshleman's Wash- ington Artillery, and found a heavy force of the enemy, with six or eight pieces of artillery, occupying the salient of the outer line of works on the turnpike and his own defensive lines. " Our artillery engaged at very short range, disabling some of the enemy's guns and blowing up two limbers. Another section of the same command opened from the right of the turn- pike. They both held their positions, though with heavy loss, until their ammunition was spent, when they were reheved by an equal number of pieces from the reserve artillery, under Major Owen. " Hagood, with great vigor and dash, drove the enemy from the outer lines in his front, captur- ing a number of prisoners, and, in conjunction ) with Johnson, five pieces of artillery - three 20- pounder Parrotts and two fine Napoleons. He then took position in the works, his left regiment being thrown forward by Hoke to connect with Ransom's right. In advancing, his regiment encountered the enemy behind a second line of works in the woods, with abatis, interlaced with L It was afterward claimed - and General Hoke confirmed the claim - that Hagood's brigade alone, with the assistance of no other command, captured these five pieces of artillery, the only ones taken by our troops from the enemy on that day.-G. T. B. 202 THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF. wire. Attack at that point not being contemplated, it was ordered back to the line of battle, but not before its intrepid advance had brought on it considerable loss. . . . "Johnson, meanwhile, had been heavily engaged. The line of the enemy bent around his right flank, subjecting his brigade, for a time, to fire in flank and front. With admirable firm- ness he repulsed frequent assaults of the enemy, moving in masses against his right and rear. Leader, officers, and men alike displayed their fitness for the trial to which they were sub- jected. . . . The brigade, holding its ground nobly, lost more than a fourth of its entire ,,tunber." I hurried two regiments of the reserve to its support, but they were not properly posted by the officer leading them, and afforded but little assistance. Two regiments of Clingman's brigade were likewise sent by General Hoke to reinforce Johnson's left. They also failed to accomplish the object for which they were pressed forward. Seeing this, I now ordered Hoke to relieve his right center with his right; and Clingman's remaining regiments and [X. D.] (Corse's whole brigade being used by him for that purpose, the enemy was soon forced to give way before them. A gap intervening between the troops on the left of Clingman and his own command led him to fall back to prevent a flank movement, thus isolating Corse, who, believing his right flank seriously menaced, retreated almost simultaneously, but not as far back as he was when first ordered to move forward. These two commands participated but little in the succeeding events of the day, though both were afterward marched again to the front, and gave evidence of their readiness to perform any duty that might be required of them. The enemy, however, did not occupy the ground from which Corse and Clingman had compelled him to retire, but held his owIN, none the less, with much stubbornness in Hagood's and John- son's front; and, though giving way to Johnson's right, succeeded in secur- ing a good position abreast of Proctor's Creek, near the turnpike, and also at the Charles Friend house. But General Johnson, with the timely assistance of the Washington Artillery, finally drove back the opposing forces from his right flank, and was thus enabled to clear his entire front. One of the pieces captured was now used against the enemy, who gave way beyond the Proctor Creek ridge, leaving but a skirmish line to keep up the appearance of a con- tinuous contest. I took advantage of this somewhat unexpected lull in the movements of the enemy, first, to inquire into the whereabouts of General Whit- ing, the sound of whose guns was said to have been heard at 1:45 P. m., but who had given no further sign of an early junction with our forces; and second, to reorganize our lines, in order to present a more united front, were the enemy to show a desire to resume the offensive. No news came of Whiting. The only portion of his force which communicated with me on the 16th was a detachment of Dearing's command, acting as an escort to General T. M. Logan, one of the bearers of my instructions to General Whiting the day before, who had come, with the utmost celerity and through great danger, to inform mue " that I need not rely on any advance being made that day by General Whiting." From him I also learned that Dearing, impatient at his command- er's tardiness to obey my orders, and desirous of accelerating General Logan's r eturn to me, had encountered the enemy's pickets near Chester, and had gal- lantly driven them in, forcing them back as far as the Half-way House and 203 THE DEFENSE OF DREWRY'S BLUFF. capturing a large number of stragglers; that there was great demoralization among the Federal troops; that nothing would have prevented Whiting from capturing the entire force of General Butler, had he followed my instructions. I ordered the original formation of our lines to be resumed, and General Hoke was directed to send two regiments along the " Court House Road" to flank the enemy at that point, if possible, and erect enfilading batteries west of the railroad. A heavy storm of rain now came on, which very much retarded the movement. The enemy had opened a telling fire upon us just at that moment, but it took us very little time to silence it. Darkness pre- vented a farther advance that evening. Butler's intrencled camp was too near, and too many obstacles might have been met with to justify any unguarded move on my part. I therefore halted the troops for the night, and sent word to General Whiting that I expected his cooperation, early the next morning, at the railroad, on the right of our line. We had defeated Butler and forced him to take refuge within his fortified lines. The communications south and west of Richmond were restored. We had achieved the main object for which our forces had encountered the enemy. But, though -unable, for the present, to do us any harm,- though hemmed in, or " bottled up," as was said of him at that time,-he was none the less there, scarcely beyond cannon-shot of us; not much weakened in number, for dur- ing the progress of the fight we had only taken some 1400 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and five stand of colors. We could and should have done more. We could and should have captured Butler's entire army. Incomplete, however, as was the result of the Confederate victory at Drewry's Bluff, it had thwarted and annulled the main object of Butler's presence at Bermuda Hundred, and his expected cboperation, later on, with General Grant. General Whiting joined me on the 17th near midday. He was thoroughly downcast. No word was spoken by him, and no attempt was made to throw off the responsibility of his failure to unite his forces to mine the day previous. He admitted the error of which he had been guilty, and expressed most heart- felt regret. At his own request he was relieved from duty in the field, and returned to the command of his department. His after-conduct during the closing scenes of the war, and his heroic conduct at Fort Fisher, contributed largely to reinstate him in the good opinion of his comrades-in-arms and of the entire South. The forces just arrived from Petersburg had scarcely been put in position, when, by order of the War Department, and against my protest, the whole of Ransom's division was withdrawn from Drewry's Bluff and marched back to Richmond. I was then pursuing the enemy, and still driving him nearer and nearer to his base. Fortunately for us, his rout of the 16th had been such as to preclude, on his part, all thought of any determined resistance. He was clearly demoralized, if not destroyed, and his main object seemed to be to reach a secure position and shield himself from all further pursuit. He was successful in that, if in no otherfeature of his plan. General Grant, who fully understood Butler's actual position with respect to mine, took imme- 204 THE DEFENSE OF DREWR Y'S BLUFF. diate advantage of the fact, and caused Smith's entire corps, numbering some sixteen thousand men, to be transferred from the Army of the James to the Army of the Potomac. Butler winced under the order, but obeyed. This reduced his force at Bermuda Hundred to about thirteen thousand. To oppose it I could command not more than twelve thousand men. The difference was insignificant; but it must be remembered that the Federal (ommandler possessed many an advantage which I had not, and that, not- withstanding his defeat and the drain made upon him, he could, and event- ually did, continue to threaten General Lee's communications with his main sources of supply through Richmond and Petersburg, thereby constantly eldlangeritig both of these cities. For that reason I considered it unwise to send reiiforcements to the Army of Northern Virginia, as the War Depart- meat was already pressing me to do. Nor could I, later on, accept the prop- sition of General Lee to leave a sufficient guard for the purpose of watching Butler's movements, and with the rest of my command move to the north side of the James, to lead the right wing of his army. But the War Department, in its great anxiety to increase the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, readily yielded to the applications of its dis- tinguished commander, and I was finally left with a portion only of Bush- rod Johnson's division, say 3200 men, and Wise's brigade, 2200 more, including the local militia, making in all some 5400 men, with whom I was expected to protect, not only the Bermuda Hundred line, but also the city of Petersburg, and, to a certain extent, even Richmond itself. Nor should I omit to mention here that fully one-third of that force had to be kept unremittingly on picket duty. COEDEXTK ROLL-CALL 205 BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. BY WM. FARRAR SMITH. BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL., . S. A. O N the 31st of March, 1864, General Grant left 0 Washington on a steamer to go and make the acquaintance of General B. F. Butler, then in command at Fort Monroe, and to deter- mine for himself by personal observation if General Butler should be left in command of the foree that was to operate from the Yorktown Peninsula in connection with the contemplated overland movement against Richmond. General Grant arrived at Fort Monroe on the morning of April 1st, went at once with General Butler to Norfolk, and satisfied him- self during the day that it was proper to leave the command of the depart- ment in the hands of General Butler. Just as General Grant was about to leave Fort Monroe to return to Washington, about sunset of the even- ing of the 1st of April, a violent gale sprang up and detained his vessel at the wharf during that night and the next day. Oil the morning of the 2(1 General Grant went ashore, and General Butler then developed his idea of at campaign by making a landing in the " bottle" formed at Bermuda Hundred bv the James and Appomattox rivers, and by operating from that position onl the enemy in rear of Richmond.), The plan was at once adopted. General Grant returned to Washington, leaving a letter of instructions dated Fort Monroe, April 2d, in which he said: " When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. The fact that has been already stated -that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your force and the Army of the Potomac - must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would beeome a unit.' Had the order directing that City Point should be taken " with as much force as possible " been construed to mean the whole force under General Butler, ) On April 1 st Butler disclosed to me his plan of binding at Bermuda Hundred. Having only re- ported to him two or three hours before, I did not like to say anything against the movement, or about my opinion that the first move should be for Petersburg. On April 2d, when General Grant came ashore, Butler got out his maps and sent for me. Not liking to oppose the campaign in Butler's presence, I did not go, but thought Grant would have some talk with me about it. He did not, but sat down and wrote Butler's instructions, which Butler understood as indorsing his plan entirely, and so I thought and still think from the text of them. After that of course I said nothing. Afterthe movement, and our first move on Petersburg from Bermuda Hundred, Gillmore and I united in a letter to General Butler. telling him that Peters- burg must be taken from the other side, and that he ought to bridge the Appomattox at the Point of Rocks so that we could cross there and get at Petersburg from the east. Butler declined, and said he was not going to build a bridge for West Point men to retreat over. Alter that we offered no advice.-W. F. S. 206 BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. the campaign would have been entirely changed for the better, anl any movement towar Ricllmofle must have beenI by way of Petersburg, which was a vital strategic point, while the sequel will ilow that the position at Beruldba Hundred, though excellent for lefensive pur- poses, was not properly sit- uated for offensive action. K o f Butler moved o y the 5th of a May in accordance with his own plan, with the Tenth7 and Eighteenth corps and the cavalry of the depart- r o nient, numbering in all about B forty thousand men, landed C Kc at Bermuda Hundred, leav- tb ing a small force at City s g Point, and marched to the neck of land between the hnde James and the Appomattox rivers. General Butler in his plan of campaign was MCAJOR-GS141RAL JOHN A. DIX. FROM APHTGA. tempted by the short line Geea i okcmada Fort Monroe on June, 2 IM2, M'id bet-ween the rivers, and, tak- .-icced (tenerni Wool at X-e York City, where the dr-ft riot. lo- ihig into account only the been' in progre-i Oieneral Foster was relieed at Fort Monroe by (teneral fButler, Xovember ii, 155 ease with which this line could be defended, forgot certain elements of great importance in an offen- sive campaign. The James River will never again present such a scene as that of the 5th. of May, 1864. Ani army of forty thousand meni was afloat on its waters, convoyed by various vessels of the navy, then under command of Admiral Lee. It was a motley array of vessels. Coasters and river steamers, ferry-boats and tugs, screw and side-wheel steamers, sloops, schooners, barges, and canal-boats raced or crawled uLp the stream toward the designated landing. General Butler, to make his own command a per- fect unit, had improvised for his own purposes at volunteer navy under the command of General C. K. Graham, an ex-navy 6fficer, who, scorning the slow and steady progress of the admiral's squadron, took the lead, followed by the fastest transports in what seemed to be some grand national pageant. For- tunately no torpedoes or masked batteries checked General Butler's commo- dore, and by sunset a brigade had been landed at Bermuda Hundred above the mouth of the Appomattox River, and by 9 o'clock of the morning of the 6th 207 BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. of May the Tenth and Eighteenth corps were in position on the line from Walthall's Landing on the Appomattox across to the James, and the work of intrenching called for l)y General Grant's letter of April 24 was begun, but not in the specified place. The line taken up was about three and a half miles in length. Richmond was on the right and Petersburg on the left. The distance between the two cities was by the turnpike about twenty-one miles. From the center of the lines to the turnpike was about two miles, and from there to Petersburg about seven miles, with two unfordable streams, Swift Creek and the Appomattox, intervening. Richmond, the objective of the army, was covered by the works at Drewry's Bluff, a little over four miles from our lines, and by the James River. Practically, the position taken up was between two fortresses with wet ditches. In this campaign, whichever way the Army of the James moved, it was weakened by two paralyzed forces, one holding the line of intrenchments, and one necessarily posted to cover the rear from the works in that direction. The colored troops, Hinks's division of infantry, nominally attached to the Eighteenth Corps, and some cavalry were left at City Point-for what purpose, unless to keep the letter of the order of April 2d, it is hard to understand. In the movements of the cam- paign they might as well have been back in Fort Monroe. Though they were wanting in drill, discipline, and actual service in the field, they had many excellent officers and a division commander who united to great brav- ery much experience and the ability to take advantage of it. On the 9th of May the two corps were ordered out in the direction of Peters- burg. The enemy were easily driven back to Swift Creek, a distance of four and a half miles, and the railroad and turnpike bridges were reached. The stream was very narrow and with steep banks, and no crossing was possible except by a bridge. Both bridges were guarded by artillery and infantry. The railroad bridge, being only covered with " ties," was impassable in the face of opposition, even by infantry. After several hours spent in ineffect- ual efforts to find a crossing place which offered a fair prospect of forcing a passage, General Gillmore, commanding the Tenth Corps, and myself met for consultatiou, and united in a letter advising General Butler that if Peters- burg was to be taken, the proper way was to throw a bridge across the Appo- mattox behind our lines and, crossing there, to assault the works at Petersburg from the east. General Butlers written answer disapproved of the sugges- tion; his spoken criticism was of such a character as to check voluntary advice during the remainder of the campaign. [See p. 206.] The army remained that night in its position on Swift Creek. On the 10th rumors were current of a large force coming from Richmond, and under General Butler's orders the troops fell back to the shelter of the intrenchments. On the night of the 11th of May instructions were received from General Butler for a movement at daybreak of the 12th in the direction of Rich- mond. The two white divisions of the Eighteenth Corps, with the exception of the force necessary to leave in the lines, reenforced by a division of the Tenth Corps, were to move out on the turnpike. General Gillmore, with the remainder of his command, was to hold the road from Petersburg. As soon 208 BUTLER 'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. as the Eighteenth Corps had passed Chester Station on the railroad, General Kautz was to move with his cavalry on the Danville road, destroying as m1ulth as possible of it. The colored (livision under General Hinks w-as to move up from City Point to Point of Roeks on the right bank of the Appomattox. The movement began shortly after daylight on the 12th, and General Weitzel in the advance on the turnpike began skirmishing shortly after leaving our lines, and steadily advanced until Red House or Red Water Creek was reached, when two pieces of artillery opened fire on hint. These were driven away, and the creek was crossed and the line formed beyontd it. Finding that the whole front of General Weitzel was covered by thfe (enemy's skirmishers, his corn- mnand was thrown to the right of the turnpike and six regiments of the re- serve division were (lep)loyel on the left. This line was pressed forward, but the advance was slow, for on the left were a dense thicket and marshy ground extending from Red House in the (irection of Proctors Creek. As the entire line did not outflank the enemy's skirmishers there (but late in the day) General Gillmore with three brigades came up and took position on the left and the troops bivouacked in the rain. During the night an- other brigade was thrown to the left in or(Ier to give General Gillmore suf- ficient, force to make a flank movement BRE1VET MAJOR-GUNEEAL JOSEPH R. HAWLEY. around the head of Proctor's Creek. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. Early on the morning of the 13th a brigade of General Brooks's division pushed. forward and seized a hill beyond Cattle Run, overlooking the enemy's position on the left bank of Proctor's. Creek. This cleared the country and allowed our line to press forward and re-form beyond Proctor's Creek at the Half- way House. In front was a line of woods. Pushing the line forward, the skirmishers found themselves on the outer edge of the woods in front of the heavy works at Drewry's Bluff. Strong profiles, with an outside ditch extending for over a mile, were in sight. Numerous embrasures were filled with artillery, and the ground had been cleared for a space of from 301 to 700 yards, which was entirely swept by the artillery in the works. A close reconnaissance by myself led me to report to General Butler that if the line were held in force by the enemy, it could not be carried by assault; that my troops were formed for an attack, and that I awaited orders to that effect. Shortly after this news was received that General Gillmore had turned the enemy's outer works and held their extreme right. I was ordered to remain in my position. At daylight on the 14th skirmishers were ordered forward, and 209 BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. those of General Turner on my left soon occupied the enemy's works in their front. The right of General Brooks and all of the front of (eneral Weitzels conunand eould make no inipression upon the enemy's skirmishers. general Brooks's left oeeupied a portion of the line of works which Turner's command had entered. General Weitzel's advance through the woods had discovered a bastion salient o0l all eminence (omnpletely commalding Weitzel's position. The works on the enemy's left fell back to the James River and Drewry's Bluff, and on the right extended on the north-west beyond any point we could see. The prong or arm of the work which General Gillmore had. turned, and which Turner and Brooks had entered, was like the spoke of a wheel, and started from the bastion salient before mentioned. A heavy fire of artillery was opened on Weitzel's lines from this salient, which lie soon after checked by sharp-shooters. The day was spent in reconnoissances, and an assault ordered by General Butler was abandoned for the want of disposable troops to form. a column. On the morning of the 15th my position gave cause for anxiety. Onl my right, extending to the river and up to Drewry's Bluff, was an open, undu- lating country more than a mile in width, and offering every facility for the movement of a heavy column on our right and rear. This was covered by 150 mounted men of the colored cavalry. My troops were all in one thin line without reserves. I succeeded in getting two additional regiments to cover a road oil my right and rear. During the afternoon of the 15th I went with Generals Weitzel and Heckman to a farm-house about one hundred yards to the right and front of Heckman's command, forming Weitzel's right. This house [Willis's f] was situated on a knoll opposite the flank of the bastion before mentioned, and commanded a good view of the country between us and the James River. This farm-house I ordered to be heavily occupied by the reserves of the pickets. On report- ing my weak and exposedl condition to General Butler, I was informed that three regiments were at the Half-way House which could be used as a reserve. During the day I had instructed Generals Brooks and Weitzel to gather tele- graph wire from the turnpike road and stretch it among the stumps in their front.4 I left the farm-house after midnight, and returned to my headquarters a short time before daylight. All was quiet at that time and the moon was shining blight. Shortly after, I was aroused by a heavy musketry and artil- lery fire on my right. [See p. 201.] On going out I found a fog so dense that a horseman was not visible fifteen yards away. I established my headquarters on the turnpike as the only place where I could be found in the fog, commu- nicated with Generals Brooks and Weitzel, sent a request to General Butler to order Gillmore to make an attack in his front, and ordered two of the reserve regiments at the Half-way House to march to the assistance of my right. I also sent orders for the artillery oil the front to be withdrawn, as :In 1S3 General Butler claimed the credit for were so near the enemy that I was fearful they the use of the wire, and intimated that in Heck- might he run over. Heckman was not in such man's case his order with reference to it was not danger of a sudden rush, and so the wire was carried out. The fact is, there was not wire enough used in, the direct front in contact with the en- to go round. Brooks and one brigade of Weitzel emy.-W. F. S. 210 BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. the fog was so dense that it was of no use and was in danger of capture. The order did not reach some of the guns most exposed until it was too late, as the bearer of the message was killed. It must be understood that the guns had to 1)0 removed by hand, as they were too close to the enemy to keep horses in the vicinity. The two reserve regiments, the 11 2th New York and the 9th Maine, arrived on1 the right in time to check a force of the enemy that was moving on our rear. While this was going on the enemy made furious assaults on the brigades of Wistar and Burnham in my front. It was impossible to get any information from personal observation; fortunately the (lease fog also hindered any intelli- gent movement of the enemy. General Weitzel soon reported to me a move- mert of the enemy still farther on his right, and as such a movement directly threatened our communications, my ar- tillery,-wbich bad been withdrawn and which was without supports,- my am- munition train, and our lines at Bermuda Huiidred, which had been left but feebly (lefended, I immediately ordered a re- tirement of the whole line, sending word to the right division of the Tenth Corps to conform to the movement in order to keep up the connection between the two coi')s. While this movement was going on [about 9 A. 31.] the fog lifted and en- abled me to watch out for my light; and having rallied those troops of Heckman's MAJOR-G"EERAL GODFREY WEITZEL brigade that had not been captured, I FROM A PHOTOGRAPH ordered an advance which, however, by some mistake in the information he received, was not begun by General Weitzel. At this time I learned that the connection with the Tenth Corps had been broken, and then gave up the idea of an advance to recover my lines. I then moved miy entire line to the might to cover the turnpike and country road parallel to it, and again advanced for the purpose of recov- ering some of my wounded. The advance was maintained until a line of battle was met in the woods and the enemy was developed on both flanks. In obedience to the orders of General Butler, I then began to retire across Proctor's Creek to return to the intrenchments. The Tenth Corps, which had not been ordered to make a diversion in the early morning, was at that time across the turnpike in rear of Proctor's Creek to cover the crossing of the Eighteenth Corps. Without further molestation, both corps reentered the historic bottle, which was at once carefully corked by a Confederate earth-work. Of the details of the fight sustained by the Eighteenth Corps on the 16th a few may be given. Brooks and Weitzel report that not a than was driven 21 1 BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. from their lines in front; that the enemy in falling over the telegraph wire were slaughtered like partridges. General Weitzel says, May 22d, 1864: "- The four regiments of Heckman's brigade were crushed by the attack, but there was no sur- prise on account of the fog, as the whole line was in line of battle and prepared for the shock, having several times received warning from the farm-house. The other seven regiments of my line did not move until, after they had twice repulsed the enemy with terrible slaughter,- he being piled in heaps over the telegraph wire,- they were ordered to fall back." In his report of May 99th General Weitzel adds: " Have just received full files of Richmond papers from 16th to 28th. The force that attacked my division was six brigades of infantry, one unattached regiment of infantry, and three bat- t-ries of artillery, all under Major-General Ransom. His entire loss was near three thousand by official lists. They have about five hundred of my own men prisoners. General Heckman, who was captured in the fight, sends word that Gillmore could easily have gone in. They speak of the wire as a devilish contrivance which none but a Yankee could devise." Ransom's division was demoralized by their repulse. :Butler, oln May 27th, 1864, says: " The number of Beauregard's wounded is 3040, which is consid- erably more than ours. We lost about 4500 in the two corps, of whom 1478 were missing." The Eighteenth Corps at Drewry's Bluff was composed of three and a half brigades stretched out in one thin line, with a mile of unguarded open country on its right. Against this force Beauregard brought seven bri- gades. It is the old story of masses thrown against a weak point. It is true that on this occasion the logical result did not follow, but the movement was skillfully planned, was as well carried out as circumstances would allow, and was a partial success. Beauregard's original plan contemplated the aid of a division from Petersburg. What changes that might have made in the result had it come on the field opportunely it is not pleasant to contemplate. Had the instructions of April 2d of General Grant been strictly carried out, and had Petersburg been promptly attacked on the 6th of May, it would doubtless have fallen, and the Southern lines of communication would have been at the mercy of General Butler. He could then have waited patiently to be attacked, and the plum he so longed for might have dropped into his mouth. At any rate Lee could not have remained north of Richmond. Between a good plan of campaign and a faulty one, in this case, was only the width of a river, and the taking of the wrong bank of the Appomattox for a line of operations brought the campaign to a most lame and impotent con- clusion in twelve days, including the day of leaving Fort Monroe. On the 13th of May General Sheridan with his cavalry corps arrived at the James River opposite Bermuda Hundred. On the 14th he came to my head- quarters and went with me to visit my lines. I pointed out to him my exposed right flank, and gave him a history of the campaign made by the Army of the James to that date, expressed my anxiety as to the future, and requested him on his return to the headquarters of General Grant to say to him for me that, in my opinion, the interests of the country would be best forwarded by withdrawing General Butler's army within its strong lines - leaving with him sufficient force to defend himself, and sending the remainder of the command to reenforce the Army of the Potomac. 212 COLD HARBOR. BY MARTIN T. McMAHON, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V. TN the opinion of a majority of its survivors, the battle of Cold Harbor 1 never should have been fought. There was no military reason to justify it. It was the dreary, dismal, bloody, ineffective close of the Lieutenant- General's first campaign with the Army of the Potomac, and corresponded in all its essential features with what had preceded it. The wide and winding path through the tangled Wilderness and the pines of Spotsylvania, which that army had cut from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, had been strewn with the bodies of thousands of brave men, the majority of them wearing the Union blue. No great or substantial success had been achieved at tny point. The fighting in the Wilderness had told heavily against us, as it must necessarily against an assaulting army in such a country. A gleam of victory had come when the selected column of the Sixth Corps, under Russell and Upton, carried the works near Spotsylvania on the 10th of May.) Failure elsewhere and conflicting orders had led to the abandon- ment of the works and the guns, and about one thousand prisoners remained as the sole fruits of the success. On the 12th, at the Bloody Angle, Han- cock had inspired the army with new hope, taking there also four thousand prisoners by a brilliant dash, but the slaughter that followed in holding the works all day had saddened his success. Gloom and discouragement had taken hold of the army also, because of the death three days before of Sedgwick, an officer who would have been worth to that army maiy thousand men. Many other leaders had fallen whose names were familiar to the rank and file, but the Sixth Corps, although commanded by Sedg- wick's most trusted lieutenant, General H. G. Wright, an able and gallant Upton was promoted the next day by telegraph to be brigadier-general - an honor he had more than once deserved.-M. T. McM. 213 COLD HARBOR. ress had been by the enemy tion than ever. which had drawn in the commenced a movement to- ward thePam- V soldier, seemed like an or- phaned household. Warren's and Hancock's fight at North Anna had been fierce but ineffective, resulting only in slaughter, of which, as usual, a sadly disproportioned share was ours. The erossings of the North Anna had been forced [see map, p. 136], but our prog- barred as before in stronger posi- .........The three corps .7':,pv +crossed had with- :n night-timeand had unke, a river formed lby the ' junctionofthe k;i North Anna and the South Anna. The ..4.....a passage of ; that river had been complet- ....... ed onMay 28, 1 and then, af- - ter three days 77- of marching, interspersed with the 1usu- al amount of fighting, the army found itself again s A itself again Confederate po-tIons at the North Anna and at Cold Harbor, with the route of confronted by march of Ewell'. corps to the latter plae. By Jed. Hlotehkl., Lee's main Top. Eng., Second Corps, A. N. V. line on the Totopotomoy. The operations which followed were known as the battle of Cold Harbor. On the afternoon of May 31st Sheridan, who was on the left flank of the army, carried, with his cavalry, a position near the old well and cross-roads known as Old Cold Harbor, and, with his men dismounted behind rough breastworks, held it against Fitzhugh Lee until night. To this point, dur- ing the night, marched the vanguard of the Army of the Potomac, the 214 COLD HARBOR. Sixth Corps, under Wright, over roads that were many inches deep in dlust. Thei night was sultry and oppressive. Many of our horses and mules were dlying of thirst, yet they had to be forced through streams without halting to drink. Frequent messengers from Sheridan came during the night, urging the importance of rapid movement. About 9 the next day (June 1st) the head of the column reached Sheridan's position, and the cavalry was with- drawn. The enemy, who had been seriously threatening Sheridan, withdrew from our immediate front to within their lines and awaited us, occupying a strong outer line of intrenchments in front of our center, somewhat in advance of their main position, which included that on which the battle of Gaines's Mill had been fought two years before. It covered the approaches to the Chickahominy, which was the last formidable obstacle we had to meet before standing in front of the permanent works of Richmond. A large detachment, composed of the Eighteenth Corps and other troops from the Army of the James, under General W. F. Smith, had disembarked at White House on the Pamunkey, and was expected to connect that morning with the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor. A mistake in orders caused an unnecessary march and long delay. In the afternoon, however, Smith was in position on the right of the Sixth Corps. Late in the afternoon both corps assaulted. The attack was made vigorously, and with no reserves. The outer line in front of the right of the Sixth and the left of the Eighteenth was carried brilliantly, and the enemy was forced back, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands. On the left, where Russell advanced, our losses were severe. The men went forward under a terrible fire from front and flank, until they were ordered to lie down under such shelter as was afforded by the ground and the enemy's impenetrable slashing, to which they had advanced. Russell was wounded, but remained upon the field all day. This left the well and the old tavern at Cold Harbor in our rear, and brought us in front of the most formidable posi- tion yet held by the enemy. In front of him was a wooded country, inter- spersed with clearings here and there, sparsely populated, and full of swamps. Before daylight the Army of the Potomac stood together once more almost within sight of the spires of Richmond, and on the very ground where, under McClellan, they had defended the passage of the river they were now endeavoring to force. On the 2d of June our confronting line, on which the burden of the day must necessarily fall, consisted of Hancock on the left, Wright in the center, and Smith on the right. Warren and Burnside were still farther to the right, their lines refused, or drawn back, in the neighborhood of Bethesda Church, but not confronting the enemy. The character of the country was such that at no point could the general direction of the various corps be seen for any considerable distance. The enemy's general line, although refused at certain points and with salients elsewhere, because of the character of the country, was that of an arc of a circle, the concave side toward us, overlapping on both flanks the three corps intending to attack. The line of advance of Wright's com- mand holding the center was therefore perpendicular to that of the enemy. 215 On the. forenoon of June lIt Wright oeeupied an in- Harbor and intrenehed a new line. Waarren was north tretiehed .i. (Ilo-e to (lOd Cold Ilrbor. At that thboe of Sniith. On June 2d Hanenek funned On the left of Hoke', division formed the Confederate right, near Wright. Hill'. eerps and Breekinridge's division took New Cold Hart." auod Anderso-n's euorl (Longstreet'st position opposite, extending the Confderate line to e-teuded the tin- to, taint op Bosite leutah Churel. the Chiekahouiny. Burnside, May 30th to June tit, lDuring the afternoon W. F. Sounithi' eorps arrived on oecupied lines faeing south and west, above Syd lrl` the right of Wright, extending the l Union line to Ben- -uwmnill; Jtame id he withdrew to Warren's right 'a Chureh. At 6 o'Oeh-k St-ith anod Wright drove the Ewell's position throughout was on the Confederate enemy through the woods along the road to New Cold left. 216 COLD HARBOR. Haiicock's line, connecting with Wright's left, extended obliquely to the left and rear. A movement upon his part to the front must necessarily take him off obuliquely from the line of advance of the center. The same was true of Smith's command upon the right. What resulted from this formation the 3d of June (levelopled. No reconnoissance had been made other than the bloody one of the evening before. Every one felt that this was to be the final struggle. No further flanking marches were possible. Richmond was dead in front. No further wheeling of corps from right to left by the rear; no further dusty marches possible on that line, even "if it took all summer." The general attack was fixed for the afternoon of the 2d, and all preparations had been made, when the order was countermanded and the attack postponed until half-past four the following morning. Promptly at the hour named on the 3d of June the men moved from the slight cover of the rifle-pits, thrown up during the night, with steady, determined advance, and there rang out sud- denly on the summer air such a crash of artillery and musketry as is seldom heard in war. No great portion of the advance could be seen from any par- ticular point, but those of the three corps that passed through the clearings were feeling the fire terribly. Not much return was made at first from our infantry, although the fire of our batteries was incessant. The time of actual advance was not over eight minutes. In that little period more men fell bleeding as they advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the war. A strange and terrible feature of this battle was that as the three gallant corps moved on, each was enfiladed while receiving the full force of the enemy's direct fire in front. The enemy's shell and shot were plung- ing through Hancock's battalions from his right. From the left a similarly destructive fire was poured in upon Smith, and from both flanks on the Sixth Corps in the center. At some points the slashings and obstructions in the enemy's front were reached. Barlow, of Hancock's corps, drove the enemy from an advanced position, but was himself driven out by the fire of their second line. R. O. Tyler's brigade (the Corcoran Legion) of the same corps swept over an advance work, capturing several hundred prisoners. One officer alone, the colonel of the 164th New York [James P. MeMahon.- EDITORS.], seizing the colors of his regiment from the dying color-bearer as he fell, succeeded in reaching the parapet of the enemy's main works, where he planted his colors and fell dead near the ditch, bleeding from many wounds. Seven other colonels of Hancock's command died within those few minutes. No troops could stand against such a fire, and the order to lie down was given all along the line. At points where no shelter was afforded, the men were withdrawn to such cover as could be found, and the battle of Cold Harbor, as to its result at least, was over. Each corps commander reported and complained to Gen- eral Meade that the other corps commanders, right or left, as the case might be, failed to protect him from enfilading fire by silencing batteries in their respective fronts: Smith, that he could go no farther until Wright advanced upon his left; Hancock, that it was useless for him to attempt a further advance until Wright advanced upon his right; Wright, that it was impossi- ble for him to move until Smith and Hancock advanced to his support on VOL. IV. 15 2,7 COLD HARBOR. the right and left to shield him from the enemy's enfilade. These dispatches necessarily eaused mystification at headquarters; so much so that copies of Hancock's and Smith's dispatches were sent to Wright and copies of his to each of the others. The explanation was simple enough, although it was not knowii until reconnoissance had been made. The three corps had moved upon diverging lines, eaeh directly facing the enemy in its immediate front, and the farther ench hadl advanced the more its flank had1 become exposed. Further telegraphic correspondence followed, and at last caine a circular order to the corps commanders, understood to be from Lieuteniant-General Grant. It directed, in substance, that the three corps should advance and atta-k with their entire forces the enemys position ini their respective fronts, without reference to the movements of other troops either upon their right or left. Unity of action, so necessary to success, could certainly riot be expected from such an order. The at- tack was made here and there by the advance A of troops that had re- tired for shelter, and by merely opening fire from troops that had already reached obstacles which they could not surpass; and the corps command- ers duly reportedxthat the regular aailattack had been made AAuehA by eevfead aotand had failed. A third time the order was given for a general assault along the whole line. It MAJOReGENERtAL FRANCIII C. BARLW. FROM A PHOTOORAPH. caetthcophad quarters, was transmitted to the division headquarters, and to the brigades and the regiments without comment To move that army farther, except by regular approaches, was a simple and absolute impossibility, known to be such by every officer and man of the three corps engaged The order was obeyed by simply renewing the fire from the men as they lay in position. Shortly after midday came the order to suspend for the present all further operations, and directing corps commanders to intrench, " including their advance positions," and directing also that reconnoissances be made, "with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular approaches." The field in front of us, after the repulse of the main attack, was indeed a sad sight. I remember at one point a mute and pathetic evidence of sterling 218 valor. The 2d Connecticut Heavy Artillery, a new regiment eighteen hundred strong, had joined us but a few days before the battle. Its uniforill was I)riglit and fresh; therefore its dead were easily distinguished where thel lay. They niarked in a dotted line an obtuse angle, covering a wide front, with its alpex toward tihe enemy, and there upon his face, still in death, with his head to the works, lay the colonel, the brave and genial Colonel Elisha S. Kellogg. j When night eame on, the groans and moaning of the wounded, all our o nwn, who were lying between the lines, were heartrending. Some were etroulght in by volunteers from our intrenchments but ninny remained for three davs uncared. for beneath thea hot summer suns anid the unrefreshing dews of the sultry sumnmer nights. 'he men in the works grew impatient, yet it was against orders and was almost certain death to go beyond our earth- works. An impression COLD IIARROR, .1tJCN- :1-MIMl-PROOS .I TIE l.lNE. OIF THE prevails in the popular SECOND CORPS. IRIIM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME. mind, and with some reason perhaps, that a commander who sends a flag of truce asking permission to bury his dead and bring in his wounded has lost the field of battle. Hence the reluctance upon our part to ask a flag of truce. In effect it was done at last on the evening of the third day after the battle, when, for the most part, the wounded needed no further care and our dead had to be buried almost where they fell. The work of intrenching could only be done at night. The fire of sharp- shooters was incessant, and no man upon all that line could stand erect and live an instant. This condition of things continued for twelve days and nights: Sharp-shooters' fire from both sides went on all day; all night the zig- zags and parallels nearer to the enemy's works were being constructed. In none of its marches by day or night did that army suffer more than during those twelve days. Rations and ammunition were brought forward from parallel to parallel through the zigzag trenches, and ill some instances where regiments whose term of service had expired were ordered home, they had to leave the field crawling on hands and knees through the trenches to the rear. At 9 o'clock every night the enemy opened fire with artillery and musketry along his whole line. This was undoubtedly done under the suspicion that the Army of the Potomac had seen the hopelessness of the task before it and would withdraw in the night-time for another movement by the flank, arid, if engaged in such a movement, would be thrown into confusion by this threat of a night attack. However, no advance was made by the enemy. Another strange order came about this time. It opened with a preamble Killed on June 1st, the day on which his regiment suffered great lo"s.-EDITORS. COLD HYARBOR. 2, I9 that inasmuch as the enemy had without provocation repeatedly opened fire during the night upon our lines, therefore, at midnight of that day, the corps commanders were directed to open fire from all their batteries generally upon the enemy's position and continue it until daylight. This was coupled with the proviso that if in the opinion of a corps commander the fire would pro- voke a return from the enemy which would inflict severe damage upon his troops, then he was exempted from the operation of the orler. The com- manders of the three corps holding the front communicated with one another by telegraph with this result: Smith was satisfied that the fire which he would provoke would inflict upon him disproportionate damage. Hancock for the same reason did not intend to open fire unless the fire provoked by the other corps reached his lines. Wright adopted the same rule of action. Twelve o'clock came, and the summer night continued undisturbed. Thus things went on until the 15th of June. Preparations had been made in the meantime for the abandonment of the position and the withdrawal of the army to another line of operations. Yet the summer had scarcely begun. The army was withdrawn successfully and skillfully, and, crossing to the south bank of the James, entered upon the new campaign before Peters- burg, which culminated nearly a year thereafter in the capture of Richmond. Cold Harbor was a discouraging fight in every particular. The men could not help recalling and discussing certain facts. Two years before, this same' army had been placed much nearer Richmond with comparatively little loss. During Grant's advance from the Rapidan he had the advantage, of which he freely availed himself, of ordering troops to his assistance, not begging for them as McClellan did in vain. He depleted the defenses of Washington at his pleasure, and of new troops more than the number of men with which he commenced the campaign joined him before its termination at Appo- mattox. The line of the peninsula and the advance to Cold Harbor and the Chickahominy had been McClellan's second plan. His first had been a movement from Urbana [see Vol. II., p. 163], with the possibility in view of crossing to the south side of the James and compelling the evacuation of Richmond and its defenses. This plan had been overruled in Washington, and that of the peninsula, also suggested by McClellan, had been approved as a compromise. But the plan of an overland march to Richmond, while protected navigable waters within our control led to the very door, was fully tried between the 3d of May and the 15th of June and had failed. Whether the failure was due to faults inherent in the plan, or the belief upon the part of the Lieutenant-General that the Army of the Potomac had never been fought to its utmost in previous campaigns, or to the system, new to that army, of fighting battles by watch and wire, it is useless to inquire, and difficult to determine. " Cold Harbor," said General Grant, "is, I think, the only battle I ever fought that I would not fight over again under the circumstances " ("Around the World with General Grant," by John Russell Young, Vol. II., ch. XXXIV., p. 304); and again, in his " Memoirs," p. 276, Vol. II., " I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made." COLD HARBOR. 220 THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. BY WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH, BREVET MAJOR-.ENERAI, V. S. A. ON the 27th of May an order came from Washington to me near Ber- muda Hundred to concentrate sixteen thousand men under my com- mand ready for removal by water to a point opposite White House on the Pamunkey, there to protect a corps of bridge-builders. On the 28th I received the following order: "1 HEADQUARTERS, IN THE FIELD, Mlay :8thl, IWA. " MAJOR-GENERAL SMIrTH, Commanding Eighteenth Corps: " The transportation for your columnhaving arrived, although not in my judgment sufficient, yet in consequence of imperative orders from General- Grant your column will move to his assistance. You will use the utmost expedition in embarking and getting on. If you desire any cavalry to accompany you, please designate what regiments or battalions. I grieve much that this weakness of the Army of the Potomac has called the troops away just as we were tak- ing the offensive, and that the attack on Petersburg which was agreed on to take place to-mor- row morning must be abandoned; but it is so ordered, and, however against our wishes and judgment, we must obey. I propose to give you every facility in going off. You will have to use great caution in going up the Pamunkey and in getting into White House. The torpedoes on the water or a well-arranged surprise on land would bring your expedition to grief, as you will not have the advantage in going away which we had coming. Your destination will be exactly known by the rebels the moment you start. Indeed, they have already predicted it in their newspapers... e nBENJAMIx F. BUTLER, Major-General Commanding." In half an hour after the receipt of this order my troops were moving to Bermuda Hundred and City Point for embarkation. Learning at Fort Monroe by a telegram on the 29th that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Pamunkey, I determined to land the troops directly at White House, and the debarkation began there on the morning of the 30th and proceeded as rapidly as the limited wharf facilities would admit. The landing was covered by Captain Babcock of the V. S. Navy, in eom- mand of an old New York ferry-boat on which were mounted some bow and stern guns. The whirligig of time had brought me back to the Army of 221 . -.1 ... 222 THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. the Potomac, and that army to its campaigning grounds of 1862, it having in the interim traced a path resembling that reputed to havse beei made by the Israelites in the wilderness. I)iring the night of the 30th and the morning of the 31st I reeeived three c4)pies of an order dated Hanovertown, 1 P. at., May 2bth, and signed by General Rawlins, ehief-of-staff, directing me to leave a garrison at White Blouse and move with the remainder of the command to New Castle, on the south side of the Pamunkey River. As none of the wagons or reserve ammunition had as yet arrived, and as some of the troops were still behind, I at onee sent a confidential aide (Major P. C. F. West) to ask if the necessi- ties were such as to make it incumbent on me to move as I then stood with referente to men, transportation, and supplies, or if I should wait until I (tuld take with me the necessary transportation for the supplies. Fearing that there might be some urgent reason for the appearance at New Castle of such a force as I eould gather, and in such condition as I could move it, I devided not to await an answer to my letter but to move at once. Leaving G(ineral Adelbert Ames with 2500 men at White House. I marched at 3:30 P. mj. with about 10,000 infantry and artillery, but without wagons to carry supplies or ammunition. During the march I received the following auto- graph letter from General Grant: HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, NETAR HAWES'S SHOP, VA., May 30th, 1864, 7: 30 P. M. "MAJOR-GENERAL W. F. SMITH, Commanding Eighteenth Army Corps. " (4EXERAL: Triplicated orders have been sent to you to march up the south bank of the Pamankey to New Castle, there to await further orders. I send with this a brigade of cavalry to accompany you on the march. " As yet no farther directions can be given you than is contained in your orders. The move- ments of the enemy this evening on our left, down the Mechaniosville road, would indicate the possibility of a design on his part to get between you and the Army of the Potomac. They will be so closely watched that nothing would suit me better than such a move. Sheridan is on our left flank with two divisions of cavalry, with directions to watch as far out as he can go on the Meelanicsville and Cold Harbor roads. This, with the care you can give your left flank with the cavalry you have and the brigade sent to you, and a knowledge of the fact that any movement of the enemy toward you cannot fail to be noticed and followed up from here, will make your advance secure. The position of the Army of the Potomac this evening is as fol- lows: The left of the Fifth Corps is on the Shady Grove road, extending to the Mechanicsville road and about three miles south of the Totopotomoy. The Ninth Corps is to the right of the Fifth; then comes the Second and Sixth, forming a line being on the road from Hanover Court House to Cold Harbor and about six miles south of the Court House. " U. S. GiveT, Lieut.-General." At about 10 o'clock that night the command encamped at Bassett's, near Old Church, and about three miles from New Castle. The troops were not inured to long marches and suffered greatly from the heat. From Bassett's an aide was sent to inform General Grant of the position occupied by the Eighteenth Corps and to ask for further orders. At daylight on June 1st I received from the headquarters of General Grant an order to proceed at once to New Castle ferry, and there place the command between the Fifth and Sixth Corps. From the urgency of the order I deemed THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. minutes to be of importance, and the troops marched without breakfast. On reaching the ferry I found myself in a broad valley surrounded by hills within artillery range, but could find nothing of the Fifth or Sixth ecorpls. I at once drew back to occupy the hills behind me, and send Captain Francis U. Flarquhar of the Engineers to General Grant to say that there must have beeui so mine mistake in my order, and asking that it be rectified. Uncertain as to the position of the enemy, I began the construction of a blridge across the 'amunukey River, and while so engaged a staff-officer arrived from General rant to say that there had been a mistake in my order, and that it should have readl (old Harbor instead of New Castle ferry. The command was therefore marched back to 0ld Chureh and thence to Cold Harbor. The day was intensely hot, the dust stifling, and the progress slow, as the hea(l of the column was behind the trains of the Sixth Corps. The ranks were consequently much thinned by the falling out of exhausted inel. While we were on the march I received my first order from Meade, (direeting me to follow the Sixth Corps and form on its right at Cold Harbor. There .[ was to hold the line from Bethesda Church to Cold Harbor and join with the Sixth Corps in an attack. The distance between the two points was over three miles, and my force of less than ten thousand men would not have filled the space. As I could not fulfill both requirements of the order, I decided to join in the attack, and at once began the formation of the lines of battle. A hasty reconnoissance of the ground showed that the enemy were posted in a wood in front, which was to be reached by crossing a wide open field. On the right two broad roads, leading from Mechanicsville and Shady Grove, united on an open plain which dominated the ground over which the attack was to be made. That point required a division to hold it, leaving only two divisions, numbering about six thousand men, for the assault. While preparations were being made for the attack, a note was sent to Gen- eral Meade to inform him that, having moved from White House before the arrival of transportation or supplies, I had no ammunition except that in the cartridge-boxes, and asking that a supply might be sent to me as a reserve. About the same time General Wright, commanding the Sixth Corps, sent to say that the enemy were turning his left flank, and asking for reenforce- ments. Though entirely without support on my right, I sent two regiments from the right division. The attack was begun about 4:30 P. M. by the advance of the divisions of Generals Brooks and Devens. Under a severe fire they crossed the open field, and, entering the wood, made their way through slashings and interlaced tree-tops, and carried the rifle-pits, capturing about 250 prisoners. The bri- gade on the extreme right of the assaulting line, under the young and gallant Colonel Guy V. Henry, carried the rifle-pits in the front, but found the posi- tion commanded by an earth-work on the right flank against which no fire could be brought to bear, and the brigade fell back into the edge of the clear- ing. Beyond the woods, in another open field, was a second line of works, from which the troops received so heavy a fire that they fell back under 223 THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. l IF V UHI itJ ti URVeTaRKS 0'. T1F Cik 03 H 3A3RD11 LINK , JUNE L. FR1t1. A SKE'.TC;1 IMAIIIE AT TIHE TUM. cover, and held the line of the captured rifle-pits. The advance of the line and the necessity for holding the roads on the right had increased the length of our front so that the greater part of it was held by one line of battle, and the two divisions which had been engaged had nearly exhausted their ammu- nition. At 10: 30 P. M. I addressed a note to General Bumphreys, chief-of- staff of the Army of the Potomac, in which I wrote: I have had the honor to report my necessities and requirements for ammunition, and, hav- iig now given the present condition of my situation, must leave it for the commanding general to determine how long I can hold this line ir vigorously attacked.' About 12: 30 A. M. of the 2d I received the following order: -10:05 P. m., June 1st. You will make your dispositions to attack to-morrow morning on General Wright's right, and in conjunction with that officer's attack. This attack should be made with your whole force and as vigorously as possible. "GDEo. G. MI:ADE, Major-General." To that I returned the following reply: ' Your order for an attack is received. I have endeavored to represent to you my condition. In the present condition of my line an attack by me would be simply preposterous -not only that, but an attack on the part of the enemy of any vigor would probably carry my lines more than half their length. I have called on General Wright for about 100,000 rounds of ammuni- tion, and have asked it to-night. Deserters report enemy masing on my right for an attack in the morning.' About 2:30 A. M. I received an order postponing the contemplated attack until 3 P. M. At 7 A. MI. I received from General Wright sufficient ammunition to fil up the cartridge-boxes, which relieved a most pressing want; and during the morning a division of the Sixth Corps took the place of General Devens's division in the lines, enabling me to shorten my front so that it eould be held. A division was also ordered to take post on my right, but it failed to appear. 224 , I -,I , 0 ft, I THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. The day was spent in strengthening the position and making ready for the next conflict. In the afternoon the following circular order was received: 2:30 P. M., June 2d. Circular: The attack ordered for 5 P. x. this day is postponed t) 4: 3 A. If. to-morrow. Corps commanders will employ the interim in making examinations of the ground on their front and perfecting the arrangements for the assault. " Gzo. (G. MEADE. Major-General Commanding." Such an order of battle as was developed in that circular-an attack along the whole line-is denounced by the standard writers on the art of war, and belongs to the first period in history after man had ceased to fight in unor- galized masses. Giving up the few advantages belonging to the assailants, it increases largely the chances of successful defense, and would never be adopted by a trained general, except perhaps under certain peculiar condi- tions, where also the attacking force had an overwhelming superiority in numbers. Aghast at the reception of such an order, which proved conclu- sively the utter absence of any military plan, I sent a note to General Wright, commanding the corps on my left, asking him to let me know what was to be his plan of attack, that I might conform to it, and thus have two corps acting in ullison. General Wright replied that he was "going to pitch in." This left to me only the attack in front contemplated in the circular. The position held by the Eighteenth Corps may be briefly given: A gap of nearly two miles between its right and the left of the Fifth Corps under War- ren made it necessary to throw back the right flank of the corps to hold the open plain and roads and to prevent that flank from being turned. This neces- sity put the division on the right quite out of the battle, except in the use of its artillery at rather long range. In front of the center was a line of Con- federate earth-works like a curtain, with a flanking arrangement at either end-that on the right being somewhat exposed to the fire of the artillery of my right division, that on the left being opposed to the left of the Eighteenth and right of the Sixth Corps. Near the center was a small stream with marshy sides running toward the enemy's lines. On its right was a bluff a few feet in height affording to the troops moving down the stream partial shelter from a cross-fire from the right. The plan adopted gave to Devens, with his division, the duty of keeping the right flank secure. Martindale's division was to move down the stream to the assault, while the division of Brooks maintained our connection with the Sixth Corps on the left. At precisely 4:30 on the morning of the 3d of June Martindale's command moved down the stream, out of the woods, and against the earth-works. The first line reached the foot of the works but fell back, under the heavy front and cross fire, to the edge of the woods, but within short musket range of the line they had gallantly attempted to carry. Soon after the repulse of the first assault I made a personal inspection of General Martindale's front, and found that before again assaulting the works it would be necessary to form a line of battle faced to the right, to keep down in some measure the flank fire from the right on the assaulting column; 225, THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS A T COLD HARBOR. and also that to advance farther before the Sixth Corps advanced was to subject my troops to a heavy flank fire from the left. General Martindale was ordered to keep his column as well covered as possible, and only to advance when lie saw an advance by General Brooks on his left. I then went to inspect the front of General Brooks and direeted him to form a columnl for an assault, thinking then to inform General Wright that I would make with him a combined assault, and thus break up the eross-fire front the left. While General Brooks was forming his column, so heavy a fire from the right came in on his troops that I at once ordered him not to miove, but to keep his men sheltered till the cross-fire slackened. Going back to the right to ascertain the cause of the firing, I found that Martindale had anticipated matters, and that under his orders Stannard's brigade had made three assaults, having been repulsed in all with severe loss. I then made the following report to General Meade: " General Martindale got into so hot a place that he was forced to assault the works without the assistance of the columni of General Brooks. The assault was made three times, and each time repulsed. While I was on the front of General Brooks, the enfilading fire of the enemy was so heavy as to force me to give the order to General Brooks not to attempt to advance his column until the fire was slackened. This fire being entirely on my right, I have had nothing but artillery fire to use against it, and have therefore been unable to silence it. My troops are very much cut up, and I have no hopes of being able to carry the works in my front unless a movement of the Sixth Corps, on my left, may relieve at least one of my flanks from this gall- ing tire." In answer I received the following from the chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, dated June 3d, 8 A. M.: General Wright has been ordered to assault and to continue his attack without reference to your advance, and the commanding general directs that your assault be continued without reference to General Wright's. General Wright has, but a very short time before the receipt of your communication through Major West, reported that he was waiting your advance to enable him to assault." My right was held by General Devens, and his troops could not be spared for an assault. Of General Martindale's two brigades, Stannard's had been thoroughly used up, and Stedman, in addition to having been repulsed, was holding the line between Martindale and Devens, and also endeavoring to keep down the cross-fire from the right. Two of Brooks's brigades had suf- fered severely in the first advance and through holding their position under the terrible cross-fire. This left but one brigade of fresh troops, under Gen- eral Burnham. I had had but about ten thousand men with me on the 1st of June, on my arrival, and had already lost heavily in killed and wounded. On sending to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac for artillery ammunition some strictures were made upon what was deemed my extrava- gant use of it, and I addressed .a note to General Meade from which I make the following extract: " I have nothing to cover the entire open space on my right but my artillery, and I have tried to keep down both the enemy's artillery and infantry fire which enifiades my front by artillery fire. I have a regiment so far advanced that I cannot withdraw it without serious Ios., and the enemy are trying to get a battery in position to enfilade this regiment. It has 2 2b THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. become, therefore, somewhat of a question as to the expenditure of ammunition or muscle. All the artillery firing has been strictly under my orders, and has not exceeded the amount I have dleetmed necessary to cover my men. I regret exceedingly that the absence of my own ammumi- lion should have forced me to make the requisition. Of its propriety the general commanding nust himself be the judge." To that General Meade replied, telling me to call for all the ammunition I erequired and additional batteries if they could be used, and adding: " I am sorry to hear that General Martindale is unable to assault. I have just heard from WVarren, who is forcing the enemy back on his right. I have dlirected him to push forward his left in order to relieve the attack you are able to make." I theni wrote and asked for two batteries of rifle guns, and stated: " My last four regiments that I have got for an assault are now forming for an attack, but I dare not order it till I see more hope of success to be gained by General Warren's attack or otherwise." Later in the (lay I received a verbal order from General Meade to make another assault, and that order I refused to obey. I had carefully examined the entire front of my line, and was convinced thet no assault could succeed that did not embrace a portion of the works in "front of my right," where I was powerless to make an attack. An assault under such conditions I looked on as involving a wanton waste of life. An hour or more after I had declined to obey the order Colonel (Comstock, art engineer officer of General Grant's staff, and to-day a distin- guished officer of the Corps of Engineers, came to me and said that he had been ordered by General Grant to go over my lines. This visit was but the natural consequence of my act, and I at once directed Captain Farquhar, of the Engineers, who was on my staff, to accompany Colonel Comstock. After a reasonable lapse of time Captain Farquhar came back and, smiling, said, " Comstock was thoroughly satisfied and has gone back to report to General Grant." What Colonel Comstock reported I never knew, but I heard nothing more from headquarters on the subject. Some of the troops of other eorps must have been more advantageously situated for making an attack than the Eighteenth Corps, but no success seemed to have attended the efforts made on any part of the line, for the next order I received was dated 1:30 P. M., and read: " Orders. For the present all further offensive operations will be suspended. Corps com- manders will at once intrench the positions they now hold, including their advance positions, and will cause reconnoissances to be made with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular approaches." Myr troops were put under cover as rapidly as possible and the front line was strengthened. The last order of the day was as follows, and dated 6:30 P. sr.: " Circular to Corps Commanders. The commanding general directs you to report the con- dition of affairs in your front and what it is practicable to do to-morrow." In obedience to it I made this report: "In reference to the condition of affairs in my front, I would respectfully state that I now hold and have held all that I have gained, and am now intrenching myself as rapidly as pos- sible. In reference to what it may be practicable to do to-morrow on my front, I can only say 227 THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. that what I failed to do to-day, viz., to carry the enemy's works on my front by columns of assault on the most practicable point (on my front), I would hardly dare to recommend as practicable tomorrow with my diminished force. General Ames's column is reported quite near here, which will a little more than make good my loss of to-day." There was very little straggling during the battle,- far less than I had usually observed. Shortly after the attaek began in the morning there canme out from the fray a fine-looking sergeant in the new and untarnished uniform of a "Heavy Artillery Regiment" which had joined the army the day before. As he passed I asked him where he was going. Touching his hat in the most approved military man- t i bhner, he said, " General, I am going back tothe hill to rally." The stragglers did not always suc- ceed in reaching a place of safety, for four or five of them had hidden in a dense thicket in the ravine down which Martindale had moved. A series of f A go X l I: most unearthly screams near headquar- lters occasioned the sending of a staff- officer to ascertain the cause. He re- ported that a shell which had passed over the column of assault had ex- ploded in this thicket and had horribly mangled all the skulkers. At the close of the battle the front of MAJORa-IcEwAL HORATIO . WRIGHT. General Martindale was less than two FROM A rlOTO(..RAM. hundred yards from the enemy's line, and in the open spate between were many dead and wounded. For three days no cessation of hostilities was asked for, and common rumor gave as a reason that there was fear of a refusal, as there were no dead or wounded of the enemy between the lines to be cared for. Some of our wounded were brought in by men who risked their lives in the act, and some were rescued by digging trenches to them. The groans of such as could not be reached grew fainter and fainter until they ceased. On the morning of June 5th General Meade came to my headquarters to say that he was going to fill the gap on my right, and (luring his visit I asked him how he came to give such an order for battle as that of the 2d. He replied that he had worked out every plan for every move from the cromsing of the Rapidan onward, that the papers were full of the doings of Granss armv, and that he was tired of it, and was determined to let General Grant plan his own battles. I have no knowledge of the facts, but have always supposed that General Grant's order was to attack the enemy at 4:30 A. M. of the 3d, leaving the details to his subordinate. )During the evening some regiments rejoined which had been detained at the Pamunkey by want of transportation, and that night General Ames came up with 2500 men, having been relieved by other troops from duty at White House.-W. F. S. 228 THE EIGHTEENTH CORPS AT COLD HARBOR. On the 9th of July following, I had a conversation with General Grant about the campaign, in which I expressed the opinion that the battle of Cold Harbor was fought in contravention of military principles, with which, after some discussion, he seemingly agreed, saying that he had never said any- thing about it, because it could do no good. On the 19th of the same month he referred to the former discussion, saying that he had come to the conclu- sion that I had intended to whip him over Mcade's shoulders, and that he thought " it was a very good battle anyhow." In his report dated July 22d, 1865, General Grant devotes to the subject only the following sentences: "On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's works in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy I have reason to believe was comparatively light." There is a branch of the art of war which can be executed with such pre- cision as fairly to entitle it to be classed as a science. I refer to logistics, so far as that term relates to the moving of armies and the placing of troops at the proper time in the immediate vicinity of a chosen battle-field. Com- plete ignorance of this subject or culpable neglect ruled the logistics that brought the Army of the Potomac to the battle-field of Cold Harbor in 1864. The Union arms were robbed of the advantages of the position, and of the success gained by General Sheridan on the 31st of May, by a failure to con- (entrate the army against the right flank of the enemy early on the morning of the 1st of June. From the failure there resulted a concentration that left four exposed flanks I, in close proximity to the enemy, caused a delay of many hours in the attack of the 1st of June, made that attack fruitless in results, and gave to us the murderous order of parallel advance to battle of June 3d. In conclusion, let us review the logistics of Cold Harbor. On the 30th of May, the line held by the Army of the Potomac ran along the road from Hanover Court House to Cold Harbor, beginning at a point about six miles south of the Court House, where the right of the Sixth Corps rested. To the left came the Second, Ninth, and Fifth corps in the order named, the left of the latter corps being near Bethesda Church. On that day at White House, fifteen miles to the left, the Eighteenth Army Corps was debarking. On the 31st Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, had engaged and driven the enemy from their rifle-pits at Cold Harbor. The force he encountered con- sisted of infantry and dismounted cavalry, which proved that he was on Lee's flank when Lee had as yet but little infantry. Sheridan, thinking it unsafe to attempt to hold the place with his isolated command, retired from the town, but was met by an order to hold Cold Harbor at all hazards. Return- ingi he reoccupied the works, and strengthening them held his position until relieved by the Sixth Corps, about 10 o'clock the next morning. On the 31st the determination was reached to concentrate at Cold Harbor, and that afternoon the Sixth Corps moved under orders for Cold Harbor, about fifteen miles distant; the Second Corps was ordered to march and take position on the left of the Sixth Corps, having about the same distance to 4i The wide gap between the Eighteenth and the Fifth corps made two additional flanks.-W. F. S. 229 NOTES ON COLD HARBOR. move. The Eighteenth Corps, at White House, about thirteen miles from Cold Harbor, moved on the 31st, at 3:30 P. M., for New Castle, fifteen miles up the Pamunkey, and thence, on the 1st of June, about twelve miles to Cold Harbor, taking place on the right of the Sixth Corps, and thus crossing both the lines of march of the Sixth and Second corps. It arrived in time to join in an attack at 4: 30 P. -i. of the 1st. The Fifth Corps did rtot move at all, remain- ing in its position two miles to the right of the Eighteenth Corps. This gap threw one division of the Eighteenth Corps practically out of action on both the days of battle. When the concentration near Cold Harbor was determined upon, had the Eighteenth Corps been ordered to join Sheridan it would have reached him on the night of the 31st, with about the same length of march it did make, and would have been fresh for battle early on the morning of the 1st. The Sixth Corps, moving to take position on the right of the Eighteenth, would have had a shorter march than it made, and should have been in position at an early hour of the same morning. The Second Corps, with a very short march, would have filled the gap between the Sixth and Fifth corps, andl would also have been in position for an early battle. The Ninth Corps could have marched to a proper place as a reserve. The army would then have presented a continuous line and an oblique order of battle, with the right wing thrown back or refused. In speaking of a concentration much better than the one which was made by the Army of the Potomac, Jomini says: " The logistics were contemptible." NOTES ON ('OLD HARBOR. BY GEORGE CARY EGGLESTON, SERGEANT-MAJOR, LAWKIN'S VIRGINIA BATTERY. IALWAYS think of our arrival at Cold Harbor as marking a new phase of the war. By the time that we reached that position we had pretty well got over our surprise and disappointment at the eon- duet of General Grant. I put the matter in that way, because, as I remember, surprise and disap- pointment were the prevailing emotions in the ranks of the Army of Northern Virginia when we discovered, after the contest in the Wilderness, that General Grant was not going to retire behind the river and permit General Lee to carry on a campaign against Washington in the usual way, but was moving to the Spotsylvania position instead. We had been accustomed to a pro- gramme which began with a Federal advance, cul- minated in one great battle, and ended in the retirement of the Union army, the substitution of a new Federal commander for the one beaten, and the institution of a more or less offensive cam- paign on our part. This was the usual order of events, and this was what we confidently expected when General Grant crossed into the Wilderness. But here was a new Federal general, fresh from the West, and so ill-informed as to the military customs in our part of the country that when the battle of the Wilderness was over, instead of re- tiring to the north bank of the river and awaiting the development of Lee's plans, he had the temerity to move by his left flank to a new position, there to try conclusions with us again. We were greatly disappointed with General Grant, and full of curi- osity to know how long it was going to take him to perceive the impropriety of his course. But by the time that we reached Cold Harbor we had begun to understand what our new adver- sary meant, and there, for the first time, I think, the men in the ranks of the Army of Northern Virginia realized that the era of experimental cam- paigns against us was over; that Grant was not going to retreat; that he was not to be removed from command because he had failed to break Lee's resistance; and that the policy of pounding had begun, and would continue until our strength should be utterly worn away, unless by some decisive blow to the army in our front, or some brilliant movement in diversion,-such as Early's invasion of Maryland a little later was intended to be,-we should succeed in changing the char- acter of the contest. We began to understand that Grant had taken hold of the problem of de- stroying the Confederate strength in the only way that the strength of such an army, so commanded, 230 NOTES ON COLD HARBOR. could be destroyed, and that he intended to con- tinue the plodding work till the task should be accomplished, wasting very little time or strength in efforts to make a brilliant display of general- ship in a contest of strategic wits with Lee. We at last began to understand what Grant had meant by his expression of a determination to "fight it ouit on this line if it takes all sum5ner." Our state of mind, however, was curiously illus- trative of the character of the contest, and of the people who participated in it on the part of the South. The tSouthern folk were always debaters, loving logic and taking off their hats to a syllo- gism. They hadl never been able to understand how any reasonable mind could doubt the right of secession, or fail to see the unlawfulness and iniquity of coercion, and they were in a chronic state of surprised incredulity, as the war began, that the North could indeed be about to wage a war that was manifestly forbidden by unimpeachable logic. In the same way at Cold Harbor we were all disposed to waste a good deal of intellectual energy in demonstrating to each other the absurd and un- reasonable character of General Grant's procedure. We could show that he must have lost already in that campaign more men than Lee's entire force, and ought, logically, to acknowledge defeat and retire; that having begun the contest with an over- whelming advantage in point of numbers, he ought to be ashamed to ask for reitnforcements; and that while by continuing the process of suffering great losses in order to inflict much smaller losses on us, he could ultimately wear us out, it was incon- ceivable that any general should consent to win in that unfair way. In like manner we were pre- pared to prove the wicked imbecility of his plan of campaign, a plan that could only end by placing him in a position below Richmond and Petersburg, which he might just as well reach by an advance from Fort Monroe, without the tremendous slaugh- ter of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, etc. In view of General Grant's stolid indifference to considerations of this character, however, there was nothing for us to do but fight the matter out. We had no fear of the ultimate result, however plainly our own perception of facts pointed to the inevitable destruction of our power of resistance. We had absolute faith in Lee's ability to meet and repel any assault that might be made, and to de- vise some means of destroying Grant. There was, therefore, no fear in the Confederate ranks of any thing that General Grant might do; but there was an appalling and well-founded fear of starvation, which indeed some of us were already suffering. From the beginning of that campaign our food supply had been barely sufficient to maintain life, and on the march from Spotsylvania to Cold Har- bor it would have been a gross exaggeration to de- scribe it in that way. In my own battery three hard biscuits and one very meager slice of fat pork were issued to each mail on our arrival, and that was the first food that any of us had seen since our halt at the North Anna River, two days before. The next supply did not come till two days later, and it consisted of a single cracker per man, with nto meat at all. We practiced a very rigid economy with this food, of eourse. We ate the pork raw, partly beeaulse there was no convenient means of cook- ing it, but more because cooking would have in- volved some waste. We hoarded what we had, allowing ourselves only a nibble at any one time, and that only when the pangs of hunger became unbearable. But what is the use of writing about the pangs of hunger! The words are utterly meaningless to persons who have never known actual starvation, and cannot be made otherwise than meaningless. Hunger to starving men is wholly unrelated to the desire for food as that is commonly understood and felt. It is a great agony of the whole body and of the soul as well. It is unimaginable, all- pervading pain inflicted when the strength to en- dure pain is utterly gone. It is a great despairing cry of a wasting body-a cry of flesh and blood, marrow, nerves, bones, and faculties for strength with which to exist and to endure existence. It is a horror which, once suffered, leaves an impression that is never erased from the memory, and to this day the old agony of that campaign comes back upon me at the mere thought of any living creat- ure's lacking the food it desires, even though its hunger be only the ordinary craving and the denial be necessary for the creature's health. When we reached Cold Harbor the command to which I belonged had been marching almost con- tinuously day and night for more than fifty hours without food, and for the first time we knew what actual starvation was. It was during that march that I heard a man wish himself a woman,-the only case of the kind I ever heard of,- and he tit- tered the wish half in grim jest and made haste to qualify it by adding, "or a baby." Yet we recovered our cheerfulness at once after taking the first nibble at the crackers issued to us there, and made a jest of the scantiness of the sup- ply. One tall, lean mountaineer, Jim Thomas by name, who received a slight wound every time he was uinder fire and was never sufficiently hurt to quit duty, was standing upon a bank of earth, slowly munching a bit of his last cracker and watching the effect of some artillery fire which was in progress at the time, when a bullet carried away his cap and cut a strip of hair from his head, leav- ing the scalp for a space as bald as if it had been shaved with a razor. He sat down at once to nurse a sharp headache, and then discovered that the cracker he had held in his hand was gone, leaving a mere fragment in his grasp. At first he was in doubt whether he might not have eaten it unconsciously, but he quickly discovered that it had been knocked out of his hand and crushed to bits by a bullet, whereupon as he sat there in an exposed place, where the fire was unobstructed, lie lamented his loss in soliloquy. " If I had eaten that eraeker half an hour ago, it would have been safe," he said. " I should have had none left for next time, but I have none left as it is. That shows bow foolish it is to save anything. Whew! how my head aches! I wish it was from over-eat- ing, but even the doctor couldn't lay it to that just now. The next time I stand up to watch the 231 NOTES ON COLD HARBOR. firing, I'll put my cracker-if I have any-in a safe plaee down by the breastwork, where it won't get wounded, poor thing! By the way, here's a little piece left, and that'll get shot while I sit here talking." And with that he jumped down into the ditch, carefully placed the mouthful of hard-tack at the foot of the works, and resumed his interested observation of the artillery duel. Trifling of that kind was constant among the men throughout that terrible campaign from the Wilderness to Petersburg, and while it yielded nothing worth recording as wit or humor, it has always seemed to me the most remarkable and most significant fact in the history of the time. It revealed a capacity for cheerful endurance which alone made the campaign possible on the Confed- erate side. With mercenary troops or regulars the resistance that Lee was able to offer to Grant's tremendous pressure would have been im- possible in such circumstances. The starvation and the excessive marehing would have destroyed the sorale of troops held together only by disci- pline. No historical criticism of our civil war can be otherwise than misleading if it omits to give a prominent place, as a factor, to the ehar- aeter of the volunteers on both sides, who, in ac- quiring the steadiness and order of regulars, never lost their personal interest in the contest or their personal pride of manhood as a sustaining force under trying conditions. If either side had lacked this element of personal heroism on the part of its men it would have been driven from the field long before the spring of 1865. It seems to me, the most important duty of those who now furnish the materials out of which the ultimate history of our war will be constructed is to emphasize this aspect of the matter, and in every possible way to illustrate the part which the high personal charac- ter of the volunteers in the ranks played in deter- mining the events of the contest. For that reason I like to record one incident which I had an oppor- tunity to observe at Cold Harbor. Immediately opposite the position occupied by the battery to which I belonged, and about six or eight hundred yards distant across an open field, lay a Federal battery, whose commander was manifestly a man deeply in earnest for other and higher reasons than those that govern the pro- fessional soldier: a man who fought well because be fought in what he felt to be his own cause and quarrel. His guns and ours were engaged almost continuously in an artillery duel, so that I became specially interested in him, particularly as the ex- treme precision of his fire indicated thoroughness and conscientiousness of work for months before the campaign began. One day-whether before or after the great assault I cannot now remember -that part of our line which lay immediately to the left of the position occupied by the battery to which I belonged was thrown forward to force the opposing Federal line back. It was the only large movement in the way of a charge over perfectly open ground that I ever had a chance to observe with an unobstructed view, and merely as a spec- tator. When we, with a few well-aimed shells, had fired a barn that stood between the lines, and driven a multitude of sharp-shooters out of it, the troops to our left leaped over their works and with a cheer moved rapidly across the field. The resist- ance made to their advance was not very deter- mined,-probably the Federal line at that point had been weakened by concentration elsewhere,- and after a brief struggle our men crossed the slight Federal earth-works and pressed their adversaries back into the woods and beyond my view. It was a beautiful operation to look at, and one the like of which a soldier rarely has an opportunity to see so well; but my attention was specially drawn to the situation of the artillery commander, to whom I have referred as posted immediately in our front. His position was the pivot, the point where the Federal line was broken to a new angle, when that part of it which lay upon his right band was pressed back while that on his left remained sta- tionary. He fought like a Turk or a tiger. He directed the greater part of his rapid fire upon the advancing line of Confederates, but turned a gun every few moments upon our battery, apparently by way of letting us know that he was not unmind- ful of our attentions, even when he was so busily engaged elsewhere. The bending back of the line on his right presently subjected him to a murder- ous fire upon the flank and rear. a fire against which he had no protection whatever, while we continued a furious bombardment from the front. His position was plainly an untenable one, and, so far as I could discover with a strong glass, he was for a time without infantry support. But he held his ground and continued to fight in spite of all, firing at one time as from two faces of an acute triangle. His determination was superb, and the coolness of his gunners and cannoneers was wor- thy of the unbounded admiration which we, their enemies, felt for them. Their firing increased in rapidity as their difficulties multiplied, but it showed no sign of becoming wild or hurried. Every shot went straight to the object against which it was directed; every fuse was accurately timed, and every shell burst where it was intended to burst. I remember that in the very heat of the contest there came into my mind Bulwer's superb description of Warwick's last struggle, in which he says that around the king-maker's person there "centered a little war," and I applied the phrase to the heroic fellow who was so superbly fighting against hopeless odds immediately in front of me. Several of his guns were dismounted, and his dead horses were strewn in rear. The loss among his men was appalling, but he fought on as coolly as before, and with our glasses we could see him calmly sitting on his large gray horse directing the work of his gmners and patiently awaiting t1e coming of the infantry support, without which he could not withdraw his guns. It came at last, and the batteries retired to the new line. When the battalion was gone and the brief action over, the wreck that was left behind bore sufficient witness of the fearfulness of the fire s0 coolly endured. The large gray horse lay dead upon the ground; but we preferred to believe that his brave rider was still alive to receive the pro- motion which he had unquestionably won. 232 SHERIDAN'S TREVILIAN RAID. BY THEO. F. BODEMBOUOGH, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. A. J W HILE Torbert and Gregg had been engaged near Cold Harbor, Wilson had been operating on our right flank. He fought at Mechump's Creek on May 31st, 1864; Ashland, June 1st; and Hawes's Shop and Totopotomoy Creek, June 2d. The fight at Ashland was brought on by McIntosh, ill a successful dash at the railroad bridges over the South Anna. The permanent injury of Lee's lines of supply was an important element in Grant's purposes. To this end, on the 211th of May, Hunter was directed to move down the Shenandoah Valley to Lynchburg, cut the canal, and return over the Lyiichburg branch of the Virginia Central to Char- lottesville, where it was expected he would meet Sheridan. That officer was again to " cut loose ' from the army, and, after tearing up the Virginia Central near Gordonsville, to cooperate with Hunter, if practicable. In obedience to instructions Sheri- daii, with the divisions of Torbert and Gregg, num- bering, exclusive of non-combatants, about eight thousand men, started (June 7th) from New Castle on the Pamunkey, crossed that river on pontoons, moved rapidly via Aylett's, Polecat Station, Chiles- burg, New Market, Mt. Pleasant, Young's Bridge, crossed the Souith Anna at Becker's Store, and bivouacked on the evening of the 10th at Buck Childs's, three miles from Trevilian Station. On the march, whenever the column passed near the railroad it was cut in several places. The weather was hot, and the roads heavy with dust, causing the weaker horses to drop out; in all cases where this occurred the disabled animals were shot by the rear-guard. As on the Richmond raid, trans- portation and supplies had been reduced to a minimum, the entire train, including ammunition wagons and ambulances, not exceeding 125 ve- hicles. Two days' short forage, carried on the saddle, three days' rations, and one hundred rounds of ammunition were carried by each trooper. While moving along the north side of the river, Sheridan heard that the infantry of Breckinridge was en route to Gordonsville, and that the cavalry of Hampton and Fitz Lee were in pursuit of Sheridan's column, and straining every nerve to reach the objective point first. Sheridan's intention was to cut the main line of the Virginia Central at Trevilian Station, and the Lynchburg branch at Charlottesville. At dawn of the 1 Ith of June shots were interchanged by the pickets near Trevilian. Custer was sent with his brigade by a wood-road to the left to strike the Louisa Court House road, and move up to the first-named station from the east, while the re- mainder of Torbert's division approached that point from the north-east. The bulk of Sheridan's command, preceded by the Reserve Brigade (Mer- ritt's), passed through our picket line, and as the leadingregiment, 2dUnited StatesCavalry, tooklthe trot it encountered a patrol, or advance-guard, of the enemy. This was driven back, and several pris- oners taken, who stated that they belonged to the brigade of General M. C. Butler, of Hampton's cav- alry. The Reserve Brigade advanced a quarter of a mile farther, when it found the enemy in force, dismounted, in a piece of timber, which extended across the road for some distance. Our cavalry was partly dismounted, and the entire First Di- vision became engaged. Merritt reported that "the enemy was driven through a thick, tangled briishwood for over two miles to Trevilian Station; but not without serious loss to ourselves, though we inflicted heavy punishment on the adversary in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Among his wounded was General Rosser; a colonel command- ing brigade was killed,-his body, together with most of the enemy's killed and wounded, falling into our hands. Few less than two hundred pris- oners were taken by the brigade. The enemy's re- treat finally became a rout; led horses, mounted men, and artillery all fled together in the wildest confusion. Williston, with his battery, did excel- lent practice with his guns, planting shells in the midst of the confused mass of the enemy. Trevil- ian Station was thus gained. In this retreat part of the enemy went toward Gordonsville, whilst frag- ments were driven off on the road to Louisa Court House. In their headlong career these latter came in contact with the First Brigade, which, being en- gaged toward its rear by the advance of Fitchugh Lee's division, coming from Louisa Court House, was compelled to abandon some captures it had made from the led horses and trains of the force that was engaging the rest of the division. General Custer's operations are described by Colonel A. C. M. Pennington, then commanding Horse Battery "1 M," 2d United States Artillery: - We moved out about 6 :30 A. M., the battery follow- Ing the leading regiment. As the command strnek the road we discovered the Impedimenta of a cavalry col- umn, mack-mules, ambulances, wagons, etc., all of which we captured and sent to our rear a short distance. The enemy, which turned out to be Hampton's division go- Ing toward Gordonsville ahead of us, halted and began to form. I was ordered to bring two guns forward to a position selected by General Cnster; round Custer at a high board-fenee, whIch separated him from the station (Trevillan). He told me to tiring one gun on the road and bring the other to where he stood with his staff mounted. I took up the gun and placed it in position, pointing at the board-fence, from which we wvere to knock the boards to enable us to enfilade a battery of the enemy. Number one at the gun had his axe uplifted in the act of striking, when we discovered a line of dis mounted rebel cavalry getting over a rall-fence. about a hundred yards on our right. Custer ordered every one I to get out of there,,- and we lost no time." In the meanwhile part of Hampton's force at- tacked Custer, killing some of the men and horses of the battery before it could gallop into a more fa- vorable position and open on the enemy. Colonel Alger, 5th Michigan Cavalry, got in between Hampton's dismounted men and their led horses, )See "Sheridan's Richmond Raid," p. 188, of whIch this artile is a continuation, for a map giving Sheridan's route In the Trevillan ralid.- EDrrORs. VOL. TV. 16 233 SHERIDAN'S TREVILIAN RAID. capturing about 350 men and horses. Custer sent his eapturet to his rear,-that is, toward Louisa Court House,- where also were parked his wagons and the caisson. of Pennington's battery. It was supposed that Hampton's entire force was then in front. It appears, however, that Fitz Lee, who should have been closed up on Hampton, was late in getting out that morning, and Custer, without knowing it, struck the road between them. When Lee attempted to close up he espied a wagon-train, caissons, ete. (Custer's), and obligingly took them under his protection. The spoil included all of Custer's captures (except two hundred prisoners), his headquarters wagon, and his colored cook. "Eliza," who usually occupied an antique ruin of a family carriage on the march, and was called by the soldiers " the Queen of Sheba." In one of the fluctuations of the fight that day " the Queen " es- caped, and came into camp with her employer's valise, which she had managed to secure. While moving upon the rear of the First Brigade, Fitz Lee's men also espied one of Pennington's guns in a tempting spot; theydrove away its slight support and captured the piece, but the limber and most of the artillerymen escaped. Upon report- ing this loss, Pennington said he thought the enemy intended to keep it. "I'll be d-d if they do," responded his irate chief; and collecting some thirty men, Custer led them in person where the gun was being hauled off by hand. Failing in his first attempt, he dismounted every other man of a lot of horse-holders near, and, aided by several mounted staff-officers, tharged and recov- ered the gun. The First Brigade of Gregg's Division guarded the corps train and the rear; the Second Brigade (Irvin Gregg's) was put in on the left of Torbert, and by vigorously attacking Fitz Lee enabled Custer to retire in good order and rejoin the First Division. Torbert tried to communicate with Custer sev- eral times, without success until after noon, when Captain Dana, assistant adjutant-general, managed to reach the isolated brigade, which he found in a tight place; it formed a hollow triangle pressed on all sides, but was banging away cheerfully. At one time Custer's color-bearer was killed, and to pre- vent the capture of the flag the brigade commander tore it from the statf and thrust it in his bosom. Finally about 5 P. M. the brigade was extricated and took position to Merritt's left rear. Fitz Lee now faced the Union left flank, his line being per- pendicular to Merritt's. The two parts of the Union line formed a right angle; the Reserve Bri- gade occupying the right of the line to the vertex of the angle, the Second Brigade on its left occu- pying part of the other line with the Second Di- vision, and the First (Custer's) Brigade formed en 4keloa to the left rear. On the night of the 11th the enemy retired toward Gordonsville. The morning of the 12th was Spent in a thor- ough destruction of the railroad for five miles, from Louisa Court House to a point one mile west of Trevilian. At 3 P. M. Torbert advanced toward Gordonsville to find the most direct route by which to return. He found the enemy strongly in- trenched across his path. The Confederate line faced to the east, Fitz Lee being on the right, per- pendicular to the railroad. Merritt says: - The Reserve Brigade was ordered to, attack the en- emy's left. and it was inte-nded that the First Briga - shouild eoiiperate on our lect, while the Se ...d Brigade was held In reserve. The Reserve Brigade wenit in, on an open field tn its right and attacked the enemy's lent flank vigoroasly. It was low work, iowci-er, and as the enemy was not pressed on tie left, he coneentrated his force on the bri tad1e, and by larger numnerp and fresh troops gal-, tibe cu.....and as mnuh as it enuld attend to. . . . In thus advancing, the right of the brigade was So swung around as to be exposed to the enemy's attack on its wing. This he was not slow to take advantage of, wben a squadrout nf the 2d Cavalry, my only remanining lounted suppsort to the battery, was thrown in to m-ct the attack. Com- ing up on the right of the 6th Pennsylvania. wiiich lip to that time had been the extreme right regimenit in line theyeharged gallantly. and, tbough fewinnumbers, by the ihpetu-sity of their onslaught drove the enemy back and protected the right until relieved by two regi- meats of the HSeond ingadte. Afterthestwo regiments got in position this2quadron 2d United States Cavalry- was withdrawn to again aet as support to the battery. which was ordered to, advance, a good position having been gained on the right. Right gallantly did the battery ome up in the midst of a heavy musketry fire, we being at that tite so elose to the enemy that theirshelis all flewv far overus. Planting three gun o the battery in thi - mbione, where it dealt the enemy heavy bllows, Lieutenant Wilston moved one o the bra.s 12-pounders on to the skirmish-line; 1n fact, the line was moved to the front to allow him to get an eligible position, wher be ereinined with his gun In the lace of the strengthened enemy Iwvo advanece to It. very muzzlet dealing death atid destruction In their ranks with dobube loads of caniiser. It was now dark, and t was directed to retire the bri- gade, . . . the eneetmy not advancing." The 10th New York, of Davies's brigade, also distinguishetd itself in the assault; the remainder of Gregg's division continued the destruction of the railroad. General Hampton says: "At 3:30 P. t. (t2tht a heavy attack was made on my left, where ButlB e brigadewa poted. Being repulsed, the enemya ade a succesesio of determined assaults, which were all handsomely repulsed. In the mneantim General Lee had, by my direction. reint foreed m y left with Wickham's brigade, while he took Lonaax's across to the Giorduasvllle road so as to strike the enemy on his right flank. This moement was stiucessful, and the eenemy, who had been heavily punished in frnt, when attacked on his flaiak fell back in onfus I on. I mmedi- ateiy gave orders to foll1ow him up, but It was daylight before these orders could be carried out, the fight not having ended antli 10 -. M." Hampton reports a loss in his own division of 59 killed, 258 wounded, and 295 missing; aggre- gating 612. Fitzhugh Lee's losses are not given. General Sheridan reported this day's fight aS by far the most brilliant one of the present campaign. ThTemy my's l s was very heavy. My loss in kille d an d wounded will le ebont 575. Of this number 490 were wounded. I hbroghtgt ff in my ambulances 877-all that could be transported. The remainder were, with a al-t her of the rebel wounuied that fell lute my hands, left behind. Snrgeons andn a ttendants were detailed and re mained In charge of thtb m. I captured and have now wit me 370 prisoners of war, including 20 conunissIoet offlers. My loss in captured will not exceed 1i0." From prisoners Sheridan learned that Hunter, instead of coming toward Charlottesville, was near Lexington, moving apon Lynchburg; that Ewell's corps was on its way to Lynchburg; and that 234 SHERIDAN'S TREVILIAN RAID. AIAP OF THEl BATLFt OF TREVILIAN STATION. FOR 5 lire-kinridge was at Gordonsville. , He concluded, therefore, to return. During the night of the 12th the command moved back, recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford, unsaddled the horses aind turned them out to graze; the poor animals had been without food for two days. The enemy tame in sight but once during the entire march to West Point on the York River, from which place the wounded were sent by transport to Washington. Nothing could exceed the tender care bestowed upon the wounded, and the humane treatment of the prisoners by the commanding general and his staff. Every kind of conveyance was utilized to transport the disabled: ordinary army wagons, ancient family carriages, buggies, and gigs, in all stages of decrepitude, were appropriated for am- bulance purposes. General Sheridan placed his own headquarters spring-wagon at the disposal of the medical director, Surgeon Pease, who is grate- fully remembered by hundreds who came under his treatment at this time. When it was suggested that the prisoners be paroled on the spot, Sheridan replied, "In that case it might be hard to convince people that we have captured any." In order to keep them up with the column, a portion of the command was from time to time dismounted, and the prisoners permitted to ride, so that they came in as fresh as their captors. A large number of negro refugees attached themselves to the col- tlmn and added to the difficulties of the subsist- ence department. General Humphreys, an able and, in this case, impartial critic, says (after quoting the reports of Sheridan and Hampton): It Is apparent from these accounts that General hampton was defeated and driven several miles from the position he had determined to hold against Sheri- HERMIDAN'S ROUTE DVRI1so THE RAID, SEE MAP, P. 190. dan's further advance. The conclusion of Sheridan, on the night of the 12th, was evIden.tly sound; the move- ment of Runter had rendered It Impracticable to carry out his orders in the presence or Hampton." On the 1 5th of June Sheridan learned that supplies awaited him at White House; which depot he was ordered to break up, transferring its contents to the new base. On the 19th the column crossed the Mattapony at Dunkirk, and on the 2bth its commander learned that White House was threatened by the enemy. It was guarded by a small detachment, made up of invalids, dismounted cavalry, and colored infantry. commanded by Gen- eral Getty, who was en rotae to join his permanent command. Sheridan moved leisurely to the spot. found the enemy on the bluffs overlooking the depot, and drove them away. Having made all preparations on the 24th, Sheridan took up the line of march for Petersburg, with his valuable charge of nine hundred wagons. The enemy, foiled at White House, were in an ugly mood. On this day Torbert was in front; Gregg was on the flank, where he was marehing parallel with the train when he was attacked, at St. Mary's Church, by Hampton's entire corps. After the column had started Sheridan was compelled by circumstances to change the orders for the march. A courier was dispatched to Gregg but never reached him, and. largely outnumbered, Gregg was left to fight alone. He was severely handled, but lost no guns. Gregg states to the writer, "In this engagement the light batteries, commanded respectively by Randol and Dennison, did the most effective work, unsurpassed by that on any other field." Sheridan reports, " This very creditable engagement saved the train, which should never have been left for the cavalry to escort." This Information was false. It is now known that Breckinridge had moved onl L c.vnhhbrg.-T. F. R. 23; - 11, -----..,C____ ----------------------- ' SHERIDAN'S TREVILIAN RAID. At daylight on the 29th, having seen the train safely over the James at Wilcox Landing, the Cav- alry Corps crossed and went into camp at Windmill Point. Here a little rest was anticipated, but hardly had they unsaddled when Sheridan was or- dered to move to the relief of Wilson, who, return- ing from a raid on the enemy's railroads, south of the James, was confronted by an overwhelming force. At midnight the divisions of Torbert and Greggreached Prince George Court House, to learn that Wilson had returned within our lines. Wilson's small division had been engaged in the varied and thankless duties of an infantry auxiliary until June 20th, when his command was swelled to 5000 effective men by the addition of Kautz's division (of Butler's army) of four regiments. On the 22d Wilson started under orders from Meade to cut the Weldon and Southside roads, and to continue the work of destruction "until driven from it by such attacks of the enemy as you can no longer resist." This was carried out to the letter. He moved rapidly, preceded by Kautz's division, from PrinceGeorge Court House to the Weldon road, at Reams's Station; thence (via Dinwiddie Court House) to a point on the Soutiside road, fourteen miles from Petersburg. Here W. H. F. Lee failed to detain the leading division, but (lid interrupt the march of Wilson with his own division, under MNe- Intosh. Pushing on, with the loss of seventy-five mien, Wilson further destroyed the Southside road. At Burksville, on the 26th, Kautz inflicted great damage. Wilson found the bridge over the Staun- ton River in the enemy's possession and impass- able. He then turned eastward, and moved on Stony Creek Station on the Weldon road. Here he had a sharp fight, and learned from prisoners that, in addition to a small infantry garrison, Hampton. just returned from Trevilian, was in his front. Wil- son withdrew his train in the night, and headed for Reams's, where he had good reason to think he would find Meade's infantry. On the way he was severely handled. Upon reaching Reams's, Kautz, with Wilson's advance, found it in the possession of the enemy's infantry, and by the time Wilson came tup he was virtually surrounded. Here he de- stroyed his wagons and caissons. and in an attempt to retire via Double Bridges on the Nottoway River was obliged to abandon all his artillery, and a general stampede ensued. Kautz returned with a fragment of the command by one route; Wilson, with the remnant that could be rallied, by an- other, and after meeting with many difficulties re- joined the Cavalry Corps at Lighthouse Point, July 2d. Wilson had been absent I 0 days, had marched 300 miles, and had destroyed 60 miles of railroad and much valuable rolling-stock. He had lost nearly 1 000 men and 16 guns. It is stated that General Grant declared, however, " the damage in- 9licted on the enemy more than compensated for any that had been received." At an inspection of Wilson's command, soon after its return, the Corps Inspector was struck by the variety of costume worn. Some of the men were literally in rags from too intimate acquaint- ance with bush and brier. But they were in good spirits. One fine-looking specimen of the Ameri- can volunteer, whose arms and brasses were very bright, paraded in a pair of trousers barely cover- ing his knees and barefooted. " Have you no shoes or stockingsI" demanded the astonished inspect- ing officer. "No, sir!" replied the man, with a grin; "not this side (lf Ohio." The corps remained at Lighthouse Point for the next twenty days, recuperating after more than sixty days of continuous marching and fighting. The final operations of the cavalry, prior to Sheri- dan's transfer to the Shenandoah, were not the least of its brilliant services. In connection witit the firing of the Burnside Mine, upon which so much depended, Grant arranged a cooperative demonstration by a force under Hancock, to consist of the Second Corps and two divisions of the Cavalry Corps. This force crossed the Appomattox at Point of Rocks on the night of July '26th; I lie bridge being covered with hay to muffle the sound. Before morning the James had been crossed at Deep Bottom, and some infantry at the bridge driven away. The cavalry moved toward New Market and Charles City; Torbert's division, headed by the 2d United States Cavalry, driving in the enemy's pickets on the New Market road. The Second Corps recon- noitered the enemy's works in the direction of Chaffin's Bluff. This combined advance developed a large force of the enemy's infantry in Sheridan's front, which extended from New Market to Mal- vern Hill-Gregg be"ing on the right of the line with Kautz's brigade in his rear. The cavalry line had hardly been formed when the enemy advanced to the attack and pressed our skirmish-line back over the crest of the ridge, along which the dis- mounted men lay. Lieutenant W. H. Harrison, of the Reserve Brigade, says in " Everglade to Cafion with the Second Dragoons-: - The enemy's first o 1ey passes over our heads. So closely are we pressed that we fear, unless retforced speedily, we shal low our led horses. With a cheerthat makes our hearts bound, the lst New York, lst United States, and 6th Pennsylvaia., on the run, dismounted, form themselves on our shattered line. A few volleys from our carbines .ake the Wle of rebel infantry waver, and in an instant the cry is heard along our entire liue, charge!" "'Charge!" We rush forward, firing as we advance, the enemy's colors fall, and the -North CarolIna brigad breaks lI complete rout, leaving three stand of colors, alt their killed and wounded, and many prisoners in our hand.," Two hundred and fifty prisoners were taken at this time. This counter-attack was made by the First and Second divisions simultaneously. The affair is called the battle of Darbytown. ,,. The enemy, deceived by the extended front of Hancock's force, at once sent a large part of the Petersburg garrison to succor Richmond. TheI illusion was kept up until the next day, when prep- arations were made for withdrawal. On the 30th this was effected. On August 1st Sheridan was ordered with two divisions to the Shenandoah. From May 5th to August 1st, 1864, the casu- alties in the Cavalry Corps are estimated at 5500 men, and the expenditure in horses, from all causes, about 1500. Our captures exceeded 2000 men and 500 horses, besides many guns and colors. 236 THE CAVALRY FIGHT AT TREVILIAN STATION. BY M. C. BUTLER, MAJOR-0ENERAL, C. S. A. [N June, 1 fit4, the armies of Northern Vir L ginia and of the Potomac were confronting eacl.h other in front of Richmond. Grant, in com- mnand of the latter, had ventured to move upon the -apital of the Confederacy and take it from the line of the Rapidan and Rappahannock, and every step of his mnareh had been contested by General Lee, in comnmanid of the Army of NorthernVirginia, until he finally turned the head of Grant's column toward the Jamnes River ald compelled him to adopta new line of attack. In the progress of these movements. while the splendid infantry and artil- lery of these two armies were struggling for the nastery around the Confederate capital, Hunter Was mOVilng UIp the valley at the head of a strong force toward Lynchhurg to strike at the rear of Richmond. On the 5th of June Grant detached two divisions of his cavalry under Sheridan toward Gordonsville to destroy the railroad communica- tions between Richmond and Gordonsville and Lynchburg. and possibly to form a junction with Hunter. My brigade consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 11th South Carolina Cavalry, then recently transferred from the sea-coast of South Carolina, where they had seen little active service in the field; and this, with Young's and Rosser's brigades, constituted Hampton's division. On the evening of the 8th of June we were encamped not far from Atlee's Station, on the then Virginia Central Railroad. I received orders late in the day from division head- quarters to have my command in readiness the next morniing "for extended mounted service." On the morning of the 9th of June we marched up the turn- pike toward Beaver Dam Station, and onthe follow- ing day, the 10th, we passed Louisa Court House, and bivouacked not far from Trevilian Station. Rosser's and Young's brigades, the latter under command of Colonel Wright of the Cobb Legion (General Young being absent, wounded), were in advance of my brigade, and camped higher up the road toward Gordonsville. Besides his own divi- sion Hampton had Fitzhugh Lee's, consisting of Wickham's and Lomax's brigades, and this division was in our rear, toward Louisa Court House. On the night of the 1 0th my orders were to be prepared the next morning at daylight for action. Accordingly at the dawn of day we were mounted and drawn up in column of regiments, prepared with the usual supply of ammunition, etc., for immediate action. It mav be well to state just here that my brigade, about 1300 strong, was armed with long-range Enfleld rifles, and was, in fact, mounted infantry, but for our sabers. General Rosser rode down to my bivouac about sunrise and inquired if I was informed of what we were to do, to which I replied that I knew nothing except the orders above recited, to be prepared for action at daylight, and that I was awaiting instruc- tions. Whereupon he proposed that we ride to General Hampton's headquarters at Netherland's house, about half a mile below Trevilian, and, if possible, ascertain his plans. General Hampton informed mis he expected to form a junction with General Fitzhugh Lee at Clayton's Store, where he would engage Sheridan. Rosser returned to his command, and General Hampton and I rode from Netherland's toward Clayton's Store, on a road that I was picketing, for the purpose of reconnoissanee. We had advanced but a short distance from the railroad when we were met by Captain Mul- ligan's squadron, of the 4th South Carolina, which had been on picket, retiring before the en- emy, by whom he had just been driven in. Gen- eral Hampton then ordered me to bring up my brigade and attack at once, telling me that he was expecting to hear Fitzhugh Lee's guns on my right on his way up by another road from Louisa Court House. I sent in Captain Snowden's squadron of the 4th South Carolina to charge whatever he met, and develop the force in front of us. It was soon ascertained that a heavy column of Sheridan's command was moving on us, and I thereupon dis- mounted squadron after squadron until my entire command was on foot, except Captain John C. Cal- houn's squadron of the 4th South Carolina regi- ment, and we were soon driving the enemy before us in the very thick woods. I heard firing on my right and expected every moment to form a junc- tion with Fitzhugh Lee. General Hampton also in- formed me, when I moved in from the railroad, that he wolrd hold Young's brigade in readiness to reenforee my line as the exigency might require. Consequently I went ahead until the enemy had doubled on my left flank, when I sent to the rear forYoung's brigade. On the arrival of the head of Colonel Wright's column, dismounted, I directed him to Colonel Rutledge, whose regiment, the 4th South Carolina, was on the left, and paid little at- tention to my right, where Colonel Aiken was sta- tioned with the 6th South Carolina, as I supposed it was protected by Lee's division. Colonel Wright had some difficulty in the thick undergrowth in find- ing his position on Rutledge's left, the enemy mean- time pounding us with all his might. While we were thus struggling with a superior force in my front, and the stubborn fight had been kept up at close quarters for several hours, I received infor- mation from the rear that Custer, with a mounted column, had moved by an open road to my right, around my right dank, and had captured some of my ambulances, whereupon I received orders from General Hampton to withdraw and mount my command. This was easier said than done, for Sheridan was pressing me in front and gradually t outflanking my line. I slowly withdrew by mount- ing one regiment at a time on such horses as we could reach, and fell back to a point not far from the railroad. On reaching a position where the doc- tors had established a field infirmary under a large oak-tree, I found some ambulances parked and the wounded being cared for. Meantime Rosser had thundered down the Gordonsville road, charged and scattered Custer's forces, and, together with 237 THE CAVALRY FIGHT AT TREVILIAN STATION. UAM.I-OXRNBAL TWIMAS L. ROWSER, C. I. A. FROM A PHOTOORAPI. a charge by Captain Calhoun's squadron, recap- tured what he had taken, and besides got posses- sion of Custer's headquarters ambulances and a number of his horses and men. While I was mass- ing my command near this field infirmary I received orders from division headquarters to take the Phillips Legion of Young's brigade and charge the crossing of the railroad. This I did, and drove a part of Custer's brigade in confusion into a field beyond. About the time I had reached the rail- road I was recalled to the point from which we had started, and on reaching it discovered a com- pact line of battle of blue-coats advancing, dis- mounted. I must mention at this point an act of gallantry and dash I have never seen surpassed. Lieutenant Long, of the 6th South Carolina, had a small mounted detachment acting as a provost guard; I directed him to charge the advancing en- emy and check them, while I ordered the removal of the ambulances and led horses. He promptly obeyed, and of course had many of his saddles emp- tied, but he accomplished the purpose I had in view. I formed a new line on the crest of a hill running at right angles with the position I had occupied early in the day, and formed a junction with Rouser, and kept up the contest until nightfall. My command camped that night at Green Spring Valley, two or three miles away, with light rations for the men, and nothing for our distressed and worn-out animals but bearded wheat. General Rosser was severely wounded in the leg late in the afternoon, while we were driving the enemy before us, and had to retire from the field, the command of his brigade devolving upon Colonel Richard H. Dulany, of the 7th Virginia. This day's operations ended disastrously to our arms. I venture to be- lieve that I am not claiming too much for the gal. lant troops under my immediate command when I say that they tore the brunt of the fight, and but for their stubborn and invincible courage must have been annihilated. ID. making this claim I do not wish to be understood as disparaging others, for I am confining this narrative to my own command. The next morning, the 12th of June, General Hampton placed me in command of his division. The command of my brigade devolved upon Colonel Rutledge. Celonel Aiken had been severely wounded in the engagement of the day before. Early in the forenoon I posted the division on the railroad near Denny's house, about a mile above Trevilian Station; Rutledge on the left, Young's, still commanded by Colonel Wright, in the center, and Rosser's on the right. The line formed an obtuse angle on the railroad embankment, and ex- tended off to the right with an open field in front, and to the left along the embankment. Beginning at the railroad, I had thrown up temporary breast- works of fence-rails and such materials as were available. The 6th South Carolina occupied the angle, with the 5th and 4th South Carolina regi- ments to its left along the embankment, and Young's and Rosser's brigades filling up the space to the right, with two batteries of horse artillery of four guns each-Hart's and Thomson's-stationed at convenient points or, the line. In this position [ awaited Sheridan's attack, having kept scouts well to the front to watch his movements. Between 1 and 2 o'elock P. s. I was advised of his advance, and was prepared to receive him. He drove in my skirmishers, and moved promptly upon that portion of his line occupied by Rutledge with my brigade. This attack was re- pulsed without much effort. The second attack was made with more v igor, and was directed sharply upon the angle above described, where the 6th South Carolina wac stationed. This, too, was re- pulsed; and between then and dark five distinct and determined assaults were made upon us, mak- ing seven in all. I had placed two brass howitzers of Thomson's battery just in the rear of our line, not far to the right of the angle, in the open field. As there was no protection to the men who served the guns, they were picked off and shot by Sheri- dan's sharpshooters as fast as they could take their positions. I consequently directed Major Chew, commanding the artillery battalion, to have the survivors withdrawn to a place of safety, and had to rely upon Hart's and Thomson's guns stationed farther to the right. The attacking forces would spread out, and at times open fire along our entire front, but whoever was in command of the attack- ing column, with the eye of a good soldier, selected this angle for his most determined assaults. 01O the eve of every attack we could hear in the woods preparations for the onslanght, the sounding of bugles, words of command, ete. Between sunset and dark, when the dusk of the evening was still further shrouded by the smoke of the battle, and after six assaults had been repulsed, we heard the usual preparation for another, and. as I concluded, the last desperate effort. Now 238 TIHE CAVALRY FAGHT AT TREVULAN STATION. that the dusky ataiosphere would in a measure protect the caaataoaieers from the sharp-shooters, I direeted Major Chew to reman the two howitzers Lull douable-shot them with canister, as I believed the enemy would emerge from the woods a little nore thani a stone's-throw in our front, cross the fence (which they had not previously done), and ,-ush for our line. They did just as I had antici- lpltcd, and came charging out of the woods in the opien field and into the railroad cut immediately in (ear front. Before the canister and still steady fire oIf our carbines and rifles the enemy fell back for the last rime before the deadly aim of our troops. At one time during the progress of the fight, one or two nf Sheridan's gun-as we were informed, of Pennington's battery-got in a position to en- filade my line along the railroad embankment and were piayiag havoc with my men. I called Cap- taut Hart's attention to it, and directed him to e-onventrate the fire of the six guns to our right, dt111 enadeavor to silence Pennington's enfilading lire. This was done with great promptness and ,feflacy, and the enemy's guns were silenced. At another time, Sheridan's sharp-shooters effected a bslgunent in the houses just across the railroad in uar immediate front, and kept up a destructive fire upon us from their sheltered position. I directed the guns to be turned upon them, and in a short time they set fire to the house where the greatest aaaamber of the enemy's sharp-shooters had assem- bled, and it was consumed by fire. Sheridan must have begun his retreat soon after his last charge, about dark. Pursuit by my command was out of the question. We had been engaged in this bloody encounter from its beginning without food or rest for either men or horses, in the broiling sun of a hot June day, and recuperation was absolutely necessary. As it was, I was not relieved and did not withdraw from my lines until 2 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, and in the meantime had to care for the wounded and bury the dead. Sheridan's forees consisted of two divisions, the First commanded by General A. T. A. Torbert, and the Second by General D. MeM. Gregg. The First Division was composed of the Reserve Brigadle, 1Ist, 2d, and 5th U. S. C avalry (Regulars), Gth Pennsylvania Cavalry, ist New York Dragoons, commanded by Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt, the First Brigade consisting of the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Michigan Cavalry, commanded by Briga- diir-leneral (G. A. Custer; the Second Brigade, 4th, Wth, and 0th New York Cavalry anal 17th Pewasylvania Cavalry, commanded by Colonel T. C. Devia. The Second Division, commandedl by General David MeM. Gregg, was composed of two brigades, the First, commanaled by General H. E. Davies, coaasistedh of the I t Massachusetts, ist New Jersey, 104th New York, and lot Pernsyl- vania. The Second Brigade was commanded by Colonel J. Irvin Gregg, and consisted of the 2d Penaisylvania, 4th Pennsylvania, 8th Pennsyt- vallia, 1:3th Pennsylvania, and 16th Pennsylvania, making twenty-two regiments in the two divisions. Sheridan had four batteries of horse artillery, Batteries If and 1, Ist United States (Regulars), Battery I), 2d United States, and Battery M, 2d United States. The returns of May 31st, 1864, show 454) officers and 9889 men "present for duty" in the First and Second divisions, making a total of 1 0,33:7 officers and men.4 Hampton's command consisted of, as I have stated, Butler's brigade, the 4th, 5th, and 6th South Carolina; Rosser's brigade, 7th, 11th, and 12th Virginia, and White's battalion of two com- panics; Young's brigade, Cobb's Legion, ten com- panies; Phillips Legion, six companies; Jeff Davis Legion, four companies; 7th Georgia Cavalry, ten companies, and Millen's Georgia battalion, four companies. Fitzhugh Lee's division was composed of Wickham's brigade, the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Virginia; Lomax's brigade, the 5th, 6th, and 15th Virginia, making for the two divisions, thirteen regiments and three battalions. The horse artil- lery, with Hampton at Trevilian, were three bat- teries, Hart's South Carolina, Thomson's Virginia, and one other Virginia battery. The strength of Hampton's forces cannot be given accurately, but is estimated at about 5000 all told. 4 Sheridan estixmated his effective foree In that ftlrht at M 0-E.Dnrom WAXTINO FOR HIS BIKNAST. FROM A WAR-TOM SKo a 23C) GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPIION. BY CHARLES S. VENABLE, LJEUTXNAtT-COLONEL, C. a4. A., OF 4,ENERAL LEE's STAFF. S ,RING] the winterof 1863-64 D Geiieral Lee's headquarters were nearOrange Court House. They were marked by the same bare simplicity and absence of military form anddisplay which e always characterized them. Three or four tents of ordinary size, situated on the steep hill- side, made the winter home of himself and his personal staff. It was without sentinels or guards. He used during the winter every exertion for fill- iug up the thin ranks of his army and for obtaining the nec- essary supplies for his men. There were times in which the situation seemed to be critical in regard to the commissariat. The supplies of meat were - brought mainly from the States south of Virginia, and on some days the Army of Northern Virginia had not more than twenty-four hours' rations ahead. On one occasion the general received by mail an anonymous communication from a private soldier containing a very small slice of salt pork, carefully packed between two oak chips, and accompanied by a letter saying that this was the daily ration of meat, and that the writer having found it impossible to live on it had been, though he was a gentleman, reduced by the crav- ings of hunger to the necessity of stealing. The incident gave the commanding general great pain and anxiety, and led to some strong interviews and correspondence with the Commissary Depart- ment. During the winter General Lee neglected no interest of his soldiers. He consulted with their chaplains and attended their meetings, in which plans for the promotion of special religious services among the men were discussed and adopted. While he was accessible at all times, and rarely had even one orderly before his tent, General Lee had certain wishes which his aides-de-camp knew well they must conform to. They did not allow any friend of soldiers condemned by court-mar- tial (when once the decree of the court had been confirmed by him) to reach his tent for personal appeal, asking reprieve or remission of sentence. He said that with the great responsibilities rest- ing on him he could not bear the pain and distress of such applications, and to grant them when the judge advocate-general had attested the fairness and justice of the court's decision would be a se- rious injury to the proper discipline of the army. Written complaints of officers as to injustice done them in regard to promotion he would sometimes turn over to an aide-de-camp, with the old-fash- ioned phrase, " 'Suage him, Colonel, 'suage him "; meaning thereby that a kind letter should be writ- ten in reply. But be disliked exceedingly that such disappointed men should be allowed to reach his tent and make complaints in person. On one occasion during the winter an officer came with a grievance and would not be satisfied without an interview with the commanding general. He went to the general's tent and remained some time. Im- mediately upon his departure General Lee came to the adjutant's tent with flushed face, and said warmly, " Why did you permit that man to come to my tent and make me show my temper I " The views which prevail with many as to the gentle temper of the great soldier, derived from observ- ing hbn in domestic and social life, in fondling of children, or in kind expostulation with erring youths, are not altogether correct. No man could see the flush come over that grand forehead and the temple veins swell on occasions of great trial of patience and doubt that Lee had the high, strong temper of a Washington, and habitually under the same strong control. Cruelty he hated. In that same early spring of 1864 I saw him stop when in full gallop to the front (on report of a demonstration of the enemy against his lines) to denounce scathingly and threatea with oondign punishment a soldier who was brutally beating an artillery horse. The quiet camp-life at Orange had been broken in upon for a brief season in November by Meade's Mine-Run campaign. In this General Lee, finding that Meade failed to attack the Confederate lines, made arrangements on the night of December 1st to bring on a general battle on the next morning by throwing two divisions against the Federal left, held by Warren's corps, which had been found by a close cavalry reconnoissance to present a fair occasion for successful attack. He had hoped to deal a severe blow to Meade's army, and felt very keenly his failure to carry out his designs. When he discovered that Meade had withdrawn, he ex- claimed in the presence of his generals, " I am too old to command this army; we should never have permitted these people to get away." Some who were standing by felt that in his heart he was sighing for that great " right arm " which he threw around Hooker at Chancelloraville. Both armies returned quietly to winter quarters and rested until May 4th, when Lee marebed out in the early morning to meet the Federal army which had moved under its new commander, at midnight on the 3d, to turn his right flank. He took with him Ewell's corps (less two brigades which had been detached for duty elsewhere during the winter) and two divisions f Hill's corps -with artillery and cavalry -leaving Longstreet with two divi- sions at Gordonsville (Pickett's being absent below Richmond), Longstreets third division and An- derson's division of Hill's corps, on the Rapidan heights, to follow him on the next day. On the morning of the 5th General Lee, though generallyreticent at table on military affairs, spoke very cheerfully of the situation, having learned that Grant was crossing at Germanna Ford and 140 GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. moving into the Wilderness. He expressed his pleasure that the Federal general had not profited by General Hooker's Wilderness experiences, and that he seemed inclined to throw away to some extent the immense advantage which his great superiority in numbers in every arm of the ser- vice gave him. On the 5th Ewell marched on the old turnpike, and Hill on the Plank road, and the cavalry on a road still farther to the right into the Wilderness. Lee rode with Hill at the head of his column. He was at the front in the skirmish at Parke(r's Store and moved with the advance to the field on the edge of the forest which became the scene of the great conflict on the Plank road. Riding on in advance of the troops, the party, con- sisting of Generals Lee, Hill, and Stuart and their staff-offi!ers, dismounted and sat under the shade of the trees, when a party of the enemy's skir- mislers deployed from a grove of old-field pines on the left, thus revealing the close proximity of Grant's forces, and the ease of concealing move- ments in the Wilderness. Hill's troops were soot. up and in line, and then began on the Plank road a fierce struggle, nearly simultaneously with that of Ewell's forces on the old turnpike. Thus was inaugurated a contest of many battles, in which the almost daily deadly fir- ing did not cease for eleven long months. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, under Lee's eye. maintained themselves well against the heavy as- sault of the Federal forces which greatly outnum- bered them; Ewell's corps did good work on the old turnpike in its contest with Warren's corps, and Rosser's cavalry on the right had driven Wil- son back. Lee slept on the field not far from his line of battle, sending orders to Longstreet to make a night march and reach the front by day- break on the 6th. On that morning serioas disaster seemed immi- nent. Longstreet did not arrive in time to reen- force Lee's line of battle in the position it held at the close of the engagement of the preceding evening. Hancock's well-planned attack on our right forced the two Confederate divisions from their position, and it seemed at one moment that they would. sweep the field. Lee gave orders to get his wagon trains ready for a movement in retreat, and sent an aideto quicken themarchofLongstreet's two divisions. These came soon, a little after sun- rise, at doutble-uiek, in parallel columns, down the Plank road. Lee was in the midst of Hill's sullenly retreating troops, aiding in rallying them, and re- storingeonfidence andorder, when Longstreet'smen came gallantly in and reformed the line of battle under his eye. Lee's presence at the front aroused his men to great enthusiasm. He was a superb figure as he sat on his spirited gray with the light of battle on his face. His presence was an inspira- tion. The retreating columns turned their faces bravely to the front once more, and the fresh di- visions went forward under his eye with splendid spirit. It was on this occasion that the men of the Texas brigade (always favorites of the general), discovering that he was riding with them into the charge, shouted to him that they would not go on unless he went back. The battle line was restored early in the morning. Soon afterward, Ander- son's division, which had been left on the Rapidan heights, arrived on the ground; and a successful assault, which carried everything before it, was made on Grant's left. The Federal troops were driven back, with heavy loss, to their intrench- ments on the Brock road. Longstreet's wounding, and the necessary delay in the change of com- manders, J caused loss of time in attacking them in this position. An attack made in the afternoon failed, after some partial suceesses, to gain posses- sion of the Federal breastworks. The runmor which MAJOl-GF.ER-I. G. W. C. LEE. C. Y. A. FICIM A PHOTOGRAPH. General Grant mentions in his "Memoirs," and to which he seems to have given credence, that "Lee's men were in confusion after this attack, and that his efforts failed to restore order," was without foundation in fact. On the same after- noon, of the 6th, a successful flank assault was made by Gordon, with three brigades of Ewell's corps, the results of which were not so great as hoped for, because night put a stop to his further successful rolling up of Sedgwick's line. The Wilderness fighting closed with the night of the 6th of May. Lee's grand tactics in these two days of battle had been a superb exhibition of military genius and skill in executing his plan of throwing his lit- tle army boldly against his opponent, where his great inferiority in numbers would place him at the least disadvantage; where manceuvring of large , t. H. Anderson was taken from Hill's corps to command Longstreet's, and Mahone assnmed command of Anderseon's divislon.-EprroRs. 241 GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. bodies was most difficult, and where superiority in cavalrv and artillery counted almost for nothing. The failure to push rapidly the successful move- unent ill which Longstreet was wounded was a serious disappointment to General Lee. I believe his daring spirit conceived the signal defeat of Grant's army, and the driving it back across the Riapidan, as a possibility within his immediate grasp. One thing remarkable in the position of the J0OR5-EtNERAL srFPH-E- D. 5AX6E5R, C. 5. A. FROM A PHOTOGRSAPH. Confederate lines in these engagements is worthy of note, namely, the large gap between Ewell's right and Longstreet and Hill's left. I hadl oc- casion, on being sent with orders to General Ewell on the t6th, to ride across this lonesome interval of half a mile or more, and to meet or see no one, except two Federal soldiers, who had found it easier to desert to the front than to the rear. The quiet or the 7th told Lee that Grant would move on around his left. When Grant did move, the Confederate general, with that firm reliance upon the steadfast courage of his men in fighting against odds which had never failed him, and in the con- sequent ability of a small body of his troops to hold superior forees in check until he could come to their support, sent Anderson with Longstreet's two divisions to support Stuart's cavalry in holding Spotaylvania Court House until he could come up with the rest of his army. This mutual confidence between the general and his men was a striking feature of the campaign. and. indeed, a prime necessity for any possibility of success. General Grant sent troops to occupy Spotsylvania Court House, but retained Hancock's corps to guard against the contingency of another attack from Lee in the Wilderness. Lee had evidently won the respect of his foes when, with his smaller force, reduced by two days' hard fighting, he could employ one part of his infantry to aid in checking the movement of the Army of the Po- tomac on Spotsylvania Court House, and at the same time threaten its rear in the Wilderness. Meanwhile General Grant was sending to Wash- ington for reenforcements. Lee sent an aide-de-camp with Anderson under orders to keep him constantly advised, and, follow- ing with the main botly of his army, took up his position on the Spotsylvania lines in the afternoon of the 8th. And Grant again found himself in a position which required hard fighting and in which lhe could not use to great advantage his superiority in, numbers and equipment. The Spotsylvaniia campaign of twelve days was marked by almost daily combats. It was, General Lee's habit in those days of physical and mental trial to retire about 10 or 11 at night, to rise at :3 A. M., breakfast by candle-light, and re- turn to the front, spending the entire day on the lines. The 9th of May was spent by both armies mainly in strengthening their positions by throw. ing up intrenchments. The day was marked, how- ever, by the death of General Sedgwick, who was killed by a Confederate sharp-shooter. He was much liked and respected by his old West Point comrades in the Confederate army, and his death was a real sorrow to them. Early on the morning of the 10th Hancoc k's corps made an effort to pass around Lee's left wing and gain a position on his flank and rear. This was repulsea by Early, com- manding Hill's corps (Hill being ill). Almost simultaneously came fieree assaults on Lee's left wing, which were repulsed with terrible slaughter. These were renewed again in the afternoon with the same result. The heaviest assault was made at 5 o'clock by Hancock and Warren, and again repulsed; again reorganized and hurled at Lee's lines only to meet with a still more bloody recep- tion. In one of these attacks a small portion of the Confederate line was taken, but held for a short time only by the assailants. It was pitiful to see and hear the bravest of these brave men who had got up nearest to the Confederate lines as they lay the next day groaning with the pangs of thirst and pains of death, when to relieve them was im- possible, on account of the active sharp-shooting of the Federal riflemen. One fair-haired New York youth lay thus twenty-four hours near the Confed- erate intrenchments before he was relieved from his sufferings by death, every effort to bring him in having been rendered unavailing by the sharp fire which his would-be rescuers met at the hands of his comrades, ignorant of their kind intentions. About the same hour at which these last assaults were made, there was a heavy attack by the Sixth Corps on Ewell's front, near Lee's head- quarters for the day, about 200 vards in rear of Doles's brigade, which captured and held a portion of the lines for a short time. This at- tack was repulsed and the line recaptured by Gor- don, the men and officers, as in the Wilderness, again beseeching Lee to go to the rear, and shout- ing their promises to retake the line if he would only go back. The 11th of May was a comparatively quiet day, as there were no regular assaults on the Confed- erate lines. But on that day the gallant J. E. B. Stuart met his death in an engagement with 242 "emb- !Amiga L J GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. Sheridan, whom lie had followed uip from Spot- sylvania and boldly attacked with greatly in- ferior numbers near Richmond. Stuart's loss was greatly mourned by General Lee,4 who prized him highly both as at skillful soldier of splendid cour- age and energy, and a hearty, joyous, loving frienidl. t)n thn- 12th, before dawn, caine Haniock's fatuous u8ssalt on1 at weak salient in, Ewell'. front-the sole appreciable success in attack of all the hard fighting by the Federal troops since they crossed the Rapidan. The threatening at- titude of hlancock's attacking column, as indi- cated by the toisu' of the preparations going on in front of the salient during the night, had not been comumuntuicated to General Lee. The an- nomutuceinent of the dlisaster was the first news which caine to him of this movement of the enemy. lie galloped forward in the darkness of the morning and learned the extent of it from those engaged ill rallying the reuttiiajits of Elward Johnson's division and itl itakitig arrangements to cheek Hancock. The oceasion amruused all the cwonbative energies of his soldier nature, and he rode forward with his co]lumns toward the captured angle. His generals exposttulated with him, and his men cried him back shouting their promises to retake the lines. The advance of Hancock's troops, after his successful assault, was checked by the brigades of Hill's corps, under Early, which held the lines on the right of the salient, and by Ewell's troops on the left of it. A line of battle was formed making the base of the triangle of the salient, and the work on the retrenchment (which had been begun the day be- fore as a new line to remedy this weak point in the lines) was pushed rapidly forward. During the day General Lee sent three brigades and a number of batteries of artillery to reenforee Rodes's division, on which fell the main task of holding the enemy in cheek and recovering, if practicable, the salient and the eighteen pieces of Confederate artillery which lay silentbetweentheopposinglines (havingarrived too late itt the morning for effective use against Hancock's assault). III that narrow space of the salient captured before dawn raged the fiercest bat- tle of the war. Lee's position during the day was near Early's lines, where he observed, from time to time, the movements of the Federal troops in aid of Hancock's attack, and counter-movements of Early's troops. He was with the artillery when it broke Burnside's assault. Lee was present dic- tating notes and orders in the midst of his guns. At one time he rode at the head of Harris's Missis- sippi brigade, which by his orders I was guiding down in column to the assistance of Rodes. The men marched steadily on until they noticed that Lee at their head was riding across a space swept by the artillery fire of the entemy. Then were renewed the same protesting shouts of "Go back, General Lee," and the same promises to do their duty. The firing in the battle of the salient did not cease until far into the night. Hancock had been compelled to retire behind the lines which lie hlau captured, holding them as breastworks for the protection of his troops. The Confederate front at the close covered four of the eighteen pieces of artillery. Lee's retrenchment itt rear of oulr battle-line (which rendered the salient a tise- less capture) had been completeul. The wearied ant worn Confederate battalions were withdrawn to this line late at itight, but the fottr recovered guns, tufter being dragged off, were left hopelessly stuck in a swamp outside of the new lihes, and became Hatteock's trophies after all. General Gratnt did not leave Hancock unaided itt this fight, having sent the Sixth astdFifthcorps to his support. He expected much front Burnside also, but Early's counter-moveutuetuts in part prevetted the realiza- tion of these hopes. I have gone into some detail itt this brief sketch of the battle of the salient, be- catuse, as perhaps the fiercest struggle of the war, it is illustrative ofthevalorofthe troopson both sides. On the 1 Sth atu attack was made on Early's left and easily repulsed, though some of the assailants reached the breastworks. Ott the 19th Ewell was setit to the north side of the Ny to threaten (trant's communications. He met some Federal resutforcements, atid, being without artillery (fitud- ing the ground impracticable for it), he regained his position on the south side of that stream with some loss. Hampton's cavalry brigade and battery of horse artillery proved of great assistance in his withdrawal from his hazardous position. The battles of Spotsylvania Court House closed with the 19th of May. It gives a clearer idea of the nature of this tremendous contest to group by MAJOH-GENERAL EDWARD J01150N, C. S. A. FROM A. PHOTOn.RAPH. days and count its various combats from the be- ginning of the campaign: On May 5th, three; on May 6th, four; on May 8th, two; on May 10th, five; on May 12th, repeated assaults during twenty 4 The new, of Stuart's fall reached General Lee on the 12th.- C. S. V. 243 244 GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. hours in salient and t of the line; May 18t is no wonder that on ordnance officers gat pounds of lead. whiel did work again before closed. Lee, discovering th 20th of May on his ward, immedis'tely mi army between the Fe, He crossed the North Grant arrived on the 2 compelled battle in t anxious now to strik, wo combats on another part muds Hundred. This corps reached him at Cold h, one; May 19th, one. It Harbor on June 1st. On the 30th the Confederate these fields the Confederate forces were in line of battle, with the left at Atlee's thered more than 120,000 Station confronting the Federal army. General i was recast in bullets and Lee was still sick, fmnd occupied a house at night the campaign of 1864 was forthe first time duwing the eampaign. As one of his trusted lieutenants has well said: "In fact, at Grant had set out on the nothing but his own determined will kept him in the flanking movement south- field; and it was then rendered more evident than iarched so as to throw his ever that he was the head and front, the very life leral forces and Richmond. and soul of his arny." Grunt declined general Anna on the 21st. General battle and drew eastward; and after several lesser "Id. Lee would gladly have combats, with no serious results, the two armies his position there. He was confronted one another on the 3d of June at Cold e a telling blow, as he was Harbor. In these days Lee had drawn to himself Hoke's division from Beauiregard, and had been re- enforced by Finegan's Florida brigade and Keitt's South Carolina, regiment. The days from May 3t0th to June 2d were aix- ions ones for General Lee. For while General Grant had easy and safe communication with Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred, and coin- mended all the Federal troops north and south of Richmond, he commanded only the Army of North- ern Virginia and was compelled to communicate his "suggestions r to General Beauregard through Gen- eral Bragg and the War Department at Richmond. This marred greatly the unity, seNcecty, and celer- ity of action so absolutely essential to success. That he considered this separation of eommands, and the consequent circuitous mode of communi- cation with its uncertain results, a very. grave matter is plain from the telegrams which he sent at this time. Gent ral Beauregard had telegraphed from Chester (half-way between Richmond and Petersburg), on May 30th, 5: 15 P. t., as follows: war Department must determine when and what troops to order from bere. I sead to (;enerai Bragg 11 iformation I obtain relative to amovement of enemy's troops in front." BRIGADIER-GENERAI. GEORGE R. STEUART, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOiGRAPH. convinced that General Grant's men were dis- pirited by the bloody repulses of their repeated at- tacks on our lines. Lee had drawn Pickett and Breekinridge to him. But in the midst of the operations on the North Anna he succumbed to sickness, against which he had struggled for some days. As he lay in his tent he would say, in his impatience, " We must strike them! " " We must never let them pass us again! " " We must strike them! " He had reports brought to him con- stantly from the field. But Lee ill in his tent was not Lee at the front. He was much disappointed in not securing larger results from the attack which prevented the junction of Hancock's and Warren's columns after they had crossed the North Anna. On May 26th Grant withdrew his army from its rather critical position on the south side of the North Anna, and moved again to the east, down the Pamunkey, which he crossed on the 28th, to find Lee confronting him on the Totopotomoy. Grant had received regnforcements from Washington, and had drawn Smith's corps from Butler in Ber- This called forth the following telegrams: I - ATLEK-S, 71i P. M., 30tb May, 1864. "GENERAL G. T. BEAUIIEGARD, Hanmock's House: " If you cannot determine what troops yon can spare, the Department cannot. The result of your delay will be disaster. Butlers troops will be with Grant to- morrow. B. E. LeE." ATLEE'S, 7:X P. M., 3eth May., Is. His EXCeLLENC Y .IEFEaSox DAVIS, Richmond: General Beauregard says the Department must de- teruine what troops to send from. him. He gives it all necessary information. The result of this delay will be dister. Butler troops Smith's Corps) will be with Grant to-morrow. Hoke's division at least should be with me by light to-morrow. R. E. LE."d INDIORBEMENT. tOPERATOR: Read last sentence 'by light to-mor- row.'. -C. S. V, "A. A. G." The battle of the 3d of June was a general as- sault by Grant along a front nearly six miles in length, and a complete and bloody repulse at all points, except at one weak salient on Breckin- ridge's line, which the brave assailants occupied ) The first dispatch is from the original in possesion of General T. F. Rdenbongh. The dispatch to Jeflerson Davis is from, the original in possession of the Massachusetts Commlandery of the Loyal Legion.- EDriORs. GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. ot7 aP Oh a dJd _ ,L1540 Cy a A CALL FOR RZNNFORCFMF.N for a short time only to be beaten back in a bloody hand-to-hand conflict on the works. The Federal losses were naturally, under the circumstances, very large, and those of the Confederates very small. The dead and dying lay in front of the 'onfederate lines in triangles, of which the apexes were the bravest men who came nearest tee the breastworks under the withering, deadly tire. The battle lasted little more than one brief hour, beginning between 5 and 6 A. m. The Fed- eral troops spent the remainder of the day in strengthening their own lines in which they rested quietly. Lee's troops were in high spirits. General Early, on the 6th and 7th of June, made two efforts to attack Grant's forces on his right flank and rear, but found him thoroughly protected with intrenchments. On the 12th General Hamp- ton met Sheridan at Trevilian and turned him back from his march to the James River and Lynchburg. General Grant lay in his lines until the night of June 12th. On that night he moved rapidly across the penin- sula. The overland campaign north of the James was at an eud. Except in the temporary driving back of Lee's right on the morning of May 6th before the arrival of Longstreet's divisions, the brief occupation of Rodes's front on May 10th, Hancock's morning assault on May 12th, and a few minor events, the campaign had been one series of severe and bloody repulses of Federal attacks. The campaign on the Confederate side was an illustration of Lee's genius, skill, and boldness. and as well of the steadiness, courage, and constancy of his greatly outnumbered forces, and of their sublime faith in their great commander. After the battle of Cold Harbor, Lee felt strong enough to send Breckinridge toward the valley to meet Hunter's expedition, and on the 13th to de- tach Early with the Second Corps, now numbering some eight thousand muskets and twenty-four pieces of artillery, to join Breckinridge; he also restored Hoke's division to Beauregard. When Grant set out for the James, Lee threw a corps of observation between him and Richmond. Grant moved his troops rapidly in order to cap- ture Petersburg by a cawp de main. Smith's corps was in front of the advanced lines of Petersburg on the morning of the 15th. The first brigade of Hoke's division reached Beauregard on the even- ing of the 15th. On the night of the 15th Lee tented on the south side of the James, near Drewry's Bluff. On the 16th and 17th, his troops coming up, he superintended personally the recapture of Beauregard's Bermuda Hundred line, which he found to be held veryfeebly bythe forces of General Butler, who had taken possession of them on the withdrawal of Bushrod Johnson's division by Beauregard to Petersburg on the 16th. On the 17th a very pretty thing occurred, in these lines, of which I was an eye-witness, and which evinced the high spirit of Lee's men, especially of a division which had been with him throughout the cam- paign, beginning at the Wilderness, namely, Field's division of Longstreet's corps. After the left of Beauregard's evacuated line had been taken up, there remained a portion the approach to which was more formidable. The order had been issued to General Anderson commanding the corps to retake this portion of the lines by a joint assault of Pickett's and Field's divisions. Soon afterward the engineers, upon a careful reconnoissance, de- cided that a good line could be occupied without the loss of life which might result from this recap- ture. The order to attack was therefore withdrawn by General Lee. This rescinding order reached Field but did not reach Pickett. Pickett's divi- sion began its assault under the first order. The men of Field's division, hearing the firing and see- ing Pickett's men engaged, leaped from their trenches,-first the men, then the officers and flag- bearers,-rushed forward and were soon in the for- 245 I64 24b GENERAL LEE IN THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. midable trenches, whic h were found to be held by a very small force. On tlh 1 5th, 1 6th, and I Tth battle raged along the lines of intrenehments and forts east of Petersburg, between Grant's forces and Beauregard's troops, who made a splendid defense against enormous odds. About dark on the 1 7th grave disaster to the Confederates seemed imminent, when Graeie's brigade of Ala- bamians. just ret-mned from (Chaffin's Bluffou the north side of the James, gallantly leaped over the works and drove the assailants back, capturing a thousand or more prisoners. Hoke, too, on his part of the lines, had easily repulsed Smith's assaults. This battle raged until near midnight. Meantime Beauregard's engineers were preparing an interior line, to which his wearied troops fell back during the night. A renewal of the attack on the lines held by the Confederate troops on the night of the 17 th had been ordered by Grant along his whole front for an early hour on the 19th. But the withdrawal of the Confederates to interior lines neeessarily caused delay, and, when the attack was made at noon, Lee and two of his divisions, Kershaw's and Field's, had reached the Petersburg lines. The attack made no impression on the lines, which were held until the evacuation on April 2d, 1 865. To some military eritics General Lee seemed not to have taken in the fuRll force of Beauregard's lur- gent telegrams in those critical days of June. But it must be remembered how easy it was for General Grant to make a forced march on Richmond from the north side of the James. accompanied by a strong feint on the Petersburg lines. Then, too, any strategist will ee- that Petersburg, cut off from Riehmond by an en.-my holding the railroad be- tween the two cities lor holding ani intrenclied line so near it as to make its use hazardous), would not have been a very deiral)le possession. The fact is, that the defense or Rihmon d against an enemy so superior in numbers to the defending army, andl in possession of the James River to City Point as a great water-way to its base of s,,pplies, was sur- rounded with immense diflieulties. And, in fact, in sending back Hoke's division to Beauregard, and in approving that ge. eral's withdrawing of Bushrod Johnson's division from the Bermuda Hundred line to Petersburg, Lee thereby sent him more reen- foreements by far than he sent to Rodes on the I 2th of May at Spotsylvania, when that general was holding the base of the salient against Han- cock and Wright aid Warren. Besides this, Lee had already detaehed Breekinridge's division and Early's corps to meet Hunter at Lynchburg. And, after all, the result showed that Lee's reliance on his men to hold in eesk attacking forces greatly superior in numbers did not fail him in this instance; that he was bold to audacity was a characteristic of his military genius. The campaign of 1S 64 now became the siege of Petersburg. On the night of June 18th Hunter retreated rapidly from before Lynchburg toward western Virginia, and Early, after a brief pursuit, marched into Maryland, and on July I 1th his ad- vanee was before the outer defenses of Washington. BELLE PLAIN, POTOMAC CREEK, A UNION BASS OF SUPPLIES. FROM A 1-HOTOGRAPI TAKEN IN lSSL THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. J BY WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, GENERAL. V. 1. A. ON the 4th day of March, 1864, General U. S. Grant was summoned to Washington from Nashville to receive his commission of lieutenant- general, the highest rank then known in the United States, and the same that was conferred on Washington in 1798. He reached the capital on the 7th, had an interview for the first time with Mr. Lincoln, and on the 9th reeeived his commission at the hands of the President, who made a short address, to which Grant made a suitable reply. He was informed that it was desirable that he should come east to command all the armies of the lUnited States, and give his personal supervision to the Army of the Potomae. On the 10th he visited General Meade at Brandy Station, and saw many of his leading officers, but he returned to Washington the next day and went on to Nashville, to which place he had summoned me, then absent on my Meridian expedition. It On the 18th of March he turned over to me the command of the Western armies, and started back for Washington, 1 accompanying him as far as Cincinnati. Amidst constant interruptions of a business and social nature, we reached the satisfactory conclusion that, as soon as the season would permit, all the armies of the 'Union would assume the "bold offensive"b by " concentric lines" on the common enemy, and would finish up the job in a single campaign if possible. The main "objectives" were Lee's army behind the Rapidan in Virginia, and Joseph E. Johnston's army at Dalton, Georgia. ) Re-arrangec from " The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion," by General Sherman, printed in "The Century" magazine for February, 1888, and from a letter by General Sherman to the editor, printed in that periodical for July, 1S87. The figures in the text are from Phisterer's "Statistical Record." (Charles Scribner's Sons.) Zt On February 3d, 1864, General Sherman started from Vicksburg with two columns of in- fantry under Generals McPherson and Hurlbut, and marched to Meridian, Mississippi, to break up the Mobile and Ohio and the Jackson and Selma railroads. His force was about 20,000 strong. A foree of cavalry, 10,000 strong, under General W. Sooy Smith, set out from Memphis on the 11th, intending to cooperate by driving Forrest's cavalry from northern Mississippi, but Smith was headed off by Forrest and defeated in an engagement at West Point, Mississippi, on the 21st. After de- stroying the railroads on the route, General Sher- man abandoned the enterprise, and on February 20th put his troops in motion toward central Mis- sissippi, whence they were transferred, later, to Vicksburg and Memphis.-EDITORa 247 248 THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR On reaching Washington, Grant studied with great care all the minutiae of the organization, strength, qualities, and resources of each of the many armies into which the Union forces had resolved themselves by reason of preceding events, and in due time with wonderful precision laid out the work which each one should undertake. His written instructions to me at Nashville were embraced in the two letters of April 4th and April 19th, 1864, both in his own handwriting, which I still possess, and which, in my judg- ment, are as complete as any of those of the Duke of Wellington contained in the twelve volumes of his published letters and correspondence. With the month of May came the season for action, and by the 4th all his armies were in motion. The army of Butler at Fort Monroe was his left, Meade's army the center, and mine at Chattanooga his right. Butler was to move against Richmond on the south of James River, Meade straight against Lee, intrenehed behind the Rapidan, and I to attack Joe Johnston and push him to and beyond Atlanta. This was as far as human foresight could penetrate. Though Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac, Grant virtually controlled it, and on the 4th of May, 1864, he crossed the Rapidan, and at noon of the 5th attacked Lee. He knew that a certain amount of fighting, " killing," had to be done to accomplish his end, and also to pay the penalty of former failures. In the "wilderness" there was no room for grand strategy, or even minor tactics; but the fighting was desperate, the losses to the Union army being, according to Phisterer, 18,387,4 to the Con- federate loss of 11,400-the difference due to Lee's intrenchments and the blind nature of the country in which the battle was fought. On the night of May 7th both parties paused, appalled by the fearful slaughter; but Grant commanded, " Forward by the left flank." That was, in my judgment, the supreme moment of his life; undismayed, with a full comprehension of the importance of the work in which he was engaged, feeling as keen a sympathy for his dead and wounded as any one, and without stopping to count his numbers, he gave his orders calmly, specifically, and absolutely-" Forward to Spotsylvania." But his watchful and skillful antagonist detected his pur- pose, and, having the inner or shorter line, threw his army across Grant's path, and promptly fortified it. These field intrenchments are peculiar to America, though I am convinced they were employed by the Romans in Gaul in the days of Caesar. Troops, halting for the night or for battle, faced the enemy; moved forward to ground with a good outlook to the front; stacked arms; gathered logs, stumps, fence-rails, anything which would stop a bullet; piled these to their front, and, digging a ditch behind, threw the dirt forward, and made a parapet which covered their persons as perfectly as a granite wall. When Grant reached Spotsylvania, May 8th, he found his antagonist in his front thus intrenched. He was delayed there till the 20th, during which time there was incessant fighting, because he was compelled to attack his enemy behind these improvised intrenehments. His losses, according to Phisterer, were 12,564, 1 while the Confederates lost 9000. Nevertheless, his renewed 4 later official compilation, 17,U66.-EDITORs. J LAter official compilation, 18,399.-EDITOR THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. 249 order, " Forward by the left flank," compelled Lee to retreat to the defenses of Richmond. Grant's "Memoirs " enable us to follow him day by day across the various rivers which lay between him and Richmond, and in the bloody assaults at Cold Harbor, where his losses are reported 14,931 \ to 1700 by his opponent. Yet ever onward by the left flank, he crossed James River and penned Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia within the intrenchments of Richmond and Petersburg for ten long months on the pure defensive, to remain almost passive observers of local events, while Grant's other armies were absolutely annihilating the Southern Confederacy. While Grant was fighting desperately from the Rapidan to the James, there were two other armies within the same " zone of operations "- that " of the James" under General Butler, who was expected to march up on the south and invest Petersburg and even Richmond; and that of Sigel at Winchester, who was expected to march up the Valley of Virginia, pick up his detach- ments from the Kanawha (Crook and Averell), and threaten Lynchburg, a place of vital importance to Lee in Richmond. Butler failed to accomplish what was expected of him; and Sigel failed at the very start, and was replaced by Hunter, who marched up the valley, made junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, and pushed on with commendable vigor to Lynch- burg, which he invested on the 16th of June. Lee, who had by this time been driven into Richmond with a force large enough to hold his lines of intrenchment and a surplus for expeditions, detached General Jubal A. Early with the equivalent of a corps to drive Hunter away from Lynchburg. Hunter, far from his base, with inadequate supplies of food and ammunition, retreated by the Kanawha to the Ohio River, his nearest base, thereby exposing the Valley of Virginia; whereupon Early, an educated soldier, promptly resolved to take advantage of the occasion, marched rapidly down this valley northward to Winchester, crossed the Potomac to Hagerstown, and thence boldly marched on Washington, defended at that time only by militia and armed clerks. Grant, fully alive to the dan- ger, dispatched to Washington, from his army investing Petersburg, two divi- sions of the Sixth Corps, and also the Nineteenth Corps just arriving from New Orleans. These troops arrived at the very nick of time,-met Early's army in the suburbs of Washington, and drove it back to the Valley of Virginia. This most skillful movement of Early demonstrated to General Grant the importance of the Valley of Virginia, not only as a base of supplies for Lee's army in Richmond, but as the most direct, the shortest, and the easiest route for a " diversion" into the Union territory north of the Potomac. He there- fore cast around for a suitable commander for this field of operations, and settled upon Major-General Philip H. Sheridan, whom he had brought from the West to command the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac. Sheridan promptly went to his new sphere of operations, quickly ascertained its strength and resources, and resolved to attack Early in the position which he had chosen in and about Winchester, Va. He delivered his attack across A, Later official compilation, 12,737.-EDITORS. VoL. IV. 17. 2SO THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. broken ground on the 19th of September, beat his antagonist in fair, open battle, sending him " whirling up the valley," inflicting a loss of 5500 men to his own of 4873, and followed him up to Cedar Creek and Fishers Hill. Early recomposed his army and fell upon the Union army on the 19th of October, at Cedar Creek, gaining a temporary advantage during General Sheridan's absence; but on his opportune return his army resumed the offensive, defeated Early, captured nearly all his artillery, and drove him completely out of his field of operations, eliminating that army from the subsequeint problem of the war. Sheridan's losses were 5995 to Early's 4200; but these losses are no just measure of the results of that victory, which made it impossible to use the Valley of Virginia as a Confederate base of supplies and as an easy route for raids within the Union lines. General Sheridan then committed its protec- tion to detachments, and with his main force rejoined General Grant, who still held Lee's army inside his intrenchments at Richmond and Petersburg. I now turn with a feeling of extreme delieacy to the conduct of that other campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, Savannah, and Raleigh, whieh with liberal discretion was committed to me by General Grant in his minute instructions of April 4th and April 19th, 1864. To all military students these letters must be familiar, because they have been published again and again, and there never was and never can be raised a question of rivalry or claim between us as to the relative merits of the manner in which we played our respective parts. We were as brothers -I the older man in years, he the higher in rank. We both believed in our heart of hearts that the success of the Union cause was not only necessary to the then generation of Ameri- cans, but to all future generations. We both professed to be gentlemen and professional soldiers, educated in the science of war by our generous Govern- ment for the very occasion which had arisen. Neither of us by nature was a combative man; but with honest hearts and a clear purpose to do what man could we embarked on that campaign, which I believe, in its strategy, in its logistics, in its grand and minor tactics, has added new luster to the old science of war. Both of us had at our front generals to whom in early life we had been taught to look up,- educated and experienced soldiers like ourselves, not likely to make any mistakes, and each of whom had as strong an army as could be collected from the mass of the Southern people,- of the same blood as ourselves, brave, confident, and well equipped; in addition to which they had the most decided advantage of operating in their own difficult country of mountain, forest, ravine, and river, affording admirable opportunities for defense, besides the other equally important advantage that we had to invade the country of our unqualified enemy and expose our long lines of supply to the guerrillas of an " exasperated people." Again, as we advanced we had to leave guards to bridges, stations, and intermediate depots, diminishing the fighting force, while our enemy gained strength by picking up his detachments as he fell back, and had railroads to bring supplies and reenforcements from his rear. I instance these facts to offset the common assertion that we of the North won the war by brute force, and not by courage and skill. I N X W t N WAP yL ' cat r iI p I D o.,,IJ T' / i, .\,/ l 4 W M,' e. -e o--- Sest0 wt.. C H Al k'S 9, ""'J;U.lVF Y /)VM;E f-, , X t t ;t g e f A bH_ ffffi t f ABS,2 s - X StI,-, d ',2E a 0 - S A; P - D i e Xtty iit9 it-X2tEli; 0 SS SX A,,,i i...-k.,.er '\E. t \'t t ut u9: T , .,.'50 ia'.-. ,W.-i-'lal Sli '' ' .)fti .gS e /3 Si IA ,1'b- O "Bt 1g , S, i1'l. S,, y 251 1-1 I " ,"I - C "Joel,N` Ial 1 ----- ---- NZ7..... 11 --- I 2;2 THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. On the historic 4th day of May, 1864, the Confederate army at my front lay at Dalton, Georgia, composed, according to the best authority, of about 45,000 men [see also p. 281], commanded by Joseph E. Johnston, who was equal in all the elements of generalship to Lee, and who was under instructions from the war powers in Richmond to assume the offensive northward as far as Nashville. But he soon discovered that he would have to conduct a defensive campaign. Coincident with the movement of the Army of the Potomac, as announced by telegraph, I advanced from our base at Chattanooga with the Army of the Ohio, 13,559 men; the Army of the Cumberland, 60,773, and the Army of the Tennessee, 24,465,- grand total, 98,797 men and 254 guns. I had no purpose to attack Johnston's position at Dalton in front, but marched from Chattanooga to feign at his front and to make a lodgment in Resaca, eighteen miles to his rear, on " his line of communication and sup- ply." The movement was partly, not wholly, successful; but it compelled Johnston to let go Dalton and fight us at Resaca, where, May 13th-16th, our loss was 2747 and his 2800. I fought offensively and he defensively, aided by earth parapets. lie then fell back to Calhoun, Adairsville, and Cassville, where he halted for the battle of the campaign; but, for reasons given in his memoirs, he continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to Allatoona. Pausing for a few days to repairthe railroadwithout attempting Allatoona, of which I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, 1 resolved to push on toward Atlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-2Sth, at New Hope Church, four miles north of Dallas, with losses of 3000 to the Confederates and 2400 to us. The country was al- most in a state of nature--with few or no roads, nothing that a European could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as surely as at Sevastopol. Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received rein- forcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his center, and Lcst Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute con- tact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full cooperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3000 men, to the Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within three days Johnston abandoned the strongest pos- sible position and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered and THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. 253 protected by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. No officer or soldier who ever served under me will ques- tion the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind. We had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food, ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000 animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city opening the interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had to go,- illustrating the principle that " an army once on the offensive must maintain the offensive." We feigned to the right, but crossed the Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek, prepared in advance for this very occasion. At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service. Being dis- satisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army [July 18th]. Hood was known to us to be a " fighter," a graduate of West Point of the class of 1853, No. 44, of which class two of my army commanders, McPherson and Schofield, were No. 1 and No. 7. The character of a leader is a large fac- tor in the game of war, and I confess I was pleased at this change, of which I had early notice. I knew that I had an army superior in numbers and Morale to that of my antagonist; but being so far from my base, and operating in a country devoid of food and forage, I was dependent for supplies on a poorly constructed railroad back to Louisville, five hundred miles. I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country, but not behind well-constructed parapets. Promptly, as expected, General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the 20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps (Hooker), whieh had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4796 men, to our loss of 1710. We fol- lowed up, and Hood fell back to the main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank " in air," a movement that led to the hardest battle of the campaign. He encountered the Army of the Ten- nessee,-skilled veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic valor. The battle raged from noon to night, when the Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8499 to ours of 3641; but among our dead was McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. While this battle was in progress, Schofield at the center and Thomas on the right made efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault. The Army of the Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard), from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach, if possible, 254 THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when, on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d, sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4632 men to our 700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor, General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive. Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies, because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food. Our extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro) on the railroad twenty-six miles below Atlanta, not forti- fied. This movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864. The result had a large effect on the whole country at the time, for solid and political reasons. I claim no special merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings of the best masters of the " science of war" of which I had knowledge; and, better still, I had pleased Mr. Lincoln, who wanted "success" very much. But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief " objective," had escaped. Then began the real trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, thirty miles south-east, on the Savan- nah railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war, and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies, independent of the railroads. On the 21st of September he shifted his position to Palmetto Station, twenty- five miles south-west of Atlanta, on the Montgomery and Selma railroad, where he began systematic preparations for an aggressive campaign against our communications to compel us to abandon our conquests. Here he was visited by Mr. Davis, who promised all possible cooperation and assistance in the proposed campaign; and here also Mr. Davis made his famous speech, which was duly reported to me in Atlanta, assuring his army that they would make my retreat more disastrous than was that of Napoleon from Moscow. Forewarned, I took immediate measures to thwart his plans. One division was sent back to Rome, another to Chattanooga; the guards along our railroad were relnforced and warned of the coming blow. General Thomas was sent back to the headquarters of his department at Nashville, Schofield to his at Knoxville, while I remained in Atlanta to await Hood's " initiative." This followed soon. Hood, sending his cavalry ahead, crossed the Chattahoochee River at Campbelltown with his main army on the 1st of October, and moved to Dallas, detaching a strong force against the railroad above Marietta which destroyed it for fifteen miles, and then sent French's division to capture Allatoona. I followed Hood, reaching Kenesaw Moun- tain in time to see in the distance the attack on Allatoona, which was hand- somely repulsed by Corse. Hood then moved westward, avoiding Rome, and by a circuit reached Resaca, which he summoned to surrender, but did not wait to attack. He continued thence the destruction of the railroad for about twenty miles to the tunnel, including Dalton, whose garrison he captured. I followed up to Resaca, then turned west to intercept his retreat THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. 255 down the Valley of Chattooga [see map, p. 249]; but by rapid marching he escaped to Gadsden, on the Coosa, I halting at Gaylesville, whence to observe his further movements. Hood, after a short pause, crossed the mountains to Decatur, on the Tennessee River, which point, as it was defended by a good division of troops, he avoided, and finally halted opposite Florence, Alabama, on the Tennessee. [See map, Vol. HI., p. 6.] Divining the object of his movement against our communications, which had been thus far rapid and skillful, I detached by rail General Schofield and two of my six corps to Nashville, all the reenforcements that Thomas deemed necessary to enable him to defend Tennessee, and began my systematic preparations for resum- ing the offensive against Georgia. Repairing the broken railroads, we col- lected in Atlanta the necessary food and transportation for 60,000 men, sent to the rear all impediments, called in all detachments, and ordered them to march for Atlanta, where by November 4th were assembled four infantry corps, one cavalry division, and 65 field-guns, aggregating 60,598 men. Hood remained at Florence, preparing to invade Tennessee and Kentucky, or to follow me. We were prepared for either alternative. According to the great Napoleon, the fundamental maxim for successful war is to " converge a superior force on the critical point at the critical time." In 1864 the main "objectives" were Lee's and Johnston's armies, an4 the critical point was thought to be Richmond or Atlanta, whichever should be longer held. Had General Grant overwhelmed and scattered Lee's army and occupied Richmond he would have come to Atlanta; but as I happened to occupy Atlanta first, and had driven Hood off to a divergent line of opera- tions far to the west, it was good strategy to leave him to a subordinate force, and with my main army to join Grant at Richmond. The most practicable route to Richmond was nearly a thousand miles in distance, too long for a single march; hence the necessity to reach the sea-coast for a new base. Savannah, distant three hundred miles, was the nearest point, and this distance we accomplished from November 12th to December 21st, 1864. According to the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon its belly, not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons can operate more than a hundred miles from its base, because the teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons, leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of the men and animals at the front, who are fully employed in fighting; hence the necessity to " forage liberally on the country," a measure which fed our men and animals chiefly on the very supplies which had been gathered near the railroads by the enemy for the maintenance of his own armies. "The March to the Sea" was in strategy only a shift of base for ulterior and highly important purposes. Many an orator in his safe office at the North had proclaimed his purpose to cleave his way to the sea. Every expedition which crossed the Ohio River in the early part of the war headed for the sea; but things were not ripe till the Western army had fought, and toiled, and labored down to Atlanta. Not The army reached the vicinity of Savannah, December 10th, but did not get possession of the city until the 21st.-EDITORS 256 THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. GENERAL WILLIAM T. SUEMAN AT ATLANA. ROM A PHOTOGRAPH. till then did a "March to the Sea" become practicable and possible of grand results. Alone I never measured it as now my eulogists do, but coupled with Thomas's acts about Nashville, and those about Richmond directed in person by General Grant, the "March to the Sea," with its necessary corollary, the march northward to Raleigh, became vastly important, if not actually conclusive of the war. Mr. Lincoln was the wisest man of our day, and more truly and kindly gave voice to my secret thoughts and feeling when he wrote me at Savannah from Washington under date of December 26th, 1864: " When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering ' nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce; and taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next I I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide." THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. 257 So highly do I prize this testimonial that I preserve Mr. Lincoln's letter, every word in his own handwriting, unto this day; and if I know myself, I believe oil receiving it I experienced more satisfaction in giving to his over- burdened and weary soul one gleam of satisfaction and happiness, than of selfish pride in an achievement which has given me among men a larger measure of fame than any single act of my life. There is an old maxim of war, that a general should not divide his forces in the presence of an enter- prising enemy, and I confess that I felt more anxious for General Thomas's success than my own, because had I left him with an insufficient force it would have been adjudged ungenerous and unmilitary in me; but the result, and Mr. Lincoln's judgment after the event, demonstrated that my division of force was liberal, leaving to Thomas " enough to vanquish the old oppos- ing force of the whole, Hood's army," and retaining for myself enough to march to the sea, and thence north to Raleigh, in communication with the old Army of the Potomac which had so long and heroically fought for Richmond, every officer and soldier of which felt and saw the dawn of peace in the near approach of their comrades of the West, who, having finished their task, had come so far to lend them a helping hand if needed. I honestly believe that the grand march of the Western army from Atlanta to Savannah, and from Savan- ilah to Raleigh, was an important factor in the final result, the overwhelming victory at Appomattox, and the glorious triumph of the Union cause. ) Meantime Hood, whom I had left at and near Florence, 317 miles to my rear, having completely reorganized and resupplied his army, advanced against Thomas at Nashville, who had also made every preparation. Hood first encountered Schofield at Franklin, November 30th, 1864, attacked him boldly behind his intrenchments, and sustained a positive check, losing 6252 of his best men, including Generals Cleburne and Adams, who were ) One single fact about the " March to the Sea," unknown to me, revealed by General Grant in his "Memoirs," Vol. IL., p. 376: I was In favor of sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. My hift-ot-taff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it, and as I learned subse- quently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at Waahington to stop it."' I had been acquainted with General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's "c hief-of-staff," from the beginning of the war. He was always most loyal and devoted to his chief, an enthusiastic patriot, and of real ability. He was a neighbor of General Grant in Galena at the breaking out of the war, a lawyer in good practice, an intense thinker, and a man of vehement expression; a soldier by force of circumstances rather than of education or practice, yet of infinite use to his chief throughout the war and up to the hour of his death as Secre- tary of War, in 1869. General Rawlins was en- thusiastically devoted to his friends in the West- ern army, with which he had been associated from Cairo to Vicksburg and Chattanooga, and doubt- less, like many others at the time (October, 1864) feared that I was about to lead his com- rades in a " wild-goose chase," not fully compre- hending the objects aimed at, or that I on the spot had better means of accurate knowledge than he in the distance. He did not possess the magnifi- cent equipoise of General Grant, nor the confidence in my military sagacity which his chief did, and I am not at all surprised to learn that he went to Washington from City Point to obtain an order from the President or Secretary of War to compel me, with an army of 65,000 of the best soldiers which America had ever produced, to remain idle when an opportunity was offered such as never occurs twice to any man on earth. General Raw- lins was right according to the light he possessed, and I remember well my feeling of uneasiness that something of the kind might happen, and how free and glorious I felt when the magic telegraph was cut, which prevented the possibility of orders of any kind from the rear coming to delay or hinder us from fulfilling what I knew was compara- tively easy of execution and was sure to be a long stride toward the goal we were all aiming at- victory and peace from Virginia to Texas. He was one of the many referred to by Mr. Lincoln who sat in darkness, but after the event saw a great light. He never revealed to me the doubts he had had.-W. T. S. 258 THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. AION-DAY AT CATTANOOGA IN 184. FROM A WAr -TIN SXTems. killed on the very parapets, to Schofield's loss of 2326. Nevertheless he pushed on to Nashville, which he invested. Thomas, one of the grand charac- ters of our civil war, nothing dismayed by danger in front or rear, made all his preparations with cool and calm deliberation; and on the 15th of December sallied from his intrenchments, attacked Hood in his chosen and intrenched position, and on the next day, December 16th, actually annihilated his army, eliminating it thenceforward from the problem of the war. Hood's losses were 15,000 men to Thomas's 3057. Therefore at the end of the year 1864 the conflict at the West was concluded, leaving nothing to be considered in the grand game of war but Lee's army, held by Grant in Richmond, and the Confederate detachments at Mobile and along the sea-board north of Savannah. Of course Charleston, ever arrogant, felt secure; but it was regarded by us as a "dead cock in the pit," and fell of itself when its inland communications were cut. In January Fort Fisher was captured by a detachment from the Army of the Potomac, aided by Admiral Porter's fleet, and Wilmington was occupied by Schofield, who had been brought by Grant from Nashville to Washington and sent down the Atlantic coast to prepare for Sherman's coming to Goldsboro', North Carolina,-all " converging" on Richmond. Preparatory to the next move, General Howard was sent from Savannah to secure Pocotaligo, in South Carolina, as a point of departure for the north, and General Slocum to Sister's Ferry, on the Savannah River, to secure a safe lodgment on the north bank for the same purpose. In due time -in February, 1865-these detachments, operating by concentric lines, met on the South Carolina road at Midway and Blackville, swept northward through Orangeburg and Columbia to Winnsboro', where the direction was changed to Fayetteville and Goldsboro', a distance of 420 miles through a difficult and hostile country, making junction with Schofield at a safe base with two good railroads back to the sea-coast, of which we held absolute dominion. The THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. 259 resistance of Hampton, Butler, Beauregard, and even Joe Johnston was regarded as trivial. Our "objective" was Lee's army at Richmond. When I reached Goldsboro', made junction with Schofield, and moved forward to Raleigh, I was willing to encounter the entire Confederate army; but the Con- federate armies-Lee's in Richmond and Johnston's in my front-held inte- rior lines, and could choose the initiative. Few military critics who have treated of the civil war in America have ever comprehended the importance of the movement of my army northward from Savannah to Goldsboro,, or of the transfer of Schofield from Nashville to cooperate with me in North Carolina. This march was like the thrust of a sword toward the heart of the human body; each mile of advance swept aside all opposition, con- sumed the very food on which Lee's army depended for life, and demon- strated a power in the National Government which was irresistible. Therefore, in March, 1865, but one more move was left to Lee on the chess- board of war: to abandon Richmond; make junction with Johnston in North Carolina; fall on me and destroy me if possible-a fate I did not apprehend; then turn on Grant, sure to be in close pursuit, and defeat him. But no! Lee clung to his intrenchments for political reasons, and waited for the inev- itable. At last, on the 1st day of April, General Sheridan, by his vehement and most successful attack on the Confederate lines at the " Five Forks " near Dinwiddie Court House, compelled Lee to begin his last race for life. He then attempted to reach Danville, to make junction with Johnston, but Grant in his rapid pursuit constantly interposed, and finally headed him off at Appomattox, and compelled the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, which for four years had baffled the skill and courage of the Army of the Potomac and the power of our National Government. This substantially ended the war, leaving only the formal proceedings of ac- cepting the surrender of Johnston in North Carolina and of the subordinate armies at the 'A South-west. THE "CALICO HOUSE.' GENERAL SHFRMAX'S FIRST HEADQCARTERS IN ATLANTA -AFTERWARD TIlE OFFICE OF HIlS ENGINEERS: ALSO FOR SEVERAL MONTHS A hOSPITAL. FROM A P(OT0RAFPl. OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL C. S. A. RESIDENT DAVIS transferred me Pfrom the Department of Mississippi to the command of the Army of Ten- nessee by a telegram received Decem- ber 18th, 1863, in the camp of Ross's brigade of cavalry near Bolton. I :.llEs l k l l \0 aassumed that command at Dalton on the 27th, and received there, on the 1st of January, a letter from the President dated December 23d, purporting to be "instructions." In it he, in Richmond, informed me of the encouraging condition of the army, which " induced him to hope that I would soon be able to commence active operations against the enemy,"- the men being " tolerably" well clothed, with a large reserve of small-arms, the morning reports exhibiting an effective total that exceeded in number "that actually engaged on the Confederate side in any battle of the war." Yet this army itself had lost in the recent campaign at least 25,000 men in action, while 17,000 had been transferred from it in Longstreet's corps, and the two brigades (Quarles's and Baldwin's) that had been sent to Mississippi; so that it was then weaker by 40,000 men than it had been when " engaged on the Confederate side" in the battle of Chickamauga, in the September preceding. In the inspections, which were made as soon as practicable, the appearance of the army was very far from being "matter of much congratulation." Instead of a reserve of muskets there was a deficiency of six thousand and as great a one of blankets, while the number of bare feet was painful to see. The artillery horses were too feeble to draw the guns in fields, or on a march, and the mules were in similar condition; while the supplies of forage were then very irregular, and did not include hay. In consequence of this, it was necessary to send all of these animals not needed for camp service to the valley of the Etowah, where long forage could be found, to restore their health and strength. The last return of the army was of December 20th, and exhibited an effect- ive total of less than 36,000, of whom 6000 were without arms and as many without shoes. The President impressed upon me the importance of recover- ing Tennessee with an army in such numbers and condition. On pages 548-9, Vol. II. of his work, " The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," he dwells upon his successful efforts to increase its numbers and means ade- quately. After the strange assertions and suggestions of December 23d, he did not resume the subject of military operations until, in a letter of Feb- ruary 27th to him through his staff-officer General Bragg, I pointed out the OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. necessity of great preparations to take the offensive, such as large additions to the number of troops, an ample supply of field transportation, subsistence stores, and forage, a bridge equipage, and fresh artillery horses. This letter was acknowledged on the 4th of March, but not really replied to until the 12th, when General Bragg [see note, Vol. III., p. 711] wrote a plan of cam- paign which was delivered to me on the 18th by his secretary, Colonel Sale. It prescribed my invasion of Tennessee with an army of 75,000 men, includ- ing Longstreet's corps, then near Morristown, Tennessee. When necessary supplies and transportation were collected at Dalton, the additional troops, except Longstreet's, would be sent there; and this army and Longstreet's corps would march to meet at Kingston, on the Tennessee River, and thence into the valley of Duck River. Being invited to give my views, I suggested that the enemy could defeat the plan, either by attacking one of our two bodies of troops on the march, with their united forces, or by advancing against Dalton before our forces there should be equipped for the field; for it was certain that they would be able to take the field before we could be ready. I proposed, therefore, that the additional troops should be sent to Dalton in time to give us the means to beat the Federal army there, and then pursue it into Tennessee, which would be a more favorable mode of invasion than the other. General Bragg replied that my answer did not indicate acceptance of the plan proposed, and that troops could be drawn from other points only to advance. As the idea of advancing had been accepted by me, it was evi- dently his strategy that was the ultimatum. I telegraphed again (and also sent a confidential officer to say) that I was anxious to take the offensive with adequate means, and to represent to the Pres- ident the actual disparity of forces, but without result. The above is the sub- stance of all said, written, or done on the subject of Mr. Davis's pages 548-9, before the armies were actually in contact, with odds of ten to four against us. The instruction, discipline, and spirit of the army were much improved between the 1st of January and the end of April, and its numbers were increased. The efforts for the latter object brought back to the ranks about five thousand of the men who had left them in the rout of Missionary Ridge. On the morning report of April 30th the totals were: 37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns, and 2392 cavalry. This is the report as corrected by Major Kinloch Falconer, assistant adjutant-general, from official records in his office. ) Sherman had assembled at that time an army of 98,797 men and 254 guns; but before the armies actually met, three divisions of cavalry under Generals Stoneman, Garrard, and McCook added 10,000 or 12,000 men to the number. The object prescribed to him by General Grant was " to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage possible on their war resources." The occupation of Dalton by General Bragg had been accidental. He had encamped there for a night in his retreat from Missionary Ridge, and had ) See another estimate, p. 281.- EDIrroBa. 26i 262 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. remained because it was ascertained next morning that the pursuit had ceased. Dalton is in a valley so broad as to give ample room for the deploy- ment of the largest American army. Rocky-face, which bounds it on the the west, terminates as an obstacle three miles north of the railroad gap, and the distance from Chattanooga to Dalton around the north end exceeds that through the railroad gap less than a mile; and a general with a large army, coming from Chattanooga to attack an inferior one near l)alton, would follow that route and find in the broad valley a very favorable field. Mr. Davis descants on the advantages I had in mountains, ravines, and streams, and General Sherman claims that those features of the country were equal to the numerical difference between our forces. I would gladly have given all the mountains, ravines, rivers, and woods of Georgia for such a supply of artillery ammunition, proportionally, as he had. Thinking as he did, it is strange that he did not give himself a decided superiority of actual strength, by drawing troops from his three departments of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, where, according to Secretary Stanton's report of 1865, he had 139,000 men, fit for duty. The country in which the two armies operated is not rugged; there is nothing in its character that gave advantage to the Confederates. Between Dalton and Atlanta the only moun- tain in sight of the railroad is Rocky-face, which aided the Federals. The small military value of mountains is indicated by the fact that in the Federal attack on June 27th our troops on Kenesaw suffered more than those on the plain. During the previous winter Major-General Gilmer, chief engineer, bad wisely made an admirable base for our army by intrenching Atlanta. As a road leads from Chattanooga through Snake Creek Gap to the rail- road bridge at Resaca, a light intrenchment to cover 3000 or 4000 men was made there; and to make quick communication between that point and Dal- ton, two rough country roads were so improved as to serve that purpose. tZ On the 1st of May I reported to the Administration that the enemy was about to advance, suggesting the transfer of at least a part of General Polk's troops to my command. Then the cavalry with convalescent horses was ordered to the front,- Martin's division to observe the Oostenaula from Resaca to Rome, and Kelly's little brigade to join the cavalry on the Cleveland road. On the 4th the Federal army, including the troops from Knoxville, was at Ringgold. Next day it skirmished until dark with our advanced guard of cavalry. This was repeated on the 6th. On the 7th it moved forward, driv- ing our cavalry from Tunnel Hill, and taking a position in the afternoon in front of the railroad gap, and parallel to Rocky-face -the right a mile south of the gap, and the left near the Cleveland road. Until that day I had regarded a battle in the broad valley in which Dalton stands as inevitable. The greatly superior strength of the Federal army made the chances of battle altogether in its favor. It had also places of refuge in case of defeat, in the intrenched pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga; while we, if beaten, had none nearer than Atlanta, For maps of the campaign see p. 251 and the paper by General Howard, to folloW.- EDITORS. OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. 100 miles off, with three rivers intervening. General Sherman's course indicat- ing no intention of giving battle east of Rocky-face, we prepared to fight on either side of the ridge. For that object A. P. Stewart's division was placed in the gap, Cheatham's on the crest of the hill, extending a mile north of Stewart's, and Bate's also on the crest of the hill, and extending a mile south of the gap. Stevenson's was formed across the valley east of the ridge, his left meeting Cheatham's right; Hindman in line with Stevenson and on his right; Cleburne behind Mill Creek and in front of Dalton. Walker's divisioll was in reserve. Cantey wite his division arrived at Resaea that evening (7th) and was harged with the defense of the place. During the day our cavalry was driven from the ground west of Rocky-face through the gap. Grigsby's lfrigade was placed near Dug Gap,-the remainder in front of our right. About 4 o'clock P. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade who were guarding Dug Gap, and who were soon joined by Grigsby's brigade on foot. The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp a conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested to send Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our people, and to take command there himself. These accessions soon decided the contest, and the enemy was driven down the hill. A sharp engagement was occur- ring at the same time on the crest of the mountain, where our right and center joined, between Pettus's brigade holding that point and troops of the Fourth Corps attacking it. The assailants were repulsed, however. The vigor of this attack suggested the addition of Brown's brigade to Pettus's. On the 9th a much larger force assailed the troops at the angle, and with great determination, but the Federal troops were defeated with a loss pro- portionate to their courage. Assaults as vigorous and resolute were made at the same time on Stewart and on Bate, and were handsomely repulsed. The Confederates, who fought under cover, had but trifling losses in these com- bats, but the Federal troops, fully exposed, must have lost heavily-the more because American soldiers are not to be driven back without severe losses. General Wheeler had a very handsome affair of cavalry near Var- nell's Station, the same day, in which he captured 100 prisoners, including a colonel, three captains, five lieutenants, and a standard. General Sherman regarded these actions as amounting to a battle. Information had been received of the arrival of the Army of the Tennes- see in Snake Creek Gap, on the 8th. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark. Lieutenant- General Hood was dispatched to Resaca with three divisions immediately. The next morning he reported the enemy retiring, and was recalled, with orders to leave two divisions midway between the two places. Spirited fight- ing was renewed in and near the gap as wel as on the northern front. The most vigorousof them was made late in the day, on Bate's division, and repulsed. At night information was received from our scouts near the south end of Rocky-face, that the Army of the Tennessee was intrenching in Snake Creek Gap, and next morning reports were received which indicated a general 263 6 11 4 pi 11 5 4 I 0 i m i 4 4 x A F. t 0 ;11 t, 0 I P -i 0 4 11 iI A 264 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. movement of the Federal army to its right, and one report that General McPherson's troops were moving from Snake Creek Gap toward Resaea. General Polk, who had just reached that place with Loring's division, was charged with its defense. General Wheeler was directed to move next morning with all the available cavalry around the north end of Rocky-face, to learn if a general movement of the enemy was in progress. He was to be supported by Hindman's divi- sion. In this reconnoissance General Stoneman's division of cavalry was eneountered and driven back. The information gained confirmed the reports of the day before. About 10 o'clock A. It. of the 13th the Confederate army moved from Dal- ton and reached Resaca just as the Federal troops approaching from Snake Creek Gap were encountering Loring's division a mile from the station. Their approach was delayed long enough by Loring's opposition to give me time to select the ground to be occupied by our troops. And while they were taking this ground the Federal army was forming in front of them. The left of Polk's corps occupied the west face of the intrenchment of Resaca. Hardee's corps, also facing to the west, formed the center. Hood's, its left division facing to the west and the two others to the north-west, was on the right, and, crossing the railroad, reached the Connasauga. The enemy skirmished briskly with the left half of our line all the afternoon. On the 14th spirited fighting was maintained by the enemy on the whole front, a very vigorous attack being made on Hindman's division of Hood's corps, which was handsomely repulsed. In the meantime General Wheeler was directed to ascertain the position and formation of the Federal left. His report indicating that these were not unfavorable to an attack, Lieuten- ant-General Hood was directed to make one with Stewart's and Stevenson's divisions, strengthened by four brigades from the center and left. He was instructed to make a half change of front to the left to drive the enemy from the railroad, the object of the operation being to prevent them from using it. The attack was extremely well conducted and executed, and before dark (it was begun at 6 P. m.) the enemy was driven from his ground. This encour- aged me to hope for a more important success; so General Hood was directed to renew the fight next morning. His troops were greatly elated by this announcement, made to them that evening. On riding from the right to the left after nightfall, I was informed that the extreme left of our line of skirmishers, forty or fifty men, had been driven from their ground,-an elevation near the river,-and received a report from Major-General Martin that Federal troops were crossing the Oostenaula near Lay's Ferry on a pontoon-bridge - two divisions having already crossed. In consequence of this, Walker's division was sent to Lay's Ferry immediately, and the order to General Hood was revoked; also, Lieutenant-Colonel S. W. Presstman, chief engineer, was directed to lay a pontoon-bridge a mile above the railroad, and to have the necessary roadway made. Sharp fighting commenced early on the 15th, and continued until night, with so much vigor that many of the assailants pressed up to our intrench- VOLx IV. 18 26 - 266 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. ments. All these attacks were repelled, however. In General Sherman's language, the sounds of musketry and cannon rose all day to the dignity of a battle. Soon after noon intelligence was received from Major-General Walker, that the report that the enemy had crossed the 0ostenaula was untrue. Lieutenant-General Hood was therefore again ordered to assail the enemy with the troops he had commanded the day before. When he was about to move forward, positive intelligence was received from General Walker that the Federal right was actually crossing the Oostenaula. This made it neces- sarv to abandon the thought of fighting north of the river, and the orders to Lieutenant-General Hoo'i were countermanded, but the order from corps headquarters was not sent to Stewart promptly, and consequently he made the attack unsustained, and suffered before being recalled. The occupation of Resaca being exceedingly hazardous, I determined to abandon the place. So the army was ordered to cross the Oostenaula about midnight,-Hardee's and Polk's corps by the railroad and trestle bridges, and Hood's by that above, on the pontoons. General Sherman claims to have surprised us by McPherson's appearance in Snake Creek Gap on the 9th, forgetting that we discovered his march on the 8th. He blames McPherson for not seizing the place. That officer tried the works and found them too strong to be seized. General Sherman says that if McPherson had placed his whole force astride the railroad, he could have there easily withstood the attack of all Johnston's army. Had he done so, " all Johnston's army" would have been upon him at the dawn of the next day, the cannon giving General Sherman intelligence of the movement of that army. About twice his force in front and three thousand men in his immediate rear would have overwhelmed him, making a most auspicious beginning of the campaign for the Confederates. General Sherman has a very exaggerated idea of our field-works. They were slighter than his own, because we had most inadequate supplies of intrenching tools. Two events at Resaca were greatly magnified to him. He says that toward evening on the 15th [14th] McPherson "moved his whole line of battle forward till he had gained a ridge overlooking the town" [there was no town.- J. E. J.], and that several attempts to drive him away were repulsed with bloody loss. The fact is, near night of the 14th, forty or fifty skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the slight elevation they occupied, Z, but no attempt was made to retake it. Sherman also says that "Hooker's corps had also some handsome fighting on the left, . . . capturing a 4-gun intrenched battery." . . . From our view in the morning a In his published " Narrative " General John- dered forward the brigades of Generals Giles A. Smith ston says: and C. R. Woods, supported by Veatch's division from "Onridng ro th riht o he eft afernigtfal.Dodge's corps. The height held by Polk, was carried. n riding from the right to the left. after nightfall, and the position intrentheld under a galling artilety I learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's advanced and musketry fire from the enemy's principal line-. troops had been driven from a bill In front of his left, During the evening Polk made a vigorous effort to re- which commanded our bridges at short range." take the posItion, bht was repulsed, McPherson seed- And General J. D. Cox, in his volume " Atlanta" 1 ing forward Lighiburn's brigade to the support of the troops already engaged. The hill thus carried corn- (Charles Seribuer's Sons), says: manded the railroad and wagon bridges crosing the "Between a and 6 o'clock Logan [of McPherson] or- Oastenauls." [See also p. 2I]1 EDITORS. OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. of the 15th, Major-General Stevenson advanced four guns some eighty yards and began to intrench them. General Hood had their fire opened at onee. A ravine leading from the Federal line within easy musket-range enabled the Federal troops to drive away the gunners; but their attempt to take off the gins was frustrated by the Confederate musketry. So the pieces remained in place, and fell into the possession of Hooker's corps on the 16th, after we abandoned the position. The Confederate army was compelled to abandon its position in front of Dalton by General Sherman's flank movement through Snake Creek Gap, and was forced from the second position by the movement toward Calhoun. Each of these movements would have made the destruction of the Confed- erate army inevitable in case of defeat. In the first case the flank march was protected completely by Rocky-face Ridge; in the second, as completely by the Oostenaula. A numerical superiority of more than two to one made those manaeuvres free from risk. General Sherman thinks that the imprac- ticable nature of the country, which made the passage of the troops across the valley almost impossible, saved the Confederate army. The Confederate army remained in its position near Dalton until May 13th, because I knew the time that would be required for the march of 100,000 men through the long defile between their right flank near Mill Creek Gap and the outlet of Snake Creek Gap; and the shortness of the time in which 43,000 men could march by two good roads direct from Dalton to Resaca; and the further fact that our post at Resaca could hold out a longer time than our march to that point would require. Mr. Davis and General Sherman exhibit a strange ignorance of the country between Dalton and Atlanta. Mr. Davis describes mountain ridges offering positions neither to be taken nor turned, and a natural fortress eighteen miles in extent, forgetting, apparently, that a fortress is strong only when it has a garrison strong enough for its extent; and both forget that, except Rocky- face, no mountain is visible from the road between Dalton and Atlanta. That country is intersected by numerous practicable roads, and is not more rugged than that near Baltimore and Washington, or Atlanta and Macon. When the armies confronted each other the advantages of ground were equal and unimportant, both parties depending for protection on earth-works, not on ridges and ravines. In leaving Resaca I hoped to find a favorable position near Calhoun, but there was none; and the army, after resting 18 or 20 hours near that place, early in the morning of the 17th moved on seven or eight miles to Adairsville, where we were joined by the cavalry of General Polk's command, a division of 3700 men under General W. H. Jackson. Our map represented the valley in which the railroad lies as narrow enough for our army formed across it to occupy the heights on each side with its flanks, and therefore I intended to await the enemy's attack there; but the breadth of the valley far exceeded the front of our army in order of battle. So another plan was devised. Two roads lead southward from Adairsville,- one directly through Cassville; the other follows the railroad through Kingston, turns to the left there, and rejoins 267 268 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. the other at Cassville. The interval between them is widest opposite Kings- ton, where it is about seven miles by the farm roads. In the expectation that a part of the Federal army would follow each road, it was arranged that Polk's corps should engage the column on the direct road when it should arrive opposite Kingston,- Hood's, in position for the purpose, falling upon its left flank during the deployment. Next morning, when our cavalry on that road reported the right Federal column near Kingston, General Hood was instructed to move to and follow northwardly a country road a mile east of that from Adairsville, to be in position to fall upon the flank of the Federal column when it should be engaged with Polk. An order announcing that we were about to give battle was read to each regiment, and heard with exultation. After going some three miles, General Hood marched back about two, and formed his corps facing to our light and rear. Being asked for an explanation, he replied that an aide-de-camp had told him that the Federal army was approaching on that road. Our whole army knew that to be impossible. It had been viewing the enemy in the opposite direction every day for two weeks. General Hood did not report his extraordinary disobe- dience-as he must have done had he believed the story upon which he professed to have acted. The time lost frustrated the design. for success depended on timing the attack properly. Mr. Davis conceals the facts to impute this failure to me, thus: " The battle, for causes which were the subject of dispute, did not take place.... Instead of his attacking the divided columns of the enemy, the united Federal columns were preparing to attack him." There was no dispute as to facts. An attack, except under very unfavorable circumstances, being impossible, the troops were formed in an excellent position along the ridge immediately south of Cassville, an elevated and open valley in front, and a deep one in rear of it. Its length was equal to the front of Hood's and Polk's and half of Hardee's corps. They were placed in that order from right to left. As I rode along the line while the troops were forming, General Shoup, chief of artillery, pointed out to me a space of 150 or 200 yards, which he thought might be enfiladed by artillery on a hill a half mile beyond Hood's right and in front of the prolongation of our line, if the enemy should clear away the thick wood that covered it and establish batteries. He was desired to point out to the officer who might command there some narrow ravines very near, in which his men could be sheltered from such artillery fire, and to remind him that while artillery was playing upon his position no attack would be made upon it by infantry. The enemy got into position soon after our troops were formed and skirmished until dark, using their field-pieces freely. During the evening Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood, the latter being spokesman, asserted that a part of the line of each would be so enfi- laded next morning by the Federal batteries established on the hill above mentioned, that they would be unable to hold their ground an hour; and therefore urged me to abandon the position at once. They expressed the conviction that early the next morning batteries would open upon them from a hill then thickly covered 'with wood and out of range of brass field- OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. pieces. The matter was discussed perhaps an hour, in which time I became apprehensive that as the commanders of two-thirds of the army thought the position untenable, the opinion would be adopted by their troops, which would make it so. Therefore I yielded. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose ground was the least strong, was full of confidence. Mr. Davis says ("Rise amd Fall," Vol. II., p. 533) that General Hood asserts, in his report and in a book, that the two corps were on ground commanded and enfiladed by the enemy's batteries. On the contrary, they were on a hill, and the enemy were in a valley where their batteries were completely commanded by ours. The army abandoned the ground before daybreak and crossed the Etowah after noon, and encamped near the railroad. Wheeler's cavalry was placed in observation above, and Jackson's below our main body. No movement of the enemy was discovered until the 22d, when General Jackson reported their army moving toward Stilesboro', as if to cross the Etowah near that place; they crossed on the 23d. On the 24th Hardee's and Polk's corps encamped on the road from Stilesboro' to Atlanta, south-east of Dallas, and Hood's four miles from New Hope Church, on the road from Alla- toona. On the 25th the Federal army was a little east of Dallas, and Hood's corps was placed with its center at New Hope Church, Polk's on his left, and Hardee's prolonging the line to the Atlanta road, which was held by its left. A little before 6 o'clock in the afternoon Stewart's division in front of New Hope Church was fiercely attacked by Hooker's corps, and the action contin- ued two hours without lull or pause, when the assailants fell back. The can- ister shot of the sixteen Confederate field-pieces and the musketry of five thousand infantry at short range must have inflicted heavy loss upon Gen- eral Hooker's corps, as is proved by the name " Hell Hole," which, General Sherman says, was given the place by the Federal soldiers. Next day the Federal troops worked so vigorously, extending their intrenchments toward the railroad, that they skirmished very little. The Confederates labored stren- uously to keep abreast of their work, but in vain, owing to greatly inferior numbers and an insignificant supply of intrenching tools. On the 2ith, how- ever, the fighting rose above the grade of skirmishing, especially in the after- noon, when at half-past 5 o'clock the Fourth Corps (Howard) and a division of the Fourteenth (Palmer) attempted to turn our right, but the movement, after being impeded by the cavalry, was met by two regiments of our right division (Cleburne's), and the two brigades of his second line brought up on the right of the first. The Federal formation was so deep that its front did not equal that of our two brigades; consequently those troops were greatly exposed to our musketry-all but the leading troops being on a hillside facing us. They advanced until their first line was within 25 or 30 paces of ours, and fell back only after at least 700 men had fallen dead in their places. When the leading Federal troops paused in their advance, a color-bearer came on and planted his colors eight or ten feet in front of his regiment, but was killed in the act. A soldier who sprang forward to hold up or bear off the colors was shot dead as he seized the staff. Two others who followed successively fell like him, but the fourth bore back the noble emblem. Some time after night- 269 270 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. fall the Confederates aptured above two hundred prisoners in the hollow let)le the m. (T eneral Sherman does not refer to this combat in his "Memoirs," although, lie dwells with some exultation uponi a very small affair of the next day at Dallas, in which the Confederates lost about three hundred killed and woundefl, anid ill whieh he Imiust have lost more than ten times as many. II the afternoon of the 2Sth Lieutenant-General Hood was instructed to draw his corps to the rear of our line in the early part of the night, march around our right flank, and form it facing the left flank of the Federal line and obliquely to it, and attack at dawn -Hardee and Polk to join in tIns battle successively as the success on the right of each might enable him to do so. We waited next morning for the signal - the sound of Hood's mus- ketry -from the appointed time until 10 o'clock, when a message from that officer was brought by an aide-de-camp to the effect that hei had found R. W. Johnson's division intrenching on the left of the Federal line and almost at right angles to it, and asked for instructions. The message proved that there could be no surprise, which was necessary to success, and that the enemy's intrenehments would be completed before we could attack. The corps was therefore recalled. It was ascertained afterward that after marching eight or ten hours Hood's corps was then at least six miles from the Federal left, which was little more than a musket-shot from his starting-point. The extension of the Federal intrenebments toward the railroad was con- tinued industriously to cut us off from it or to cover their own approach to it. We tried to keep pace with them, but the labor did not prevent the desultory fighting, which was kept up while daylight lasted. In this the great inequality of force compelled us to employ dismounted cavalry. On the 4th or 5th of June the Federal army reached the railroad between Ackworth and Allatoona. The Confederate forces then moved to a position carefully marked out by Colonel Presstman, its left on Lost Mountain, and its right, of cavalry, bevond the railroad and somewhat covered by Noonday Creek, a line much too long for our strength. On the 8th the Federal army seemed to be near Ackworth, and our position was contracted to cover the roads leading thence to Atlanta. This brought the left of Hardee's corps to Gilgal Church, Polk's right near the Marietta and Ackworth road and Hood's corps massed beyond that road. Pine Mountain, a detached hill, was held by a division. On the 11th of June the left of the Federal army was on the high ground beyond Noonday Creek, its center a third of a mile in front of Pine Mountain and its right beyond the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road. In the morning of the 14th General Hardee and I rode to the summit of Pine Mountain to decide if the outpost there should be maintained. General Polk accompanied us. After we had concluded our examination and the abandonment of the hill that night had been decided upon, a few shots were fired at us from a battery of Parrott guns a quarter of a mile in our front; the third of these passed through General Polk's chest, from left to right, killing him instantly. This event produced deep sorrow in the army, in OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. every battle of whieh he had been distinguished. Major-General W. W. Lorinig succeeded to the command of the corps. A division of Georgia militia under Major-General G. W. Smith, transferred to the Confederate serviee by Governor Brown, was charged with the (lefense of the bri(lges and ferries of the Chattahoochee, for the safety of Atlanta. Oit the 16th Hardee's corps was placed on the high ground east of Mud Creek, fauitigto the west. The right of the Federal army made a corresponding ehange of fronmt by which it faced to the east. It was opposed in this manmcuvre by Jack- son's cavalry as well as 2300 men can resist 30,000. The angle where Hardee's right joined Loring's left was soo01 found to be a very weak point, and on the 17th another position was chosen, including the crest of Kenesaw, which Colonel Presstman pre- iared. for occupation by the 19th, when it was as- sumed by the army. In this position two divisions of Loring's corps occupied the crest of Kenesaw from end to end, the other divi- sion being on its right, and Hood's corps on the right of it, Hardee's extending from Loriug's left across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road. The enemy approached as usual, under cover of successive lines of intrenchments. In these positions of the two armies C02FEDERATE04 DRAGGING GUNS UP KEIESAW M(40 TAIr,. FROM THE i-'ALENTIN'E," PUBLISHED BY TilE WETRElN TL.ANTIC 1B. R. there were sharp and incessant partial engage- ments until the 3d of July. On the 21st of June the extension of the Federal line to the south which had been protected by the swollen condition of Noses Creek, compelled the transfer of Hood's corps to our left, Wheeler's troops occupying the ground it had left. On the 22d General Hood reported that Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of his corps, having been attacked, had driven back the Federal troops and had taken a line of breastworks, from which they had been driven by the artillery of the enemy's main position. 271 272 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. Subsequent detailed accounts of this affair prove that after the capture of the advanced line of breastworks General Hood directed his two divisions against the enemy's main line. The slow operation of a change of front under the fire of the artillery of this main line subjected the Confederates to a loss of one thousand men-whereupon the at- tempt was abandoned, either by the gener- al's orders orby thediscretion of the troops. On the 24th Hardee's skirmishers were attacked in their rifle-pits by a Federal line of battle, and on the 25th a similar assault was made upon those of Steven- son's division. Both were repulsed, with heavy proportion- atelosses o hthee as ;2 X \ Cumb-sailants. In the morning of the 27th, after a can- nonade by all its ar- tillery, the Federal army assailed the Confederate posi- tion, especially the center and right - the Army of the Cumberland ad- Coeera Mntr e ANn GE UAL THOmaS Rny THE pl AULT ATaini vancing against the for UTA,1, UN 2, C N O A SKVTCH two Ir aT THE TIME. first, and that of the 4.,,,. 4wUr i teitelre' iur, n hergh. tend4ru r TtwTennessee agist At a11dt HA. MI. the il ttea hrod waieh l . teIliGen eir . t. the again "root. by tocn. Ilohh xtt-t. werte rayeied Jut order trhetitei thttg the other. Although tada lottlt. suffering losses out of all proportion to those they inflicted, the Federal troops pressed up to the Confederate intrenchments in many places, maintainilig the unequal conflict for two hours and a half, with the persevering courage of American soldiers. At 11:30 A. Mi. the attack had failed. In General Sherman's words: " About 9 o'clock A. m. of the day appointed [June the 27thl, the troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry was kept up. At all points the enemy met us with determined courage and in great force. . . . By 11: 30 the assault was over, and had failed. We had not broken the line at either point, but our assaulting columns held their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches and there covered them- selves with parapet. McPherson lost about 500 men and several valuable officers, and Thomas lost nearly 2000 men." 4 4 In his "Memoirs' Sherman says, in continu- killed and wounded as Hoods corps Knot reported) ation of the quotation made by Johnston: Hardees corps, 16; Lorlnag`s (Pols), 522.-ttotal, b0u. This, no doubt. Is a true and fair statement; but, M5 -This was the hardest flight of the campaign up to usual, Johnston overestimates our los, putting It at that date, and It is well described by Johnston In hbi 080, whereas our entire loss was about 2500 killed and 'Narrative [pp. SE, 84l, where he admits his less In wounded." EDITOSS. OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. Such statements of losses are incredible. The Northern troops fought very bravely, as usual. Many fell against our parapets, some were killed in our trenches. Most of this battle of two hours and a half was at very short range. It is not to be believed that Southern veterans struck but 3 per cent. of Thomas's troops in mass at short range, or 11 per cent. of McPherson's - and, if possible, still less so that Northern soldiers, inured to battle, should have been defeated by losses so trifling as never to have discouraged the meanest soldiers oln record. I have seen American soldiers (Northern men) win a field with losses ten times greater proportionally. But, argument apart, there is a witness against the estimates of Northern losses in this campaign, in the 10,126 graves in the Military Cemetery at Marietta, of soldiers killed south of the Etowah. L Moreover, the Federal dead nearest to Hardee's line lay there two days, during which they were frequently counted - at least 1000; and as there were seven lines within some 300 yards, exposed two hours and a half to the musketry of two divisions and the canister-shot of 32 field- pieces, there must have been many uncounted dead; the counted would alone indicate a loss of at least 6000. As to the " assaulting columns holding their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches and there covering themselves with parapet," it was utterly impossible. There would have been much more exposure in that than in mounting and crossing the little rebel " parapet"; but at one point, seventy- five yards in front of Cheatham's line, a party of Federal soldiers, finding themselves sheltered from his missiles by the form of the ground, made a " parapet" there which became connected with the main work.\ As the extension of the Federal intrenched line to their right had brought it nearer to Atlanta than was our left, and had made our position otherwise very dangerous, two new positions for the army were chosen, one nine or ten miles south of Marietta, and the other on the high ground near the Chatta- hoochee: Colonel Presstman was desired to prepare the first for occupation, and Brigadier-General Shoup, commander of the artillery, was instructed to strengthen the other with a line of redoubts devised by himself. The troops took the first position in the morning of the 3d, and as General Sherman was strengthening his right greatly, they were transferred to the second in the morning of the 5th. The cavalry of our left had been supported in the previous few days by a division of State troops commanded by Major- General G. W. Smith. As General Sherman says, " it was really a continuous battle lasting t Many of the burials at Marietta were of The bodies wer removed from the National Ceme- soldiers who died of disease before and after the tery at Montgomery, Ala. (which was discontinned). and battle of Kenesaw Mountain, and the following from Rome, Dalton, Atlanta, and from many other batte ofKensaw ounainand he olloingplaces in Georgia. Several buiuala have ben made., extract from the report, in 1874, of Colonel Oscar anee my last inapection, from the garrison at Atlanta." A. Mack, Inspector of National Cemeteries, shows EDITORS. that Marietta Cemetery includes dead from widely separated fields, and of other dates: Surgeon Joseph A. Stillwell, 2-2d Indiana Vol- aeparated felds, and ofmother dates: nteers, writes to the editors that the point re- The Interments [Marietta Cemetery] are as follows: ferred to was in front of Gleneral Daniel McCook's W"it. Union soldiers and saiors (known, GMa unknown, brigade, and was seesty-fire feet from the enemy, 297)._ total, gm50; colored Union -idlders (known, 158; nUkloown,67),_tota;, 225; citizens, etc., 21;-total inter- and commanded by half a mile of the Confederate meats, 1o,12. works. 273 274 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. from June 10th to July 3d." The army occupied positions about Mari- etta twenty-six dlays, in which the want of artillery ammunition was eslecially felt; in all those days we were exposed to an almost inees- sant fire of artillery as well as musketry-the former being the more harassing, because it could not be returned; for our supply of artillery ammunition was so small that we were compelled to reserve it for battles and serious assaults. In the new position each corps had two pontoon-bridges laid. Above the railroad bridge the Chattahoochee had numerous good fords. General Sher- man, therefore, directed his troops to that part of the river, ten or fifteen miles above our camp. On the 8th of July two of his corps had crossed the Chat- tahoochee and intrenehed themselves. Therefore the Confederate army also crossed the river on the 9th. About the middle of June Captain Grant of the engineers was instructed to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta materially, on the side toward Peach Tree Creek, by the addition of redoubts and by converting barbette into embrasure batteries. I also obtained a promise of seven sea-coast rifles from General D. H. Maury [at Mobile], to be mounted on that front. Colonel Presstman was instructed to join Captain Grant with his sub- ordinates, in this work of strengthening the defenses of Atlanta, especially between the Augusta and Marietta roads, as the enemy was approaching that side. For the same reason a position on thc high ground looking down into the valley of Peach Tree Creek was selected for the army, from which it might engage the enemy if he should expose himself in the pas- sage of the stream. The position of each division was marked and pointed out to its staff-officers. On the 17th we learned that the whole Federal army had crossed the Chat- tahoochee; and late in the evening, while Colonel Presstman was receiving from me instructions for the next day, I received the following telegram of that date: " Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of general under the late law of Congress. I am directed hy the Secretary of War to inform you that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood. " S. Cooraa, Adjutant and Inspector-General." Orders transferring the command of the army\ to General Hood were written and published immediately, and next morning I replied to the tele- gram of the Secretary of War: " Your dispatch of yesterday received and obeyed-command of the Army and Department of Tennessee has been transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger, compared with that of Tennessee, than Grant's compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much N I have two reports of the strength of the and 10,484 cavalry-total, 54,085. 2. Of July army besides that of April 30th, already given: 10th, 36,901 infantry, 3705 artillery, and 10,270 1. Of July 1st, 39,746 infantry, 3835 artillery, cavalry,-total, 50,926.-J. E. J. OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD, C. S. A. FEOX A PHOTOGRAPH. more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg, and pene- trated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia. Confident language by a military com- mander is not usually regarded as evidence of competence." General Hood came to my quarters early in the morning of the 18th, and remained there until nightfall. Intelligence was soon received that the Federal army was marching toward Atlanta, and at his urgent request I gave all nee- sary orders during the day. The most important one placed the troops in the position already chosen, which covered the roads by which the enemy was approaching. After transferring the command to General Hood, I described to him the course of action I had arranged in my mind. If the enemy should give us a good opportunity in the passage of Peach Tree Creek, I expected to attack him. If successful, we should obtain important results, for the enemy's retreat would be on two sides of a triangle and our march on one. If we should not succeed, our intrenchments would give us a 275 276 OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA. safe refuge, where we could hold back the enemy until the promised State troops should join us; then, placing them on the nearest defenses of the place (where there were, or ought to be, seven seacoast rifles, sent us from Mobile by General Maury), I would attack the Federals in flank with the three Con- federate corps. If we were successful, they would be driven against the Chattahoochee below the railroad, where there are no fords, or away from their supplies, as we might fall on their left or right flank. If unsuccessful, we could take refuge in Atlanta, which we could hold indefinitely; for it was too strong to be taken by assault, and too extensive to be invested. This would win the campaign, the object of which the country supposed Atlanta to be. At Dalton, the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the chances of battle much against us, and even if beaten they had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Atlanta, 100 miles off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore victory for us could not have been decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his fall- ing back into them, while defeat would have been our ruin. In the course pursued our troops, always fighting under cover, had very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the enemy's numeri- cal superiority was reduced daily and rapidly; and we could reasonably have expected to cope with them on equal ground by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on the south side of that river would have been their destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of refuge in Atlanta-too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to be invested. I had also hopes that by the breaking of the railroad in its rear the Federal army might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or forced into a retreat easily converted into a rout. After we -crossed the Etowah, five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Chattanooga and the Etowah. All failed, because they were too weak. Captain James B. Harvey, an officer of great courage and sagacity, was detached on this service on the 11th of June and remained near the railroad several weeks, frequently interrupting, but not strong enough to prevent, its use. Early in the campaign the impressions of the strength of the cavalry in Mississippi and east Louisiana given me by Lieutenant-General Polk, just from the command of that department, gave me reason to hope that an adequate force commanded by the most competent officer in America for such service (General N. B. Forrest) could be sent from it for the purpose of breaking the railroad in Sherman's rear. I therefore made the suggestion direct to the President, June 13th and July 16th, and through General Bragg on the 3d, 12th, 16th, and 26th of June. I did so in the confidence that this cavalrv would serve the Confederacy far better by insuring the defeat of a great invasion than by repelling a mere raid. In his telegram of the 17th Mr. Davis gave his reasons for removing me, but in Vol. II., pp. 556 to 561, of the " Rise and Fall" he gives many others, THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. most of which depend on misrepresentations of the strength of the positions I occupied. They were not stronger than General Lee's; indeed, my course was as like his as the dissimilarity of the two Federal commanders permitted. As his had increased his great fame, it is not probable that the people, who admired his course, condemned another similar one. As to Georgia, the State most interested, its two most influential citizens, Governor Joseph E. Brown and General Howell Cobb, remonstrated against my removal. The assertions in Mr. B. H. Hill's letter [of October 12th, 1878] quoted by Mr. Davis [" R. and F.," Vol. II., p. 557] do not agree with those in his oration delivered in Atlanta in 1875. Mr. Hill said in the oration: " I know that he (Mr. Davis) consulted General Lee fully, earnestly, and anxiously before this perhaps unfortunate removal." That assertion is contradicted by one whose testimony is above question-for in Southern estimation he has no superior as gentleman, soldier, and civilian-General Hampton. General Lee had a conversation with him oil the subject, of which lie wrote to me: " On that occasion he expressed great regret that you had been removed, and said that he had done all in his power to prevent it. The Secretary of War had recently been at his head- quarters near Petersburg to consult as to this matter, and General Lee assured me that he had urged Mr. Seddon not to remove you from command, and had said to him that if you could not command the army we had no one who could. He was earnest in expressing not only his regret at your removal, but his entire confidence in yourself." Everything seen about Atlanta proved that it was to be defended. We had been strengthening it a month, and had made it, under the circumstances, impregnable. We had defended Marietta, which had not a tenth of its strength, twenty-six days. General Sherman appreciated its strength, for he made no attack, although he was before it about six weeks. I was a party to no such conversations as those given by Mr. Hill. No soldier above idiocy could express the opinions he ascribes to me. Mr. Davis condemned me for not fighting. General Sherman's testimony and that of the Military Cemetery at Marietta refute the charge. I assert that had one of the other lieutenant-generals of the army (Hardee or Stewart) succeeded me, Atlatita would have been held by the Army of Tennessee. THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. BY W. P. C. BRECKINRIDGE, COLONEL, C. S. A. IN his paper "Opposing Sherman's Advance to people, and to take command there himself. These ae- Atlanta," General Joseph E. Johnston-elarui cesslonx soon decided the contest, and the enemy was driven down the hill.... et renerabile nomee-writes [see p. 263]: drie.. dw d been received of the arria of the Cantey with his division arrived at Resaca that even- Army of the Tennesee in Snake Creek Gap on the 8th. log i7th), and was charged with the defense of the place. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had During the day our cavalry was driven from the ground been engaged with those troops until dark. Lieutenant- west of Roc ky-face through the gap. Grigsby's brigade General Hood was dispatched to Resaea with three was placed near Dug Gap,-the remainder in front of divisions immediately." our right. About 4 o'clock P. M. of the Rtb, Geary's divi- sion of Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Rey- It so happened that the brigade of Kentucky nulds.' Arkansas brigade who were guarding Dug Gap, cavalry was present at Dug Gap and Snake Creek anod who were soon joined by Grigsby's brigade on foot. Gap, and that the regiment I commanded- the 9th The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp aKn t t both places conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested Kentucky cavalry-was m frn a pe to send Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our and it may not be improper to put on record an 277 THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. account of those affairs, and thereby correct the unintentional mistakes in the meager statements given above. The winter having ended, and all possible prep- arations having been made, the operations known as the Dalton-Atlanta campaign opened on May 5th, 1 Sf64, by the advance of General Thomas on Tunnel Hill, and on May 7th the withdrawal of our forces within Mill Creek Gap marked the begin- ning of the long retreat. Including the corps of General Polk, then under orders to join him, Gen- eral Johnston had under his command, available for strategic purposes, between 65,000 and 70,000 men of all arms. It was a superb army of veterans, with implicit confidence in its general, and capable of great achievements. Deficient to a certain ex- tent in supplies, it had enough for any possible movement its commander might order. Being a Confederate army, it necessarily was inferior to the armybefore it in numbers, equipment, and sup- plies. This was generally the case. It was neces- sarily so. With a white population of 5,000,000 to over 20,000,000; with no market, no ships, no factories, no credit; against a people commanding the sea, rich in all resources, and with all the world to buyfrom,-it was the fate of the Southern armies to confront armies larger, better equipped, and ad- mirably supplied. Unless we could by activity, audacity, aggressiveness, and skill overcome these advantages it was a mere matter of time as to the certain result. It was therefore the first requisite of a Confederate general that he should be willing to meet his antagonist on these unequal terms, and on such terms make fight. He must of necessity take great risks and assume grave responsibilities. While these differences between the two armies that confronted each other in the mountains of North Georgia existed, they were no greater than usually existed, and for which every Confederate general must be presumed to have prepared. I re- peat, ours was a superb army. While it had met defeat, and knew what retreat meant, it had fought battles which were and are among the bloodiest in all the annals of war; and it felt that under John- ston it could parallel Chickamauga and renew the glories of Shiloh. The army laybehind an impassable ridge, through which, on its left flank, were only two accessible gaps,-Dug Gap, less than four miles south-west fromDalton, on the main road from Dalton toLafay- ette, and perhaps six miles from Mill Creek Gap; and Snake Creek Gap, some eighteen miles south from Mill Creek Gap. [See map, p. 251.] With these gaps fortified, the left flank and rear of that army were absolutely safe; for while the Roeky-face and Chattooga ridges protected our flank, through these gaps we bad access to attack the flank of the enemy if he attempted to make a march so far to the left and rear as to threaten our communication south of the Oostenaula or Coosa. These gaps were capable of easy and impregnable fortification. Dug Gap was a mere road cut out of the mountain-side and really needed no breastworks, for the natural palisades and contour of the mountain rendered easy its defense by resolute men. Snake Creek Gap was a gorge apparently cut through the mountains by the creek that ran through it. It was a narrow defile between Milk Mountain and Horn Mountain, which are merely a prolongation of Chattooga Mountains, and capable of impregnable defense. These gaps were well known to both armies. Through them ran public roads, and soldiers of both armies had marched through both. Late in Feb- ruary Dug Gap had been seized by an Indiana regi- ment and held until Cleburne retook it. As early as February General Thomas, knowing that at that time Snake Creek Gap was unguarded, proposed a campaign, the plan being to attract General John- ston's attention by a demonstration on Buzzard Roost, and to throw the main body of the army through Snake Creek Gap, and cut his communi- cations between Dalton and the Oostenaula. Neither of these gaps was fortified, and on May 5th, when the campaign opened, Dug Gap was guarded by a small command of Arkansas troops under Colonel Williamson, numbering perhaps 250, while Snake Creek Gap was left wholly un- protected. At Besaca, where the railroad crosses the Oostenaula, Cantey's brigade was held on the evening of the 7th of May, on its way from Rome to Dalton. General Sherman had in hand for attack nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into three armies-the Army of the Cumberiand, com- manded by General Thomas, numbering 60,773; the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson, 24,465; the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield, 13,559. It was a superb army, admirably equip- ped, abundantly supplied, excellently led. It was veteran, and had known victory. It had pushed its antagonist out of Kentucky with the surrender of Donelson; had captured Tennessee; captured Vicksburg; repossessed the Mississippi River; driven its foe over Missionary Ridge in Right. It knew how to fight, and was willing to fight. On May 7th our cavalry was driven through Mill Creek Gap. On that night, after we had gone into camp, Colonel Grigsby, who commanded the Kentucky cavalry brigade, was ordered to send a regiment to the front of Dug Gap, to guard the ap- proaches to it. In obedience to that order the 9th Kentucky Cavalry passed over Roeky-faee Ridge, and near midnight bivouacked on Mill Creek, about a mile from, and in front of, Dug Gap. Heavy picket lines were thrown out on all the roads leading down the valley. There were sev- eral of these roads, and scouts were sent out to aseertain the movements of the enemy. By day- light it was discovered that very large bodies of troops were moving down the valley on all the roads leading to the south. General McPherson had marched from Chattanooga to Rosaville, thence west of Chickamauga Mountain to Shipp's Gap and to Villanow, where the road forks -one branch leading down the east foot of Taylor's Ridge, the other leading across toward Rocky-face; this road again forks - one branch leading through Dug Gap, the other down the valley to Snake Creek Gap. Until McPherson reached Villanow it was only a conjecture as to his course, and until the head of his column turned toward Snake Creek Gap his destination was uncertain. His march 278 THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. was concealed by Hooker's corps of the Army of the Cumberland, which corps, forming Thomas's right, marching from Ringgold via Nickajack Gap and Tricknm, bid the flank movement of McPher- son. The plan was for Hooker to seize Dug Gap and push forward sufficiently to protect the flank of McPherson, and strike the flank of Johnston if fie turned on McPherson; while McPherson, marching through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, should not only destroy but hold the only railroad tributary to Johnston. The possession of Dug Gap by Hooker not only would render Dalton untenable, but would make a retreat from Dalton by the line of the railroad extremely hazardous, and completely protect McPherson from attack on his left flank. With Hooker descending from Rocky-face on our left flank and rear, McPherson holding Resaca, Thomas, with the corps of Howard and Palmer, pushing to Dalton, and Schofield to his left, our army would have been in a perilous situation. The march of Hooker and McPherson was dis- covered early on the morning of May 8th by the scouts of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry, and timely information was given that at least an attack on Dug Gap was certain, and that the columns on the march were very heavy and their movements were guarded by forces too large to be either resisted or developed by the detachments sent out by the 9th Kentucky. On this information the remainder of Grigsby's brigade was ordered to Dug Gap, and reached there none too soon. All possible delay to the march of Hooker's corps was made, but about 2 P. M. Geary's division of that eorps drove the 9th Kentucky across the creek and slowly up the mountain-side, until the regiment fell back in its proper position in the gap, where it found the bri- gade drawn in mere skirmish-line along the edge of the mountain-side. As one-fourth of cavalry soldiers are detailed to hold the horses, I presume that we had about 800 of our brigade in the fight and 250 Arkansas troops; and this handful of men held that gap until nightfall, repelling every assault. After nightfall Granbury's Texas brigade relieved us, but the assault was over. Hooker had failed in his part of the mission. That flank of our army was safe. The importance of holding that gap was so mani- fest that Generals Hardee and Cleburne, with their staffs, galloped to the scene to encourage us by their presence and to aid Colonel Grigsby by their suggestions; and though the fight was made un- der their eye, that command needed no encourage- ment, and its officers and men knew that they were holding one of the doors to Dalton. I hold in my hand the official report of General Geary, by whom that attack was made, and on the whole it is a fair and soldierly report. But he is mistaken in his belief that we had two lines of in- trenchments, or that we were ever driven from our first position. Our loss was verysmall-in killed and wounded not a score. He reports that he made that attack with two brigades of infantry and two batteries, being an aggregate of perhaps 4500 men, or about four to one, besides the bat- teries. Assault after assault was made from 3 o'clock until after dark, and each assault was re- pulsed with loss. At first, in a mere spirit of exuber- ant fun, some of the men rolled stones down the mountain-side; but when the effect was noticed they were directed to use these means as part of our defense; great stones were rolled down on the supporting lines on the mountain-sides or at its foot; and as these bowlders would go leaping, crashing, breaking off limbs, crushing down sap- lings, we fancied we could see the effect of the unexpected missiles. It also proved a valuable resource to us, for without them our ammunition would have given out; indeed it was about ex- hausted when the attack ceased. General Geary reports an aggregate loss of 357 officers and men, of whom some 50 were the ad- venturous advance, who actually reached the crest, only to be made prisoners. After dark our bri- gade, being relieved by the Texas brigade of Gran- bury, was ordered to the foot of the mountain to feed and to obtain ammunition. While this attack had been going on, McPher- son had steadily marched toward Snake Creek Gap, to protect which no steps had been taken. Undoubtedly if a cavalry force had been started to Snake Creek Gap at the moment Grigsby was ordered to Dug Gap, it would have reached there before McPherson, and held it during the night of the 8th, during which time infantry sup- port could have reached there. I do not wish to be understood as offering any criticism on these facts; I am merely stating the facts as I believe them to be. Why these gaps were left unguarded, why a prompt effort was not made to hold Snake Creek Gap, I neither pretend to know nor venture to guess; nor do I offer any criticism. That they were not guarded, and that this gave Sherman the easy means of causing the evacuation of Dalton and the retreat to Resaca, is undoubtedly true. That we could have held Dalton or made an attack on Sherman if these gaps had been held is a prob- lem over which military men may differ. Whatever may have been the reason or cause, the fact is that the provision made to hold Snake Creek Gap was an order to Grigsby during the night of the 8th to move his brigade to its mouth. The 9th Ken- tucky had been on duty continuously for over twenty-four hours; the whole brigade for over twelve hours, and under fire all the' afternoon. But with cheerful alacrity the command began its march as soon as it could feed, after being relieved by Granbury-possibly about 10 o'clock. The night was dark, the road rough and unfamiliar, and it was difficult to find guides. But just at dawn we came in sight of the eastern mouth of the gap, and, contrary to our information, found it in pos- session of the enemy. Colonel Grigsby had been informed that a company of Georgia troops was on picket on the road to the gap, and at or near its eastern outlet. We had not seen that company, and Colonel Grigsby naturally concluded that the troops we saw a few hundred yards before us were those. The usual confusion of an all-night march and the halt of the head of the column had jammed the different organizations somewhat together in a narrow lane. The advanced vidette reported the troops to be Federals. Colonel Grigsby, still sup- 279 THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. PART OF nT CONTEDRSATE ItUThNCHXByTS AT RXACA. FROY A noPHoORAPH. posing them to be Georgians, ordered a small scout to the front. In these few minutes the enemy, having discovered us and being concealed by the character of the ground and the forest, had formed line of battle, while our column had become more confused by many of the men dismounting to rest. Between us and the foot of the mountain was a fallow cotton-field, on the near edge of which was a row of deserted cabins. The road ran along this field a few hundred yards with a gradual descent until it passed through a fringe of willows and underbrush, beyond which there were other open fields, and then on both sides of these open fields were also thick woods. Suddenly a long skirmish-line broke from the woods, ran to the fringe of willows, and directly through toward the row of cabins, keeping up a brisk fire as they ran. Behind the skirmish-line was developed a line of infantry. For a moment the fire staggered the head of the column, and the order to fall back and form could not be executed. The 9th Kentucky was in front, and very quickly its front companies were dismounted and a dash made for the cabins. Fortunately our men reached them first and drove the Federal skirmishers back. This gave breathing time, of which immediate and brill- iant advantage was taken by Mqjor J. Q. Cheno- with, who led a portion of the 1st Kentucky, on horseback, on a detour to the right through the woods until he reached the fringe of willows, when at full run he charged the skirmish-line on the left, and the dismounted men of the 9th Kentucky charged on foot through the open field. The au- dacity of this sudden and unexpected dash caused the skirmish-line to run at breakneck speed, and the line of infantry to halt and to await reen- foreements. This gave ample time to form the brigade for its day's work of retreating fight. The immediate result of this was a delay to the Federal column of several hours, increased cau- tion on the part of McPherson ill his march during the day, and prompt information of his movement to our army headquarters. The force under McPherson was so large that our small brigade of cavalry could not force it to develop its line. All that was possible was to cause the march to be as slow as that of a skir- mish-line. This was done. It was late in the afternoon when McPherson drove us into the works before Resaca, which were defended only by Cantey's brigade and ours. It was a gloomy prospect. We knew that McPherson had a force of from 15,000 to 20,000, and that there was no possibility of our receiving any reinforcements that afternoon or night. One serious attack by McPherson, and Resaca must have been captured. Fortunately McPherson knew that Hooker had failed in his attempt to seize Dug Gap, and that consequently the road from Dalton was free to any Confederate column moving on him. The in- trenchments at Resaca were formidable, and when McPherson felt the lines, the response was resolute and spirited. As Hardee came to reenforce us at Dug Gap, so here Hood joined us. He and part of his staff came to share our fate. Calmly we waited for the inevitable assault. We did not doubt that it would be made. McPherson was young, ambitious, and able. In our ranks he was 280 THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 281 accounted the equal, perhaps the superior, of Sher- man. Here was an opportunity that Sherman might well say " does not occur twice in a single life"; and not for a moment did we doubt that such a soldier, with such an army, would seize such an opportunity. I recall the scene, as a group stood on a knoll and watched the skirmishers advance. As the puffs of smoke arose in the distance, as the sharp- shooters paid compliments to this group, General Hood rode up, and after a few moments' gaze turned the head of his horse and rode a few feet, and by motion called Colonel Grigsby to him; in another moment Grigsby called me, and General Hood said in a cheery yet grave tone, "1 We must hold until night." Just at dusk the enemy began to fall back, and to our surprise the retrograde movement ended near to the point at which we had commenced our fight in the morning. THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. BY E. C. DAWES, LATE MAJOR, 53D om1o REGIMENT. IN the foregoing paper [see p. 260] General Joseph E. Johnston asserts that on the 30th of April, 1864, the strength of the Confederate army was " 37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns, and 2392 cavalry,"-in all, 42,856. But the return of that army for April 30th, 1 864, on file in the War Department, signed by General Johnston and attested by his adjutant-general, shows its "present for duty" almost 53,000: Infantry. . 41,279 Cavalry. .. .. .. 84 Artillery, 144 pieces. . . 3,277 52,99M The difference between these figures and those given by General Johnston from the same return is, that in his paper he gives the footings of the column of "effective total." This, in all Coufed- crate returns, includes only sergeants, corporals, and private soldiers "for duty, equipped." That the cavalry had an effective total of but 2392 with 8436 officers and men for duty is accounted for by the fact that a large number of horses were grazing in the rear because of the scarcity of for- age at Dalton. They were brought to the front and the men became effective when Sherman's army began to advance. General Johnston's state- ment that his artillery comprised but 112 pieces is a manifest error, for the return plainly says 35 companies, 144 pieces. The battle of Resaca was fought on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May. Prior to that time the Confederate army was reenforced by General Mer- cer's brigade of four Georgia regiments, which had been on garrison duty on the Atlantic coast. A foot-note to the return of April 30th records that one of these regiments, the 63d Georgia, joined the army "since the report was made out," and that its effective total was 814. All of these regi- ments had full ranks; 2800 is a low estimate of their line-of-battle strength. Cantey's division, ) two brigades of infantry and two batteries, 5300 for duty, came from Mobile about the 7th of May and was stationed at Resaca. Loring's division, three infantry brigades and two batteries, from General S. D. Lee's command, with 5145 for duty and a detachment of 550 from French's division, reached Resaca May 10th, 11th, and 12th. Mean- time a regiment of the Georgia State line, esti- mated as six hundred strong, had been added to Hood's corps. VOL. IV. 19 At Resaca General Johnston had at least 67,000 men for battle and 168 pieces of artillery. Gen- eral Sherman had at most 104,000:, the odds against General Johnston when " the armies were actually in contact " were as 100 to 64, instead of "10 to 4," as stated in his article. On the night of May 1 6th the Confederate army evacuated Resaca. On the following day, at Adairsville, it was reenforced by General W. H. Jackson's cavalry command, 4477 for duty, which was increased to 5120 by June 10th. On the 19th of May, at Cassville, the division of General French joined the army with 4174 effectives, ex- clusive of the detachment that was at Resaca. Another Georgia State line regiment, estimated as 600, was added to Hood's corps, and Quarles'f; brigade, 2200 strong, came on the 26th of May at New Hope Church. A comparison of the return of April 30th with that of June 10th shows an increase to the fighting strength of the army of 3399 from the return of men " absent with leave " in the corps of Hood, Hardee, Wheeler, and in the artillery. The return of May 20th is missing, but that of June 10th shows an increase since May 20th of 649 "returned from desertion I and 799 "joined by enlistment." General Johnston has to account, between April 30th and June 10th, for at least the following men available for battle: Present for duty at Dalton ........ April 30th..52..692 Mercer's brigade .................. May 2d.. 2,5n0 Cantey's division..... ............ May 7th.. 5,300 Loring'. division .. May 10th, 11th, and 12th.. 5,145 French's detachment ............. May 12th .. 550 French's division ... ... ....... May 19th.. 4,174 Jackson'a cavalry ........ ...... May 17th.. 4,477 Jackson's cavalry increase before June Mth_ . 643 Quarles's brigade ..... ... ... . May 26th 2,200 Two regiments Georgia State .ne ...... ... 1,200 Furloughed men returned . 3,399 Recruits ..9................9............... Returned deserters 649 54,328 All these figures are official except for Mercer's brigade and the two regiments of the Georgia J For Cantey's strength, see General D. H. Maury's return April 22d, 1864. For Loring's strength, see Gen- eral S. D. Lee's return May 10th, 1864. For French's detachment, see General French's report of effective when joined."- E. C. D. : For the strength of Shertn's army at Resaca, add agil for cavalry joined between May ist and 12th to his strength, May Ist, of ,797.-E. C. D. 282 THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. State line. 4 The return of General Johnston's army June 10th is the first on file in the War Department that includes all these reonforce- ments. It shows "present for duty": oflra. 2r,,. Infantry . W9. ...... ... 41.54 Cavalry ........ . ..... 12..... .... 12, 72 Artillery. 187 piece. 257 4,414 6555 64,540 Or in round number. 71,00 The difference of over 1:3,000 is accounted for by losses in battle, desertion, and increase in absent sick. The incomplete return of Medical Director Foard shows killed and wounded, May 7th to 20th, inclusive, 3384. The return of June 10th shows 1551 killed and died since May 20th, indicating fully 6000 wounded. The same re- turn shows 569 deserters. The 1542 prisoners captured from Hood and Hardee, shown by in- erease of absent without leave in their corps, aceount for the remainder, without examining the returns of Polk's corps and the cavalry. General Johnston's army reached its maximum strength on the New Hope Church line, where he must have had 75,000 for battle when the armies faced each other May 27th. General Sherman's army ) there numbered, of all arms, for duty, 93,- ti00 men, and several brigades of this force were employed in guarding trains and watching roads in all directions, for Sherman's army had no rear. Odds of less than five to four against him is "the great inequality of force " which General Johnston complains compelled him " to employ dismounted cavalry " in holding this line. In a foot-note [p. 274] General Johnston says: "1 I have two reports of the strength of the army be- aides that of April 30th. already given: 1. Of July 1st, 39,746 Infantry, S255 artillery, and 10.48 cavalry,- total, 6,655 2. Of July 10th, SW901 infantry, 3756 artillery, and 10,270 cavalry,- total, 0,92." The return of July 1st shows " present for duty," all arms, officers and men, 64,578, instead of 54,085. (As in ease of the return of April 30th, General Johnston gives only the " effective total.") The loss since June 10th is accounted for by 1114 dead, 711 deserters, 1042 increase in absent with- out leave (prisoners), and 3693 in increase of ab- sent sick and wounded. None of the returns of this army, either under Johnston or Hood, makes any account of the Georgia militia, a division of which under G. W. Smith joined the army about June 20th near Kenesaw, making its available force on that line nearly 70,000 men. [G. W. Smith, p. 334, says the militia were 2000, whieh would reduce Major Dawes's total to about 67,000.-EDITOP.S.] The return of July 10th gives the present for 4 For the strength of Jackson's esvalry division., see General S. D. Lee's return May loth, and the return of General Johnston's army June 10th, 1864. For the strength of General French's division, ee his return of Ilefletives when joined." For the strength of Quarles's brigade, fee "Johnston's Narrative." p. 575. IFor Sherman's strength on the New Hope line, see his return May 31st, and deduct llaie's Seventeenth Corps, which did not join the army until June 8th. duty 60,032, instead of 50,926, the loss since July 1st being 1377 deserters, 526 dead, two regiments sent to Savannah, and prisoners and wounded. This with the Georgia militia (increased to about 9000 [G. W. Smith says 5000.-EwI- TORs] when the army reaehed Atlanta) represents the force turned over to Hood, July 18th, viz.: Infantry............. 42,571 Cavalry............. . 13,318 Artillery, 187 pieces . . ..... .. 4.143 Militia (proably ........ ...... . ,006 65,02 General Johnston asserts that the only affair worth mentioning on his left at Itesaca was near the night of May 14th, when "forty or fifty skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the slight elevation they occupied, but no attempt was made to retake it." In his official report, made in October, 1864, he says that at 9 o'clock at night of May 1 4th he " learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's troops had lost a position commanding our bridges." Comment upon the generalship that would leave a position commanding the line of retreat of an army in charge of forty or fifty skirmishers within gun- shot of a powerful enemy is unnecessary, for it was not done. The position was held by a line of men. It was carried on the evening of May 14th by a gallant charge of two brigades of the Fifteenth Corps of the Union army. teinforced by another brigade, they held it against the repeated and desperate efforts of Polk's men to retake it. The battle lasted far into the night. General John A. Logan, in his official report of it, says that when at 10 o'clock at night "the last body of the enemy retired broken and disheartened from the field, it was evident to the meanest comprehen- sion among the rebels that the men who double- quicked across to their hills that afternoon had come to stay." General Logan also says that by the capture of this position "the railroad bridge and the town were held entirely at our mercy." The Fifteenth Corps lost 628 killed and wounded at Resaca. The troops in its front, Loring's and Cantey's divisions and Vaughan's brigade, accord- ing to their incomplete official reports, lost 698. Much the greater part of this loss must have been on the evening of May 14th, for there was no other line-of-battle engagement on this part of the field. General Johnston characterizes the battle of May 28th at Dallas as " a very small affair," in which the Confedi'rates lost about three hundred men and the Union troops " must have lost more than ten times as many." This was an assault made upon troops of the Fifteenth Corps by two bri- gades of Bate's Confederate division and Arm- strong's brigade of Jackson's cavalry dismounted, supported by Smith's brigade of Bate's division and Ferguson's and Ross's brigades of Jackson's cavalry. Lewis's Kentucky brigade attacked the front of Osterhaus's division without success. Bullock's Florida brigade charged along the Mari- etta road and was driven back, with heavy loss, by the fire of the 53d Ohio regiment. Armstrong THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 283 assailed the position held by Walcutt's brigade across the Villa Riea road and met a bloody re- pulse. General Bate officially reported the loss in his division as 450. GeneralWalcutt in his official report says that " 244 dead and wounded rebels were found in my front," and many were doubtless removed. The Confederate loss in this " very stuall affair" was, therefore, over seven hundred. The loss of the Fifteenth Corps was 379, or about onie-half the Confederate loss, instead of " more than ten times as many." General Johnston assumes that General Sher- man used his entire army in the assault of Kene- saw Mountain, when, in fact, he employed less than 15,000 men. The remainder of the army was not engaged, except in the continuous battle of the skirmish-lines. The assaulting eolumn of the Armyof the Cumberland, directed against Hardee's corps, was composed of five brigades about nine thousand strong. The formation was such thateach brigade presented a front of but two companies. The leading regiments lost very heavily; those in the rear suffered few casualties. General Thomas reported the entire loss as 1580. The attack of the Army of the Tennessee was made upon the Confederate intrenehments held by French's di- vision and a part of Walker's, by three brigades of the Fifteenth Corps, numbering .-55)0 men. Their formation was in two lines; their total loss 60,:, three-fourths of this falling on the regiments in the first line. General Johnston expresses the belief that Northern soldiers could not be repulsed with cas- ualties so small as reported at Kenesaw. In this he, unwittingly perhaps, compliments Sherman's army at the expense of his own. On the 22d of June, five days before the battle of Kenesaw, he tells us that the divisions of Stevenson and Hind- man were repulsed, in an assault on the Union line, with a loss of one thousand men. These di- visions, June 10th, numbered over eleven thou- sand for duty. Their loss, therefore, was but nine per cent., while that of the troops of the Army of the Cumberland engaged at Kenesaw was 17 per cent.; of the Army of the Tennessee, 11 per cent. In both eases the loss sustained was sufficient to demonstrate the futilityof furthereffort. In neither case was it a fair test of the staying qualities of the troops, who on many fields had shown their willingness to shed any amount of blood necessary when there was reasonable hope of success. CncINxNTrh September 8th, 1857. CONFEVEIDATE DEFENSES AT THFt RuIDE OVER TIHE ET)WAIL. tROM THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. May 3d-September 8th, 1864 THE UNION ARMY. Major-General William T. Sherman. ileadquarlers Guard: 7th Co. Ohio Sharp-shooters,' Lh nt. William. MeCrory. Artil-ery:t Brig.-Gie. William F. Barry (chief-of-ar- tilllery,. ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, MaJ.-Gen. George It. Thomas. BRc. 1, lt Ohio Cav., Lieut. Henry C. Reppert. Art iUer :1 Brig.-Geo. John M. Br.anuan (hIef-of-ar- tillery). FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Oliver 0. How- ard. haj.-ien. David S. Stanley. FIRST DIVISi.N, Maj.-Gen. David S. Stanley, Brig-Gen. William (Groge, Brig.-Geu. Nathan Kimball. Pirel Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft, CoL Isaac M. Kirby: 2ISt IU.., MaJ. Jamues E. Calloway, Capt. Will- lam H. Jaminon; 8th IlI.,3 Lileut.-Col. William T. Chap- man; 31st Ind., Col. Johu T. Stimith; 81st Ind., Lieut.- Col. Willtam C. Wheeler; lIt Ky.,- CoL. David A. Enyart; 2d Ky.,' Lieut.-CoL John R. Hurd; 90th Ohio, Col. Sam- uel N. Yeoman; 101st Ohh, Col. Isaa M. Kirby, Lieut- Col. Bedan B. MeDonaId. ecnd Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker, Col. Jacob E. Taylor: 96th Ill., CoL Thomas E. Champion, Maj. George Riks; 113th ILi., CoL Jesse H. Moore; 35th Ind., MIiJ. John P. Duffley, Capt. Jam1es A. Gaviak, Lieut.-Col. A. (. Tassin; 84th Imd., 1Ieut.-Col. Andrew J. Neff, Capt. John C. Taylor, Capt. Martin B. Miller; 21st Ky., Col. Samuel W. Price, LUeut.-Col. James C. Evans; 40th Ohio, Col. Jacob E. Taylor, Capt. Chas. G. Matehett, Capt. Milton Kemper; 514t Ohio, Lieut.-Vol. C. H. Wood, CoL Richard W. Me- (lain; 99th Ohlo,8 Lieut.-Col. John E. Cummins, Capt. Jas. A. Bope, Lieut.-Col. J. E. Cunmins. Third Brigade, CoL Wm. (loose, Col. P. Sidney Post, Brig.-(en. Wi. G-roe, Col. John E. Bennett: 69th 111_,7 Col. P. Sidney Post. Llent.-CoL Clayton Hale. CoL P. Sidney Post, Capt. Samuel West; 75th Ill.. Col. John E. Bennett, Leaut.-CoL William M. Kilgour; 8Dth Ill., Lieut.4-l. William M. Kiloour, Maj. James M. St-okey; 84th iL, CoL Louls H. Waters;: th Ind., Col. Isaac C. B. Boman; N0th Id., Lieut.-CoL Orrin D. Hard, Capt. William Dawson, Lieut.- Col. Orrin D. Hurd; 36th Ind., Lient.-Col. 0. H. P. Carey; 77th Pa., Capt. Joseph J. Lawson, Col. Thomas E. Roe. AriUiery,S Capt. Peter Simonson, Capt. Sam- aI M. MeDowell, Capt. Theodore S. Thomasson: 6th Ind., Lieut. Alfred Morrison; B, Pa., Capt. Samuel M. MeDoweli, Lieut. Jacob Ziegler. SECOND DoVISsOxi, Brig.-Gen. John Newton. Fist Brig-de. Cot. Francis T. Sherman, Brig.-Gen. Na- than Kimball, CoL Emerson Opdycke: 36th M., CoL Silas Miller. Capt. James B. MeNeai. Leut.-Col. Porter C. 01- son: 44th HI., CoL Wallaee W. Barrett, Lient.-Cot. John Russell, Maj. Luther M. Sabin, Lieut.-CoL John Ruasell; 73d Ill.. Maij. Thomas W. Motherspaw; 74th IIL, CoL Jaon Marsh. Lieut.-Col. John B. Kerr, Capt. Thomas J. Bryan; 88th Ill., Lieut.-Col. George W. Chandler, Lieut.- Col. George W. Smith; 2ath Ky.,' Lieut.-CoL J. Rowan I ltellet-,- tIw enrs 1loth oIo l0,f. May 20th. 8ee batterie awtar-l- ti d tdivisions and erpa. I Non-vel-ransattaclel t. 101st Ohlotill Jane 4th and Ith. reserti'-lh. when regiments rejoined from vetersa furlougb. (rI-red hon.e for -Moter-ont May 29th and Jane 3d, re- sjie-tiely. Trzauferreil tn Third Brietle August 16th. Transferred to Tw-ent-third Corps .II-l 22d. Transferred to Seonld Brigade Augast 16tb, nd to See- on., Brigade. Third Division. Augost 19th. see also artillery brigade of orps. Trasferrred ti 9leo-lad Brigdae May 28th. I Remained at Ilalta.n fron May 14th. RBelievedl fr t- trreoot J-tne 10th sad August 25th, re- sleetively. Boone, Maj. George W. Barth: 2d Mo.,' Lieut.-Col. Ar- itold Beek, Col Bernard Laiboldt; lth Mo., Col. Joseph Conrad; 24th Wis., Lient.-Col. Theodore S. West, Maj. Arthur Ma-Arthur, Jr. Son d Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner. Col. John W. Blake, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner: 10Oth Ill., Maj. Charles M. Ham- mond, Col. Frderick A. Bartleson, Maj. Charles M. Hammond; 40th Ind., Col. Jobh W. Blake, Lleut.-Col. Henry Leaming; 57th Ind.. Lieut.-Col. George W. Len- nard, Llemtt.-Col. Willis Blanch; 26th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William H. Squires, MsJ. Norris T. Petmat , Capt. Lewis D. Adair, Lieut.-Col. William H. Sqnlres, Maj. Norris T. Peatma.; 97th Ohio, Llent.-Col. Milttmn Barnes, Col. John Q. Laue. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles G. Harker, Brig.-Gem. Luther P. Bradley: 22d III.,"t Lleut.-CoL Francis Swanwiek; 27th IIL,t Lieut.-Col. William A. Schmitt; 42d Ill., Ltent.-Col. Edgar D. Swain, Capt. Jared W. Richards, Maj. Frederick A. Atwater; 51st Ill., Col. Luther P. Bradley, Capt. Theodore F. Brown, Cot Luther P. Bradley, Capt. Albert M. Tilton; l9th ItL, Col. Allen Backner, Lteut.-Col. Henry E. RIves, Maj. Terraen Clark, Capt. Oliver 0. Bagley, LIeut.- Col. Ter-enc Clark; 3d Ky., CoL Henry C. DunaIp, Capt. John W. Tuttle, Col. Henry C. Dunlap; 54th Ohlo, Col. Alexander Meilvain, Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Brown, Msi. Samuel L. Coulter, LIut.-CoL Robert C. Brown; 65th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Horatio N. Whitbeek, Capt. Charles 0. Tannehill, Maj. Orlow Smith; 125th Ohlo, CoIL Emer- son Opdyeke. Lleut.-Col. David H. Moore. Arfifery,lt Capt. Cbarles C. Alesbire, Capt. Wilbur F. Goodspeed: M. lst IIL, Capt. George W. Spencer; A, Ist Ohio, Capt. Wilbur F. Goodapeed, LIeut. Charles W. Sovill. THIRD D8IvISIO, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood, Cot. P. Sid- ney Post. Brig.-Gne. Thomas J. Wood. First Birgade, Brlg.-Gen. August Wiilehb, Col. William H. Gibson, Col. Richard H. Nodine, Col. William H. Gibson, Cot. Charles T. Hotchkiss: 26th 111.,13 Cot. Rlch- ard H. Nodine; 38th ll.,t4 Lleut.-Col. William P. Chand- ler; 8Nth Ill., CoL Charles T. Hotebkias, Lleut.-Col. William D. Williams, Col. Charles T. Hotchklss, Lieut.- Cotl WillIam D. Williams; 32d Ind.,"' Col. Frank Erdel- meyer; 9th Kan.,tS CoL John A. Martin, Lieut.-Col. James M. Graham; 15th Ohio, CoL WIlliam Wallace, Lieut.-Col. Frank Askew, Col. William Wallace, Col. Frank Askew 49th Ohio, Col. William H. Gibson, Lieut.- Cot. Samnel F. Gray; 15th Wti., MXJ. George Wilson, Lleut.-Col. Ole C. Johnson. A-nd Brigade, Brig.-G(le. William B. HRoen, Col. Oliver It. Payne, Cot. P. Sidney Post: 6th Ind.,t' Lieut-C0,l. Calvin D. Campbell; 5th Ky.,"7CoL William W. Berry: 6th Ky.,7 Maj. Rtichard T. Whitaker. Capt. Isaac N. Johnston; 23d Ky.,tt Lteut.-Col. James C. Foy, Maj. George W. Northup; lt Ohio,t9 MaJ. Josb A. Stafford; ith Ohio,U Col. Nlholas L. Anderson: 41st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Robert L. Kimberly; 7Ist Ohio," Col. Henry K. McConnell: 93d Ohio, Lieut-Col. Daniel Bowman; 124th Ohio, Cot. Oliver H. Payne, Lemt.-Col. t See also artillery brigale of corps. aJoinedl J.-te 6th and reles-cit- for intiter-out Algli9t 4 Relieved ier nitster-ont Aognst 25th aud Atgust 2l, respectively. a Joined from veteratt fiteloogh Jane 28th. a Relieved for mauteC-ont August 22di. It Transferred to Fourth Dil DVIS, Twentieth Corps, Jaly 25th a,,d August 9tb, respectively. t1 Transferred to 8ecotiil Brigade., Firt Division, August 19th. a Ordered to Chslani-oga JtlIy 25th. ' At Cleveland. Kingsioli. and Resala; relieved for ma-ler ont June 6th. a Joined August 31.t. 28 TUE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAiGN. James Pickands, Col. Oliver H. Payne. Third Brigde, Brig.-Gen. Salunel ealty, Col. Frederick Knefler: 79th Iind., Col. Frederick Kneiler, Lieut.-CoL Samuel P. Oy- Icr, MaJ. George W. Parker, Capt. John G. Dunbar, Capt. Eli F. Ritter; 86tb Ind., Col. George F. Dick; 9th Ky., Lieut.-CoL Chesley D. Bailey, Col. George H. Cram; 17th Ky., Col. Alexauder M. Stout; 13th Ohio, CoL Dwight Jor,-i., Jr., MaJ. Joseph P. Snider; 19th Ohio, CoL Chitrles F. Manderson., Licut.-Coi. Henry G. Stratton; sgtth Ohio, Lient.-Col. Granville A. Frambes, Capt. Charles A. Sheaf., Capt. John L. Watson, Capt. Robert It. Higgins. Artilley, Capt. Culleu Bradley: IlL Bat- tery, Capt. Lyman Bridges,' Lient. Morris D. Temple. Lictit. Lyman A. White; 6th Ohio, Lieut. Oliver H. P. Ayrc,., Lieut. Lorenzo D. Iu.i.eli, Licut. Oliver H. 1. Ayr-s, Licut. Loreuzm D. Imnell. ABTILLERY BRIGItAE (organized July 26th), MaJ. Thomas W. Oshbrn, Capt. Lyman Bridges: M, 1st Il., Capt. George W. 1Specer; Bridges's Ill., Lieut. Lyman A. Wbit,-; 5th Iud., Capt. Alfred Morrison, Lieut. George 11. Biriggs; A, 1st Ohio), Capt. Wilbur F. Goodspeed; M, 1st Ohio, Capt. Frederick Schultz; 6th Ohio. Lieut. Lo- ri-znb D. Imtmell, Capt. Cullen Bradley; B, Pa., Capt. J.i-ob Ziegler. FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Mnj.-(lcn. John M. Palmer, Brig.-Ge.. RIchard W. Johnson, Brig.-ten. Jet- fersoit C. Davis. FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. R. W. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. Job.t H. King, Brig.-Gen. Wililam P. Carlin. Pr-sost Guard: D, Ist Batt'n 16th V. S., Capt. C. F. Trowhbridge. First Brigde, Brig-Gen. WilliSam P. Carlin, Col. An- son (G. MeCook, CoL Marion C. Taylor, Brig.-Gen. Will- lam P. Carlin, Col. Marion C. Taylor: 104th 111., Lieut.- Cul. Donglas Hapetuan; 42d Ind., Lient.-Col. W. T. B. MIentire, Capt. James H. Masters, Capt. Gideon R. Kellan., Llent.-Col. W. T. B. McIttire; 88th Ind.. Lieut.- Cal. Cyrns E. Briant; Ith Ky., Col. Marion C. Taylor, Lliot.-Col. WillIam 0G. Halpin; 2d Ohio,2 Col. Aeson 0. MecCook. Capt. James F. Sarratt; 33d Ohil,, Lieot.-CoL Joites 1t. 51. Montgomery, Capt. T. A. Minshail; 94th Ohio, Liet.-Col. flue P. Hutchins; 10th Wis.,a Capt. WJacob W. Roby; 21st Wis., Lieut.-Col. Harrison C. HEo- hart, Maj. Michael H. Fitch. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Johin 11. King, Col. William L. Stoughton, Brig.-Gen. Jlohn 11. King, C.]l. Willi.a L. Stoughtan. Col. Marshall F. Moeore, Brig.-Ge!,. John H. King, Maj. John R. Edie: Ittb Mit-h., Col. William L. Staughton. Capt. Patrick H. Keegan, Col. William L. Stonghtan, Capt. Patrick H. Keegan, Lieut.-Col. Melvin Modge, Capt. P. H. Keegan; s9th Ohio,5 Col. Marshall F. Moore, Lie-t.-Col. Joseph 11. Brigham, Capt. Lewis E. Hicks; lth U. 5. (9 co's 18t ansi 3t Batt'ns), MaJ. Albert Tracy, Capt. Albert B. Dm1, Capt. James Curtis, Capt. Horace Jewett; lath U. s. t en's 2d Batt'n), MNJ. John R. Edi,. Capt. William S. MeManus; 16th U. S. (4 co's Ist Batt'n), Capt. Alec- antler H. Stanton, Capt. Ebenezer Gay; 16th U. R. (4 co's 2d Batt'.,), Capt. Robert P. Barry; 18th U. S. (8 c'.s 1st : 3d Batt'ns), Capt. George W. Smith, Capt. Lyman M. Kellogg, Capt. Robert B. Hull; 18th U. S. 32d Bntt'n), Capt. Willin J. Fetterman; 19th U. S. (1st Batt'n and A, 2d lBatt'n), Capt. James Mooney, Capt. Lewis WII- sot, Capt. Egbert Phelps, Capt. James Mooney. Third Brigade, Col. Benjamin F. Seribner, Col. Josiah Given, (Cl. Marshall F. Moore: 37th Ind., Lient.-Cal. William D. Ward, Mqi. Thomas V. Kimble, Llent.-Col. William, 1). Wardl; 38th Ind., Lient.-Col. Daniel F. Griffin; 21st Obio, Col. James M. Neibling, Lieot.-CoL Arnold Me- (It,! of corps artillery from May 23td. lrer,-tl to C hattanooga Jaly 27th. ( leretl to Marietta Jaly 28th. Ordered to (Ciattanooga August 25th. Jtieel froin veteran forlough and assi.gaed to Third Brt- ,utle Jaly lth. Joiled from veteran tierloogh May 9th. ec also artillery Frigate of corps. Transferred to Fourth Dvision., Sixteenth Army Corps, ,g tist 20th. Joinetl from veteran f rlough May 15th. a Joined J-ne 4th and Angust 21st, respectively. Mahan; 74th Ohlo, Col. JosIah Given, MaJ. Joseph Fisher, Col. Josiah Given; 7Sth Pa., Col. Williant Mir- well; 79th Pa.,6 CoL Henry A. Hambright, Maj. Michael H. Locher, Capt. Jobhn S. McBride, Maj. Michael 11. Lacher; 1st Wis., Lieut.-Col. George B. Binaghit.i. Ar- tiUcry,7 Capt. Lucius B. Drury: C, 1st Ill., Capt. Mark H. Prescott; I, let Ohio, Capt. Hubert Dilger. secoND DnVIStON, Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis, Brig.- Jen. James D. Norgan, Brig.-Giel. Jeffersonu C. Davis. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan, Col. RIto- ert F. Smith, Brig.-Gen. J. D). Morgan, Col. Charles M. Lum: loth tli.,1 CaL John Tilbson; 16th Ill., Col. Robert F. Smith, Lieut.-Col. James B. Cahill, Col. B. F. Smith, Lieut.-Col. J. B. Cahill, Col. R. F. Soith, Lieut.-Col. J. B. Cahill; 60th III., Col. William, B. Anderson; 10th Mich.,9 Col. Charles M. Lum, Ma4. HBery S. Burnett, Capt. Willi-a H. Dunphy; 14tb Mlh.,'C Col. Henry R. Mizuer; 17th N. Y.,1 Col. W. T. C. itrower, MaJ. Joel 0. Martin. Second Brigde, Col. John G. Mitchell: 34th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Osear Van Tassell; 78th Ill., Col. Carter Van VIeck, Lieut.-Col. Mario R. Vernon; gath tOhio, Ileut.-Col. John S. Pearce, Capt. John A. Norris, Capt. David E. Roatch, Lieutt.-Col. John S. Pearee; 108tb Ohilo,t Lieut.-Col. Jo-eph (toad, Col. George T. Lilberg, Lieut-Col. Joseph Good; 113t1 Ohio, Lieut.-Cal. Darlua B. Warner, Maj. Lyne S. Sollivant, Capt. Toland Jones; 121st Ohio, Col. Henry B. Banning. Third Brigade, Col. Daniel McCook, CoL Oscar F. Harmon, Col. Caleb J. Dilworth, Lieut.-CoL James W. Langley: sath Ill., Col. C. J. Dilworth, MaJ. Robert G. Rider, Capt. James R. Griffith; 8Sth Ill., Lleut.-Col. Allen L. Fahoestoek, Maj. Joseph F. Thomas, Lieut.-Col. A. L. Fhnestock; lloth 111.,'lCol. E. Hibbard Topping; 125th III., Col. 0. F. Har- mhoe, Maj. John B. Lee, Lieut.-Col. J. W. Langley, Capt. George W. Cook; 22d Ind., Lieut.-Col. William M. Wiles, Capt. William H. Taggart, Capt. William H. tatodgras., Maj. Thomas Shea, Capt. W. H. Taggart, Capt. W. It. Sundgrass; a2d Ohio, Lieut.-CoL Charles W. Clancy, MnJ. James T. Holmes, Capt. Samuel Rathas-ker, IMaj. J. T. Holmes. Artiliery,'3 Capt. Charles M. Barrett: I, 2d Ill., Lient. Alonzo W. Coe; 5th Wia. (detacimeut 2d Mita. attached),-Capt. George Q. Gardner. TIIIRD DtIVISIO, Brig.-Gee. Almsalom Baird. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turehln. Ca. Moses B. Walker: 19th Ill.," Lieut.-Col. Alexander W. Raften; 24th il.," Capt. August Mauff; 82d Ind., Col. Morton C. Hunter; 23d Mo.,'5 oCl.Wllnlil P.Robinsan; lthOhio,'4 Lieut.-Ciu. Ogden Street; 17th Ohio, Col. Dlurlin Ward; 31st Ohio, Cal. M. B. Walker, Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Lister; 89th Ohio, MaJ. Jobn H. Jolly, Col. Caleb I. Cariton; 92d Ohlo, Col. Benjamin D. Fearing. .Seond Brigade, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer, Col. Newell Glea- son: 75th Ind., Lieut.-Cal. William O'Brien, Mial. Cyrus J. Mctole; 87th Ind., Col. N. Gleason, Lieut -Col. Edwin P. Hammond; 101st lad., 1ieut.-Cl.. Thomes Doan; 2d Minn., Col. James George, Lieait.-Col. Judson W. Bishop; 9th Oh1,16 Col. Gustave Kammerling; S5th Ohio," alJ. Joseph L. Budd; 105th Ohi,, Lieut.-Col. George T. EPer- kins. Third Brigade, Col. George P. Este: lOth Tnd.,', Lieut.-Col. Marsh B. Taylor; 74th Ind., Lieut.-Col. My- ron Baker, MeJ. Thomas Morgan; loth Ky., Col. William H. Hays: 18th Ky.," Lieut.-Col. Hubbard K. Miwrari; 14th Ohlo, MaJ. John W. Wilson, Capt. George W. Kirk; 38th Ohio, Col. William A. Choate. Arilery,'9 Capt. George Estep: 7th Ind., Capt. Oto H. Morgan; 19th Ind.. Lient. William P. Staekhouse. ARTILLERY BatGADnE, Maj. Charles Houghtaling: C, I Employeld mainly in M-anting trains. o Guusrlieg trains till July 20th. u se also artillery brigatle at the corps. u Relievesl for mister-out June 9th, June 28lh, alI J too- 10th. respcti-vely. 5 Joltesl July 1th. Relieveid tor muster-out Stay 22d a- l August 3.1. n-spc.- lively. 7 Part of time detacheid at Marietta. Is Detached at Rinegold. k Se,- also artillery brigade of carP. . Iattalns. - Organised July 24th; reorgaisoesl Angost 27th1 Ilto three 28;, 28( THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. I.t.l l., C Iapt. Mark 1. I re-eott; 1, 2d Ill.. Capt. Charle. M. Barrtt; 7th Ihud., C(apt. Otho H. M-rgan; 19th lad., Lhi-t. W. 1. stackloItIse; 20th Ind.,' Capt. Milton A. (bIlartiu,; 1, 1st Ohlio,2 Capt. Hubert Dilger; ,th Wis., Capt. tCeorge . ia:rdler. Lieut. Joseph MeKnight. TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS. Maj.-Gen. Joseph ltnkr,. Brig.-(,eu. Alpheus S. Willians, Mlaj.-Gen. HIlury WV. Stlotito. E-cort.: K. 15th III. CtV., Capt. WiiIIlNI Duncan. FIttsT 1)\1;,Brig.-Cen. Alpheu. S. WiIallten, Brig.- (let.. Joseph F. Knipe, Brig.-Gen. A. S. Willias.. Firat lriigde, Brig.-Gen. J. F. Knipe, Col. Warren W. Ptiieker, Brig.-(Ieo,. J. F. Knipe: 5th Coon., Cot. W. W. Paeker, Lient.-CoI. IHenry W. Daboil, MaJ. William S. Cogaweil, CoL. W. W. Packer; 3d M1d. tdetachment), Lient. David Gov,-, tieut. Donald Reld, Lieut. David (love; 123d N. Y., (.,d. Archibald L. Meliougull, Lieut.- Col. Jamoe- C. Roger; 141st N. Y., Col. William K. L- gie. Li-ut.-Col. Andrew J. McNett, Capt. Elisha (I. Ball- wil,. (apt. Andrew J. Compton; 46th la.. Cot. JameH L. Seltfridge. Beiegd Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thouas It. Buger: 7th Ind., Col. Sitla H. Colgrove, Lleut.-Col. John R. 2Festr 2d Mass., (ol. William Cogawell, Lient.-Col. ('huries F. Morse, Col. Wllis. Cogswell; 13th N. J., tot. Ezr- A. Ca.-an; 107th N. Y., Col. Niron, M. Crane; 15011. N. Y.. Cotl. John it. Keteham; 3d Wit.. Col. William Hawley. Third Brigade, Col. James S. RPbinaon, Col. Iorace Boughton: 8211 IU.. Lieut.-Col. Edward S. SaIO- IOn; l1(st 111.. Lieut.-Col. John B. La Sage; 45th N. Y..3 Col. Adolpiho Doltke; 143d N. Y., Col. Horaee Boughton, Li ut.-Col. lHezkiah Watkina, MNj. John Higgins; Slat Ohio, Col. Stephen, J. MeGro-rty. Capt. John Garrett; SIti Ohio, Lient.-Col. David Thomson; talt WtI.,4 CoL. F-racis 1. West. ArtH1erV,5 Capt. John D. Woodbury: i. 1st N. Y., Lieut Chartea E. Winegar; M. tat N. Y., Cap.t. J. Ds. Woodhury. .eOF N ID I 1(I40. Brig.-Gen. John W. (leary. First Corilad. ( .l. Charles Candy, Col. Arto Pardee, Jr.: 5th Ohio, Col. Jobhn H. Patrick, Lieut.-Col. Robert L. Kilpatrick, Mlaj. Henry E. Symoue., Capt. Robert Kirkup; 7th Ohio,' L.ieut.-CoI.Saxnue lMeClelland; 29th Ohio, Col. Williao, T. Fitch, Capt. Myron T. Wright, (aptl WIlbur F. Stevens; afith Ohio, Liet.-Col. Eugene lowell, Capt. Th ona MeCounell; 28th Pa.. Lient.-Col. Johb FFlynn; 147th Pa., Ct.. Arto Pardee. Jr., Lieut.-Col. Craig. ",reood Briade,. CoL. Adolphus Bunhibeek, CoL. Jobhn T. Lock...n.. ( ol. Patrick H. Jonea. Col. George W. Mi,,dil: 33.1 . J., Col. George W. Mindil, Llent.-Col. E.-oa Fo.rat, Catpt. Thlouas O'Connor; 119th N. Y., Col. J. T. I.-kuau., Calpt. Charles H. Odell, Capt. Cheater H. Southworthb Col. J. T. Loekman; 134th N. Y., Lieut.- (Co. Alble H. Jackonu, Capt. Clinton C. Brown; 154th N. Y., Cot. P. H. Jones. Lieut.-Col. Daniel B. Allen, MtaJ. Lewis D. Warner, Lieut.-Cot. Daniel B. Allen. Mla,. L. D. Warner; 27th Pa..7 Lient.-Col. August Riedt; 73.1 Pa.. Maj. Charles C. Cresson; It9th 1I., Capt. Fred- eriek L. (imber, Capt. Walter G. Dunn, Capt. Hugh Aiexca.der, Capt. William Geary. Third Brigade, Col. David Ireland. Col. William Rickarda, Jr., Col. George A. Cobhhm. Jr.. Col. David Ireland: 60th N. Y., CoL Abel (todtart. C(apt. Thomas Elliott, Cot. Abet God- ard, Capt. Thom... Elliott; 78th N. Y.,t Lteut.-Col. la-rvey S. Chattlld, CoL. Herbert von Hammerstein; 10-1 N. Y.. Col. Jutm-5 C. Latte, Maj. Lewis E. Stegmau, Calpt. Barent Vat. Boren. Col. Herbert von Hammer- steiu; 137th N.Y., Licut.-Col. Koert S. Van Voorbls; 149th N Y., Lh it.-Col. Charle B. Randall. Cot. Henry A. Bar- ntow; 29th Pa., Cot. William Rickards, Jr., Mtaj Jesse R. 31ili-not, IeAnt.-Col. Thomas N. Walker, Capt. John H. (:Golda,,,ith. ('apt. Benjamin F. Zarracher. Licut.-Col. Satinel M. Zntlich; 111th Pa., Col. George A. Cobham, Jr., Liettt -Col. Thonias M. Walker, tol. G. A. Cobham. Jr., Licut.-Col. T. M. Walker. Artillerg, Capt. William A.ssirt1e-l August l4t.. 1 Relieved A,,sWt 14th. aO tl ,ett 1 Nath ille Jutly 0th. ' Joiaed July 2lat. aSIaJeor J ..to A. 11cc noldis, chief of eorps artillery; see, albo, ail ziltetl twt145.e ,, tlle corps,. a ltelleveli t.,t,,r sllt.-r..,tt Stlfe 11th. Ite I.sl f,..... .t. .e....t Ma. '23d. a oaodtidatd w.til 102d1 New York July 12th. Wheeler. Capt. Charles C. Aleshire: 13th N. Y., Capt- Willianm Wheeler, Lieut. Henry Btondy; E, Pa., Capt. James D. Metlli, Lieut. Thotas S. Sloan. TIIli)l DIVISION, Mj.-Ge.n. Dantiel Butterfield, Brig.- Gen. Williato T. Ward. First Brigade, Brig.-(e. Wlla, T. Ward, Col. Ben- jamin Harrison, Brio.-Gen. Willia.. T. Ward, Col. Ilen- jmli. Harrion: 102d Ill., Cot. Franklin C. Smith, Lieit.- Col. Jamee M. Msatinn, Col. F. C. Smith; 105th Ill., Cot. Danliel Dastin, Lieut.-Col. Everell F. Dutton, Col. Ianh-l Dinutiu; 129th Ill., Col. Itenry Case; 70th hid., Col. Benja- min Harrison, Lilnt.-Cot. Samnuel Merrill; 79th Oh1.i Col. Henry G. Kennett, Lieut.-Col. Azariab W. Dn.,m, Capt. Samuel A.Wcst. ec ond Brigade, Col. Samulel Ruse, (ol. John Coburn: 20th Coon.,4 .ie ut.-Col. Philo B. Ruekingham, (CI. Senioel Ross, Lieut.-CoI. P. B. Btack- iughan.; 33d Ind.. Maj. Levin T. Niller, Capt. Edwurrd T. McCrea, Maj. L. T. Miller; 8ntb Ind., Col. Johtn I1 Baird. Lh-it.-Cod. Ale..ander B. Crane, ('apt. Jefferson E. Brandt; 19th Milh., Col. Hetiry C. Gilbert, Maj. Eli A. Griffin, ('apt. John J. Baker, apt. David Anderso,; 22 Wtis., Col. William 1J Utley, Lteut.-CoI. EdwairI Bloodgood. Third IBrigade, (il. James Wood, Jr.: 33d Mass.. Lient -Col. Godfrey Rider, Jr.; 136th N. Y.. Lieut.- Col. Lester B. Fauilknr, Maj. Henry L. Arnold; nrth Ohio, Col. Charles B. (Gambee. Capt. Charles P. Wick- ham., L.ieut.-Col. Edwin 11. Powers; 73d Ohio, Maj. Sal,- ulel H. Hurst; 20th Wis., Lieat.-Col. Frederick C. Winkler. Artilery, Capt. Mareo B. Gary; 1, 1st Mt h., Capt. Luther R. Smith; C, It Ohio, Lieut. Jerome B. StI- phens. AlTIlLEltY BRi.ADE (organtzed July 27th), MaJ. Joti., A. Reynolds. 1, 1st Mich.. Capt. Luther R. S,.ith; 1, 1st N. Y.. (tilt. ChalieI E. Winegsr; M, 1st N. Y., Capt. John 1). WOoI- bury; 13th N. Y.. Capt. Henry Bundy; C, I1t Olhio, Uieut. Jerotne B. Stephens, Capt. Marco I. Gary; l, Pa., Lieut. Thomas S. SIloa. UNATTACHED TROOPS. Reaerr t Brige, Col. Joseph W. Burke, Col. Helter I. Favour: lth Ohio,'- Col. Joseph W. Burke; 9th Mhib.. Lieut.-Col. William Wilkinson; 22d Mieh., " Lieut.-(oxl. HeluryS. Dean. Io ton-ies,' VolC. (leorge P. Bu-l: 1:68t h Ind., Lieut.-Cotl. Joaeph Mtoore; Pontoon Battlion," Capt. Patrick O'Connell. g.iee Arttilery: ltl Itd. But- tery. Capt. Arnold S,.termnelster. Ao-t-Uili- lia Guward: 1at Batt'n Ohio Sharp-shooters, Capt. (Gershol M. Barker. CAVALRY CORPS, Brig.-(Cen. Washuigton L. Elliott. Escort: D, 4th Ohio, Capt. Philitp H. Warner. FIRST DIVISloN, Brig.-Gen. Edward M. MeCook. Firt Brigade. Col. Joseph B. Dorr. Col. Jobn T. Cr..x- ton, Col. J. B. Dorr, Lieut.-Col. Jamres P. Browolow, Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton: 8tb Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Hora- tin G. Barner, Col. J. B. Dorr, N4j. Richard Root, Maj. Job,, H. taett, MaJ. Richard Boot; 4th Ky." (mounted inry), Col. J. T. Croton, Lleut.-Col. Robert MI. Kelly, Capt. James8 H. West, Lient. Granville C. West, Cnpt. James L. Hudnall; 2d Slich.,'. Maj. Leonidas S. Scran- ton, Lient.-Col. Benjamtu Smith; 1st Teno., Lielt.-Co1. Jamue P. Brownlow. Seos,-,d Brigade, Col. Oscar it. LaIGrange, Lieut.-Col. James S. Stevwrt, Lientt.-Col. Horaee P. Lms.on, Lient.-Col. WMiliam iH. Torrey, Lient.- Col. FT. P. Lamso: 21 Ind., L-ut,-ot. J. S. Stewart, Mid. David A. Brigg-; 4th Ind.. Lient.-Col. H. P. Lamto-o, Maj. George H. Purdy, Capt. Albert J. Morley; 1lt Wi.., Maj. Nathan Paine, Capt. Henry Harnden, Capt. Les M. B. Smith, Llent.-Col. William H. Torrey. Maj. Nathan Paitte, Capt. L. M. B. Smith. Arlitlr : lath hid., ieut. Villiam B. Rippetoe, Capt. Moses M. Beck. SECOSD DwvIIoN, Brig.-Ven. Kenner Garrard. First Brigade. Col. Robert H. . Millty: 4th Mich., Lient.-Col. Josiah B. Park, MaJ. Frank W. Mix, Capt. Teansferred to TItril Brirsde Stay 29th. t" Bellevel f- -ster-o-t tay 27tl.. tt Joined May lut Ta Jt-ne 17th ct-nel Buell eomma.,ded the " Pittaer Brigaite.' t Oledredt 1, CIattanstga J-..e 17th. 14 Assigaedl Jtte Sti,(. a Ordered to Franklin, Tena., J.ue 29th. THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE A TLANTA CAMPAIGN. L. Briggs Eldridge; 7th Pa., Col. William B. Sipes, MaJ. Ja.a.... F. Amadress, Mai. Williaa H. Jenuings; 4th U. S., Capt. James B. Ma-lhityre. 8econd Brigade,i Vol. Eli Long, tail. Boroth B. Egglestora: I1t Ohio, Vol. Bernth B. Eggieston, Lient.-Col. Thomas J. Patten; 3d Ohi, CoL. Charles B. Seidel; 4th Ohio, Lient.-C.el. Oliver P. Rlible. Third Brgife (k mounted nfy), Col. Jobn T. Wilder, tCol. Abrat-n 0. Miller: 98th Il1., Lieut.-Col. Ed- Wiid Kltchell; i23d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Jon.than iBggs; 17tb Iad., Limit.-Col. Henry Jordan, MAJ. Jaeob J. Vail; 72d mad., Vol. Abram 0. Miller, MB,;. Henry M. Carr, Capt. Adilm Plnkerton, Liet.-Col. Samunel C. Kirkpat- riek. Artillery: Chieago i 111.) Board of Trade Battery, Lient. (.eorge I. REnablhon. TItIRD DlVISIOlf, Brig.-tien. Judson Kilpatriek, (o,. Eli H. Murray, Vol. William., W. Lowe, Brig.-Ce. JlU-o- Kilpatriek. Firs lBrigade, Llent.-(ol. Robert Klein,, Lient.-Cul. Matti.ew-n T. Patrlick: a3d Ind. (4 en'sJ, MaJ. Altrea (Gaddil, I'lent.-Col. Robert Klein; 6th Iowa,3 MaJ. Har- Inn Baird, MAJ. J. Morris Young. Second Brigade,2 Col. Charles C. Smith, MaJ. Thomas W. Saudersin, blent.- Col. Flebler A. Jones: 8th Indi, Liei.-Col. Fielder A. Jones, MaJ. Thomas Herring; 2d Ky.,. MAJ. William H. Elfort, MAJ. Oweua Star; 10th Ohl,, Maj. Thoma-s- W. Samslersan, MaJ. William Thayer, Licat.-Vol. Thamas W. Saudlersia. Third Brigade, Col. Eli it. Murray, Col. Smith I). Atkins, Col. Eli It. Murray: 92d Ill. (mounted lnfy), Col. Smith D. Atkins, Capt. Mathew Van BaIs- kirk, .ol. S. D. Atkins, Ma]. Albert Woodeack, Col. S.D. Atkimas; 3d Ky., MaJ. Lewis Wolfley, Lient.-CVl. Robert H. King; ath Ky., Vol. Oliver L. Baldwin, MaJ. Chris- tIpher T. Check, Vol. 0. L. Baldwin. Artillery: 18th WIs., Capt. Yate- V. Beebe. ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Maj.-tlcn. Jlamnes B. McPherson, MAJ.-Gen. John A. Logan, Maj.-Gen. Oliver 0. IHoward. Escort: 4th Co. Ohio Cay., Capt. John S. Foster, Capt. Julio L. King; B, 1st Ohlo Cay., Capt. George F. Coon. FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, MaJ. John A. Logan, Brig.-(.en. Morgan L. Hmith, MaJ.-Gen. John A. Logan. PlaRT DIVISIOi, Brig.-Gen. Peter J. Osterhans, Brig.- (Gen. Charles R. Woods. Brig.-Gen. P. J. Osterhaus. Thirdt Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles B. Woods, Col. Mllo Saidth, Brig.-Gen. C. t. Woods, Col. Milo Smnith: 26th Iowa, Col. Milo Smith, Lieut.-Col. Thomas G. Ferreby, Cul. MHlo Soith, Lieat.-Cul. T. tI. Ferreby; 30th lown, Lieut.-Col. Aurelius iRobert; 27th M.., Col. Thanis Curly, Maj. Dennis O'Connor, Col. Thomas Curly; 7,tM Ohlo, Cut. William B. Woods. Second Brigade, Col. James A. Williamson: 4th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Samuel D. Nichols, Capt. Randolph Sry; 9th Iowa, Col. David Carskaddon, Maj. George Granger; 2lth Iowa, Col. George A. Stone; 31st Iowa, Col. William iSmyth. Third Brigadc, Col. Hugo Wangelin: 3d Mo., Col. Theodore Meum.ani; 12th Mo., Lieut.-CoI. Jacob Kacreher, Maj. F. T. Ledergerber; 17th .Mo., MaJ. Francis Ramer; 29th Mo., Lieiat.-Col. Joseph S. Gage, Mail. Philip H. Murphy, Col. J. S. Gage,; 31st Mo., Lient-Col. Samuel P. Simpson, Ma]. Frederick Jaensch, Llent.-Col. 8. P. Simuson; 32d Mo., Capt. Charles C. Bland. hlaJ. Abra- ham J. Seay. Artillry,4 MaJ. Clemens Landgraeber: F, 2d Mo., Capt. Louis Voelkner, Lieut. Lewsvi A. Winn; 4th Ohlo, Capt. Geo. Froehlich, Lleut. Lewis Zimmerer. SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Morgan L. SoIth, Brig.- Gen. J. A. J. Lighthurn, Brig.-Gen. 3. L. Smith, Brig.-Gen. J. A. J. Lightburn, Brig.-Gen. Williala B. Haztch. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Giles A. Smith, Col. James a tlacraliai In N arthleen Alabama to Ju.ne 6ti. Cnzlioel TIianis J. Itarrison, the csomnia ler at this hri. gaile, was eaptaircil July 30tb. wl,ile in uimand of ,a pro- v io ial li ision ciii, sieal at tle St 1t il.. 2.1 Ky., 5th I-wa. 9t i 01i1i, said 4t, Teno. suit one section Battery E, 1t M lel,. Art',. a Iu tle eIt frlana July 27tb1. Ch.iefs of arp. artillery: MaJar C. J. Stolbrasd, Major Alleaa C. Waterlouse, Major Tlhaass D. M.aurice. Joine. l raaa vetersa, ta hrlinagl Jose l ll,. 'Transferred to Second Brigaed Augoat 4th. S. Martin, Col. Theodore Jones: 6sth Ill.,' Lieut.-Csl. Theodore C. (iasndler, Capt. Jacob M. Auigustin, Capt. Francis H. Shaw, ('apt. Cyrus M. Browne; Illth IlLi Col. Jamnes S. Martin, Mai. Williana M. Mabary, C.l. J. S. M.ar- tin; 118th III., Liemt.-CoI. Anderson Fromama,, Capt. Thomas White, Capt. John S. Windsor; 127th Ill., Ileut.- (ol. Frank S. Curtiss, Capt. Alexanda-r C. Little, Lieut.- Cot. i. S. Curtlss,Capt. Charles Sehryver; fth Mo., Lieut.- Col. Delos Vanm Deuaien; 8th Mo.,7 Licatt.-Col. David C. C(oleman, Capt. Hugh Neill, Capt. John W. White; 57th Ohio, Col. Americus V. Rice, Lieut.-Col. Samuel R. Mott. S.ecod Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. A. J. Lightbhrn, Col. Wells S. Jones, Brig.-(en. J. A. J. Lightbaur-, Col. Wells S. Jones, Brig.-t;an. J. A. J. Liglthurn, Col. WMell S. Jones: 83d Ind., Col. Beilajniaa J. Spooner, Capt. (George H. Scott, Capt. Be.. North; 30th Olio,' Col. Theoidore Jones ; 37th Ohio,' Llent.-Col. Louis von Blessiugh, MaJ. Charles Hipp, Capt. Carl Moarit:; 47th Ohio, ol. Aiagustass C. Parry, Licot.- Col. John Wallae, Moai. Thlai-as T. T.aylir; 53d Ohlo, '5 Coii. Well. S. Jones, tieaat.-Col. Rolert A. Faiton, CVil. W. S. Jone-; r41th Ohio, Lienit.-Col. Robert Williams, Jr., Maj. Israel T. Moore. A rtillry, Capt. Francis D. GreSs: A, Ist Ill., Capt. Peter P. Wood, Liait. a;eorge MeCagg, Jr., Lieut. Sma-iael S. Smyth, Lieut. Garge Echte; B, let 111. consolidated with Battery A, July 12th), Capt. Israel P. R ia..asey; H, 1st Ill., Capt. Francis Do G-res. FOUtTH DIVI.ION,1 I Brig.-Gen. William Harrow. First Brigade, Col. Reuben Williams, Col. .iUhn NM. Oliver: 28th tl.,is Lieiat.-Col. Robert A. (Cliasore: 10th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Owa n Stuart, Capt. Daniel O'Connor; 12th Iad., I.ieast.-C,,. Jamoes Cioalaaowv, Col. Reuben Wall- Iams; 1loth Ill., Lient.-Col. Albert Heath. .cd Bri- gade, Brig.-Gen. Charles C. Walnutt: 40th III .," Liciat.- Col. Rlgdon S. Baarnhill, MaJ. Hirami W. Hall. (apt. Michael ClIvin, Capt. William Sitewardl; 1stl Il1. Mal. Asias Willison, Col. Willard A. Dickerman, Li-lat-Cal. George. W. Wright, Capt. Franklin C. Post; 97th Ind., Col. Robert F. Catteron, Lieut.-Col. Adeia :. Cavins; 6th lowa, Lieit-C-Vol. Alex. J. Miller, MaJ. Thoamass J. Ennis, Capt. William If. Clame, Lieut-Col. A. J. Miller: 46th Ohio, Maj. Henry H. t;iesy, Capt. Joshmia W. Heath, Col. Isaac N. Alexander. Third Rriqade. V tol. John t1. OlIver: 48th Ill., Col. Licon Greathoaas, 31:1a. Edward Ad-atas; 99th Ind., Col. Alex. Fowler, Lient.-Cl. John M. Berkey, Capt. Josiah Faria, Liet.-Cual. J. M. Berkey; 15th Mieh., Lentt.-Cot. Anstin E. Jaquith, Lb-ut.-VoL Fred . S. Haitehinson; 70th Ohio, Lieaat.-Cad. De Wilt C. Louadan, Maj. Willi-an B. Brown, Capt. Lo.is Lore, Capt Henry L. Philips. AriiUraj, Capt. Henry H. Grilfiths, Maj. Jshaa T. Cheney, Capt. H. H. tlrifiths, Capt. Josiah H. Burton: F. Ist Ill., Capt. Josiah H. Burton, Lieaut. Jefferson F. Whaley, Lieut. George P. Cunino-laaao: lat lowa, Lieut. William H. Gay, Capt. H. H. Griffitlas, Lieut. W. H. (;ay. SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS (Left Wing), MaJ.-Gen. Gren-ilie M. Dodge, Brig.-tGeo. Thinnas E. C. Raalsom. General Headquarters. 1st Ala. Cav., Lieait.-Cal. Go. L. Godfrey, Col. George E. Spencer: A, 3ht III. (detailed Aug. 8th), Capt. George E. Young. SECOND DIVIsION, Brig.-Gen. Thoana W. Sw9eeay, Brig.- Cen. Elliott W. Rice, Brig.-Geo. John M. Co-se First Brigad, Brig.-Gen. Elliott W. Rice: 52d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Edwin A. Bawea,; S6ith tnd., Lient-VaL Roger Martin, MaJ. Thomas C. Morrison, Capt. Alfred Morris: I21 lowa, Col. Jame. s B. Weaver. Lieut.-C(,L Noel B. Howard. Mail. Matlaew G. Hl.ill, (apt. John A. Duvkworth; 7th Tow., Llemat.-Ct. Jan--es C. Parrott, Maj. James W. M unlulin, Lieut.-CaaL J. C. Parrott, Mal. Four companies aelieveat flr n -sier-o-t J-se 16thsa.l- five cnpaa-ies June 25th,, Company K raauainilg. ' J'i'ucl from veteranlfrio ga 51.a- 22.1, antl trau.te rr l tIi Ftrst Brigade Aug.st 4th. J.oineal f.im veteran llirlaiseb May 10th. I Transfered fra- Tiairal Brigaile, F iirtih Div, Ntay 121h. The Thairal Dis-ision was .siitiianed at Carterevaile aii utlael Isilmas as thle rear ii! thle armauy. u Tramauferro lii Secoaul Brigade Angust 4th. aullel June 3dL .Brigae. t Dise.ontisuemi August 4th, anal troops transterred to First 287 288 THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. J. W. McMulUnl, Capt. Sanmuel Mahon. Secood Bide, Col. Putrit k E. Burke, LIeut.-Col. Robt-rt N. Adams. Col. August Meray, LUeut.-Col. Jewts' J. Phillips, Col. Robert N. Adatna,: 9th 111. iiounted:. Lieut.-tol. Jes- J. Phil- lips. Mlaj. John H. Kahn. Capt. Sanltue1 T. Hughes; 1211l Ill.. Maj. James i. Hugunin, Liout.4'oi. Henry Van SPl- lar; 66th Ill., Maj. Andrew K. CampbelIl, Capt. Williau S. Boyd; Nsot Ohio. Llcut.-Vol. Robt. N. Adau., Maj. ]'rank Evtsut. Lieut.-C 1. IL. N. Adatus, Capt. Noah Stoker, Capt. William C. Henry. Third Brigade (at Rtome from May TId). Cot. M-,.es M. Bae,. Brig.-Geu. William,. Vaudever, Col. H. J. B. Cunauings, Col. Riehardt Rowelt: 7th ID. t()idln Ily9th),Col. Riehard Rowett, Lleut.-Col. Hector Pe-rrin; 0th Ill, Mat). William Hlanna; b7th Ill.. iAlct.- (Ol. Frederiek J. linrIbut; 39th Iowa, Col. 11. J. B. Cum- inings. Lieut.-Col. James Redlicild, Col. It. J. B. Cuu.- ingt, Maj. Joseph M. Grilfith., Uettt.-Col. Jamnes Redileld. Artiaery.' Capt. Frederick Welker: B. It Suich. (at Rome from May 22d.) Capt. A. F. R. Arndt; 11. 1st Mo.. Lieut. Andrew T. Blodgett. F IVRTH DEvitsioi, Brig.-Gen. Janmes C. Veateh. Brig.- t-en. John W. Fuller, Brig.-Get.. Thomas E. 'L. Ran- solo, Bnrg.-Gen. J. W. Fuller. First Brigade, Brig.-Gtne. John W. Fuller, Col. John rrill, Lieutl.-CoL l-Henry T. Mc-Lowell, Brig.-tten. J. W. Fuller. Lieut.-Col H. T. MtDowell: 614th Ill., Ci,l. John Murrill, Lient.-Col. M. W. Manning; 18th Mo., Ll-ut.-CoL Charles S. fheldon, Ma). William H. Minter; 27th 0hio, Lieut.-Col. Mendal Ch-rchill; 39th Ohio, Vol. Edward F. Noyea, Lient.-Col. H. T. Mc!Dowell. Maj. John S. Jenkins. Lieut.-Col. H. T. MclDowell, MaJ. Jobta S. Jenkinl. Recow d Brigae. Brig.-Gien. Johu WV. Sprague: 35th N. J.. Capt. Charles A. Angel, Col. John J. Cladek, Licit.-t 'i. William A. Henlry; 43d Ohio, Col. Wager swayne; tld Ohio, Lieot.-Col. Charles E. Brown, Ma). Johln W. Font.; 25th Wis., Col. Milton Montgo..ery, I.ieut.-Col. Jeremiah M. Ruak. Third Brigade (joined army from Decatur Auig. 7th), Col. William T. C. Grower, Vol. John Tillon1: l0th Ill. (assigned Aug. WMth), Capt. George C. Lusk; 25th Ind.. Ueut.-Col.John Rhein. a.Ide.,, Capt. James S. Wright; 17th N. Y. ttransferred to Second Division, Fourteenth Crps, Aug. 30th), Ma). J.1e 0. Martin; 3.1d Wi.., Lieut.-Ct.I Charlea H. De tr,,at. Arftilery, Capt. Jerome B. Burrows, Capt. tieorge Robinon: C, lst Mieh., Capt. George Robin.",, Iienl. Itenry Shier; 14th Ohio. Capt. J. B. Blurrows, Lient. Seth M. Laird, Lient. George Hurlbut; F, 2d U. S., Lietit. Albert M. Murray, Lieut. Joseph C. Breckin- ridge. Lieut. Lamuel Smith, Lieut. Rezin G5. Howell. SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS (joined the army in (-.-rgia June 8th). UaJ.-Gen. Frank P. Blair, Jr. EAaort: M. lst Obhis Cav. (relieved June l8th), Lieot. Charles H. Shultz: G, 9th Ill., Monnted Int. 4relieved July 24th,, Capt. Ita., Clement.; (1, 11th III. Ca,. (s- signed Attg. 11th from escort of Faurth Division). Capt. Stephen S. Tripp. THIRD ItVlstOx. Brig.-4en. Mortimer L. Leggett, Brig.- (n-ia. Charles R. Woods. iaort: D, lt Ohio Cav. (relieved June 1lth), Licnt. James W. Kirkendall. Fir- Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Manning F. Foree, CoL George E. Bryant: 20th Ill., Lieut.-'oL. Daniel Bradley, Ma4. George W. Kennard, Capt. Job,, H. Austin; s0th Ill., Col. Warren Shedd, Lieut.-CJol. William C. Rhoads, (Capt. John L. Nichola; 31st mI.. CoL. Edwin S. MeCeok, Lieut.-Col. Robert N. Pearson. Capt. Simpson S. Striek- llu; 4Uth Ill. (detaehed it Etowah Bridge), Uent.-Col. Robert P. Sealy; 16th WI.., Col. Cassius Fairchild, MaJ. William F. Daves. Seond Brigade, CoL Robert K. Secott, Lieut.-Col. Greenberry F. Wiles: 20th Ohio, Lieut.- Col. John C. Fry. Ma). Francis M. Shaklec; sld Ohio, ttransferred to First Brigade, Fourth Division, July lth), Col. Benjamin F. Potts. Capt. William M. Morris, Lieat.-Col. Jeff. J. Hibbeta; 68th Ohio, LieAt.-Col. George E. Welles; 78th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. ;. F. Wiles, MaJ. John T. Rainey. Third Brigade. Col. Adam 0. Maloy: 17th Win., Lieut.-Col. Thomas MeMahou, Maj. Donald D. Seott; Worden s Battalion (,etaelhsuets 14th Wis., soil 81t and 95th 111.). Maj. An. Worden. ArUilery,l Capt. William S. Williaims: D. tt Ill., ('alit. Edgar H. Coo.pr; H, lt MHich:, Capt. Mar-uLi D. Elliott, LieAt. William Jusln; 3d Ohio, Lieut. J.ihnt Sullivan. FOUaRT11 DIVlItON, Brig.-Gen. Walter Q. Greaham, Col. William Hall, Brig.-G-i.. liles A. Stuith. First Brigade, Col. William L. fialderson, Col BenJa- nin F. Potts: 32d IIL .transferred to Second Brigaud, July lath), Col. John Logau, Lieit.-Col. (eorgo H. kug- lii.b; ad Indl., Lieut.-Col. William P. Datis, Leut.-('ol. George S. Babbitt; tw Ind., Lleut.-Col. William Join.., Maj. Warner L. Vestal. Capt. Gi0-irge 11. Beers; 3d Il wa a cii's), Capt. Duniel MLeTnin, Capt. Pleasant T. Matbes, Lieut. Lewis T. Linmuell Liecit. D. W. WilRi t; 1lth WI.. )tranaferred Ia, first Brigade, Third Dliv1is1,. July loth), Col. Georgoe U. Bryant, LIeut.-Col. Jamn. K. Prondlit. seeonad Bi-igale t All-toi.i.., Kenesaw, Aek- worth, and other points in rear froni Jlu.e 1th), C0l. (Gtol-ge C. Rogers, Col. Isaac C. Piugh, Ci'l. John Logan: 14th Ill.,3 Capt. Chbarl,'s C. Cox; lfth 111,1 Maj. Rtntfu C. McEathrol; 41st 111. (Joined Jily 6th), Maj. Robert H. McFadden; 53d Ill. tra-stserre-l to First Brigade, Joly lath), Lieat.-Col. Johb.' W McCh:nltalhn. Third Brigade, C,1d. William Hailt, C,,l. John ili'lm, C4tl. Willial H1:11, Brig.-eu. .'Willia.,a W. BelkIlkap: 11th lowa, Lieut.- CoL John C. Aberronmbie; 13th lIowa, Col. Jobh Shane, Maj. W. A. Walker, C(. John Shlane; 15th lowa, Col. W. W. Belktiap, M.A). 4eir-ge Poiantz; 16th liwa. Lieut.-Col. Addion H. Sanders, Capt. Cranulall W. Williams. Artillery, ('apt. Edward Spear, Jr., Ciapt. William Z. Clayton : F. hlt Ill., Lient. V. alter It. Powell, Iien-t. George R. Richardsott, Licot. Wmedollu Meyer; lst MiNn., Calpt. W. Z. Clayton. Li-ut. Hetary Hunter; C, 1st Mu. (at Allatoona and K ell-saw), ('apt. John IL Matthaei; 10th Ohio tat eneueaw from July lith), Capt. Franeis Seaman ; 16th Ohao, Lieut. James Blurdick. ARMY OF TIIE OHIO (Twenty-third Corps), Maj.- (len. John M. Scbofield, Brig-Geou. Jaeob D. C(ox (telmpo- rarily May l6th and 27th), Maj.-Gi'n. John M. Schofield. Eort: (1, 7th 01.10 Cay.. Capt. John A. Ashbury. FImiT DiVistox,' Brig.4-l-. Aliti P. Hovey. First Brigade, Col. Riehard F Barter: 120th Ind., Lieut.-CoL Allen W. l'r-ther; 124th Int., Ci0l. James Burges, Col. John M. Orr; 128th hid., Col. Richard P. Le Hart Lieut.-ColJasper Prekard. road Brigade, t'ol. John C. MlieQtitoti, 'ol. Peter T. Swalne; 123d Ind., Lient.-C4il. Wilalist A. CVlleti, C'i. J. C. HcQutltin; 129th InLd., Col. Charles C'use, Ctl. Cbarles A. Zilliuger; ISOtb Ind., Col. Charli-. S. Parrish; 99th Ohiii, Li,-nit.- Col. John E. Cuntmins. Artilery: 2ad Ind., Lietit. Lntber M. Houghton. 1.1Unt. Aaron A. Wilber; 14th Ilid. (asigned to cavalry division July 6thM , Capt. Alexander Hardy, Lieut. Hiram Allen. SECOND Iuivisiow. Brig.-Gen. Henry M. Judahl, Brig.- Gen. Milo S. Ha-call. First Brigade, Brig-G,-n. NSathnniel C. McLean, Brig.- Gen. Josepb A. Cooper: 80th Ind. Itralisferred t. teeittid Brigade June Sth), Ltelut.-Col. Alfred D. Oweti, Maj. John W. Tucker, Lient.-olA. AD. Owen. Ma3. J. W. Tucker, Capt. Jacob RBgle, Maj. J. W. T-cki'r; 13th Ky. tIransferred to Second Brigade June 8th), Col. WIlliam E. Hobson, Lient.-Ci. Benjamin P. Este.; 25th Mieb., Lient.-Col. Benjamin F. Oreutt, Capt. Samuel L. Dema- rest, Capt. Edwin Childs; 3d Tenn., Col. MWlilllam Cro-s. Ma). R. H. DLiDn, Col. Wmt. Cross, Maj. R. H. Duun; 6th Temn., Cil. J. A. Cooper, Ma). Edward Maynard, Capt. Maretus D. Bearden. Capt. Wililtiam Aulmt; 91st Ind. )trantsferred to Third Brigade, Second Division, Angllt lith), Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Butterfield, Col. John Mebringer. Seond Brigade, Brig.-Geu. Mile S. Hascall. Col. John R. Bond, Col. Willianm E. Hobson. CVl. J. P. Bond: 107th Ill., Maj. Urtab M. Laurauce, Lleut.-Col. X Maj. Wlliam H. Ro.s, chief of -rpt artillery. I Coasolbifated July 5tilt.untler Col. ft. V. Hugr.. ('itatff carl. artillery: Ma). Th-u.a D. Maui-ice Lioul.. 4 Diseoiin-a August tlt], a.td trI-rll ass1gned Wt eon 'i. Allat M. Pwell. Mj. J:h. T. ('lacry. Misit. Eiact;; adTlrltir ivasion ta wtii a tiey were temporarly attachei SI.ar. Jr. freat Ju-e 9th. THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE A TLANTA CAMPAIGN. Francis H. Lowry; 23d Mic.., Lleut.-Coi. Oliver L. Spaultding, Maj. WIlliam W. Wheeler; 46th Ohlo (tran8- t,-rre1 to First Brigade, June 8th, and toS-eond Brigade, First Dlivislon, Fourth Corps, June 22d), Col. Benjamin P. Rtunkle, LUemt.-Col. Charles H. Butterfield, Capt. John H. Htumphrey; Ilth Ohlo, C,,l. John R. Bond, Liet.-Cot. I.aa. R. Sherwood; 118th Ohlo, Lleit.- (.1. Thuan.- L. Yonlig, Capt. Edgar Sowers, Capt. William Kennedy, C(att. Rudolph Renl. Capt. Edgar 8Owers. Third Brigalde (Joined May 28th1 allItd eslgnated as ltrvisinatI Brigade to June 8th), Col. Silas A. ftrick- land: 14th Ky. (traznsferred to First Brigade August 11th), C]. George W. Gallup; 20th Ky.. Lieut.-Col. Thomnas B. Waller; 27th Ky.. Llent.-Col. John H. Ward, (1t41. Andrew J. Bailey; 10th Ohio, Lient.-Col. Gerge It. Elmtbe-r, MAJ. Ilaiuultou S. Gillespie. ArtiUery: Capt. Josepih C. Shields: 22d Ind., Capt. B. F. Denning, Lieut. E. W. Nlcth.Ioao; F, 1st Mich., Capt. Byron D. Paddock. Lienit. Marshall M. Miller; 19th Ohio, Capt. J. C. Shields. TIIII v 1,1v1IS-1, Hrig.-t:eu. Jncob D. Cox, ( ol. James W. Rilly (telniaorlrly May 26-27), Brig.-G-en. J. D. Cox. First B,-igadr, Col. Jaes W. Reilly, Col. James W. Glault, Brig.-Gen. James W. Reilly: 112th ItI. (Joined May 11th, :411d transferred to Third Brigade August lth), ('o1. Thoma J. Henderson, Lleut.-Col. E.i.ery S. Bond, MaJ. T. T. Dow, Col. T. J. Itenderson, Maj. T. T. D-w; Ith Ky. (jolied .May 11th, and tranfcrreadtoThlrd Brlgudi- Augost 1llt.), Col. James W. Gault, Maj. John S. White, Cot. James W. Gault, MAH. J.IS. White, Capt. Jaeob Mtiller, MAJ. J. H. White; 100th OhIo, Col. Patrick S. 8le- yin, Cnlpt. Frank Rundel,; 104th Ohio, Cal. Oscar W. Sterl; 8th Teuin., Col. Felix A. Reeve, Mal. William J. Jordan. Calpt. Robert A. Ragan, Capt. James W. Berry. geasid Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Mahlon D. Manson, Col. John S. Htut, Brig.-Gen. Miil S. Hascalt, Cal. John S. Hurt, Col. Jobhi S. Casemlent, Cot. Daniel Cameron, Col. Johin i3. Caselmunat: 65th III. (Jloined from veteran furlough June 4th1), lient.-Col. Willila.i S. Stewart; 6f3a tnd. (trans- fer-rd to Third Brigade August 11th), Col. Israel N. Stiles, Llelt.-Col. Daniel Morris; 65th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Th-mas Johnson, Capt. Walter G. Hedge, Capt. William F. Stillwell, Capt. Edward A. Baker; 24th Ky., Col. Johna S. Hurt. Lieat.-Col. Lafayette North, Col. Johnl S. Itort; 103d Ohio, Capt. William W. Hutchinson, Capt. I'hliltp C. Hayes, Lieut.-Col. James T. Sterling, Col. J. S. Casement, Capt. P. C. Hayes; 6th TealIl. (transferred to Third Brigade June 5th), Col. James T. Shelley, Maj. David (;. Bowers, Col. James T. Shlelley. Third ni- go. ((Irgualiled Jlue 11th), Brig.-(.en. N. C. McLean, Ct . Robert K. Byrd, Col. Israel N. Stiles: 11th Ky. (transferred to First Brigade August l1ths, C.l. S. Palace love. Lieut.-Col. E. L. Mottley, Col. S. P. Love; 12th Ky. (transferred to First Brigade August llth), Lieut.-Col. Laurence R. Roasseau; lt Tenn. (relieved for muster-out August 11th), Col. R. K. Byrd, Lhent.-Col. John Ellis. Di.srnaoted Caralry Brigadc (assigned June 21st; transferred to eaanlry division August 22d), Co. Eugene W. Crittenilen: 16th 111., Capt. Hiram S. Hlln- ehett; 12th Ky., Lieut.-Co . Jnme T. Bramlette, MaJ. James B. Harrison. Arliitery, Mas. Henry W. Wells: 16th tnd., Capt. Alomao D. Harvey; D, lot Ohlo, Capt. (Glles J. Cockerill. CAvALRY lOlVIlON,' MaJ.-Gen. George Stoneman. Col. Horae. Capron. Esrort: D. 7th Ohio, Lieut. Samuel Murphy, Lieut. W. W. Mantaing. Firt Brigade (Joined army I, the field July 27th\, Col. Israel (Garrard: 9th Mle., Col. (George S. Aeker: 7th Ohlo, Lleut.-CoI. George C. Mtner. .Yd Brigd (designated as the First Brigade until July 31st,, el. James Biddle, Col. Tho..as It. Butler, Col. Jams10 1 Bid- die: 16th Itt., Capt. IIram S. Hancheltt; .Ith 1nd., (Col. Thomas It. Butler, Maij. Moses D. L e-on; 6th Ild., Lieut.-Col. C. C. Matson, MAJ. William W. Carter; 12th Ky., Col. Eugene W. Crittenden, MaJ. Jamles B. lntrrl- son. Third Brigade (joined army in the fIeld Je 3 28th), Col. Horace Capron: 14th l1t., Leoit.-Col. Darid P. Jlcn- kius; 8th NlMeh., Lleut.-Cl. Elisha Mix, MaJ. Willia- t. Buek, MHA. Edward Coates; McLaughlin's Ohi Sqnalad- ron, Maj. Richard Rice. Idpepdet Briqgade, Cot. Alex. W. Holeman, ieut.-Col. Silas Adams: let Ky., Lieuit.- Col. Silas Adams; 11th Ky., Lieut.-Col. Archibadl J. Alexander. EFFrECTIVE STREXGTH OF THE L'Xtox ARMY. DATE. ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , Mny It ..... . ...... 88,188 4460 6,149 98,-97 Joined Julte 8th ;. t 9J,310 1601 12,908 112,819 Jul7y 1st .... 88,086 1941 123911) 196,070 August st .. 715619 1499 10,117 9146f76 September 1st.... , 6,674 4690 9.394 81,71)3 Losses: killed, 4423; wounded, 22,822; eaptured or o1issIng,4442 =31,687. (MaJorE. C Dawes, of Cineioati, who Ias made a special study of the subject, estimates the Union IOs at about 40,000, and the Confederate loss at about the same.) THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Gen.eral Joseph E. John- stoljt, (eneral Jodn B. Hood. ,scort, Capt. Guy Dreux. HARDEE'S CORPS, Lieut.-Geu. WillIam J. Hardee,7 MaJ.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne. Ka-or, Capt. W. C. Raum. CIIEATOAM's DIVIStION, MaJ.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Brig.- t:en. George Mauuey, Brig.-Gen. John C. Carter. Escort, Capt. T. M. Merritt. fMamey'g Brigade,, Brtg.-Gell. George anuey, C(l. t;eortce C. Porter: 1st and 27th Tenn,., Col. H. R. Feild, Cnpt. W. C. Flournoy, Lleut.-Col. John L. House; 4th Tean. (Coifted.) and 24th Tenn. Batt'n, Lleut.-Col. 0. A. Br.]dshaw; 6th and 9th TennI., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Buford, i R-rga-uize,1 Angust li1,, with COl. Israel Garrard as di. Tisi,,. cotnoan..er, a...l torae-l into two brlgale. The toaatesl Brlgstle" as- enrigdaa lew t.y (at . Geo rge 9. Aeker. except from A,,guot lath to 2341. when ( W441. v. D. hlbifllton was In comniand. tt co fistel ot tlhe 9th Mih.., I.le,,t..col. W. B. Way; 7th Ohio., L.eut.-Col. (;. C. Miner: dietaclm,-14t 9th Ohlio, ('apt. I.. H. Howls.; McLa.ghblin's Ohido Sqiuadron, M.J. Rbcharl Rice; sod the 24th lnd. sat- tery, Lieut. Hiram Allen. The - Disinaunted Brigade, com- Llebt.-Cdl. John L. Harris; 19th Tena., Col. F. M. Walker, Maj. J. G. IDeaderiek; 10th Tenn., Col. StephleI H. Calais. Wrighrts Brigde, Brig.-lien. John C. Carter: 8th Tenn., Col. J. H. Anderson; 16th Tenn., 3al. Bemja- mliil Randal:; 28th Teno., Col. S. S. Stanton, Li.nt.-('ol. D. C. Crook, Capt. L. L. De.r-.an, Capt. Jebon B. Hl- man; 38th Tenn., Llicut.-Col. A. D. (iwynne, M1aj. H. W. Cotter; 51at and 52d Tenn.. Lieut.-Col. John t;. Hall, Lieut.-Col. J. W. Estes, MaJ. T. G. Randle. tirahl's Btri- gade, Brig.-Gen. 0. F. Strnhl: 4th and 5th Tent,., 4 itl. J. J. Lomb, Maj. H. Hampton; 24th Tenn., Lient.-Col. S. E. Shannon, Col. J. A. Wilson, Lieut.-CoI. S. E. Sh-an-n: 21st Tenn., Maj. Samuel Sharp, Lieut.-Col. F. E. P. Staf- ford; 33d Tenn., Col. W. P. Jones, Miaj. R. N. Payne, nanled by Col. Horace Caprin, was eompot ot tle 14t a-,d Itl 6 tIll., 5 d n 12th Ky. Tile lft1, 11. was detailed as provost gtarln Twenty-tllrd Ctorps frue, A.gst l 6th, an-l the 12th1 KIy. as cattle guarl fron Au.gu.st 21st. The 6th Indl. m1-ller XaJ. William H. Cart,-r, w.-, or- dIere' l to Yaslvile; tr rca-a-mat Almgust 23,1, In command at lilt oWn and Lee's carps August 31st- 8eptember 241. 289 290 THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. Capt. W. F. Marberry; 41st Tenn., Llent.-CoL James D. Tilman, Cnpt. A. M. Kieth. Toughea'. Brigade, Brig.- Gen. A. J. Vaughan, Jr., Col. M. Magevney, Jr., Brig.- (ten. 4;. W. Gordon: 11th Tenn., Col. G. W. Gordon, M4.. J. E. Burn.; 12th and 47tb Tenn.. Col. W. M. Watkins, Capt. W. S. Moore, Lieut.-Col. V. (i. Wynne; 26th Tenn., CoL. Horace Rice; lath and 154th Tenn., CoL. 5. Magev- ney, Jr., Lleut.-Col. B. L. Dyer, Cal. M. Magevnuy, Jr. CLE.3UNUE'S Divsow., Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne, Brig.- Gen. M. P. Lowrey. Eart, Capt. C. F. Sanders. PbSka. Brigade,' Brig.-Gen. Lucius E. Polk: lst and lath Ark.. Col. J. W. Colqaitt, LIeut.-Col. W. H. Martin. Capt. F. G. Luak. Capt. W. H. Pealea; 5th Confederate. Capt. W. A. Brown, Mal. It J. Person, Capt. A. A. Co.; Sd Tenn., CoL. W. D. Robtion, Capt. Iaae P. Thompson; 5th and 48th Tenn.. Capt. H. G. Evans, Lieat.-Col. A. S. Godwin, Col B. J. Hill. Lwrrc Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 5. P. Lowrey, Col. John Weir: 16th Ala.. Col. F. A. Ashford; 33d Ala., Cal. Samuel Adams, LIeut.-Col. R. F. Crittenden; 45th Ala.. Col. H. D. Lampley, Lieut.-Col. Rt. H. Abererombie; 3Sd, Mtis. Col. W. H. H. TtSou; 45th Mtis. Col. A. B. Hrdcaetle; 3d Mlss. Battalion. Lient.- Cal. J. D. Wlliam GoeaaS . Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. C. Govau. Col. Peter V. Green: 2d and 24th Ark., Co!. E. Warfield, Maj. A. T. Meek, Capt. J. K. PhillIps; 6th and 15th Ark.. Col. J. E. Murray, Col. P. V. Green. Lieut.- Cot. E. A. Howell; 6th and 7th Ark., Col. S. G. Smith, Capt. J. T. Robinson; sth and 19th Ark., Col. G. F. Baneum, 54.. D. B. Hauntter; 3d Confederate, Capt. 5. B. Dixon. Orabury'a Brigadc, Brig.-Gen. B. B. Grani.ury. Brig.-Gen. J. A. Smith, LIeut.-Col. R. B. Young. Brig.-Gen. H. B. Granbury: 6th and lth Tex.. Capt. B. Fisher. Ca.pt. M. M. Honaton, Capt. J. W. Terrill. Cap.L I. B. Ty.s, Capt. S. E. Rice. Lieut. T. L. Fl1nt; 7th Tes.. Capt. J. H. Col.lett, Capt. C. E. Talley, Capt. J. W. Brown; loth Te.., Cad. t. Q. Mills, Capt. J. A. Fornuwalt, Lient-Col. R. B. Young; 17th and lath Te.. idismauted eavalry), Calpt. G. D. Manion. Capt. William H. Perry, Capt. F. L. MtItnight; 24th and 25th Te.. diamuounted cavalry). Col. F. C. Witkes, Lieat.-Col. W. M. NeyLand. Maj. W. A. Taylor. WALKEa s DIV1sio",x Maj.-Gen. W. H. T. Walker, Brig.- Gen. H. W. Mercer. BEont: Capt. T. G. Holt. Jaekson'. Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John R. Jackson: 5th Ga.,3 Col. C. P. Daniel; 47th Ga.,3 Col. A. C. Edwards; 65th ia., Capt. W. G. Faster; 5th Ml5-., Col. John Weir, IeAnt.-Col. Jobh B. Iterring; 8th Mi., C.1. J. C. WIlkinson; 2d Ga. Battalion Sharp-shoters, Maj. R. H. Whiteley. (9. Brijade. Brig.-(;en. StateI R. Git, Col James MeCulloagh: 8th Ga. Battalion. LIeut.-CoL Z. 1L Watters; 4Gth Ga., Mal. S. J. C. Dunlop. Capt. E. Tay- lor. Maj.. 8J. C. Dunlop; 16th S. C., CaL Jamea McCul- hlugh. Capt. J. W. Boling; 24th F. C., Col. Ellaon Caper.. Lieut.tCol. J. S. Jones., Col. Elison Caper. Sierrs' (or Jaek".aa') Brigade. Brig.-Gen. C. 11. Ste- vens. Brig.-Ge. . T. Jaekson, Cal. W. D. Mitchell: 1St Ga. Confederate). Cal. G. A. Smith; 26th Ga., Col. W. J. Wiun. Maj. A. W. Smith, Capt. G. W. Holmes; 29th Ga., Lient.-Col. W. D. Mitehell. Ma). J. J. Owen., Capt. J. W. Turner; 3ath Ga., Lien.t Col. J. S. Boynton. Ma3. H. Hendrick; 66th Ga.. Cal. J. C. Nisbet. Capt.T. L Langs- tan; 1st Ga. Battallon Sharp-sbooters. M5j. A. Shaat, Capt. B. H. Hardee, 31J. A. Shaaf; 26th Ga. Battalion. Maj. J. W. Nisbet. Mere Brigade, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Mercer. Col. W. Barkunoo. Lient.-Col. 54. Rawls, Lieut.- Col. C. S. G.yton., Cl. C. H. Ohustead: 1St Ga., Cal. C. H. Olhotead. M5J. M. J. Ford; 54th Ga., Lient.-.Cl. M. Rawls. Capt. T. W. Brantley; 57th Ga., Col. William Barkulbo. Leut.-Coi. C. S. Gnyten; 63d Ga.. Col. G. A. Gordon, Maljor W. F. Allen, Cant. E. J. Craven. BRTsb8 DrIisIOW. Maj.-Gen. William B. Bate, Maj.-Gen. Johu C. Brown. E.aort, Lient. James H. Buc-k. Lewis' Brigadc, Brig.-Gen. JSeph 1H. Lewis: d Ky., Col. J. W. Ma-, Ltent.-Col. Philip Lee, Capt. Joel Hig- gins; 4th Ky., Lieut.-Col. T. W. Thompson; 5th Ky.. LIent.-Col. H. Hawkins, Liett.-Col. G. W. Connor, 4.j. William Mynbher; 6th Ky., Maj. G. W. Moxaon, Col. M. H. Cofer, Capt. Rh-hard P. Finn; 9th Ky., Col. J. W. CaldwelU. Tyler' (or Sm.iAh) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. B. Smith: 57th Ga., Lient.-Col. J. T. Smith; 10th Teno., Maj. J. O'Neill, CoL William Grace, Lieut. L. B. Doaoha; 15th and 57th Tenn., 54j. J. M. Wall, Lleut.-Col. B. D. Frayser, Capt. M. Dwyer; 21th Tenu., Llent.-Coi. W M. Shy; 20th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J.J. Turner; 4th Ga. Bat. talion Sharp-shooters, Capt. W. M. Carter, M5.. T. D. Cawell. Ie.W Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Finley, CaL R. Bullock: let and 3d Ila., MaJ. G. A. Ball, Capt. M. H. Strain, 54a. G. A. Ball; lst and 4th Fla., Lent.-CoL E. Badger, 4.3. J. A. Lash, Llent.-Ctl. E. Badger; 6th Fla., Col A. D. McLean, Lien-t.L. D. L. Kenan. Capt. S. A. Cawthorn; 7th Fla., Lient.-Col. T. Ingram, Col IL. BuI- loek, M5j. N. S. Blount. ANTILURT, C'ol. MelaneihoU Smith. HRo' Baffalfe, M5.3. L. Hoxton: Ala. Battery, Capt. John Phelan, Lieut. N. Venable; Fla. Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Perry, Licut. J. C. Davi-s Miss. Bat- tery, Capt. William B. Turner, Lieut. W. W. Henry. RoMeieei Baiteia/,MaJ.T. B. Hotcbklts,Capt. Thoma J. Key: Ark. Battery, Capt. T. J. Key. Lieut J. G. Mar- shall; Ala. Battery, Capt. R. W. Goldthwaite; Miss. Battery, Lieut. B. Shannon. Lient. H. N. Steele. Mar4n's Baalea: Mo. Battery, Lhint. t. W. Higgins, Capt. H. M. Bledsoe, Llent. R. L. Wood; S. C. Battery, Lieut. B. T. Beauregard, Lient. J. A. Alston; Ga. Batter:,, Lieut. W. G. Hobson, Capt. Eran 1'. Howell. Cobb' tBaUta/in, M4.. Robert Cobb: Ky. Battery, Lieut. R. B. Matthews; Tena. Battery, Capt. J. W. Mebane, Lient. J. W. Phillip.; La. Battery, LUcat. W. C. D. Vaught, Capt. C. H. Pio- eomb, Lieut. . A. Chalaron. Palmer. Baadiaa: Ala. Battery, Capt. C. L. Lumsden; Ga. Battery, Capt. R. W. Anderson; Ga. Battery, Capt. M. W. Havis. HOOD'S tar LEE'S) CORPS, Lieut.-ten. John B. Hood, Maj.-Gen. C. L. Stevenon, Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cbeathan, U-et.-Gen. S. D Lee. HtXDlAlC8 DIVISIow, MaJ.-Gen. T. C. Hiudman, Brig.- Gen. Jobn C. Brown, MSJ.-Geu. Patton Andersen, Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson. Eseari: B, 3d Ala. Cav., Capt. F. J. Blllingslea. Dea. Brigade, Brig.-Ge.. Z. C. Dess, Col. J. G. Cot- tart, Brig.-Gen. G. D. Johnston, Col. J. G. Coltart, Lient.- Col. H. T. Toulmin, Brig.-Gen. Z. C. Dens: 19th Ala.. Col S. K. MeSpaddeu, Lleut.-Col. . B. Klmbrough; 22d Ala., Col. B. R. Hart, Capt. Iaae M. Whitney, Col. H. T. Toulmin; 25th Ala., Cal. G. D. Johnston, Capt. N. B. Rouse; 39th Ala., Lient.-CdL W. C. Clifton. Capt. T. J. Brannon, Capt. A. J. Miller, Capt. A. A. Cassady; 6ath Ala., Col. J. G. Coltart. Capt. G. W. Arnold. Capt. A. D. Bay, Col J. G. Coltart; 17th Ala. Battalion Sharp- shooters, Capt. J. F. Nabers, Lieut. A. B. Andrews. eoiga-dre Brigade. Brig.-Gen. A. M. Manigault: 24th Ala., CoL N. N. Daris, Capt. S. H. Oliver. Col. N. N. Davis; s8th Ala.. Llent.-C.a. W. L. Butler; 34th Ala., Col. J. C. B. Mitchell, Maj. J. N. Slaoghter, Capt. H. J. Rix. Capt. J. C. Carter; 10th 5. C., Cal. J. F. Pre-ley, Uent.-Col. C. Irvin Walker, Capt. R. Z. Harlee. Capt. C. C. White, Capt B. B. MeWhite; 19th S. C., Lieut.-Col. T. P. Shaw, Ma5. J. L. White, Capt. T. W. Getzen, Capt. E. W. Horne, CWl. T. P. Shaw. Tacker' (or Sharp's,) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. F. Tucker, Brig.-Gen. Jacob H. Sbarp: 7th Miss., Lieut.-CoLI B. F. Johns, Col. W. B. Bishop; 9th Miss.. Capt. S. S. Calhoun, Lieut.-Col. B. F. Jobns; loth Mis.., Capt. I. A. Bell, Lieut.-Col. G. B. Myer; 41st Miss., Col. Byrd Williams, Capt. J. M. Hicks; 44th Miss.. Col. Jacob H. Sharp, Llcut.-CoL B. G. Keisey; 5th Miss. Battalion Sharp-shooters, Maj. W. C. ;iticardN. Lient. J. B. Downing. Walhlls (or Brasnty'.) Bri- gade, Brig.-Gen. E. C. WalthalL, Col. Samuel Benton. I Broken up in July and regiment. asftgne to otler bri. Stevens.' britade went to Bate'a division, and .dereer's bri- gade. gade to Clehbrne'. dlviai. BiDac.ldnnue.I Joly 24th, J.ckao'. bria.te being c-ns-i. Transerred witi, General Jackson to Savannah July 3d. dated with GVist'. and trnslerred to Cheathaa.'. di.vIan; 4 Assigned to Jackson's cavalry division september 4th. THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. Brig.-Gen. W. F. Brantly: 24th and 27th Miss. Col. Sam- uel Benton, Col. R. '. McIelvaine, Lieat.-Col. W. L, Lyles; 29th and 30th Miss., Col. W. F. Brantly, Lleut.- Col. J. M. Johnson, Maj. W. Gt. Reynolda; 34th Miss., Capt. T. 9. Hubbard, Col. Sanunel Ienton, Captain T. S. Hlubbard. vTaV ZNsoN's DIVISION, Major.-Gen. C. L. Stevenson. Fa- rt. Capt. T. B. Wilson. Bron's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Browr, Cotl. Ed. C. Cook, Ctl. Joseph B. Palmer: 3d Tenn., Col. C. H. Walker, Lient.-Col. C. J. Clack, Capt. W. S. Jennings; loth Tenn., Lelnt.-Col. W. R. Butler, Maj. William H. Joyn-r; 26th Tenn., Capt. A. F. Boggess, Ctl. R. M. Saffell; 32d Tenn., Col. Ed. C. Cook, MaJ. J. P. Mc- Guire, Capt. C. a. Tucker, MaJ. J. P. Mcouire; 45th mid 23d (battalionl) Teno., tot. A. Searcy. C.mmig' Bri- gade, Brig.-Gen. Aifred C mintng, Cot. C. M. Hbelley: 34th Ga.., MaJ. J. M. Jackson, Capt. W. A. Walker, M.a. J. M. Jacksmn, Cllpt. R. A. Jones; .36th Ga.. Col. C. E. Broyles: 39th Ca., Lleut.-Col. J. F. B. Jackson, Capt. W. P. Milton; 56th (G,,.. Col. E. P. Watkins, Capt. J. A. GrOce, Capt. B. T. Speartnan; 2d Ga. (State troops), Col. J. B.Willeoxson, Calpt. Sealporn Saffold. Reyssoids'sBri- gade, lirig-Gen. A. W. Reynolds, Cotl. R. C. Trigg, Col. John B. Palmer: C5th N. C., Mg). T. J. Dnla, Capt. S. M. Silver; sOth N. C., Lient.-Col. J. T. Weav-r, Col. W. M. Hardy, Lleut.-Cot. J. T. Weaver; 64th Va., Cul. R. C. Trigg. Licut.-Col. J. J. Wade, Capt. W. G. Andermsn, Col. B C. Trigg; 63d Va., Capt. C. It. Lynch. Peils'. Brigade, Brig.-Ge,.. E. W. Pettus: 20th Aln.. Col. J. N. Dedman, Capt. S. W. Davidson, Col. J. N. Dednan; 23d Ala., Lment.-Cot. J. B. Bibb; 30th Ala., Col. C. M. Shelley. LIeut.-Col. J. K. Elliott; 31st Ala.. Cot. D. R. Ha-dley, Capt. J. J. Nil, MaJ. G. W. Mathieson; 46th Ala., MaJ. George E. Brewer, Capt. J. W. Powell. STEWA.RT'S OVISIoN, MaJ.-GCn. Alexander P. Stewart, Maj.-Gen. H. D. Clayton. Escort: C, tat Ga. Cay., Capt. George T. Watts. Batag Brigade, Brig.-G-en. M. A. Htovall, Col. Abda Johnson, Brig.-Gen. M. A. Stovall: 40th Ga., Cot. Abda Johnon, Capt. J. N. Dobbs, Capt. J. F. Groover, M.). R. S. C-mp; 41at Ga., Maj. M. S. NaIl, Capt. J. E. Stall- lo1gs; 42d Ga., Col. R. J. Henderson, Mia. W. H. Hulsey, Capt. L. P. Thomas; 43d Ga., Lient.-Col. H. C. Kellogg, MaJ. W. C. Lester, Capt. IH. R. Howard, MaJ. W. C. Les- ter, CooL H. C. Kellogg; 62d Ga., Capt. R. R. Asb ry, Capt. J. B. R.-sell, Capt. R. R. Asbury, Capt. J. R. Russell; lst Ga. (State troops), CoL E. M. Galt, Capt. - Howell. Mal. William Tate. C gayloa's Brade, Brig.- Gen. H. D. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. J. T. Holtelaw, Col. Bushrod Jones: loth Ala., Col. J. T. Itoltzelaw. Lieut.- Col. P. F. Hunley; 32d and 58th Ala., Col. Bushrld Jones, MaJ. H. I. Thornton; 86th Ala., Cul. L. T. Woodruff, Capt. J. A. Wemy-s, Lieut.-C 1. T. H. IHerndon, Capt. N. M. Carpenter; 8Hth Ala.. Col. A. B. Lsukford, Capt. G. W. Welch. Capt. D. Lee, Capt. B. L. Posey. Baker's Bri- gade, Brig-Gen. Alpheus Baker: 37th Ala., Lleut.-Col. A. A. Greene, Capt. T. J. Griffin; 40th Ala., Col. John H. Higley; 42d Ala., Lleut.-Col. T. C. Lanier, Capt. W. D. MeNeill, Capt. R. K. Wells, Capt. W. B. Kendriek; U4th Ala., Lieut.-CoL J. A. Minter. Gibon's Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Randald L. Gibson: lat La.., MJ. S. S. Batcbelor, Capt. W. H. Sparks, Liemit. C. L. IlRger, Capt. V. Quirk; 4th La., Col. S. E. Hsuter; 13th La.. Lient.-Col. F. L. Campbell; 16th and 25th La., Col. J. C. Lewli, Lient.- Col. R. H. Lindsay, Col. J. C. L1ewsl, Licut.-Col. R. IH. Lindseay; 19th La., Llent.-Col. H. A. Kennedy, Col. R. W. Turner, Capt. J. W. Jones, Capt. C. Foarooy; 20th La., Maj. S. L. Bishop, Capt. R. L. Keen, Col. Leon von Zinken. Capt. B. L. Keen, Capt. A. Dresel; 0th La., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Hbields, Capt. H. P. Jones; 4th La. Battalion, Lient.-CoL J. MeEnery, MiiJ. D3isucan B.le, Capt. W. J. Powell, Capt. T. A. Bslan1d; 14th La. Bat- taliln Sharp-sh-oters, MaJ. J. E. Austin. ARTILLESY, Col. Robert F. Beckham, Llent.-CoL J. H. Hallonquist. Co-riney's Batialina, Ma)i. A. R. C..nrtney: Ala. Battery, Capt. James Garrity, Lient. Phil. Bond, Capt. James Garrity; Conted. Battery, Capt. S. H. Dent; Te.. Battery. Lient. J. H. Biagham, Capt. J. P. Douglas. Eldridge's Baiiali-o, Maj. J. W. Eld- ridge: Ala. Battery, Capt. MeD. Oliver, Capt. W. J McKenzie; La. Battery, Capt. Charles E. Fenier; Miss. Battery, Calt. T. J. 8tanford, Lieut. J. Y. McCall. John- tans' Boailcias, Maj. J. W. Johnston, Capt. Maxc. Van D. C.orput; Ga. Battery, Capt. M.x. Van D. Corput, Lieut. W. S. Hoge, Lieut. M. L. MeWhorter; Ga. Battery, Capt. J. B. Rowan; Tents. Battery, Capt. L. G. Marshall. Wiliianst' (or Kolb') Battali-: Ala. Bat'y, Capt. E. F. Kolb, Lieut. P. F. Power; Miss. Bat'y, Capt. Put. Dar- den; Va. Bat'y, Capt. Wm. C. Jefress, Lieut. B. B. Todd. CAVALRY CORPS, Maj.-Oan. Joseph Wheeler. MARTIN'8 DIVIION, Maj.-Gen. W. T. Martin. Browaa's (or Alke') Brigde, Brig.-Gen. Johis T. Morgan, Brig.-Gen. Wlliam W. Allen: Ist Ala., MaJ. A. H. Johnson, Lient.-Col. D. T. Blakey; 3d Ala., Col. T. H. Mtuldin, Col. James Htagan; 4th Ala., Col. A. A. Russell; 7th Ala., Col. James C. Malone, Catit. George Mason; list Ala., ('ol. M. L.. Kirkpatriek; 12th Ala. Batt'n, Capt. W. S. Reese. Ie-r.o'Brigade, Brlg.- Gen. Alfred Iverion:lst Ga., Col. S. W. Davitte; 2d Ga., Col. C. C. Crews, Mmi. J. W. Mayo, Col. C. C. Crew.; 3d Ga., Col. B. Thompon; 4th Ga., Col 1. W. Avery, Mis. A. R. Stewart, CoL I. W. Avery; 6tb Ga., Col. J. R. Hart. KELLY'S DIVISoN, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Kelly. AUen' (or Aslero's) Brigae, BRig.-Gen. Williuai WV. Allen, Brig.-Ueu. R. H. Andersolm, Col. Edward Blrd: 3d Cosifed., Cot. P. H. Rice, ILieut.-Col. John MeCaskill; 8th Confed., Lleut.-Col. J. S. Pratber; loth Conted., Col. C. T. Goode, Capt. T. G. Holt, Capt. W. J. Va-,n; 12th Cotfed., Capt. C. H. Conner; 5th Ga., MaJ. R. J. Davant, Jr., Col. Edward Bird. Dibrell's Brigade, Brig.-Geu. George G. Dibrell: 4th Tenn., Col. W . S. MeLcmvore; 8th Teon., Capt. 3. Leftwich; 9th Tenn.. Col. J. D. Biffle. Capt. J. M. Reynolds; lath Tenn., Col. W. E. DeMoss, Maj. John Minor; 11th Tenn., Col. D. W. I Hol-an. Baa- nn'. Brigade, Col. M. W. Han....: 92d Ala., Lieut.-Col. J. F. Galnes; 24th Ala. Batt'n. Maj. R. B. Snodgrnas. UnoEa's DIVI8giN, Brig.-Gen. W. Y. C. litine. Bare' (o-d) Brigade, Col. J. T. Wheeler, Col. It. M. Ashby: 1st Tc.n., MaJ. J. J. Dobbins, Col. J. T. Wheeler; 2d Tenn., Capt. J. H. Kushn. Capt. W. M. Smith; 6th Tenn., Col. G. W. McKenzie; 9th Tenn., MaJ. J. H. Akin, Capt. J. W. Greene. MaJ. J. EI. Akiim. Bareio' Bri- gade, Col. Thoma HIarrison: 3d Ark., Col. A. W. Hub- Rin; 4th Tena., Lient.-C40. P. F. Anderson; 8th Tex., Lieut.-Col. Gustave Cook, Maj. S. P. Christian, Lieut.- Col. Gutave Cook; 11th Tex., C.L G. R. Reeves. Grig- by's (or iliamss) Brig-Ie, Col. J. Warren Grigahy, Brig.-Gen. John S. Williams: Ust Ky., Ci'. J. R. Butler, Lienit.-Co. J. W. Griffith, Cot. J. R. Butler; 2d Ky., Mai. T. W. Lewis; 9th Ky., cot. W. C. P. Breekinridie; 2d Ky. Batt'n, Capt. J. B. Dorteh; Allison's Squadron, Capt. J. H. Allison; Hamilton' Batt'n, MnJ. Jo. Shaw. SODDET'S COMx.M;D. Brtg.-Gen. P. D. REddey. (The only mention of Roddey In the reports of this time speaks of his having a40e men.) ARTILLERY, Lieut.-Col. Felix It. Robertson, Mat. James Hamilton: Ark. Battery, Lieut. J. P. Bryant, Lient. J. W. Cahaway; Ga. Battery , Ferrell'a, one section., Lieut. W. B. S. Dawis; Tent,. Battery, Capt. B. F. White, Iieut. A. Pne, Capt. B. F. White; Tenn. Battery. Lieut. D. B. Ramsey; Ten.. Battery, Capt. A. L. Huggins. ENGtNEER TROOPS. Lteut.-CoI. S. W. Preti an. POLK'S (or STEWART'S) CORPS, ARMY OF MISSIS- SIPPI, Lleut.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, bfikj.-Gen. W. W. Loring, Lieut.-C.- A. P. Stewart. Maj.-Gne. B. F. Cheatham, LieuIt.-(en. A. P. Stewart. EsCort: Orleans Light Horse, Capt. L. Greeffleaf. LORING'S DIVISIN-, MIaj.-C.en. W. W. Loring. Brig.-Gen. 'V. S. Featherston, Mau.-Gen. W. W. Loring. Escort: B. 7th Tenn. Cay., Capt. J. P. Rassell. eth -eriaa'. Brigade. Brig.-G-.n. W. S. Featu-tr.o.. Col. RHbert [owry, Brig.-Gen. W. S. Feathersti: lIi Miss., MnJ. M. S. Aleomr; 3d Mi. Col. T. A. Melton. Lleut.-C0l. F. M. Dyer; 22d Miss. 55aj. Martin A. Oltis, Lielt.-CoL. H. J. Ieid, Capt. J. T. Fornhby; 31At Miss., Col. M. D. L. Stephens, LiU-t.-C.4. J. W. Drane, Li-t. William D. Show, Capt. T. J. Pulliam, Col. M. D L. Stephens; 33d Miss., CoL. J. L. Drake, Capt. 26. Jackson, 29, 292 THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. Maj. A. 1. llail; 40th Miss, ('ot. W. B. Colbert, Lient.. Col. George P. Wallaee, Capt. C. A. Hnddleston; lSt MiNs. Batt'n Sharp-shooters. Maj. (.. Stigler. Adams's Briad, Brig.-ten. John Aslanis: 6th Miss.. CoL Bobert Lowry: 14th Mis., Lieut.-Col. W. L, Do."; lath Mis-., C(,l. M. Farrell, Lieut.-Cl. J. R1 Bitord; 20th MIts., Col. William N. Brown; 21d Miss., Cot. J. M. Wells. Mj. :. W. B. Garrett; 41d Mi-., Col. Rbibard Hurrisn. ,Yacott'. Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thoma. M. Smott: 27th Ala.., Col. James. Jackson, Lient.-Col. E. MeAlexander; 35th Ala., V'a. S. S. Ivee; 49th Ala.,l Lieut.4'ol. J. D. Weeden, Capt. W. B. Beeson; 55th Ala., Col. JohnI Snodgra-, Maj. J. B. Diekey; 57th Al.., Col. C. J. L Conlughanl, Lieut.-t'ol. W. C. Bethune, Capt. A. L, Milligan. Maj. J. H. Wiley; 12th La., Col. N. L, Nelon, Capt. E. MeN. (Gr'.lham. FHaNCel's DIVIsIoN. Mau.-Gen. Su-ni l (G. F'renh. ltror'aBrlgasleBrig.-(-n. M. D. Eetor, Brig.-tGen. Wim. 11. Youtng: 29th N. C., ,ieut.-Col. B. S. Proffitt; 3S9th N. C., 'ol. 1). (CI.man; 9th Tex., CoL. Willi.a H. Young, 31td. J. H. MtReyoalid.; loth Tex. 1dis,1ounted eav.), Col. C. B. Eurp; 14th Tex. (dilnmoUoted ray.v. Col. J. L. Cump; 32ds Tex. idimouunted ca-v., Col. J. A. Andrew; Jaiues's RItttalion. M.aO. J. Jaques. ( okrmira Brigade, Brig.4-,-1. F. M. Ciekrell, Col. Elijah (iltem, Brig.-Gen. F. M. C'okreil: lst and 3d Mo. (dtintountl ea.), Col. Elijah irtes., Lieut.-CoI. D. T. Mamuela, Col. Eliah (lutes; let and 4th Mo., Cot. A. C. Riley, Lleut.-Col. H. A. Garland; id and 6th M,,., 'ol. P. C. Flournoy; 3d and sth Mo., Co,. Janes MWC own. rs's Brigade, CoL W. S. Barry, Brig.-41e.. C. W. Sear-: 4th Miss., Col. T. N. Adaire; 35th Mis.. i'ieut.-Col. R. It. Shotwell. Col. W. S. Barry; 36th MSI., ('C1. W. W. Witherepoon; 39th ties., Licnt.-C.o. W. E. Rose, Maj. R. J. Durr; 46th MIss., Col. W. H. (lark; 7th Mis-. Batt',n, Capt. W. A. Trotter, Calt. J. D. Harris. (ANTEY'S :i,r WALTHALLVSi DIVISION, Brig.-sen. James Cautey, MaJ..Gen. E. C. Watthati. Qaarles' Britgad. Brig.-(;e.. William A. Qutarlee: lst Al. . Cit. S. L Knox; 42d Teun., Col. I"aa! N. IHulme, Capt. A. M. Duncan; 46th and 25th Ten,.. Col. ]. .A. Owelie, Lieut.-Coi. 51. B. Blac k; 48th T, im., Lieut.-Col. A. S. (lodwin. Lmeoit.-Cul H. (G. Evans; 49th Teni., Col. W. F. Yiiong, Capt. T. 11. Snith, Maj. T. M. Atkins; 52d Tenn.. Col. J. B. White. Maj. William C. Riehardson. Cupt. J. J. Ritteubury, Capt. S. C. Orr. Reyaoldse. B.i- gtlde. Brig.-Gen. D. H. Reynolds: let Ark. Mounted tifles (dis mteti, Lient.-Co.L M. . G(allway, Capt. J. S5. Perry, Capt. R. P. Parks; 24 Ark. Mounted Rifd-i iItie....ntcd). LieJt..Col. J. T. SmIth. Capt. W. E. John- son. Muj. J. P. Eagle: 4th Ark., Col. H. (G. Bunn, Capt. A. Kile, Maj. J. A. Res; 9th Ark., Lletit.-Cal. J. W. Roger.. MaJ. J. C. Bratton,; 25th Ark., Lieut.C.ol. Ell HuNftedler. Mi1t. L, L Notes, Capt. IL C. Woodson; Gthiilso.'. Brigade, Col. Job. Meuirk; Youngilood's Battalion,2 MSIl. Yo xgblood. Caaicy's Brgade, Col. V. S. Murphey, Col. E. A. O'Neal: 17th Ala., CoL V. S. Murphey, MaJ. T. J. Iurin-ett. Capt. T. A. MeCane; 26th Al... Cul. E. A. O'Ncal. Ms.). D. F. Bryan; 29th Ala., Col. J. F. Coniley. Capt. J. A. Foster; 37th Miss., Col. 0. S. Iolland Li.uet.-Col. W. W. Wier, Maj. S. H. Terral. ABTILLERY. Lieut.-Col. S. C. Williams. WVaddelrs Belia: Ala. Buttery, Capt. W. D. Emery; Conulid.tai in July, uder C,.l. S. S. Ives. Ala. Battery, Lieut. F. A. O'Ncat, Capt. R. H. Bellamr; Mo. Battery, Capt. 0. W'. Barret, Lieut. Willtam Brow,. Myriek's BalttaliS, MaJ. J. D. Myriek: Lu. Battery, Capt. A. Bousnehauss, Lieut. E. (. L[gemidre; MIs. Battery, Capt. J. J. Cownu, Lieut. Gi. It. Tompkins; Tenn. Battery, Capt. R. L, Barry, Liet. R. L. Watkins. Bter.'. Battalio, Ma.J. George 8. Sturrm: Ala. Battery, Capt. John J. Ward, Llent. U. W. Weaver; Mts. Battery, Capt. J. A. Hloskins; Mo. Battery, Capt. Henlry (inibor, Lient. A. W. Harris, Sergt. Raymond Burke. Ps'tows (or Trewharfs) Battalion, MaJ. BW. C. Preston, MaJ. D. Triuehurt: Ala. Battery, Lient. C. W. Lo-elaue; Al. Battery, Lii-.t. Seth Sheperd, Capt. E. Tnrrant; Miss. Battery, Capt. J. H. Yates. CAVALRY DIVISION. Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson. Arslstr.Wig Brigade, Brig.-Gen. F. C. Armstrong: let Mis.., Cat. B. A. Pinson; 2d Mtiss., MaJ. J. J. Perry; 28th Miss., Mqs. J. T. MeBie, Col. P. B. Ntarke; BtIleutihews Miss., Capt. I. E. Porter, t Weut..C'il. '. C. tax.wel;l A, let Coaled. (Escort), Capt. JunuiaB Ruiin. oes.'. Brigade. Brig.-Gen. L. S. RBss; 1st Tex. Legion, Ct.. E. Rt. Hawkins; 3d Tex., Lient.-Col. J. S. Boggess; elb Tex., LtAeut.-Col. Peter F. RBus; '3th Tex., Col. D. W. Jones, Capt. H. C. Dial `'ergasas'a Brigade, Brig.-G-en. S. W. FergniionCot.W. Boyle: 2d Alu., tCo. John N.Carpenter; W6th Ala., Col. W. Boytee. Lieut.-'ol. Willia... Martn; 9th Mis.., Col. H. H. Miller; 11th Miss., Cii. R. 0. Pemr ; 12th Mis. Batt'n, Col. U t. Inge., Capt. (-. F. Peek. Artill-ry, Capt. John 'attee: (Ia. Battery, Capt. Ed. Croft, Lieut. A. J. Young; Mo. Battery, Capt. uone- to,, King; 14. C. Battery, Lieut. R. B. Waddell. FIRST DIVISION GEORGIA MILITIA, Maj.-Gmn. Guetavus W. Smith (who hbe supplied the following paragraph): First Brigade, Brtig.-Gen. R. W. Carewell: lst Regt.. Ciii. E. U. Pottle; 2d Rtegt., Col. C. D. Anderson: 6th Regt., Col. S. S. Stafford; let Batt'., Liut.-CoI. H. K. MeCay. Seond BrlOgd Brig.-Gsen. P. J. Phillips: 3d Regt., Cal. Q. M6. Hilt; 4th Rlegt., Col R. MeMiltai; 6th Regt., Cot. J. W. Barney; Artillery BAttUlon, ('si. C. W. Styles. Third Brigad, Brig.-(.en. C. D. Atederson. Fourth Brigode, BrHg.-tten. H. K. MeCay. (The Third and Fonrtth Brigadee were forineul after the Reserves joined, during the sieee of Atlant". The organizations of these two brigades are not found in I amiy accessible data.) t Lossis. Accoarding to the report of Mi'dtea Director A. J. Fouard (Ie Johnbto.- 1 Narrative-" pp. 576-178, the losse of the Confederate Army in the Atlanta cam- paign amounted to 3044 killed, 18.952 wounded = 21,996. The prisoners inetluding duess-reter captured by the Union Anny (See Sihermant' 1' Memoirs." Vol. It., p. 124), numbered 12,983. whieh gives 34.979 as the ggregate loss of the Confederate Army. (Major E. C. Dawi's of C(- cinnati, who has made a special stody of the subJect, estiilates the Contederate loss at about 4e,6n8, and thi- Union loss at about the saanu.) For statemento relative to the strength of the Coafetl- erate army In the Atlanta ranipaig see .General John- ston'. paper, p. 260, and Major E. C. Dawen's continents, p. 2si. 2 Ten.ierarily attsctic, July 28. THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. BY LIVER 0. HlOWAR.D, .MAJOR-GENERAL, V. S. A. THE forces under General Grant after his appointment as general-in-chief were, the Army of the Potomac, under Meade; that of the Ohio, near Knoxville, under Schofield; J that of the Cumberland, under Thomas, I near Chattanooga; that of the Tennessee, under McPherson, scattered from Huntsville, Alabama, to the Mississippi; that of the Gulf, under Banks, in Louisiana; besides subordinate detachments, under Steele and others, in Arkansas and farther west. Grant took the whole field into his thought. He made three parts to the long, irregular line of armies, which extended from Virginia to Texas. He gave to Banks the main work in the south-west; to Sherman the middle part, covering the hosts of McPherson, Thomas, Schofield, and Steele; and reserved to himself the remainder. The numbers were known, at least on paper; the plan, promptly adopted, was simple and comprehensive: To break and keep broken the connecting links of the enemy's opposing armies, beat them one by one, and unite for a final consummation. Sherman's part was plain. Grant's plan, flexible enough to embrace his own, afforded Sherman "iinfinite satis- faction." It looked like " enlightened war." He rejoiced at " this verging to a common center." "Like yourself," he writes to Grant, "you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty cooperation." Sherman made his calculations so as to protect most faithfully our line of supply which ran through Louisville, Nashville, and Chattanooga, guarding it against enemies within and without his boundaries, and against accidents. He segregated the men of all arms for this protection. Block-houses and intrenchments were put at bridges and tunnels along the railway. Loco- ) General John M. Schofield succeeded General General George H. Thomas succeeded Gen- John G. Foster in the command of the Depart- eral W. S. Rosecrans in command of the Depart- ment, and Army, of the Ohio, February 9th, ment, and Army, of the Cumberland, October 1864.-EDITORS. 19th, 1863.-EDITORS. 298 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. motives and freight cars were gathered in, and a most energetic force of skilled railroad men was put at work or held in reserve under capable chiefs. Besides an equal number of guards of his large depots and long line of sup- ply, Sherman had an effective field force of 100,000,- 50,000 with Thomas, 35,000 with MePherson, 15,000 with Schofield. Sherman was gratified at the number of his force; for two years before, he had been held up as worthy of special distrust because he had declared to Secretary Cameron that before they were done with offensive operations on the line from the Big Sandy to Paducah, 200,000 men would be required. A few changes of organization were made. Slocum's corps, the Twelfth, and mine, the Eleventh, were consolidated, making a new Twentieth, and Hooker was assigned to its command. I went at once to Loudon, east Ten- nessee, to take the Fourth Corps and relieve General Gordon Granger, to enable him to have a leave of absence. Slocum was sent to Vicksburg, Mis- sissippi, to watch the great river from that quarter; while Hooker, Palmer, and myself, under Thomas, were to control the infantry and artillery of the Army of the Cumberland. In a few days I moved Wagner's (afterward Newton's) division and T. J. Wood's of my new corps to Cleveland, east Tennessee. Rations, clothing, transportation, and ammunition came pouring in with sufficient abundance, so that when orders arrived for the next move- ment, on the 3d of May, 1864, my division commanders, Stanley, Newton, and Wood, reported everything ready. This very day Schofield's column, com- ing from Knoxville, made its appearance at Cleveland. There was now the thrill of preparation, a new life everywhere. Soldiers and civilians alike caught the inspiration. Ringgold and Catoosa Springs, Georgia, were the points of concentration for Thomas's three corps. We of his army were all in that neighborhood by the 4th of May. It took till the 7th for McPherson to get into Villanow, a few miles to the south of us. Schofield meanwhile worked steadily south- ward from Cleveland, east Tennessee, through Red Clay, toward Dalton, Georgia. The three railway lines uniting Chattanooga, Cleveland, and Dalton foi-m an almost equilateral triangle. Dalton, its south-east vertex, was the center of the Confederate army, under Joseph E. Johnston. Push- ing out from Dalton toward us at Catoosa Springs, Johnston occupied the famous pass through Taylor's Ridge, Buzzard-Roost Gap, and part of the ridge itself; and held, for his extreme outpost in our direction, Tunnel Hill, near which our skirmish-line and his first exchanged shots. His northern lines ran along the eastern side of the triangle, between Dalton and Red Clay. Johnston, according to his official return for April, had a force of 52,992. At Resaca, a few days later, after the corps of Polk had joined him, it num- bered 71,235.4 Our three field armies aggregated then, in officers and men, 98,797, with 254 pieces of artillery. The Confederate commander had about the same number of cannon. McPherson had thus far brought to Sherman but 24,465 men. 4 See the artiele by Major E. C. Dawes, p. 281.-EDITORS. 294 9 0 F1S4CCPC3 Fly THU Itt " ZZEM1 T. A 0 ' 296 'k THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. When the Army of the Cumberland was in line, facing the enemy, its left rested near Catoosa Springs, its center at Ringgold, the railway station, and its right at Leet's Tan-yard. My corps formed the left. Catoosa Springs was a Georgia watering-place, where there were several large buildings, hotel and hoarding-houses, amid undulating hills, backed by magnificent mountain scenery. Here, on the mnornilig of the 6th, I met Thomas and Shermnall. Sherman had a habit of dropping in and explaining in a happy way what he purposed to do. At first he intended that Thomas and Schofield should simply breast the enemy and skirmish with him onl the west and north, while McPherson, coming from Alabama, was to strike the Atlanta railroad at least ten miles below Resaca. McPherson, failing in getting some of his troops back from furlough, was not now deemed strong enough to operate alone; hence he was brought to Chattanooga instead, and sent thence to Villanlow, soon after to pass through the Snake Creek Gap of Taylor's Ridge, all the time being kept near enough the other armies to get help from them in case of emergency. By this it was ardently hoped by Sherman that McPherson might yet succeed in getting upon Johnston's communications near Resaca. Thomas here urged his own views, which were to give Schofield and McPher- son the skirmishing and demonstrations, while he (Thomas), with his stronger army, should pass through Snake Creek Gap and seize Johnston's communi- cations. He felt sure of victory. Sherman, however, hesitated to put his main army twenty miles away beyond a mountain range on the enemy's line, lest he should thereby endanger his own. He could not yet afford an exchange of base. Still, in less than a week, as we shall see, he ran even a greater risk. Early in the day, May 7th, the Fourth Corps, arranged for battle, was near a small farm-house in sight of Tunnel Hill. Two divisions, Stanley's and Newton's, abreast in long, wavy lines, and the other, Wood's, in the rear, kept on the qiti vive to prevent surprises, particularly from the sweep of country to the north of us. The front and the left of the moving men were well protected by infantry skirmishers. It was a beautiful picture - that army corps, with arms glistening in the morning light, ascending the slope. By 8 o'clock the few rifle-shots had become a continuous rattle. First we saw far off, here and there, puffs of smoke, and then the gray horsemen giv- ing back and passing the crest. Suddenly there was stronger resistance, artillery and musketry rapidly firing upon our advance. At 9 o'clock the ridge of Tunnel Hill bristled with Confederates, mounted and dismounted. A closer observation from Stanley's field-glass showed them to be only horse artillery and cavalry supports. In a few moments Stanley's and Newton's men charged the hill at a run and cleared the ridge, and soon beheld the enemy's artillery and cavalry galloping away. " The ball is opened," Stanley called out, as I took my place by his side to study Taylor's Ridge and its "Rocky Face," which was now in plain sight. We beheld it, a craggy eleva- tion of about five hundred feet, extending from a point not far north of us, but as far as the eye could reach southward. Its perpendicular face presented a formidable wall and afforded us no favorable door of entrance. [See also article, p. 278.] 206 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. Thomas's three corps, Palmer occupying the middle and Hooker the right, were now marehed forward till my men received rifle-shots from the heights, Palmer's a shower of them from the defenders of the gap, and Hooker's a more worrisome fusillade from spurs of the ridge farther south. Thomas could not sit down behind this formidable wall and do nothing. How could he retain before him the Confederate host Only by getting into closer contact. On the 8th I sent Newton some two miles northward, where the ascent was not so abrupt. He succeeded by rushes in getting from cover to cover, though not without loss, till he had wrested at least one-third of the " knife edge" from those resolute men of gray. Quickly the observers of this sharp contest saw the bright signal flags up there in motion. Stanley and Wood gave Newton all possible support by their marksmen and by their efforts to land shells on the ridge. The enemy's signals were near Newton. He tried hard to capture them, but failed. In the night two pieces of artillery, after much toil, reached the top, and soon cleared away a few hundred yards more of this territory in bloody dispute. On May 9th Thomas put forth a triple effort to get nearer his foe. First, Stanley's division , reconnoitered Buzzard-Roost Gap into the very "jaws of death," till it drew the fire from newly discovered batteries, and set whole lines of Confederate musketry- MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. PALMER. supports ablaze. At this time I had a FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. narrow escape. Stanley, Captain G. C. Kniffin of his staff, several other officers, and myself were ii a group, watching a reconnoissance. All sup- posed there were no Confederate sharp-shooters near enough to do harm, when whiz came a bullet which passed through the group; Kniffin's bat was pierced, three holes were made in my coat, and a neighboring tree was struck. Thomas now made a second effort. Palmer sent Morgan's brigade up one of the spurs south of the gap. It encountered the hottest fire, and suffered a considerable loss in killed and wounded. One regiment drove back the enemy's first line, and, like Newton's men, came within speaking distance of their opponents. Here arose the story to the effect that a witty corporal proposed to read to them the President's Emancipation Proclama- tion, and that they kept from firing while he did so. Still farther south, with Hooker's Twentieth Corps, and almost beyond our hearing, Thomas made his third push. In this action fifty were reported killed, and a larger number wounded; among them every regimental commander engaged. Similarly, but with easier approaches than ours, Schofield kept John- ston's attention at the east and north. Such was the demonstration, while McPherson was making his long detour through Villanow, Snake Creek ff_ IV. 20 297 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. PlARtT OF' TH BA -LltFI1K1. OF UF4A(4A, FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTIWMAiPH Gap, and out into Sugar Valley. He found the gap unoccupied; and so, with Kilpatrick's small cavalry detachment ahead, I followed closely by Dodge's Sixteenth Corps, with Logan's Fifteenth well closed up, he emerged from the mountains on the morning of the 9th, at the eastern exit. Immediately there was excitement -the cavalry advance stumbled upon Confederate cavalry, which had run out from Resaca to watch this doorway. Our cavalry followed up the retreating Confederates with dash and persist- ency, till they found shelter behind the deep-cut works and guns at Resaca. In plain view of these works, though on diffieult ground, Logan and Dodge pressed up their men, under orders from McPherson "to drive back the enemy and break the railroad." And pray, why were not these plain orders carried out I McPherson answers in a letter that night sent to Sherman: "They [probably Polk's men] displayed considerable force and opened on us with artillery. After skirmishing [among the gulches and thickets] till uearly dark, and finding that I could not succeed in cutting the railroad before dark, or in getting to it, I decided to withdraw the command and take up a position for the night between Sugar Valley and the entrance to I Lieutenant James Oates wrote to the editors on July Sth, 187, from Cincinnati, Ark., as follows: "General Howard is in error ID the above statement. On May Ist the 9th IllUnois Mounted Infantry broke camp at Decatur, Alabama, to take part in the Atlanta campaign. On the afternoon of May 9th the regiment (-ae up with General McPherson at Villano.w. Lieu- tenant-Colonel J. J. Phillips. who was in command, re- ceived orders to take the advance of the Arny of the Tennessee, and did so at once, Company IK,1 Lieuten- ant James Outes In command, taking the lead through snake Creek Gap. We advanced down into the open country of Sugar Valley On the evening of May 8th. No part of General Kilpatrick's command was there when we passed through Snake Creek Gap. On the morning of the 9th of May our regiment took the ad- vane. without any other cavalry support. The infantry was a considerable distance in the rear. Very early in the morning we engaged the Confederate cavalrylosing several men in killed and wounded-among the latter. Lieutenant-Colonel PhillIp.. The infantry came up at double-quick to our support and ended the tight. Our regiment followed up the retreating Confederates ' with dash and persistency.' It was during the advance that day that we came In contact with the Georgia Cadets from the Military Institute at Marietta, who had come out from the woods at Resaca and formed their line behind a rail fence. After a volley from the Cadets, which killed several of our men, our regiment charged them and did not give up the chase until it ran against the works at Mesaesa. 298 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. 299 the gap." At the first news Sherman was much vexed, and declared con- (cerning McPherson's failure to break the enemy's main artery: "Such an opportunity (toes not occur twice in a single life, . . . still he was per- fectly justified by his orders." Our commander, believing that Johnston would now speedily fall back to Resaea, at once changed his purpose. Leaving me at Rocky Face with the Fourth Corps and Stoneman's small division of cavalry to hold our linie of supply, Sherman pressed after McPherson the armies of Thomas and Schofield. But Johnston was not in a hurry. He terrified me for two days by his tentative movements, till our skirmishing amounted at times almost to a battle. But the night of the 12th of May he made off in one of his clean retreats. At dawn of the 13th the formidable Buzzard-Roost (Oap was open awd safe, and our men passed through. Stoneman rushed iiito the village of Dalton from the north, and the Fourth Corps, eager and rapi(d, kept close to the chasing cavalry. Not far south of Dalton we came upon a bothersome Confederate rear-guard, which made our march- ing all that long day slow and spasmodic, yet before dark my command had skirted the eastern slope of Taylor's Ridge for eighteen miles and joined skirmishers with Sherman, who was already, with MePherson, abreast of Resaca. Thus we ended the combats of Tunnel Hill and Dalton, and opened up Resaca. As soon as Johnston reached the little town of Resaca he formed a horse- shoe-shaped line, something like ours at Gettysburg. He rested Polk's corps on the Oostenaula River; placed Hardee's next, running up Milk Creek; and then curved Hood's back to strike the Connasauga River. After the EXTIREME LEFTr (VIEW LOOKXING SOItT1i) OF THE CON.FEDERAITE LIESI AT RESAICAi F A W A R- TMS IM POTOGRAPH The ouster of houses inctudes the railway tation ihe ratilway runninig gentrdli parallel ith the eiarth .-wrks here seen, which in the distance deicend to the Oostesaula River. The railway and wagon bridge. nentioned in the notes on p. 26 are 'ear the railway station i;. 'Ll - 'l IH7-t rff qVIt' .WAi\,S,9rS- W/ tW\\B- W tf i v' k 8 FS g ;/ S m l : g Tsfy - gX -r w PW wD R g. tf/t fJjW"' E"'t X fC-r i m-'- . -...i.s ,..BBa S ff.= tt ,3 ' 2 TX fWL+'L AL\X W t r z fMW - =,_1 \ ;, R _) a''8 u NW6 300 ,f4 f , THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. Confederates had thrown up the usual intrenchments, and put out one or two small advanced forts with cannon, the position was as strong as Marye's Heights had been against direct attack. We spent a part of the 14th of May creeping up among the bushes, rocks, and ravines. Early that morning, while this was going on, Sherman, who had worked - all night, was sitting on a log, with his back against a tree, fast asleep. Some men marching by saw him, and one fellow ended a slurring remark by: "A pretty way we are commanded!" Sher- man, awakened by the noise, heard the last words. " Stop, my man," he cried; 33uxvrr nnxOADmE-GRNPIULt 3BKNJIAMU UlA0rBO. " while you were sleeping, last night,FRMAPOO"K I was planning for you, sir; and now I was taking a nap." Thus, familiarly and kindly, the general gave reprimands and won confidence. McPherson rested his right upon the Oostenaula River, opposite Polk. Thomas, with the corps of Palmer and Hooker, came next; and then that brave young officer, Cox, commanding the Twenty-third Corps, against a storm of bullets and shells swung his divisions round to follow the bend in the enemy's line. I watched the operation, so as to close upon his left. T. J. Wood's division moved up in a long line, with skirmishers well out, and then Stanley's carried us to the railway. Stanley's chief-of-artillery arranged two or three batteries to keep the enemy from walking around our unprotected left. The air was full of screeching shells and whizzing bullets, coming uncomfort- ably near, while line after line was adjusting itself for the deadly conflict. Our fighting at Resaca did not effect much. There might possibly have been as much accomplished if we had used skirmish-lines alone. In McPherson's front Logan had a battery well placed, and fired till he had silenced the troublesome foes on a ridge in his front; then his brave men, at a run, passed the ravine and secured the ridge. Here Logan intrenched his corps; and Dodge, abreast of him, did the same. Afterward, McPherson seized another piece of ground across Camp Creek, and held it. During the evening of the 14th a vigorous effort was made by Polk to regain this outpost, but he was repulsed with loss. The detailed account gives great credit to Generals Charles R. Woods, Giles A. Smith, and J. A. J. Lightburn. One hundred prisoners and 1300 Confed- erates hors de combat were on Logan's list. This work forced Johnston to lay a new bridge over the Oostenaula. The divisions of Absalom Baird, R. W. Johnson, Jefferson C. Davis, and John Newton plunged into the thick- ets and worked their way steadily and bravely into the reentrant angles on Hardee's front. Schofield's right division, under Judah, had a fearful 30l THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. struggle, losing six hundred men; the others, coming to its help, captured and secured a part of the enemy's intrenchments. Hood assailed my left after :3 P. ii. The front attack was repulsed, but heavy columnns came surging around Stanley's left. Everybody, battery men and supporting infantry, did wonders; still, but for help promptly rendered, Sherman's whole line, like the left of Wellington's at Waterloo, would soon have been rolled up and displaced. But Colonel Morgan of my staff, who had been sent in time, lbrought up Will- iamns's division from Hooker's corps as quickly as men could march. Stanley's brave artillerymen were thus succored before they were forced to yield their ground, and Hood, disappointed, re- y. X l L turned to his trenches. The next day, the 15th, came Hooker's attack. He advanced in a column of deployed bri- gades. Both armies watched with eager excitement this passage-at-arms. The divisions of Generals Butterfield, Will- iams, and Geary seized some trenches and cheered, but were stopped before Mit.Xl UR-6Ellt.At, F. 2. , 9 a sort of lunette holding four cannon. Fit..: A PE10TOGRIIl. The Confederates were driven from their trenches; but our men, meeting continuous and deadly volleys, could not get the guns till night. A color-bearer named Hess, of Colonel Benjamin Har- rison's brigade, while his comrades were retiring a few steps for better cover, being chagrined at the defiant yell behind him, unfurled his flag and swung it to the breeze. He was instantly killed. A witness says: "There were other hands to grasp the flag, and it came back, only to return and wave from the very spot where its former bearer fell." While the main battle was in progress, Dodge had sent a division under the one-armed Sweeny, to Lay's Ferry, a point below Resaca. Under the chief engineer, Captain Reese, he laid a bridge and protected it by a small force. Sweeny, being threatened by some Confederates crossing the liver above him, and fearing that he might be cut off from the army, suddenly drew back about a mile beyond danger. On the 15th, however, he made another attempt and was more successful; formed a bridge-head beyond the river; threw over his whole force; and fought a successful battle against Martin's Confederate cavalry, before Walker's infantry, which was hastily sent against him from Calhoun, could arrive. Besides Sweeny's division, Sherman dispatched a cavalry force over the pontoons, instructing them to make a wider detour. The operations in this quarter being successful, there was nothing left to the Confederate commander but to withdraw his whole army from Resaca. This was effected during the night of the 15th, while our 302 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. weary men were sound asleep. At the first peep of (lawn Newton's skir- mishers sprang over the enemy's intrenchments to find them abandoned. In the ensuing pursuit, Thomas, crossing the river on a floating bridge, hastily constructed, followed directly with the Fourth and the Fourteenth corps. Stanley had some sharp fighting with Stewart's Confederate division, which was acting as Johnston's rear-guard. It was, in fact, a running skirmish, that lasted till evening, at the close of which we encamped for the night near the enemy's empty works at Calhoun. Meanwhile McPherson had been marching on parallel roads to the right toward Rome, Georgia, Jefferson C. Davis's division from Thomas's army sweeping farther still to the right, and Schofield, accompanied by Hooker, to the left toward Cassville. Our enemy, between these columns with his entire force, made a brief stand on the 17th of May at Adairsville, and fortified. About 4 P. M. Newton and Wood, of my corps, Wood on the right, found the resistance constantly increasing as they advanced, till Newton's skirmishers, going at double-time through clumps of trees, awakened a heavy opposing fire. A little after this, while I was watching the developments from a high point, Sherman with his staff and escort joined me. Our showy group immediately drew upon it the fire of a battery, shells bursting over our heads with indescribable rapidity. Colonel Morgan's horse was very badly lamed; Fullerton, the adjutant-geii- eral, was set afoot, and several horses of the escort were killed or crippled. Captain Bliss, of Newton's staff, had one shoulder-strap knocked off by a frag- ment, which bruised him badly. The skirmishing of Newton and Wood kept increasing. In fact, both parties, though desiring to avoid a general battle, nevertheless reinforced, till the fiing amounted to an engagement. It was not till after 9 o'clock that the rattling of the musketry had diminished to the ordinary skirmish, and the batteries had ceased, except an occasional shot, as if each were trying to have the last gun. The losses in my command in this combat were about two hundred killed and wounded. The morning of the 18th found the works in front of Adairsville with few reminders that an army had been there the night before. Hooker and Schofield had done the work. John- ston's scouts during the night brought him word that a large Federal force was already far beyond his right near Cassville, threatening his main cross- ing of the Etowah; and also that McPherson was camping below him at McGuire's Cross-roads, and that our infantry (Davis's division) was already in sight of the little town of Rome, where, under a weak guard, were foundries and important mills. We began now to perceive slight evidences of our opponent's demoralization. I captured a regiment and quite a large number of detached prisoners. The whole number taken, including many commissioned officers, was about four thousand. The rapidity with which the badly broken railroad was repaired seemed miraculous. We had hardly left Dalton before trains with ammunition and other supplies arrived. While our skirmishing was going on at Calhoun, the locomotive whistle sounded in Resaca. The telegraphers were nearly as rapid: the lines were in order to Adairsville on the morning of the 18th. While we 303 of 4 s1! Ad ISC S A:XS [ fat'''aS k X ta'ssMakS 3 4 t X a g--XwAY- X sX -W-A ; t 804 a 442 I .1. THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. were breaking up the State arsenal at Adairsville, caring for the wounded and bringing in Confederate prisoners, word was telegraphed from Resaca that bacon, hard-bread, and coffee were already there at our service. Johnston, by his speedy night-work, passed on through Kingston, and formed an admirable line of battle in the vicinity of Cassville, with his back to the Etowah River, pro- tecting the selected crossing. This was his final halt north of that river, so difficult with its mountain banks. Johnston re- mained here to obstruct and dis- pute our way one day only, for Schofield and Hooker had pene- trated the forests eastward of him so far that Hood, still on John- I ston's right, insisted that the Yan- kees were already beyond him and in force. Upon this report, about which there has since been much contro- versy, Johnston ordered a prompt withdrawal. The morning of the 21st of May, bright and clear, NAJOR-O333kL JACOB D. COX. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. showed us a country picturesque ill its natural features, with farm and woodland as quiet and peaceful as if there had been no war. So Sherman, taking up his headquarters at King- ston, a little hamlet on the railway, gave his armies three days' rest. \ A glance at the map [see p. 251] shows the Etowah flowing nearly west thirty miles from Allatoona to Rome. Sherman's headquarters at Kingston were midway. While the armies were resting, the right (Davis's division) at Rome, the left (Schofield and Hooker) near Cartersville, and the remainder at Kingston, the railroad and telegraph lines were repaired to Kingston; baggage, temporarily abandoned, came back to officers and men; necessary supplies, at the hands of smiling quartermasters and commissaries, now found us. The dead were buried, the sick and wounded were made more comfortable, and everybody got his mail and wrote letters. Meanwhile Sher- man and his army commanders were endeavoring to find the location of their enemy. Johnston was holding the region south of the Etowah, including the pass \ One of these days was Sunday. My friend E. der guard for an hour. Then he was taken to P. Smith, of the Christian Commission, afterward Sherman, who looked up from his writing and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was ringing the asked abruptly: ,hurch bell at Kingston, when Sherman, being "What were you ringing that bell for " disturbed by the ringing, sent a guard to arrest "For service. It is Sunday, General," Smith the supposed "bummer." replied. Smith, in spite of his indignant protest, was "Oh!isitt"answeredSherman. "Didn'tknow marched to Sherman's anterocm and kept un- it was Sunday. Let him go."-O. 0. H. 305 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. of Allatoona, and extended his army along the ridge of Allatoona Creek toward the south-west. He was picketing a parallel ridge in front of his line, along another creek, the Pumpkin Vine. This is substantially where we found this able and careful commander; but he pushed a little to the left and forward as we came on, till Hardee was at Dallas and Hood at New Hope Church. Our march was resumed on the morning of the 24th of May, Thomas crossing on his own pontoons south of Kingston; Ibooker, contrary to the plan, went in advance of Kehofield's column over a bridge at Milam's, east of Kingston; Davis, being at Rome, went straight forward from that place, and McPherson did the same from his position, laying his bridges so as to take the road to Van Wert. Stoneman's cavalry covered the left; Garrard's divi- sion was near McPherson and Davis, while Mc(ook's cleared the front for the center. The whole country between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee presented a desolate appearance, with few openings and very few farms, and those small and poor; other parts were covered with trees and dense under- brush, which the skirmishers had great difficulty in penetrating. Off the ordinary "hog-backs" one plunged into deep ravines or ascended abrupt steeps. There was much loose, shifting soil on the hills, and many lagoons and small streams bordered with treacherous quicksands. Very soon on May 24th the usual skirmishing with the cavalry began, but there was not much delay. Hooker, coming into Thomas's road the next morning, the 25th, led our column, taking the direct road toward Dallas. It was showery all day, and the weather and bad roads had a disheartening effect on men and animals. To relieve the situation as much as possible Thomas had my corps take advantage of country roads to the right, that would bring us into Dallas by the Van Wert route. McPherson and Davis had already come together at Van Wert. Now, suddenly, Geary's division found a bridge over Pumpkin Vine Creek on fire, and hostile cavalry behind it. The cavalry soon fled, and the bridge was repaired. Hooker, think- ing there was more force in that quarter, pushed up the road toward New Hope Church. He had gone but a short distance before he ran upon one of Hood's brigades. It was an outpost of Stewart's division, put there to create delay. Hooker soon dislodged this outpost and moved on, driving back the brigade through the woods, till he came upon the enemy's main line. The sound of cannon speedily drew Sherman to the point of danger. He immediately ordered the necessary changes. Williams's division, having passed on, faced about and came back. Butterfield's hastened up. The two divisions, each forming in parallel lines, promptly assaulted Hood's position. Again and again Hooker's brave men went forward through the forest only to run upon log-barricades thoroughly manned and protected by well-posted artillery. During these charges occurred a thunder-storm, the heaviest shower of the day. I turned to the left by the first opportune road, and deployed Newton's division to the right of Hooker by 6 P. m. The remainder of my command came up over roads deep with mud and obstructed by wagons. In the morning all the troops were at hand. On that terrible night the nearest house to the field was filled with the wounded. Torch-lights and 3ob THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. CONFEDRRATE INRRXCHMXNTS NEAR NNW HOPE CHURCH. FROM A WAR-TINS PHOTOGEAPH. candles lighted up dimly the incoming stretchers and the surgeons' tables and instruments. The very woods seemed to moan and groan with the voices of sufferers not yet brought in. McPherson, with Davis for his left, took position at Dallas, having Logan on his right, and Garrard's cavalry still beyond. There must have been a gap of three miles between McPherson and us. Schofield was badly injured by the fall of his horse in that black forest while finding his way during the night to Sherman's bivouac, so that for a few days Cox took his command. Cox, with his Twenty-third Corps, and Palmer with the Fourteenth, swung in beyond me, as my men were moving up carefully into their usual posi- tions in line of battle. Now the enemy kept strengthening his trench-bar- ricades, which were so covered by thickets that at first we could scarcely detect them. As he did, so did we. No regiment was long in front of John- ston's army without having virtually as good a breastwork as an engineer could plan. There was a ditch before the embankment and a strong log revetment behind it, and a heavy " top-log" to shelter the heads of the men. I have known a regiment to shelter itself completely against musketry and artillery with axes and shovels, in less than an hour after it reached its position. It would only weary the reader's patience to follow up the struggle step by step from New Hope Church to the Chattahoochee. Still, these were the hardest times which the army experienced. It rained continuously for seventeen days; the roads, becoming as broad as the fields, were a series of quagmires. And, indeed, it was difficult to bring enough supplies forward from Kingston to meet the needs of the army. Sherman began to pass his 307 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. UBOON RAZ.WORKS IN NCOT Or S O BAD Ifl d NEAW. FROM A WAR-TINE PHOTOGRAMP armies to the left. First, I was sent with two divisions to attempt to strike Johnston's right. I marched thither Wood's division, supported by R. W. Johnson's, and connected with the army by Cox on my right. At Pickett's Mill, believing I had reached the extreme of the Confederate line, at 6 P. Is. of the 27th I ordered the assault. Wood encountered just such obstructions as Hooker had found at New Hope Church, and was similarly repulsed, suf- fering much loss. R. W. Johnson's division was hindered by a side-thrust from the hostile cavalry, so that we did not get the full benefit of his forward push. We believed that otherwise we should have lodged at least a brigade beyond Hindman's Confederate division. But we did what was most impor- tant: we worked our men all that weary night in fortifying. The Confed- erate commander was ready at daylight to take the offensive against us at Pickett's Mill, but he did not do so, because he found our position and works too strong to warrant the attempt. With a foot bruised by the fragment of a shell, I sat that night among the wounded in the midst of a forest glade, while Major Howard of my staff led regiments and brigades into the new position chosen for them. General R. W. Johnson had been wounded, Cap- tain Stinson of my staff had been shot through the lungs, and a large number lay there, on a sideling slope by a faint camp-fire, with broken limbs or dis- figured faces. The next day, the 28th, McPherson made an effort to withdraw from Dallas, so as to pass beyond my left; but as Hardee at the first move quickly assailed him with great fury, he prudently advised further delay. This battle 308 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. was the reverse of mine at Pickett's Mill. The enemy attacked mainly in columns of deployed regiments along the front of Dodge's and Logan's corps, and was repulsed with a dreadful loss, which Logan estimated at two thou- sand. Now, necessity pressing him in every direction, Sherman, mixing divisions somewhat along the line, gradually bore his armies to the left. The 1st of June put Stoneman into Allatoona, and on the 3d Schofield's infantry was across the railroad near Ackworth, having had a severe and successful combat en route. Being now far beyond Johnston's right, and having seized and secured the Allatoona Creek from its mouth to Ackworth, Sherman was ready, from Allatoona as a new base, to push forward and strike a new and heavy blow, when, to his chagrin, in the night of the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his works and fell back to a new line. This line ran from Brush Mountain to Lost Mountain, with "Pine Top" standing out in a salient near the middle. He also held an outpost in front of Gilgal Church abreast of Pine Top. Slowly, with skirmishes and small combats, for the most part in dense woods, we continuously advanced. On my front we seized the skirmish-holes of the enemy, made epaulements for batteries there, and little by little extended our deep ditches or log-barricades close up to Johnston's. As we settled down to steady work again, McPherson was near Brush Mountain, having pushed down the railroad. F. P. Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) from Huntsville, Alabama; had now joined him, making up for our losses, which were already, from all causes, upward of nine thousand. This accession gave heart to us all. Thomas was next, advancing and bearing away toward Pine Top, and Schofield coming up against the salient angle near Gfilgal Church. To tell the work of these two opposing hosts in their new position is a similar story to the last. There was gallant fighting here and there all along the lines. Here it was that my batteries, opening fire under the direct instruc- tion of Sherman, drove back the enemy from the exposed intrenchments on Pine Top. It was at this time that General Polk was killed. McPherson, by overlapping Hood, skirmished heavily, and captured the 40th Alabama regi- ment entire. Schofield, brushing away the cavalry, penetrated between Lost Mountain and Gilgal Church, put his artillery on a prominent knoll, and, with rapid discharges, took Hardee in reverse. That night, the 16th of June, Johnston again went back to a new line, already prepared, just behind Mud Creek. Our troops, being on the alert, followed at once with great rapidity. Just where the old lines joined the new (for Johnston's right wing was unchanged), I saw a feat the like of which never elsewhere fell under my observation. Baird's division, in a compara- tively open field, put forth a heavy skirmish-line, which continued such a rapid fire of rifles as to keep down a corresponding hostile line behind its well- constructed trenches, while the picks and shovels behind the skirmishers fairly flew, till a good set of works was made four hundred yards distant from the enemy's and parallel to it. One of my brigades (Harker's), by a rush, did also a brave and unusual thing in capturing an intrenched and well-defended line of the enemy's works and taking their defenders captive. Again, another (Kirby's 309 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. CON9EDKXATE WORKS ON THE MOUTH BANK OF THU CHATTAHOOCHRL PRON A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH. brigade), having lost Bald Hill in a skirmish, retook it by a gallant charge in line, under a hot fire of artillery and infantry, and intrenched and kept it. Hood, who had been massed opposite McPherson, made a forced night- mareb, and suddenly appeared on the other flank fronting Schofield and Hooker. With his known method of charging and firing, he delivered there a desperate attack on the 22d of June. After a hard battle he was repulsed with heavy loss. This was the " Battle of Culp's Farm." Here it was that Hooker received a reproof from Sherman for an exaggerated dispatch, which inferentially, but wrongly, blamed Schofield. Hooker was ever after incensed at Sherman. Again, by the gradual pressure against Johnston's right and left, Sherman forced him to a new contraction of his lines. This time it was the famous Kenesaw position that he assumed. With his right still at Brush Mountain, he extended a light force over the crest of the Kenesaws, and placed a heavier (one along the southern slope, reaching far beyond the Dallas and Marietta road. He drew back his left and fortified. The whole line was stronger in artificial contrivances and natural features than the cemetery at Gettysburg. The complete works, the slashings in front, and the difficulties of the slope toward us under a full sweep of cross-fire made the position almost impregnable. For reasons similar to those which influenced Lee to strike twice for Little Round Top, Sherman ordered an assault here with the hope of carrying the southern slope of Kenesaw, or of penetrating Johnston's long front at some General Hooker signaled to General Sherman, on the evening of June 22d, that he [Hooker] was uneasy about his right flank, which Schofield had been ordered to protect.- EDITORS. 310 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. weak point. Schofield, well southward, advanced and crossed Olley's Creek, and kept up enough fire and effort to hold a large force in his front. Mc- Pherson, on the left, did the same, a serious engagement being sustained by Logan's corps advancing straight against the mountain. Logan lost heavily from the trenches in his front, and from artillery that raked his men as they advanced. Seven regimental commanders fell, killed or wounded. But the dreadful battle, hard to describe, was left to Thomas. He commanded two attacks, one opposite the Confederate General Loring's , left, the other in front of Cheatham. Newton's division led my attack, and Davis that of Palmer. Like Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, the movement was preceded by a heavy cannonade. Then our skirmishers sprang forward and opened; atied quickly the enemy's skirmish-line was drawn back to their main work. Harker, commanding one brigade, led his column rapidly over the open ground. Wagner did the same on Harker's left, and Kimball put his brigade in close support. The enemy's fire was terrific. Our men did not stop till they had gained the edge of the felled trees; a few penetrated, to fall close to the enemy's parapet; but most sought shelter behind logs and rocks, in rifle- holes, or depressions. Harker, moving with them, cheered on his men; when they were forced to stop, he rallied them again and made a second vigorous effort, in which he fell mortally wounded. Davis's effort was like Newton's; he met the same withering fire from rifle-halls and shells. But his men managed to make a shelter, which they kept, close up to the hostile works. Here they staid and intrenched. Among those who fell were brigade com- manders Colonel Daniel McCook and Colonel 0. F. Harmon. Our losses in this assault were heavy indeed, and our gain was nothing. We realized now, as never before, the futility of direct assaults upon intrenched lines already well prepared and well manned. Plainly there was now nothing left for Sherman to do but to send his left army (McPherson's) to follow up the right (Schofield's) across Olley's Creek, and force his cavalry to Sandtown and the Chattahoochee far below John- ston's force. The first sign, namely, McPherson's starting, and Schofield's boldness, set the Confederates again in motion. On the morning of the 3d of July Sherman turned his spy-glass to the Kenesaw crest, and saw our pick- ets " crawling up the hill cautiously." The strong works were found vacant. Johnston had made new breastworks six miles below, at Smyrna Camp Ground, and another complete set, by the labor of slaves and new levies, where the railway crosses the Chattahoochee. Thomas, taking up the pur- suit, followed his enemy through Marietta and beyond. My command skir- mished up to the Smyrna works during the 3d. The next day Sherman paid us a Fourth of July visit. He could not at first believe that Johnston would make another stand north of the river. " Howard," he said to me, " you are mistaken; there is no force in your front; they are laughing at you! " We were in a thinnish grove of tall trees, in front of a farm-house. " Well, General," I ) General Loring remained with his division in sissippi was ordered to Johnston. Polk, with Lor- the Denartment of Mississippi and East Louisiana ing's division,reachedResaca May 1th. June l4th, until the Atlanta campaign was fairly opened by Polk having been killed, Loring succeeded tempo- Sherman's advance, when all the infantry in Mis- rarily to the command of the corps.-EDITORS. 311 A Sil 312 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. replied, " let us see." I called Stanley, whose division held the front. " General, double your skirmishers and press them." At once it was done. The lines sped forward, capturing the outlying pits of the enemy, and took many pris- oiners; but a sheet of lead instantly came from the hidden works in the edge of the wood beyond us, and several unseen batteries hurled their shot across our lines somie of them reaching our grove and forcing us to retire. Slier- malt, as he rode away, said that I had been correct in my report. While we kept the Confederates busy by skir- muishiiig and battery firing, a set of demonstrations to the north and south of us finally resulted in gaining cross- ings of the river' at Roswell, Soap Creek, Powers's and Paice's ferries. Schofield effected the first crossing by pushing out from Soap Creek boats loaded witlh neil, crossing quickly, and surprising the Confederate cav- alry and eannon in his front. This was (lone on the 9th of July. As soon as Johnston knew of it, he left his ex- cellent works near the Chattahoochee, burned his bridges, and hastened his retreat to Atlanta. The weather had become good, and there was great ani- ination and manifest joy on our side. It was gratifying to escape from such fastnesses and dismal forests as those tfN4'ttAI att8RItt I EAOQtAtARTFRS AT TIt Hw`A4ARIt tIUt.SE, IN FRONt;T ItW ATLANTA. FR..M A SKLTItTI MAIDE AT TIM TIM1F. Ilt hii9 " t-tttirt" I,, net ti Shera to y tnhatt oin jttlt 21st (the day 1tfore G4e-terat MePh-l Il s killedti xbitte he t'he-Roia) Evl at the ht ati of Sehotiltd's trtosps, expeet ing that the ennemy wobtld evoettate., e- Mherson atd his staff rule tip. "W We wnt hitk," he lttys, 'to the Itowart- ltot--e, a doahie fdt-b m-httitd- tiog with a Itre.b, and sat on the Steps isgllitt thte htaotee. of hatte., atat ttooI's generat etaraeter. MePhevrsto tad alo tteent of the amte ehss at WVest which had hampered us for over a tatottgitto aettlly eatttts t;tirtarett month, and we now firmly believed tot tl titeh fo alhete -tile h of )t titetttitr. ir Ef that the end of the eampaign was sure. great -Intatal ttatity, ws- t Itttoubtetlly at h-ass, tie Our armies made a right wheel- Thomas, on the pivot, taking the shortest line to Atlanta; McPherson, on the outer flank, coming by Roswell to Decatur, with Schofield between. As the several columns were crossing the famous Peach Tree Creek my corps was divided. I was sent, with Stanley and Wood, to connect with Schofield, causing a gap of two miles. Newton remained on Thomas's left; o11 Newton's right was Ward; next, Geary; then, Williams; last, Palmer's corps; all, having crossed over, were stretched out along the creek. There was at that point but little open ground, mostly woodland, and very uneven with cross-ravines. Just at this time, much to our comfort and to his surprise, Johnston was removed, and Hood placed in command of the Confederate army. Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made. Hood endeavored to carry out the plan. A. P. Stewart now had Polk's eorps, and Cheatham took Hood's. Hardee on the right and Stewart on his NOt.. TV. '21 313I THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. left, in lines that overlapped Newton's position, at 3 o'clock of the 20th of July, struck the blow. They came surging on through the woods, down the gentle slope, with noise and fulry like Stonewall Jackson's men at Chancel- lorsville. As to our men, sonie of them were protected by piles of rails, hut the most had not had time to barricade. Stewart's masses advanced successively from his right, so Newton was first assailed. His rifles and cannon, filing incessantly and with utmost steadiness, soon stopped and repulsed the front attack; but whole battalions went far east of him into the gap be- fore described. Thomas, behind the creek, was watching ; he turned some re- served batteries upon those Con- federate battal- ions, and fired his shells into SPRAGUE''r.gS lURlAf:I P1TtMNG Tl. W TRAINS OF SITERMAN'" ARMYN sAT thethicketsthat 111..IW A -KVTI A"' TR TII.E bordered the deep creek, sweeping the creek's valley as far as the cannon could reach. This was sufficient; in his own words, "it relieved the hitch." The hostile flankers broke back in confusion. In succession, Ward, G4eary, Williams, and Palmer received the on-coming waves, and though their ranks were shaken in places, they each made a strong resistance, andl soon rolled the Confederates back, shattered and broken. Hardee would have resumed the assault, but an order from Hood took away a whole division (Cleburne's), for McPherson was too rapidly approaching Cheatham and the defenses of Atlanta from the east. The battle of the 20th did not end till Gresham's division, on McPherson's left, had gone diagonally toward Atlanta, sweeping the hostile cavalry of Wheeler before it past the Augusta railroad, and skirmishing up against an open knob denominated Bald Hill. General Gresham, a fine officer, was severely wounded during his brisk movement. Wheeler had made a des- perate and successful stand here, and soon after, in the evening, the division (Cleburne's) which was taken from Newton's sorely handled front was brought hither and put into the trenches, in order to make secure the right of Hood's line. The Bald Hill was an important outpost. The 21st, a fearfully hot day, was spent by all in readjustment. Thomas brought his three corps forward, near to the enemy. The gap in my lines was closed as we neared the city. Schofield filled the space between the Fourth (mine) and Logan's corps. McPherson, to get a better left, ordered Blair to seize Bald Hill. General Force, of Leggett's division, supported by Giles A. Smith, who now had Gresham's place, charged the hill and 314 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. carried it, though with a heavy loss. No time ran to waste till this point was manned with batteries Iprotected by thick parapets and well secured by infantry supports. Atlanta appeared to us like a well-fortified citadel with outer and inner works. After Thomas had beaten him, Hoo10 resolved to give up the Peaeh Tree line; so, after dark, he drew lback two corps into those outer works. Hardee, however, was destined to a special duty. About midnight he gathered his four divisions into Atlatita: Bate led the way; Walker came next; (leburne, having now left the vicinity of Bald Hill (for he was soon to go beyond it), followed; then came Maney in rear. They pushed out far south alIld around (4resham's sleeping soldiers; they kept on eastward till Hardee's advance was within two miles of Decatur, and his rear was nearly past Sherman's extreme left. There, facing north, he formed his battle front; then he halted on rough 3 groundl, mostly covered by forest and thikt He had made a blind night-march of fifteen miles; so lie rested his men for a sufficient time, when, slowly and confidently, the well- disciplined Confederates in line took up their forward movement. Success was never more CENIE OF GENERtAL M-PHlESON'S IEATH, ON TilE BATTLE-IIELID OF JULY 22. FROMt WAR-TIME PHOT'RIOROO'S A 32-pounder cannon, act upon a granite block, now tiuarka the pIot of General Me'hecaona death, A Large line stands within a few feet of the montiment, which tacaes a partly i... pro-d roadway that is called N-Pher-o. A-en-e. 3 15 i i I 'A -g THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. '4 i-,t A JOMES IE 4.PIPIfl. II ,ULIIT 22, 194. 1FRO1M A I-11TOdIRAP1l. assured, for was not Sherman's cavalry well out of the way, breaking a rail- road and burning bridges at and beyond Decatur I And thus far no Yankee except a (halce prisoner had discovered this Jaeksonian narch! The morning showed us empty trenches from Bald Hill to the right of Thomas. We quickly closed again on Atlanta, skirmishing as we went. McPherson's left was, how- ever, near enough already, only a single valley lying between Blair's position and the outer defensive works of the city. The Sixteeinth Corps (Dodge), hav- ing sent a detachment under General Sprague to hold Decatur, to support the cavalry and take care of sundry army wagons,- a thing successfully accom- plished,-had marched, on the 21st, toward Atlanta. Dodge remained for the night with head of eolumni a mile or more in rear of Blair's general line. 316 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. Fuller's division was nearest Blair's left, and Sweeny's not far from the Augusta railroad, farther to the north. McPherson spent the night with Sweeny. His hospitals and main supply trains were between Sweeny and the front. About midday McPherson, having determined to make a stronger left, had set Dodge's men in motion. They marched, as usual, by fours, and were in long column pursuing their way nearly parallel to Hardee's battle front, which was hidden by the thick trees. Now danger threatened: at the first skirmish shots Dodge's troops halted and faced to the left and were in good line of battle. The Confederate divisions were advancing; fortunately for Dodge, after the firing began Hardee's approaching lines nearing him had to cross some open fields. McPherson was then paying a brief visit to Sherman near the Howard house. The attack was sudden, but Dodge's veterans, not much disturbed, went bravely to their work. It is easy to imagine the loud roar of artillery and the angry sounds of musketry that came to Sherman and McPherson when the sudden assault culminated and extended from Dodge to Blair's left. McPherson mounted, and galloped off toward the firing. He first met Logan and Blair near the railway; then the three separated, each to hasten to his place on the battle-line. McPherson went at once to Dodge; saw matters going well there; sent off aides and orderlies with dispatches, till he had but a couple of men left with him. He then rode forward to pass to Blair's left through the thick forest interval. Cheatham's division was just approaching. The call was made, " Surrender!" But McPherson, probably without a thought save to escape from such a trap, turned his horse toward his command. He was instantly slain, and fell from his horse. One of his orderlies was wounded and captured; the other escaped to tell the sad news. Our reenforcements were on the way, so that Cheatham was beaten back. While the battle raged, McPherson's body was brought to Sherman at the Howard house. I wrote next day: " We were all made sad yesterday by the death of General McPherson,-so young, so noble, so promising, already com- manding a department!" I closed my report concerning him thus: " His death occasioned a profound sense of loss, a feeling that his place can never be completely filled. How valuable, how precious the country to us all, who have paid for its preservation such a price! " Logan immediately took the Army of the Tennessee, giving his corps to Morgan L. Smith. As soon as Hood, from a prominent point in front of Atlanta, beheld Hardee's lines emerging from the thickets of Bald Hill, and knew by the smoke and sound that the battle was fully joined, he hurried forward Cheatham's division to attack Logan all along the east front of Atlanta. At the time, I sat beside Schofield and Sherman near the Howard house, and we looked upon such parts of the battle as our glasses could compass. Before long we saw the line of Logan broken, with parts of two batteries in the enemy's hands. Sherman put in a cross-fire of cannon, a dozen or more, and Logan organized an attacking force that swept away the bold Confederates by a charge in double-time. Blair's soldiers repulsed the front attack of Cheatham's and Maney's divisions, and then, springing over their parapets, fought Bate's and Maney's men from the other side. The battle continued 317 4 x x 2 0 0 1. _ = I- I 3 To 318 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. till night, when Hood again yielded the field to Sherman and withdrew. The losses on both sides in this battle of Atlanta were probably nearly even -about four thousand each. Our gain was in morale. Sherman now drew his half-circle closer and closer, and began to manceuvre with a view to get upon the railways proceeding southward. The Army of the Tennessee (late McPherson's) was assigned to me by the President, and I took command on the 27th of July, while it was marching around by the rear of Schofield and Thomas, in order to throw itself forward close to Atlanta on the south-west side, near Ezra Church. Skirmishing briskly, Dodge was first put into line facing the city; next Blair, beside him; last, Logan, on the right, making a large angle with Blair. He was not at night quite up to the crest of the ridge that he was to occupy. In the morning of the 28th he was moving slowly and steadily into position. About 8 o'clock Sherman was riding with me through the wooded region in rear of Logan's forces, when the skirmishing began to increase, and an occasional shower of grape cut through the tree-tops and struck the ground beyond us. I said: "General, Hood will attack me here." "I guess iot-he will hardly try it again," Sherman replied. I said that I had known Hood at West Point, and that he was indomitable. As the signs increased, Sherman went back to Thomas, where he could best help me should I need reenforcement. Logan halted his line, and the regiments hurriedly and partially covered their front with logs and rails, having only a small protection while kneeling or lying down. It was too late for intrench- ing. With a terrifying yell, Hood's men charged through the forest. They were met steadily and repulsed. But in the impulse a few Confederate regi- ments passed beyond Logan's extreme right. To withstand them four regi- ments came from Dodge; Inspector-General Strong led thither two from Blair, armed with repeating-rifles; and my chief-of-artillery placed several batteries so as to sweep that exposed flank. These were brought in at the exact moment, and after a few rapid discharges, the repeating-rifles being remarkable in their execution, all the groups of flankers were either cut down or had sought safety in flight. This battle was prolonged for hours. We expected help from Morgan's division of Palmer's corps, coming back from Turner's Ferry; but the Confederate cavalry kept it in check. Our troops here exhibited nerve and persistency; Logan was cheerful and hearty and full of enthusiasm. He stopped stragglers and sent them back, and gave every needed order. Blair was watchful and helpful, and so was Dodge. After the last charge had been repelled I went along my lines, and felt proud and happy to be intrusted with such brave and efficient sol- diers. Hood, having again lost three times as many as we, withdrew within his fortified lines. Our skirmishers cleared the field, and the battle of Ezra Chureh was won; and with this result I contented myself. One officer, who was a little panic-stricken, ran with the first stragglers to Sher- man, and cried substantially, as I remember, "You've made a mistake in McPherson's successor. Everything is going to pieces!" Sherman said, "Is General Howard there i" "Yes; I suppose he is." "Well, I'll wait before taking action till I hear from him!" So Sherman sustained and 319 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. MAJIR-GENERAL JOHN A. LOGAN. FROM A IPHOTOGRAPH. trusted me, and I was content. Of General Logan, who has so recently gone from us, I wrote, after this battle: " Major-General Logan was spirited and energetic, going at once to the point where he appre- hended the slightest danger of the enemy's success. His decision and resolution animated and encouraged his officers and men to hold on at all hazards." For a month Hood kept to a defensive attitude, and, like a long storm, the siege operations set in. Sherman worked his right, with block after block, eastward and southward. Schofield and part of Thomas's command had passed beyond me, digging as they halted. Every new trench found a fresh one opposite. The lines were near together. Many officers and men were 320 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. slain and many were wounded and sent back to the hospitals. Dodge, while reconnoitering, was badly hurt; T. E. G. Ransom took his corps, and J. M. Corse a division in it. Hooker, already vexed at Sherman, was incensed at my assignment, resigned, and went home. Slocum came from Vicksburg to command the Twentieth Corps. Palmer, having a controversy concerning his seniority, left the Four- teenth Corps, and Jeff. C. Davis took his place. Hazeii passed from a 0-, brigade in the Fourth (Stan- ley's) to M. L. Smith's divi- sion of Lo- ganscorpAs. F. P. Blair, in a report, con- dentied the Work Of his THEl BATTLE i.F EZR CHU(, JLY 2. lb4 FR-M A SKETCH MAD AT THE TIME corps in these words: "tThe ommand was occupied for 28 days in making approaches, digging rifle-pits, and erecting batteries, being subjected day and night to. a galling fire of artillery and musketry." Sherman now having his supplies well up, beginning on the night of the 25th of August, intrenched Sloeum's strong corps across his railroad comnmu- nication to defend it; then made another grand wheel of his armies. Schofield this time clung to the pivot. My command described an arc of 25 miles radius aiming at Jonesboro', while Thomas followed the middle course. Both southern railways were to be seized, and the stations and road destroyed. Preceded by Kilpatrick, we made the march rapidly enough, considering the endless plague of the enemy's horse artillery supported by Wheeler's cavalry, and the time it took us to break up the West Point railroad. At Renfro Place we were to encamp onithe night of the 30thof Auguist. Finding no water there, and also hoping to secure the Flint River Bridge, six miles ahead, I called to Kilpatrick for a squadron. He sent me a most energetic young man, Captain Estes, and the horsemen needed. I asked Estes if he could keep the enemy in motion. He gave a sanguine reply, and galloped off at the head of his men. Wheeler's rear-guard was surprised, and hurried toward the river. Hazen's infantry followed, forgetting their fatigue in the excitement of pursuit. We reached the bridge as it was burning, extinguished the fire, crossed over in the dusk of the evening under an increasing fire from hostile cavalry and infantry, but did not stop till Logan had reached the wooded ridge beyond, near Jonesboro'. The command was soon put into position, 321 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. and worked all night and during the ,next morning to ilntreniIlI, and build the reqjuired hbridges. Hood had s.'nt Hardee by rail, with perhaps half of his command, to hold Joniesboro'. My Confederate classmate, S. 1). Lee, who had had the imimediate assault at Ezra Vx Ch; (1hurch, here app ieared again, coin- manding Cheathaut's (orps. At :3 i. Mi. on the 31st the Confedlerat(s cane ont with the usual vigor, but. were met by Logan and Ransom, and thoroughly l l I l , repulsed.Hood now abandoned At- lanta, and united with Hardee in the vicinity of Jonesboro', near Love- joy's Station. Thomas, joining my left flank, fought mainly the battle of JoHAt 1 1'0RV4, W10 "uIMIL THU. September 1st. During the rest that T1T0A MA Pl RAlPH followed, Blair and Logan went home on leave of absence; the field-force of the Army of the Tennessee was consol- idated( into two corps, Osterhaus temporarily commanding the Fifteenth, and Ransom the Seventeenth. Thomas went to Chattanooga to defend the com- munications with Sherman's army. Wagner's division was sent to Chatta- nooga, and Corse's division to Rome. Colonel John E. Tourtellotte had a detac hment garrisoning the works at Allatoona Pass. Hood had been threatening for some time to break Sherman's long line of eommunication anld supply. Sherman (ould not livinie where the blow would fall. He was already arranging for a campaign southward; but he wanted Grant's formal sanction, an(d he wished to make proper provision for Hood. At last, on the 2d of October, Hood had passed on his way back beyond the Chattahoochee. Sherman had waited for this till he was sure that the first attempt against his line would be south of the Etowah. Now, leaving one corps, Slocum's, at Atlanta, he followed Hood with the remainder of his force. Hood stopped near Dallas, and sent French's division to take the garrison of Allatoona and the depots there. From the top of Kenesaw, Sher- man communicated with CorseJ who had joined Tourtellotte at Allatoona, and J On the 4th of O(ctober General John MI. Corse, to hold the piae until daylight. I then learned from (ommalldillg the Fourth IDivision, Fifteenth Corps, Colonel Tourtellotte that the garrison emlbr-eed thie 4th stationed in observation at Rome, Georgia was Minnesota infantry. 450 men, Major J. C. Edon coam- ordered by General Sherman to move by railway lOalpdl.nlg; tedIlhlnoWisinantriey,290tIll'enaori Fisah- to Allatoona to assist tie garrison at that point try 150 mell Lieutea, aut-Cloine Jackson eommanding; against a heavy force of Hood's army, which was 12th WIsclsiln battery, ix gnun, Lieutenant Amlnadel moving north from Kenesaw Mountain. With a conmmandig-furnni.lhing a forceof mnen. coll-laded part of his command Corse reached Allatoona at by Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Tourtellotte, 4th MInnesota Volunteer infantry. I tolok with me. of Itowett's blrig,,de I A. x. on the 5th. The battle which took place of this division, eight compalies 39th Iowa infantry, 290 that day is described in his report as follows: men, Lieutenant-Colonel James Redfeld commanding; ThTe amnmunition heing nnloaded, and the train sent nine companIes 7th Illinni s lnfautry,291menLieutenant- batk Ito Romoe] for re:nforcemnents, ae-ol.lpanied ly Colo-el Heetor Perrill eommlIandinlg; eight companles Colonel Tourtellotte. the post eommandant, rude I 0thillinolsitnfantr,267men. Lent-olonelWi.Han.la around and ilmIleeted the ground anld inade such dipo- eommandiung; two eoinpanie. 57th Illinois infantry, 6t itt.on of the troop a., ill my Judgment. was necessary Inell, Captain Vanstienburg commanding; detachment 322 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. 3 2 3 taken (ommallnd. The popular hymn, " Hold the Fort," was based upon the itmessages between these chiefs and the noble defense that the garrison sue- tMimssfully made against a whole Confederate division. Sherman was coming, 12t h Illinois. Adamo brigade, 10 nten. Capt. Iochiler com- rmnimig; total, 1054- mikimig an aggregate of 19.... tIfler a brisk cannomonde, kept up for near two hours, with sharp skirmishing oln our south front and our w Ist flnk, thMe enemy pushed a brigahle of Infantry arm.i.iimm I nrtih of us, ecit the railroad and telegraph, seo- m'rlig our commnm..ication. with (artersvitle and Rome. The c mnonawimlfg and muisketry had not ceased when, m 1-lmif-pim1t 8 A. m., I received tiy flag of truce, which -tune frmnc the north on the Carter-ville road, the fol- lowim hg sim imomis to surrender: AhtI ;Nn AL.A.ATOO , Owti ltmr 5th, 18t4. " 'm ' MViIANtm'lmXi YI.mi'ICIJm UNITF 1tm AThs Foacca, Aliatona. SiltI: mtmve jlammb-l time farce, miader my commandI In such. I,.-ittlmmm- thlat y,mmt are, o-rrmleml. m,.mt t1m avoId a neediess ltslim of 1,1m1m l -11 am y t- stirrendl-r your fortes at m,,eI mmmmmmmmaiitillmIly. lve loutex tine allowed ya f.e 1,1m. M4ianibi ymmm ar-remi to tmls ymmm will Is treattml 1m 1tsm mwmt imonnrailc .m.auu....r as prlsmomeo of w-r. I m.are lM immmmmr 1mm iv. very rees mm'tfiliy yours. S. Gt. FitsNei. miajmmr-uimm-1ral Cummaimmllng Farem-ts C amlemierat Mtatms.' To which I made the following reply: "It l1mm5tAKrlmI.. Fylmmumlmm Dirl-`suX. FlvT5K2mTII AKRt Cme1o9, Allatlson., ttergia, 8: 30 A. M., O(tOter 5lm, 1116.. A.mmmitr.NfmessImm S. (J. C'mmsmi-m, t-f emlerate States Army, Yamr e..........niciIon mlemanmllug smmrremlmmer oa my eom- nmm I-u t arkmm wlemdgn receipt of, an.i -epectttilly reply tlmat we, are mrelmaarem fmr timo -imeedl.s effusion tl blood" when. ever it Is agreeable t., ymmm. I am, very respectfully, yonr mbmm Icnt servant, Jon. 3 M. CO-ac, lrigamll, r-(-enerai onmmoanmlig Fmre-, Utied State.' I then hastenied to my different ecmmands, inform- 1Ig tmem of tbe onJeet of the filag, etc., my answer, amid the Importanee and neceseity of their preparing for hard fighting. . . . I had hardly issued the incipient orders whemi the stmrm broke In all Its fury. . . . The fighting up to . . . abommt 11 A. Mt. was of the moet extraordInary character. . . . About I P. M. I was wounded by a rifle- ball, which rendered me insensible for some thirty or fmrty butlnules, hnt managed to rally on hearing some per- son mmr persons cry, Cease firing,m which conveyed tm nine the umpre"son that they were trying to surrender the fort. Again I urged my staff, the few offleers left nahurt, and the mwem around me tI renewed exertlons, assuring them that Hherman would soon he there with reenforee- ents. The gailant fellow struggied tm keep their heads miove the ditch and parapet, had the adtantag.M of the eniemy, and maintalned it with such sess that they (the Cmnfederates] were driven from every positimn, amid finally fled In ronftilon, leaving the dead amid wmmimnmied and ommr little garrison 1mm possession of thi- teld.- Corse a entire loss, officially reported, w-a: Gaison. KillW. Wommsded. Mi-fing. Tat el. Officers . 6 ... I 2:1 .....t; :t.3 Men.... 3 ... . ::30 1 .24 . 1 72 Total... 142 .. 3.i3 .. . 212 .. 70t7 General Sherman, in his " Memoirs," xays: -mWe crossed the Chattahoochee River dimrng thiM 3d mind 4th of Octoher, rendezvoused at the old lbattle-field of Smyria Camp, and the next .lay reached NMarietta and Kenesaw. The telegraph wires had been cut above Marietta, and learning that heavy masses inf infantr-, artillery, and cavalry had been seen from Kenemaw (marehing north), I imferred that Allatoolma was their objective point; and on the 4th of October I signaled from Vlning's Statimn to Kenesaw, and froim Keneaaw to Allatoona, over the heads mmf the eneamy, a mesoage for (General Corse at Rome, to hmmrry back tmm the asist- ance of the garrison at Allatoona. . . . Reaching Kenesaw Mountain abo11t 8 A. t. of October 5th Ia beamt- tifut day), I had a superh view of the vast pamoramna to the north and west. To the south-west, abolit Dallas, -onId ie seen the emminke of eamp-fires, indicatimig the presence of a large force of the enemy, and the whole line of railroad, from Big Shanty up to Allatmiooa Ifill fifteen miles), was marked by the fires of the mumirning railroad. Wee onid plainly see the smoke of batte abiout Allatoona, and hear the tanlt reverberatloim of the cannon. From Kenesalw I ordered the Twenty-third Corpa iGeneral Cox) to march dime west on the Blrnt Hickory road, and to burn houses or piles of brush as it progresed, to iudicate the head of colutnn, hoping to in- terpose this corps between Hod's main army at Dallas and the detachment then assailing Allatmmon. The rest of the army was directed straight for Alhlatoona, north- west, distant eighteen miles. The ignai-olieer oai Keneslaw repmmrted that since daylight he had failed to obtain any answer tm his call fmr Allatoona; but, while ALLATOONA PASK, tLOOKING NOIORTU-CORSE'S FO5RT ON TIHE LEFT (SEE P. 344). FROi .A WAR-TIME PHOT01MtAPt. 4 C iN 0 0.a t: - NC- I- t: F Pb I Fx F I I Q " 4 v 0 :: x :;, f- O I A:-. 0 E r; !5 8 . To 324 THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA. and French, several times repulsed with great loss, withdrew and joined Hood at New Hope Church. Taking up his northward march, Hood avoided Rome and aimed for Resaca. Schofield was warned, and got ready to defend Chattanooga, while Sherman now made forced marches so as to overtake his enemy and force him to battle. Finding us on his heels, Hood, picking up two or three small garrisons, but leaving untouched those that showed great pluck, like that of the resolute Colonel Clark R. Wever at Resaca, I rushed through Sugar Valley and Snake Creek Gap, choking it behind him with trees. My command, following rapidly through the pass (October 16th), cut away or threw the gap obstructionis to the right and left, and camped close up to Hood's rear-guard. He again refused battle, and we pursued him beyond Gaylesville( Ala- bama. Between Rome and Gaylesville, General Ransom, the gallant and prom- ising young officer Itefore mentioned, died T lt . E. M. from over-work and exposure due to our i tAMAPIL forced marches. Taking advantage of a rich country, Sherman recuperated his men and moved slowly back to the Chattahoochee. Now, with the full consent of Grant, he hastened his preparations for his grand march to the sea. I wa with him. e aeught a faint glimpse of the tell-tale flag through all embraure, and after mitch tinie he made out these letters: C' R,' ' 8,' E,' , H' E R,' and trans.lated the ..e.mage, 'Curse iff here.' It was a source of great relief, fur it gave m.e the first a- u.racee that General Corse had received his orders, and that the place was adequately garrisoned. I watched with painful suspense the indi ations of the battle raging there, and wa. dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of the relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smokes which were made according to orders. but about 2 P. x. I noticed with satisfaction that the smoke of battle abut Allatoona grew less and less. ,ini ceased altogether about 4 P. Mt. For a tinme I attrib- titid this result to the effect of General Cox.' march, liut later in the afternoon the signal-flag annutt.need the welo-me tidings that the attack hal been fairly re- pulsed, but that Getieral Curse wist wounded. Tbe next tiny my aide, Coloniel Dayton, recelived this characteristic dispatch: A.LAToON- s A, (teoi,.t Octotfir W.th. i551i 2 r. . .zPT vA"x L. M. DAtiTT.N . AMlele C..p: an, ,abrt a etteek-I...e andI an ear. IIt sat sle tt, whip all li-I yetW My lasses are very l-e3y. A force moving Irnin stileslullro tol cinigston giVes me susie anxiety. Tell iie stacre Shlerman is1. JOIIXt It. UtuisF, Brigariter tteilerai.' Intaffmuch as the enemy bad retreated sonth-west, id would probably next appear at Rome, I answered tieneral Curse with orders to get lhack to RoP e with his troops as quiekly as posible.... "I esteemed this defence of Allatona so hanidsome attd inmlsirtant that I made it the seibject of a general order, vz., No. 6 of tOtober 7th, 1964: The general commanatiag avails linI.eIf or the ,plstrt-wi nity. lathe h -lni1e ietense ni le at Allatai. ta illaMtrate thle btst impo+rtant princ-ll- in war. that H ortitit l its sl-tlt. ilcdetel to the lsit. rcgarIlesa of the relative niim 'rs o.f the party attackiiig saIl attatkM... . The thanks if thes aesly are doe suit are l -erehty acrtteit to 0,-ieral hore, oitInel Tiartellotti' tolne-l R-owett. o ndera au-n f- r their iteterinie anil gallant ilefense iii Atlalasana .itl It is iade n example to ihl-osrate the iaportanei if prnparin.g ti time nnd meeting tha tanyer., hen present. iolitly. lau- filly and well. t-(oaimasdecssnil garrisons7 of the pasts aiongsalir raatroat anr h-reby instr"icte"i that thee muIst nt.il their liiist. to th'- last ninstte, sIre that the lime gaine.i is val.i ahle .a.l neees- aary to their Iiiral!es nt the trus. BIy .ntter of - Mzjoi-OSNEaett. W. T. o t; M 1.. It. D.-,TO, AiheAute-csuip.' EDITORS. ;, Hood had partly invested Resaca, an.] ott the 12th of October he demanded the unconditional sttrrender of the garrison, which the commander, Colonel Wever, refused, saying, "Its my opitiioii I can hold the post. If you want it, come ani take it."- -EDITORS. 325 l14)l)'S SECONI) SORTIE AT ATLANTA. BY W. It. VIIANIBERLIN, MAJOR, SIST OHIO VOLUNTEERS. A1 ENERAL Sherman's lihe lay east and north- east of Atlanta, with MMcPherson's Army of the Tennessee funninig the extreme left, and ex- tending some distance south of the Augusta railroad. General Logan's Fifteenth Corps, Which joined the left of the Army of the Ohio, extended across the Augusta railroad, and General Blair's Seventeenth Corps extended the line southward, touching the Mcl)onough road beyond what is now McPherson Avenue. The Sixteenth Corps, corn- manded by General G renville M. l)odge, had been in reserve in rear of the Fifteenth Corps, north of the railroad, until July 21st, when tieneral Ful- ler's division was placed in the rear of the center of the Seventeenth Corps. On the morning of July 22d. a movement was begun, which afterward proved to have been the most fortunate for the Union army that could have been ordered, even if the intention of the enemy hadn been known to us. It was to place the remainder of General Dodge's corp.s-General Sweemy's division-upon the left of the Seventeenth Corps. (ieneral Sweeny's di- vision moved south of the railroad and halted, some time before noon, in open ground, sloping down toward a little stream, in the rear of General Ful- ler's division, which was in bivouae near the edge of a woo.l Here, then, in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps. lay the two divisions of General Dodge's corps, as if in waiting for the approach of General Hardee's troops who had been marchinig nearly all night around Blair's left flank, and were even then making painfully slow progress, moving in line of battle through the thickets and obstructions that opposed their march. Our troops were really in waiting for the order to go to their new position. General D odge had been out on the left of General Blair's corps to select a place for his troops, and had succeeded in drawing a shell or two from the enemy's nearest earth-work. He had returned to General Fuller's headquarters, and had accepted that officer's invitation to a noonday lunch with him. In a few minutes his command would have been in motion for the front. If that had happened, and his corps had vacated thie space it then held, there would have been absolutely nothing but the hospital tents and the wagon trails to stop Hardee's command from falling unheralded di- rectly upon the rear of the Fifteenth and Seven- teenth corps ill line. Upon what a slight chance, then. hung the fate of Sherman's army that day, for though such a catastrophe as this might not have wrought entire destruction, it is plain it would have put an entirely different phase on the battle. Just here is a point upon which most of the ae- counts of the battle are wrong. They represent Dodge's eorps to have been ill motion. Fuller had bivouacked there the previous night. Sweeny's command, while technically in motion, had been halted, awaiting orders. Just as General Dodge was about to dismount to accept General Fuller's hospitality, he heard firing in a somith-easterly direction, to the rear of General Sweeumy's division. He took no lunch. He was all ilutemisely active, al811,t 1 nmrvously restless,ofil- cer. He saw iml all ilmatulut that solmlethimlg serious was at hanied. He gave tIelleral Fuller orders to form his division immediately, facing south-eastwardly, and galloped off toward Sweeny's division. lIe had hardly reached that (omomnamld when Hanr-i's lines came tearing wildly through the woods with the yells of demons. As if by magic, Sweeny's division sprang into line. The two batteries of artillery (Loomis's and L-ird's) had stopped on commanding ground, and they were promptly in service. General Dodge's quick eye saw the promer disposition to be made of a portion of Colonel Mersy's brigade, and, cutting red tape, he delivered his orders direct to the colonels of the regiments. The orders were executed instantly, and thin en- emy's advance was checked. This act after- ward caused trouble. General Dodge was not a West Point graduate, amid did iot revere so highly the army regulations as did (emleral Sweeny, who 1uad learned them as a eadet. Sweeny was much hulrt by General Dodge's action in giving orders direct to regimental commanders, and pursued the matter so far as to bring on a personal en- colunter a few days after the battle, in which he came near losing his life at the hands of a hot- tempered officer. He was placed in arrest. The court-martial, however, did not consider his ease until nearly the end of the war, when he was acquitted. The battle of General Dodige's corps on this open ground, with no works to protect the troops of either side, was one of the fiereest of the war. General Dodge's troops were inspired by his cou- rageous personal presence, for he rode directly along the lines, and must have been a conspicuous target for many a Confederate gun. His sturdy saddle-horse was worn out early ill the afternoon, and was replaced by another. There was moot a soldier who did not feel that he ought to equal his general in courage, and no fight of the war ex- hibited greater personal bravery on the part of an entire command than was shown here. Nor can I restrain a tribute to the bravery of the enemy. We had an advantage in artillery; they in numbers. Their assaults were repulsed, only to be fearlessly renewed, until the sight of dead and wounded lying in their way, as they charged again and again to break our lines, must have appalled the stoutest hearts. So persistent were their onslaughts that numbers were made prisoners by rushing directly into our lines. When General Dodge rode from General Fuller's lunch toward the sound of the firingg I rode with him. The first order he gave me was to return to General Fuller and direct hinm to close up his line on General Sweetly's right. Returning as soon as I could after delivering this order, I met General Dodge riding at full speed. As soon as he got 326 HOOD'S SECOND SORTIE AT ATLANTA. THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA, JUtLY 22. FROM TIHE PAINTINI, BY JAMES E. TAYLORi. Fuller'. di1i-l-on ( of the Sixt-etith Cltrpst -allying too hol thi-ir go-lod' afte- bitug fon-i-t lNirk la tol hirst charge, Of thel Couf-tIeratei In thol- ltt k attr k. within hearing distance he called out to me, " Go at once to Xereral McPherson, on Blair's left, and tell him I need troops to cover my left. The enemy is flanking Ius." Wheeling my horse, I started back. As I went, the attack on Dodge's corps was in full force. Out in open ground, in full view as it was, I could not resist checking my horse for a moment to see the grand conflict. I remember yet how the sight of our banners advancing amid the smoke thrilled me as it gave them a new beauty, and the sound of our artillery, though it meant death to the foe, fell upon our ears as the assurance of safety to us and to our flag. General McPherson, from a point farther on, had witnessed the same scene. Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. Strong, his chief-of-staff, and the only staff- officer with him at that time, thus describes what they then saw: '- The enemy, massed in columns three or four lines deep, moved out of the dense timber several hundred yards from Dodge's position, and, after gaining fairly the open fields, halted and opened fire rapidly on the Sixteenth Corps. They, how- ever, seemed surprised to find our infantry in line of battle prepared for attack, and, after facing for a few minutes the destructive fire from the divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeny, fell back in disorder to the cover of the woods. Here, however, their lines were quickly re-formed. and they again advanced, evidently determined to carry the position. The scene at this time wa. grand and impressive. It seemed to us that every mounted officer of the attacking column was riding at the front or at the right or left of the first line of battle. The regimental colors waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not a shot was fired by the rebel infantry, although their movement was covered by a heavy anal well-di- rected fire of artillery which was posted in the woods and on higher ground, and which en- ahled the guns to bear upon our troops with solid shot and shell by firing over the attacking column. It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping, deadly tire from Fuller's and Sweeny's divistions, and the guns of Laird's 14th Ohio andl Welkers batteries fairly mowed great swaths in the advancing columns. They showed great steadiness, and closel tip the gaps and preserved their alignments; but the iron and leaden hail that was poured upon them was too much for flesh and blood to stand, and before reaching the center of the open fields the columns were broken and thrown into great confusion. Taking advantage of this, a portion of Fuller's and Sweeny's divisions, with bayonets fixed, charged the enemy and drove them back to the woods, taking many prisoners. The 91st Ohio (Colonel Adams) charged first, then the .39th Ohio (Colonel McDowell) and the ,27th Ohio (Col- onel Churchill). G.eieral McePher,.ou'sadmiration 327 328 HOOD'S SECOND SORTIE AT ATLANTA. ATTlX OF ATLANTA JIULY X2-RECAFTltHE FROM THE CbNFEDRRATES OF DE G(tES'S BATTERY. 1. The w-ie is we-' tw -rd Atl...ta the Con ftt-ate. i.- ptutring tie battery eharged (along thM (.eogtea railroad fo .i. tot -olling-,oiUl I -ap, 1, 3121. and look dotardtagi , lof the eovaer of the railtroad atia knient anl. edit. for the steadiness and determined bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded.' While I was riding to find General McPherson, he had just taken his eyes from the view of this splendid vietory described by Colonel Strong, and had started ahead of me in the direction of Blair's left. Of course I did not find him. In a very few minutes after leaving Color-el Strong the brave general was dead, while I, following, was forced to deflect to the right, and reached our line at Giles A. Smith's division, at the point known then as Bald Hill. While in the act of asking there for a brigade for General Dodge's left, I heard a terrific yelling toward the left and rear, and, looking around. I saw a full Confederate line rushing out of the dense timber within easy hailing distance. I perceived at once that no brigade could be spared from that position for General Dodge. General Smith's troops quickly jumped to the other side of their works, prepared to meet this rear at- tack. The mounted offeers, myself included, found some difficulty in getting their horses over the works before the firing began. I then rode to General Harrow's division, next on the right, but be had no reserve troops to spare. Proceeding to General Morgan L. Smith's division, I met Gen- eral John A. Logan. commander of the Fifteenth Corps, and he directed General Smith to weaken his front line by sending Martin's brigade to Geun- eral Dodge's left. Perhaps no better disposition of General Dodge's corps could have been made, if the intentions of General Hood had been known. But so much can- not be said of the position of General Blair's left. It has not escaped attention that Hood's ability to throw Hardee's corps into the position where it struck General Dodge that noonday, was aided materially by the fact that General Sherman's usual cavalry flanking pickets were wanting. The cavalry had nearly all been sent to break rail- roads in Hood's rear. Nor does it appear that General Blair's infantry outposts were far enough advanced to give timely warning of the approaeh of an enemy. I happened to be with General Logan when he received the order to take command of the Army of the Tennessee in place of General McPherson. I shall not easily forget the ride I had with him as he made his way to the point of danger, the left. Although whizzing balls sped about our ears as we entered the open ground near Dodge's position, and shells now and then exploded overhead, Gen- eral Logan moved on the most direct line, and with no delay, to General Dodge's headquarters. He beard, in a few terse sentences fron General Dodge, how affairs stood there. Dodge's battle at HOOD'S SECOND SOR TIE A T A TLANTA. BATTLE OF ATLANTA, JULY 22-RECAPTURE FROM THE e,)NFEDERAT.E OF DE GRFA4' BATTERY. 11. This picture, in two part,, is a leproduction from the Panorara of thbe aBsttle of Atlanta. that time was about won, and his command, after the enemy had spent its force in unsuccessful as- saults, intrenched quickly, almost on the battle- line. Both General Fuller's and General Sweeny's divisions had captured battle-flags and prisoners. A part of General Fuller's command had changed front under fire with conspicuous bravery and steadiness, General Fuller having himself planted the colors of the 27th Ohio, to indicate the new line. Among the regiments engaged were the 27th, :J9th, 43d,and 81stObio; the7th, 9th, 12th,60tb. 52d, 57th, 64th, and 66th Illinois, and the 2d Iowa. The brigade (Martin's) from the Fifteenth Corps did not take part in the action, and was subsequently sent farther to the rear to assist in the defense of Decatur. What may be considered a separate action, al- though intended by Hood to be simultaneous, was the attack on the Fifteenth Corps, one division of which (General Morgan L. Smith's) was driven from its line. This took place about 3 o'clock, after the Sixteenth Corps' fighting was mainly over. It was a part of the attack from the Atlanta defenses made by Hood on both the Seventeenth and Fifteenth corps. When General Logan assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee he placed General Morgan L. Stuith in command of the Fifteenth Corps, and General Lightburn succeeded to the command of VOL. IV. 22 Smith's division. This all happened just before Hood's attack on the Fifteenth Corps. The line had been weakened as before indicated, and the enemy succeeding in pushing a column through a cut in the Augusta railroad line, and driving back a portion of General Lightburn's troops and flank- ing the rest, the whole division, to use the lan- guage of General Lightburn's official report, "broke in confusion to the rear." This left in the enemy's hands sections of an Illinois battery (A, 1st Artillery) stationed near the railroad, and also De Gresss famous battery of four 20-pounder Parrott8, placed on the right of this division. Gen- eral Lightburn's report is very brief. He simply says he checked the retreat of his division at the line oecupied by his troops on the morning of that day, re-formed, and, with the assistance of General Woods's division and one brigade of the Sixteenth Corps, commanded by Colonel Mersy, recaptured all the guns of Battery H, 1st Illinois (De Gress's), and two of Battery A. He had but six regiments in line when his division was driven back. General Logan, in his report of the Army of the Tennessee, says that when he heard of the repulse of the Fifteenth Corps' division, he ordered Colonel Martin's brigade back to its position, and adds: I1 r alse ordered General Dodge to send a brigade of the Sixteenth Corps to the assistance of the right of our line. . . . The second brigade of the Second Division. 329 HOOD 'S SECOND SORTIE AT ATLANTA. Sixteenth Corps, Colonel M-ery corunniadiug, n o...J promptly out, and I -onducteld it to the rear of the Wli works of the Second Dtl-itaoin of th1 Fifteenth Corts, were- it deployed on the- right of tbe railroad.' After detailing his orders to fieneral Smith, alit the disposition of troops by Umeneral Woods on th. right, he contitues: -At the st...... ttme the .eo..t DMliv.li . , followed hy ('oluel Mirsy's brigade, adv-nced uwtn the e u-my's front. The movement wa s ecasfl. oodts' diWi- Mon striking the enemoy' flank, it began to hreak, anud soait ufter, the 9e-onld DiviaMlo 1.rgiag hia front, the olhI line of works, De (iress s battery, and two gunu of Bu ttry A' were recaptared.- Colonel Wells S. Jones, who succeeded to the eommand of Lightburn's brigade, after telling in his official report of the repulse of his brigade, says: -it re-formed In a few minutes bhak at the work. we had advan-ed from tn the -inorning, and, supported hy a brigade of the Sixteenth Corp., charged upon and drove the enemy from our works, turuing our recaptured artillery upon the retreating enemy." General C. B. Woods, who commanded the First Division, posted on the right of the Second, says in his official report: . Abhot S r. V.1 the rebels made a determined attaek it heavy foree upon the lines to my left, and, aSter hav. Iug been several Utmes repulsed, suceeded tn breaking those tines and occupying the pit., which gave them a position three or four hundred yards to my rear and left. Finding my position untenable, I threw my lett baek, an iformed a new line, facing the enemy's fauk. At the same time I kept up a heavy artillery Stre on the enemy, preventing them from taking off D. Gress's battery of four 2-ponader Parrott., of which they had possession. Shortly after having taken my new position I received a verbal order from General M. L., Smith. commanding Fifteenth Army Corps, to attack the enemy in tank and rear. while other troops moved up in front to retake the position. I immediately moved the Second Brigade forward to strike the enemy's fnlk and rear, and the First Brigade to attack then from front and flank. The maovemeot proved nescessful, and In less than fifteen minutes I had retaken De G ress's battery and driven the enemy from their rifle-pits on their left as far as the railroad." I was so well aware, at the time of the battle, that it was Colonel Mersy's brigade of General Sweeny's division of the Sixteenth Corps that re- took De Gress's battery that I was astonished, years afterward, in reading accounts of the battle, to find that the honor was assigned to others. General Lightburn and Colonel Wells S. Jones, in their reports, mentiout the Sixteenth Corps' brigade, but do not specify the part it took, farther than to say it supported their troops; while General Woods makes no mention of it whatever. Geni- eral Logan was evidently guided in his report by that of General Woods. To one not familiar with the numberless duties of an officer in General Logan's position at that time, it teems incredible that he should overlook the part taken by this Brevet lieutenant-Colonel Edward Jones, of C eneral Dkodget staff. writ.e to the editors that, by direetion of General Dodge, he eonducted General August Mersy's brigade to the seene of the charge. "After a rapid marhb of perhaps a mile," he says, "Mlersy, at a run, deployed his brigade, charged and recaptured De Gross's battery and the ine of works, having his horse brigade, for he asked Gieneral Dodge in person for " the little Dutchman's brigade," meaning ('olonli Mersy's brigade, and in ers8on be rode at its head dowum the railroad until witbin range of the citenty. and theut he gave Colonel Mersy orders to forin his line along a board fence at right angles with the railroad, and in 'otiperation with General Woods to charge the enlemy's line. lie then left the brigade.) Colonel Mery bad ju.t given the order to levt, the railroad, as directedi, when a volley from the enemy struck the brigade, killing the colotel's horse and wounding him. He turned over the command to Colonel (afterward Brevet Brigadier- General) R. N. Adams, eominanding the 81 st Ohio, who had heard the instructions given by Genteral Logan. The brigade was thrown into some col- fusion in leaving the railroad under a galling firc, but it quickly formed along tte board fence, wit]. its left resting on the railroad. Let me tell the re- mainder of the story in Colonel Adams's own words: "I at once gave tie -ommand, 'Forward!' Thte brigade crossed the fence, aid at 'trail arms' advanced under a moderate fire toward the line to be taken. On emerging from the ravine, and beginning the ascent of the hill, the enemy opened anew upon us, vwhereupon I gave the order, 'Charge!' and in apparently less thati half a minute the line was otrs. We captured some of the men who were manning the De Gress guns, and about fifty men in the works, who fired until they were captured. Among these was the only eolored man I saw during the war shooting the wrong way. He was game; he fired till he was taken. I de- failed tner at once to tna the recerered gaas, but found them partly disabled. I am not sure, but it is my impression, that this detail succeeded in dis- charging one of the pieces. At any rate, they were endeavoring to use them when Captain De Gress and some of his men came and took charge of the recovered guns. " Simultaneous with our action wasthat of Gen- eral Charles Woods (I think it was), who charged the enemy on our right. It would not be fair to say that we could have succeeded without Woods's cooperation; nor is it fair forthem to say that they could have succeeded without ours. Certain it is, we charged that line with the enemy in it, and that we recaptured the lost guns and had them in our possession some time before the men of any other command saw them, or before Captain De Greta himself came and took charge of them." In another letter, General Adams, in answer to specific inquiries, says that his line, at the be- ginning of this movement, rested its left on the railroad; but during the movement it left a space between its left and the railroad, owing to the slight divergence of the road. No other troops advanced before, with, or behind his line over the killed nuder him in th, aessult. The Fifteenth Corps men, who were preent, Joined tery, and were with him in the action; bht the brigade (Merey's) of the Sti- teenth Corps led, and, if my memory does not fail mle. Captain Willim S. Boyd, of the 56th fllnots, damaged one of the recaptured guns ty attempting to discharge it upon the retreating enemy."-Eorroas. 330 THE GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA. space covered by his brigade. He does not speak of any simuioltaneous movement on his left. No doubt the peculiar circumstances mentioned already, of thl, change in, commanders of General Morgan L. Smithb' division, gave rise to mislead- ing ai-cou-nts concerninbg the recovery of this bat- ti ry. Shortly after the line was retaken, General Lightbthrii's troops relieved Mersy's brigade, and it marched back to its own division. It should be remembered, in placing an estimate upon what was aceomplishel by these troops, that thevy hal borne a part in an open field, at midday, ivider it seorchiiig suii, in one of the fiercest fights of the war, and had afterwartl performed their share of the heavy work of throwing up intrench- t-e-nts. They were still engaged at this when olrdered to follow General lfogan. The movement, under his leadership, was made at " double-quick" over the greater portion of the distance, which was more than a mile. There is not a man in, that bri- galle who could be repaid by the pensions of a lifetime for the work of that single day and its attendant risks, nor could the country pay in pen- sions to the whole brigade, at the highest rates, for the actual value of its services rendered that day. But I have not yet told the whole story of the service of General Dodge's command that day. When night fell, the Confederate line was in- trenched almost within a stone's-throw of what was then called Bald Hill. That was a position which had been stubbornly fought for almost since General Leggett captured it, July 21st. It was the key to the situation, and was the point where an attack by Hood's forces was most likely to fall. General Leggett that night pleaded most earnestly to have his command relieved from duty at Bald Hill. His men, he said, were physically exhausted. They had been under almost constant fire for two days in such circumscribed limits that they were practically imprisoned in the trenches. General Logan answered that the entire army was worn -the Fifteenth Corps had been weakened, and had no reserves from which relief could be drawn; the Seventeenth Corps had been crushed, and was needed where it was. But General Leg- gett insisted that his men must be relieved; that it would be unwise to trust such an important point in the hands of men in such a condition as his command was; and General Dodge was ordered to send a brigade to Baldl Hill. It was long after nightfall when he designated Colonel Mersy's bri- gade, and for the third time that daythese men were called to go into action. They went promptly, and though the assignment meant fighting and work- ing on intreniehments during the remainder of the night, they did both so well that no serious night attack was made, and when morning came an at- tack would have been well-nigh hopeless, for Bald Hill was almost a Gibraltar. Its fortification was unique, and though engineered by the men who wielded the shovel, it was complete and invulner- able. General Hood's shattered forces, however, had spent their energies in that direction on the 22d, and no assaults were made on our lines on the 23d. Colonel Nfersy's term of service had expired shortly before this battle, Il.t he had volunteered to lead his brigade while awaiting transportation. General Dodge gave him a letter of farewell, in which, speaking of his services on the 22do of Jnly, he said: 'You leave at a time and fnder cireamsinees of which you and your command may J.otly Ie proud. Fighting as you did on three different tields the same day. adnt victoriou on every one, forns tihe heat and most honorable reward that you can take with you." go far very little has been said of the action of the Seventeenth Corps. These troops occupied the line from Bald Hill to the McDonough road, and were attacked in flank, front, and rear, though in the inverse order. The first attack was from the rear, then upon the flank, and at last from the front. Their line was bent back at right angles, hinging at Bald Hill, and the wonder is that larger numbers were not captured. They fought with most heroic determination at close quarters. The next day I remember seeing Colonel Wm. W. Belknap of the 15th Iowa (afterward Brigadier-General and Secretary of War). He was a brawny, red-bearded giant in appearance, and it was told of him that he had captured a num- ber of prisoners by pulling them over the breast- works by main force, so closely were the lines engaged. li Lieutenants Thomas ff. lues and William Pitman. roboration of General Adams. Captain Edward Jonas, and privates John Qaigley and William E. MeCreary,. of of General Dodges ataff, ha written to the same effect the 81st Ohio (Mersy's brigade), have written me incur- in a letter which I have read.-W. H. C. THE GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA. BY OCsTAVUS W. 9311TH, MAJORH-E-NERAL, C. S. A. AnOuT the time that General Johnston crossed to the south of the Etowah, Governor Joseph E. Browii ordered the militia and the civil officers of the State of Georgia to assemble it Atlanta. These two classes of State officers were, by act of the Confederate Congress, exempt from conscrip- tion. Governor Brown's order was promptly obeyed, and these officers -about three thousand in number-were organized into companies, regi- ments, and two brigades, under the personal an- pervision of the Governor, by Major-General H. C. Wayne, Adjutant-General of the State. They were required to elect their own officers; and those not chosen had to take their places tempo- rarily in the ranks. They were informed that if they were not willing to aecede to this ruling, they would be deprived of their regular commissions in the State service and sent to the Confederate con- script camp. This action of Governor Brown gives a clear indication of the intense strain to which 331 THE GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA. the States and the general government of the (Con- federaey were then being subjected. It will be seen later, that when General Johnston's army approaehed still closer to Atianta, (iovernorlBrowni calledl into active serviee the old men of the State uip to the age of fifty-five, and the boys down to sixteen years, armed in great part with flint-lock muskets, ordinary rifles, and shot-guns, and or- dered them to report to me for serviee in the field. Immediately after the two classes of State of- ficers were organized, the Governor tendered their services to General Johnston, reserving the right, however, to withdraw them from the Confederate service whenever the interests of the State should require it. Their services were accepted on these terms, and General Wayne was ordered to report to General Johnston. The latter directed the larger portion of General Wayne's command to guard the crossings of the Chattahoochee River from Roswell to West Point, the distance being nearly one hundred miles. About one thousand men were left in camp of instruction near Atlanta. A short time after, in order that General Wayne might resume his ditties as Adjutant-General of the State, much to my surprise the troops elected me to command them in the field. At that time I was busily engaged in Macon, preparing for the manufacture of iron. the iron-works at Etowah, in north Georgia, unler toy charge, having been d-- stroyed by tieneral Sherman's army a few weeks before. I took command of the Georgia militia on the Ist of June, and began to prepare them for the field. About the middle of June tGeneral Mansfield Lovell came from Marietta to explain to nie the condition of affairs near that place and General Johnston's views in reference to the special service it was pro- posed should be performed by that portion of my command which was in camp of instruction. It seemed that whilst Johnston's army was strongly intrenched and capable of resisting direct attack, his lines were already so extended that no troops could safely be taken from the trenches to support the cavalry on the flanks. But it was believed by General Johnston that if the small cavalry foree on his left could be supported by the militia, the ex- tension of Sherman's army on that side might be checked, and the Confederates could permanently hold position near Marietta. I told General Lovell that I did not believe the small available force of raw militia, acting as a support to the cavalry, could stop Sherman's advance if he chose to move in force around Johnston'. left flank; but if I re- ceived a positive order from general Johnston to move across the Clhattahoochee for the purpose in- dicated, the order would lbe obeyed to the best of my ability, without regard to my opinion of the matter. In giving that order, General Lovell, in the name of General Johnston, directed me not to allow my command to become closely engaged with superior numbers. Fortunately for this small body of militia, there was then in Atlanta a Confederate battery of light pieces, commanded by Captain R. W. Anderson. That battery had just been refitted for field service, and was awaiting orders to return to the front. Without other authority than my own, but with the full consent of the officers and men, I took this battery with the militia when we crossed the Chattahoochee at James's Perry, and assumed position in the opman country, within close support- ing distance of our small force of cavalry, live or six miles from the left of General Johnston's intrenched position. We played "brag" with the Federals in the open eountry, on that side, for eight or ten days, giving way a little when they pressed, bitt still holding position well out until they advanced in earnest on the 3d of July, when it became appar- ent that they were moving close on us in large force. Against this advance our cavalry could do but little more than " get out of the way." For a short time thereafter the "supporting force" was at a great disadvantage, but it was withdrawn in good order, and the line of cavalry pickets was again formed between the militia and the advancing Federal columns. On the 4th, being farther pressed, the whole foree was moved back to the crest of Nickajack ridge, about three miles north of Turner's Ferry. At the point where the road from that ferry crosses the ridge an embrasure battery for artillery had been previously constructed, and short lines of trenches for infantry extended ox each side, but not far enough to give cover to more than five hundred men. In a very short time after then troops were formed in this defensive position, the Federals, ill large force, advaiced against ou r front. The situation of the militia on the afternoon of the 4th will be letter understood by reference In the movements that had been previously made in other portions of the theater of operations. July 1st, General Sherman reported to General Halleek: " Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek. To-morrow night I propose to move McPherson from the left to the extreme right. . . . The movement is substantially . . . straight for Atlanta.' One of McPherson's divisions moved on the 2d, the rest of his army followed that night, and on the 4th the armies of Schofield and McPherson were concentrated in front of the militia, four or five miles west and a little south of the position then occupied by General Johnston's army strongly intrenched at Smyrna Station, six or eight miles south of Marietta. The affair at Smyrna Station, that day, is re- ported by General Sherman as follows: - We celebrate our 4th of July by n noisy but not des- perate battle, to htimd tile nemly there till Generals McPheron and Schotield can get well into position below him, near the Chattahooclhe crossings." When I took up a defensive position on the crest of Nickajack ridge I did not know that the armies of McPherson and Schofield were in my immediate front, but it was evident that the Federal forces pressing upon the militia were in large numlers, and if they passed us they would be within easy reach of the then unoccupied strong Confederate fortifications on the north bank of the Chatta- hoochee River. These works had been constructed some time before, under the supervision of an 332 THE GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA. officer of General Johnston's staff, for the protee- tiori of the erossings of the Citattahoocitee, includ- ing Turuier's Ferry anid the railroad bridge. I tiderstooqi the situation well enough to feel -,-rtninl that the Federal forces in front of the Ililitiat should be held back if possibld, and not permiotted to reach the unoccupied works on the a,;nks of tihe Chattahoochee whilst tGeneral John- stoes army remained at Smyrna Station. InL nrutikintg a statnd on the crest of Nickajack ridge I irltendled to hold the position without regard to becoming closely etigageti with superior numbers, anid was determined to sacrifice the command, if necesstry, itl an ettrnest effort to prevent the Federals frotn crossing the ridge that afternoon. Our position was strongagaitist attack in front; but it could have been easily turned t n either fl:ank. About thte middle of the afternoon the Federals approached outr front, and, under cover of sharp firing of a strong skirmish-line, they muade dispositions to attack in force. The firing soon became very heavy and continued so until night. No attempt was made to carry the position by assault, but they approached within good mus- ket range, where they were held in check, prin- cipally, no doubt, by the very effective fire of Captain Anderson's battery. No effort was made against either of our flanks. A little after nightfall I wrote to General John- ston, informed him of what had occurred, and stated that the enemy were in very large numbers and would, in all probability, attack again at day- light in such strength that my small force could not hold them back for more tnan a very short tine. But, so long as he held his army at Smyrna Station, I should contiiue to resist the farther ad- vancez- of the Federals, unless I received an order from hin to withdraw. Before that note was dispatched, General W. H. Jackson, the commander of the cavalry that I was supporting, and General Toombs, chief of my staff, joined me. At their earnest request I modified the note I had just written by adling: I would retire at daylight if I did not get orders during the night to holi the position as long as possible. At 1 A. a.. July 5th, in reply, I received an order from General Johnston to withdraw my command at the dawn of day. When we arrived at the works on the north bank of the Chattahoochee we found them occupied by General Johnston's army. I suppose that previously to the receipt of my note lie must have known that the armies of Mc- Plerson and Schofield were on the left flank anid rear of his intrenched. position at Smyrna Station. Ble that as it may, he withdrew his army to the works on the Chatt'shoochee before we retired front the crest of Nickajack ridge. The militia were proud of their debut bevond the Chatta- hoochee; elated by the successful resistance they had made during the afternoon of July 4th; rather dissatisfied because of their being withdrawn at daylight on the 5th; but were reconciled to this when they found the main Confederate army had preceded them to the Chattahoochee. In reference to these operations General John- ston says: ) `Ft the e-cuitig [July 4thl Major-Gtneral Smith re- Ported that the Federal cavalry was presstt On hint il such force that he wuild be comselled to abattdoet tbh gritund he had be It11 bolding, and retire before moriting to General Shotp's line itt redoubts. As the position It question coveret a very iml1trtant route to Ataita. anti was nearer than the main body of our army to that plaee, the necessity of atandonting It involved the tak- iltg a new litte. The three orpts were aecerdltigly ulroagltt to the Wntren-hed position jtist prepared by General Slhottp.- This " contribution of materials for the mise of the future historian of the war between the States " requires amendment. I did not report to General Johnston that the Federal cavalry was pressing me in such force that I would be compelled to abantdont the ground I had been holding and retire before morning. It is trite that the position in question did cover a very important route to At- lanta, and was nearer than the main body of our army to that place; but that position was pressed by the armies of McPherson and Schofield, and I held them in check until daylight of July 5th, thus enabling General Johnston to withdraw his army quietly from Smyrna Station during the night, after Sherman had held him there all day "'by a noisy but not desperate battle." If McPherson and Schofield had wiped out the small militia force opposing them on the 4th, and occupied the strong Confederate works that covered the crossings of the Chattahoochee, General John- ston would have had no opportunity to excuse his falling back from Smyrna Station by claiming that I reported the Federal earaery was pressing or. me in such force that I would be compelled to ahensoni the gromnd I hadl been holding and retire beJor, taorsing. General Johnston fell back from Smyrna Station to the strong works on the north hank of the Chattahoochee because his left flatk was tiurned by the armies of McPherson attd Sehofiell. A few days later lie fell back to the jouith side of the Chattahoochee because his right flank was turned by the Federal army. And on the I C th of Jutly the Confederate Government relieved hitn from the command of the army hte had led from Dalton to the gates of Atlanta witltomit engaging it, a decisive battle. When he relinquished command ott the isth. McPherson's army was closely approaching the east side of Atlanta, on the railroad leading to Augusta. Of the four railroads centering in At- lanta, two were already in the hands of the Feder- als, and that leading to Macon was within easy striking disaniee of M1cPherson. In his "-Narrative "- speaking of what he ivould have done if he had not been relieved from com- mand - Getueral Johnston says: 4 - I expcrted an opert-nity to engage the enemy on terms of advantage while they were divided in ertsing Peach Tree Creek. . . . If utstcesful, we lttl t safe place of refiure li onir Intrenched Ilties le ait hand. Holding it we couli certainly keept bask the enemny . . . mittil the Stttte troops romlsetd by Gos-- ernor Brown wtere asemtbled. Theti I intended to mait J Johnston's Narrative," p. 345. Johnston's a Narrative,' dedication. 4 Johnsttos. arrative," p. tAe. 333 THEa GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA. tho works of Atlatta on the slo.- toward Paeotb Treo (ro'ek with tho.e troopoo, asod leiulrely fal loath wit), t,.- Cooteolera-t trionl. fidto thie towls ai old, when thil Fle loral arnoy opproaloohedl, ooooorrh out with tloo threo. rlo orl ngoiostlot oooo of it. floonk o. . If nuoso eor Vos foot. tho Conofeoterootc Otr y blad . bear Ire l oo-uro plaeo of reaf e itn Atbaitot. whoicbo it ld I oolot forov r. sint oo: w iho the raoopaiwoo oit w. io 'ot that plowie woos th.e oojecI. The 1.;os g of Po.soh Tree Creok lollyr lest hare tvo-li ,io oopjiortoiiiity too ittosk ; Ito t tler to N o, mr - cooioo too ttinbk ilt t th, -oomIo anol foor f looooot poruoiait ing laitn onight 1 t balve been -ll ix-ted. - Iii adlditi .lt to thi aibo -o. o loioo. thout hoo cosuld hal-vo oel Atlanta " forever if loe lad toot beeo roie-vedl of cominanld, tieno'rol .lolhitstooo IloW says: 0 I astiso rt that bad il 00 uof thloe oother lieuotenanot- go'uoerali of the armty (Hlardloe or Stewart) sue- ecolodeol me Atlanta wolilod halve lIo l elol.' It, is not propoosed too diseoooso thioj -ossortioto, nor too roofer to the clainm mnode bly (Gooeoorol Johlustoto itl his town behlif, farther than booty 1. ooecessary too elucidate brietty its eonieetioo.. with the Georgia militia. At the time General Joioistooi wats relieveol thl militia nomohered aloouot two otiottiatiol effectiveo and the "troops promised by (Govertnor Brown " wrrt joist beginning to assemolbole. Atlanta woos boot strongly fortified, atiod the Federal army on the east siole was at tle very gates of the city. Io about two weeks the old men and boys called out by G(oovernor Brown had arrived il sufficient naum- hera to itoerease tle effective militia force itl the trenehes to five thousand. At no time did it exeeed that number. If the fortifications of Atlanta had oeeno ' iooo- pregnable," as General Johnston asserts, tliswoould have given no assutrance of his ability to prevent Sherman from turning the position, cutting off its railroad communications, andl tItus making it uto- tenable for an army. It had neither provisions nor ammunition to enable it to resist a siege. Suppose that General Johnstoon had not been re- lieved, and General Sherman lad suspended his turning operations for two weeks - until the State troops promised by Governor Brown were as- sembled," what guarantee cosold be given that five thousand militia could hold Atlanta, whilst General Johnston with his army II leisurely" fell back " into the town," marched out against one of the flanks of the Federal army, and was " unsue- cessful " ' The Georgia militia were good fighters, but in the ease supposed I do not think they could have held Atlanta as " a secure place of ref- uge " for Johnston's army. But if the militia bad held the place whilst the three corps were utn- successful " on the outside Atlanta was no " secure place of refuge" for an army that could not, by hard and successful fighting, prevent the position from being turned. On the afternoon of the I Sth of July General Johnston gave up the command of the army to his successor. General John B. Hood. It will be borne in mind that General Johnston "expected an op- portunity to engage the enemy on terms of advan- tage while they were crossing Peach Tree Creek." On the 19th General Hood gave orders for two corps to take position ready to attack Thomas's army on Peach Tree Creek, whilst one corps watched and guarled against the movements of the armies oof Mceloowilsoon tiodl Schofield, cloosoly aopproachilng Atlanta otit tto onst side. Oo tliot night oof the Ilath llood govo. orders to the two -orts then ill the neo ighlborhloodl oof I'cenh Trio. ('reek to attaik Thlonti:os's asrny ill thlat los5itioti ot I t-. To. oooo the 20th. At thoo thine uoimod Thotomniu's oormy was engaged ill eossitog the -reek. Thlo orotoies of Secofieldo aold Metol'lhi rs-ooo wero' not withiti good supporting diototue.o, nand it is soofe too sooty tloat if HooI's oordler for tio ottitk at I P. ft. hilu beon promptly oloo.yod by the two coorps Thomaoos womuld oave met with soriomoos disaster bofore the for(oos of Sehofieol ori Iohel'hetsoto onolot hItavo reacheol him. Otwijog to uimismaooagement tof thoe leadilg coorpps fte V'otifodorate sttsok waos ole- layed until 4 0,. M., and was then made withoot proper cotocert of action. In thoe noeantiute the zodvance of MePherson's army ono tie east oof At- lanta was so threatening that it bmecame oecesstary late in the afternoonoo to oletith a division of the leading corps ott PIetseh Tree (reek and oetsd it to hold McPherson ilo oheck. That dtivisiono was soeoot off before it had been put in a-tion against Thomas. The Confederate attucok on the latter was repulsed. If Hood's orders hiold beon promptly obeyed, this attack would probably have r-sulted in a stagger- hiog blow to Sherman. But Thcnoas had safely crossed Peach Tree Creek, and was strooigly etab- lihed on its soott side. Schofield was again in fair communication with Thomas, and McPherson was extending his fortifications south of the rail- road leading to Amogousta, thlos threatening the rail- road leading to Macon. The militia oceupied the onfinished lines of Atlanta, south of the Augusta road, closely confronted by McPhersoou's fortifi- oations. General Hood deemed it necessary that MePher- son should be held back from the railroad leading to Macon. And he hoped by attaecing the rear of McPherson's fortified lines to bring on a general engagement that might result in the defeat of the Federal army. On the 21st be ordered one corps to fall back at dusk and move rapidly from Peach Tree Creek, through the eastern suburb of Atlanta, pass out to the south, around McPherson's extreme left, and attack the fortified lines of the latter from the direction of Decatur. When the Federals were thus assailed in rear an attack was to be made on their front by the Confederates from the Atlanta side. The corps that turned McPherson's left moved slowly, the attack was not made until late in the morning of the 22d, and was not then directed against the rear of the Federal lines, because the turning corps bad not moved far enough in the di- rection of Decattr before being sent into action. When that corps became engaged General Hool ordered the corps on my left to advance from its lines around Atlanta and attack the front of the Federals. Seeing this movement on my left, I formed the militia in line of battle in the trenches, and without waiting for orders moved my command over the parapet against a strong embrasure bat- tery in McPherson's line about one mile in front of our works. That battery had greatly annoyed 334 GEORGIA MILITIA ABOUT ATLANTA. us by its fire whilst we were engaged in completing our UlLfinisilled intren'liments. Anderson's bat- tery Ii...l..lipniiedl this miovfment and took posi- tion in p, n, grozmld supported by the militia on th right and left, within about four lihn(red yards of the Fedleral lines. The effective fire of the 4 my ill lur imtimedtiate front was soon silenced, lItd mly e,,mri.lad strongly lesired that orders should lh 1 givent for them to assault the -embrasure battlry. I woutdl not permit this to hle done at that time, because tie firing on iy right had eeased 50011 lafter the militia Imoved out of the hn.1es and the Confederate troops on my left had beto driven, back several liundred yards itl rcar of the position hedl by command. I ('onsidereld it useless to make all isolated attack with the Inilitia-about two thousand men. Btit they were retained in the po- Hition they first assumed, and I awaited develop- mentit. About two hours later came an order from Hiood to withdraw my command to the trenches. It, a letter to Governor Brown, July 23d, l S64, Gicnieral Hlotal says: "The State troops, under General (X. W. Smith, fought with great gallantry yesterday." After the battle (f the 22d of Jufly Sherman withdrew his left from its position threatening the railroad leading to Macon, and extended his right in the direction of the railroad leading to West linit. In the meantime he pressed his lines closer to the city on the north and west. On the 25th of July Hood fought the battle of Ezra ('hurch, a few miles west of Atlanta, in order to prevent Sherman from seizing the West Point railroad. From that time Sherman continued to extend his right. On the 31 st of August he sue- ceeded in cutting off all railroad communications with Atlanta, and that place was consequently evacuated by Hood on the 1st of September, after he had held Sherman closely at bay for seventy- five days. It will be noticed that Sherman had succeeded in forcing Johnston back from Dalton to Atlanta in a somewhat less length of time. My report of September 15th, 1864, says: " A few days after the ffair f the 22d of July I was ordered again to Poplar Spring, N . . . but was scarcely established in camp before we had to be placed in the trenches on the left of the Marietta road, and from that time until the end of the sIege we continued under close fire night and day. We had to move from one portion of the lines to another, and had our full share of all the hardest places. . . . The militia. although poorly armed, very few having proper equip- merits, more than two-thirds of thenm without cartridge- hoxes, almost without ambulances or other transporta- tion. most of the reserves ['State troups pronmed by Governor Brown'] neverhavingheen drilled at all, and the others but a few days. all performed well every ser- vice required of them during an arduous and dangerous canmpaign. They have been in service about one hun- dred days. during at least fifty of whieh they have been ouider close fire of the enemy mostlv night and day.. They have done good and substantial serviee in the cause of their country, and have established the fact that Georgia is willing and able to do somethingeffeetive in her own name, besides furnishing iore than her quota to the Confederate armies proper . . . There being a lull In active operations, the Governor has . . . Itemporarilyl withdrawn the Georgla militia from Con- federate service, and furloughed theu for thirty days." In his report Hood says: "This force rendered excellent and gallant service during the siege (f Atlanta." When again called into active service a few weeks later, the Georgia militia, although still uinder Hood's orders, did not form a part of his active operating army. During his Tennessee cam- paign the militia remained ill Georgia and p[- posed Sherman's army in its march to Savannah. As commander of a brigade, division, and eorps. Hood had proved himself an aggressive, bold, le- termined, alid careful fighter, perhaps a shadel too sanguine, and disposed to assume that subordinates would carry instructions into effect as fully as hie would have lone if in their place. His high replita- tion as a brigade and division commander was ae- quired in the Army of Northern Virginia. At tiet- tysblnrg he was crippled in one arm; he lost a leg close upto the hip-joint on the field of Chiekamaiga. From these causes he was not physically as active as he had been ill the early years of the war; bult he was an excellent horseman and could ride nearly as well as most men who have two legs and two arms. It may be assumed, however, that many of the "slips" made by his subordinates whilst he commanded the army might have been corrected by him if he had then been as much " at home on horseback" as he was before he was so badly maimed. As an army commander his orders were judicious and well-timed in the operations around Atlanta; but te was compelled to evacuate that place, and the cry arose, "Atlanta was ispreg.ab/l' and if General Johnston had not been superseded he would have held it forever." The fall of Atlanta was discouraging to the Con- federates in a degree that called for the utmost exertion on the part of the commander of that army to force the Federals to abandon that city, and, if possible, make them give lip all the terri- tory in north Georgia which had been yielded to them by General Johnston. The backing, digging, and constant service in trenches, from D)alton to Atlanta, had very per- ceptibly injured the morale of the Confederate forces before General Johnston was relieved from command. The condition of that army had not been improved by the loss of Atlanta. and its practical efficiency was likely to be ruined if the policy of backing and digging" was continued. Hood determined to move against the railroad over which Sherman. in Atlanta, drew all his supplies from Nashville, then invade Tennessee, transfer the theater of operations to that State, and perhaps to Kentucky and the Ohio River. He believed that a change from the defensive, in trenches, to the active offensive wotild reestablish the morale of his army, present many chances of success free north Georgia, and probably arrest the previous tide of Federal successes in the West. It seemed to him that the passive policy-wait- ing for Sherman to manceuvre the Confederate army back from one position to another -would re- sult in the perhaps slow but certain subjugation and occupation of all Georgia by the Federals, and the consequent probable downfall of the Confederacy. N Near the soath-wester suburb of Atlanta. 335 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA.) BY JOHN B. HOOD, GENERAL, C. S. A. AXOT 11 o'clock on the night of the l7th of July, 1 Ft64, I received a telegram from the War Office directing me to assume command of the Army of Tennessee. It is difficult to imagine a commander placed at the head of an army un- ier more embarrassing circumstances than those against which I was left to contend. I was eoin- paratively a stranger to the Army of Tennessee. The troops of the Army of Tennessee had for such length of time been subjected to the ruinous policy pursued from Daltons to Atlanta that they were unfitted for united action in pitched battle. They had. ill other words, been so long habituated to se- e(nritv behind breastworks that they had become wedded to the ' timid defensive " policy, and nat- urally regarded with distrust a commander likely to initiate offensive operations. The senior corps commander [Hardee] consid- ered he had been supplanted through my promo- tion, and thereupon determined to resign. Itl consequence, I have no doubt, of my application to President Davis to postpone the order trans- ferring to me the command of the army, he, how- ever. altered his decision, and coneluded to remain with his corps. The evening of the 1 5th of July found Gen- eral Johnston comfortably quartered at Maeonl, whilst McPherson's and Schofield's corps were tearing up the Georgia railroad between Stone Mountain and Decatur; Thomas's army was has- tening preparations to cross Peach Tree ('reek, within about six miles of Atlanta; and I was busily engaged ii hfuntig up the positions of, and establishing comumunication with, Stewart's and Hardee's corps. After having established communication with the corps and the cavalry of the army during the forepart of the nlight, I found myself upon the morning of the 1 9th in readiness to fulfill the grave duties devolving upon me. Our troops had awakened in me heartfelt sympa- thy, as I had followed their military career with deep interest from early in May of that year. I had witnessed their splendid condition at that period; had welcomed with pride the fine body of rednforcements under General Polk; but, with dis- appointment, I had seen them, day after day, turn their back upon the enemy, and lastly cross the Chattahoochee River on the night of the 9th of July with one-third of their number lost-the men downcast, dispirited, and demoralized. Stragglers and deserters, the captured and killed. could not now, however, be replaced by recruits, because all the recruiting depots had been drained to reenforce either Lee or Johnston. I could, therefore, but make the best dispositions in my power with the reduced numbers of the army, which opposed a force of 106,000 Federals., buoyant with sue- J Taken by permision and condensed trom General Hoodr work. - dvance and Retreat," published by General G. T. Beauregard for the Hood Orphan Memorial Fund, New Orleans, 1880.-EDITORS. 336 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. cess and hope, and who were fully equal to 140,- 000 such troops as confronted Johnston at Dalton, by reason of their victorious march of a hundred miles into the heart of the Confederaey. Accordingly, on the night of the I 8th and morning of the l9th I forned line of battle facing Peach Tree Creek [see map, p. 312]; the left rested near Pace's Ferry road, and the right covered Atlanta. I was informed on the 19th that Thomas was building bridges across Peach Tree Creek; that McPherson aneld Schofield were well over toward, and even on, the Georgia railroad, near Decatur. I perceived at once that the Federal commander had com- mittedl a serious blunder in separating his corps or armies by such distance as to allow me to con- centrate the main body of our army upon his right wing, whilst his left was so far removed as to be incapable of rendering timely assistance. General Sherman's violation of the established maxim that an army should always be held well within hand, or its detachments within easy sup- porting distance, afforded one of the most favor- able occasions for complete victory which could have been offered; especially as it presented an opportunity, after crushing his right wing, to throw our entire force upon his left. In fact, such a blunder affords a small army the best, if not the sole, chance of success when contending with a vastly superior force. Line of battle having been formed, Stewart's corps was in position on the left, Hardee's in the center, and Cheatham's (formerly Hood's] on the right. Orders were given to Generals Hardee and Stewart to observe closely and report promptly the progress of Thomas in the construction of bridges across Peach Tree Creek and the passage of troops. General Cheatham was directed to reconnoiter in front of his left; to erect, upon that part of his line, batteries so disposed as to command the entire space between bis left and Peach Tree Creek, in order to completely isolate McPherson's and Schofield's forces from those of Thomas; and, finally, to intrench his line thor- oughly. This object accomplished, and Thomas having partially crossed the creek and made a lodgment on the east side within the pocket formed by Peach Tree Creek and the Chattahoochee River, I determined to attack him with two corps -Har- dee's and Stewart's, which constituted the main body of the Confederate army -and thus, if pos- sible, crush Sherman's right wing, as we drove it into the narrow space between the creek and the river. Major-General G. W. Smith's Georgia State troops were posted on the right of Cheatham, and it was impossible for Schofield or McPherson to assist Thomas without recrossing Peach Tree Creek in the vicinity of Decatur, and making on the west side a detour which necessitated a march of not less than ten or twelve miles, in order to reach Thomas's bridges across this creek. I im- mediately assembled the three corps commanders, Hardee, Stewart, and Cheatham, together with Major-General G. W. Smith, commanding Georgia State troops, for the purpose of giving orders for battle on the following day, the 20th of July. The three corps commanders, together with Gen- eral G. W. Smith, were assembled not only for the purpose of issuing tothem orders for battle. but with the special design to deliver most explicit instruc- tions in regard totheir respeetiveduties. I sought to " make assurance doubly sure " by direct interroga- tory; each was asked whether or not he understood his orders. All replied in the affirmative. I was very careful in this respect, inasmuch as I had learned from long experience that no measure is more important, upon the eve of battle, than to make certain, in the presence of the commanders, that each thoroughly comprehends his orders. Thin usual discretion allowed these officers in no manner diminishes the importance of this precaution. I also deemed it of equal moment that each should fully appreciate the imperativeness of the orders then issued, by reason of the certainty that our troops would encounter hastily constructed works, thrown up by the Federal troops which had been foremost to cross Peach Tree Creek. Al- though a portion of the enemy would undoubtedly be found under cover of temporary breastworks, it was equallycertain a largerportion would be caught in the act of throwing up such works, and in just the state of confusion to enable our forces to rout them by a bold and persistent attack. With these convictions, I timed the assault at 1 P. M., so as to surprise the enemy in their unsettled condition. The charge was unfortunately not made till about 4 o'clock P. x., on account of General Hardee's fail- ure to obey my specific instructions in regard to the extension of the one-half division front to the right, in order to afford General Cheatham an ad- vantageous position to hold in check McPherson and Schofield. The result was not, however, ma- terially affected by this delay, since the Federals were completely taken by surprise. General Stewart carried out his instructions to the letter; he moreover appealed in person to his troops before going into action, and informel them that orders were imperative they shouldl carry everything, at all hazards, on their side of Peach Tree Creek; he impressed upon them that they should not halt before temporary breastworks, but charge gallantly over every obstacle and rout the enemy. It was evident that, after long-con- tinued use of intrenchments, General Stewart deemed a personal appeal to his soldiers expedient. General Stewart and his troops nobly performed their duty in the engagement of the 2(0th. At the time of the attack his corps moved boldly forward, drove the enemy from his works, and held pos- session of them until driven out by an enfilade fire of batteries placed in position by General Thomas. Unfortunately, the corps on Stewart's right, al- though composed of the best troops in the army, virtually accomplished nothing. In lieu of moving promptly, attacking as ordered. and supporting Stewart's gallant assault, the troops of Hardee -as their losses on that day indicate-did nothing more than skirmish with the enemy. Instead of charg- ing down upon the foe as Sherman represents Stew- art's men to have done, many of the troops, when they discovered that they had come into contact 337 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. LICUTENANT-OFNERAL AtLEX. 1. STEWUT, eC. S. A. V N1 A -N111T oeRV1,II. with breastworks, lay down, and, consequently, this attempt at pitched battle proved abortive. The failure on the 20th rendered urgent the most active measures, in order to save Atlanta even for a short period. Through the vigilance of General Wheeler I received information, during the night of the 20th, of the exposed position of McPher- son's left flank; it was standing out in air, near the Georgia railroad between Decatur and Atlanta, and a large number of the enemy's wagons had been parked in and around Deeatur. The roads were in good condition, and ran in the direction to enable a large body of our army to march, under cover of darkness, around this exposed flank and attack in rear. I determined to make all aecessary preparations for a renewed assault; to attack the extreme left of the Federals in rear and flank. and endeavor to bring the entire Confederate army into united action. Accordingly, Ilardee's and Stewart's corps re- sumed their former positions. Colonel Presstman, chief engineer, was instructed to examine at once the partially completed line of works toward Peach Tree Creek, which General Johnston had ordered to be constructed for the defense of Atlanta, and to report, at the earliest moment, in regard to their fitness to be occupied by Stewart's and Cheat- ham's corps, together with the Georgia State troops, under General G. W. Smith. The report was re- ceived early on the morning of the 21st, to the effect that the line established by Johnston was not only too close to the city and located upon too low ground, but was totally inadequate for the purpose designed; that Sherinan's line, which extended from the vic-inity of Decatur almost to the I)Dlton railroad, north of t Atlanta, rendered necessary the eonstruc- tion of an entirely new line, and upon more elevated ground. The ehief engineer was thereupon di- reeted to prepare and stake off a new line, and to employ his entire foree, in, order that the troops might occupy the works soon after dark on the night of the 21st, and have time to aid in strength- ening their position before (lawn of next morning. This task was soon executed through the skill and energy of Colonel Presstman and his assistants. Generals Stewart, Cheatham, and (i. W. Smith were instructed to order their division and bri- gade commanders to examine before dark the ground to be occupied by their re- spective troops, so as to avoid confusion or delay at the time of the movement. General Hardee, who commanded the largest corps, and wbose troops were com- paratively fresh, as they had taken but little part in the attack of the previous day, was ordered to hold his forces in readiness to move promptly at dark that night-the 21st. I selected Hardee for this duty, because Cheatham had, at that time, but little experience as a corps com- mander, and Stewart had been heavily engaged the day previous. The position of the enemy during the 21st re- mained, I may say, unchanged, with the exception that Schofield and McPherson had advanced slightly toward Atlanta. To transfer after dark our entire line from the immediate presence of the enemy to another line around Atlanta, and to throw Hardee, the same night, entirely to the rear and flank of McPherson-as Jackson was thrown, in a similar movement, at Chancellorsville and Second Manassas-and to initiate the offensive at daylight, required no small effort upon the part of the men and officers. I hoped, however, that the assault would result not only in a general battle, but in a signal victory to our arms. It was absolutely necessary these operations should be executed that same night, since a delay of even twenty-four hours would allow the enemy time to intrench further, and afford Sherman a chance to rectify, in a measure, his strange blunder in separating Thomas so far from Schofield and McPherson. I well knew he would seek to retrieve his over- sight at the earliest possible moment; therefore I determined to forestall his attempt and to make another effort to defeat the Federal army. No time was to be lost in taking advantage of this second unexpected opportunity to achieve victory and relieve Atlanta. 338 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. I was convinced that McPherson and Schofield intended to destroy riot only the Georgia railroad. but likewise our main line of communication, the railroad to Macon. It is now evident the blow on the 20th checked the reckless manner of moving, which hadl so long been practiced by the enemy, without fear of molestation, during the Dalton- Atlanta campaign. The rap of warning received l)y Thomas, on.. Peach Tree Creek, must have in- dUced the Federal commander to alter his plan. Thus was situated the Federal army at the close of flight, on the 21st: it was but l)artially in- trenched ; Schofield and McPherson were still sepa- rated from Thomas, and at such distance as to -ompel them to make a detour of about twelve miles, in order to reach the latter in time of need. The Confederate army occupied the same posi- tion., at dark, as prior to the attack of the 20th. The new line around the city, however, had been e-hosen; each eorps commander frilly advised of the ground assigned to him, and the special duty devolving upon him; working parties had been de- tailed in advance from the corps of Stewart and Cheatham, and from the Georgia State troops; rations and ammunition had been issued, and Hardee's corps instructed to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning. The demonstrations of the enemy upon our right, and which threatened to destroy the Macon rail- road,-our main line for receiving supplies,- rendered it imperative that I should check, im- mediately, his operations in that direction; other- wise Atlanta was doomed to fall at a very early day. Although the attack of the 20th had caused Sherman to pause and reflect, I do not think he would have desisted extending his left toward our main line of communication had not the events occurred which I am about to narrate. As already stated, every preparation had been carefully made during the day of the 21st. I had summoned, moreover, to my headquarters the three corps commanders, Hardee, Stewart, and Cheat- ham, together with Major-General Wheeler, com- manding cavalry corps, and Major-General G. W. Smith, commanding Georgia State troops. The following minute instructions were given in the presence of all assembled, in order that each might understand not only his own duty, but likewise that of his brother corps commanders. By this means I hoped each officer would know what sup- port to expect from his neighbor in the hour of battle. Stewart, Cheatham, and G. W. Smith were or- dered to occupy soon after dark the positions assigned them in the new line round the city, and to intrench as thoroughly as possible. General Shoup, chief-of-artillery, was ordered to mass artillery on our right. General Hardee was di- rected to put his corps in motion soon after dusk; to move south on the McDonough road, across En- trenchment Creek at Cobb's Mills, and completefy to turn the left of McPherson's army and attack at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible. He was furnished guides from Wheeler's cavalry, who were familiar with the various roads in that di- rection; was given clear and positive orders to detach his corps, to swing away from the main body of the army, and to march entirely around and to the rear of McPherson's left flank, even if he was forced to go to or beyond Decatur, which is only about six miles from Atlanta. Major-General Wheeler was ordered to move on Hardee's right with all the cavalry at his disposal, and to attack with Hardee at daylight. General Cheatham, who was in line of battle on the right and around the city, was instructed to take up the movement from his right as soon as Hardee sue- eeeded in forcing back, or throwing into confusion, MAJoR-aENEaAL W. iR. T. W ILKER C. S. A.- KILLtED -EAR YTLANtTA, JULY -2. 184. FROM A P-0`TD0.ipTL the Federal left, and to assist in driving the enemy down and back upon Peach Tree Creek, from right to left. General G. W. Smith would, thereupon, join in the attack. General Stewart, posted on the left, was instructed not only to occupy and keep a strict watch upon Thomas, in order to prevent him from giving aid to Schofield and Me- Pherson, but to engage the enemy the instant the movement became general, i. e., as soon as Hardee and Cheatham succeeded in driving the Federals down Peach Tree Creek and near his right. Thus orders were given to attack from right to left, and to press the Federal army down. and against the deep and muddy stream in their rear. These orders were carefully explained again and again, till each officer present gave assurance that he fully comprehended his duties. At dawn on the morning of the 22d, Cheatham, Stewart, and G. W. Smith had, by alternating working parties during the night previous, not 339 341) THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. only strongly fortified their respective positions, It had rested in his power to rout McPherson's but had kept their men comparatively fresh for army by simply moving a little further to the action, aid were in readiness to act as soon as the right, and attacking in rear and flank instead of battle was initiated by Hardee, who was supposed assaulting an intrenched flank. I hoped, never- to be at that moment in rear of the adversary's theless, this blunder would be remedied, at least Ha,k. in part, by the extreme right of his line lapping I took my position at daybreak near ('heatham's round, during the attack, to the rear of McPherson. right, whence I could observe the left of the I anxiously awaited tidings from the scene of enemy's intrenehments, which seemed to be action while listening attentively to what throwi back a short distance on their ex- seemed a spirited engagement upon tretne left. After awaiting nearly the that part of the field. This sound entire morning, I heard, about 10 or 1 I proceeded from the guns of the gal- o'clock, skirmishing going on direetly lant Wheeler, in the direction of opposite the left of the enemy, which was in front of Cheatham's right and Shoup's artillery. A considerable time had elapsed when I discovered, with astonishment anal bitter disap- pointment, a line of battle composed of one of Hardee's divisions advan- eing directly against the intrenched 4 flank of the enemy. I at once per- ceived that Hardee had not only failed to turn McPherson's left, ac- cording to positive orders, but had thrown his men against the enemy's X breastworks, thereby occasioning un- necessary loss to us, and rendering doubtful the great result desired. In lieu of completely turning the Federal left and taking the intrenched line of I it\ r WT t THU, UNION ' id ' O,', TttE POITEYR B1USV, AT- . VIEW OFt THlE COUERittATI: LINE AT rTtt tOTTER tttNE.C iFENtEi I't ATLAN'tA, ILOti- ING NOilTHt-FAST. RM t - TU Mi.TE 1110tOGR71IU-. Decatur, whence I hoped, momentarily, to hear a cnn- tinuous roar of musketry, accompanied by the genu- ine Coitfederate shout from Hardee's entire corps, as it advanced and drove the en- emy down Peach Tree Creek between our general line of battle and that formidable the enemy in reverse, he attacked the retired wing stream. Although the troops of Hardee fought. of their flank, having his own left almost within seemingly, with determination and spirit, there gunshot of our main line around the city. I were indications that the desired end was not be- then began to fear that his disregard of the fixed ing accomplished. The roar of musketry occurring rule in war, that one danger in rear is more to be only at intervals strengthened this impression, feared than ten in front,-in other words, that one and a staff-officer was dispatched to Geiieral thousand men in rear are equal to ten thousand in Hardee to know the actual result. front, -would cause us much embarrassment, and During the early afternoon I received information place his corps at great disadvantage, notwith- that the attack had been, in part, successful, but standing he had held success within easy grasp. had been checked in consequence of our troops THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. coming in contact with different lines of intrench- ments, several of which they had carried and held. Fearing a concentration of the enemy upon Hardee, I commanded General Cheatham, about 3 P. M., to move forward with his corps and attack the posi- tion in his front, so as to, at least, create a diver- sion. The order was promptly and well executed, and our troops succeeded in taking possession of the enemy's defenses in that part of the field. A heavy enfilade fire, however, forced Cheatham to abandon the works he had captured. Major-General G. W. Smith, perceiving that (Cheatham had moved out on his left, and having thoroughly comprehended all the orders relative to the battle, moved gallantly forward with his State troops in support of Cheatham's attack, but was eventually forced to retire on account of su- periority of numbers in his front. Hardee bore off as trophies eight guns and thir- teen stand of colors, and, having rectified his line, remained in the presence of the enemy. Cheatham captured five guns and five or six stand of colors. Notwithstanding the non-fulfillment of the brill- iant result anticipated, the partial success of that dJay was productive of much benefit to the army. It greatly improved the morale of the troops, in- tused new life and fresh hopes, arrested deser- tions, which had hitherto been numerous, defeated the movement of McPherson and Schofield upon our communications in that direction, and demon- strated to the foe our determination to abandon no more territory without at least a manful effort to retain it. l, became apparent almost immediately afterthe battle of the 22d that Sherman would make an at- tack upon our left, in order to destroy the Macon railroad; and, from that moment, I may say, be- gan the siege of Atlanta. The battles of the 20th and 22d checked the enemy's reckless manner of moving, and illustrated effectually to Sherman the danger of stretching out his line in such a manner as to form extensive gaps between his corps or armies as he admits he did at Rocky Face Ridge and New Hope Church. On the 26th of July the Federals were reported to be moving to our left. This movement con- tinued during the 27th, when I received the ad- ditional information that their cavalry was turning our right, in the direction of Flat Bock, with the intention, as I supposed, of interrupting our main line of communication, the Macon railroad. We had lost the road to Augusta previous to the de- parture of General Johnston on the 18th, and, by the 22d, thirty miles or more thereof had been utterly destroyed. The Federal commander continued to move by his right flank to our left, his evident intention being to destroy the only line by which we were still able to receive supplies. The railroad to West Point, because of its proximity to the Chat- tahoochee River, was within easy reach of the enemy whenever he moved far enough to the right to place his left flank upon the river. Therefore, after the destruction of the Augusta road, the holding of Atlanta -unless some favorable oppor- tunity offered itself to defeat the Federals in battle -depended upon our ability to hold intact the road to Macon. General Wheeler started on the 27th of July in pursuit of the Federal cavalry which had moved around our right; and General [W. H.] Jackson, with the brigades of [Thomas] Harrison and [L. S.] Ross, was ordered, the following day, to push vigorously another body of the enemy's cavalry which was reported to have crossed the river, at Campbeliton, and to be moving, via Fairburn, in the direction of the Macon road. On the 28th it was apparent that Sherman was also moving in the same direction with his main body. Lieu- tenant-General S. D. Lee was instructed to move out with his corps upon the Lick-Skillet road, and to take the position most advantageous to prevent or delay the extension of the enemy's right flank. This officer promptly obeyed orders, and in the afternoon, unexpectedly, came in con- tact with the Federals in the vicinity of Ezra Church, where a spirited engagement ensued. The enemy was already in possession of a portion of the ground Lee desired to occupy, and the struggle grew to such dimensions that I sent Lieutenant- General Stewart to his support. The contest lasted till near sunset without any material advantage having been gained by either opponent. Our troops failed to dislodge the enemy from their position, and the Federals likewise to capture the position occupied by the Confederates. Whilsttheseoperations were in progress, Wheeler and Jackson were in hot pursuit of the Federal cavalry; General Lewis's infantry brigade having been sent to Jonesboro', the point about which I supposed the raiders would strike our communica- tions. At an early hour on the 29th dispatches were received from various points upon the Macon road to the effect that General Wheeler had success- fully checked the enemy at Latimer's, and was quietly awaiting developments. On our left, the Federals succeeded in eluding our cavalry, for a time, by skirmishing with our main body, whilst their main force moved round to the rear and cut the telegraph lines at Fairburn and Palmetto. General Jackson, however, soon discovered the ruse, and marched rapidly toward Fayetteville and Jonesboro', the direction in which the Federals had moved. The enemy succeeded in destroying a wagon-train at the former place, in capturing one or two quartermasters who afterward made their escape, and in striking the Macon road about four miles below Jonesboro', when the work of destruction was begun in earnest. General Lewis, within three hours afterreceiving the order, had placed his men on the ears and was in Jonesboro' with his brigade ready for action. Meantime Jackson was coming up with his cavalry, when the Federals became alarmed and aban- doned their work, but not without having de- stroyed about a mile and a half of the road, which was promptly repaired. While Jackson followed in pursuit and Lewis returned to Atlanta, Wheeler moved across from Latimer's, wiTh a portion of his command, in rear of this body of the enemy, leaving General Iverson 341 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. to pursue General Stoneman, who, after some- what further damaging the Augusta road and burning the bridges aeross Walnut Creek and the Oconee River, had moved against Macon. These operations had been ordered by General Sherlman upon a grand seale; picked men and horse! had been placed under the command of General. MleCook and Stoneman, with the purpose to de- stroy our sole line of communication, and to re- lease, at Andersonville, 34,000 Federal prisoners. These raiders, under Mc(ook, came in contact with General lioddey's cavalry at Newnan, and were there held in check till Wheeler's and Jack- son's troops came up; whereupon the combined forces, directed by General Wheeler, attacked the enemy with vigor and determination, and finally routed them. Whilst these operations were pro- gressing in the vicinity of Newnan, General Cobb was gallantly repelling the assault of Stoneman at Macon, when Iverson came up and engaged the enemy with equal spirit and suecess. The flanks of the Federal army were at this juncture so well protected by the Chattahoochee and the deep ravines which ran down into the river, that my antagonist was enabled to throw his entire force of cavalry against the Macon road; and but for the superiority of the Confederate cavalry he might have succeeded to such extent as to cause us great annoyance and subject our troops to short rations for a time. After the utter failure of this experiment Gen- eral Sherman perceived that his mounted force, about twelve thousand in number, in concert with a corps of infantry as support, could not so effectu- ally destroy our main line of communication as to compel us to evacuate Atlanta. Wheeler and Iverson having thus thoroughly crippled the Federal cavalry, I determined to de- taeh all the troops of that arm that I could possibly spare, and expedite them, under the command of Wheeler, against Sherman's railroad to Nashville; at the same time to request of the proper authori- ties that General Maury, commanding at Mobile, be instructed to strike with small bodies the line at different points, in the vicinity of the Tennessee River, and also that Forrest be ordered, with the whole of his available force, into Tennessee for the same object. I intended Wheeler should oper- ate, in the first instance, south of Chattanooga. I was hopeful that this combined movement would compel Sherman to retreat for want of sup- plies, and thus allow me an opportunity to fall upon his rear with our main body. In accordance with my determination to attempt. with cavalry, the destruction of Sherman's road, I ordered General Wheeler, with 4500 men, to begin operations at once. He succeeded in burning the bridge over the Etowah; recaptured Dalton and Resaca; destroyed about 35 miles of railroad in the vicinity, and captured about 300 mules and 1000 horses; he destroyed in addition about 50 miles of railroad in Tennessee. General Forrest, with his usual energy, struck shortly afterward the Federal line of supplies in this State, and inflicted great damage upon the enemy. Forrest and Wheeler accomplished all but the impossible with their restricted numbers, and the former, finally, was driven out of Tennessee by superior forces. So vast were the facilities of the Federal com- mander to rednforce his line of skirmishers, extend- ing from Nashville to Atlanta, that we could not bring together a suffieient force of cavalry to ac- complish the desired object. I thereupon became convinced that no sufficiently effective number of cavalry could be assembled in the Confederacy to interrupt the enemy's line of supplies to an extent to compel him to retreat. A heavy demonstration was niade on the (ith against Bate's division, which was twice as- saulted; twice the foe were driven back in great confusion, with a loss of two stand of colors, eight hundred killed and wounded, some small- arms and intrenching tWols. On the 7th General Cleburne's division was transferred to our extreme left, and the 9th was made memorable by the most furious cannonade which the city sustained during the siege. Women and children fled into cellars, and were forced to seek shelter a greater length of time than at any period of the bombardment. The 19th, nigh two weeks after Wheeler's de- parture with about onme-half of our cavalry force, General Sherman took advantage of the absence of these troops, and again attempted a lodgment on the Macon road with cavalry. At 3:30 A. m. General Kilpatrick was reported to be moving, via Fairburn, in the direction of Jonesboro'. General Jackson quickly divined his object, moved rapidly in pursuit, overtook him at an early hour, at- tacked and forced him to retreat after sustaining considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Federals had previously destroyed a mile and a half of the Macon road, and they bad cut the wires and burned the depot at Jonesboro'. Our cavalry also drove a brigade of the enemy from the Augusta road on the 22d, which affair, together with the happy results obtained in the engagement with Kilpatrick, demonstrated con- clusively that, the absence of one-half of our mounted force notwithstanding, we had still a suf- ficient number, with Jackson, to protect not only the flanks of the army, but likewise our communi- cations against similar raids, and, moreover, to defend our people against pillaging expeditions. The severe handling by Wheeler and Iverson of the troops under Stormeman and MeCook, together with Jackson's success, induced me not to recall Wheeler's 4500 men, who were still operating against the railroad to Nashville. I had, more- over, become convinced that our cavalry was able to compete successfully with double their number. Our cavalry were not cavalrymen proper, but were mounted riflemen, trained to dismount and hold in check or delay the advance of the enrmy, and who had learned by experience that they could without much difficulty defeat the Federal cavalry. The bombardment of the city continued till the 25th of August; it was painful, yet strange, to mark how expert grew the old men, women, and ehildren in building their little underground forts, in which to fly for safety during the storm of shell and shot. Often 'mid the darkness of night were 342 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. they constrained to seek refuge in these dungeons beneath the earth; albeit, I cannot recall one word from their lips expressive of dissatisfaction or willingness to surrender. Sherman had now been over one month contin- uously moving toward our left and thoroughly forti- fying, step by step, as he advanced in the direc- tion of the Macon railroad. On the night of the 25th he withdrew from our immediate front; his works, which at an early hour the following morn- ing we discovered to be abandoned, were occupied at a later hour by the corps of Stewart and Lee. On the 27th General G. W. Smith's division was ordered to the left to occupy the position of Stev- enson's division which, together with Maury's comi- mand, was held in recerve. Early the following morning the enemy were reported by [F. C.] Arm- strong in large force at Fairburn, on the West Point road. It became at once evident that Sher- man was moving with his main body to destroy the Macon road, and that the fate of Atlanta de- pended upon our ability to defeat this movement. Reynolds's and Lewis's brigades were dispatched to Jonesboro' to cooperate with Armstrong. Gen- eral Adams, at Opelika, was directed to guard the defenses of that place with renewed vigilance, while General Maury was requested to render him assistance, if necessary. The chief quartermaster, ordnance officer, and commissary were given most explicit instructions in regard to the disposition of their respective stores. All surplus property, supplies, etc., were ordered to the rear, or to be placed on cars in readiness to move at any mo- ment the railroad became seriously threatened. Armstrong was instructed to establish a line of couriers to my headquarters, in order to report every hour, if requisite, the movements of the enemy. In fact, every precaution was taken not only to hold our sole line of communication unto the last extremity, but also, in case of failure, to avoid loss or destruction of stores and material. On the 29th the Federals marched slowly in the direction of Rough and Ready and Jonesboro'. A portion of Brown's division was directed to take position at the former place and fortify thoroughly, in order to afford protection to the road at that point. General Hardee, who was at this juncture in the vicinity of East Point, was instructed to make such disposition of his troops as he con- sidered most favorable for defense; and, in ad- dition, to hold his corps in readiness to march at the word of command. Jackson and Armstrong received orders to report the different positions of the corps of the enemy at dark every night. The morning of the 30th found our general line extended farther to the left-Hardee being in the vicinity of Rough and Ready with Lee's corps on his right, near East Point. Information from our cavalry clearly indicated that the enemy would strike our road at Jonesboro'. After consultation with the corps commanders, I determined upon the following operations as the last hope of hold- ing on to Atlanta. A Federal corps crossed Flint River, at about 6 P. M., near Jonesboro', and made an attack upon Lewis's brigade, which was gallantly repulsed. This action became the signal for battle. General Hardee was instructed to move rapidly with his troops to Jonesboro', whither Lieutenant-General Lee, with his corps, was ordered to follow during the night. Hardee was to attack with the entire force early on the morning of the 31st, and drive the enemy, at all hazards, into the river in their rear. In the event of success, Lee and his com- mand were to be withdrawn that night back to Rough and Readly; Stewart's corps, together with Major-General G. W. Smith's State troops, were to form line of battle on Lee's right, near East Point, and the whole force move forward the following morning, attack the enemy in flank, and drive him down Flint River and the West Point rail- road. In the meantime the cavalry was to hold in check the corps of the enemy, stationed at the railroad bridge across the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Peach Tree Creek, whilst Hardee advanced from his position near Jonesboro', or directly on Lee's left. Such were the explicit instructions delivered. I impressed upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta rested upon his ability, with the aid of two corps, to drive the Federals across Flint River, at Jonesboro'. I also instructed him in the event of failure-which would necessitate the evacuation of the city-to send Lee's corps, at dark, back to or near Rough and Ready, in order to protect our retreat to Lovejoy's Station. The attack was not made till about 2 P. x., and then resulted in our inability to dislodge the enemy. The Federals had been allowed time, by the delay, to strongly intrench; whereas had the assault been made at an early hour in the morning the enemy would have been found but partially protected by works. General Hardee transmitted to me no official report at that period, nor subsequently, of his operations whilst under my command. I find, however, from the diary in my possession that his corps succeeded in gaining a portion of the Federal works; the general attack, notwithstanding, must have been rather feeble, as the loss incurred was only about 1400 in killed and wounded-a small number in comparison to the forces engaged. Among the wounded were General Patton Ander- son and General Cumming, who were disabled whilst gallantly leading their troops into action. This failure gave to the Federal army the con- trol of the Macon road, and thus necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta at the earliest hour possible. I was not so much pained by the fall of Atlanta as by the recurrencc of retreat, which I full well knew would further demoralize the army and renew desertions. The loss of over 4000, sus- tained from this same cause during the change from Kenesaw Mountain to and across the Chatta- hoochee, augmented my great reluctance to order the army to again turn its back to the foe. HEo-- beit, the presence of 34,000 Federal prisoners at Andersonville rendered it absolutely incum- bent to place the army between Sherman and that point, in order to prevent the Federal commander from turning loose this large body. . . Thus the proximity of these prisoners to Sherman's army 343 THE DEFENSE OF ATLANTA. not only foreed me to remain in a position to guard the country against the fearful calamity aforemen- tioned, but also thwarted my design to move north, across Peach Tree Creek and the Chattahoochee, back to Marietta, where I would have destroyed the enemy's communieations and supplies, and then have taken position near the Alabama line, with the Blue Mountain railroad in rear, by whieh means the Confederate army could, with ease, have been provisioned. in, lieu of the foregoing operations, the battle of Jonesboro' was fought, and on the following day, September 1st, at 2 A. Y., Lieutenant-General Lee, with his corps, marched from Jonesboro' to the vicinity of Rough and Ready, and so posted his troops as to protect our flank, whilst we marched out of Atlanta at 5 P. N. the same day, on the MclDonough road, in the direction of Lovejoy's Station. Generals Morgan and Scott, stationed at East Point, received similar orders to protect our flank during the retreat. Upon our uninterrupted march, information reached me that Hardee's corps was engaged with a large force of the enemy. His position upon a ridge with an open country in rear relieved me from speeial anxiety in regard to the safety of himself and command. Lieutenant-General Stew- art, nevertheless, was instructed to hasten forward to his support, and General Lee to follow promptly with his corps. When these retnforeemeuts reached the scene of action the contest had ceased. Hardee's troops had been attacked by a considerable foree; but in consequence of the pro- teetion afforded by their breastworks their loss in killed and wounded was small in comparison to that of the enemy. The Federals, who largely ex- eeeded them in numbers, forced them. back a short distance from the position they primarily occupied, and necessitated the abandonment of two four- gun batteries. This engagement was the only event of importance which occurred during our con- tinuous march from Atlanta to Lovejoy's Station. I have often thought it strange Sherman should have occupied himself with attacking Hardee's in- trenched position, instead of failing upon our main body on the march round to his rear. Notwithstanding full and positive instructions, delivered prior to the evacuation of the city, and ample time and facilities afforded to move all stores, cars, and engines, the chief quartermaster grossly neglected to send off a train of ordnance stores and five engines, although they were on the track and in readiness to move. This negligence entailed the unnecessary loss of these stores, engines, and about eighty ears. The stores which had been abandoned were blown up at about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 2d September, and the rear-guard soon thereafter marched out of Atlanta. That night, and the morning of the 3d, our troops filed into position in Sherman's front, which was then near Jonesboro'. By the 4th our entire army was at this point, on the Maeon road. On the 6th the Federals withdrew from our im- mediate front and moved off in the direction of Atlanta. General Sherman published orders stat- ing that his army would retire to East Point, De- catur, and Atlanta, and repose after the fatigue of the campaign through which it had passed. We were apprised of these instructions soon after their issuance-as well as of nigh every important movement of the enemy-through the vigilance of our cavalry, spies, and scouts, and from informa- tion received through Federal prisoners. Upon this date it may be justly considered that the oper- ations round Atlanta ceased. We had maintained a defense, during forty-six days, of an untenable position, and had battled almost incessantly, day and dight, with a force of about 45,000 against an army of 106,000 effectives, flushed with vic- tory upon victory from Dalton to Atlanta. ALSO P. NI). FROM A WAR-TIME PROTOGRAPIL 344 -.- , g - M I', , "Di, , U 11 I "I I I , gn.M , " '' 1- I I U.ION JDEFE-,48ES AT ALLATOONA PASS (SEE THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. BY RICHIARD B. IRWIT-, LIEVTENANT-COLONEL, 1. H. V., ASSISTANT AtDJJUTANT-(.ENERAX.. DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF. AFTER the fall of Port Hudson on the Sth of July, 1863, the forees of the Department of the Gulf, instead of going at once against Mobile as urged by General Grant, General Banks, ) and Admiral Farragut, and thus lending an effective support to the main operations about Chattanooga at a critical period, were occupied in attempting to carry out the orders of the Government to restore the flag in Texas. General Banks was informed by General Halleck that the Government fully appreciated the importance of the proposed operations against Mobile, I but there were important reasons, reasons other than military, why the Texas movement should be made first and with the least possible delay, by sea or land. A combined naval and mili- tary operation by the Red River was indicated as the best mode of carrying out the object; the selection of the route was, however, left to General Banks, Gut as to the movement itself he was distinctly told there was no choice and that the views of the Government must be carried out. 4 The first attempt to carry them out led to the unfortunate expedition to Sabine Pass, in September [see Vol. III., p. 598], the object of which was to gain a footing on the coast by surprise. Its summary failure put that idea out Banks to Halleek, July 23d. 30th, and August dent Lin-oln himself: see Lincoln to Stanton, Ju1ly 1st, 1863. And see General Grant's article, Vol. 29th, 1863. Ill., p. 679, of this w oork. General Hilcek's own opinion of the relative ZjHalleck to Banks, July 24th, August (6th. value of the Mobile and Texas eampaigns is in- latth, and 12th. There is some reason for think- dicated in his dispatch to General Banks of July ing that the idea may have originated with Presi- 24th: '1 think Texas much the most important." VOL. IV. 23 345 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. of the question, anld the route proposed by General lialleek being at that Inoll(elnt qIlite impractiabthle, because the Red River is oliy navigable during a few weeks in the spring, General Baniks at once conll(elltrate(l his troops on the Teelhe for a renetwal of the attempt by niovilig direetlv west across the prairie by way of Nihlett's Bluff. However, it did not take long to realize that to march an armyv three hundred miles aeross a barren eouintry, with no water in the sunnllier and fall, and plenty of water l)ut .no road in the winter and spring, was really not to be thought of, especially wleit the coluimnit would have to guard against an active enemy on its flank and rear (lurling the mareb and to meet and overcom)ne another at its end. Accordingly, General Banks reverted to his first idea of making the attempt by sea, and selected the Thirteenth Corps, then eommanded by Major-Gell- eral C. C. Washburn, I for the service. To Major-Genteral N. J. T. I)ana was assigned the duty of effecting the first landing at Brazos Santiago, at the mouth of the Rio Grrande. The expedition, General Baanks himself accompanying it, sailed front New Orleans on the 26th of October, under co0)nvoy of the M[inonqaheht, Ota'Ssco, and Virgn ia. After eneountering a severe "norther" on the 30th, from which the men, animals, and transports suffered greatly, on the 2d of November Dana landed on Brazos Island, drove off the small (onfederate force on the mainland on the 3d, and on the 6th occupied Brownsville, thirty miles up the river. Point Isabel was oeeupied on the Sth. With the foot-hold thus gained, General Banks's plan was to occupy successively all the passes or inlets that conneet the Gulf of Mexico with the land-loeked lagoons or sounds of the Texas coast from the Rio Grande to the Sabine. Leaviiig Dana i eommtanid on the Rio Granide, a strong detach- ment, under Brigadier-General T. E. G. Ransom, embarked on the 16th, landed at Corpus Christi, occupied Mustang Island, crossed Aransas Pass, and moved on Pass Cavallo, where the Confederates had a strong work called Fort Espe- ranza, commanding the entrance to Matagorda Bay. This was captured on the 30th of December, the Confederates retiring to the mainland. These operations, though completely successful so far and at small cost, being, indeed, almost unopposed, were not satisfactory to the Government. However, General Banks, being committed to the movement, was proceeding to complete the conquest of the Texas coast by moving in force against the strong Confederate positions at Galveston and the mouth of the Brazos when (General Halleck on the 4th of January renewed his instructions of the pre- vious summer for the naval and military operation on the Red River; this time it was to be on a larger scale, for Steele was also to advance to the Red River from the line of the Arkansas, and General Grant was to cooperate with such troops as lie could spare during the winter from the military division of the Mississippi. Since it has been claimed that these instructions were not positive, that they onil required General Banks to communicate with Gen- eral Sherman, General Steele, and Admiral Porter, it may be enough to I Major-General E. 0. C. Ord, who had sue- on sick leave at this time and did not return to the ceeded Major J. A. MeClerijand ill command of Department of the Gulf, being assigned to duty the Thirteenth Army Corps, before Vicksburg, was with the Army of the James in the summer of 1864. 346 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. observe that they did instruct General Banks to communicate with the officers nained, that each of those generals as well as General (Grant received corre- sporitling instriuitions, that Admiral Porter read. those ad(lresseld to C'reneral flanks and that all five commanders undlerstood and executed these orders inl tfl same sense.\ General Banks repliedl, expressing his concurrence in hlilleck's plan. This may have been a mistake. Yet, though a soldier may often he exetsed, and sometimes even praised, for disobeying orders, he call never lee blamed for obeying themn when all the conditions art, known to his stuperior, and, it is unnecessary to burrow in search of a motive for the cheerful performance of duty. In an elaborate and carefully prepared nenronir by his chief engineer, Major D. (C. Houston, General Banks pre- sented a cletar view of the difficulties to be encountered and the conditions deemed essential to suecess. These conditions (all of which except the fourth, in the result, shared the general fate of "ifs," by being completely disre- garded) were, in brief, five: 1. Complete preliminary organization, so as to avoid delay in movement. 2. A line of supply by land from the Mississippi, or, in other words, the reconstruction of the railway from De Soto to Monroe, and a good and safe, wagon-road thence to Shreveport. 3. The expulsion of the (Confederates from Arkansas and northern Louisiana. 4. The enemy to lie kept fully emploved, so as to be prevented from undertaking raids and diversions. 5. One general to command the whole force. The usual time of highest water in the upper Red River fixed the (late for the movement as abiout the middle of March. General Sherman came to New Orleans onl the 1st of 'March and promptly arranged to send ten thousand men to join Admiral Porter at the mouth of the Red River, anal, accompanied by the fleet, to be at Alexandria by the 17th of March, simultaneously with the arrival of Banks's troops marching north by the Teche. Thus two armies and a fleet, hundreds of miles apart, were to concentrate on a given day at a remote point far within the enemy's lines, situated, moreover, on a river always difficult and uncertain of navigation and now obstructed and fortified. And here, especially in Sherman's ready agreement to overlook a fundamental rule of the art of war, we see clearly the earliest sign of that general disregard of the enemy's power of resistance that was so soon to wreck the campaign. It is noteworthy that the same error was repeated on a greater scale when it was arranged that after once concentrating within the enemy's lines at Alexandria, the united forces of Banks, Sherman, and Porter should meet those of Steele within the enemy's lines at Shreveport, where, roughly speaking, Kirby Smith was within three hundred miles of either Banks or Steele, while the two Federal commanders, separated from each other at the start by nearly five hundred miles of hostile territory, could only communicate by the rivers in their rear over a long circuit, lengthening as they approached their common enemy in his central stronghold. tieneralGrant says [p. 108]: "GeneralBanks because it was the order of my superiorat the time. had gone on atr expedition up the Red River long . . . It is but just to Banks, however, to say that before my promotion to general command. I had his expedition was ordered from Washington.... Opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced He opposed the expedition."-EDITORS. 347 1"N V 4) 1 B f I t1 pound;6 ' , j a.- 9'l 1 lx I 7 1 -7 '1 '--I: / I L -C 0 -C-, 11 t UIVlEIU, INi A1CKANS,4 AND MIS11URI CXMIAI6lOS, OF 1864. 34ir I-, T. :Nt 7n r II I) )IA 1' Till. BEI 1 I -1 -I -j 1 , , N, ,ill " F z I I., - I . I P , t ", 'I z(- -, I k -eEr THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. hi estimating the forces at Kirby Smith's disposal to meet this triple invasion at 25,00() men, Banks was, as he had been the year before in the 13ort Hudson campaign, virtually correct, although on both oecasions the 4Coverrimenett regarded his figures as exaggerated. Since the forces told off for the Red River (expedition numbered 42,00) officers and mneli of all naris, of whom Sherman was to furnish 10,000, Steele 15,000, and lianks 17,000, it is obvious that bly concentrating his whole force, Kirby Smith would be stronger than either column separately, nearly as strong as the wvhole of Sherman's force and Banks's when tnmited and before being weaketne d by detachments, and therefore possibly stronger than their comillniiied force after providing for the heavy details indispensable to such a imiovemnent. Porter's fleet entered the mouth of the Red River on the 12th of Marell, eomivoying Sherman's detachment on transports. On the 13th two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps under Mower, and Kilby Smith's division of the Seven- teenth Corps, the whole under command of Brigadier-General A. J. Smith, landeud at Simsport, near the head of the Atchafalaya, and the next nuorunilug mar('hed on Fort de Russy. Walker's division of the Confederate army, under General Richard Taylor, which was holding the country from Simsport to Opelousas, at once fell back to Bayou Bmeuf, covering Alexandria. A. .J. Smith's march was therefore unmolested. He arrived before Fort (Ie Russy on the afternoon of the 14th, and promptly carried the works by assault, with a loss of 34 killed and wounded, capturing 260 prisoners, eight heavy guns, and two field-pieces. Meantime the advance of Porter's fleet had burst through the dam and raft nine miles below, and was thus able to proceed at once up the river, arriving off Alexandria on the 15th. Kilby Smith followed on the transports with the remainder of the fleet, landed at Alexandria oil the 16th, and occupied the town, Taylor having retired toward Natchitoches and called in Mouton's division from the country north of the liver to join Walker's. A. J. Smith, with Mower, followed on the 18th. Thus Porter and A. J. Smith were at Alexandria ahead of time. Banks himself was detained at New Orleans by the necessity of giving per- sonal attention to special duties confided to him by the President in con- neetion with the election and the installation, on the 4th of March, of the governor and other officers of the new or, as it was called, the "free State" Government of Louisiana. Some criticism and much ridicule have been wasted oln this; the fact being that General Banks simply carried out the orders of President Lincoln, just as, for example, was done by General Gillmore in Florida and General Steele in Arkansas, only that more attention was natu- rally drawn to Louisiana as a greater State, and containing the most important city in the South. Banks therefore confided to Franklin, under whom the Nineteenth Corps had been reorganized and brought up to a high state of dis- cipline and efficiency, the task of preparing and putting in motion the troops of the Department of the Gulf, designated to form part of the expedition. Franklin, when selected for this service, was the second officer in rank in the department, and, in any case, a better selection could not have been '.49 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. made. His forces eonsisted of Emory's division, and Grover's two brigades of the Nineteenth Corps, about 10,500 strong, Cameron's and Riausom's divisions of the Thirteenth Corps, about 4800, and the newly organized division of cavalry and newly mounted infantry, under Brigadier-General Albert L. Lee, numbering 4600. Bad weather had ruined the roads; but on the 13th of March Lee led the advance of the column from Franklin, on the Teehe, and, moving by Opelousas and Bayou Bneuf, marched into Alexandria, distant 175 miles, on the 19th, followed by the infantry and artillery on the 25th and 26th. Banks himself made his headquarters at Alexandria on the 24tlh, and there on the 27th he received fresh orders that imposed a new and well-nigh impos- sible condition on the campaign. These were the instructions of Lieutenant- General Grant, dated the 15th of March, on taking command of the army of the United States, looking to the cooperation of the whole effective force of or in the Department of the Gulf in the combined movement early in May of all the armies between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. A. J. Smith was to join the Army of the Tennessee for the Atlanta campaign, and Banks was to go against Mobile. If Shreveport were not to be taken by the 25th of April, at latest, then A. J. Smith's corps was to be returned to Vicksburg by the 10th, " even if it should lead to the abandonment of the expedition." Yet Halleck's orders for the expedition were not revoked; it was to go on - only, to make sure that it should not be gone too long, it was put in irons. Banks might well have given up the campaign then and there; yet there was a chance that Kirby Smith might not be able to concentrate in time to save Shreve- port; another, still more remote, that he might give the place up without a fight, and a third, more unlikely than either, that Steele might join Banks in time to make short work of it. There were twenty-six days left before the latest time at which A. J. Smith must leave him; so in his dilemma Banks decided to take these chances. His delay made no real difference, for the river, though slowly rising, was still so low that the gun-boats had not been able to pass the difficult rapids that obstruct the navigation just above Alexandria. The leading gun-boat, Eastport, hung nearly three days on the rocks; the hospital steamer, Woodford, following her, was wrecked, and it was not until the 3d of April that the last of the thirteen gun-boats I and thirty transports that were finally taken above the rapids had succeeded in making the difficult passage. Seven gun-boats and the larger transports staid below; the only communication with the upper fleet was by the road around the falls; all supplies had therefore to be landed, hauled round in wagons, and reshipped; and this made it neces- sary to establish depots and to leave Grover's division, four thousand strong, at Alexandria for the protection of the stores and the carry. At the same time General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, recalled Ellet's JThe following summer, even after the Red 4The 13 gun-boats sent up were the East- River failure, General Grant considered that he port, ChiUicothe, Carondelet, Louisville, Mound City, would be strengthened by having Franklin to Pittsburgh, Osage, Ozark, Neosho, Fort Hindman, Command the right wing of his army [see p. Cricket, Juliet, and Lexinyton. See "The Navy in 106].-R. B. 1. the Red River," p. 363.- EDITORS. Adol THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. Marine Brigade to Vicksburg, and thus the expedition lost a second detach- inent of three thousand. This loss was partly made up by the arrival of a brigade of 1500 colored troops, under Colonel W. H. Dickey, from Port Hudson. Taylor, retiring before the advance of the columns ascending the Red River and the Teche under A. J. Smith and Franklin, had evac- uated Alexandria, removing all the munitions of war and material except three guns and passing all the transports above the Falls, and on the 18th of March was with Walker's and Mouton's divisions at Carroll Jones's plantation, in the pine forest covering the roads to Shreveport and the Sabine, about thirty-six miles above Alexandria and forty-six below Natchitoches. After the arrival of Lee's cavalry, A. J. Smith sent Mower with his two divisions and Lucas's brigade of Lee's division on the 21st to Henderson's Hill, near Cotile, twenty-three miles above Alexandria, to clear the way across Bayou Rapides. Here, the same night, in a heavy rain-storm, Mower skillfully sur- prised the only cavalry force Taylor had, the 2d Louisiana, Colonel William G. Vincent, and with trifling loss captured nearly the whole regiment, about 250 men and 200 horses, together with the four guns of Edgars battery. This was a heavy blow to Taylor, since it deprived him of the means of scouting until Green's cavalry long looked for, should arrive from Texas. Mower returned to Alexandria and Taylor withdrew to Natchitoches. While the navy was occupied in passing the rapids, the advance of the army, on the 27th, took up the line of march, and on the 3d of April the whole force was concentrated near Natchitoches, the gun-boats and the twen- ty-six transports carrying A. J. Smith's corps and the stores having arrived at Grand Ecore, four miles distant, on the same day. Here General John M. Corse overtook the expedition, bearing renewed and very special orders from Sherman for the return of A. J. Smith's corps by the 10th of April; but the expedition was now within four marches of Shreveport, and it was agreed to go on. Kilby Smith's division, 1700 strong, remained with the transports, under orders to proceed under convoy as far as Loggy Bayou, opposite Springfield, 110 miles by the river above Grand Ecore, while A. J. Smith with Mower's divisions, numbering about 7000, moved by land with the rest of the army, now reduced to less than 26,000 officers and men of all arms, including the 2200 colored infantry and engineers, and 1700 cavalry presently detached for service on the north bank. Franklin marched on the 6th of April, Lee's cavalry in advance, followed by the Thirteenth Corps under Ransom, Emory's division of the Nineteenth, and Dickey's colored brigade. A. J. Smith with Mower marched on the 7th, and the same day Admiral Porter, with Kilby Smith and six light-draught gun-boats carrying about seventeen guns, got under way for Loggy Bayou. On the night of the 7th, Lee's cavalry, after a sharp skirmish with Major's brigade of Green's division of Texas cavalry, bivouacked on Bayou St. Patrice, seven miles beyond Pleasant Hill, Ran- som and Emory at Pleasant Hill, thirty-three miles from Natchitoches, and A. J. Smith a day's march in their rear; the march of the infantry having been retarded by a heavy storm that broke over the rear of the column and cut up the road. 1S1 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. 6 Shreawhl A T wil lomte ws ha g (0on- bearing all his and provitinu(in to fall bakd intli )th ath'. plans- fielde foveriig t1il aoadst to Marshulh, lniles to Salin C an thereforme lineof baTexas, and to Shrev teort, with (nOreon s cavalrv comning uip at last, and (Churchill's, Ai- the Federal in a wel-kansas piovision and ParsonS's MiSsouri ing on bohsdso hera n fte e laig division of Price's army in supporting distance at Keachie, arnout half-way be- the mdlruadtweenMansfieldand Shreveport, which "V are forty-two miles - apart. This gave 4 Taylor 16,000 men with whom hie . might give battle Kin a chosen posi- 4 ton, while Banks's "V \ force was stretched out to the length of a day's march on a single narrow road in the pine \ forest and encuni- '' bered and weakened MAJO-IMERAL P, AIM. tun APHO1-RA11. by guarding twelve miles of wagonts bearing all his ammnunitton and provisions through a bar reii wilderness, deep in the heart of the enemy's country. Such, indeed, was Kirby Smith's plait. However, Taylor did iiot wait for that, but, sending back or ders for Churchill and Patrsons to join him early oii the monioumg of the 8th moved out three miles to Sabinne Cross- roads, and there formed line of battle with Walket's, Mouton's, and Greeits divisions, 11,000 strong, arid awaited the approach of the Federals in a well-selected position, in the edge of the wood, command- ing on both sides of the road one of the few -clearings to be found iii that region. This dlearitig was about 1200 yards long, 900 wide, and through the middle ran a deep ravine. THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. Lee's bivouac of the night before was but twelve miles away. Aeeompanied by Vance's brigade of Landrani's division, Lee marched at daylight, and after meeting with a spirited resistance from three of (reen's regiments, dlsigned to give time for Taylor to formu his line, arrived about noon on the hill at the easterii edge of the elearing that was to be the field of battle. The main body of the armay marched at daybreak and halted between 10 and 11, Ratisom two miles beyond Bayou St. Patrice and Emory on its bankks, to wait for his provision train, which had not come up the night before. A. J. Smitl mjioved up to within two miles of Pleasant Hill. Batnks sent Ransom forward with Emerson's brigade, and rode to the front himself at an early hour. Finding the enemy before him in force, he ordered Lee to hold his ground and sent back " to hurry forward the c olumn." About 4 o'clock, when the two lines had been skirmishing and looking at each other for a couple of hours, Taylor suddenly delivered his attack J by a vigorous charge of Mouton's division on the left of the Pleasant Hill road, supported on his left by Major's and Bagby's brigades of cavalry dismounted. Walker followed astride and on the right of the road, with Bee's brigade of cavalry on his right. The Federal line formed on the cleared slope, and, eom- posed from left to right of the brigades of Dudley, Vance, Emerson, and Lucas, with four batteries, about 4500 in all, met with spirit the fierce onset of more than double their numbers, but were soon overcome. The artillery was powerless in the woods. Nims's splendid battery, with its honorable record on every field from Baton Rouge to Port Hudson, was taken by Walker's men in the first rush. Franklin, whose headquarters were with Cameron in front of Bayou St. Patrice, received Banks's orders to move to the front at a quar- ter-past three. He at once sent for Emory and led forward Cameron, whose (livisioll, advancing at the double-quick, arrived on the field, five miles away, an hour later, just in time to witness and for a brief interval to c heck the disaster, but not to retrieve it. The whole Union line was again driven back. To complete the confusion a wild panic ensued among the teamsters of the cavalry train, which was close behind. \ This caused the loss of the guns of two fine batteries, the Chicago Mercantile and the 1st Missouri, as well as of many prisoners and wagons. Emory had received the order to advance at twenty minutes to four while in his bivouac on Bayou St. Patrice, and had instantly put his division in motion. Three miles in rear of the field of battle he met the routed column pressing in great disorder to the rear. Quiekening their pace, his men forced their way through the confused mass of fugitives, negroes, cavalry, camp followers, wagons, and ambulances, and formed line in I The Confederate accounts of this engagement was intercepted by our troops, says that Mouton (called by the Confederates the battle of Mans- attacked "without the knowledge or orders of Gen- field-by us, Sabine Cross-roads; see p. 369) eral Taylor."-R. B. I. cannot be quite reconciled without reading be- \ This order of march has been severely criti- tween the lines. Kirby Smith says the recon cised, but a little reflection will show that it did noissauice ordered by him was " converted into a not cause but only aggravated a disaster really decisive engagement." Taylor says, "Becoming brought about by accepting battle at the head of impatient at the delay, . . . I ordered Mouton to a column twenty miles long, at the hands of an open the attack...." Lieutenant Edward Cun- enemy formed in complete order of battle, in a nhigham, A. 1). C., and Chief-of-Artillerv, in a very position previously chosen by him, where our artil- clear and outspoken letter to his brother, which lery could not be used.-R. B. L. 3S THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. a good position to check the pursuit, Dwight on the right of the road, covered by the 161st New York deployed as skirmishers, Benedict on the left, and MeMillan in reserve behind Dwight. Hardly was the line formed when Taylor's victorious troops attacked with great energy, pressing heavily on Dwight's right; but MeMillan was brought up to his support, and when night shortly fell the attack had been thrown off. Emory's division held the ground it fought for, the retreat was covered and the army was saved- the army that had set out so onfidentlv to take Shreveport, only two imarchies beyond; saved by a trimiph ; t m ! l \ A\;0of valor and discipline on the -00000 l part of a single division, and of skill on the part of its intrepid commander, from complete de- struction at the hands of an enemy inferior in everything, whose entire force ours out- \I' numbered almost as two to one. But the campaign was lost. 4 All hope of taking or even F reaching Shreveport within the time fixed for the breaking up of the expedition was at an end. Banks at once ordered a retreat, and sent messengers 1 it J. SMITHY VIOM, X PliOT PU. to notify Kilby Smith and Por- ter. Emory marched at mid- night, and at 8 o'clock the next morning, the 9th of April, the army came into position at Pleasant Hill, where A. J. Smith had been left, and where what remained of Lee's cavalry, of Ransom's corps, now under Cameronj and of Dickey's colored brigade had been re-formed during the night. The train, escorted by Dickey's brigade, was put in motion toward Grand Ecore, followed by Cameron. Emory and A. J. Smith remained in position, cover- ing the retreat and approaches to Pleasant Hill, including the important cross-road to Blair's Landing on the Red River, 4 where it would be easy and might be found best to reunite the army and the fleet. Meanwhile Churchill's and Parsons's divisions having arrived at Mansfield Taylor says he drove the enemy five miles. fighting was severe for a time, but . . . we en- "Here the Thirteenth Corps gave way entirely and camped on the creek as night fell, the enemy forced was replaced by the Nineteenth hurriedly brought back some four hundred yards beyond,"- i. e., the up to support the fight. The Nineteenth shared the skirmish-line was driven back to Emorv's line of fate of the Thirteenth." (The italies are mine.) This battle on the rising ground overlooking the creek. is a mistake, the Nineteenth Corps never reached -R. B. I. the position of the Thirteenth. Taylor's next ) Ransom having been wounded at Sabine Cross- paragraph describes the fight with the Nineteenth: roads. " Just as night closed the enemy massed heavily 4 Sixteen miles from Pleasant Hill and forty- on a ridge overlooking a small (reek. . . . The five, by the river, above Grand Ecore. 34 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. after a march of twenty miles from Keachie, too late in the evening to take part in the battle of Sabine Cross-roads, Taylor ordered Churchill to march both divisions to the front at 2 A. M., meaning to renew the fight; but when daylight disclosed the retreat of the Union forces, Taylor promptly moved forward with his whole force in pursuit - Green with the cavalry leading, Churchill next with his own division under Tappan, then Parsons's, Walker's, and Mouton's divisions, the last now under Polignac.1 It was afternoon when the Confederates found themselves confronted by Emory and Mower in order of battle. Churchill's men were so fagged by their early start and their long march of forty-five miles since the morning of the 8th that they were given two hours' rest. Taylor then formed line of battle, Bee with two brigades of cavalry on the left of the Mansfield road, with Polignac in support, Walker on the right of the road, and Churchill, with three regiments of cavalry on his right, moving under cover on the iight of the Sahine River road. Major, with his own brigade and Bagby's dismounted, was sent to turn the Federal right and hold the Blair's Landing road. The Union troops had rather the advantage of ground, except that the position was easily turned and that they could not stay in it for want of water, of which there was none to be had, and for want of provisions, which were rolling on the way to Grand Ecore; the Confederates were fresh and slightly superior in numbers,\ besides being, with good reason, elated by their signal victory of the day before; however, I think this last advantage may fairly be offset by the steadiness with which the Northern soldier ac- eepted and the sternness with which he avenged a defeat. About 5 o'clock Churchill opened his attack, Parsons on the right, Tappan on his left, and fell vigorously on the left of the Union line, which happened to be the weakest part of Emory's posi- . X K ti()n. Here was posted Benedict's bri- gade, supported on the left by Lynch's brigade and on the right by Moore's ' brigade of Mower's division. Benedict fell dead and his brigade was out- flanked and crushed. At the sound of MdAJORGENERA CJ . A. MOWER . FRO)M A PHlOTOGC P11 Churchill's guns, Walker, en chelon M of brigades on the right, fell upon Shaw of Mower's division (who had relieved MeMillan of Emory's in the front line), enveloped both his flanks, and drove him back; but Emory quickly ordered a charge of McMillan's I Mouton having been killed in the first onset on 11,000, nor that the Confederate force was lese the 8th. than 13,000: Taylor says he had 12,000 and at- \ After the battle, each side claimed to have tacked " twenty odd thousand," and that " the third fought superior numbers. I cannot make out that army of the enemy in point of numbers on the the- the Union troops, including Gooding's cavalry, ater of war was routed and driven from the field which was not engaged, numbered more than with a loss of at least 10,000 men."-R. B. I. THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. .1 .A\-14111A ,. 1,a TiM UY UM1) vFR. FROM I IAi4-TIMP. I I IE l brigade, withdrawn from the right and rear and joined by some of Fessell- den's men, who had rallied tic his support, while others rallied upon Lyneh, who attacked and broke Parsons's right; A. J. Smith then advanced his whole line in a fine charge led by Mower and completed the overthrow of Parsons before Tappan couldl come to his aid. Tajpan, finding himself exposed to a front and flank fire by the giving way of Parsons, fell back to re-formi. Dwight, who was strongly posted in the woods, stood firm agaiust the combined attacks of Walker in his front and Bee on his right. Taylor ordered up Polignac to their assistance, but the whole Confederate line was now falling back in confusion and the battle was host. Walker and Churchill with most. of the cavalry retreated six miles to the nearest water, while Polignac with one brigade of cavalry remailledl about two miles from the field to cover the retreat. After the close of the aetion, Kirby Smith joined Taylor, having hurried to the front as soon as he heard of the engagement at Sabine Cross-roads. Kirby Smith now determiined to move against Steele in Arkansas; accordingly, during the 10th and 11th, Taylor withdrew his infantry to Mansfield, learving the cavalry under Green to watch and, if possible, harass the enemy. At first Banks was for resuming the advance, but during the iiight he decided to continue the retreat to Grand Ecore.) The whole army was reunited there on the 11th. Banks then intrenehed, threw a pontoon-bridge The earliest Confederate dispatches and orders claimed a signal and glorious victory, but Kirby Smith's report of August 2Stb, lSt4, to President Davis, says that - Taylor's troops were reoulsed and thrown into confusion. . . . The Missouri and Arkansas troops, with a brigade of Walker's division, were broken and scattered. The enemy recovered artillery which we had taken, and two of our pieces were left in his hands.... TP uiy greet relief I found in the morning that the enemv had fallen back during the night.... O'er troops,-rcre eosutdekly paralyzed by the repulse at Pleasant Hill." (Italics mine.) In the letter already cited, Lieutenaimt Cunningham says: "'That it was impossible for us to pursue Banks immedi- ately - under four or five days - cannot be gain- said. . . . It was impossible . . . because we had been beaten, demoralized. paralyzed, in the fight of the 9th."-K . B. 1. [And see p. 370.] ) General A. J. Smith strongly opposed this. General Franklin proposed to march to Blair's Landing to await the return of the fleet. This was probably sound advice, though it would have separated the army temporarily from its train and from the troops that had already gone on to Grand Eeore.-R. B. 1. 3 :At) THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. aeross the river, placed a strong detaehment on the north side, sent to New Orleans an(l Texas for reenforcemnents, and( waited for the fleet, now in great peril. The fleet arrived at Loggy Bayou on the afternoon of the 10th, and two hours later reeeive(l the news of the misfortune at Pleasant Hill. The ioext nortniDg Kilby Smith received written orders to return to Grand Eeore. (in the 12th Green, with three or four regiments of eavalry and three guns, posted in aml)ush on the bluff itear Blair's Landing, attacked the fleet and thll transports as they were (leseend- iag thle river. A brisk fight followed; the ('onfederateos were soon driven off, anid their leader killed, by thes gmis of the Lxcnriy/qto ail(1 (J.saqe and the3 fire of Kilby Smith's infantry and part of his artillery on the transports. On the 13th Porter and Kilbv Smith re- turned to Grand Ecore, and hy the 15th all the gun-boats were baek. The river was falling, and as fast as the vessels could pass the bar they made their way towardl Alexandria. The L'as tport was sunk by a torpedo eight nmiles below Grand Ecore on the 15th, hut was got afloat on the 21st; on the 26jth, after grounding several timnes, she ran hard and fast on a raft of logs p , fifty miles farther down, and had to be abandoned and blown up. The other vessels, though several times seri- ously molested by parties of the enemy on the river bank, reached the falls above Alexandria in safety. W\Then he heard from Admiral Porter that the East port was afloat, Banks, on the 22d, marched from Grand Ecore on Alexandria, and bivouacked the same night at Cloutierville, after a march of thirty-seven miles. Kirby Smith had taken the whole of Taylor's force to go against Steele in Arkansas, except Podigniac's division, redueed to about 2000 men, and Green's livisiou of cavalry augmented by a fresh brigade from Texas, and now eommanded by General John A. Wharton, of Tennessee famne. The road on which Banks was larc hing twice crosses the western arm of tlme Red River, called Cane River, the sevond time at Monette's Ferry, thirty-six miles below Natchitoe hes. Here Bee, with four brigades and four latteltes, had taken up a tposition to contest thle pas- sage, while Wharton and Polignac (to use Taylor's expression) wvorrieol Banks's rear. On the 23d Emoryj sent Birge with his own brigade and Fessenden's, suipIorted by Cameron's division, to ford the river three miles above the ferry, turn Bee's left flank, while Emory engaged his attention in front, and dr-ive him away. Birge performed this service handsomely, overcoming ninny difficulties vith great skill, and finally leading the brilliant assault of 4 Franklin having beeni wounded mn the Sth. 3;7 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. Fessenden's brigade that dislodged Bee from his strong position, and sent hint off to Beasley's, thirty miles away. k The way being thus cleared, the army marched into Alexandria onl the 25th and 26th, without further serious moles- tation. Here General Hunter was met, bearing fresh, and this time very posi- tive, orders from Lieutenant-General Grant to bring the expedition to all end.'\ These orders were afterward suspended (April 30th); but in any case it was now impossible to abandon the navy in its perilous situation above the rapids, with the river falling, and an active enemy on both banks. From this danger the navy, from this reproach the army, from this irrep- arable disaster the country was saved by the genius and skill of Lieutenant- Colonel Joseph Bailey, of the 4th Wisconsin regiment, then serving on1 General Franklin's staff as chief engineer, and by hard and willing work on the part of the officers and men of the army. After the capture of Port Hudson, Bailey, by means of wing dams and a central boom, had floated and released the Confederate transports Starlight and Reed Ciief, found lying on their sides in the mud of Thompson's creek. He now proposed to rescue the fleet in the same way. Stupendous as the work looked, the engineer officers of the army reported it practicahle. General Franklin, himself a distin- guished engineer, approved it, and General Banks gave orders to carry it out. In the month that had elapsed since the fleet had, even then with some difficulty, aseended the rapids, the river had fallen more than six feet; for a mile and a quarter the rocks were now bare; there were but three feet four inches of water, the gun-boats needing at least seven feet; and in some places the channel, shallow as it was, was narrowed to a mere thread. The current ran nine miles an hour, the total fall was thirteen feet, and at the point just above the lower chute, where Bailey proposed to construct his dam, the river I The Union losses in this affair were about 200, strength of private information received, but that of which 1;53 were in Fessenden'sbrigade. Colonel the President was not ready for this.-R. B. I. Fessenden was severely wounded.- R. B. I. Especially Captain John C. Palfrey, United \ The records show that General Grant wished States Engineers, who had made a careful and Hunter to be sent out to relieve Banks, on the complete survey of the rapids.-R. B. L. Od . S. "rs ItaeMsmr . 1h,rsroer.Av S" 7ga 4g aM rw MAP AND SECTIONS tF THE RED RIVER DAMS ABOVE ALEXAND)IA. 38 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. was 758 feet wide, with a fall of six feet below the (lam. The problem was to raise the water above the dam seven feet, back ing it tip so as to - float the gui-lboats over the upper fall. From. the north bank a wing XrO IVF'neRAC'KIET DXM. dlam was constructed of large trees, thle butts tied by cross-logs, the tops toward the current, and kept in place by weighting with stone, brick, and brush. From the cultivated south bank, where large trees were scarce, a CR OF 0IT AND R1111K. crilb was lna(le of logs and timbers, filled in. with stone and with bricks an(l heavy pieces of machinery taken from the neighboring sugar-houses and cotton-gins. The space of about i50 feet between the wings was closed by sinking across it four of the large SVI'TION OF THE TREE il AMl coal barges belonging to the navy. FEATURES OF THE REEF UJVXR DAM. The work was begun on the 30th of April and finished on the 8th of May. The water having been thus raised five feet four and a half inches, three of the light-draught boats passed the upper fall on that day. On the morning of the 9th the tremendous pressure of the pent-up waters drove out two of the barges, making a gap sixty-six feet wide, and swung them against the rocks below. Through the gap the river rushed in a torrent. The admiral at once galloped round to the upper fall and ordered the Lexington to run the rapids. With a full head of steam she made the plunge, watched in the breathless silence of suspense by the army and the fleet, and greeted with a mighty cheer as she rode in safety below. The three gun-boats (the Osaqe, Neosho, and Fort Hindman) that were waiting just above the dam followed her down the chute; but six gun-boats and two tugs were still imprisoned by the falling waters. So far Bailey had substantially followed the same plan that had worked so successfully the year before at Port Hudson,J but it was now plainly shown tojbe not altogether applicable against such a weight and volume and velocity of water as had to be encountered here. He therefore promptly remedied the defect by constructing three wing dams at the upper fall: a stone crib on the south side, and a tree dam on the north side just above the upper rocks, and just below them, also on the north side, a bracket dam, made of logs raised at the lower end on trestles and sheathed with plank. Thus the whole current was turned into one narrow channel, a further rise of fourteen inches was obtained, making six feet six and a half inches in all; and this )There the gap between the two wings was strain the boom was hauled up against the current; closed by a boom of logs, to which, when all was then the hawser was cut with an axe, the boom car- ready, a hawser was attached and carried to the ried away the dam, and the boats, under full head- capstan of one of the steamers. With a slow way, steamed out into the Mississippi.- R. 13. L 359 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. T.II . . - VA-SInti 11,ik TRU.'A AT Tilr riAM. S ROM A WARTlME lS.KETC.Ii new task, by incredible exertions, being completed in three dlays and three nlights, onl the 12th and 13th the remaining gun-boats passed free of the iauger. I This accomplished and the reunited fleet being on its way to thee Mississippi, the army at once marched out of Alexandria on Simsport, where the eolumn arrivel, without serious molestation, on the 16th of May. Bailey improvised a bridge of stealnl)oats across the Atchafalaya, J here betweeln six and seven hundred yards wide; and thus, by the 19th, the whole command crossed ill safety. O() the day before, however, the rear-guard unider Mower had rather a sharp encounter with Whartou aiid Polignlac oil Yellow Bayou, the Confed- erates losing 452 killed and wotunled to our loss of about 267. At Simsport a third messenger was waiting, this time bearing the bow- string, disguised as a silken cord, for though Banks was for a time left in command of the Department of the (-ulf, Canby was placed over him and took control of his troops as tile commander of the newly made Trans-Missis- sippi division. A. J. Smith's troops embarked for Vicksburg on the 22d of May, forty-two days after the date first set for their return and two weeks after the opening of the Atlanta campaign, in which they were to have been emuiplhyed. The Governomenit decided that it was too late to use Banks's army agaillst M1olhile, and or(lered the Nineteenth Corps, consolidated into two divisions, with part of the Thirteenth Corps incolrprated, to join the Army of the Potomae. They arrived just in time to be sent to Washington to aid-in repelling Early's invasion. Of Steele's operations, since they belong, to another c hapter [see p. 375], it is only necessary to say here that lhe entered ('anileu, Arkansas, ninety miles in a northeasterly direction from Shreveport, oil the lth of April, just when Banks got back to Grand Ecore. Kirn y Smith then left Taylor with Wharton and Polignac to watch aild 4 Bniley was made a brigadier-general and re- l General Banks speaks of this use of steam- eciveed the thanks of Conigress. The eribh were soon boats to form a bridge as the first attempt of the washed away, but it i6 said the main tree dam stir- kind: but wbeu wu. moved on Port Hudson, the vive- t( this day, having driven. th- ehanitel toward year before, the last of the troops and trains the souuth shttre anid washed atwav a large alie of crossed over at the sante plaee in substantially the batik at the upper end of the tow...- R. B. 1. the satne way.-R. B. I. 360 THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. 361 worry Banks, and, concentrating all the rest of his army against Steele, forced him to retreat to Little Rock. On both sidles this unhappy campaign of the Red River raised a great and 1iutter crop of quarrels. Taylor was relieved by Kirby Smith, as the result of an angry corresonudence; Banks was overslaughed, and Franklin quitted the department in disgust; Stone was replaced by Dwight as chief-of-staff, and Lee as chief-of-eavalry by Arnold; A. J. Smith departed more in anger tliant in sorrow; while between the admiral and the general commanding, resriminations were exchanged in language well up to the limits of " parlia- nientary" privilege. I have nothing to (lo with any of these things, hut I feel it a duty to express my entire disbelief in all the many tales that seek to east 11)0on the army or its commander the shadow of a great cotton speculation. These stories, as ample in insinuation as they are weak in specification, are ill the last resort found to be vouched for by nobody. I am convinced they are false. The speculators who certainly went with the army as far as Alexandria, had for the most part passes from Washington; the policy under which they were permitted to go was avowedly encouraged by the Government, for reasons of state. When General Banks sent them all back from Alexan- dlria, without their sheaves, they returned to New Orleans furious against him and mouthing calumnies. All the cotton gathered by the army was turned over first to the chief quartermaster, and by him to the special agent of the Treas- ury Department designated to receive it.\ All the cotton seized by the navy was sent to Cairo, was adjudged "lawful prize of war," and its proceeds dis- tributed as prescribed by the statute. At one time it was supposed that the extensive seizures made by the navy led to the burning of the cotton by the Confederates; the truth is, however, that Kirby Smith ordered the burning of all the cotton in Louisiana east of the Ouachita and south of Alexandria, esti- mated by him at 130,000 bales, and then worth 60,000,000, on the 14th of In a statement presented to the Committee fled that trade was prohibited, and the quartermaster on the Conduct of the War (1865, Vol. II., p. 347) and the supervising agent of the Treasury Department General Banks says: informed that whatever property shonld fall into our hands would be disposed of aceording to the orders of During the Rted River campaign, all the property the Government and the laws of Congress subject to that estee into the hands of the army was turned over Such claims as should be recognized at Washington." to the quartermaster, and by him to the Treasury oe- R B. 1. cers. There was nO exeeption to this nrle. Every per- son who accompanied the expedition. was noti- About 6000 bales, Admiral Porter states. UlNITEhD STATES HOSPITAL SHIP. "EI)D ROVER.' FROM A WA.1TItIT PiOTOGRTAPIL VOlA V. 24 A j, I '9" , , 5 "t = "I I 7;=77',KL" 162 THE NAVY IN THE RED RIVER. Marih, as soon as he became satisfied that Banks's army meant to advance onete more up the Teehe. Porter and A. J. Smith had then just entered the iiiouth of the Red River, but as yet Kirby Smith neither knew nor expected their coming. After the Red River eanmpaign lo important operation was ulndertakell by either side in Louisiana. The Confederate forces in that State held out until the end( of the war, when, on the surrender of Kirby Smith, May 26th, 1865, they were finally disbanded. THE NAVY IN THE RED RIVER. IY TIllitMAk 0. 5F.t.FRIDO;E, CAPTAIN, V. K. N. T ns Red River expedition wats essentially a mov ement of the Army of the Golf to control more thoroughly Louisiana and eastern Texas, in which Admiral Porter was called upon to cooperate with the naval forces of the Mississippi. For this purpose, early in March, 1S64, he as- sembled at the mouth of the Red River the iron- clads Eaitport, Esw, Bestfo, Lafayette, Ahoetair, (Chilliroatfh O:ark, Loaitdille, C'a rondelef, Pittsburgh, MoauN, C'ity, Osage, Neosho, and the light-draught gun-boat, Ouachita, Lezringfta, Fort Hindmai, Cricket. Gazelle, Juliet, and Mlark Hawk, bearing the admiral's fag. This was the most formidable force that had ever been collected in the western waters. It was under IL lourageous and able commanider, full of energy and fertile in resources, anid was manned by officers and men who, from a long series of conflicts on the Mississippi, hail become veterans in river warfare. With a powerful army. retinforced by ten thousand of Sherman's old soldiers utder General A. J. Smith. the navy felt there wolld be but few laurels left for themn to win, and little did it dream of the dangers, hardships, and possible loss of a portion of this splendid squadron that the future had in store for it, owing to the treacherous nature of this crooked, narrow, and turbid stream, whose high banks furnished the most favorable positions for artillery and for the deadly sharp-shooter. That the naval portion did not meet with greater hiss4e of life is owing to the skill, derived from long experience. with which the officers prepared and fought their vessels. The active eolperation of the navy was depend- ent to a considerable extent upon the usual spring rise: but this year the rise did not come, and the movements of the army, which forced the navy to risk its vessels in insufficient depths of water, were the main causes of the almost insurmountable diffi- culties it had to eontend with. Had the river been bamk-full no force that the Confederates could have controlled could have stood for a moment against the fleet; its movement to Shreveport would have been but a holiday excursion. But against nature it could not contend, and the very low stage of water soon reduced the active squadron to three iron-lads and a half-dozen light-draughts. On the 1 2ti of Man'h the fleet and transports moved uip the Reul River. The greater part turned off at the Atehafalava to cover the landing of Smith's fore-1 at Simsport; from which point they were to march hy land to Ale-xandria, where the junction with Banks's army was to be made. The Eastport (Lieutenant-Commander S. L. Phelps), Osage (Lieutenant-4'ommander T. 0. Selfridge), Fart Hiodmnna (Acting-Master John Pearce), and Cricket (Lieutenant H. H. Gorriige) were ordered to go ahead and clear the obstreetions that were known to exist below Fort De Rimasy, a strong fortification constructed by the Confederates ear- lier in the war, recently strengthened, and now armed with heavy guns in easemates protectedl with railroad iron.I These obstruetions were reached March 14th. and were found to consist of a row of piles sx-ross the river, supported by a second row bolted to the first; a forest of trees had been eut and floated against them, with their branches interlaced with the piles. It was slow work clearing a passage. owing to the strength of the current and to the raft of logs and the snags above the piling, so that a day was consumed; and before the squadron had finally pushed through and had arrived in proximity to the fort the guns of the Union forees were heard. so that for fear of injury to them the fleet could only fire a few rounds at the water-battery. The capture of Fort De Russy was a most gallant feat, General Mower actually riding into the fort at the head of his attacking column. Porter's or- ders to Phelps to push ahead were delayed by the dispatch vessel getting entangled in the obstruc- tions, or else we should have captured the Confed- erate transports, which were just out of sight as we reached Alexandria, about teli ntiles above the fort. On the morning of March 16th nine gun-boats had arrived. I was directed, with 180 men froni the fleet, to occupy the town until the arrival of the land forces under General A. J. Smith. It hail been agreed that General Banks should be at Alexandria by March 17th. but the cavalry did not arrive till the 19th, and his whole force was not assembled till the 26th. [See p. 350.] On March 29th fourteen of the squadron left Alexandria for the upper river, the Eastport and J Fort De Ruasy was captured by the navy In the first movement up the Red River in May. 183, but was - afterward abaudoued when the army umuarched to Pon Hudson tbe Vol. III., p. aYO.-EisrToug. THE NAVY IN THE RED RIVER. Osage being in the advance; thus fourteen days of precious time had been lost, allowing the Confed- erates to concentrate their forces for the defense of Shreveport, our objective point. As we advanced the enemy's scootsaf set fire to all the cotton within ten miles of the river-bank. Millions of dollars worth of it were destroyed, and so dense was the smoke that the sun was obscured, and appeared as though seen through a smoked glass. One Sunday mnorning a man. was seen waving a white handker- chief in front of a handsome dwelling. Captain l'helps and myself stopped and went ashore to in- q1uire the reason. He told us his name was Col- thouii; that he was a brother of Captain Colhoun of the United States navy; that, being over age, he tad taken no part in the conflict, but had remained at home cultivating his plantation. With tears in his eyes he told us that that night his cotton pile, of 5,000 bales, had been set on fire, and his gin- houise, costing 30,000, destroyed. He was a rieh man the night before, and the morning found him penniless. A bale of cotton was worth at that time 400 in New Orleans, so that he had lost at a single blow 2,000,000. He was but one of many in- nocent persons who suffered the loss of all their property through this indiscriminate destruction. [See p. 372.] Our supply of coals havinggiven out, we were de- pendent upon fence rails for fuel. Two hours before sunset the fleet and transports would tie up to the bank, and whole crews and companies of soldiers would range over the country, each man loading himself with two rails, and in an incredibly short time the country would be denuded of fences as far as the eye could see. So dependent were we upon these rails for fuel that it was a saying among the Confederates that they should have destroyed the fences and not the cotton. Had they done so, our progress would have been much slower. As it was, it proved a laborious task for the crews of the gun-boats to cut up these cotton-wood rails in lengths to fit the furnaces, which were much shorter than those of the transports. On April 3d, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant J. P. Couthouy, commanding the iron-clad Chillicothe, was shot by a guerrilla a few miles above Grand Ecore. He was a brave officer, and his loss was much lamented in the squadron. April 7th, Admiral Porter, on the Cricket, bear- ing his flag, left Grand Ecore for Shreveport, ac- eompanied by the Osage, .Veosho, Fort Hindman, Lxrington, and Chillicothe, convoying twenty trans- ports, containing General Kilby Smith's division of the Sixteenth Army Corps; a rendezvous being agreed upon with the army within three days at Springfield Landing, 110 miles by the river below Shreveport. The river was stationary, at a lower stage than usual at this season, and there was barely water to float the gun-boats. April 10th, the fleet, as agreed upon, arrived at Springfield Landing, about 30 miles, as the crow flies, from its destination, meeting with no obstruc- tion beyond the usual amount of bushwhacking. Here the channel was found obstructed by the sinking of a large steamboat, the New Falls City, Zl across the channel, both ends resting upon the banks. Of the disastrous results of the battles of Sabine Cross-roads and Pleasant Hill, April Sth and 9th, the fleet were entirely ignorant until a courier reached Admiral Porter from General Banks stating that the army was falling back upon Grand Ecore. Signal was made for commanding officers, to re- pair on board the flag-ship, when the repulse and retreat of the army was first made known to them. It was announced that it would be necessary for the fleet to go back. The gun-boats were dis- tributed through the transports, and my vessel, the Osage, was directed to bring up the rear. The return of the fleet was fraught with peril: The Confederates, being relieved by the falling back of the army, were now free to attack us at any point of the river. There were but half-a-dozen gun-boats to defend the long line, two of which were light-draughts, known as "tin-clads," from the lightness of their defensive armor, which was only bullet-proof. The river was falling; its nar- rowness and its high banks afforded the best pos- sible opportunities for harassing attacks, and the bends of the river were so short that it was with the greatest difficulty they were rounded by vessels of the Osaqe type. Steaming with the current, the Osage was almost unmanageable, and on the morn- ing of April 12th the transport Black Hawk 4 was lashed to her starboard quarter, and thus the descent was successfully made till about 2 P. x., when the Osage ran hard aground opposite Blair's Plan- tation, or Pleasant Hill Landing, the bows down stream and the starboard broadside bearing on the right hank. While endeavoring to float her, the pilot of the Black Hawk reported a large force gathering in the woods some three miles off dressed in Federal uniforms. I ascended to the pilot-house, and scanning them carefully made sure they were Confederates, and at the same time di- rected Lieutenant Bache of the Lexinqten to go be- low and open an enfilading fire upon them. Every preparation being made, the attack was quietly awaited. The battery unlimbered near the Lei.mq- ton, but a caisson being blown up they quickly with- drew. The enemy came up in column of regiments. and, protectedbythehigh andalmost perpendicular banks, opened a terrific musketry tire, and at a distance not exceeding one hundred yards. Shell- firing under the cireumstances was almost useless. The great guns of the Osage were loaded with grape and canister. and, when these were exhausted, with shrapnel having fuses cut to one second. Our fire was reserved till the heads of the enemy were seen just above the bank, when both guns were fired. Everything that was made of wood on the Osage and Black Hawk was pierced with bul- lets. Upon the iron shield in the pilot-house of the latter were the marks of sixty bullets, a proof li This steamer was sunk, as stated in the text, ou the had to be removed before the Confederates could re- 5th of April by Captain James XcCloskey, acting under cover the use of the river.- EDrTORS. the orders of General E. K. Smith and Taylor. After 4 Not to be confounded with the naval steamer of the the return of the fleet to Grand Ecore. the obstruction same name, which remained at Alexandria.-EDnnORs. 363 THE NAVY IN THE RED RIVER. Tilt' 1`11,lT AT ULAIta'S ILANT fTION. FROM A WAIJ-TlME SKETCtI. of the hotness of the fire. This unequal contest (ould not continue long, and after an hour and a half the eneniy retreated with a loss of over four hundred killed and wounded, as afterward ascer- tained. Among the former was General Thomas Green, their foremost partisan fighter west of the Mississippi. b The Awaye sustained a loss of seven wounded. Company A of the 90th Illinois were on board and behaved most gallantly. The Confederates did not again molest the feet until the 2ith of April, when they attacked Admiral Porter in the light-draught gunboat Cricket. At this late period the low condition of the river had foreed him to send the Osage and Neosko down the river, or the rebels would have suffered as severely as at Blair's Plantation. The 15th of April found the squadron with its fleet of transports safe back at Grand Ecore, not much the worse for their encounters with the enemy and the snags and sand bars of the river. Admiral Porter was called to Alexandria by the affairs of the Mississippi squadron, leaving the 0sage and L.6rigtox at Grand Ecore. The larger iron-clads had with great difficulty been forced over the bar below Grand Ecore and sent on toward Alexandria, whither the Osaye and Lenny- twa followed them. The Eastport (Lieutenant-Commander Phelps), the largest of our iron-clads, which had joined the squadron for the first time on this expedition, un- fortunately struck a torpedo eight miles below Grand Ecore, and her bottom was so badly injured b of this action Admiral Porter. In his "Naal Hi- tory of the Civil War," writes as follows: - Seltridge eondueted this affair In the handsomest manner, inflict- lug such a panishmnut on the enemy that their infantry gave no more trouble, having come to the conclusion that fighting with muskets against Iron-lads did not pay. To say nothing of the low in men Infllted upon that she sank. Captain Phelps was very proud of his ship, and went to work with a will to save her. After the most untiring efforts he succeeded in bulkheading the leak, and, assisted by two steam- pump boats which the admiral had brought to his assistance, succeeded in getting her some forty miles down the river. Here she grounded again, but after strenuous efforts, assisted by the admiral, who remained behind, she was Boated, but after proceeding a few miles again grounded on a pile of snags. From the 21st to the 25th of April Captain Phelps, one of the bravest and most competent commanders in the squadron, had worked day and night with his officers and crew to save his ship, but the retreat of the army had left the banks of the river unprotected [see p. 357], and the low stage of water had compelled the admiral to send his squadron to Alexandria. There was no longer a chance to save the Eastport, and he reluctantly gave the order to blow her up. Hardly had this been done when the little squadron was attacked by a large force of infantry, which was quickly driven off. It was evident that serious work was ahead. The squadron now consisted of the light-draught gun-boats Cricket (flag-ship), Juliet, and Fort Hindman. They had proceeded some twenty miles when the enemy opened upon them with twenty pieces of artillery. Nineteen shells went crashing through the Cricket, and during the five minutes she was under fire she was struck thirty-eight times and lost twelve killed and nine- teen wounded out of a crew of fifty, one-third of the enemy, the oarge had killed the best officer the Con- federates had in this quarter, who, Judging from his energy on this occasion, would have given no end of trouble had he lived. Lieutenant [George M.] Bachee managed the Leztsgon beautifully and did great exeeu- tion with his guns, though les exposed to the infantry Are than the OraW." -EDnrros. 364 THE NAVY IN THE RED RIVER. whom were negroes. The escape of the Cricket was almost miraculous, and was largely owing to the coolness and skill of the admiral. \ The re- ,nainicder of the squadron turned up stream, except the two pump-boats, Champion No. 3 and No. .i, which being unarmed were destroyed. Captain Phelps concluded to wait till the next slay to run the batteries, which was success- fully accomplished under a heavy fire, the ,Juli, t sustaining a loss of 15 killed and wounded, and the Fort Hindman 7. April 27, th found the fleet once more assembled at Alexandria. During all this hazardous and harassing return from Springfield Landing there had been no instance in which the navy had with- held support from the army when called upon; of which there is no better proof than that every transport returned safely, though by delaying the return to the last possible moment the safety of the fleet was jeopardized, and the Eastport and the two pump-boats were lost. Twelve of the squadron were now assembled above the falls, the rocks of which were bare, while the channel between them was hardly twenty feet wide, and three feet deep. No spring rise had come, and General Banks with the army was anxious to leave Alexandria and the region where o. laurels had been gained. What should be done with the squadron stopped by this seemingly im- passable barrier, the falls of the lied River At this critical moment Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, chief engineer of the Nineteenth Army Corps, came forward with the proposition to con- ,.truct a dam at the falls. It seemed almost an im- possibility to accomplish what had before been attempted without success in more peaceful times; but it was only necessary to propose the plan for both army and navy to enter into the scheme with characteristic American energy. While the work was in progress, the side armor was stripped from the larger iron-clads, taken up the river after night- fall. and dropped in a deep hole, while the lighter guns, 32-pounders, some dozen altogether, were put ashore. In about ten days the unique and Herculean work was completed. All the credit is due to the gallant men of the army, who for eight days worked good-humoredly in water, and exposed to a hot sun. The current was now rushing through the gap in the dam at a rate of nine miles an hour, and yet upon the falls there lacked a foot of water to float the larger boats. To close the gate, two strong loaded coal-barges were shipped into it, secured by lines from the banks. After all but "I. When the pilot was wounded, Admiral Porter piloted the vessellhmself. See Maban' The Gulf and Inland Waters," p. 201.-EDIroRs. The destruction of the Eatport and the action of the Cricket occurred on the 26th. While the Cricket was running the gauntlet of the Confederate position, the pump-boat Champion N.. 3 received a shot in her boiler, c auitng it to explode. The captain. Stewart, three en- mnneera, and all the crew, composed of some 200 negroe, wre scalded to death, with the exception of 15. The Champion N.. 5 retreated with the Hiadmaa and Jrlit. above the Confederate battery, and on the 27th at- tempted to make the passage down in their company. the largest vessels had descended safely over the falls, it seemed assured that the morning would show enough water to float the whole squadron over. But during the night the lines parted, and the barges were swept away and struck a ledge of rocks below the dam and bilged. What then seemed a great misfortune, however, proved our salvation, for the Lexington, the first gun-boat to go through, though carried against this very ledge and striking the sides of the barges, caromed off down stream, when, but for them, she would doubtless have been sunk, most seriously obetructingthe channel against the passage of the others.t, Colonel Bailey, as a next resource, proceeded to construct below the upper falls wing dams from each bank, by which a further rise of a few inches was obtained. Hawsers were run out from the gun-boats to the shore, and these manned by a brigade, and the mited force of three thousand men, enlivened with a band of music, dragged them over the bot- tom till they floated in the deeper water below, and both army and navy breathed more freely in this rescue of the squadron upon seeing them anchored in the stream below Alexandria. On the morning of May 13th I was dispatched to the upper falls to destroy the 32-poliders left behind, the army having already begun its march for the Mississippi. Just as the last one was blown to pieces, a rebel cavalry regiment galloped down the road and fired a volley which happily did no damage, and before it could be repeated the swift current had carried the boat out of their range. During the building of the dam a gallant hut is- astrous action took place between the small light- draught gun-boats Signal (Acting-Master Morgan) and Covington (Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Lord), at Dunn's Bayou, below Alexandria, while convoy- ing the Warner, a quartermaster's boat, down the river. The rebels, having passed round the rear of our forces at Alexandria with six thousand men and twenty-five pieces of artillery, established themselves on the river and opened on the Warner when she came in sight. The gun-boats rounded to immediately and opened the fight, but the fire was so severe that the steam-pipes were cut and the boilers perforated. Though virtually disabled, they continued this unequal contest for five hours, when Lieutenant Lord landed his crew and set fire to his vessel. The Signal had too many wounded to permit her commander to pursue a like course, and she fell into the hands of the enemy, who, after removing the guns, sunk her in the river as an obstruction. Unable to get by, she was guided to the opposite bank by her pilot, Maitland, who remained at the wheet after having received eight wounds. The boat finally sank, and most of the crew were captured.- ErroRs. ) For a description of the dam, see p. 359.- EXTORr. ;The awege., N-o, and 1brt Risdsaen passedthe fail on the th. the other vessels remaining above. On the 9th, afterthe bargeshad been earried away, and tbus had opened the break in the dam, these three gun-boats andthe Le.risgta pased through theopening. The ve- sels remaining above, which pased through on the 11th and 12th. were the Carendeekt, Loimitrle, Mlound City. Piltsburgh, Ozark, Chillicothe, and two tugs.-EDr!ORS. 365 366 THE MISSISSIPPI FLOTILLA IN THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION. Of this action, Admiral Porter writes: The brave men in their tight vessel., only musket- proof, defended them for fouror five bouro, and many of the actions heralded to the world during the late war were utch less worthy of notiee than thts contest be- tween two little gun-bouts and twenty pteces of artil- Iery, most of which bad been captured from the army at Pleaant Hill Imeantug Sabine Cro-roads]." On the 21 st of May, the squadron and transports reached the Mississippi. Atid thus ended the Red River expedition, one of the most humiliating and disastroits that had to be recorded during the war. The vessels lost were the Eaotport, sunk by a torpedo; the two pump-boats, Chamnion No. :s and No. 5, and the small gun-boats (Cotington atid Sinyal. The total casualties of the navy in killed, wounded, and missing were about 1 20, exclusive of the crews of the pump-boats, which lost upward of 200. THE MISSIISSIPPI FLOTILLA IN TIIE RED RIVER EXPEI)ITION. Rear-Admiral Ihlvi D. Porter, -omuaisudlng. Ieow-CLAIM.- seZr, ("In'. Robert Townsend, 2 100- pliuiot'r tlarrott., 6 tI4-hl, 4 12-ponuder howitzers. -teaos. Int.-Com. Jame A. (Greer, 2 100 potuler Par- rott., 8 9-Ineb, 2 50-pounder Datl.gren ritles. 4 t2- ponil ler.. Lofafeile, Llel.-t'oui. J. P. Foater, 2 11- incb, 2 9-inh, 2 100-pound-r Parrotts, 2 24-pounder howitzers, 2 12-pounder bo-itzers. (hoetaw. Lleut.- Coin. F. M. Ram-sy, 1 100-pounder l arrott, 3 9-Ineh. 2 30-pounder Parrotti.- 2 12-pounder howitzers. Chit- teothe, Act. V. Ltent. Joseph P. Coutbouy, Licut.- Coni. Watson Smith itemporarily). 2 It-inch. 1 12- poun..der. (wrk, Act. V. Lent. lePorge W. Brown, 2 11-inch, 1 12-pounder rifled howitzer. LouiatdUkt. Icot.-Co.. F. K. Owen., loto-pounder Parrott, 4 9-lInl, 2 30-1punder Parrotts, 4 32-ponalers. 'ardetkl, Lieut.-(oi. J. (i. Mitchell,. 2 10-ou-nder Parrotts, 3 9-Inch, 4 -ineb, 1 60-pomiider rifle, 1 -pounder rifle. Eautport. Lteut.-Con. S. I_ Phelps, 2 100-pounder Par- rotts, 4 9-i4eh, 2 30-pounder D1alglgrei rifli's. Pittsabsrgh, Act. V. Llent. W. R. Ioel. 4 9-inch, 1 ltolmnder Par- rott, 2 30-pounder Patrrott.. ound City, Act. V. Lieut. A. P. Langthurue, 1 100-pounder Parrott, 4 9-Inch. 8-inch, I b0pounder rifle, 130pounder rifle, 2 32-ponders. Osage. Lleut.-Com. T. 0. Seflridge, 2 I-inbh, 1 12-potiider howitzer. N-oao, Act. V. Lieut. P:miel lloward, 2 It- inch, 2 2-pounder howitzers. TIN-cL.Ds.- (Erick, A-ting Mast-r H. 11. ftorriiage. 2 2-pounder Parrotts, 4 24-po-miler howltzers, 1 12- pounder howitzer. Gazelte, Acting Master Claarl,-s Thateher. 6 12-pounderrifled howitzers. Signal, Aet. V. Lieutenant E. Morgan, 4 24-poutid-r S. B. howitztr -, 2 1-pounder rifled howitzer, 2 30-pounder Parrotta. .Idtet, Acting Mater J. S. Watson, 6 24-pounder S. B. hobwitzers. Omzan VUsEU.-L ingo., Lieut. (leorge M. Baa-te, 4 9-inch. 2 30-npauder Parrott., 1 32-pou iti-r. Btua'k Hawrk flag-ship). Lieut.-to... K. R. Breeze, 2 30-pounider Parrotts, S 24-pounder FI. B. ho.itzers,2 12-pounder riled howitzers, I 12-pounIder S. B. hb-witz-r. 2 Inton repeating guns., I Parmenter battery gnu. )Mneflt (twamal tran.- port), Lleut.-Ctom. S. W. Terry. Crinsgitn, Act. V. Licait. (George P. Lord, 4 24-painildr howitzers, 1 12-pounder howitzer, 2 30-piunder Parrott., 2 t0-pounder labhlgren rifles. Ouachto. Lieut.-Coua. Byron Wilson, 130-pounder Parrotts, 18 24-pounder S. B. howitzers. 16 12-pounder S. B. bowitzers, 1 12-pou-id-r rifled howitzer. Fort Hiudmad. Act. V. Lient. J,,hu Pearce, 6 9-Inch, 1 12- olundder howitzer. ON T11E MISSISSItPI RIVER HOSPITAL-nOAT "D. A. JANtUARY." tFROl A WAR-TIMEI SKETCHt. THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN.J THE UNION ARMY.- Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks. lleadqtartera Troops (0oord): A and B, Capt. Richard W. Fralncs. (Eseor)t: C, Capt. Frank Sayles. THIRTEENTH ARMY CORIS (detachment), Brig.- 41eo Thoi ias E. (. Ransom (w), Brig.-.en. Robert A. T.,IRD l)1 vIsION, Brlg.-Gen. Robert A. Cameron. First Brigade, Lient.-Col. Aaron M. Flory: 46th Ind., ri.pt. William M. De hart; 2stb Wis., MaJ. Bradford Han- cock. S-cond Brigade, Col. William H. Raynor: 24th Iowa. Maj. Edward Wright; 28th Iowa, C John Con- 11;.56th Ohio, Capt. Masehil Manring. Artillery. A, lot Mo. Lient. Elisha Cole; 2d Ohio, Lieut. Win. It. Harper. r1uiRTH DIVISION, Col. William J. Lnndram. First Brigade, Col. Frank Emerson tw and ci: 77th Ill., LIct.-Col. Lysander R. Webb: 67th Ind. (non-vet- .raii Ofr1 60th Ind. attached), MNJ. Francis A. Sears; 19th Ky., lhcut.-Col. John Cowan; 2.3 Wis., Maj. Joseph E. (irc,.-. ,Sedoni Brigde, Col. Joseph W. Vance (k): 97th III., Col. Friend S. Rutherford; 130th Il1., Maj. John 1t. hlu; 48th Ohio, Llelnt.-Col. 3Jo-1ti W. Lindsey; SMd (Ohi, Lleiit.-(Col. Wilflain EI. Bialdwin ; 9th OhIlo. Lieot.- Co'l. Alhert 11. Brown. Artillery: Chlago (Illj. Mer- ,-antile Battery, Capt. Patrick H. White (chlet of rtil- hlry detachment Thirteenth Army Corps), Lient. P'ih.ckn,-y S. Cone; 1st lcd., Capt. Martin Klsnes. 814XTEENTII AND SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS .ltnah.hment fromn the Army of the Tennessee), Brig.- (1,11. Andrew J. Smith. SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS. FIRIST AND THIRD DIVISIONS, Brig.-Gen. Jo.. A. Mower. FIRST DIVISION. ',-,oad Brigade, C.o. L Pclits F. Hnbbard: 47th III., Col. Jloh.i 1). MeClure; 5th Mnn.., Maj. Johnl C. Becht; sth Wia., Lietit.-CoI. John W. Jegerson. Third Brigade, Col. Syiv;,.ter (1. IIIII: i4tth lows, Lient.-Col. William B. K-eehr; 234 Mo., Licut.-Col. Willitli. H. Heath. THIIRD DlVIRI.r;. Fi-rt Brigade, Cot. Witli.an F. Lynch: 58th IUI., MaJ. Thomas Newlan; 119th Ill., VlC. Thomas J. Kinney; 89th lnd.. Vol. Charles D. Murray. Seccod Brigade, Col. Wilhlia T. Shaw: 14th Iowa, Lient.-Col. Joseph H. New- lsld; 27th Iowa, CaL James 1. Gilbert; 32d towa, Col. John Scott; 24th Mo. (non-veterans of 21st Mo. at- tachedb, MaJ. Robert W. Fyan. Third Brigade. Col. RBsdon M. Moore: 49th Ill., Maj. Thomas W. Morgan; 117th Ili., Lmeut.-Col. Jonathan Merriam; 178th N. Y., Cot. Edward Welder. Artillry: 3d Ind., Capt. James M. Co-ketalr; 9th Ind., Capt. George R. Brown. SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. T. Kilby 8mith. Firat Brigade, Col. Jonathan B. Moore: 41t IIL., Lient.- Col. Job.n H. Nnle; 3d Iowa. Lteut.-Col. James Tullis; 33d WI.., Ma). Horatio H. Virgin. Second Brigade, Col. Ly- loan M. Ward: Stst Ill., Col. Andrew W. Rogers; 95th lil., CIIl. Thoe. W. Humphrey; 14th Wis., Capt. C. M. G. Mans- field. Artillery: M, 1st Mo., Lient. John H. Tiemeyer. NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. William B. Franklin Z; (wi, Brig.-Gen. Williamn H. Emory. FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William H. Emory, Brig.- Gen. J. W. MeMillan. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Dwight, Jr., Cot. Gea. L. Beat: 29th Me., Col. George L. Beat; 114th N. Y., Lleut.-Col. Henry B. Morse; 116th N. Y., Col. George M. L-ve; 153d N. Y., Col. Edwin P. Davis; 161st N. Y., Lleut.-Col. William B. Kinsey. econd Brigade, Brig.- Gen. James W. MeMlan: 13th Me., CoL Henry Rost, Jr.; lth Me., Col. Isaac Dyer; 160th N. Y., Lteut.-Col. John B. Van Petten; 47th Pa., Col. Tilghman H. Good. Third Brigoade. Col. Lewis Benedict (k), Col. FrancIs Fe.- -enden (wi; 30th Me., Col. Francis Fesseeden, Lient.- Col. Thomas H. Hubbard; 162d N. Y., Lient.-CoL Juatus W. Blanchard; 165th N. Y., Licut.-Col. GouverneurCarr; 173d N. Y., Col. LewIs M. Peck. Artillry, Capt. (Gcorge T. Hebard: 25th N. Y., Lieut. Irving D. southworth; L, let U. S., Llent. Franck E. Taylor; lt Vt.. Capt. .eorge T. Hebard. SECOND DIVIsION, Brig.-Gen. Cuvier Grover. First Brigade, 4 Brig.-Gen. F. S. Nickerson. ,Seeond Brigade, Brig.-(ien. Henry W. Birge,, Col. Fdward 1.. Xoline lx; 13th Conn., Col. Charles D. Bllnn; lst La., Col. William 0. Flske; 90th N. Y. (3 co.'., Maj. John C. Smart; 169th N. Y., Lieut.-CVo. Edward L. Gaull Third Brigade, CVl. Jacob Sharpe: 38th Mass., Lietit.-Col. James P. Richardson; 128th N. Y., Col. James SmitIt; 16fth N. Y., Capt. James J. Hoyt; 175th N. Y. (lbtt'.). Capt. Charles McCarthey. Artillery, Capt. G-eorge W. Fox: 7th Mass., Capt. Newman W. Storer; 2fth N. Y., Capt. George W. Fox; F, 1st U. S., Licut. HIardlin P. Norris; C, 2d U. S., Lient John I. Rodgers. .artry: 3d Md., Col. C. Carroll Tevi". ARTILLERY RESERVE, Capt. Henry W. Closson (chief of corps artillery): lst Del., Capt. BenJamin Nield; 1), lst Ilnd. HIeavy, Capt. William S. Hinkle. CAVALRY DivisioIN, Brig.-Ge... Albert L. Lee, Brlg.-ti. Rlchard Arnold. Frst Brigade, CIl. Thomas J. Lucas; lth toid. (moluted infry), tleut.-Col. James H. Redtleld; 2d La (monntedinryl, MsJ. Alfred lodadon; 6th Mo. (Howit- ser battery tnder Capt. Herbert H. Rottaken, attachbffh, Capt. SIdney A. Breese; 14th N. Y., MaJ. Abraham Ba..ford. Third Brigade, Col. Haral Robinson: 87th III. (mounted inry), Lleut.-Col. John M. Crebs; lat La., Maj. Algernon S. Badger. Fourth Wtrigade, Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley: 21 III., MaJ. Benjamin F. Marsh. Jr.; 3d Mass., Lieut.-Col. Lorenzo D. Sargent; 31tt Mass. (mounted ln'y), Capt. Elbert H. Fordham; 8th N. It. (mounted Jnry, Lieut.-Col. George A. Flanders. Ftith Brigade, Col. Oliver P. Gooding: 2d N. Y. Veteran, .t. Morgan H. Chrysler; 18th N. Y., Col. James J. Byran; 3d R.I. (detachment.. Maj. George R. Davis. Artillery; 2d Mass., Calt. Ormand F. Nims; G, 5th f. S., Liult. Jacob B. Rawles. CORPS D AFRIQUE. irst Brigde, Col. William H. Dickey: 1t Intan-try (7.3d U. S. C. T.. Maj. Hiram E. Perkins; 3d Infantry (75th U. S. C. T.), Col. Henry W. Fuller; 12th Infantry .84th U. S. C. T.), Capt. James H. Corrtn; 22d Ilifantry .921 U. S. C. T., Col. Henry N. Friehie. Ili hi. testinony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (p. 21, Vol. It.), General Banks says: We started with tlb iles that -e were to lia-v ac irateil cammanl , at least 35,000 to40.000 amen, when In tact we tent less tian 20,000, anil int little more than 15,000) for actilat battle with the enemy." The returns for Mareh 31st, 184, however, show a total present for duty of 31,303 officers and men, viz.: Head- quarters, 67; Engineers, 721; l1tb Corps, 4773; 19th Corps, 10,619; Corps d'Afrique, 1635; Cavalry, 4653,- total Army of the Golf, 22.364; detachment Army of the Tennessee, 8935,-grandtotal, 31,t03. DeduetingGrover`s division left at Alex.andria (28461, and Kilby Smith's division, which moved with the fleet (1721), it will be seen that the marching column consisted on the 31st of March of 25,T36 offcers and men of all arms. In his official report Banks says; " 11. these operations (up tI April 2f6th). in which my awn coniman hald macelicit by lanil nearly U4l0 mites the total toss -sstatnei. Iws 3980 men. oa whom 289 were kille., 1541 wnundlerl, sail 2160 missing. A iarge portion ot the latter w.ere cptulred."- On the return march trom Alexandria the loss ap- pro-imated 165 killed, 650 wounded, and 430 captured or missing. As A onstntuted about AprItl lt, 2804, with subsequent changs- at Union commander partly indicated. I Als emmanled the roops engaged at lbs battles It Sabine Cr-Iroals sad Pleant Hill. Joined the army at Alesandria ttrom New Orleans) after the battle oa Pleaeant HiIl. Also commanded at ,lunette's Ferry a temporary division oh his own brigade and the Third Brigade, Flrst Division. 967 368 THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.- General E. Kirby Smith. DISTRICT OF WEST LOUISIANA, Lieut.-Gn. Bih-h- art T.ylr. WALKER'S DIVI1O.N, Maj.J-.ell. Joist G1. Walk, r. Brsiiiad o.nn tader-: Brig.-Geu.. T. N. Waul, W. K. Scurry, and Col. Horace Randal. MoUTON's DIVisiOx, Brig.-Gen. Alfred ioouton, Brig.- 4;en. C. J. Poliguec. Brigade C..m..-Ia: Brig.-(.m-zm. C. J. Polignac and (ol. Henry (tray. st5-is IIIaI OF mmTrYtI LOUISIANA. Brtg.-(:G-n. St. John R. Liddell. CAVALRY DIVisi1O, Brig.-(een. Thoneaa Green and Maj.- (Gen. Jobsn A. Wharton. Brigade Con(magders: Brig.-etn. iatuilton P. Bee, J. P. Major. and Arthut P. Bagby. IUNATTACRtELD 'AVALRY: 2d La., Col. W. (. Vincent; 4th La., 'ol. Louls Snoh. DETACHMENT OF PRICE'S ARMY, Brig.-Gen. Thonao J. Chnrehill. MISSOURI DivisnON, Brig.-Geu. M. M. Paraon. Brigade Cosmeaaoder: Brig.-Gen. John B. Clark, Jr., and Col. S. P. Burns. ARtANSA8 DIViat1IN (tChurbhill'.), Brig.-Get. John C. Tappa,. Brigade Coinolmmers: Col. it. L. C rlnetm d tiid L. C. ( aIt"e. A5TILLERT (attached to brigades and divisione,. General Ta) lor saya: T'hiearmyIballatiI. , 1immemmtoemmn-mnm nlintide a nmmnuemtere . 1, at its -reate-t.i rea gtlm, a.emi t l 3.ot o f all emenme. mmme'limiin timimld l's htt. e on the -ortih (ta k of Itemi ltit -r; lut ilnma me-iately after th.e battle , i't a-ammt 11(11 it w-me -t. ml-eem m 6I tiny lime wititiila- al mmf W aikera a.iml Cilm rmi- i dll- i i.. . . Ouiartmttal Iteaitt killeml,w- mtmmiemt,.,,I ummi- etg wa a 3976." ( ee tIn. 1915. i- ..tittetiom aumm Beem m truetimne, 1t. A1jtetmmn C-,., No-: - - m rk.) General E. Kirby Smith, in his omi-al report, ay.: Taylimr haa u at Vaniilm. fter thib Jmntim of (ireelt, 11,000 effeetivec, with 5000 tufnatry fro- PrteeY arIlmy i oue day's mnarrh ib iMm." According to General Pmrsone'H report. hIs divisioln at Pleasant Hill numbihered "2200 musakets." THE OPPOSING FORCES IN ARKANSAS, APRIL 20, 1864. THE UNION ARMY. DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS, Maj.-Gen. Frederick ste-ele. TlntuKi ImivislOW. Brig.-Gen. Frederiek Salolnon. Fir- Brigade. Brig.-(;en. Samuel A. Rice: 50th Ind.. Limeat.-C0m1. Ha.-Inel T. Wells; 29th Iowa, Col. Thoma B. Bemlnot. Jr.; 3ad Iowa, (Col. Cyrun H. Mackey; tth UIt... C0mi. (Charleat E. Salomnoum. eotd Brigade. Col. Wllllaitm E. M5cLean: 4ad Ind., Mmej. Wealey W. Norria; 35th Imwa, Cml. C. W. Kittredge; 77th Ohio. Col. Willilmie B. Maaon. rhird Brigade, Coi. Admlph Engelm.n.: 4td ill., Lient.- CimI. Adolph LDengler; 40th lowa. Vol. Jmhn A. (amrrtt; 27th Wti.. Col. Conrad IKrez. Artillery: Ill. Battt-ry, Capt. T. F. Vaughn; 3d Iowa, Lieut. M. C'. Wright; K, let Min., Calpt. Janet Mlarr; E.2,1 5to., Lieut. Charlet Peetz. FIImmTtlt it' l181, Brig.-Gen. John M. Thayer. Fir. Crgmd, Col. Jlen Edward;: let Ark., Liemut.- C(in. E. J. S.emmrle; 2d Ark., Maj. 5S. Li Stephenstn; lath Ioswmm. ( mim. Wlllib.i.. M. Dinm.,.t: 2d Ind. Battery, Lielt. Slogh Epiey. itecead Brigade. Col. Charlee W. Adttina: tat Kan. 4colored), Coi. Ja.est M. Willioa-m; 2d Kan. tcolored), Col. Samuel J. Crawfordi 12th Kaim., Lieut.- C'il. Josiah E. Hayea; ltt Ark. Battery, Cmapt. Denton D. Stark. Third Brigade (cavalry), Col. Owen A. Baa- aett: ad Katn., Maj. JUlis (.. Flak; lth Ktn.. LIeMt.-Col. WillIam T. Caniphell; 14th Kan., Lieut.-Col. John (i. Brown. CAVALRY DIVISiON, Brig.-(Cen. Eugent' A. Carr. Fir7f Brigade, Col. Johim F. Bitter: 3d Ark., Maj. (George F. Iovitj my; let Mo., Capt. 5111es Kehe e; ,d IMm., Capt. William H. Higdon; 13th 111. and 3d IowaI (de- tachim-eit, Clapt. Adolph Beebllaid. Third Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Jo-eph W. Caldwell: let Iowa, Capt. Jme-m P. Crosby; 10th 111. idetachument;. Lieut. R. J. Bellanmy; 3d Mo.. Miaj. John A. Lennon. INIEPENDENT CAV'ALRY BRIGADE, C'o1. Pmlwell Claytoim: let Inl.. MaJ. J.lian D. Owen; 5th Kmit... Lleut.-C-I. Wiltm-n A. Jenkisitm. Effmcttve force featinated), 13,000; itmatml Imm about 2,600. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.-General E. Kirby Smith. Dl)ITRICT OFARKANSAS, Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price.) E-ron: Mo. Battalion. MaJ. R. C. Wood. FAGA!4'C CAVALRY Dtll"1ON, Brig.-(en. J. F. Fagan. Callellr' Brigade, Brlg.-Gen. W. L. Cabeil: lst Ark., C('1. J. C. Mtmuroe; 2d Ark., Col. T. J. Morgan; 4th Ark., (Cme. A. Gorrdun; 7th Ark., C.L Jehn F. Hill; Ark. Bat- talnmn. Lient.-Col. T. M. G-utter; Blocher'a Battery, -. Aterj aBrigade. Brlg.-Gen. T. P. Doecery; 18th Aek.. - 19th Ark., Lleut.-CoL H. (. P. Willian; JOlth Ark., ; Ark. Battalion, - . Craoford's Brigade. Col. W. A. Crawford: 2d Ark.. Capt. 0. B. Tebbe; Crawford's Reg't, -; Wright's Reg't, Cmm1. Jimlmt C. Wright; Poe'a Battalion, Mej. J. T Poe; Ark. Battalon. Maj. E. L. McMartrey. AHUIl-er: Ark. Bat- tery, Capt. W. M. Hughey. MARMADIrKE'R CAVALRY DIVISlONt, Brig.-Gen. John S. Marmnduke. reeae'a Brigade. Col. Colton Greene: 3d Mo., Lient.- Col. 1. A. C('mItlbl ell; tlh Mo., Lient.-Col. W. J. Preston; 7th M,,., - ; 8th Mo., Cot. W. L. Jeffers; 10th Mo., Col. R. R Lawther; Mo. Battery, Capt. - Harria. Shdbj Brigade, Brlg.4Ien. Joseph 0. Shelby: let Mo., Battalion. Mtj. Benjanmin Elliltt; 5th Mo., Col. B. F. Gordon; 11th Mo., Col. M. W. SPimith; 12th M,,., thd. David Shanks; tHunter'a Relet, Col. D. C. Hunter; Mo. Battery, Capt. R. A. Collns, MASKY's CAVALRV DIVIilOi. Brig.-G.n. Sreml. B. Maxey. aaeo's Brigade, Col. Charles De Moree: 29th Tex., Maj. J. A. Carroll; 30th Tex., Liettt.-Col. N. W. Battle; 31et Tex., Maj. M. Lo-eni; Welhb's Co.. Lie-tt. Franik M. Gano; Tex. Battery, Capt. W. B. Krnmhtaar. Choeti-i Brigade, Col. Tanidy Walkt'r: let Regiment, Lieut.-CoL James Riley; 2d Regiment, Col. Simpson W. FWmlonta. WALKER'S DIViSION, Maj.-Gen. Jmmhm G. Wmtlker. Brigade Come andera; Brig.-Gens. T. N. Wanu, W. R. ,e'nrry, and Col. Horace Raitdal. ARKANSAS DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Churchill. Tapp-'. Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. C. Tappan: 24th and 30th Ark., Lieut.-Col. W. B. Hardy; 27th and 38th Ark., Col. R. G. Shaver; 33d Ark., Col. H. L. Grinsted. Hat- tiora' Brigade, BriK.-Gen. A. T. Hawthorn: . . . Gauss's Brgade, Col. I. C. Gattee: 26th Ark., Llent.-Col. Iverson L. Brooks; 32d Ark., Lieut.-Col. Wiliam Bieke; 36th Ark., Col. J. M. Davie. MISSOURI nitVIsION, Brig.-Gen, M. M. Pirsous. Fi-r Brigade. Brig.-aen. John B. Clark. Jr.: 8th Mo., Col. Charles S. Mitehell; 9th Mo., Col. B. H. Musser; Mo. Battery, Capt S. T. Bmffher. Reoed Brigade, C,,ol S. P. Burns; loth Mo., Col. William Moore; 11th Mu., Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Murray; 12th M... -; lath Mo,, Lieut.-Col. P. W. H. Cumming; 9th Mo. Battalion Sharp-shooters, MmLi. L. A. Pindall; Mo. Battery, Capt. A. A. Lesneur. Maximum effectve strength (estimated, 14,000; total loss (estimated), 1200. ASsumed1 command of tIle Arskas- and Missouri divii..ns April 26. THE OPPOSING FORCES IN ARKANSAS. THE DEFENSE OF THE RED RIVER.J BY E. KIRBY SMITIT, GENERAL, C. S. A. -OON after my arrival in the Trans-Mississippi Department :a I became S convince(l that the valley of the Red River was the only practicable line of operations by which the enemy could penetrate the country. This fact was well understood and appreciated by their generals. I addressed myself to the task of defending this line with the slender means at my disposal. Fortifications were erected on the lower Red River; Shreveport and Camden were fortified, and works were ordered on the Sabine and the crossings of the upper Red River. Depots were established on the shortest lines of communication between the Red River valley and the troops serving in Arkansas and Texas. Those commands were directed to be held ready to move with little delay, and every preparation was made in advance for accelerating a concentration, at all times difficult over long dis- tances, and through a country destitute of supplies and with limited means of transportation. In February, 1864, the enemy were preparing in New Orleans, Vicksburg, and Little Rock for offensive operations. Though 25,000 of the enemy were reported on the Texas coast, my information convinced me that the valley of the Red River would be the principal theater of operations and Shreveport the objective point of the columns moving from Arkansas and Louisiana. Oin the 21st of February General Magruder, commanding in Texas, was ordered to hold Green's division of cavalry in readiness to move at a moment's warning, and on the 5th of March the division was ordered to march at once to Alexandria and report to General Taylor, who had command in Louisiana. About that time the enemy commenced massing his forces at Berwiek Bay. On the 12th of March a column of ten thousand men, composed of portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps under General A. J. Smitlh, moved down from Vicksburg to Simsport, and advanced with such celerity oil Fort De Russy, taking it in reverse, that General Taylor was not allowed time to concentrate and cover this important work, our only means of arrest- ing the progress of the gun-boats. The fall of this work and the immediate movement of the enemy, by means of his transports, to Alexandria, placed General Taylor in a very embarrassing position. He extricated himself with his characteristic tact by a march of seventy miles through the pine woods. Banks now pressed forward from Berwick Bay, by the line of the Teche, and by the aid of steamers, on both the Mississippi and Red rivers, conceli- trated at Alexandria a force of over 30,000 men, supported by the most p)owerful naval armament ever employed on a river. J I have found amongst my war papers two let- either prejudice or personal feeling could hav-, ters upon the Red River campaign which I believe biased. From these, chiefly, I take this narra- have never been published. They were written by tive.- E. K. S. me to Mr. Davis, the President of the Confeder- , General E. Kirby Smith took command of aey, immediately after the occurrence of those all the Confederate forees west of the Mississippi events, and are official and have the merit of be- River March 7th, 1S63, and held it until the end ing written when events were fresh and before of the war.-EDITORS. 359 THE DEFENSE OF THE RED RIVER. As sf.o)n as I receivedl intelligence of the debarkation of the enemy at Sinisplort, I ordered (ielleral Price, who commanded in Arkansas, to dis- uatch his enitir-e infanltry, consisting of Churehill's and P'arsonis's ditvisions, to shreveplort, and General flaxey to move toward (General Price, and, as sooti as Steele Alvarezmezl, to join Price with his whole coinmand, Indlians ineluded. 'ite ctivalry east of tile Ouachita was direvted to fall hask toward Natehi- tctchies, and subsequently to oppose, as far as possible, the adv.ance of the elielnie's fleet. It was unrder the comimand1 of General St. John It. Liddell. All disposhable infantry ill Texas was directed onl Marshall, and1l although tile enemr still had a force of several thousand on the eoast, I redihced the numi- lbrof men holding the defenses to in absolute minimium. Gxenieral Magru- der's field repo rt show.s that but 2301) mien were left in Texas. Ex(elt these, everv effective soldier in the tleldartmient wasl put in front of Steele or in suppl)ort of' Tavlor. The enemiy was operating with a force, according to my inf irmation, o full 50,000 effeetive ien ; witil tile Lit- most powers of concentration not 25,000 men of all arms could be brought to oppose his, movements. Taylor had at Mansfield, after the junction of Green, 11,000 effective-s with 5000 infantry Il'TU. sS-i:.1 1Mt TA'.YLOR. from Priee's ai-my in one day's march of him at Keaehie. Price, with 6000 or 80(0) (avalrv, was engaged in holding in check the advance of Steele, whose column, au ording to our information, did not number less than 15,000 of all arms. Shreveport was made the point of concentration ; with its forti- fications covering the depots, arsenals, and shops at Jefferson, Marshall, and above, it was a strategic point of vital importance. All the infantry not with Taylor, opposed to Banks, was directed on Shreveport. Price with his cav- alry command was instructed to delay the march of Steele's column whilst the conceiitration was being made. Occupying a central position at Shreve- port, with the enemy's columns approaching from opposite directions, I pro- posed drawing them within striking distance, when, by concentrating upon and striking them in detail, both columns might be crippled or destroyed. Banks pushed on to Natchitoches. It was expected he would be detained there several days in accumulating supplies. Steele on the Little Missouri and Banks at Natchitoches were but about one hundred miles from Shreve- port or Marshall. The character of the country did not admit of their forming a junction above Natchitoches, and if they advanced I hoped, by refusing one of them, to fight the other with my whole force. It seemed probable at this time that Steele would advance first. When he reached Prairie d'Aiie, two routes were open to him: the one to Marshall, 174 THE DEFENSE OF THE RED RIVER. THoE CONFEDEIRATE FORT DE RNTJ9Y. ABOUT TEN MILER BElow ALKXAN-)BIA. I1RO. A EKETCII Ai.)E RI-ON AFTER IT WAS -APrTREI-. crossilig the river at Ftilton, the other direct to Shreveport. I consequently held Price's infantry, under Churehill, a few days at Shreveport. Steele's hesitation and the reports of the advance of Banks's eavalry caused me, on the 4th of April, to move Churchill to Keachie, a point twentv miles in rear of Mansfield, where the road divides to go to Marshall and Shreveport. He was directed to report to General Taylor. I now visited and conferred with General Taylor. He believed that Banks could not yet advance his infantry across the barren country lying between Natehitoches and Mansfield. I returned to Shreveport and wrote General Taylor not to risk a general engagement, but to select a position in which to give battle should Banks advan(e, and by a reeonnoissance in force to compel the enemy to display his infantry, and to notify me as soon as he had done so and I would join him in the front. The reconnaissance was converted into a decisive engagement near Mans- field, on the 8th of April, with the advance of the enemy (a portion of the Thir- teenth Corps and his cavalry), and by the rare intrepidity of Mouton's division resulted in a complete victory over the forces engaged. The battle of Mansfield was not an intentional violation of my instructions on General Taylor's part. The Federal cavalry had pushed forward so far in advance of their column as to completely cover its movement, and General Taylor reported to me by dis- patch at 12 meridian of the day on which the battle took place, that there was no advance made from Grand Ecore except of cavalry. In fact, however, General Franklin with his infantry was on the march and at once pushed for- ward to the support of the cavalry. When General Mouton with his division drove in the cavalry, he struck the head of Franklin's troops, and by a vigor- ous and able attack, without waiting for orders from Taylor, repulsed and drove back Franklin's advance and opened the battle of Mansfield, which, when Taylor came to the front, with his accustomed boldness and vigor he pushed to a complete success. [See p. 353.] 37'1 THE DEFENSE OF THE RED RIVER. Churchill, with his infantry under Tappan and Parsons joined Taylor that night. The next morning Taylor, advancing in force, found the enemy in position at Pleasant Hill. Our troops attacked with vigor and at first with success, Iut, exposing their right flank, were finally repulsed and thrown into confusion. The Missouri and Arkansas troops, with a brigade of Walker's division, were broken and scattered. The enemy recovered cannon which we had captured the day before, and two of our pieces with the dead and wounded were left on the fieldi. Our repulse at Pleasant Hill was so com- plete and our command was so disorganized that had Banks followed up his success vigorously he would have met but feeble opposition to his advance on Shreveport. Having ridden forward at 2 A. m. on receipt of Taylor's report of the battle of Mansfield, I joined Taylor after dark on the 8th, a few yards in rear of the battle-field of that day. Polignac's (previously Mouton's) division of Louisi- ana infantry was all that was intact of Taylor's force. Assuming command, I countermanded the order that had been given for the retreat of Polignac's division, and was consulting with General Taylor when some stragglers from the battle-field, where our wounded were still lying, brought the intelligence that Banks had precipitately retreated after the battle, converting a victory which he might have claimed into a defeat. Our troops in rear rallied, and the field was next day occupied by us. Banks continued his retreat to Grand Ecore, where he intrenched himself and remained until the return of his fleet and its safe passage over the bars, made especially difficult this season by the unusual fall of the river. Our troops were completely paralyzed and disorganized by the repulse at Pleasant Hill, and the cavalry, worn by its long march from Texas, had been constantly engaged for three days, almost without food or forage. Before we could reorganize at Mansfield and get into condition to advance over the fifty-five miles of wilderness that separated our armies, the enemy had been reenforced and intrenched at Grand Ecore. The enemy held possession of the river until he evacuated Grand Ecore. Steele was still slowly advancing from the Little Missouri to the Prairie d'Ane. I deemed it imprudent to follow Banks below Grand Eeore with my whole force, and leave Steele so near Shreveport. Even had I been able to throw Banks across the Atchafalaya, the high water of that stream would have arrested my farther progress. An intercepted dispatch from General Sher- man to General A. J. Smith, directing the immediate return of his force to Vicksburg, removed the last doubt in my mind that Banks would withdraw to Alexandria as rapidly as possible, and it was hoped the falls would detain his fleet there until we could dispose of Steele, when the entire force of the depart- ment would be free to operate against him. I confidently hoped, if I could reach Steele with my infantry, to beat him at a distance from his depot, in a poor country, and with my large cavalry force to destroy his army. The prize would have been the Arkansas Valley and the powerful fortifications of Little Rock. Steele's defeat or retreat would leave me in position promptly to support Taylor's operations against Banks. 372 THE DEFENSE OF THE RED RIVER. Leaving Taylor with his cavalry, now under Wharton, and the Louisiana division of infantry under Polignac, to follow up Banks's retreat, and taking the Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri divisions of infantry, I moved against Steele's column in Arkansas. Steele entered Camden, where he was too strong for assault, but the capture of his train at the battle of Marks's Mill on the pith of April forced him to evacuate Camden on the 28th, and the battle of .Jenkins's Ferry on the Saline, April 30th, completed his discomfiture. [See p. :175.] He retreated to Little Rock. Churchill, Parsons, and Walker were at once marched across country to the support of Taylor, but before the junc- tion could be effected Banks had gone. To return. to Taylor, after the enemy left G4rand Ecore General Taylor at- tacked his rear at Cloutierville, whilst a detachment under Bee held the Fed- eral advance in check at Monette's Ferry. General Taylor's force was, however, too weak to warrant the hope that he could seriously impede the march of Banks's column. After the y t' latter reached Alexandria, General Tay- br transferred a part of his command to the river below Alexandria, and with uniaralleled audacity and great ability h and success operated on the enemy's gun-loats and transports. The construction of the dam, aided by a temporary rise in Red River, en- a RmADuR E J. the Mis.si. abled Admiral Porter to get his fleet over the falls. Had he delayed but one week longer, our whole infantiy force would have been united against him. Banks evacuated Alexandria on the 12th and 13th of May, the fleet quitted the Red River, and the campaign ended with the occupation of all the coun- try we had held at its beginning, as well as of the lower Teche. The operations of Taylor on Red River and Marmaduke on the Mississippi prevented A. J. Smith from obeying Shermans order to return to Vicks- burg in time for the Atlanta campaign. 4 Through the courtesy of the editors of this work, I have carefully read a statement in which are grouped in detail the covert insinuations, the gos- sip of camps and capitals, and the misstatements of well-known facts that go to make up the old story of many versions of " an arrangement at Washing- ton whereby Kirby Smith's army was to recede before the army of General Banks, falling back through the State of Texas, and finally to disband. In anticipation of this," the story continues, " Confederate cotton to an amount I A. J. Smith did not rejoin Sherman, but, after Sherman had set out for Savannah, he joined Thomas in time to take part in the battle of Nashville.- EDITORS. 37 3 REISUME OF MILITARY OPERATIONS named, believed to be 25,000 bales, was to be gathered at points convenient for transportation and taken by three commissioners, residents of New Orleans, who would accompany the expedition under Banks, and sold by them; the proceeds to be divided like naval prize money, and to go to make a fund for the benefit of such Confederate officers and men as might expatriate themselves in Brazil or some other country. General Banks was instructed to carry out this arrangement. General Dick Taylor was assigned to the command of the Army of the West Mississippi after this arrangement was entered into anal before its execution, was not a party to it, and purposely prevented its being carried out by bringing on an engagement at Mansfield. After the navy commenced taking the cotton, claiming it as prize of war, a wrangle began over it and its destruction commenced." I remark in passing that neither the emphatic statement in regard to Gen- eral Taylor, nor the equally explicit one about the destruction of cotton, can stand the test of dates; for General Taylor had been in command since 1862,- in fact before either General Banks or myself,-and I ordered the cotton to be burned, in accordance with the settled policy of the Confederacy, as soon as I heard of Banks's movement, and before I knew of the approach of the navy. There is not the least foundation upon which this story could rest. The circumstances alleged are impossible to have happened without my hav- ing been a party to them. My power in the Trans-Mississippi Department was almost absolute. I bought cotton through my Cotton Bureau at three and four cents a pound, and sold it at fifty cents a pound in gold. It passed in constant streams by several crossings of the Rio Grande, as well as through Galveston, to the agents abroad. It would have been absurd in me to have called in the devious and uncertain agency of a Federal army, and of cotton speculators from within the Union lines, when I could at any time have safely exported and placed to my credit abroad thousands of bales of cotton. RESUME OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS, 1864-65. BY WILEY BRITTON, 6TH KANSAS CAVALRY. T capture of Fort Smith by General Blunt, and of Little Rock by General Steele, early in September, 1863 [See "The Conquest of Arkan- sas," Vol. III., p. 441), put the Arkansas River, from its mouth to its junction with the Grand and Verdigris rivers, into the possession of the Federal forces. This general advance of the Federal line forted General Price to fall back with his army from his fortified positions around Little Rock to Camden and Arkadelphia, in the southern part of the State. Having now no threatened positions of importance to hold, the Confederate generals in Arkansas were free to use their mounted troops and light artillery in attacking and threatening with attack the small posts and lines of communi- eation in the rear of the Federal army. On his retreat from Little Rock (Lee map, p. 348], Price detached General Joseph 0. Shelby with a brigade from Marmaduke's cavalry division and a battery of light artillery to make a raid into Missouri, hoping by this diversion to cause the withdrawal of at least part of the Federal troops from the Arkansas valley. Shelby, with his bri- gade of upward of two thousand menJ and with two pieces of artillery, crossed the Arkansas River on the 27th of September, moved north rapidly, entered south-west Missouri near Cass- ville about the 1st of October, and captured the post of Neosho with a detachment of the Missouri State militia stationed there, and paroled them. From Neosho he moved north, and, with scarcely any opposition, reached the vicinity of Marshall in central Missouri, where he encountered General E. B. Brown with a force of the State militia. On ) Shelby reported his forse as 600. There were tour colonels, Shelby, Hunter, Gordon, and Coffee. The writer's father was captured at N.eho., and stated the ftrse as WM50, an estimate which is supported by four Union reports quoted in Moore's 1- Rebellion Record."- EDITOs. 374 IN ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI, 1864-65. the l 3th of October, after a sharp fight of several hours, Shelby was defeated. his artillery captured, and his command dispersed. General Thomas Ewing, Jr., commanding the l)istrict of the Border, on hearing of the advance of the Confederate raid- itig force into central Missouri, marched with a force of about two thousand men from Kansas City to join General Brown, and picked up some of Shelby's demoralized command in their retreat toward the Kansas border. Having suffered this reverse, Shelby's next object was to get out of the State in as good shape as possible, and at once he cormmenced a hasty retreat south. Hie was pur- sued day and night by Ewing and Brown, in an excit- ilg ehase of upward of two hundred miles, and until his command lost all cohesion in the mountainous regions of Arkansas. Thus western Missouri was not only relieved for the remainder of the year 1 8 3 of Shelby's raiding force, but also of Quan- trill's murderous band of guerrillas, who, on the 20th of August, had burned the city of Lawrence, Kansas, and murdered 1 54) of her citizens in cold blood; and on the lth of Oetober had killed some S1 of Blunt's escort at Baxter Springs, Kansas, most of whom were first wounded and fell into his hands. Ihoring the winter of 1863-64 the forces of Gen- erals Steele and Blunt held the Arkansas River as a Federal line of advance. The winter was so cold that no important aggressive operations were attempted. During this period of inactivity, how- ever, Steele was making preparations for a vigorous spring campaign. It was decided that the column under General Banks and the columns under Gen- eral Steele from Little Rock and Fort Smith should converge toward Shreveport, Louisiana. The Federal columns under Steele left Little Rock and Fort Smith the latter part of March, moved toward the southern part of the State, and after some fighting and manoeuvring drove General Price's forces from Camden, Arkadelphia, and Washington. In the midst of these successful operations, Steele received information that Banks's army had been defeated and was retreating: [see p. 354], and that Price had received refnforcements from Kirby Smith of 8000 infantry and a complement of ar- tillery, and would at once assume the offensive. Not feeling strong enough to fight the combined Confederate forces, Steele determined to fall back upon Little Rock. He had scarcely commenced his retrograde movement when Smith and Price began to press him vigorously. A retreating fight was kept up for several days, until the Federal army reached Jenkins's Ferry on the Saline River. Here the swollen condition of the stream and the almost impassable swamp on the opposite side held Steele's forces until his trains were crossed over on the pontoons. While he was thus detained, on the 30th of April, Smith and Price came up and -On tlearninlg the defeat and consequent retreat of Gterreral Banks en Red River . . General Steele de- terunirred to fall back to the Arkansas River." (Report of GeneralU.S.GCrant. Appendix to " Memoirs," p. 592.1 4 Thls follows Steele's report, but Colonel Snuad, of Price's staff, plaees the force at 12,000, of whom only 8O0 were armed, and 14 guns.- EDrros. attacked him with great energy. The battle raged furiously nearly half a day, when the Confederate army was repulsed with heavy loss and withdrew from the field. Steele crossed the river without further opposition and retired leisurely to Little Rock, with all his army except the division tinder General John M. Thayer, which was sent back to Fort Smith. Price was so badly beaten that he made no effort to pursue the Federal forces north of Saline River. After the battle of Jenkins's Ferry, instead of making preparations to attack the Federal forces at Little Rock and Fort Smith, Price commenced or- ganizing his forces for an expedition into Missouri, to be led by him in person. The Confederate troops under Cooper, Maxey, and Gano, in the In- dian Territory and western Arkansas, were to make demonstrations against Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, and the line of communication between those points and Kansas, while another part of the Confederate army was to threaten Little Rock. Price's army for the invasion of Missouri num- bered some 15,0004 men and 20) pieces of artil- lery before crossing the Arkansas River, and con- sisted of three divisions, commanded by Generals Fagan, Marmadluke, and Shelby. These troops were mostly veterans, having been in active ser- vice since the first year of the war. About the 1 st of September, while strong demonstrations were being made against Fort Smith and Little Rock, Price, with his army, crossed the Arkansas River about half-way between those points at Dar- danelle, and marched to the northern part of the State without opposition, and, in fact. without his movements being definitely known to General Rose- erans, who then commanded the Department of the Missouri at St. Louis. b When the Confederate forces entered Missouri they were met by detach- ments of the State militia, who captured several Confederate prisoners, from whom it was aseer- tained that the invading force was much larger than had been supposed, and that Price was marching direct for St. Louis. Rosecrans at once commenced collecting his forces to meet and cheek the enemy. General Thomas Ewing, Jr., was in command of the District of South-east Missouri. Pilot Knob, near Iron Mountain [see map, Vol I., p. 263], was a post of importance, with fortifications of consid- erable strength, and was on Price's direct line of march to St. Louis, which was only eighty-six miles distant. Finding that General Price was certainly ad- vancing toward St. Louis, Ewing, in order to defend Pilot Knob, drew in the detachments of his com- mand stationed at different points in south-east Missouri. As the Federal forces around and in the vicinity of St. Louis were considered inadequate to, defend the city against the reported strength of Price's veteran army, on the request of Roseerans General A. J. Smith's veteran division of the Army - General Wililanm S. Resecrans. who was relieved of command it Ciattanoosa, October i9th, 1803, assu-etd eommand of the Department of the Missouri, Jan- ulary 28th, 1864, ard remained In co...mand of that de- partmuent until December 9th, 1964. For the remainder of the war he was at Cincinnati on waiting orders.- EDoroRs. 375 RSUMI OF MILITARY OPERATIONS of the Tennessee, 4500 strong, passing up the Mississippi River to join Sherman's army, was de- tained at Cairo to assist in checking the advance of the Confederate army. Price arrived before Pilot Knob in the afternoon of September 26th, and skirmished until night with detachments of Federal cavalry, which had been thrown out to meet his advance. Ewing had l1051 men at that post, which were only enough to man the works. Having got his troops and artillery all up, Price opened the attack on the fort at daylight on the 27th, and kept it up all day with great reso- lution. But Ewing's well-served artillery of eleven pieces and his thousand small-arms repulsed every assault made by the Confederates. When night came, however, Ewing was satisfied that he could not hold out another day against the superior at- tacking force, and he determined to evacuate the fort. Shortly after midnight his troops marched out, and a few moments later his magazine was blown up, and the ammunition which could not be taken along was destroyed. Ewing then marched with his foree and joined the troops engaged in the defense of St. Louis and of Jefferson City. On hearing the explosion of the magazine, Priee sus- peeted the retreat of the garrison, and immediately ordered his generals to start in pursuit. Continu- ing his march north with his army he came up and attaekt-d the defenses of St. Louis some miles south of the city, but was repulsed by General A. J. Smith's veterans and other troops, and then changed his line of march and moved westward toward Jefferson City, the State capital. While Price's plans were not definitely known, his move- inents indicated that he would endeavor to take Jefferson City. But Roseerans determined not to allow the State capital to fall into the hands of the invader, and not only called out the enrolled militia of central Missouri for its defense, but also ordered General John B. Sanborn, commanding the District of South-west Missouri at Springfield, and General John McNeil, commanding the District of Rolls, to march to its defense with their available forces, with the least possible delay. General E. B. Brown and General Clinton B. Fisk, commanding districts in central and north Missouri, were also directed to bring forward to Jefferson City all the State militia that could be spared from their respee- tive districts. General Price moved forward and attacked the capital, but as he was closely pursued by the Federal forces from St. Louis he was soon driven off, and continued his march westward up the south side of the Missouri River. His next objects were understood to be the eap- ture of Kansas City, and Fort Leavenworth, Kan- sas, and more particularly the invasion and desola- tion of Kansas. He conscripted and pressed into service every man and youth found at home able to bear arms. 4 Major-General K. R. Curtis, com- manding the Department of Kansas and the In- dian Territory, the moment he was advised of the approaching storm, began collecting all his forces along the eastern border of the State south of Kansas City, and urged Governor Carney, of Kan- .as, to call out the militia to cooperate with the volunteers in resisting the threatened invasion. In response to the governor's call, twenty-four regiments of militia were hastily organized, and took position along the eastern line of the State. Early in these preparatory operations for the de- fense of the border, Major-General George Sykes, commanding the District of South Kansas, was, at his own request, relieved, and Major-General James G. Blunt was placed in command. As soon as in- formation was received that Price had been driven from Jefferson City and was moving westward, Curtis and Blunt took the field in person to direct the operations of their forces in defense of the border. Blunt took the available force of the volunteers and several sections of artillery, and moved down to Lexington, some forty miles, to meet and hold the enemy as long as possible, so that HIoseerans's forces in pursuit from St. Louis and Jefferson City, under Generals Alfred Pleas- onion \ and A. J. Smith, could come up and attack Price in the rear. On the afternoon of October 20th Price's ad- vance under Shelby came within sight of Lexington on the south side of the city. Sharp fighting at once commenced between the opposing forces, and lasted until night, when Blunt, having ascertained the strength of the enemy, fell back to Little Blue River, a few miles east of Independence, to form a new line of battle. As this stream was fordable at different points above and below where the In- dependence and Lexington road crossed it, Blunt's forces, under Colonel Thomas Moonlight, were obliged, on the 21st, to abandon the position taken up behind it after an engagement with Shelby's division, lasting several hours, and fall back be- hind the Big Blue River, a few miles west of In- dependence. Here a new line of battle was formed with all Curtis's available troops, includ- ing most of the Kaneas State militia, who had eon- sented to cross the State line into Missouri. Curtis and Blunt determined to hold Price's army 4 As this statement has been questioned, I quote the are ordered. to report to headquarters at the Co-rt House following do-nmenta from Colonel R. J. Hinton' s It- within 24 ho-rs after issuing tbi order. -- N Orlt. llEAst Asrazs. t.txixnToxt 1YIsSOts, October 14th [18641. I berh-by notiy the citizen of Le-ington snd vicinity that I ant here now fltr the purpose of eolisting al those who are subjet to military duty, aso organizinR then into coin- ,a-ies. battatis. etc.. with anthority front Msjor.iencral Price. Atl those subject to ditty will report to me at the ('curt House iumedlately. '- L. L. Bltitx.oR. Captain and Recruiting Officer." "tittNi HAL ORDtUg . ItKADQUARrcsu , titEL85Ps lSIG 1ti , Lxxi.;Trox. MissoLRI. October 14th [1864]. II.A f e w t . . .it zent. w a 17.a d50 " tto. Sf. IIATrHit' Captain C omuianming Ortachmeot Shelby Brigade Recruiting ServIce W W. B. X General Sykes, who was relieved from the com- mand of the Filth Corps (Ar..y of the Potomac) In March, 18s4, was on duty in the Department of Kansas from April 20th, 1864, until June 7th, 1863. For a part ot this time (September 1st -October 10th, 18641 he was In command of the District of South Kansas.- EDIrots. \ General Pleasonton, who was relieved from the command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac in March, 186I4, served In the Department of Missouri from March "id, 1864, until the close of the war.-EnDrrOR. 376 IN ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI, 1864-65. east of the Big Blue as long as practicable in the hope of receiving assistance from Rosecrans, who, it was thought, was following close upon the rear of the Confederate army. While Curtis's forces were thus fighting and skirmishing with the enemy over nearly every foot of the ground from Lexing- toil to Big Blue, Pleasonton's provisional cavalry division of Rosecrans's army was marching day and night from Jefferson City to overtake the in- vading force. On the 22d, just as Curtis's troops were being driven from the line of the Big Blue hack upon the State line and Kansas City, Pleas- onton's cavalry came up and attacked the rear of Price's army, east of Independence, and routed it and drove it in great disorder through the town. Pleasonton at once sent a messenger to Curtis, an- nouncing his presence upon the field. The night of the 22d Price's army encamped on the west side of the Big Blue, just south of Westport. Pleasonton's cavalry encamped that night around and in the neighborhood of Independence, east of the Big Blue. Curtis's forees were encamped from Kansas City to Westport and along the State line west of Westport. At daylight on the 23d the columns of Pleason- ton began to move west, and those of Curtis to move south, and in a short time afterward they became warmly engaged with the Confederates, who were drawn up in the line of battle two and a half miles south of Westport. The opposing armies fought over an area of five or six square miles, and at some points the fighting was furious. At times there were as many as forty or fifty guns throwing shot and shell and grape and canister. About the middle of the afternoon Price's lines began to give way, and by sundown the entire Confederate army was in full retreat southward along the State line, closely pursued by the victorious Federal forces. In the meanwhile General A. J. Smith was bring- ing forward his division of veteran infantry on forced marches from Lexington, but, receiving in- formation that the Confederate army was retreat- ing down the border, changed his line of march to move via Pleasant Hill and Harrisonville, to head off Price and bring him to a stand. When, how- ever, General Smith's division reached a point some four miles south-west of Harrisonville, he ascertained that Price had already passed on southward down the line road. After the battle near Westport the cavalry of Curtis and Pleason- ton kept up the pursuit and was constantly en- gaged in skirmishing with the Confederate rear column until the Southern forces arrived at the Marais des Cygnes River. Here Price was obliged to make a stand to get his artillery and trains across the river. After being driven from this position he formed a line of battle on the 2.5th, a few miles south of the Marais des Cygnes, near Mine Creek, in Linn County, Kansas, placing his artillery, supported by a large force, on a high mound in the prairie. The Federal cavalry coming up charged nis position with great gallantry, broke his line, captured nearly all his artillery, ten pieces, and a large number of prisoners, among them Generals Marmaduke and Cabell and many other officers of lower rank. In his retreat from this position Price was closely pursued by the Federal cavalry, his rear-guard being almost con- stantly under fire. His army encamped that night on the Marmiton River, about eight miles nearly east of Fort Scott, which place he had intended to capture with the large depot of Government sup- plies. Having lost most of his artillery, about midnight he blew up such of his artillery ammu- nition as was unsuitable for the guns which he still had. The troops of Curtis and Pleasonton, who reached Fort Scott that night and replenished their haversacks and cartridge-boxes, heard the loud explosion. From Fort Scott the pursuit was continued by Curtis's forces under Blunt, and by Rosecrans's cavalry under Sanborn and McNeil. At Newtonia in south-west Missouri, on the 28th of October, Price made another stand, and was at- tacked by the pursuing forces named, and finally driven from the field with heavy loss. This was next to the severest battle of the campaign. Blunt, and some of the Missouri troops, continued the pur- suit to the Arkansas River, but Price did not again attempt to make a stand. His line of march from Westport to Newtonia was strewn with the debris of a routed army. He crossed the Arkansas River above Fort Smith with a few pieces of artillery, with his army demoralized and reduced by cap- tures and dispersion to perhaps less than 504)00 men. Most of the noted guerrilla bands followed him from the State. The " Price raid," as it was called in the West, was the last military operation of much conse- quence that took place in Missouri and Arkansas. It is certain that Price lost more than he gained in war material and that the raid did not tend to strengthen the Confederate cause in the West. He did not capture and take off a single piece of can- non on his raid. Large numbers of the men he conscripted and pressed into service during the raid left him at the first opportunity and returned to their homes, or were picked up by the Federal cavalry and paroled. [In General Price's report occurs the following summary of the campaign: ' I marched 1434 miles, fought 43 battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over 3000 Federal officers and men, captured 1 8 pieces of artillery 3000 stand of small-arms, 16 stand of colors - . . . a great many wagons and teams, large numbers of horses, great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores, . . . and destroyed property to the cost of 10,000,000. ... I lost 10 pieces of artillery. 2 stand of colors, 1o00 small-arms, while I do not think I lost 104)0 prisoners. . . . I brought with me at least 5000 recruits."-EDITORS.] 377 .1 6 = I i i a . 0 A , t I I . 1 4 i IQ t I - I . 11 I t FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY.) BY JOHN CODDINGTON KINNEY, FIPRT LIEUTENANT, 13TH ('(ONNECTrCUTT INFANTRY. AND ACTING SIGNAL, OFFICER. V. S. A. AFTER the Mississippi was opened in July, 1863, by the capture of Vieks- burg and the consequent surrender of Port Hudson, Admiral Farragut devoted a large share of his attention to the operations against Mobile Bay. He was aware that the Confederates were actively engaged in the construe- tion of rams and iron-elads at Mobile and above, and it was his earnest desire to force the entrance into Mobile Bay and capture the forts that guarded it, before the more powerful of the new vessels could be finished and brought down to aid in the defense. In January, 1864, he made a reconnaissance of Forts Gaines and Morgan, at which time no Confederate vessels were in the lower bay, except one transport. In letters to the Navy Department he urged that at least one iron-clad be sent to help his wooden fleet, and asked for the cooperation of a brigade of five thousand soldiers to enable him, after running into the bay, to reduce the forts at his leisure. It is easy to see now the wis- (iom of his plan. Had the operations against Mobile been undertaken promptly, as he desired, the entrance into the bay would have been effected with mueh less cost of men and materials, Mobile would have been captured a year earlier than it was, and the Union cause would have been saved the disaster of the Red River campaign of 1864. At this late day it is but justice to Farragut to admit the truth. His position at the time was one of great anxiety. He saw the ease with whieh the forts could be captured if a few thousand troops could be obtained )Based upon the author's paper in "The Century" for May, 1S81, entitled An August Morning with Farragut," revised and extended for the present work.-EDITORS. 379 F3FRRRAGUTUAT MOBILE BAY. to cooperate with his fleet. He knew that the Confederates were bending all their energies to the construction of three or more powerful rams, to meet which he had until late in the summer nothing but wooden vessels. Every day was strengthening the Confederate situation and making his own position more perilous. With the necessary cooperation he would run inside the bay, prevent any iron-clads from crossing Dog River bar (over which they had to be floated with " camels "), put a stop to the planting of torpedoes, effectu- ally prevent blockade-running, and easily capture the garrisons of the forts. But, much to his regret, the army under General Banks started up the Red River, and he was left alone with his little fleet to watch the operations he could not prevent. At last, about May 20th, the great ram Tennessee made her appearance in the lower bay. Just before she arrived, and when it was known that Admiral Buchanan was engaged in efforts to float the ram over the bar, eight miles up the bay, Farragut wrote to Secretary Welles: " I fully understand and appreciate my situation. The experience I had of the fight between the Arkansas and Admiral Davis's vessels on the Mississippi showed plainly how unequal the contest is between iron-clads and wooden vessels, in loss of life, unless you succeed in destroy- ing the iron-clad. I therefore deeply regret that the department has not been able to give we one of the many iron-clads that are off Charleston and in the Mississippi. I have always looked for the latter, but it appears that it takes us twice as long to build an iron-clad as any one else. It looks as if the contractors and the fates were against us. While the rebels are bending their whole energies to the war our people are expecting the war to close by default; and if they do not awake to a sense of their danger soon it will be so. But be assured, sir, that the navy will do its duty, let the issue come when it may, or I am greatly deceived." A few days later the Tennessee came down and anchored near Fort Mor- gan. From that time until the battle was fought, Farragut never left the Hartford except when making inspections. It was expected that the rebel admiral would attack the blockading fleet before the iron-clads arrived, and Farragut made his preparations accordingly, even arranging extemporized torpedoes to place himself in this respect on a par with the enemy. This he did very reluctantly, writing on May 25th: " Torpedoes are not so agreeable when used on both sides; therefore, I have reluctantly brought myself to it. I have always deemed it unworthy a chivalrous nation, but it does not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you." In the same letter he speaks of the discouraging news just received of Banks's defeat, and adds: " I see by the rebel papers Buchanan is advertised to raise the blockade as soon as he is ready. As I have before informed the department, if I had the military force . . . and one or two iron-clads, I would not hesitate to run in and attack him; but if I were to run in and in so doing get my vessels crippled, it would be in his power to retire to the shoal water with his iron-clads (in fact, all their vessels draw much less water than ours), and thus destroy us with- out our being able to get at him. But if he takes the offensive and comes out of port, I hope to be able to contend with him. The department has not yet responded to my call for the iron- clads in the Mississippi." After the Red River disaster, General Grant decided that the majority of the fighting men of the army could be used to better advantage in Virginia, and the force in the Department of the Gulf was largely reduced. It was not 380 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. THlE III1Ui-lI) ANI1 THE LACKAWANX" STRIPPED FOR THE FIGHT. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH. until the latter part of July, 1864, that General Canby could make his arrangements to cooperate with Farragut at Mobile Bay. On the 3d of Au- gust a division of troops, under General Gordon Granger, landed on the west end of Dauphine Island and began preparations for a siege of Fort Gaines. Meantime, also, three monitors had arrived and a fourth was daily expected, and at last the time, for which Admiral Farragut had so long been praying, arrived. On the morning of August 4th a detachment of army signal officers, under command of the late Major Frank W. Marston, arrived by tug from New Orleans. They were distributed among the principal vessels of the fleet, for the purpose of communicating with General Granger's force after the entrance into the bay had been effected, and it was the good fortune of the writer to be assigned to duty on the Hartford. In the afternoon of the same day Admi- ral Farragut, with the commanding officers of the different vessels, made a reconnaissance on the steam-tender Cowslip, running inside of Sand Island, where the three monitors were anchored, and within easy range of both the forts. On the left, some three miles distant, was Fort Gaines, a small brick and earth work, mounting a few heavy guns, but too far away from the ship chan- nel to cause much uneasiness to the fleet. Fort Morgan was on the right, one of the strongest of the old brick forts, and greatly strengthened by immense piles of sand-bags, covering every portion of the exposed front. The fort was well equipped with three tiers of heavy guns, one of the guns, at least, of the best English make, imported by the Confederates. In addition, there was in front a battery of seven powerful guns, at the water's edge on the beach. All the guns, of both fort and water-battery, were within point-blank range of the only channel through which the fleet could pass. The Confederates con- sidered the works impregnable, but they did not depend solely upon them. Just around the point of land, behind Fort Morgan, we could see that after- noon three saucy-looking gun-boats and the famous ram Tennessee. The latter was then considered the strongest and most powerful iron-clad ever put afloat. She looked like a great turtle; her sloping sides were covered with iron plates 381 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. ',- H - -- A: V- - - - - - - six inches in thick- ness, thoroughly riv- AM'I By eted together, and she had a formidable Iiron beak projecting under the water. Her 4 armamentconsisted of six heavy iBrooke I rifles, each sending a solid shot weighing from 95 to 110 pounds - a small affair com- pared with the heavy guns of the present time, but irresistible then against everything but the turrets of the monitors. In addition to these means of resist- ance, the narrow channel N A to within afew hundred i yards of the shore had V A k been lined with torpe- FROM 'WA TS-51L I0 iihIrI41 deIafr1-Imuthl,- IrthAd.. does. These were under the water, anchored to the A bottom. Some of them were beer-kegs filled withA A powder, from the sides of which projected numer- ous little tubes containing fulminate, which it was expected would be exploded by contact with the passing vessels, but the greater part were tin cones fitted with caps. Except for what Farragut had already accomplished on the Mississippi, it would have been considered a foolhardy experiment for wooden vessels to attempt to pass so close to one of the strongest forts on the coast; but when to the forts were added the knowledge of the strength of the rain and the supposed deadly character of the torpedoes, it may be imagined that the 382 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. coming event impressed the person taking his first glimpse of naval warfare as decidedly hazardous and unpleasant. So daring an attempt was never made in any country but ours, and was never successfully made by any com- mander except Farragut, who, in this, as in his previous exploits in passing the forts of the Mississippi, proved himself one of the greatest naval com- manders the world has ever seen. It was the confidence reposed in him, the recollection that he had not failed in his former attempts, and his manifest faith in the success of the projected movement, that inspired all around him. The scene on the (.wovsjip that afternoon of the 4th of August was a notable one, as she steamed within range of the forts. The central figure was the grand old admiral, his plans all completed, affable with all, evidently not thinking of failure as among the possibilities of the morrow, and filling every one with his enthusiasm. He was sixty-three years old, of medium height, stoutly built, with a finely proportioned head and smoothly shaven face, with an expression combining overflowing kindliness with iron will and invincible determination, and wvith eyes that in repose were full of sweetness and light, but, in emergency, could flash fire and fury. Next in prominence to the admiral was the tall, commanding form of Fleet- Captain Percival Drayton, the man of all men to be Farragut's chief-of-staff, gentlemanly and courteous to all, but thoughtful and reserved, a man of marked intellect and power, in whose death, a few years later, our navy lost one of its very brightest stars, and the cause of liberty and human rights a most devoted friend. I have digressed to this extent to pay my humble tribute to one of the bravest and most patriotic men I ever met, and to a native South Carolinian of bluest blood, and proud of his ancestry, who in his love of country had learned to look beyond State lines and to disregard the ties of kinship. As we steamed slowly along inside Sand Island, inspecting every hostile point, a Confederate transport landed at Fort Gaines, and began discharging cargo. At a signal from the admiral, one of the monitors, by way of practice, opened fire at long range, and, as the huge fifteen-inch shell dropped uneom- fortably near, the work of unloading was stopped, and the transport suddenly left-the last Confederate transport that ever crossed the hay. After the reconnoissance the final council of war was held on board the Hartfird, when the positions of the various vessels were assigned, and the order of the line was arranged. Unfortunately Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Thorn- ton A. Jenkins was absent, his vessel, the Richniond, having been unavoidably delayed at Pensacola, whither she had gone for coal and to escort the monitor Tecaniseh. Had he been present lie certainly would have been selected to take the lead, in which event the perilous halt of the next day would not have occurred. Much against his own wish Admiral Farragut vielded to the unani- mous advice of his captains and gave up his original determination of placing his flagship in the advance, and, in the uncertainty as to the arrival of the Richmond, assigned the Brooklqn, Captain Alden, to that position. Is 3; According to Admiral Farragut's report the Brooklyn was appointed to lead, because she bad four ehase-guns and apparatus for picking up torpedoes.- EDITORS. 383 .;A( r_____._ -. . S. aI -I0 FORT0X, PM=EE 1CLL 2'02 wi00 ' _,. .9 A/ TA a A. TA TATNAtA NAs fhip e yaJ OCtttRt AAR , 41 -- . Gt(' TfS O FF MJEXIC O N nrr.-The fnonn, A, the tailing n .i.itoi.mooved frmoo tin mn.. ittit tho n ot. . thet o - i toit m Fort M or- g..., to tin left tirWaAii thn right if the line onorkeid "Tot'pX ,- ." wlo,, w i. -,i htli- it.. The ditstuoce tI-ax cmiii ti tin tlctit oioct, ,iftet irtitiog otr triimi the ettor d lotiititiI.he aim e wt 'diththeS ita,In -tittatilA by Aidtti at Jooctt at iti' tdlen. The ion- elap d, on note .d in the lio-.n report- , aostiio. s thin ntiuate. OwJing to th- lihuited ihe of the pttge, the iti.p fails to ho wv this dinwt on-, bht it indieates the direetioi of the -oour of tin gotn-oits. T'h, -patture of the IM... ti wilt n. the- giotidimig of the Ilortoii, oceorred oo1ie distaitee to the -orth-trmt of the edge of the inUp.-EbDITltIe. as4 IN 4"I A -:CrI U. At'a I 't.s 0 , -..1 h,tt- 0 p " R, I L..k., t2s "- " Ad-w 4 M-- ,5 K ,- ,6 O.., P, 7 It, 80" d f 1) GaJ- _C1 FARRAGUTAT MOBILE BAY. A few hours later, just before sunset, the Richmond arrived with the Tccum- seh, and the cause of her delay was satisfactorily explained, but the admiral decided to make no change in the order of the line, which was settled upon as follows: Brooklyn and Octorara, Hlartford and Mletaconiet, Richniond and Port Rogal, Lackawanna and Seminole, iiononqahela and Kennebec, Ossipee and Itaisra, Oneida and Galena. The first-named of each pair was on the starboard or more exposed side. The four monitors were to go a little in advance, and on the right flank of the wooden vessels. The Tecumseh and .1M1anhattan were single-turreted, eaeh with two 13-inch guns. The Winnebaqo and Chickasair were of lighter draught, with two turrets each, and four 11-inch guns. Before attempting to narrate the events of the next day, it may be well to give an idea of the situation. Mobile Bay gradually widens from the city to the gulf, a distance of thirty miles. The entrance is protected by a long, narrow arm of sand, with Fort Morgan on the extreme western point. Across the channel from Fort Morgan, and perhaps three miles distant, is Dauphine Island, a narrow strip of sand with Fort Gaines at its eastern end. Further to the west is little Fort Powell, commanding a narrow channel through which light-draught vessels could enter the hay. Between Dauphine Island and Fort Morgan, and in front of the main entrance to the bay, is Sand Island, a barren spot, under the lee of which three of our monitors were lying. The army signal officers were sent on board the fleet, not with any intention of having their services used in passing the forts, but in order to establish com- munication afterward between the fleet and the army, for the purpose of cooperating in the capture of the forts. The primary objects of Admiral Farragut in entering the bay were to close Mobile to the outside world, to capture or destroy the Tennessee, and to cut off all possible means of escape from the garrisons of the forts. Incidentally, also, he desired to secure the moral effect of a victory, and to give his fleet, which had been tossed on the uneasy waters of the Gulf for many months, a safe and quiet anchorage. There was no immediate expectation of capturing the city of Mobile, which was safe by reason of a solid row of piles and torpedoes across the river, three miles below the city. Moreover, the larger vessels of the fleet could not approach within a dozen miles of the city, on account of shallow water. But the lower bay offered a charming resting-place for the fleet, with the additional attraction of plenty of fish and oysters, and an occasional chance to forage on shore. At sunset the last orders had been issued, every commander knew his duty, and unusual quiet prevailed in the fleet. The sea was smooth, a gentle breeze relieved the midsummer heat, and the night came on serenely and peacefully, and far more quietly than to a yachting fleet at Newport. For the first hour after the candles were lighted below the stillness was almost oppressive. The officers of the Hartford gathered around the ward-room table, writing letters to loved ones far away, or giving instructions in case of death. As brave and thoughtful men, they recognized the dangers that they did not fear, and made provision for the possibilities of the morrow. But this occupied little 385 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. TruE BriTTLO MOtPBILE. FIOtM .X VAl-TUM11 hKEETC. time, and then, business over, there followed an hour of unrestrained jollity. Many an old story was retold and ancient conundrum repeated. Old officers forgot, for the moment, their customary dignity, and it was evident that all were exhilarated and stimulated by the knowledge of the coming struggle. There was no other "stimulation," for the strict naval rules prevented. Finally, after a half-hour's smoke under the forecastle, all hands turned in. The scene on the flag-ship was representative of the night before the battle throughout the fleet. It was the admiral's desire and intention to get under way by daylight, to take advantage of the inflowing tide; but a dense fog came on after midnight and delayed the work of forming line. It was a weird sight as the big ships " balanced to partners," the dimn out- lines slowly emerging like phantoms in the fog. The vessels were lashed together in pairs, fastened side by side by huge cables. All the vessels had been stripped for the fight, the top-hamper being left at Pensacola, and the starboard boats being either left behind or towed on the port side. The admiral's steam-launch, the Loyall, named after his son, 4 steamed alongside the flag-ship on the port side. It was a quarter of six o'clock before the fleet was in motion. Meantime a light breeze had scattered the fog and left a clear, sunny August day. The line moved slowly, and it was an hour after starting before the opening gun was fired. This was a 13-inch shell from the Tecumselh, and it exploded over Fort Morgan. Half an hour afterward the fleet came within range and the firing from the starboard vessels became general, the fort and the Confed- 4 Mrs. Farragut's maiden name was Loyall.-EDITORS. 386 FARRAGUTAT MOBILE BAY. erate fleet replying. The fleet took position across the entrance to the bay and raked the advance vessels fore and aft, doing great damage, to which it was for a time impossible to make effective reply. Gradually the fleet came into close quarters with Fort Morgan, and the filing on both sides became terrifie. The wooden vessels moved more rapidly than the monitors, and as the Brooklyn came opposite the fort, and approached the torpedo line, she came nearly alongside the rear monitor. To have kept on would have been to take the lead, with the ram Tennessee approaching and with the unknown danger of the torpedoes underneath. At this critical moment the Brookbyn halted and began hacking and signaling with the army signals. The Hart- fo)rd was immediately behind and the following vessels were in close prox- imity, and the sudden stopping of the Brooklyn threatened to bring the whole fleet into collision, while the strong inflowing tide was likely to carry some of the vessels to the shore under the guns of the fort. On the previous night the admiral had issued orders that the army signal officers were not to be allowed on deck during the fight, but were to go into the cockpit, on the lower deck, and assist the surgeons. The reason assigned was that these officers would not be needed during the passage of the forts, but would be wanted afterward to open communication with the army, and that therefore it would be a misfortune to have any of them disabled. The two army signal officers on the Hartford disrelished this order exceedingly, and, after consulting together, decided that in the confusion of the occasion their presence on deck would probably not be noticed, and that they would evade the command if possible. In this they were successful until shortly before passing Sand Island and coming within range of Fort Morgan. Then the executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Lewis A. Kimberly, who never allowed anything to escape his attention, came to them very quietly and politely, and told them the admiral's order must be obeyed. We were satis- fied from his manner that the surgeons had need of us, and, without endeav- oring to argue the matter, made our way to the stifling hold, where Surgeon Lansdale and Assistant-Surgeon Commons, with their helpers, were sitting, with their paraphernalia spread out ready for use. Nearly every man had his watch in his hand awaiting the first shot. To us, ignorant of everything going on above, every minute seemed an hour, and there was a feeling of great relief when the boom of the Tecimsech's first gun was heard. Presently one or two of our forward guns opened, and we could hear the distant sound of the guns of the fort in reply. Soon the can- non-balls began to crash through the deck above us, and then the thunder of our whole broadside of nine Dahlgren guns kept the vessel in a quiver. But as yet no wounded were sent down, and we knew we were still at com- paratively long range. In the intense excitement of the occasion it seemed that hours had passed, but it was just twenty minutes from the time we went below, when an officer shouted down the hatchway: " Send up an army signal officer immediately; the Brooklyn is signaling." In a moment the writer was on deck, where he found the situation as already described. Run- ning on to the forecastle, he hastily took the Brooklyn's message, which 387 388 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. Tiar BATTE oF iBILE, ltKim. SUTH AND EASTWARD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKE. IL. imparted the unnecessary information, " The monitors are right ahead; we cannot go on without passing them." The reply was sent at once from the admiral, " Order the monitors ahead and go on." But still the Brooklyn halted, while, to add to the horror of the situation, the monitor Tecufuseh, a few hundred yards in the advance, suddenly careened to one side and almost instantly sank to the bottom, carrying with her Captain Tunis A. M. Craven and the greater part of his crew, numbering in all 114 officers and men. The pilot, John Collins, and a few men who were in the turret jumped into I In Farragut's Supplementary General Order (No. 11) of July 29th, occurs the following: - There are ertaln black buoys plaeed by the enemy from the piles on the west side of the channel across it toward, Fort Morgan. It being understood that there are torpedoes and other obstrnctions between the buoys, the. -eelsI will take care to pass eastward of the east- eronmost buoy, which is elear of all obstructions." The easternmost buoy was the famous red buoy whieh figures in all aceounts of the battle. As the fleet approached, the Tensessee was lying in the rear of the torpedo obstructions, and therefore to the westward of the red buoy. When Craven, in the Teaavseh, drew near to the buoy, influenced by the narrowness of the channel to the eastward, as his remark to the pilot would indicate (Mahan, " Gulf and Inland Waters," p. 231), or by a desire to get at the Tensessee more quickly, as Parker suggests ("Battle of Mobile Bay." p. 26), he disregarded the instructions, and, shaping his eourse to the westward of the buoy, struck the torpedoes. His course crowded the main column to the westward, and left no choice to Alden and the fleet following in his wake, but to pass over the obstructions also. Of 114 officers and men on board the Tecumseh, 21 were saved. Of these two officers and five men escaped in one of the Teounteh's boats, four swam to Fort Morgan where they were made prisoners, and ten, including Ensign Zettick and John Collins, the pilot, were rescued by Acting-Ensign Nields. It is to the statement of Collins that the world is indebted for the account of that heroic set which will forever be associated with Craven's name. Commodore Parker thus tells the story: craven and Mr. John Collins, the pilot of the rTeum- eA, met, as their vessel wag sinking beneath them, at the foot of the ladder leading to the toll of the turret. . . . It may be. then, that Craven, in the nobility of hi soul-for all know he was one of natures noble nicn,-it way be, I say, that, it, the nobility of his soul. the thought flashed across him that it was through no fanit of his pilot that the Treush was in this peril; he drew back. 'Afterryou, lhut.' Said he, grandly. 'There was nothing after me,' relates Mr. Colluns; I when I reached the upmost round of the ladder. the vessel seemed to drop from under me.' " EDITORS. FARRAGUTAT MOBILE BAY. the water and were rescued by a boat from the Metacomet, which, under charge of Acting Ensign Henry C. Nields, rowed up under the guns of the fort and through a deadly storm of shot and shell and picked them up.\ Meantime the Brooklyn failed to go ahead, and the whole fleet became a stationary point-blank target for the guns of Fort Morgan and of the rebel vessels. It was during these few perilous moments that the most fatal work of the day was done to the fleet. Owing to the Hartford's position, only her few bow guns could be used, while a deadly rain of shot and shell was falling on her, and her men were being cut down by scores, unable to make reply. The sight on deck was sickening beyond the power of words to portray. Shot after shot came through the side, mowing down the men, deluging the decks with blood, and scattering mangled fragments of humanity so thickly that it was difficult to stand on the deck, so slippery was it. The old expressions of the "scuppers running blood," "the slippery deck," etc., give but the faintest idea of the spectacle on the Hartford. The bodies of the dead were placed in a long row on the port side, while the wounded were sent below until the surgeons' quarters would hold no more. A solid shot coming through the bow struck a gunner on the neck, completely severing head from body. One poor fellow (afterward an object of interest at the great Sanitary Commission Fair in New York) lost both legs by a cannon-ball; as he fell he threw up both arms, just in time to have them also carried away by another shot. At one gun, all the crew on one side were swept down by a shot which came crashing through \ The gallantry of Nields's conduct was all the about to fire at her, when some one standing more striking in view of the fact that in pulling by informed him of her character and errand. to the Tecatoseh's wreck it was necessary to pass A moment later, Nields himself observed the around the stern and under the broadside of the omission, and took the flag from its ease and Hartford and across the Brooklyn's bow, thus plac- shipped it. The rescued men were placed on ing the boat directly in the line of fire of the fleet board the Winnebago, and Nields and his boat's as well as of the fort. In fact, as the boat at first crew, unable to regain their ship, joined the carried no flag, Acting Ensign Whiting, in charge Oneida, where they served during the remainder of the forecastle guns on board the Hartord, was of the battle.-EDITORS. TH. "ALENA"AiTEU TuE FIGHT IN MOBILE. BAY. . U0i A WA-Tii ..,KET, . 389 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. the b)ulwarks4. A shvll burst between the two forward guius in charge of Lieutenant Ty- son, killing and woundiug fif- teen mcin. The inaist upon which the writer was per('led4 was twice struck, oliwe slightly, andl again just below the foretop by a heavy shell1, from a rifle on the Confederate gunx-boat Scnla. Fortunately the shell came tumlhng enld over enld, and buried itself in the mast, butt-end first, leaving then per- eussion-cap protruding. Had it come point first, or had it GA"AI, 8 j Fstruck at any other part oef the mast than in the reiinforeed it \e an ex grp arounportion where the heel of the it as asyto rac th corseof ver shtboth lapom the guns of the Hottit adfrmth oneert fet.Aower mast, tess contribution topmat ls the ta to of the ar woud aprobably have been lost to s e fworld, as the distance rtokshedeck was about a hun- hsee feet. As it was, the sued- aen yar w ould have dislodged Captain n oneto oreefiols tesgaat romat toe faostenaroe had not the shell been visible CiAINg tUNIS, the Br y CRAVEN. to obey hisTOGM ofrom the taime it left the Selia, thus giving time to prepare for it by an extra grip around the top of the mast. Looking out over the water, it was easy to trace the course of every shot, both from the guns of the Har tford and from the Confederate fleet. Another signal message from the Brookbpn told of the sinking of the Tecumseli, a fact known already, and another order to "1go on" was given and was not obeyed. Soon after the fight began, Admiral Farragut, finding that the low-hang- ing smoke from the guns interfered with his view from the deck, went up the rigging of the mainmast as far as the futtoek-shrouds, immediately below the maintop. The pilot, Martin Freeman, was in the top directly overhead, and the fleet-captaini was on the deck below. Seeing the admiral in this exposed position, where, if wounded, he would be killed by falling to the deck, Fleet- Captain Drayton ordered Knowles, the signal-quartermaster, to fasten a rope around him so that he would be prevented from falling. [See p. 407.] Finding that the Broo/Jqgn failed to obey his orders, the admiral hurriedly inquired of the pilot if there was sufficient depth of water for the Hartford to 39" FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. pass to the left of the lBrooklVyn. Receiving an affirmative reply, lie said: I will take the lead," and immediately ordered the I'arf tlrd ahead at full slieed. A As lhe passed the IBrooklin a voice warned him of the torpedoes, to which lie returned the coiitemptuous answer, " Damn the torpe(docs." This is the current story, antd may have some basis of truth. But as a matter of fact, there was never a momtent when the din of the battle would not have drownled any attempt at conversation between the two ships, and while it is quite probable that the admiral made the remark it is doubtful if he shouted it to the Blrookbi/n. ) rl'Then was witnessed the remarkable sight of the Hartford and her consort, the 1cftrcoitd, passing over the dreaded torpedo ground and rushing ahead far in advance of the rcust of the fleet, the extrication of which from the con- f usiont caused by the Blrooklyn's halt required many minutes of valuable time. 4 The IHartfi;rd was now moving over what is called the " mniddle ground," with shallow water on either side, so that it was impossible to move except as the chaninel permitted. Taking advantage of the situation, the Confederate gun- boat Stelhna kept directly in front of the flag-ship and raked her fore and aft, doing more damage in reality than all the rest of the enemy's fleet. The other gunboats, the Gaines and the iMorqan, were in shallow water on our starboard bow, but they received more damage from the Hartfordl. broadsides than they were able to inflict. Meanwhile the ram Tennessee, which up to this time had contented herself with simply firing at the approaching fleet, started for the Hartford, apparently with the intention of striking her amidships. She came on perhaps for half a mile, never approaching nearer than a hundred yards, and then suddenly turned and made for the fleet, which, still in front of the fort, was gradually getting straightened out and following the HartfordJ. This change of course on the part of the ram has always been a mystery. The captain of the ram, in papers published since the war, denies that any such move was made, but it was witnessed by the entire fleet, and is mentioned by both Admiral Farragut and Fleet-Captain Drayton in their official reports. ; The Hartford had now run a mile inside the bay, and was suffering chiefly from the raking fire of the Sehna, which was unquestionably managed more skillfully than any other Confederate vessel. Captain (now Admiral) Jouett, commanding the Hartlbrd's escort, the .Mletacoinef, repeatedly asked permission In turning to clear the Brooklyn's stern, the it could hardly have taken me less then five min- Hartford went ahead, while the Yetacomiet backed. utes to shift from the forecastle to the erosstrees. EDIToRs. It was while going up the mast that I witnessed The period of delay between the halting of the the sinking of the Teenmseh.-J. C. K. Brooklyn and the decision of the admiral to take the 4 Farragut, when he had altered his course. had lead could hardly have been less than ten minutes, every reason to suppose that there were torpedoes and may have been longer. The first signal message directly in his path. It was known that they had from the Brooklyn was taken from the forecastle of been placed west of the red buoy, the Brooklyn had the Hartford. Then the smoke from the Hartfjord's seen them, and the fate of the Tecumnseh was con- bow guns interfered, and I started up the foremast, elusive evidence. In fact the officers both of the intending to make a signal-station of the foretop. Hartford and the Richmond heard the snapping of Finding a howitzer crew at work there I kept on to torpedo-primers under the bottom of the ships as the foretop-gallant erosstrees, where I received they passed, but the torpedoes failed to explode, and replied to two messages before the Hartford having probably been corroded by lying a long passed the Brooklyn. As I was not a sailor and had time in the water.- EDITORS. never before been so far up in the rigging of a ship, I See Captain Johnston's account, p. 401. EDITORS. 391 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. VSTED STATES TUAMSHIP "M4ONONGARELA," 1BHOWI11' INJURIES RECEIVED P.N THU FIGHT. FROM A -KETCH MADE AFTEK THE BATTLE OF MOBILE. of the admiral to cut loose and take care of the Selma, and finally, at five minutes past eight, consent was given. In an instant the cables binding the two vessels were cut, and the Metacomet, the fastest vessel in the fleet, bounded ahead. The Selma was no match for her, and, recognizing her danger, endeavored to retreat up the bay. But she was speedily overhauled, and when a shot had wounded her captain and killed her first lieutenant she surrendered. Before this the Gaines had been crippled by the splendid marksmanship of the Hart- ford's gunners, and had run aground under the guns of the fort, where she was shortly afterward set on fire, the crew escaping to the shore. The gun- boat Morqan, after grounding for a few moments on the shoals to the east of Navy Cove, retreated to the shallow water near the fort, whence she escaped the following night to Mobile. The Hartford, having reached the deep water of the bay, about three miles north of Dauphine Island, came to anchor. Let us now return to the other vessels of the fleet, which we left massed in front of Fort Morgan by the remarkable action of the Brooklyn in stopping and refusing to move ahead. When the ram Tennessee turned away from the Hartford, as narrated, she made for the fleet, and in their crowded and con- fused condition it seemed to be a matter of no difficulty to pick out whatever victims the Confederate commander (Admiral Franklin Buchanan) might desire, as he had done in 1861 when commanding the Merrimac in Hampton Roads. Before he could reach them the line had become straightened, and the leading vessels had passed the fort. Admiral Jenkins, who commanded the Richmnd during the fight, wilting of this part of the fight, for the use of the present writer, says: During the delay under the guns of Fort Morgan and the water-battery by the backing of the Brooklyoi, the vessels astern had remained apparently stationary, so that the nearest one to the Richniond was about half a mile off, and some of them paid very dearly, for the men of the water-battery, who had been driven away from their guns and up the sand hills by the fire of the Richomnd and Chickasaw, had time to return and attack them. When the Hart- ford ' cut adrift ' from the Brooklyn and Richmold - the only safe thing possible to do - the 392 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. 393 Tennessee and the three gunboats pursued her. That is, the Tennessee, after getting above the lines of torpedoes, turned into the main ship-channel and followed the Hartford, while the gun- boats were in shallow water to the northward, where our heavy vessels could not go after them. WVhen the Tnnes.see was within probably half a mile of the Hartford, she suddenly turned her head toward the Brl ooklyn and Richmond (both close together). As she approached, every one on board the Richmond supposed that she would ram the Brooklyn; that, we thought, would be our opportunity, for if she struck the Brooklyn the concussion would throw her port side across our path, and being so near to us, she would not have time to ' straighten up,' and we would strike her fairly and squarely, and most likely sink her. " The gunls wtere loaded with solid shot and heaviest powder charge; the forecastle gun's crew were ordered to get their small-arms and fire into her gun-ports; and as previously determined, if we came in collision at any time, the orders were to throw gun charges of powder in bags from the fore and main yard-arms dlown her smoke-stack (or at least try to do so). To our great surprise, she sheered off from the Brooklyn, and at about one hundred yards put two shot or shells through and through the Brooklyn's sides (as reported), doing much damage. "Approaching, passing, and getting vway from the Richmond, thle ram re- ceived from us three full broadsides of e-inch solid shot, each blroadside being eleven guns. They were well aimed and all struck, but when sate was examined next day, no other indications were seen thanscrathbes. Thetmusketry fire into the two ports prevented the leveling of her guns, and therefore two of her shot or shell passed harmlessly over the Richmond, except the cutting of a ratline in the port mtAsADMLT. Art h n-. atwe , main-shroud, just under the feet of the T A va A pilot, while the other whistled unpleas- antly close to Lieutenant Terry'Fs head. The Tennessee passed toward the Lackawn-anna, the next vessel astern, and avoided her- wishing either to ram Captain Strong's vessel (Monongahela), or cross his bow and attack McCann's vessel (the Kennebec, Strong's consort). Strong was ready for her, and, anticipating her object, made at her, but the blow (by the quick manceuvring of the Tennessee) was a glancing one, doing very little damage to either Strong's or McCann's vessel. Thence the Tennessee, after firing two broadsides into the Oneida, proceeded toward the fort, and for a time entirely disappeared from our sight. During this time the three gun-boats were pro- eeeding, apparently, up the bay, to escape. The Hartford was closely watched with our glasses, and soon after the Tennessee had left Strong the etacomet (.Jouett) was seen to cast ,ff; and lei-iuing the purpose, the Powt Royal (Gherardi) was ordered to cast off from thne Richmond and go in chase of the enemy, pointing in the direction of the three gun-boats of the enemy. George Brown (in the Itasca) east off from the Ossifoe and (I believe) McCann did also, and steered for the enemy. By this time Jouett had come up with the Selma, and the fight commenced. A very few minutes after Gherardi had left the side of the Richmond, and the other small vessels had left their consorts, a thick mist, with light rain (just enough to wet the deck), passed over the Richmond, obscuring from sight every object outside the vessel" indeed, for a few minutes the bowspritoftheRichm.ondcouldnotbeseenfromthepoop-deck. Thismistand rain,inacloud- less sunshiny day, were slowly wafted over the waters toward the fort and pilot town, enabling .John W. Bennett, commanding one of the enemy's gun-boats, and George W. Harrison, com- manding the other, to shape their courses for safety, in shoal water, and finally under Fort Morgan. herdintePrRya(s soon as he could see) saw only the Selma andMea comeet, and continued his course for them." VOL. IV. 2e FARRAGUT IN MOBILE BAY. CLATURE OF 11I COUNFEDERATE GUN-BOAT "SELMA" BY TIIE "METACOMET." FROM A WAWRTIME ISKETCH. Whatever damage was done by the Tennessee to the fleet in passing the fort was by the occasional discharge of her guns. She failed to strike a single one of the Union vessels, but was herself run into by the 36onongahela, Captain Strong, at full speed. \ The captain says in his report: " After passing the forts I saw the rebel ram Tennessee head on for our line. I then sheered out of the line to run into her, at the same time ordering full speed as fast as possible. I struck her fair, and swinging around poured in a broadside of solid 11-inch shot, which apparently had little if any effect upon her." This modest statement is characteristic of the gallant writer, now dead, as are so many others of the conspicuous actors in that day's work. The .Monongahela was no match for the Tennessee, but she had been strengthened by an artificial iron prow, and being one of the fastest-or rather, least slow- of the fleet, was expected to act as a ram if opportunity offered. Captain Strong waited for no orders, but seeing the huge ram coming for the fleet left his place in the line and attacked her, as narrated. It was at this time that the Monongaliela's first lieutenant, Roderick Prentiss, a brave and gifted young officer, received his death wound, both legs being shattered. At last all the fleet passed the fort, and while the ram ran under its guns the vessels made their way to the Hartford and dropped their anchors, except the Metacomet, Port Royal, Kennebec, and Itasca. After the forts were passed, the three last named had cut loose from their escorts and gone to aid the Aletacomet in her struggle with the Selma and Morgan. \ The Tennessee, after colliding with the Moonan- passage. One shell exploded in the boiler, an- gahela, grazed the bow of the Kennebec, injured other cut the wheel-ropes, and a third disabled slightly the latters planking, and dropped one of the forward pivot-gun. The list of casualties was her boats on the deck of the gnn-boat.-EDITOaS. very large, Commander Mullany being among the The Oneida, the last ship in the line, suffered wounded. The crippled vessel was carried on more severely than any other of the fleet in the by her consort, the Galena.-EDITORS. 394 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BA Y. The thunder of heavy artillery now ceased. The crews of the various vessels had begun to efface the marks of the terrible contest by washing the decks and clearing up the splinters. The cooks were preparing break- fast, the surgeons were busily engaged in making amputations and bind- ing arteries, and under canvas, on the port side of each vessel, lay the ghastly line of dead waiting the sailor's burial. As if by mutual under- standing, officers who were relieved from immediate duty gathered in the ward-rooms to ascertain who of their mates were missing, and the reaction from such a season of tense nerves and excitement was just setting in when the hurried call to quarters came and the word passed around, " The ram is coming." The Tennessee, after remaining near Fort Morgan while the fleet had made its way four miles above to its anchorage,-certainly as much as half an hour,-had suddenly decided to settle at once the question of the control of the bay. Single-handed she came on to meet the whole fleet, consisting now of ten wooden vessels and the three monitors. At that time the Tennessee was believed to be the strongest vessel afloat, and the safety with which she carried her crew during the battle proved that she was virtually invulner- able. Fortunately for the Union fleet she was weakly handled, and at the end fell a victim to a stupendous blunder in her construction-the failure to protect her rudder-chains. The spectacleafforded theConfederate soldiers, who crowded the ramparts of the two forts,-the fleet now being out of range,- was such as has very rarely been furnished in the history of the world. To the looker-on it seemed as if the fleet was at the mercy of the ram, for the monitors, which were expected to be the chief defense, were so destitute of speed and so difficult to manceuvre that it seemed an easy task for the Ten- nessee to avoid them and sink the wooden vessels in detail. Because of the slowness of the monitors, Admiral Farragut selected the fastest of the wooden vessels to begin the attaek. While the navy signals for a general attack of the enemy were being prepared, the Mlonongahela (Captain Strong) and the Lackawanna (Captain Marchand) were ordered by the more rapid signal system of the army to "run down the ram," the order being imme- diately repeated to the monitors. The Mlonongahela, with her prow already somewhat weakened by the pre- vious attempt to ram, at once took the lead, as she had not yet come to anchor. The ram from the first headed for the Hartford, and paid no atten- tion to her assailants, except with her guns. The M1onongahela, going at full speed, struck the Tennessee amidships - a blow that would have sunk almost any vessel of the Union navy, but which inflicted not the slightest damage on the solid iron hull of the ram. (After the surrender it was almost impossible to tell where the attacking vessel had struck.) Her own iron prow and cutwater were carried away, and she was otherwise badly dam- aged about the stern by the collision. The Lackawranna was close behind and delivered a similar blow with her wooden bow, simply causing the ram to lurch slightly to one side. As the vessels separated the Lackatcanna swung alongside the ram, which sent two shots through her and kept on 395 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. her course for the Hartfird, which wias now the next vessel in the attack. The two flag-ships approached each other, bow to bow, iron against oak. It was impossible for the Hlartj qd, with her lack of speed, to circle around and strike the ram on the side; her only safety was in keeping pointed directly for the bow of her assailant. The other vessels of the fleet were unable to do anything for the defense of the admiral except to train their gUns on the ram, onl which as yet they had not the slightest effect. It was a thrilling moment for the fleet, for it was evident that if the ram could strike the Hartfbrd the latter must sink. But for the two vessels to strike fairly, bows onl, would probably have involved the destruction of both, for the ram must have penetrated so far into the wooden ship that as the Hart- tfid filled and sank she would have carried the ram under water. Whether for this reason or for some other, as the two vessels camie together the Ten- nessce slightly changed her course, the port bow of the Jartrlbrd met the port bow of the ram, and the ships grated against each other as they passed. The JHartfio- poured her whole port broadside against the ram, but the solid shot merely dented the side and bounded into the air. The ram tried to return the salute, but owing to defective primers only one gun was discharged. This sent a shell through the berth-deck, killing five men and wounding eight. The muzzle of the guin was so close to the Hartford that the powder black- ened her side. The admiral stood on the quarter-deck when the vessels came together, and as he saw the result he jumped on to the port-quarter rail, holding to the mizzen-riggiing, a position from which he might have jumped to the deck of the ram as she passed. Seeing him in this position, and fear- ing for his safety, Flag-Lieutenant Watson slipped a rope around him and secured it to the rigging, so that during the fight the admiral was twice "lashed to the rigging," each time by devoted officers who knew better than to consult him before acting. Fleet-Captain Drayton had hurried to the bow of the Hia rttrd as the collision was seen to be inevita- ble, and expressed keen satisfaction when the ram avoided a direct blow. The Tennessee now became the CAMT.IN I.E01GE 1E. PERKINS. target for the whole fleet, all the FL'TOM A Pl.1RM '. vessels of which were making to- ward her, pounding her with shot, and trying to run her down. As the Hartford turned to make for her again, we ran in front of the Lackawanna, which had already turned and was moving under full headway with the same object. She struck us on our starboard side, amidships, crushing half- 396 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. way through, knocking two portholes into one, upsetting one of the Dahlgren guns, and creating general consternation. For a time it was thought that we must sink, and the ery rang out over the deck: "Save the admiral! Save the admiral ! The port boats were ordered lowered, and in their haste some of the sailors cut the " falls," and two of the cutters dropped into the water wr-onig sidle up, and floated astern. But the admiral sprang into the starboard inizzen-rigging, looked over the side of the ship, and, finding there were still a few inches to spare above the water's edge, instantly ordered the ship ahead again at full speed, after the ram. The unfortunate Lackawanna, which had struck the ram a second blow, was mak- hig for her once more, and, singularly enough, again caine up on our starboard side, and another collision seemed immi- tient. Anld now the admiral became a trifle excited. He had no idea of whip- ping the rebels to be himself sunk by a friend, nor did he realize at the moment that the Hartflrd was as much to blame as the Lackawanna. Turning to the writer lie inquired. " Can you say ' For God's sake' by signal!" "Yes, sir," was the reply. " Then say to the Lackawanna, REOM. AO(XiAMW t'. 'For God's sake get out of our way and anchor!'" In my haste to send the message, I brought the end of my signal flag-staff down with considerable violence upon the head of the admiral, who was standing nearer than I thought, causing him to wince perceptibly. It was a hasty message, for the fault was equally divided, each ship being too eager to reach the enemy, and it turned out all right, by a fortunate accident, that Captain Marchand never received it. The army signal officer on the Lackawanna, Lieutenant Myron Adams (now pastor of Plymouth Congregational Church in Rochester, N. Y.), had taken his station in the foretop, and just as he received the first five words, "For God's sake get out" - the wind flirted the large United States flag at the mast-head around him, so that he was unable to read the conclusion of the message. The remainder of the story is soon told. As the Tennessee left the Hartford she became the target of the entire fleet, and at last the concentration of solid shot from so many guns began to tell. The flag-staff was shot away, the smoke-stack was riddled with holes, and finally disappeared. The monitor Chickasaw, Lieutenant-Commander Perkins, succeeded in coming up astern and began pounding away with 11-inch solid shot, and one shot from a 13- inch gun of the M1fanhattan crushed into the side sufficiently to prove that a few more such shots would have made the casemate untenable. Finally, one of the Chickasaw's shots cut the rudder-chain of the ram and she would no 397 398 FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. longer mind her heln.J) At this time, as Admiral Farragut says in his report, " she was sore beset. The ('hick-asai was pounding away at her stern, the Ossipec was approawhing her at full speed, and the Mononqa(helh, Lackaicanna, and this shilp were bearing down upon her, determined upon her destruction." From the time the HartJbrd struck her she did not fire a gun. Finally the Confederate admiral, Buchanan, was severely wounded by an iron splinter or a piece of a shell, and just as the Ossipee was about to strike her the Tennessee displayed a white flag, hoisted on an improvised staff through the grating over her deck. The Ossipee (Captain Le Roy) reversed her engine, but was so near that a harmless collision was inevitable. Suddenly the terrifie cannonad- ing ceased, and from every ship rang out cheer after cheer, as the weary men realized that at last the ram was conquered and the day won. A, The Chicka- sai' took the Tennessee in tow and brought her to anchor near the Ilartybrd. The impression prevailed at first that the Tennessee had beels seriously injured by the ramming she had received and was sinking, and orders were signaled to send boats to assist her crew, but it was soon diseovered that this was unneeessary. Admiral Buchanan surrendered his sword to Lieu- tenant Giraud, of the Ossipee, who was sent to take charge of the captured Tennessee. Captain Heywood, of the Marine Corps, was sent on board the ram with a guard of marines. On meeting Admiral Buchanan he could not )The admiral says in his report: we would, she was always there, firing the two ' I annot give too mueh praise to Lieutenant-Corn- I1-inch guns in her forward turret like pocket- rander Perkins. who. though he had ores from the pistols, so that she Soon had the plates flying in Departmeut to return north, volunteered to take eom- the air."-EDITORS. mldof the ekirkuau and did his duty .bty." Z The first gun of the day was fired at 6:47 According to the pilot of the TessesAc, - the A. It. The surrender of the ram occurred at 10 Chickliaw hung close under our stern. Move as o'elock.-EDITOKS. , uT BTWEEN TIM MI. . W AND FOUT POWELL, AUGST5 , 1864. SaOM A WAtt-Tilt S aETaCH. The pi ture appears to r ftthe blo I ing up of Fort Powell, hich did not occur until after io o'clock that night, when the fort was evacuated.-EDIoTS. FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY. resist the temptation to inform him that they had met before under different circumstances, the captain having been on the frigate Cumnberland when she was sunk in Hampton Roads by Buchanan in the Mferriniac.1 Late in the afternoon the Metacomet was sent to Pensacola with the wound(led of both sides, including Admiral Buchanan. In his report he accuses Captain Harrison of the Mforgan of deserting the Selna. Captain Harrison in his report, on the other hand, charges Captain Murphy of the 'Selma with running away and with bad seamanship. Those who witnessed the fight at close quarters will not accept Captain Harrison's view, and the record of killed and wounded tells the story. On the ]l'orqan one man was slightly wounded, on the Selmna eight were killed and seven wounded; and there is no doubt that the Selma was better managed and did more harm to the Union fleet than the two other rebel gun-boats combined. Captain Murphy of the Selma, in his official report, written like those of Buchanan and Johnston from the Pensacola hospital, tells very briefly the story of his part in the fight and makes no insinuations or complaints against brother officers. The total casualties in the rebel fleet were 12 killed and 2)0 wounded, as follows: Killed. Wounded. Ram Tennessee.... 2 9 Gun-boat Selma 8 7 Gaines. 2 3 " Morgan . ....... . - I Total . ... .... . ..... .. ....... . 12 20 [To the above should be added those captured on board the surrendered vessels, including, according to Farragut's report, 190 in the Tennessee and 90 in the Sele.- EDITORs.] The Gaines, according to the official report of her eaptain, was disabled by a shot or shell from the Iartford, " which broke in the outer planking under the port quarter about the water-line, and which from the marks seemed to have glanced below in the direction of the stern-post." This caused a leak in the after-magazine that could not be stopped, and made it necessary to beach the vessel as already described. The captain succeeded in removing the ammunition, supplies, and small-arms to the shore, for the use of Fort Morgan, and during the next night made his escape with his crew to Mobile, pulling up the bay in six cutters, which in the darkness easily evaded the Union gun-boats that were on guard. The lorqan also succeeded in making her way through without difficulty, covering all her lights and running very slowly until she had passed the Union vessels. The writer of this sketch has iThe casualties of the Union fleet, as reported by Admiral Farragut, were 52 killed and 170 wounded, as follows: Killed. Wounded. Killed. Wonded. Hartford 25.. 28 Osipee 1 7 Brookly, . .. 11 . 43 RicA.o.- 0 2 Larkrzwon.a 4 35 Goleaa I 1 Oneida 8 30 Oclomra I 10 Honongahela i! 6 Kenaebee. . Mdetacoret.. I 2 To the above should be added the casualties on board the Teenwe, viz., 93 drowned and 4 cap- tured, making the total losses 145 killed, 170 wounded and 4 captured.- EDITORS. First-Lieuten-t Roderick Prentis. dIied a y later, as already -entine-d. 399 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT MOBILE. never been able to understand why the Morgan and the boats belonging to the Gaines were not destroyed during the afternoon following the fight, as might have been dolle with ease and safety by any one of the monitors. This was supposed to have been the object of a little excursion of the Winnebago in the afternoon, which, however, aside from filing a few harmless and unnecessary shots at Fort Morgan, accomplished nothing. The C(hickasau (Lieutenant-Commander Perkins) at the same time shelled Fort Powell, which was evacuated about 10 P. ii. that night, the officers and meii escaping to the mainland. The C/hickasaw also tackled Fort Gaines o01 the 6th, and speedily convinced the commanding officer that it would be folly to attempt to withstand a siege. The result was a surrender to the army and navy the next morning. Fort Morgan was at once invested, and surrendered on the 23d of August. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT MOBILE. THE UNION FLEET IN THE BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY. Rear-Admiral 1). Cl. Farragut, Commanding. Fleet-Captain, Captain Percival Drayton. IoliNtoaS.- r i..aeh. Co-n. T. A. M. Craven, 2 19-inch guns; faohaffa., Co.. J. W. A. 2icijoison, 2 15-inch; Wiabaqog, Con. Tho-as H. Stevens, 4 II-ineh; Chieka- .ao., Lieut.-Coom. George H. Perkins, 411-nch. tcREW-sLto0P- H.cfoczd (flag-ship), Capt. Percival Draytoen 2 10-pounder Parrott rifles, 1 30-pounder Par- rott. 189-inch. 3howitzera: Brooklyn, Capt. Jame Alden, 2 l100poander Parrotts. 2 60-pounder rif-c, 20 9inch. 1 howitzer; RieAsn d, Capt. Thornton A. Jenkins. 1 160- pounder rifle, I 30-poundr rifle. 18 9-inch, 2 howitzers; LaAraeaaa, Capt. J. B. Marcha-d, 1 .5WpomnderParrott pivot. 1 50-ponuder Dabhgrems pivot, 2 11-nch. 4 9-incb, 6 howitzers; J.o hohela, Con. James H. Strong, 1 160- pounder Parrott, 2 11-inch. 5 22-pounders, 3 howitzers; Osaipee, Coin. William E. Le R.oy, 1 100-pounder Parrott, I lI-inch. 6 22-pounder,. 2 so-pounder Parrotta, 2 how- itzers;- O-dat. Comim. J. R. M. Mullany. 2 11-inch. pivot, 3 30-pounder Parrott., 4 32-pounder., 1 howitzer; Seui- Not., Com. Edward Donaldson, 1 11-incb pivot, 1 30- pounder Parrmtt, 6 32-pounders. SCIaVw-sTzANER.- Gkea. Licut.-tom. Clark H. Well. 1 100-pounder Parrott piv-t, : oiolunder, 8 9-inch. 1 howitzer. l)otTBLE-ENDXRS.- tortr.t, Lie.t.-(oos. Charles IH. Greene. I 100-pounder Parrott ltivot, 3 9Inh., 2 32- pounders, 4 howitzers ; JActoma . Lieot.-Cm. James E. Jouett, 2 100-ponnderParrotts, 4 9-inch, 4 howitzers; Porl Ro.a., Lient.-Com. B. Gherardi, 1 100-ponuder Parrott pivot, I 10-inch, 2 9Inch. 2 50-pounder Dabigren rifles. 2 howitzers. G;x-BoATs.-Keanebc, Lieut.-Com. W. P. McCann, 1 11-Inch, I -pounder, 3 howitz rs; Iflasm, Lieut.-Com. George Brown, 1 ll-inch. 2 32-ponlider., 2 20-pounders. I howitzer. CONFEDERATE FLEET.-Admiral Franklin Buchanan, Commanding. IRON-CLAD RAM.- Trnwee (flag-ship), Com. J. D. Harrison, 2 7-inch rifles, 4 32-pounders; Gaines, Lieut. Johnston. 2 7-inch Brooke rifles, 46.6-Inh Brooke rifles. J. W. Bennett, I 5-inch rifle. 132-pounders; 8da, Comn. SIDE-WHEEL GuN-BoAs - Morgo, Con. George W. P. U. Murphy, I 6ineh rifle. s-in-h shell gnus. LAND OPERATIONS AGAINST MOBILE.-August 5th-23d, 1864. THE UNION FORCES were Immediately commanded by Majl.-Gen. Gordon (Oranger (with Maj.-Gen. E B. S. Canby as his superior), and consisted of the following organizations: Iafoafry, 77th Ill.. 94th IU., 67th Ind.. 20th Iowa. 34th Iowa, 3th lown. 161st N. 'Y. 96th Ohio. 2th WiU.. 23d Wis.. 96th U. S. C. T.. and gith U. S. C. T. ('ealry: 3d Md.; A. 2d Me.; tM14thN.Y. Artf-y: 1st Ind. Heavy (battl.onl ; 6th Micb. Heavy: Battery A. 2d Ill.; 3d Conn. Battery: 17th Ohio Battery. The brigade commanders were Colonels Joseph Batiey. Joshua J. Guppey. George W. Clark, Henry Bertram, and George D. Robinson. The effective strength of this command was about 65NO; loa in the bombardment of Fort Morgan. 7 wounded. THE CONFEDERATE FORCES: MaJ.-Gen. Dabney H. Maury was the Confederate commander at Mobile, with Brig.-Gen. Richard L. Page in command of the de- fensive works at Fort Morgan. etc. Fort Morgan was garrisoned by a portion of the st Ala. battalion of artil- lery, one eompany of the 21st Ala.. and the lst Te.n. Fort Gaines.. co-manded by Col. Charles D. Ander- on, Was garris-oned by six companies of the 21st Ala.. two companies 1st Ala. battalion of artillery, the Pei- ham Cadets. some reserves and marines; in all abont 600. Lleiut.-Col. James M. Williams was in command of Fort Powell. which was c 1rriaoned by two companies ast Ala. and a part of Culpeper's S. C. battery. Confederate loss in Fort Morgan: 1 killed, 3 wounded. 4(( THE RAM "TENNESSEE" AT MOBILE BAY. BY JAMES D. JOHNSTON, COMMANDER, C. S. N. THE Confederate naval force at Mobile at the time of Admiral Farragut's attack was com- manded byAdmiral Franklin Buchanan,of Mernrnac fame, and consisted of the iron-clad ram Tennessee, armed with four (6.4-inch rifled guns in broadside, and two 7-inch rifles, one at each end of the shield; the gunboats Morgan and Gaines, carrying six guns each, chiefly of smaller caliber; and the Slrhtt, carrying only four, making in all 22 guns. The entire force of officers and men was about 470. Admiral Farragut's fleet consisted of six first-class steam sloops of war, eight smaller sloops and gun-boats, and four monitors, two of which had double turrets. The total number of guns carried by these vessels was 139, and 33 howit- zers; and the officers and crews numbered about :3(00. The hull of the Tv'Tnexsee was constructed on a high bluff near the Alabama River, a short distance above the city of Selma, and all the timber used was cut in the immediate vicinity. She was 209 feet in length and 48 feet in breadth of beam. The shield for the protection of her battery and crew was 78 feet 8 inches long and 8 feet high above the deck, which at each end of the shield was only about 18 inches above the surface of the water when the vessel had been prepared for service. Sponsons of heavy timber projected about five feet from the sides in a line with the deck, extending seven feet below it, the lower edge of the shield covering the outer angle or apex of the sponsons. The sides of the shield were of yellow pine and white oak, 23 inches thick, placed at an angle of 33 degrees with the deck. When she was prepared for launching, I was ordered byAdmiral Buchanan to charter two steam- boats and proceed with them to Selma, to tow her down to Mobile, as soon as she was launched. I found on arrival at Selma that every preparation had been made for that purpose by the naval con- structor in charge (Mr. Henry Pearce). She was immediately taken in tow by the steamboats and towed down to Mobile, to receive her machinery and battery, the latter having been cast at the Government foundry in Selma, under the superin- tendence of Commander Catesby ap Roger Jones, late commander of the Memrrmac, who had acquired great distinction as an ordnance officer of the United States navy. The armor plating had been prepared at the rolling-mills of Atlanta, and was rapidly arriving. It consisted of plates of exceed- ingly tough and malleable iron seven inches wide, two inches thick, and 21 feet long. Three layers of the 2-inch plates were bolted on the forward end of the shield as far as the after end of the pilot-house (which extended about two feet above the top of the shield), and from that point to the termination of the shield two plates of 2-inch and one of 1-inch were used. While this tedious work was progressing, the machinery and guns were placed in position, and about the 1st of April, 1864, the vessel was ready to receive her crew. As executive officer of the station under the admiral, I had superintended the completion of the vessel, and by his request I was now selected for the command, being imme- diately afterward promoted to the grade of com- mander. But as the draught of the vessel was over thirteen feet, and there were only nine feet of water on Dog River bar, at the mouth of the Mobile River, it be- came a serious problem to solve as to the means of floating her over this bar. Naval Constructor Thomas Porterconceived the ideaofbuildingheavy camels or floats, to be made fast to the sides of the ram; the surfaces in contact with the ram to con- form to the model of the hull; and the camels were to contain a sufficient weight of water to counter- balance in part the weight of the vessel. This plan was immediately adopted, but the timber for the purpose had yet to pass from the forest, through the saw-mill, some ten miles up the river, down to Mobile. Time was precious, and the newspapers were beginning to express the impatience of the people to see the powerful ram of which so much wag expected taken down the bay to attack the blockading fleet. The camels were being con- structed with all possible dispatch, but just as they were nearly ready they were totally destroyed by fire. Undaunted by this calamity, Admiral Bu- chanan, with his usual energy and pluck, soon had them rebuilt, and about the middle of May the Tennessee, drawing less than nine feet of water, was towed over the bar by two steamboats, one of which contained her coal, and the other her ammunition. Her crew were employed during the passage down the bay in transferring these supplies, and by the time she reached a sufficient depth of water to float 01 THE RAM "TENNESSEE" AT MOBILE BAY. without the aid of the camels, she wasquiteprepared for aetion. But unfortunately it was now nearimid- night, and by the time the camels had been sent adrift, the tide had fallen so much that she was found to be hard and fast aground. Here was an insurmnountable and most unlooked-for end to the long-eherished hoists of taking the enemy by sur- jise, dispersing the blockading fleet, and captur- ing Fort Pieketis, at thea entrance of Pensacola Bay. Such was the work Buchanan had mapped out for the ram, anld but for the fact that her prresece- in tCe bay was soon revealed by daylight, this attempt would -ertainly have been made. When the tide ros- sufticiently to float the ship, she was moved down to al anchorage near Fort Morgan. where she remained nearly three months, engaged in exereiiing the crew at their guns. Having realized from the first that the running of the steeritig gear was very defective, I addressed a letter to the admiral soon after reaching our aiii'liorage. sliggestilig certain necessary altera- tions thereiin, and he -ent the fiasal constructor down from thin eity to make plans for the purpose; hilt before they coitld be perfecteil we were com- pelled to take the consequences of the defect, whiel pri id to be disastrolus. (In thii eieiiingof the 4th of August, lFiu4, it Was pllainilV to be seeti that the blockading fleet, whic h hd recetitly been augmented by the arrival of the heavier wooiten vessels and the monitors, was ,liakilig preparations to attempt the passage of Forts Morgan algt Gaines, situated on either silde of the entrance to the bay. and to attack the Confederate sqluiadron. Similar preparations were madle bi our vessels, which had been anchored just within the hay for uearly three months. in daily ex- peetatioli of the impending enc ounter. During the night a blockade-runner entered the bay and was boarded by the executive officer of the Tennessee. At about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, the fleet was discovered to be under way toward the bay, the monitors on the right lid the wooden vessels lashed together two and two, each of the heavier shipsbaviig a gun-boat lashed alongside. Allthe light spars had been sent down, leaving only the lower and top masts stalidilig, while the boats had been hauled upon the beach at Sand Island just within the bar, on the morning previous. All hands were immediately ealled on board the Confederate vessels, and after hurriedly taking coffee, the crew were set to work to slip the cable atid buoy the anchor. This being done, they were assembled at their quarters for action, as the dis- tance from the bar to the entrance of the bay is only about three miles, and the Federal vessels were already within range of the guns of Fort Morgan and were receiving its fire without damage. As the leading monitor, the Tccuaiseh, reached the center of the channel between the forts, the Teiiessee steamed out to meet her, but the speed of both vessels was so slow that the steam-sloops advanced beyond theln, and the Tennessce was di- rected towaril the leading ship, with the hope of reaching her in time to run into her broadside and sink her; but by slightly changing her course, and with her superior speed, the ship easily avoided the intended ramming. and seemed to fly up the bay. Thiswas the admiral's flag-ship Hartfiu-d, and while she passed ahead of the ram, the Brooklya, leading the other vessels of the fleet, passed astern and followed the admiral. I learned after the fight that her commander had obtained the admiral's permission to take the lead, but an event occurred just after the Teiaessra had moved down to the THE "MONOiAIIELA. 'IAMMiNiG THE "TENNESSEE." FAOm A WAR-TIME KUTCHi. 402 THE RAM ' TENNESSEE" AT MOBILE BAY. 4"3 THE "X ItRTFOUI" IN COLLISION WITH THE "TENNESSEE." FHOM A WAR-TIME SKETCI. middle of the channel) which disconcerted him for a moment and caused him to stop his ship, thus compelling the admiral to take the lead himself. This event was the most startling and tragic of the day, causing the almost instanta- neous loss of 93 lives. The monitor Tecemaseh, at her commander's special request, had been de- tailed to "take care of the Tcnn.essce," and bad re- served her fire until she had approached that vessel within a quarter of a mile, when she was suddenly struck by a torpedo, and disappeared beneath the water. But for the cheering of my men as they saw her sinking I should not have seen her go down. Twenty-one of her crew escaped from her, of whom four landed at Fort Morgan. Meantime the other vessels of the Confederate squadron were doing their duty faithfully by rak- ing the enemy's ships as they advanced head on, and they killed and wounded a large number of men. As soon as Admiral Buchanan realized that his enemy had escaped for the moment he ordered me to follow him up the bay; but meanwhile the lash- ings between each two vessels of the fleet had been cast off, and four gun-boats went immediately in pursuit of the three hastily improvised wooden vessels of our squadron. The Selma was speedily captured by one of these, the Yetaccmet, after a gallant resistance, during which seven of her crew and her executive officer were killed, and her com- mander, Lieutenant P. U. Murphy, was slightly wounded. The Gaines, commanded by Lieutenant John W. Bennett, which was run ashore near Fort Morgan to prevent her from sinking, had received several shots below the water-line, and at night was burned by her own crew. The Morg.,n. Com- mander George W. Harrison, ran alongside the wharf at the fort to escape capture, and during the night passed safely through the enemy's fleet up to the city of Mobile. Sihe afterward rendered good service in the defense of the 6ity. While this sort of by-play was in progress the heavier ships of the fleet, together with the moni- tors, steamed up the bay to a point about four miles above Fort Morgan, where they were in the act of anchoring when it was discovered that the ram was approaching with hostile intent. Upon this apparently unexpected challenge the fleet was immediately put in motion, and the heavier vessels seemed to contend with each other for the glory of sinking the daring rebel ram, by running them- selves up on her decks. which extended some thirty feet at each end of the shield, and were only about eighteen inches above the surface of the water. So great was their eagerness to accomplish this feat that the Lack-aercana, one of the heaviest steam- ers, ran bows on into the Hartford, bv which both vessels sustained greater damage than their united efforts in this direction could have inflicted upon their antagonist. Early in the action, the pilot of the T-asessee had been wounded by having the trap-door on the top of the pilot-house knocked down upon his head by a shot from one of the enemy's ships, which struck it on the edge while it was thrown back to admit of his seeing more clearly the posi- ) In this statement, Captain Johnstons chronology In undoubtedly at fault. The testimony of eye-witnesses msakes it certain that the Brooklyn had stopped before the sinking of the Tecumseh.-EDITORS. THE RAM "TENNESSEE" AT MOBILE BAY. tion of the vessel. Thereafter I remained in the pilot-house, for the purpose of directing the move- nients of the ram. The monitors kept up a constant firing at short range. The two double-turreted monitors (Chick- tacte and 11immebago) were stationed under the stern of the T-ese, and struck the after end of her shield so repeatedly with 1 1-inch solid shot that it 'was found at the close of the action to be in a rather shaky condition. One of these missiles had struck the iron cover of the stern port and jammed it against the shield so that it became impossible to run the gun out for firing, and Admiral Buchanan, who superintended the battery during the entire engagement, sent to the engine room for a machinist to back out the pin of the bolt upon which the port eover revolved. While this was being done a shot from one of the monitors struck the edge of the port cover, immediately over the spot where the machinist was sitting, and his remains had to be taken up with a shovel, placed in a bucket, and thrown overboard. The same shot caused several iron splinters to fly inside of the shield, one of which killed a seaman, while an- o.ther broke the admiral's leg below the knee. The admiral sent for me, and as I approached he qui- etly remarked, "Well, Johnston, they've got me. You'll have to look otlt for her now. This is your tight, you know." I replied, " All right, sir. I'll do the best I know how." While returning to the pilot-house I felt the vessel careen so suddenly as nearly to throw me off my feet. I discovered that the Hartford tj had run into the ram amidships, and that while thus in contact with her the Federal crew were using their small-arms by firing through the open ports. However, only one man was wounded in this way, the cause of all our other wounds being iron splinters from the washers on the inner ends of the bolts that secured the plating. I con- tinued on my way to the pilot-house, and upon look- ing through the narrow peep-holes in its sides to ascertain the position of the enemy's ships, I dis- covered that the wooden vessels had mostly with- drawn from the action, leaving it to the monitors to effect the destruction of the ram at their leisure.4 At this time both of my most efficient guns had been placed in broadside, because both the after and forward port covers had been so effectually jammed against the shield as to block up the ports. The steering apparatus had been completely de- stroyed, as it had been plainly visible on the after deck, and the smoke-stack had fallen, destroyingthe draught in such a degree as to render it impossible to keep steam enough to stem the tide, which was running out at the rate of over four miles an hour. Al the official reports show that the only contact between the Hurtferd and the ram was bow. on. a glan- eing blow (see Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 164, pp. sea. 407, and s410. Captain Johnston auddbtedly mistook the Lakekas.a for the Hartford. Admiral Farragut in his report tibid., p. 402h says: "The ZLakeaa, Captain Xarchaud. was the nest wea eel to.strlke her, wbich she did at full speed; but. though her ster was cut ad crushed to the plank ends for the dis tance or three feet above the water's edge to five feet below. the only perceptible effect oa the ram was to (ot h., a.esy tat." ,,vrrosa. Realizing the impossibility of directing the firing of the guns without the use of the rudder, and that the ship had been rendered utterly helpless, I went to the lower deck and iltformed the admiral of her condition, and that I had not been able to bring a gun to bear upon any of our antagonists for nearly half an hour, to which he replied: '- Well, John- ston, it you cannot do them aly further damage you had better surrender." With this sanction of my own views I returned to the gtn-deck, and after another glanee about the bay to see if there was any chance of getting another sltot, and see- ing none of the enemy's ships within range of our broadside guns, I went to the top of the shield and took down the boat-hook to which the flag had been lashed after baving been shot away several times during the tight. While I was thus engaged repeated shots came from the enemy's vessels, but as soon as I returned to the gun-deck and had a flag of truce attached to the boat-book the firing ceased. Having returned to the topof the shield, I saw one of the heaviest ships of the fleet ap- proaching rapidly, apparently for the purpose of making another attempt to sink the ram. Seeing the flag of truce, the commander stopped his ship, but her momentum was too great to be overcome in the short intervening space, and she struck the ram on the starboard quarter, but without injur- ing it. As she did so her commander hailed, say- ing: " This is the United States steamer Ossipee. Hello, Johnston, how are yout Le.ioy - don't you know me rn send a boat alongside for you." The boat came and conveyed me on board the Ossipee, at whose gangway I was met by her ge- nial commander, between whom and myself a life- long friendship had existed. When I reached the deck of his ship, he remarked, - rm glad to see you, Johnston. Here's some ice-water for you-I know you're dry; but I've something better than that for you down below." I thanked him cordially, but was in no humor for receiving hospitalities graciously, and quietly followed him to his cabin, where he placed a bottle of "navy sherry" and a pitcher of ice-water before me and urged me to help myself. Calling his steward, he ordered him to attend to my wishes as he would his own. I remained on board six days, during which time I was visited by nearly all the commanding officers of the fleet. Within an hour after I was taken on board the Ossipee Admiral Farragut sent for me to be brought on board his flag-ship, and when I reached her deck he expressed regret at meeting me under such circumstances, to which I replied that he was not half as sorry to see me as I was to see him. 4 This statement ta not sustained by the official rec- ords of the fight. Admniral Farragut In his report sye: "She (the ram] wa at this tline etr. beset; tie Chlck- -at a pounding away at her stern, liae Osoipac was approaching taer -t ful speed., and the Mangu lo. Lck- s and this ship (Hrtfjrd) were bearing down upon her." Here Is direct mention of four wooden ships, and the Breokiya, Rbichond, sad others were not out of the fight. EDITORS. 404 THE SECOND FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS. h tlt- - -iME - H... SURRlENDER OIF TUCt `TLN,1-.Sl;P.." VIR111 A WAR-TIME SKETCHI. His flag-captain, Percival Drayton, remarked, " You have one consolation, Johnston ; no one can say that you have not nobly defended the honor of the Confederate flag to-day." I thanked him, but gave all the honor due to its defense to Admi- ral Buchanan, who was the true hero of the battle; and when the disparity between the forces engaged is duly considered, I am constrained to believe that history will give him his just meed of praise. The casualties on board the Tennessee were two killed and nine wounded. Her armor was never penetrated, although she was under the heaviest fire for nearly four hours. One solid 15-inch shot struck her shield, at point-blank range, be- tween two of the ports and caused an indenta- tion of about twelve inches, but did not break the iron plating. I\ Her speed dlid not exceed six knots under full steam in slack water, owing to her heavy draught, which exceeded the original calcu- lation by more than a foot. Her engine had been removed from an old Mississippi River steamboat and adapted to a propeller, and its power was totally inadequate to the performance of the work expected of it. After I left the Temiessee Admiral Buchanan was transferred to a small transport steamer and taken to the hospital in the navy yard at Pensa- cola, where he was accompanied by his own fleet- surgeon, Dr. D. B. Conrad, and his aides. Five days after the admiral's departure I was trans- \ The Board of Survey appointed by Admiral Far- ragut, anal consisting of Captain T. A. Jenkins, Captain James Alden, Commander W. E. Le Roy, and Chief- Engineer Thomas Williamson, reported in part as fol- hWws on the injuries received in the action, by the Tes- O., tits port side of the casernate the armor In also badly d-ainnged frle shot. On that side nearly adidahip of the ported to Pensacola and transferred to the receiv- ing-ship Potomac, lying off the navy yard; but as soon as Admiral Farragut's fleet-surgeon, Dr. James C. Palmer, heard of my arrival he had me removed to the hospital, owing to the fact of my suffering at the time with a painful disease. On reaching the hospital I found myself placed in a room near to that occupied by Admiral Buchanan, and immediately adjoining that of Captain J. R. Mt. Mullany, who had commanded the steamer 0Oneida of the fleet, and had had the misfortune to have his left arm shot away during the action. I had known him long before the war, and called upon him at once to offer my condolence. After remaining in the hospital about three weeks I was placed on board a small ordnance steamer in company with Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy, late of the f,,Na, with Lieutenants Brad- ford and Wharton of the Tessenssee, accompanied by my servant (whom Admiral Farragut had kindly allowed me to retain), for transportation to the Brooklyn Navy Yard. We reached our destination after a pleasant passage of five or six days, and on arrival the commander of the steamer, Captain Tat- box, reported to Admiral Hiram Paulding, com- mandant of the vard. On returning to the steamer he informed me that lie had obtained the admiral's permission to escort the party to the niavy yard at Boston, and that it was his intention to take its all down to his home at Cape Ann to spend a few days casem te. ani bettweenl the two breatside gn ... a (S-inc oolid shot k-koe-ed a fote thro-ph the a.rata ad backing, havnr on the ltaile an un-leta-hedt t.ta.s ., oak a.nt pine, sinilittert absout three lmy four feet, ant prtJ-ectltlt ti- t. ., tine casemale aitont tann feet fronl the stdr, 11- i- tile m111l- shot that penetrate. d tine wo-aen. bnatkimni of tine e aso n,. altilo tag thele.- are ni ierono itiaels ,_ the monte giittg e I- dence of the effect of thle shlt." (Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1864, p. 455. 405 406 THE LASHING OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT IN THE RIGGING. with him before turning us over to the officer com- manding Fort Warren, which was to be our abode until we were exchanged. We were all delighted at the prospect of this pleasing respite from prison life, andexpressed our gratitude to the kind-hearted captain. But we were awakened early on the fol- lowing morning by the announcement from the dis- tressed captain, who had had a second interview with the admiral, that we were all to be placed in irons and conveyed to Boston by rail. We remon- strated gently against this unprecedented mode of treating prisoners of war, but to no purpose. When we reached the wharf at Fort Warren, the commanding officer, Major A. A. Gibson, inquired the cause of our being in irons, and upon being informed that they were placed upon us by order of Admiral Paulding, he made the further in- quiry whether or not we had been guilty of any rebellious condnct as prisoners of war; this being answered in the negative, he replied that he had never heard of such treatment, and that we could not be landed on the island until the irons were removed. toon after becoming settled in my new quarters I addressed a communication to the Secretary of the Navy, inquiring whether or not he had authorized the action of Admiral Paulding, which was an- swered by Assistant-Seeretary Fox, who disavowed the act, but excused it on the ground of repeated attempts of prisoners to escape. An order for the exchange of all the prisoners in the fort had reached the commanding officer previous to our arrival, and after ten days we left for City Point on the steamer Amyriaa. We natu- rally supposed that on our arrival at City Point we would be immediately forwarded to the landing on James River, at which exchanges were usually made. But when General B. F. Butler, whose lines were between us and that point, was advised of our presence he refused to allow us to pass through them, on account of President Davis's proclamation declaring him an outlaw. The Com- missioner of Exchange informed General Grant of the fact, and he came alongside the Assyria, with his steamer, and informed us that we should be forwarded to Richmond on the following day. True to his promise, he had us landed near Duteh Gap the next morning, whence we were conveyed COMMANDIER J. I). JOHINSVN. C. K W. in ambulances to Varina Landing, where we found a Confederate steamer awaiting us with the Fed- eral prisoners on board. We soon exchanged places to the tune of 'i Dixie." After a delightful visit of five days at the house of Mrs. Stephen B. Mallory, the charming wife of the Secretary of the Confeder- ate Navy, I was ordered to return to Mobile and re- port for duf y under Commodore Ebenezer Farrand, who had succeeded Admiral Buchanan in command of that station. THE LASHING OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT IN THE RIGGING.) 1. BY J. CRITTENDEN WATSON, CAPTAIN, r. S. N. AT the commencement of the action [in Mobile Bay] Admiral Farragut was standing in the port main-rigging, which position enabled him to overlook the other vessels of the Beet while at the same time it gave him perfect command of both his own flag-ship and the Metacoset, the latter vessel being lashed on that side of the Hart- .ford for the purpose of carrying the flag-ship in- side the bay in case of the disabling of her own machinery. A slight wind was blowing the smoke from our guns on to Fort Morgan. As the wind fell lighter (which it frequently does during heavy firing), the smoke gradually obscured the admiral's view, and he almost unconsciously climbed the rig- ging, ratline by ratline, in order to see over it, until finallyhe found himself in thefuttock-shrouds, some little distance below the maintop. Here be could lean either backward or forward in a com- fortable position, having the free use of both hands for his spy-glass, or any other purpose. Captain Drayton, commanding the Hartford, and also chief-of-staff to the admiral, becoming solic- itous lest even a slight wound, a blow from a splinter, or the cutting away of a portion of the rigging, might throw the admiral to the deck, sent the signal-quartermaster aloft with a small rope, to secure him to the rigging. The admiral at first de- clined to allow the quartermaster to do this, but quickly admitted the wisdom of the precaution, and himself passed two or three turns of the rope around his body, and secured one end while the quartermaster (Knowles) fastened the other. The admiral remained aloft until after we had passed Fort Morgan. )From -- The Century Magazine" told series), June, 1581. THE LASHING OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT IN THE RIGGING. 407 While leaning against the futtock-shrouds, he was near enough to the pilot -who was in the inaintop, just over his head-to communicate with him. He was at all times visible to Cap- tain Drayton and the flag-lieutenant (myself), who were standing on the poop-deck, and con- versed with him several times during the action. Lieutenant A. R. Yates, now Commander in the United States Navy, who was acting as a volun- teer aide, was stationed underneath the admiral, and carried his orders to the other parts of the ship. After the passage of the forts was accomplished, and the vessels were anchored and anchoring, the Confederate ram Tennessee was observed to be moving out from under the guns of Fort Morgan. Captain Drayton reported this fact to the admiral, who was then on the poop, stating that Buchanan, the Confederate admiral, was going outside to de- stroy the outer fleet. The admiral immediately said, " Then we must follow him out ! " though he suspected that Buchanan, becoming desperate, had resolved to sink or destroy the flag-ship Hartford, and do us as much injury as possible before losing his own vessel. Immediately after the above re- mark, Farragut said, "NoI Buck's coming here. Get under way at once; we must be ready for him! "' Captain Drayton could not believe this, and we were a little slow about getting up our anchor, in spite of the admiral's impatience. In Lieutenant Kinney's interesting account of the battle, the subsequent events are described. LSee p. :179.] I have only to add that when the HartJord rammed the Tennessee the admiral was standing in the port mtzzen-rigging, near the rail, where I secured him with a rope's-end, having first remonstrated with him, and begged him not to stand in so exposed a plaee,-as he was only a few feet from and above the deck of the ram, which scraped her whole length along that side of the Hart.ford. There could never have been any dispute as to the admiral's having been lashed in the main-rig- ging, had the fact been generally known that the admiral himself told Captain Drayton and me, shortly after the battle, exactly what took place when the quartermaster came up to him with the rope and the message from the captain, just as I have related it. He was afterward amused and amazed at the notoriety of the incident. When a comic picture of the scene, in one of the illustrated weeklies, came to hand, a few days after the battle, he said to Captain Drayton and myself in con- versation, "How curiously some trifling incident catches the popular fancy! My being in the main- rigging was a mere accident, owing to the fact that I was driven aloft by the smoke. The lashing was the result of your own fears [Captain Drayton's] for my safety." At the close of the war he yielded to the solicitations of Mr. Page to stand for a historical portrait in the position in which he was first lashed. NEW YORK, September 6th, 18ee 11. BY JOSEPH MARTHON, LIEUTENANT-COMMNDER, U. S. N. IN regard to the truth of the statements made by various people at different times, whether Ad- miral Farragut was, or was not, lashed to the rigging of the United States flag-ship Hartford during the battle of the 5th of August, 1864, passing the forts at the entrance of Mobile Bay, my position placed me in a situation to be able to see and know as much in that respect as any one at that time. I was in charge of the howitzer placed in the maintop of the Hartford, was at my station, and used the gun while in range of Fort Morgan in passing. The admiral climbed into the port main-rigging, and stood on the upper sheer ratline (about five or six ratlines up). Captain Drayton sent a quarter- master with a piece of lead-line to lash him to the shroud to prevent him falling, in case of in- jury. After a short time the smoke grew more dense, when the admiral cast off the lashing, climbed up to the futtock-rigging, taking the lash- ing with him, where he lashed himself and re- mained during the action, and till we passed well up the bay, when he came into the top and I went up to the maintopsail-yard. Just then a heavy north-west squallof wind and rain struckus, making it very dark, and the order was given to anchor. As the squall slowly passed off I reported each ship as they came in sight coming up the bay, and catching sight of black smoke, thought it must be the ram Tennessee heading up the bay. For a short time, owing to the darkness of the squall and rain, I was in doubt as to her movements, but soon noticed she was steaming against the wind by the way the smoke left the smoke-stack, as nothing of her was visible. I said to the admiral, "The ram is coming for us." For a few moments he was in doubt, for he believed the ram would either go outside and attack the vessels on blockade, or else go under the guns of the fort, and compel the admiral to make another attack on him or stand a night at- tack from the ram. When I convinced the admiral the ram was coming he said, "I did not think old Buck was such a fool." He then went on deck, and orders were given to up anchor, get under way, and ram the enemy at full speed. The ram, after a good fight, surrendered. My station was in the maintop, right over the head of the admiral, only a few feet distant, for the admiral without any trouble reached his hand through the lubber's hole, and pressed the pilot's foot, to attract the pilot's attention on one or two occasions. My attention was called to the admiral's position by his hailing the top in a low tone of voice, just before the Teestsseh was sunk, asking, "w where this water was coming from." Upon looking about I found that the water-breaker, placed in the hole of a coil of rigging I was sitting on, had been cap- sized by a piece of shell knocking a hole in the top, and the water was running down on the admiral's head. I informed him of the fact. He replied, "I noticed it is not salt." After passing the forts the admiral came into A revision and extension oe a letter of December 5th, 1877, to Mr. Loyall Farragut. THE DEFENSE OF FORT MORGAN. the top, and 1 went up to the inaintopsail-yard iend reported the vesselh a. they passed the forts, and the position and movements of the rebel ram i)oubt hlaving been expressed as to the ability of the oldiniral to reach the pilot with his hand, in July. 1 7 7. while the Hlarrtfordt was at the Norfolk navy vard, I went on board and requested Lieu- teinant-Commander C. H. Black, who was the exec- tive officer at that timle, to send some one aloft to take the measure of the distance. He sent for the boatswain and explained what I wanted. The boatswain and one man went aloft, taking a tape-line, and made the proper measure of the distance. Mr. Black and I stool on the quarter- deek and saw the measure taken. The distance from the crossing of the futtoek-shroudls with the main-rigging is six feet to the platform of the maintop. I made my last cruise in the old Hlartford, and this question often came up. Many times, in going aloft, I have stood in the same place and reached my hand above the platform of the inaintop. NEw YORK, October 18th, teas. " I v THE DEFENSE OF FORlT MORGAN. BY R. L. PAOE, BRIOADtIER-GFENERAL. C. K. A., COMMANDER OF THE FORT. EARLY on the morning of the 5th of August, l tSti4, I observed unusual activity in the Fed- eral fleet off Mobile Bay, indicating, as I supposed, that they were about to attempt the passage of the fort. After an early breakfast the men were sent to the guns. Everybody was in high spirits. In a short time preparations were ended, and then fol- lowed perfect sileitee, before the noise of battle. At hi o'clock A. 1. the enemy's ships began to move in with flags flying. They gradually fell into a line, consisting of twenty-three vessels, four of which were monitors. Each of the first four of the largest wooden ships had a smaller one lashed ott the side opposite the fort, and was itself pro- tected by a monitor between it and the fort. The smaller ships followed in line. As they approached with a moderate wind and on the flood tide, I fired the first gun at long range, and soon the firing became general. our fire being briskly returned by the enemy. For a short time the smoke was so dense that the vessels could not be distinguished. bitt still the firing was incessant. When abreast of the fort the leading monitor, the Teeunnseh, suddenly sartk. Four of the crew swam ashore and a few others were picked up by a boat from the enemy. Cheers from the garrison now rang out, which were checked at once, and the order was passed to sink the admiral's ship and then cheer. Here I must note a little incident which chal- lenged my admiration. As the Tecyoselh was go- iug down, a boat was observed to shoot out from under the bow of the leading ship, with oars up and boat-hook in hand. Seeing her, I gave direc- tions, "Pass the order not to fire on that boat; she is saving drowning men." At this moment the Brooklyn, the leading ship, stopped her engine, apparently in doubt; where- upon the order was passed to concentrate on her, in the hope of sinking her, my belief being that it wag the admiral's ship, the Hartford. As I learned afterward, he was on the second ship. Farragut's coolness and quick perception saved the fleet from great disaster and probably from destruction. While the Brooklyn hesitated, the admiral put his helm to starboard, sheered outside the Brooklyn, and tookthe lead, the rest following, thus saving the fouling and entanglement of the vessels and the danger of being sunk under my guns. When, after the fight, the Brooklyn was sent to Boston for repairs, she was found to have been struck over seventy times in her hull and 408 I do i I T:- I - " tA THE DEFENSE OF FOR T MORGAN. uasts, RS was ShowtI by a drawing that was sent e while I was a prisoner of war it F'ort Lafayette. The ships conttinue.d passing rapidly by, nto single vess-l being unlder lire mnre than. a few In...inelits. Stint after shot was seen to strike, and shells to explode, out or abouit the vessels, but their xites being heavily protectedt by chain cables, faked along thl side-s and abreast the engines, no. vitail bilow e-lld he inflicted, partieularly as the arinanient of the fort consisted of guns inadequate in i'aliberadnliun-lers for effeitive service agailist a piowerfuil fleet it. raphid motionl. The torpedoes in the channel were also harmless; owing to the diepth of the water, the strong tides, and the im- 1,irfect moorings none exploded. Four of the enemy'a fleet turned from the fire they would have to encounter in passing, and joined the other ves- sels in the enfilading fire from the gulf side.1 One small gun-boat (the Pi'liippi) attempting to run by alone, after the fleet passed in, was sunk at the seeond shot, in shoal water, the crew saving them- selves in boats. She was burned by a boat sent from the Confederate States gun-boat Morgen. One man was found on board. He was severely wounded, and died while the officer was on board. Dumring the passage of the fleet 491 projectiles wer fired from the fort, without derangement of any kind to guns or gun-carriages. But little dam- age was done to the fort, and but small loss of life, owing to the fact that the guns of the fleet were too much elevated; most of the projectiles passing over our heads. The spirit displayed yiy the gar rison was fiue; the guns were well served, and all iliil their duty nobly. As the fleet passed the fort anild out of range of ty guns, they were ilulnediately attaeketl by the Confederate vessels under Admiral Buhanan. who fought most gallantly until he was disabled afd overpowered by the Federal fleet. After the entrance of the Feleral fleet into the bay and the evacuation of Fort Powell (a small bat- tery which was udttefable), and after tlle surrender iif Fiirt Gaines. six iniles distant on the opposite site of th(e bay. I felt l-olfident that the whole niaval allu lidn, for--s of the enemy would be brought against Fiirt NMorgaui. I 1i.g1a ait once to pre-pare the fort for as hllterillililld a defenus as possible. It hai1l bee n eiosnstraited by the fir,' of the en- emy that thl, --4i1e or outer rampart f the fort (in whieh wvas its main stren.gth) protec- tedl the scarp of the main wall of masonry only alIouit one-half its height fronm eirvateid shot, anl thalt it woililu lie in. the power of the en- emy to opei fire fromn any poilit of tie ompass., and conseluenlitlY uon.e of the casemnates without heavy traverses in their front wolildl be safe. It was manifest that by the ioncentration of fire my heavy guns -oulll sooni bw dislmlounted, and the length iif my resistali w 1oulild dlpenlnd iipon my ability tim mrtei't lly -en from the heavy fire alill to hold the fort from the flank easemates against assault. With these views, I employed my men day andl night, luost of the time under fire, in erecting traverses toe protect my glilis on the main wall, to reliler tle ehseniates selected for the sick amid wounded seeire, adli provide safe qiularters for themselves in their rest fromit the constant anl arduous dmities they would have to endure. I fonlill it necessary also to biilld a large traverse at the sally-port, whiiitl was emitirely exposed. Thus absolitely to prevelit the probability of Fort Mor- galn being redl-el at the' first severe test by the heavy giuin. iif the -letny. it wvis necessary for m!i garrison of 44)00 wllell to lalior hlril umighit almd lay. On the morIling of the 9th the e-lilily proce-ied with monitors and trainsliorts to lanild troops and guns at Navy Cov-e, iomnelicilng at 01ncc their first work of investmemit by lanld. By my order the redoubt - (2 70 4 yards from the fort) called - Battery Bragg," from whiche the guns had been removed, was destroyed by burlling the wood-work. The buildings about the fort, hospitals, quarters, stables, etc., were fired and cleared away as far as possible. During the day, two monitor,, thr-e sloops of war, and some gun-boats engaged the fort for several hoturs - the wooden vessels at long range - with but little damage on either side. Soon after. a flag of truce was reported from the fleet. bringing me a commuliication to this effe-t: BRIGADIER-GEN-ERAL B. L. PAGE, ' Cu-imitudiing Fort Morgan. "SIR: To prevent the unnecessary sacritice of hum.s life whicb must follow the openllig llf our battterie, we demand the uneouditional surrender lit Fort Morgan and its dependencies. We are, respecttully, you.r .loedieut servamits, -1D. G. FABR.GUT. Rear-AduIral. - GORDION G:iAoER, MaJer-(c;c,--rl. To whiclh I sent the following reply: SIas: I am lIrepared to sacritfie life, al-d will only surrelider when. I have no means of defefns. I do not understand that while lellg coumunicated with under the flag of truce, the Tra.aeee should he toweil Within range of liy guns.\ Re.jieettnlly, etc., h- . L. I'u;E, hirlgsdicr-(ie ucral.-' bThe enfilading vessels were the Gesie ee, Teseaaee, Bicvrille, Ptmbise., Sebgeo. 141(d Piatda.-EDITORs. \ Aekuowleilged to have lceii done by mistake; the vessel was toweed hick .ll.ll..liditet-.- R. L.. P. VOL. IV. 27 409 LAND OPERATIONS AGAINST MOBILE. After thin time, day and night, we were en- gagedl by the fleet, sometimes in a brisk tight of several hours' duration, at others in desultory fir- itg without any material damage being done to the fort, save a denmonstration of the fact that our brick walls were easily penetrable by the heavy missiles of the enemy, alnt that a systematic eon- eejitrate.t fire wouldl noon breach them. On the 1i.th three of the 1.-inch shells, strik- ing the right-flank face of bastioni No. 4, breached the wall ant disabled the howitzers therein. By this time the enemy had erectedt several batteries of heavy gu ns on the land approach and opened fire, which wan kept up pretty continnoldy; and in the interval of serving the gunas my men were engaged in the work, before umentioned, for their protection, in anticipation of a vigorous bombard- ment. The sharp-nhooters ill our front had become very numerous and active, and with them eneircliung us on the land and the fire being lelivered from the fleet on the flanks our guns had to be served with c-are and under great diffieulty. The land forces of the enemy c-ompleted their first line of approach aeross the peninnula on the 10th, and the second and third on the 14th to within 7t00 yards of the fort. This workeontinueduntilthe 2lnt, when they had approached to within 2410 yards of our glacis. Such guns as could be used on this in- trenching force were employed, especially at night, and a. far as possible retarded their work, though nothing very effective could be aecomplished by this firing, as their working parties were well eon- cealed and protected behind the sand-banks; when our fire was concentrated on any particular point they would remove to some other. Up to the morning of the '!2d our efforts were with the heavy guns that could be used against the investing forces. The topography of the country afforded the enemy great advantages, and they made a steady advance. covering it with an irregu- lar fire from the batteries already in position, and lining their works with sharp-shooters to pick off our gunners. At daylight of the 22d the fleet was reported moving up and encircling the fort, the iron-lads and the captured Tenessee included, and shortly its guns and all the batteries on land opened a furious fire, which came from almost every point of the compass, and continued unabated throughout the day, culminating in increased force at sundown; after which the heavy calibers and mortars kept it Iu during the night. During this heavy bombardment I found it use- lens to attempt to fire my guns, as the sharp-shooters could pick off my men as fast as they would ap- pear at the guns. Thin bombardtment disabled all my guns, save two, partly breached the walls ill several places, cutting up the fort ti, such all ex- tenit as to make the whole work a mere mass ,t debris. Their mortar-firing ill ftle night from the land side wan particularly accurate. Apprehensive now, from the decided effect already produced on the walls, that my magazines, containling eighty thousand pounds of powder, were in great danger by the continuation of the bomnbardlmeit at night. with great care alid under continuouis fire 1 had the powder brought out and flooded. The guns of the water and hinette batteries, Dow unserviceable and in jeopardy from the enlemy, 1 ordered to be spiked and otherwise effectually damaged, and all the guns dismounted by the enemly onl the main rampart were destroyed an of no further avail in de- fense. Early in the night the wood-work of the citadel was fired by the mortar shells, and burned furiously for some hours; the enemy during the conflagration pouring in his missiles with inereased vigor. With great efforts the fire was arrested aid prevented from extending around near the maga- zines, which would have been in imminent danger of explosion. In the gallant endeavor to stay this disaster I must be allowed to reco.d the names of privates Murphy, Bembough, and Stevens, 1st Tennessee regiment, distinguished for extraordi- nary courage and daring. At daybreak on the L;3d, acc-ompanlied by the en- gineer, I inspected the fort to determine its con- dition for further defense. The report was madln by some of the company captains that of the ease- mates, which had been made as safe for the men as my means allowed, some had been breached, others partly so, and that another shot on theni would bring down the walls. A resumption of the fire would thus inflict heavy loss of life, as there was no bomb-proof in the fort. The enemy's. approach was very near the glacis, my guns and powderwere destroyed, the citadel had been set on fire the second time alid entirely consumed; the commissariat and quartermaster's stores had been destroyed by the shells of the enemy. It was evi- dent that '1I had no means left of defense," allnd that under a renewed bombardment unnecessary loss of life would result. At 6 o'clock A. M. the white flag was displayed from the ramparts, and at 12 o'clock P. x. I capitu- lated. I am proud to say that throughout this severe test the garrison behaved like brave men. LAND OPERATIONS AGAINST MOBILE. BY RICHARD B. IRWIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V. I the last days of July. 1 S64, General E. R.S. T Canby sent (General Gordon Granger) with I1ootm men from New Orleans to cooperate with Admiral Farragut. On Angoi.t :,d Granger landed onl Dauphine Island, andl the next morning, the appointed time, was in position before Fort Gaines. At once crossing the bay, now held by Far- ragut's fleet, Granger landed in the rear of Fort Morgan and began a siege. A siege train was sent from New Orleans, and three more regiments of infantry. Onl the 22d of August. twenty-five gnus and sixteen mortars being in. ) General Granger reUinquisied the command of the Fourth Corps. Armly of the CAoiutierlaud, April ltb, 1864, and, on June 21St. wst ordered to report to General Canby.- EDrroas. 410 LAND OPERATIONS AGAINST MOBILE. position, ; a general bombardment ity the army and the fleet began at daylight. At 6 o'clock the next morning, the 23d, the white flag was shown, and the fm-t surrendered at 2:30 P. m. About five hundred prisoners were taken and about fifty gr"ns. 4 After Thomas had overthrown Hood at Nash- ille (D)ecernber 16th, 1864), Grant ordered him to fdllow Hood south, but when in January the badness of the roads stopped the movement at Eastport, Grunt detached A. J. Smith with the reorganized Sixteenth Corpsl and sent him to join Canby at New Orleans. In anticipation of this, on the 1 Sth of January, Grant ordered Canby to move against Mobile. The main lines of for- tification, three in number, and very strong, being on the western side, Canby determined to ap- proach Mobile on the east, where be would have the full benefit of the corrperation of the navy, and the principal works he would have to reduce were Spanish Fort commanding the mouth, and Blakely commanding the head of the Appalachee, where the Tensas leaves it. The movement was made in two columns: one from Dauphine Island, under Canby himself, the other from Pensacola, under Major-General Freder- ickSteele. Canby's own force was about 32,001) strong, and consisted of Veatch's and Benton's di- visions and Bertram's brigade of the reorganized Thirteenth Corps, \ under Major-General Gordon Granger, the Sixteenth Corps, under A. J. Smith, and a siege train under Brigadier-General Richard Arnold, ehief-of-artillery. Steele's force was com- posed of C. C. Andrews's division of the Thirteenth Corps (except Bertram's brigade), Hawkins's divi- sion of colored troops, and Lucas's brigade of cav- alry, and numbered 13,000. When united, Canbv had 45,000 men of all arms. Mobile was defended by about ten thousand troops, with three hun- dred field and siege guns, commanded by Major- General Dabney H. Maury; there were also five gun-boats j under Commodore Ebenezer Farrand. Canby's movement began on the 17th of March. The Sixteenth Corps moved by water from Fort Gaines; the Thirteenth Corps marched from Fort Morgan. Uniting at Danley's Ferri, near the mouth of Fish River, they laid siege to Spanish Fort on the 27th of March. Smith, with Carr's and Mc- Arthur's divisions, held the right, and Granger, with Benton's and Veatch's ;T, divisions and Bertram's brigade, the left of the Federal line. From left to 'ight the defense was upheld by the brigades of Ector, Holtzclaw, and Gibson. By the 9th of April the trenches were well advanced and a bombard- M1anned by the 1st turltan Hen,), Arttllery. 38th Iowa, Rawlt-ss battery, Rth U. S., and a naval detach- uent under Lleatc-nant Tyson, of the Hrrtfor d. Gen- 'ml RichardI Arnold was the Bhlef-of-nrtllery.-B. B. J. 4 General Grant, in IsI official report. says: "The total taptures fat the three fnrtsi an nrtinted to 1464 lrri-orrers and lo pler-es of artillcr-y.-- EDIToRs. I The )rIginal Siteenth Corps, -onstituted Decembner 1sth. 1R62, and first omnanded by MaJor-General S. A Hurlblut, was broken an November 7th, 1864. It was re- organlzed February 18th. 1865, -nder Maj.or-General Andrew J. Smith.-En[Tosa. \k The original Thirteenth Corps. constituted October 24th and Decetnber 1lth, 1862, and first commanded by ment was begun by ninety guns in position, joined by all the gun-boats within range. In the evening a lodgment was effected on the right of the Con- federate lines, and during the night the garrison made good its retreat, with the loss of about 5)ars prisoners captured. Nearly fifty guns fell into the possession of the besiegers. Steele set out from Pensacola on the 20th of March, and, as if Montgomery were his object, moved first to Pollard on the Eseambia, fifty miles to the northward of Pensacola. There he turned to- ward Mobile, and on the 1 st of April, after a march of a hundred miles over very bad roads, deploved before Blakely. His supplies had run so short that Veatch's division of the Thirteenth Corps had to be sent out on the 31st of March with a commissary train of seventy-five wagons. The siege of Blakely began on the 2d of April. From left to right the lines of attack were held by Garrard's division of the Sixteenth Corps, Veatch's and Andrews's of the Thirteenth Corps, and Hawkins's colored division. Thomas's brigade of " boy reserves " had the right. and Cockrell's division the left, of the defenses. On the afternoon of the 9th, twenty-eight guns being in position, and Spanish Fort having fallen, the Confederate works were captured by a general assault of 16,000 men; 3423 prisoners were taken and more than forty guns. Forts Tracy and Huger, two small works, were evacuated and blown up on the night of the 11 th. The rivers were swept for torpedoes; the fleet gained the rear of Mobile by the Blakely anrl Tensas; and Granger erossed the bay under eon- voy and entered the city on the morning of the 12th, Maury having marehed out with the re- mainder of his force, numbering 4500 infantry and artillery, together with twenty-seven field- pieces and all his transportation. 4 4 Maury retreated to Meridian, the cavalry sent out from Pensacola to cut him off being prevented by high water from crossing the Alabama and Tombigbee. Meanwhile Wilson, with a reorgan- ized and freshly equipped force of 1 2,500 cavalry. setting out from the Tennessee on the 18th of March, had completely defeated Forrest and taken Selma, with its fortifications, foundries, and work- shops, on the 2d of April, and entered Montgomery on the day Canby gained Mobile. On the news of Johnston's capitulation Taylor surrendered to Canby, on the 4th of May, 1 865, at Citronelle, all the remaining forces of the Con- federacy east of the Mississippi; on the 211th Kirby Smith followed with the Trans-Mississippi, and the war was ended. Grant, afterward by rtcClermand, was broken up June 11th, 1es4. The new corps was organized February 18th. 1865.-ErTros. Or 9t'r enlisted Arca effective. which Is General Maury's estimate.-EDITORS. ) Ineluding the Joeqan. the partlY eorlllelted iroir- eads TrS-. l and Hnlrillk and tire steamers Nnsl- rile and Rtrttir.- EniTts. t, . Till MNreli 0th.- ED[lORs. 4 4The Un.in los drrintl these oleratilos was 149 killed. 1203 w-nnnded,. and 27 capturedl,-I total of 1417. General Randall . Gis ion. the Confederate commander at spanish Fort. relorted a lo.-s of 1s killed, 396 wounded, and 250 snislng-E11T0OR8. 411 tlA)SItN OPlEUtATIONS IN THE GULF AND WESTERN RIVERS. BaY PROIFESSOR JAIE RtUSSELL SMOLEY, U. S. N. I N the operatiolns agaitast Mo1lbile, in March anl April, 1 Sti.a, the navy Ibre its frll share of th- work, and ataet with heavy losses. The Vest Golf siluadron, after l'arragiat's retirement from thlt commanad in Septemllber, 1 S 4, had ]hell under the directioaa. of C'omnmodore Jai.ies S. Pal mer, who wis in turn reli-ved at the enild of Fl-ulary Iby Acting Hear-Admiral Henry K. Thathebr. P'altner. how- ever, all officer of great energy ald skill, ontilnatte to serve with the saq-adron. Adairal Thatchier took personal direction o.f the elosiae. opertions against Mobile in cooperation nitb It teaelrat (amatbv. His force included amiong other vessels the iron-lads V'iaeainaosit, J iuaaeljI qa, t latksa. Malacakca . uaq. aid Kickaaa.ao. Amoig the' woodeni vessels were th- dlouble-enders teacias. .9at,/ , tcrarra, and . Ita- roolel, the gull-boats Itfoa and Nchiita. the tin- clads Roeldldl, Elf'. M10fat. Taatiltlahatdh, NatauaRza. and .itocivlaltt (fag-ship). The lupper waters of the bay were thickly sowi with stat ilmary torpedoes. and great numntaers of loatinig mines were s-nt dowia froit above,. so that the naval qlsrations were full of aldanger. The Confederate torpedo service at Molaile was partieutlarly eflicient, aid the lihtter vess.els of the Ulnioal fleet were .....staaatlv em..ployed in sweeping for torpedoes. Inl the closing attacks on Fort Alexis and Spanish Fort. which resulted in their capture. the gmaal-saats joined in the blonilbard- -enit, while a naval liattery mi sho..re undaer Lieu- tenant-Commander thillis rendered efficiett servie. Previous to this attack. alnd wbhile it was in prog- ress, I5t0 large submergal trarploes were re- moved from Bllakl-y River and the adjaeent waters by the Mtao..... t. (amimaaiahr Piera-,- Crosby. On the followinag alaYs Forts Huger nlld Traev were shelled by the guna-boats, causing their evacuation on the evening of the II th of April. on the 12th the fleet eonvoyedl Satt0t troops under General Granger to the western shore of the bay above Mobile, while the nonitors took position in front of the city. In the afteraaoon the mayor of Mobile made a formnal surreaader to the armv and navy. The Coanfederate iroaa-clads Hlmisrilie and Tusealoosa had already beeni sunk in Spanish River, and the other vessels. tile Mercfj, Nashl- ,-ilk, and Baltie, had taken refuge in the Tombig- be. whither they were presently pursued and where they were filially captured. The surrender of Comimnodore Fa.rrad and the naval forces under his comlmand to Admiral Thatcher was agreed upon at Citronelie oa Mbay 4tb, at the same time as the surrender of Taylor to ('anby. The formal surremader, in aecordalac-e with the agreement, was made to Fleet-Captain Edward Simpson, on May 1 Oth, at Naiaaaa Hubba Bluff, on the Tombigbee. It included four vessels, 1 ]'2 officers. 2S5 enlisted ioen. amad 24 mlarines. The loss of vessels dairinag the campaign was un- usually large. On Mareh "2Sth the Milaeaukee, Lieutenant-Comlmander James H. Gillis, return- ing to the fleet from an attack on a transport hyiaig tecar Spanish Fort, -xpledt a torpedo, aid sanak ia three miautats. Next day the ()agc struck a torpedo tilader her how and welt dawna almaaost im- mediately. A similar acidemat resulted in th- loss of the tima-clad oaadat1la alit April 1st. A fortiaight later. iaiiaaaediately aifter tble sarrendatr aaf Mobile, tile gamra-lolt ,Neci"ta was lost ill thle asaale way, as were also tIla tugs I,(fa, and Althaei,, and a latumnch belaanging to tlaa C'iaaaiunaati. These disasters remilted in a loss uf 2.1 killed and 32 woutleai . lIm the Mississipai squadraraan, now ander the aommnaaad of Acting Rear-Adimiral S. P. Lee, thae last months were chiefly occuapied itt eanavoy duty sad keepiag up communieation otl the MississipIi, in hiloekaading the amd River, anl imi active opera- t-Ons in eoaajunctiaan with the army by the fleets aaa the Tennessee aind Cuimberlanl rivers, tile fiaaer aitader Lieaatenaant-('oinmatider Shirk atid tibe latter mtailer Lictuta-nant-Commnanmer Fitch. Ioth theae officers dtisplayed great eamergy aaad re- sotarce in all exaating alid difficetlt servi, e, anld they were ably se-onidlea by the volammteer officers who coanimalied that light giaii-boats in freqaent alul hotly cintested engagements with the Coal- federate batteries saall tropsmait the banks. The last effot tf the Confederate inavy oil the Western rive-rs was the brilliant bilt unsuma cesfill dash of the riatat tidal,, tinder Commander C. W. Read, tatat (,f ed lRiver in April with a load of cotton. Raal's hiatl was to run the Mississippi laockaide amatat earrv his vess-l anid cottoat to Ha- vania. It was one aif the boldest exploits of tble war. The Weblab maite a rauslh thrauglig the fleet at the Red River mouth stal escaped without injaary. Her approach was telegrapahel to New Orleans, but under the disguise aif an army transport she nearly passed the vessels lying off the city before they discovered her character, too late to stop her progress. Tweatty miles below the city she met the Rficlhmsond, anid finding farther advatace im- possible Read ran her ashore and burnt her. On the 3d of Jane Lieutenant-Commander W. E. Fitzhugh received the surreander of Lieutenant J. H. Carter and the Confederate naval forces under his command in the Red River. Oal the west Gulf coast the blockade continued until the end, several important cutting-out expe- ditioats occurring during Janauary and February. Amoaag these tIhe most noteworthy were the cap- ture of the etplhiaaa, Jaituary 22d, iaa Calcasieu River, by' Lieuteiant-Comnander H. W. Meade; of the Pet and the Anna Sophia, February 7th, at Galvestoat. by all expedition orgatuized by Com- mander J. 1R. M. Mullany; and of the Asnna Dale, February 1 Sth, at Pass Cavallo, by a party sent in by Lieutenaut-Commander Henry Erben. After the surreider of Mobile, Admiral Thatcher turned his attention to the coast of Texas, and on May 25ith Sabine Pass waas evacuated. On the 2d of June Galvestoat starrendered, and the war on the Texas coast l ame tat an eald. 412 CAVALRIY OPERATIONS IN THE WEST UND)ER ROSECRANS AND SHERMAN. BY THOMAS SPEED, C'APTAIN, U. S. V. UT NTIL General W. S. Rosecrans took command of the Army of the Cumberland, October 30th, 1862, the Union cavalry in Kentucky and Tennessee had not been organized in a separate command, but its various regiments and brigades were attached to the several infantry divisions. There being no such organization, there was of course no commander of cavalry to direct the movements of the entire body of these troops, but the commander of a cavalry brigade was the ranking colonel present who received orders from the army commander direct, or through subordinate commanders of the infantry. With Rosecrans came an effort toward a better organiza- tion. Roseerans divided his army into three grand divisions known as "The Center," "The Right Wing," and "The Left Wing." The eavalry was all placed under one commander, General D. S. Stan- ley. who at once proceeded to get the cavalry inl condition for efficient service. He formed it in, three brigades. The First was under Colonel R. H. G. Minty, of the 4th Michigan Cavalry; the Second under Colonel Lewis Zahm, of the 3d Ohio Cavalry; the Third he kept under his personal charge, while Colonel John Kennett was made commander of the cavalry division. Sueh was the organization when Rosecraiis began the campaign which re- sulted in the Battle of Stone's River, December 3 lst, 18I62. to January 2d, 1 863. In the autumn of 1862, while Rosecrans was making his preparations at Nashville, a number of eavalry regiments were being recruited in Ken- tucky, and that State became a general camp of instruction for new regiments on their way to the front from other States. They were not able, how- ever, to protect the country from the raids of the Confederate cavalry. On the 7th of December, IA 62, John H. Morgan attacked the Federals at Hartsville, Tennessee, and captured the garrison. On the 9th General Joseph Wheeler attacked unsuccessfully a Federal brigade iindlr Colonel Stanley Matthews, on the road leadling to Mur- freesboro'. A little later in December Morgan moved into Kentucky and destroyel bridges on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The Federal cavalrv was not in condition at this time to oper- ate sucessfully against these efforts of the Con- federates. In the same month of December, 1862, a hold movement wivas made by a force of Federal eavalry under General S. P. Carter, composed of three regi- ments-the 9th Pennsylvania, 2d M.ichigan, and 8th Ohio. Carter made his way through the momn- tains into east Tennessee, and destroyed the track and bridges on the railroad leading from Virginia to Knoxville. This successful dash showed that raiding was not to be left wholly to one side. The cavalry under General Stanley was actively used in the advance upon Mlurfreesboro'. While numbering only about fourthousand effective men. and consequently not expected to cope with the enemy's infantry, it covered the flanks of Rose- erans's army and also kept well to the front, devel- oping the positions of the enemy, and by hold scouting obtained information of mov-ements. Dur- ing the fighting at Stone's River, December 31st. the Confederate cavalry made its way to the Fed- e-ralrear for the purpose of cuttingeommunieations and destroying supplies. Much damage might then haveoccurred had notGeneral Stanley'scavalrvymet and repulsed the raiders. In the fighting which en- sued the 3d KentuckyCavalry, underColontel E. 1t. Murray, particularly distinguished itself, also the Ist Ohio Cavalry, under Colonel Minor hMilliken. who was killed. After the battle General Stale y kept his command posted in the country between 513 414 CAV4LR Y OPERATIONS UNDER ROSECRANS AND SHERMAN. the opposing armies until active operations began in the spring of I 1iti. 0 eneral HIoseeran. endeav- ,-red uusueeessftlly to increase this braitch of his army materially. The suthorities at Washington do not seem to have appreeiated the necessities of the ease as fully as hims-lf. Some increase, however, was made, by the coming of new regiments. And while General 8tanley was onl the alert for all the necessary purposes of the army in position, Gen- eral Rosecrans organized, in the spring of 186:t, for a eavairy raid around the rear of Bragg's army. For this purpose seventeen hundred men were placed under Colonel A. 1). Streight, with directions to embark otl transports on the Tennessee River at Fort Henry and proceed t1) Eastport, Mississippi. C'olonel Streight reached Eastport and set out thence April 21st. He reached Tuscumbia, Ala- bama, April 24th, and by May I1st was at Blounts- ville, Alabama. His objective was Rome, Georgia; but when nearCedar Bluffs, Alabama, twenty-eight miles from Rome, he was attacked and defeated by Forrest. Colonel Streight himself and thirteen huudred men were captured -u.-d carried as pris- oners to Richmond. While this raid was in prog- ress Colonel J. T. Wilder with a body of 26tt0 cavalry was destroying t lie railroads south of Mur- freesboro' and capturing a number of prisoners, and other similar movements were being made by Colonels Louis D. Watkins and A. P. Campbell in the direction of Columbia, Tennessee. Atthistime, also, another eelebrated cavalryraid took place in Mississippi. Colonel B. H. Grierson of the 6th Illinois Cavalry, taking his own regiment, the 7th Illinois, Colonel Edward Prince, and the 2d Iowa, Colonel Edward Hatch, left La Grange, Ten- nessee, April 17th, and in sixteen days traversed six hundred miles of the enemy's country and reached Baton Rouge, where a Federal force was stationed. tSee map, Vol. Ill., p. 442.] Hateh's regiment destroyed the railroads east of Columbus, Mississippi, and returned to La Grange, while the remainder of Grierson's force destroyedt muach of the Mobile and Ohio and Vicksburg and Meridian railroads. This bold and successful raid produced MA.XP OF )PEKAIION,, IN MItDLE TENNEStLL AND tNOR'TH ALABAMA, 183. CAVALRY OPERATIONS UNDER ROSECRANS AND SHERMAN. 41; a profounld sensation, and was of great benefit to (inleral Urant ill the Vicksburg eanapaignL The great aetivity of the Union cavalry at this icrinti is further shown ly the fact that General Staioley if. the Ionlith of Ju let a strong force in re,-ar of Bragg's position at Tullahlioa, cutting the railiroalds at l)echerd Station, whereupon Bragg fell back to Bridgeport. In July Stanley again uud ade a uovennlent upon Huntsville. Proceeding ly several mat Is, the separate brigades of General .1. B. Turchiui and Colonels Eli Long and Robert Cialbraith all reached Huntsville, Alabama, and, after capturing prisoners, supplies, and stock, re- tuuruied without serious loss. The Confederates on their JIurt also made a cele- brated raid at this tine. On the 27th of June Morgan crossed the (umberland River at Burks- uille, Kentucky, with about 2500 men. He passed uttirthwardly throngh Columbia, Kentucky, and, reaching Green River at Tebb.'s Bend on the 4th of July, demjanded the surrender of Colonel 0. H. Moore, who was stationed there with a portion of his regimient-the 25.th Michigan. ColonellMoore returned the famous reply that the 4th of July was not a goo.d day to surrender, and was instaitly at- tacked. After a severe light Moore drove off his asasilants, anId saved the bridge over Green River ait that point. Morgan crossed below the bridge and passedl through Lebanon and Bardstown and on to Brandenburg on the Ohio River; there, seiz- ing a steamboat, he crossed into Indiana, aund dashed through that State into Ohio and was cap- tured near Salineville July 26th. [See map and article, Vol. III., p. 635.] This raid has become faunous for uutany reasons, but ouuu of the most nota- ble things pertaining to it was the pursuit and cap- tiore of the raider and his mien. The pursuit began at Burksville immediately upon Morgan's passage of 4'timberlanul River. The night of the passage four Kentucky cavalry regiments, the 1st, 8th, 9th, atnd 12th, under Generals J. M. Shackelford andrl E. H. Hobson, both Keuttuckians,, were concentrated at Marrow Bone, outly a few miles west of Burks- ville. Four noted Kentucky officers commanded these regiments, Frank Wolford, B. H. Bristow, R. T. Jacob, auIt E. W. Crittendeti. At Bardstown the pursuers were joinled by three Ohio regiments. A month later this same Federal cavalry and several other regiments were organized at Camp Nelson in Kentucky by Burnside for an expe- dition to east Tennessee. It was placed under command of Shackelford, who led it through Will- iamsburg and Big Creek Gap to Kingston. The in- fantry force under Burnside moved out at the same time and took possession of Knoxville. Shackel- ford's cavalry themi hastened to Cumberland Gap and captured the place, with 2504) melt under the ('onfederate General Fraser. They then made their way to the borders of Virginia. clearing the valley of Confederates, and returned to Knoxville, where Burnside was concentrating to resist the advance of Longstreet. For three weeks the cavalry was shut up in Knoxville with the infantry. After the siege it pursued Longstreet up the valley, fighting a hard battle at Bean's Station. Winter coming on, active movements ceased. The cavalry uuiuler Stanley cooperated with Rose- erans's infantry in the advance to Chattanooga. bearing its full share of the burdens at Chicka- mauga. After the battle of Missionary Ridge, No- vember 2.5th, 186:i, General W. L. Elliott WRa assigned to the command of the cavalry. Elliott dispatched Colonel Long's brigade to the relief of Knoxville, and during the months of [ ITrES'ANT' [EiIS.- x. K, DInll.T '. SA A FROM A 1`10T GRAtPi. November and December, among the varioussdashes made at this season was one by 'olonel Watkins, with 25.0 men, as far as Lafayette, Georgia. Also Colonel Long, with a small force, defeated 4ieaeral Wheeler at Calhoun, Tennessee. December 27th. During the winter the cavalry was principally at Athens, Tennessee. under General Elliott. On the 11th of February, 1,0i4, General Sooy Smith started from Memphis with a mounted fore,, of seven thousand men to codperate with Sherman in eastert Mississippi. The expedition proved a failure, and returned to Memphis. [See foot-note, p. 247, and article, p. 414.] In March and April, 1S64, Forrest ad-anced from Mississippi with a large force, ald passed through western Tennessee to Paducah, Kentucky. Returning, he reached Fort Pillow on the morning of April 12th, and captured the fort. [See l 418.] Forrest was pursued by General S. 14. Sturgis from Memphis. but turned upon him, and signally defeated him at Brice's Cross Roads oni the 10th of June, and pursued him back to Mem- phis. [See p. 420.] On the 14th of July Forrest was in turn defeated near Tupelo by A. J. Smith. Forrest remained in west Tennessee and northern Mississippi and northern Alabama, until he joined Hood in the Tennessee campaign. The cavalry which Sherman assembled at Chat- tanooga for the Atlanta campaign numbered about THE SOOY SMITH EXPEDITION. 15,000 in four divisions. [For organization, see pp. 280 and 289.] In the new organization General Stanley was assigned to duty with the infantry in the Army of the Cumberland. The details of the service of the cavalry in the At- lanta campaign cannot be given here. It partici- pated in all the movements and engagements from May to August, 1864. When the lines were drawn closely about Atlanta the cavalry became very active. Meanwhile Major-General L. H. Rousseau, who had been stationed at Nashville for the protection of Sherman's rear, and who had succeeded in pre- venting Wheeler from injuring the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, was ordered to execute a very important duty. On the IOth of July, 18;64, he started from Decatur, Alabama, with two bri- gades of cavalry, under Colonels T. J. Harrison, 8th Indiana, and William D. Hamilton, 9th Ohio. In nine days he had traveled 300 miles, and was 100 miles in rear of Johnston's army. He de- stroyed railroads and supplies, and safely joined Sherman in Georgia near Atlanta. On the 27th of July General MeCook moved down the right bank of the Chattahoochee to Can4. belltown, and crossing pushed boldly into the Macon road, damaging it, burning trains, and cap- turing four hundred prisoners. On his return be encountered the enemy in strong force, and was not only compelled to give up his prisoners, but lost many of his own men. On the same date General Stoneman moved from the other flank and destroyed the railroads leading from Macon to Augusta, but he, too, suf- fered greatly, Stoneman himself and part of his command being captured. Colonel Silas Adams of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry successfully fought his way back with the brigade he commanded. After the fall of Atlanta a portion of the cavalry, under General Kilpatrick, accompanied General Sherman on his march to the sea; the remainder was placed under General Thomas for the protec- tion of Tennessee against the expected movements of Hood, and went to Tuscumbia early in Novem- ber, 180f4, commanded by General Edward Hatch. During the Atlanta campaign Kentucky was pro- tected against guerrillas and raiders by General S. G. Burbridge. In May he started for Virginia with a large mounted force, and at the same time Morgan came into Kentucky through Pound Gap. This was Morgan's last raid. He was attacked at Cyn- thiana, Mount Sterling, and Augusta, Kentucky, by the Federal cavalry under Colonel John Mason Brown, Colonel Wickliffe Cooper, and others, and finally was driven into east Tennessee, where lie was killed, at Greenville, on the 4th of September. 1864. (See article by General Duke, p. 243.] In October, 1804, General Hood, having led his army from Georgia into northern Alabama, was or- ganizing for his expedition into Tennessee. At the same time Forrest was operating with his usual energy and activity. On the 30th of Octo- ber he suddenly appeared with a strong force on the Tennessee River, near Johusonville, where be captured a gun-boat, the 0,idine, and two trans- ports-an exploit which excited very general ad- miration. He then joined Hood near Decatur. At this time General John T. Croxton, with a bri- gade of Union cavalry, was watching along the north bank of the Tennessee, and on the 7th of November was joined by General Edward Hatch with a division. This body, numbering about three thousand men, kept a sharp lookout for indications of Hood's advance. On the 20th it became appar- ent that Hood was moving in the dsrection of Law- renceburg. Hatch skirmished with Forrest, and while the infantry under Schofield fell back fron, Pulaski to Columbia, Hatch also backed steadily until that point was reached. At Columnbia General J. H. Wilson, who had been transferred from the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac and assigned to the command of all the cavalry in General Thomas's department, came up and took personal charge. [See p. 466.] The fame of Forrest, Morgan, and Wheeler was accented by the widespread heralding of all their exploits. On the other hand the services of the Union cavalry, being far southward and beyond the reach of newspapers, excited less notice: but for boldness and effectiveness, devotion to duty, endurance, celerity of movement, and ac- complishment of results the Federal cavalry in the West made a proud record, and its history, when written in detail, will be full of thrilling interest. THE SOOY SMITH EXPEDITION (FEBRUARY, 18t14). BY GEORGE E. WARING, JR., COLONEL, 4TH MISSOURI CAVALRY, U. R. V., COMMANDING BRIGADE. It January, 1 S64, General Sherman arranged for an expedition from Vicksburg to Meridian with 20,000 infantry, under his own command, and a cooperating cavalry expedition, 7000 mounted men and 20 pieces of artillery, under the command of General W. Sooy Smith, chief-of- cavalry on General Grants staff. This cavalry force was ordered to start from Collierville, east of Memphis. on the 1Ist of February, and to join Sherman at Meridian as near the 1 th as possible, destroying public property and supplies and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, from Okolona south. [See map, p. 348.] Sherman's orders to Smith were, -'Attack any force of cavalry you may meet and follow them south. . . . Do not let the enemy draw you into minor affairs, but look solely to the greater object-to destroy his communications from Okolona to Meridian and then east toward Selma." Reference was made to previous verbal instructions covering all points. Sherman left Vicksburg with his force February 3d, reached Meridian on the 14th, remained there until the 20th, and in Canton until the 28th, hoping to receive word of Smith's whereabouts. None coming, he then returned to Vicksburg. Smith's command comprised three brigades of cavalry: First, Waring's; Second, Hepburn's; Third, MeCrillis's; and a battalion of the 4th 416 THE SOOY SMITH EXPEDITION. (regular) Cavalry, commanded by Captain Bowman. The main command was ready to start at the ap- pointed time. The First Brigade had left Union City, Tenn., January 22d, but was prevented from reaching Collierville until February 8th by the flooded condition of the difficult country, with its broad swamps and overflowing rivers. J Three days were occupied in arranging a pack-train, which might have been made ready in advance, and on the 11th the command continued its march. The heavy rains had made the country nearly impassable, and Okolona was not reached until the 18th. Here we entered the beautiful prairie region of eastern Mississippi. A finer country for cavalry is nowhere to be found. There was a little skirmishing, but no material opposition, until we reached West Point, thirty miles south of Okolona, on the afternoon of the 20th. Here we were confronted by Forrest's com- mand, in a position of considerable strength, pro- tected by swamps and rivers. Oni the morning of the 21st, without a.. engagement worthy of the name, we were ordered to return to Okolona. As we fully believed at that time, and as the publica- tion of General Forrest's report shows, we could have proceeded on our way, driving him before us; there was, however, much to be said in favor of drawing him out on to the prairie for an enigage- ment in the open country. But it soon became evident that we were not to "retire," but to "re- treat." Forrest had only his "escort and a portion of Faulkner's regiment." With this force he drove our seven thousand men without difficulty, the First and Third brigades receiving constant orders from Smith to hasten on and give the road to the Sec- ond Brigade for its retreat. It was an unwilling retreat, and but for its orders, the command could easily have held its position at any moment. We proceeded in this manner to the camp of the di- vision about three miles south of Okolona. At .5 A. m. on the 22d the First Brigade was or- dered to form line and prepare for a fight. It formed in the open country, with the enemy in sight, about a mile away across the prairie. Later we were ordered to take up our line of march on the road for Memphis. As we passed to the left of Okolona, one regiment, the 7th Indiana, was or- dered to fall out and support the 4th Regulars, which had been stationed at the edge of the town to watch the movements of the enemy. The Third Brigade had the rear of the column. Be- fore it had passed, the regulars and the 7th Indi- aria were engaged, and this brigade was ordered to the attack. It sonor broke in disgraceful flight andl confusion, abandoning five guns of its battery without firing a shot. Nothing can be said in ex- cuse of its behavior, but the explanation of it is not far to seek. It had taken part in the hurried retreat of the day before, and, having seen no lause for it, imagined itself in the toils of an over- J 4hhrrinan says that Smith. under Iris orders., was not justiffed in waiting for the First Brigade, as he had a suflc!ient farce without it.-G. E. W. In a letter to General Sheriniani. dated July 9th, 1875. General Smith says, referring to Waring's brigade, 1 I asked you if I shonid wait its arrival, and you answered, -Certainly; whelming enemy. It had lost all confidence in the commanding general, and its discipline dissolved. After entering the wooded country, the checking of the enemy's advance became easier. No at- tempt was made to stop him or to defeat him, only to hold him back by maintaining temporary lines, formed by the leading brigade, until the others could pass through. In this manner we re- treated nine miles between 11 A. m. arid 5 P. M. At 5 o'clock, without orders, portions of the First and Second brigades formed in order of bat- tle on open, gently sloping ground, determined to end the pursuit. Until this time Smith had been in advance. By design or by accident, he now came on the field. The feeling that had governed him for two days, and caused him to abandon such art opportunity as no antagonist of Forrest ever had before, was gone. In the actual presence of the first real personal danger that he had en- countered, he became brave and cool. The enemy was approaching rapidly and swarm- ing toward both our flanks. Our little battery was doing good service, and an attempt was made to deploy and fight on foot. It soon became obvious that this would be futile, and the 4th Missouri Cavalry was speedily mounted and formed for a charge. The charge was made ill good order, and with great moral effect, in spite of a high stake- and-rider fence, which made it impossible to reach the main body of the enemy. It, however, drove back his straggling advance aird sent them over the fence in such panic as to turn back the main line. The fence in their front, and the heavy firing at close range, broke the charging line, which turned and fled. It was rallied and formed by its own officers before its starting-point was reached, wheeling into line in good order, ready for a second charge. This stopped the pursuit, and we gradually got on to the road in marching order and went finally on our way. In his preliminary report, written that night, Forrest said the battle was ended by a cavalry charge of the enemy which was repulsed. In his final report, written March 5th, he says: "As we, aived up, the whole force 'W i-lared dowvl at a rallop, and I aiii prond to say that any me- rlid not disappoint me. Standing firr, they repulsed the gr-nd- est cavalry charge Iever witnessed. a The 2d and 7th Te-nriessee drove back the advann e line, nai as It wheeled in retreat poor-id ulpon thet, a destruitive fire. Each saucessIve line of the enemy shared the sanni- fate and fled the field In diray arid e-ifus1on, rusing another piece of artillery andi leaing It strewn with lead and wounded aren and hirr-es. . . Forrest estimates our loss in the a-hole e,,gage- ment, killed, wounded, and missing, at SO,4 with six pieces of artillery and 33 stand of colors, and says: " My force in the fight did not exceed 2500 men, while that of the enemy was 27 regi- ments of cavalry and infantry, estimated at 7000 strong." if yon go without it, you wilt be too weak. arid I w,:tnr you strong enough to go where you please.'- EDoInRS. It was not the "whole force" that charged. unIv the 4th Missouri Cavalry, less than 600 strong.- G. E. W. 4 The official list of the Uniton ls was: kill-il, 4 i wounded, 152; missing, 120,- total, 319.- EDITORS. 417 THE CAPTURE OF FORT PILLOW. The retreat to Memphis was a weary, disheart- ened, almost panic-stricken Hlight, in the greatest disorder and confusion, through a most difficult country. The First Brigade reached its camping- ground, outside the city, tive days after the en- I General Shermna in hi. report said: I inelose herewith uy instructions to General Smith, with a copy of his report, and meat say it I. untisfaetory. The de- lay in hi. start to the 11th of February, when hia orders contemplated his being at Meridian on the lotb, and when he knew I was marching from Vicksburg, is un- pardonable, and the mode and manner of his return to Memplpia was not what I expected from the intended bold cavalry uoveument. I ibs "Memoir," Sherman says Smith "1 has appealed to toe to relieve him of that eensure, but I could not do It, because it would fahiliy hittory."-G. E. W. In a letter to General Shermsan dated July 14th, 1875 (aee Sherman's Me-oirs," V'ol. I., Appendix, p. 455], General Smith says of the delay: ' In the eonversatlon that occurred between it at Nashville lafter the caum- paign enided], white all the orders, written and verbal, w-r- still fresh in your memory, you did not censume gagement, with the loss of all of its heart and spirit and of over 1500 fine cavalry horses. The expedition filled every man connected with it with burning shame. It gave Forrest the most glorious achievement of his career. me for waiting for Wartig, but for allowing myself to be encumbered with fugitive negroes to auch an extent that uty eommand was measurably unfit for active movement or easy handling, and for turning back from West Point, instead of pressing on toward Meridian. Invitations had beenindustriously circulated,by printed circulars and otherwise, to the negroea to come into our tines, and to seek our protetonti wherever they could find it, and I considered ourselves pledged to reecive and protect them." In a letter of July 9th, 1571 [Sher- man, Vol. l., Appendix, p. 453l, (;eneralf.ithsaay: "To have attempted to penetrate farther into the enemy's country, with the cavalry of Polk's army coming up to re-uforee Forrest, would have insured the destruction of my entire command, situated as it ws." The "Cavalry of Polk's Arty" refers to the command of General S. D. Lee whiehJitned Forreat within a day or two after Smith began hid retreat.- EVITo8s. THE CAPTURE OF FORT PILLOW (April 12th, 1864). \T AtoR LIONEL F. BOOTH, tWth United States -I- Heavy Artillery, who commanded Fort Pil- low April 12tb, IS 4, was killed in the battle of that (late of which there is ito circumstantial offi- eial 1'tion report. From the data attainable it appeairs that the garrison -onsisted of 557 soldiers (about half of them colored troops), atid that the killed, vounded, and captured numbered about 4t11. According to the C'onfederate reports the prisoners, ineluditig wounded, numbered 237. The percentage of killed was extraordintarily large. The news of this fight creaited iutlh exeitemeilt in the North atid led to ali investigation by the ('oi- mittee on the Conduct of the War, whieh reported that the ('onfederates entered the works shoutinig No quarter," atid that thety then began alt in- discritnitiate slaughter, sparing lneither age tior sex. white or black, soldier or eiviliat." (n June I 7th, 1 114 (in view of ' the Fort Pil- low Mas-sacre "), General ', C'. Washburu, tbeUniot comimtander of the District of West Tennessee. wrote to General S. D. Lee, then the t'otifederate commander of the Department of Ahibama, Misisis- sippi, and East Louisiana, asking for informatiots as to the ititention of the ('telifeilerates coneerning colored soldiers who might fall into their hands as prisoners of war, General Lee replied, June 28th, in part as follows: "The- ersion lof Fort PillowI giveii by yot and yotir tovernimilent is untrite. a-id not sstaine-d by the factato tbe extent that you indi-ate. The garrison was um- tuoned i, the usual ...iuaier. and its c-mmanding offcer a."uested the respousiblity of refusitig to surreder after having lbeen iufornu.d by Geeral Forrest of his alility to take the fort. nit oft his fears as to what the res-ult would be in ease tle demand was not complied with. The assault was made under a heavy 1ire and vith _oWiieralde Io to the attacking party. tour coiirs were nev er lowered, and your garrisoti tiever sur- retidered. liut retreated touder cov-r of a gmn-boat with .rums In their hand. and constantly using them This was trie particularly of your colored troops, who bad been tirmly convineed by your teachings of the cer- tainty of slaughter l case of capture. Even under these cir-umatanecs, uatty of your .en, white and black, were taken prisoners. I respectfully refer you to history for numerou. eases of intcrimitiate slaughter after suecesafil. a-ssatilt, evett utider le .. aggravated ireumistanees. It is getierally couceded by all mill- tary precedent that where the issue had leei fairly presented and the ability displayedl, fearful re.tlits are expected to fol1ow a refuIal ti i-trrctid'-r. " The ca-e under consideration is al.oost an, extri-me lne. You had a servile ra'e ittroeut againmt their ...as- ters, and in a c...utry which had beeti desolated by ailmlotit unprecedented outrage.. I as.ert that our offl- es, with aU the tircttul.t-ni' e agaInst them, en- deiavored to prevent th1 effusion of bIlol, and as an evidence of this I refer yott toI the fact that both white and colored prisoners re'r- t.aken, and are now in our The following are extracts from Forrest's report, dated April 26th, 1 804 [see also p. 107): . . . M y comumui ide cousfiatild of Mleen llo ch's brigade of Chalmers's divisioti anI B-ll's - rigarde of Buford's division, both pIa -'dI for the expetlitiou itnder the com- inand of BrigaidIer-tiijeral J o' s- R. Chtalers, who, by a forced mareb, drove in the e toy's pickets, gained Ip sess.ion of the outl r works, and by the titne I reached the field, at lo s. M., had forced the enemy to their maln fortifications, situated on the blutf or bank of the Missis- sippI River at the miotith of Coal Ci-ek. . . . Assuming eoii.tmand, I ordered General Cbalmers to advance his line a.nd gain position on the slole, where our men would be perfectly protected fron. the heavy fire of artillery and iusketry, as the neauyv -culd tin t depress their pieces so sa to rake the slopes, itor lolid they fire on them with small-arms except by mountimtg tite breastworks and exposing themselves to the fire of our sh1arp-slooters, who, under cover of atutmpl and logs, forced them to keep down itside the works. After several hours hard fighting the desired position was rgained, not, however, without censlderahle loss. Our maln line was now within an average distance of line hundred yards from the fort, and ectended from COaI Creek on the right to the bluff or batik if the Mississippi Rtier on the left. "During the etitire morning the gun-bhat I .Nete Era- gun-boat No. 7- Captain James Marsba1il kept up a coti- tinned fire iii all ilireetioup, but without effect, and be- lag confident of may ability t, take Ithel fort by assault, and desiring to prevent further loss of life, I sent, under flag of truce, a demand for the unconditional surrender of the garrison. . . . [Major Booth, In reply, asked 418 FORREST'S DEFEAT OF STURGIS AT BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS. 419 a.. hour for consultation with hi officers and Captain MarshalL] . . . The gun-boat had eased firing, but the smoke of three other boats ascending the river was iu view, the foremost apparently crowded with troops; tind believing the request for an hour was to gain time fur reiuforeenients to arrive, and that the desire to con- sult the ofieers of the gun-boat was a pretext by which they desired improperly to conumunicate with her, t at -nce sent this reply . . . [giving twenty minutes in which to surrender] . . . directing Captaiti [W. A.] tioodman, asistant adjutant-general of Brigadier-Geu- i-al Chalmers, who bore the flag, to remain until he received a reply or until the expiration of the tint, troposed. eIy disposItions had all been made, and my forces were in a position that would enable me to take the fort with less IO than to have withdrawn under fire, and it seemed [to] me so perfectly apparent to the garrison that such was the ease, that I deemed their captnuo without further bloodshed a certainty. After some little delay, scehig a message delivered to Captain (;oodman, I rode up mtysefl to where the notes were rcived and delivered. The answer was handed me, written in pen- ,1 on a slup of paper, without enveloti, and was, as well as I r-enieber, in these words: I Negotiations will nof attaiti the desired object. As the officers who we- in Iharge of tbe Federal flag of truce had expressed a dou.bt as to my presncle, and had pronounced the de- mand a trick, I handed them back the note, sayitg, I antl Gtleral Forrest; go back and say to Major Booth that I demand tin answer In piain, unmistakable Eng- itch: Will he tight or surrender ' Returning to my oirigiiatl position, before the expiration of twenty miii- tie I reei-ved a reply . . . [Major Booth repiied, We will not suirrender.' W- While these wegotiatitis were pending tu. steamers ftrot ta-lti were ratpidly ttpp-iriaching the- firt. The fitreitost was the 1irc Brarlte, whose position and oto)veiliteusindlicated her intenltilil to hlaud. A fewY bshts tired iutt her caused her [tw] leave the shore ant make fite the opposAte. One tither 1hunt 1ilsY d up on the far siA- of the river; the third ite tui-d back. The time hIa tig expired, I directed Brigadier-General Chalmlers tiliprtitare for the- asauilt . . Everythingbelg ready, the bugle sounded the charge, which was matte with ti vil. and the works carried withiout a perceptible halt in tity isirt of the lite. As our trsps inlounted and Ii reti 1ilto the fortiftlation, itt,- y retreated to- w-Irti the river, anis- In hand, anI tiring baek, atid their is filyiig; mitt ditilit expecting the gti-itoat to shell tIcI front the bluff and protect thexti until they could ie taken off ti rcttuforced. As they descended the bank itt, etll-idhitg and deadly fire sa.s la-ticed lotu them by tb trhiti tuttler Captaiut Atidirsoti Ot tbe leit, atdi B tc ttiut's u detitelimetit titi the right Utitil this fire wis opened upon thetim, at a distance varying from thirty tt tine hundred yarts, they were evideiitl- ignorant of any litree hblving gained their rear. The regiment who had t Ic strttaTEtts, Foattes'- civAt.a, Foar PiLiow, April 112, 1864. CA1-rAiN - IAssitAi..S tiommantliung 1.. Giun- bt sta: 3tvatieieetit. aptain Chi . Aes Antlerson, i1 tiiyalittt-,ri-.eiI ntoeiatlate wit, yro for thle tieiiveti. the watttietiz 'If the FeI-rai garlsaOI at this pitace-. ipon rour ..urt-,r atty itter United states vessci. itesleetfulb, N. B. FotiEaT, 3saJr-t;enera. stitrmed and etirrie I the fort also poured a destructive tire itto the rear of the retreating, anid itow phatie- stricken, and almost decimated, garrison. Fortit- nately for those of the enemy who survived this shnrt but deslerate struggle, some of our men cut the hal- yards. and the United States flag, floating from a tall mast in the center of the fort, came dowit. The forces statiotied in the rear of the fort could eee the flag, but were too far under the bluff to see the fort, and wheti the flag descended they ceased firing. But for this, so near were they to the enemy that few, if any, would have survived unhurt another volley. As it was, maty rushed into the river and were drowned, and the actual loss of lite will perhaps tiever be known, a there were quite a number tf refugee citizens 1ii the fort, nany of whom were drowned and several killed in the retreat from the fort. In less than twenty minutes from the time the bugles sounded the charge, firing had ceased, amid the work was done. One of the ltarrott guns was turned on the gun-boat. She steamed tff without reply- ing. She had, as I afterward understood, expended all her ammunition, and was therefore liowerless in afford- Ing the Federal garrison the aid and protection they doubtless expected of her when they retreated toward the river. D)etail vwere nade, eonsiting of the capitured Federals and utegroes, in charge of their own officers, to collect ttgether and bury the dead, which work eon- tinned until d.trk. I also directed Citttain Anderson to miro-ure a skiff and take with him, Captain [John T.] Young. a cal- tlured Fedlintil offcer, and deliver to Camitain Marshall, tf the gun-hoat, the i.essage. colty of whth is ap- petided 4 . . . All the boats and skiffs having I.-en tatken ofr by citizens eseapitig frItti the fort during the etigagetitent, the message ciuild not be delivered, aithitugh every effort was -uinde to indiue Captain Marshall to -end his boat ashore by raising a white.,aB, with which (alptitin Yotng walked up and down the river in vain signaling her to com- in or seud out a boat. She tilutaily uti.ved tiff ituid dialipeared around the bend abov.e the f trt General Clhaiter.s withdrew his ftrees fr-uni the fort before dahrk aitd enca.itied a few titiles east of it. On the morning itf the 13th I again dlisqltctiled Captaiin Anlerson to Fort Plilow for the purp.os .it ilacitg, If pttsiltle the Federal woutded tin tnoard thiir transprts, atnid report to Ic-e on his returmi the conditioi of affairs at the river b "We captureld six pieees of artller- viz., two to- ptunder Parrott gnus, two 12-piiitl-ler hoitzers, and twit brass e-poiinler g atis, mid about ite stand of small- ari.. The mlmure of the small-arms had bteer thrown. in the river. All the witail-arms were picked lp where the enemny fell or threw them down. A few were in, the fort, the -ilanee scattered from the top of the hill to the water's edge. We cittitired te4 Federals, 75 negro trtops, and abiouit 40 negro womeni and childrei, and after renoving everything of value its far as able to di. so the warehouses, tents, etc., were destroyed bty fire." Tue r-isrt t Cauttan Antlersttmisiiau s titat ou- site 13ti tie tielivereil ot - Iaru the 1i S. Sis t ttir stier Clati- (Ac- ing Master W. Fecritann three officers 43 white soitileec. ant 14 toinreti sohhiees, anti r-eeived an k -ikcnawetiment in writitig. Tue C,0sfterate lss, a ording tt ithe latest ttmnltilat m tn tilhe War Deltrtmtent, sits 14 kleti sail St; wotinthetiNEitrlus FORREST'S DEFEAT OF STURGIS AT BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS (June 10th, 1864). BY E. HUNN HANSON, ADJUTANT, 4TH MtSSOURI CAVALRY, t. S. V., A. D. C. WARING'S BRIGADE. T May, 1864, in order to protect his long luite -`of communication, General Sherman ordered an expedition from Memphis to defeat Forrest's cavalry, then in northern Mississippi, and thereby prevent its descent upon his line of advance. Ac- cordingly, or. the 1st of June, a small but well- organized force began its march from White's Station, itear Memphis. On the following day General Samuel D. Sturgis was placed i,. command. Some weeks earlier he had conimaniled an expedi- tion sent out from Memphis to intercept Forrest on his march southward after his captture of Fort Pillow and the massacre of its garrison, bitt had been unable to do so. On the 8th of June, before 42o FORRE.ST'S DEFEAT OF STURGIS AT BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS. the enemy had been met, Sturgim, although he had supplies sufficient for eleven days, desired to give up the expedition, but was dissuaded. The cavalry was commanded by General B. H. Grierson, and consisted of two brigades: Waring's, 1600 men, two rifled guns, and four small howitz- ers, and Winslow's, I 800 men and a light battery. There were three brigades of infantry, two white and one colored. Int ail, over five thousand men with two t-gun batteries. The whole, as a divi- sion, was commanded by Colonel W. L. McMillen. The expedition had a new and complete supply train with eighteen days' rations. Adding regi- mental wagons, there were in all 2.5t0, exclusive of ambulances andl medical wagons. June 5th the command reached Ripley, about eighty miles from its starting-point, and on the following night it encamped at Stubb's Farm, fourteen miles south from Ripley. At 5 o'clock on the morning of Julie 10th War- ing's brigade, in advance, moved southward in the direction of Briec's plantation, followed by Wins- low's brigade, the infantry, and the train, the latter guarded by the brigade of colored troops. The aivance found the fences down, as if for an engagement, and two small bridges over the road taken up. About half-past nine o'clock it reached Briec'. Cross-roads, about eleven miles from Stubb's Farm. [Sec map, p. 414.] The road on which the command was marching ran nearly north and south, and about a mile and a half north of the eross-roads it passed through a wooded bottom ind over a swampy piece of ground and took somewhat the character of a causeway, in length nearly three-quarters of a mile. After passing this, ald for about a third of a mile, the ground rose somewhat, so that at the cross-roads it was perha ps t wenty feet above the causeway. At Bricet' house a road crossed at right angles. Waring's brigade was halted at the cross-roads and a squadron sent forward on the direct road southward, and one each on the roads to the west and to the east; the latter led in the direction of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, distant about six miles, at whieh point was Guntown -a station ant small village. The last-mentioned squadron, after going about a mile, commenced to skirmish with a small mounted force, some of which dismounted sitd occupied a house by the roadside, and stopped the advancing squadron by their fire. From the southern end of the causeway to the cross-roads, and for about a third of a mile, the land had been cleared, at the cross-roads in each direction, and for nearly a mile there was standing timber and brush, to the east and south of which there were open fields. Waring's brigade was moved on the road to the east alnd deployed inline, dismounted, at the edge of the timber and on both sides of the road. The rifled guns and howitzers were placed in position on the road, along the fence of whieh, and in advance of the guns, a de- tachment of about one hundred men with revolv- ing rifles were placed as skirmishers. On the right of Waring's brigade, in line, dismounted, with its right somewhat refused, Winslow's brigade took position covering the road which ran from the cross- roads to the south. Soon after these lines were formed the enemy moved from the cover of a wood to the east ant south of the open fields, and a third of a mile away, in two lines of skirmishers, followed by a line of battle with some troops massed upon the left flank. The enemy's right rested near the roadl on which were the guts and the skirmishers of Waring's brigade, and the enemy's left was in front of the left atnd -enter of Wins- low's line. In other words, the line of the enemy was somewhat shorter than that of the cavalry in posi- tion. The enemy in view ditl not exceed '2500 men. They advanced until the right of their line eame tinder the rapid and flanking fire at short range of the skirmishers with revolving rifles, when it wavered antl halted, and with butt little disorder the entire force fell back to the wood. No effort was made to follow and turn the retreat into rout, and non.e to throw troops upon either fhank, the right tlank being vishimrable from War- ing's brigade amld the left front WVinmslow's. A skir- mish fire was kept up at long range, and a small force, less than three huidre,1, moved against the extreme left of Warimg's brigade, bult was easily repulsed. An officer who rode with the sqtuadroni semit east- ward on the (untolwn road huid remarked as it emerged front the timber, aitu about a mile to the northward, a road which seemed to lead to the right and rear of the enemy's position. This fact was brought to Colontel Waring's miotice, who di- rected that it be reported to Urierson. This wits done by the officer itl questioti atud half an hour later, and before noomn, to Grierson's adjutant-gu- eral. To neither didi it seem of moment, and nio action was taken with regard to it. While the engagement described was in progress General Grier'on semtt word of it to General Sturgis, who was with the infantry five miles north of the cross-roads, stopped by a very bad piece of wet and sunken road, amud by officer astd orderly again and again urged that the infantry be hurried forward. A ride of half an hour would have brought an aide or the general commanding himself on the field, and would have enabled him to judge if itwere expedient or otherwise to give battle where the cavalry was, or to select a position where the infantry was and direct the cavalry to fall back to that. This course was not taken, but, yielding to the representations and urgency of Grierson, Sturgis ordered the infass- try forward as fast as was practicable, and, riding in advance of them, arrived at the cross-roads less than half an hour before the head of the infantry column appeared. In the meantime, and about the time that General Sturgis arrived at the cross- roads, the enemy, ilisposed as before, again marched upon the cavalry; again their line wa- vered, hut by the exertion of their officers the mem moved forward with spirit and resolution. Whets near, and within from fifty to seventy-five paces of the edge of the wood, along which Waring's bri- gade was, the center of that command slowly gave way. As a result, the entire brigade fell back. This uncovered Winslow's left flank and caused his brigade also to fall back. A line was hastily formed about half-way between that first taken up and the A. J. SMITH'S DEFEAT OF FORREST AT TUPELO. cross-roads. With a knowledge of this it was even then possible to have halted the infantry on the -orth side of the canseway anid there to have formed line of battle. It is true the position was far from gi.'oil, but it was iicoomparably better than that taken. Abont 2 o'clock, or a little later, and after the cavalry hill retreated from its first position, the hexIld of the infaiitry cohlimn appeared at the eross-roals,, the Seconld Brigade in, advance. Thii duiy wats very siltry and hot; the men had for five ,iiiles beeni hurried forward. Sonic had failleti exhausted and all were ilistressed by the marlh. Il this condlition, and under a skirmish files fromt the suieessfiil enemly, the Second Brigade (If ilnfulltry, followed by the First, was placed on the cramoped line to which the cavalry had re- treated, amill the section of al liattery was unilim- lIered uiild sent into action on 1 the ground to the iortli iif the cross-roads. The cavalry, partly by ord-r al-d partly without, withdrew. Some of it was placed on the right flank of the infantry, and eich of it was held its a reserve on the field near where thie iattery was in action, but to the west- ward of the road. Each flanik of the infantry line was tiunprotected, andl first the right was seri...isly threateuned and then the left. With ttiese diifficulties, and those before mentioned, the infantry striuggled for nearly three hours. During this time the train hail come on the cause- way, preceded by the artillery and a number of aibiulances; so far as was possible some of these were parked (in the field near the cross-roads be- fiire metitioned as that to whieh the greater part of the cavalry had gone. About 5 o'clock the efforts of the enemy on the left of the line suc- ceeded, and it yielded to a flauking fire and re- treated the very short distance between it and the cross-roads; about the same time the right of the line was enveloped by the enemy's skirmishers, and their artillery got with precision the range of the cross-roads. At first sullenly, and then rapidly, the whole line fell back to the cross-roads, and M ith cavalry, ambulances, artillery, and wagons of the train began a disordered retreat along the cause- way. The enemy followed with eagerness, and uitter disorganization succeeded disorder as piece after piece of artillery became the spoil of the fast- pursuing enemy, some of which was turiled upon the huddled mass of fleeing men. Sturgis and MeMillen made strenuous efforts to form a line some two miles northwardl of the lost field with the colored brigade and a part of the troops that had lieen longer in action. This line stayed the pursuit for but a space and then be- caine a part of the retreating force. Through the hours of the late afternoon and all through the night the beaten men kept on their way, reaching Ripley, 24 miles from the field, by early morning of June 11th. 1)irig the retreat the enemyhadcaptured 14 pieces of artillery, the entire train of 250 wagons, with 10 days' rations and a large supply of ammunition, and over 1500 prisoners. At Ripley an attempt was made to form the com- mand gathered there into companies and regi- ments, but the enemy appeared on two sides and were checked only until the retreat could be re- sgumed. It continued via Collierville to Memphis. The bitter humiliation of this disaster rankles after a quarter of a century. Our loss in killed and wounded was 2:3 officers and 594 men. The captured or missing amounted to 52 officers and 1.571 men, making a total loss of 2244). The enemy may have numbered more than :1..00) or 4000, but it must be reluctantly confessed that not more than this number is be- lieved to have been in action. If there was, ihuring the war, another engagement like this, it is not known to the writer; and in its immediate re- sults there was no success among the many won by Forrest comparable to that of Guntown. A. J. SMITH'S DEFEAT OF FORREST AT TUPELO (July 14th, 1864). BY W. S. BURNs, CAPTAIN, 4TH xMsotSOR CAVALRY, r. S. V. ON the 9th of June, 18634, General A. J. Smith commanded by Colonel Edward Bouton-in all arrived at Memphis with his command from about 14,000 men with twenty guns. the "Red River Expedition." His men were On July 5th the command started on its march scarcely settled in camp when the vanguard of southward, pushing on day after day, with Forrest Sturgis's retreating army made its appearance, hoveringonourfrontandflanks. Onthellth,after having just been thoroughly defeated by Forrest at a sharp skirmish, we entered Pontotoc (Missis- Brice's Cross-roads. sippi), driving Forrest through and beyond the vil- General C. C. Washburn, then nominally in com- lage. Having now arrived within striking distance mand of the large Union department of which For- of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, early in tie morn- rest hadtherealcontrol(exceptingtheheadquarters ing of the 13th, we moved out of Pontotoc east- at Memphis), immediatelyordered General Smith to ward, as if to strike the railroad at Tupelo, 19 miles mke preparations for an expedition into " For- distant, thereby "flanking" Forrest, who, with his rest's country." army numbering about 12,000 men, was in a good Onl July 1st we had assembled at La Grange, fighting position 10 miles south awaiting Smith. fifty mniles east of Memphis. Our forees consisted of Forrest soon discovered this move, and started to the First and Third divisions of the right wing of intercept us before we could reach the railroad, the Sixteenth Army Corps. commandedrespectively which he didl six miles from Tupelo, attacking by General J. A. Mower and Colonel David Moore, Mower's division in the rear. He was soon re- with a division of cavalry, commanded by General pulsed. An hour later he made another attack B. H. Grierson, and a brigade of colored troops, upon the same division and met the same fate, 421 JOHN MORGAN IN ,864. Mower's men charging, anti eaptueiatg some pris- oners and a battle-flag. About dark we etemtompet at HIarrisburg. a small limnlet, one tuile from Tupelo. Smith wai now il potition to ompel alt atttack from Forrest. Next morning (I 4th), at a very early hour, Grier- son was setit to Tupelo with orlers to destroy tht railroad north and solith, while Stuith plaeett his troops for the imtpetnding battli. They occupied a knoll almost clear of trees for a utile - or tnore to the south, west, and north-west. hleyonttt which was a growth of titber. The roadl tver wlti(cl the troops hatt narchetl led to the ceitter of the r.-ition. Mower was stationed on the right or north of this (Pontotote) road, looking west, antn lMotre ont the left or soutt. Tiotitoti's colored brigade was on the extreme left. Abott i o'elock Forrest matte his attack, the brunt falling upon Moore's divisiott and the left wing of Mower's. The onset was made with For- rest's characteristic impetitosity, but it was im- possible for his men to reach ontr lines. Smith's command was in the opest. without any protection, excepting part of Moores tlivision, itt front of which was a " worm fenee," and beyond this a wide gully. Here the attacking force was rallietd. Four times they attacked, eaeh time without stitcese. Between the assatilts Forrest's artillery was very ttctive, one battery being handlet with great accuracy, throw- ing its shot and shell into the 21 st Mhissotiri, 5 Sth Illinois, and S9lth Indiana, until alt Illittois and an Indiana battery engaged their attentinit. These batteries so annoyed the enemy that Colonel W. W. Faulkner charged upon them for their capture but he was met bv an enfilading fire from the 119th Illinois, and a direct fire and a charge from the 21st Missouri. .-tSth Illinois, anid 510th Itidiana, the 122d Illinois charging to the right. Faulkner's line broke ani fled, leaving many of their wounded and dead upon the field, among them the leader, Colonel Fatalkner. For an hour and a half tht struggle continued, until the enemy were driven from the front of Moore. leaving the ground covered with their dead ant dying. Instead of retiring to the woods (where their horses were hell in reserve. for Forrest's army was always 1 mounted infantry ) they moved in what at first appeared a confused mass to their left, crossed to the north of the Pontotoc road, turned. and, in good line of battle, swept down upon Mower, whose men (under orders) re- served their fire until the enemy were quite near, when they opened upon them with musketry and eanister-shot. Human teings eould not stand suth a storm, attd the attacking line fell bat-k, bttt only to retttrtu to some seemingly e-poed- part of Mower's litit. For two hours atud a half tle battle raged ott this part of the fieltl, the entemy attacking and otr melt keepitig their positioits and repelling all atta-ks. At last Mowt-r onlerel lthi division t.. advattee, which they diil, capturing inatty prisolers atatl driviug the enmy itto tht- w.Iods, who-re thty monattet1 their horses anill mtved off. It was ts;e- le"s to puraue them fartbl-r. The afternoon was spt'lnt bringing itl and caring for the woundetl of both armies, and burying the tead of our own. Obar loss was about 6504, ,f which number S2 were killed. That of Forrest cotald only be estimated.\ Of his dleat alone thert were left on the field abottt :3O. Smith had deft-ated Fitrrest as he hatl never been defeated before. lint o-,r rations anti ammtt- nition were low, and (Griersm's tcavalry liavitig de- stroyed the railroad, Smith couldl, from a military point of view, do no more, so he tlecitled to rettrn to Memphis. About 11 o'clock itt the evettitig Forrest attaeked our extreme left, ineltilling Bouton's colore libri- gade, attd the 14th, 27th, atl :1.2(1 Iowa, and 24th Missouri, but it was rather a feeble attempt anti was soon repulsed. At an early tout next morn- iatg the enemy again maile their appearance, adl- vancing from the cover of the woods, but as they did not approach with muth energy Mower charged upon them, wheat they fled to their horses. In the meantime troops were seen advaneitig tlpon the scette of last night's attempt, where the coloretl brigade was still in position. Smith hurried to the spot, and for two hottrs there was artillery tiring. Forrest, under cover of his guns, then advanced, determined to have a parting blow at the coloretl troops. These, by command of General Smith, held their fire until he gave the word, after which he personally led them in a charge, which was made with spirit and in excellent order, the enemy breaking and fleeing in confusion. Believing that this was the last of the foe, Gen- eral Smith moved slowly northward five miles, and went into camp at Old Town Creek." The men were just settling themselves for the rest they needed when the sound of artillery was heard in our rear and a few shells fell and burst among them. Mower quickly repelled this attack, made by a few horsemen and one piece of artillery, and tto more was seen of them. We continued otar mareh, and by easy stages reached Memphis July 23d. !, Forrest's loss was oficially reported as 153 ktlled, 794 wounded, and 49 mi-ssing,- total, 996.- EDITORS. JOHN MORGAN IN 18ti4. BY BASIL W. Dt'KlE BRIGADIEB-O.NERAL, C. S. A. ESNERAL JOuN H. MORGAN escaped from the service during that winter, but in April was vir- G prison at Columbus. Ohi,. November ' 7th, tually placed in command of the Departmetit of l s4;3, and reached the Confederate lines early South-western Virginia, which embraced also a in December. He was taot ordered upon active portion of east Tetanessee. The forces at his (tGeneral. MIortan and Duke and sixty-eight other confne in the State teniten tinry at Columbus. On the officers of Morgat's cotauttad, cal-tured In Ohio, at utight of November 27th, Morgan amtd CaptaIns J. C. Ben- tte .lose of July, 1s6 Isee VoL IIL., p. 6341, were nett. L. D. Hockera-ltb, C. S. Magee. Ralph Sheldon, 422 JOHN MORGAN IN 1864. disposal for the defense of the department, excil- sivs ver the militia or " reserves " of that territory, numnbered about three thousand. Of these nearly onw thousand were men of his former division, who bad either bee-n left in Te-nessee when their t'otnrades set out upon the Ohio raid, or had es- eapedl capture in that expedition. Five or six Imnnridred of these troops were mounted, and were ,,rgrnizetd into two battalions, commanded re- spec tively by Captains (Casell and Kirkpatrick. SMorn' four hundred were dismounted and were tempri..arily employed as infantry. Two brigades of Kentucky cavalry, under H. L. Giltner ald George- B. (osby, of excellent material, although nutreic-ally deplhted by hard ald constant service, hard been stationed in that region for two years previously, and the thorough aequiaintanree of their officers and men with the country rendered them especially valuable. On the 8th of May intelligence eame of the simul- taneous advance of two strong Federal columns. General Averell, with a body of cavalry, threatened th- salt-works. and General Crook, with infantry and cavalry, was approaching Dhublin Depot, near New River Bridge. It was of vital importance to repulse both. The Confederacy ,,am largely de- pendent upon the works at Saltville for its salt supply, and the lead-works at Wytheville, not far distant, were nearly as valuable. If Crook should be successful be would he able to damage the railroad in that vieinity to much an extent that communication with Richmond might be perma- nently destroyed and the transmission of supplies from all that region prevented. It was necessary, therefore, at once to confront and cripple, if not completely defeat, both columns. General A. G. Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, detached from the Army of Northern Virginia, put himself in front of Crook, but was not strong enough to cope with him. Morgan hastened the four hundred dis- mounted men of his command to the assistance of General Jenkins. Colonel D. H. Smith, command- ing them, reached Dublin on the morning of the 10th and found General Jenkins there, hard pressed by the enemy, and that gallant officer severely wounded. Smith at once reported to Colonel John MeCausland, who had taken com- mand, and the timely reenforcement restored the battle, which had been sorely against the Confed- erates. Holding the enemy in check until sunset. the ('onfederates retreated to New River Bridge and encamped in a position to protect that struc- ture. [See map, p. 47. .] Iil the meantime General M1organ, with G iltnerls brigade and the two battalions of Cassell and Kirk- patrick, sought Averell. He was convinced on the lith, by the reports of his scouts. that Averell's first blow would not be delivered at Saltville, but S,-tl Taylor,,and Thonraas H. Hies escalwd fr.ui thieir ell.s, baring cut way through the cell-walls Into all air- Olmnlbr, and tunneled the oiuter foundation-walls of tih,' prison at the end of the chamber. The tools usedin cu1-tting away the masonry and the earth were two small knives. aind the work ,as ac. olllahcd in twenty days. of ti-e hours' latur' eaczh day. After leaving the prison the party separated. General Morgan and Captain Hiue touk the cars at Coliuhus for Cii ...ati. At that hie was striking at Wytheville. Pressing rap- idlyon past Saltville he fell on Averell's track and followed it to the junction of the roads leading respectively to Crab Orchard and Wythevilbl. Averell had taken the road to Crab Orchard, and doubtless wished and expected to be closely pur- .sued by that route. In that event, by a judicious employment of a part of his command, hie ould have held his opponent at bay in that very rugged eountry long enough to hla-e thrown a detachment into Wytheville (which was garrisoned only by a small provost guard), and could have destroyed the military stores there and the neighboring lead- mines, besides rendering the railroad tieless for many weeks. Mrgan, believing this to re his skillful adve-rsary's plan, marched dlirectly to Wytheville ty the shotter road through Burke's Garden, arriving there on the afternoon of the I I th. Colonel George B. Crittenden, taking omn- mand of a small detachment of W. E. Jones's eav- alry brigade, which had reached Wytheville the day before, was instructed to Oscupy a small pass or gap in the mountain, through which alone the enemy's approach to the town, from the road on which he was marching, was practicable. Critten- .len was attacked soon after he reached the posi- tion assigned him, but Morgan marching to his assistance with all of the troops, Averell fell back to a commanding ridge, about eight hundred yards from the gap. He was immediately attacked and. after a sharp combat, dislodged. The fighting con- tinued, however, until after nightfall, in a sueees- sion of attacks on the one side and retreats on the other. At length Averell withdrew from the field. which be had very gallantly and obstinately con- tested. Morgan lost in killed and wounded fifty or sixty. Averell's loss was somewhat more. be- sides nearly one hundred prisoners. Notwithstanding these successes, the depart- ment was by no means out of danger: for neither (rook nor Averell was materially weakened. and both continued to menace it. It soon became apparent that when supported by a movement already in progress from Kentucky they would return to the attack with greater determination. Burbridge and Hobson were reported en route for south-western Virginia. with all of the Federal forces in Kentucky available for active service. G.eneral Morgan had no hope of successfullv re- sisting a combined onset of these various forces: but he was confident that lie could avert the in- vasion of his own territory by himself assuming the offensive. His plan ianr be best explained in his own worris. On the :1 st of May. after com- mencing his march, he wrote General Samuel Cooper (Adjutant-General): "While Gtrmerrl Buckner was in c o....ani-d if this departurient he intsrteted me to strike a iriew at the cflacnkoti they rossest into Kento ky, :trmd, ta':sine soutl-want thrin glr -ew- tastle .a.d ltardst"'vn, reachell the Curitwrla-rd. near Binrkes-il-e. Nit DeceaOier Oth. Soon afterwanl they cell itn with a detachment ifr Mr- gnu's nren that had riot taken part ilt the ONtio raid, and oln the l3th ctruslsr the Tetrtt ensec near KiUgsturrr.tAfteir several ad erritires with scoutiurg parti s i)f L'niou cavalry. in one if which Cartain ttines was retaken. Morgan reached the Confederate ueus.-EtDrroaa. 423 JOHN MORGAN IN 1864. enemy in Kentucky. As I was on the eve of executing this order, the rapid muovenieat of the enemy fron the Kanawba valley. in the dltrirettio of the Tennessee and Virginia RatirIad, made it necessary that I should re- imanin to eiperate with the other torces for the defens of this section. . . . I have just received tinfrmatloi that General Hob-on left Momnt Sterling on the A3d islt. with six regimlentsof cavalry (about 3000 strong, for Lo.isa, on the Sandy. This force he has collected from all the garrisous In iimiddle and soutbh-astern Kentocky. At Louisa there is another force of about 2teo cavalry, under a colonel of a Michigan regiment recently sent to that vicinity. It is the reported design of General toHeosn to unite with this latter force and -oirelate with Generals AeeIt and Crook In another niovement upon the salt-works and lead-mines of south- western Virginia. This information bhs determined me to love at oene into Kentuecy, and thns distract the plans of the eneiy by tinittatluga tovemetnt within his liies. My force will be about looe men." Mlorganl accordingly entered Kentucky with Uiltner's brigade, the mounted men of the old Morgan division, and 800 dismounted men from the various cavalry commands stationed in the department. It was impossible to carry artillery over the roads by which he expected to march. The column reached Pound Gap on the 2d of June, dislodged a small Federal garrison occupy- ijg it, and pushed through. More than 1350 miles of the most rugged regions of the Kentucky mountains were then traversed in seven days. The dismounted men, whose numbers were constantly augmented as horses broke down from fatigue anti lack of forage, kept pace with their comrades in the saddle. Giltner's brigade lost more than 200 horses. On the 7th of June detachments were sent forward to destroy the bridges on the Louisville and Lexington and Kentucky Central railroads, to prevent troops from being sent from Indiana and Ohio to the defense of central Ken- tucky. Night fell on the 8th while the column was still struggling in the gloomy and difficult wilderness through which wound the rebel trace "; but on the morning of the 9th they had reached the confines of the beautiful blue-grass country, and were not far from Mount Sterling. That day the town was attacked and captured, and 380 prisoners were taken. Leaving Giltner to destroy the captured stores and property, and pro- vide for mounting the foot-men, Morgan promptly moved upon Lexington with the greater part of the mounted troops. That night the first disaster of the expedition befell him, and it was visited on the brave men who had made the long and painful march on foot. The Federal movement from Kentucky was made as Morgan had anticipated. Burbridge, with the Fifth Division of the Twenty-tbird Corps, had proceeded some distance east of Louisa when Morgan passed through Pound Gap. The respec- tive columns were distant from eaeh other, but it was impossible to eonceal all evidence of the Con- federate advance, and Colonel John Mason Brown, commanding the Second Brigade of the Fifth Federal l)ivision, became convinced of its -har- acter and urged Burbridge to return, and, if pos- sible, intercept Morgan at Mount Sterling. His advice was taken and the Federal troops coun- termarehed with extraordinary celerity. They reached Mount Sterling at midnight of the 9th, and at :3 P. Y. of the 10th attacked the camp of the dismounted men, whieh was very inefficietitly picketed. Colonel Brown's brigade, supported by HansoiY's, rode over the picket detail and into the encampment. A desperate fight at close quarters ensued. Giltner was not near enough to render prompt assistance, and Colonel B. M. Martin, com- manding the body assaulted, with great difficulty extricated it and effected a junetion with Giltner after three or four hours of combat. Martin's loss was 14 officers and between two and three hundred men; he was twice wounded. The Federal loss was about two hundred. OnX the same morning, the 10th, General Morgan captured Lexington, and found in the Government stables there a sufficient number of horses to mount the survivors of the dismounted brigade, who, with G(iltner's brigade, rejoined him that night. He immediately marched on Cyn- thiana, taking that place, after a brisk skirmish with the garrison, ott the 1 ith. That afternoon, General Hobson, coming to the relief of the town, approached with 1500 cavalry. He was imme- diately attacked in front by Giltner, while Mor- gan, assailing him in the rear with Cassell's battalion, compelled his surrender. On the 12th Morgan was attacked at Cynthiana by lturbridge at the head of 5200 men. Morgan's effective strength was now reduced, by losses in battle and details to guard prisoners and destroy railroad traek and bridges, to less than 1300, and his ammunition was nearly exhausted. After some hours of hard fighting lie was defeated and forced to retreat, with a loss of fully one half of his remaining command in killed, wounded, and prisoners. He destroyed all of his captured stores and paroled the prisoners be had taken, and marching instantly back to Virginia, via Flemings- burg and West Liberty, and thence through the mountains, reached Abingdon, Va., June 20th. Disastrous as this raid was, in some respects, it accomplished its purpose, and delayed the appre- hended incursion into south-western Virginia for several months, and until measures were eon- certed to frustrate it. From this period until the date of his death, September 4th, 1864, General Morgan was engaged in no military operation of consequence. He was killed at Greenville while advancing to attack Gillem at Bull's Gap in Tennessee, with the intention, if successful, of marching into middle Tennessee. He was succeeded in the command of the department by General John C. Breckinridge. . General S. G. Burbridge reported ofik-aIlly that the losses in his command during these operations amounted to as killed, 156 wounded, and s05 captured or missing =414.- EItTos. 424 THE INVASION OF TEN'NESSEE.) BY J. B. HOOD, GENERAL, C. S. A. UNLESS the army could be heavily reenforced, there was but one plan to be adopted [after withdrawing from Atlanta. See p. 3143]: by manceuvres, to draw Sherman batk into the moun- tains, then beat him in battle, and at least regain ou. r lost territory. Therefore, after anxious reflee- tion and -ontstultatioct with the corps commanders, I determined to communicate with the President, and ascertain whether or not reeduforeements could be obtained from any quarter. The reply fromt His Excellency conveyed cio hop, of assistance: "BC D. SeptemIber 5th, 186. The neccsity for retuforeeucects was, realized, 011 e-ve-ry effort made to bring forward reserve, militla, and detailed sllen for the purpose. .. . No other resource re-ains. It is now requisite that absentees be brought larek, the addition required from the surrouceding eoun- try ic procptly sliade avallable, and that the means in hieiid IAH e1 ed with energy proisrtloteate tie the country's need.. JEFFzRB o DAVIS." I thereupon decided to operate at the earliest mo- meait possible in the rear of Sherman, as I became more and more convinced of o01r inability success- fully to resist an advance of the Federal army. I recalled General Wheeler from Tennessee to join immediately the left of the army, whilst Colonel Presstman, of the engineer corps, made ready to move with the pontoon-traici and a suffi- cient number of boats to meet ally emergency. Upon the morning of the 18th the army began to move in the direction of the West Point Rail- road, which the advance reached on the 1.9th. Upon the 20th, line of battle was formed, with the right east of the railroad, and the left resting near the river, with army headquarters at Palmetto. On the 28th I issued instructions to commence the movement across the Chattahoochee at Pump- kin Town and Phillips's Ferry, and on the follow- ing morning I directed that our supplies from Newnan 'cross the river at Moore's Ferry. At noon I rode over the pontoon-bridge in advance of the infantry, and that night established my head- quarters at Pray's Church, along with General W. H. Jackson, commanding the cavalry. The morning of the 1st of October Brigadier- General Jackson advanced with the cavalry, send- ing a detachment at the same time to operate against the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Marietta. That night the army went into bivouac eight miles north of Pray's Church, after having effected an undisturbed and safe passage of the Chattahoochee. Information was here re- ceived that Kilpatrick's cavalry was north of the river, and that GJarrard's cavalry had moved in the direction of Rome. The night of the 2d the army rested near Flint Hill Church. Ott the morning of the 3d Lieutenant- General Stewart was instructed to move with his corps and take possession of Big Shanty; to send, if practicable, a detachment for the same purpose to Aekworth, and to destroy as great a portion of the railroad in the vicinity as possible; also to seni a division to Allatoona to capture that place, if, in the judgment of the commanding officer, the achievement was feasible. The main body of tihe army in the meantime moved forward acid biv- omuacked lear Carley's house, withil fouir miles of Lost Mountaize. On the 4th General Stewart captured, after a slight resistance, about 170 prisoners at Big Shanty, and at 9:30) A. x. the garrison at A-k- worth, numbering 250 mele, surreindered to Gen- eral boring. The fo)rces under these offieer-.s joiied the main body near Lost Mountain on the morning of the 5th, having, il addition, destroyed about ten or fifteenl miles of the railroad. I had received information that the enemy had in store at Allatoona large supplies which were guarded by two or three regiments. As one of the objects of the campaign was to deprive the enemy of provisions, Major-General French was ordered to move with his division, capture the garrison, if practicable, and gain possession of the supplies. Aceordieigly, on the 5th, at 10 A.M., aftera refosal to surrender, lie ataeked the Federal forces at Allatoona, and succeeded ill capturing a portion of the works; at that juncture he received intelli- gence that largereCinforcemeelts were advancing in support of the enemy, and fearing lie would he cut off from the main body of the army, he retired and abandoned the attempt. Our soldiers fought with great courage; during the engagement Brigadier- General Young, a brave and efficient officer, was wounded and captured by the enemy. General Corse won my admiration by his gallant resistance, and not without reason the Federal commacnder complimented this officer, through a general oreler, for his handsome conduct in the defense of Alls- toona. [See pp. 322, 323, and 324.] Our presence upon his communications com- pelled Sherman to leave Atlanta in haste and cross the Chattahoochee on the 3d and 4th of October with, according to our estimate at that time, about 65,000 infantry and artillery and two divisions of cavalry. He left one corps to guard the city and the railway bridge across the river, and tele- graphed to Grant he would attack me if I struck his road south of the Etowah. On the 6th my army reached Dallas; our right rested at New Hope Church, where intelligence was received that the enemy was advancing from Lost Mountain. From Dallas we marched to Coosaville, ten miles south-west of Rome, via Van Wert, Cedartown, and Cave Spring. At the latter place Major-General Wheeler, with a portion of his command, joined me from Tennessee. We arrived at Coosaville on the 10th. In a dispatch to General [Richard] Taylor, Octo- ber 7th, I requested that Forrest be ordered to operate at once in Tennessee: -Yourdispatch of the sth received. This army beaing in motion, it is of vital enspotance that Forrest should ) Taken by perision (and eondensed( from General Hoodl work. " Adv ance and Retreat," publisbed by General G. T. Beauregard for the Hood Orphan Memorial Fund: New Orleans. 1890. VOL. IV, 28 425 THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. move without delay, and operate on the enemy's rail- rwaul. It hw caninot break the Chat tanlooga andst Nashville Rnltsit d:l he tan -ocupy th-inr Vores there and pre nt damn ge Ibeing repaired on til-o ather road. tMe should Ile no stils in moving. 0,n the I Ith the army erossed the Coosa River, marched ill the direction of lHesaea anid Dalton, and bivouacked that night fourte-en miles above tCoosaville atud tell miles north-west of Rome. That samed day Major-General Arnold Elt-y, chief- of-artillery, was direeted to move to Jacksonville with the reserve artillery and nil surplus wagons, and General Jacksono was ittatrutetid toi retard the enenly as much as possible, in the event of his advance from Home. Having thus relieved the army of all ineum- bace-, and made ready for battle, we marched rapidly to Resnea, alid thence to l)alton, via Sugar Vaillev Post-Office. Lientenant-General Lee moved upon Resaea, with instrtuetions to display his forces anid demand the surrender of the garrison, but not to attack unless, in his judgment, the capture could be effected with small loss of life. He decided not to assault the Federal works, and commenced at once t'he destruction of the rail- road. On the 13th I demanded tife surrender of Dal- toll. which, in the first instance, was refused, but was finally acceded to at 4 P. K. The garrison consisted of about one thousand men. As the road between Hesaca and Tunnel Hill had been effectually destroved, the army was put in motion the next morning in the direction of Gadsden, and eamped that night near Villanow. From Villanow the army passed through the gaps in the mountains, and halted on the 15th at Cross Roads, in a beautiful valley about nine miles south of Lafayette. At this time I received intelligence that on the 1 :th Sherman had reaehed Snake Creek Gap, where the right of his line had rested itt the early spring of this year; also that lie was marching in our pur- suit, whilst General Wheeler was endeavoring to retard his advance as much as possible. I here de- termined to advance no farther toward the Tennes- see River, but to select a position and deliver battle, since Sherman. at all earlier date than anticipated, had moved as far north as I had hoped to allure him: moreover, I was again ill the vicinity of the Alabama line. with the Blue 'Mountain Railroad in my rear, and I thought I hIad discovered that im- provemenet in the morale of the troops which would justify me in delivering battle. In accord- ance with information received from our cavalry, Sherman had. however. mnade nlo further divwision of his forces after leaving Atlanta. I there- fore estimated his strength to be about t65,000 effectives. Upon the eve of action I considered it impor- tant to ascertain by personal inquiry and through the aid of officers of my staff.-not alone from corps commanders, but from officers of less rank,- whether or not my impressions after the capture of Dalton were correct, and Iconld rely upon the troops entering into battle at least lmbnpeful of victory. I took measures to obtain likewise the views of Lieutenant-General S. 1). Lee-, who at this juncture was with his corps in rear, ait or near Ship's Gap. He agreed with all the officers onsulted; the opinlion was nattiunonts that althougilh the army had much improved itt spirit, it wvas not ill eondi- tion to risk battle ngainst the numbers reported by General Wheeler. The renouncement of the object for whieh I had so earnestly striven brought with it genttine dis- appointment; I had expected that a forward move- ment of one hundred miles woild re-inspirit the officers and men in a degree to impart to them confidence, enthusiasm, anid lhope of victory, if not strong faith ill its achievement. I remained two days at ('ros Roads in serious thought and perplexity. I couidt not offer battle while the officers were unatoitions ilt their opposi- tion. Neither could I take an intrenched posi- tion with likelihood of advantageotus results, since Sherman could do the same, repair the railroatd, amass a large army, place Thomas in my front in command of the forces he afterward assembled at Nashville, alid then, himself, move southward ; or, as previously suggested, he could send Thomas into Alabama, whilst he marched through Georgia, and left me to follow in his rear. This last move- ment upon our part would be construed by the troops into a retreat, and could but result in disaster. In this dilemma I cotuceived the plan of marching into Tennessee with the hope to establish our line eventually in Kentucky, and determined to make the campaign which followed, unless withheld by General Beauregard Z, or the authorities at Richmond. I decided to make provision for twenty days' supply of rations in the haversacks and wagons; to order a heavy reserve of artillery to aceompany the army, in order to overcome any serious opposition by the Federal gun-boats; to cross the Tennessee at or near Guntersville, and again destroy Sherman's communications at Stevenson and Bridgeport; to move upon Thomas and Schofield, and to attempt to rout and capture their army before it could reach Nashville. I intended then to march upon that city, where I would supply the army and re- enforce it, if possible, by accessions from Tennes- see. I was imbued with the belief that I could accomplish this feat, afterward march north-east, pass the Cumberland River at some crossing where the gun-boats, if too formidable at other points, were unable to interfere, then move into Ken- tucky, and take position with our left at or near Richmond, and our right extending toward Hazel Green, with Pound and Stony gaps in the Cunn- berland Mountains at our rear. In this position I could threaten Cincinnati, and recruit the army from Kentucky and Tennessee; the former State was reported, at this juncture, to be more aroused and embittered against the Fed- erals than at any other period of the war. While Zs On the 25th of kkptember General Beauregard bad previona operations in drtense of Petersburg are de- bhen placed in control of the operations In the depart- scribed by General Beauregard later in this work.- mentas commanded by Generals Hood sad Taylor. His EDrIoRs. 42fb THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. Sherman was debating between the alternatives of following oar army or marehing through Georgia, I 1lrupedl, by rapid movement., to aehieve these If Shermann shlould eit loose arid move south- As I then believedl he would do after I left his front irilhoaf pr(eio v.Sti iorstiasfiy hln in aittic -I would occ apy at itielhrondl, Kentucky, a position of sri- perior itdlarutage, as Sherman, upon his arrival at the sena-coast, would he foureed to go on hoard ship, Anid, after a long dl6totir by water and land, repair to the defense of Kentucky and 0hio or march di- rect to the support of (irait. If he should return to -onfront rily forces, or follow me directly from li1e orgia into Tennressee Aind Kerrtrrcky, I hoped then to be in conditiurr to offer battle ; and, if hilsseud with victory, to sernld rednforcemernts to tierierail Lee, itl Virgintia, or to marr'h throurgih the gal" in the (Crrnberlanld Mountains and attack tirarut in rear. This lutter course I wouldl pursue ill the event of defeat or of inability to offer battle to Sherman. If, on the other hand, ie shouli march to join Grant, I corlnd prrss through the Crrmberland gaps to Petersburg, and attack Grant in rear at least two weeks before be, Sherman, corrld render him assistance. This move, I believed, would de- feat Grant, and allow General Lee, in command of ourr combined armies, to march upon Washington or turn upon and annihilate Sherman. Srtch is the plan which during the 15th and 1 (th, as we lay in bivouac near Lafayette, I maturely considered, and determined to carry out. On the 1 7th the army resumed its line of march, and that night camped three miles from the forks of the Alpine, Gaylesville, and Srummerville roads; thence it proceeded towards Gadsden. I proposed to move directly on to Guntersville and to take into Tennessee about one-half of Wheeler's cav- alry (leaving the remainder to look afterSherman) and to have a depot of supplies atTuseumbia in the event that I should meet with defeat in Tennessee. Shortly after my arrival at Gadsden, General Beauregard reached the same point; I at once un- folded to him my plan, and requested that he confer apart with the corps commanders, Lieutenant-Gen- erals Lee and Stewart and Major-General Cheat- ham. If after calm deliberation he deemed it expedient we should remain upon the Alabama line and attack Sherman, or take position, intrench, and finally follow on his rear when he should move south, I would of course acquiesce, albeit with reluctance. If, contrariwise, he should agree to my proposed plan to cross into Tennessee, I would move immediately to Guntersville, thence to Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Nashville. This important question at issue was discussed during the greater part of one night, with maps before us. General Beauregard at length took the ground that, if I should engage in the projected campaign, it would be necessary to leave in Georgia all the cavalry at present with the army. in order to watch and harass Sherman in ease he should move south, and to instruct Forrest to join me as soon as I shouldl cross the Tennessee River. To this propo- sition I aeceded. After he had held a separate conference with the corps commanders, we again debated several horrs over the corirse of Action to be pnirsued; and, during the interview, I discov- ered that fie had gone to work in earnest to ascer- tain, in person, the true condition of the army; that he haud sought information riot only from the corps commanders, but from a number of officers, and had reached tihe same conclusion I had formed at Lafayette: that we were rot competent to offer pitched battle to Sherman, nor could we follow him sorth without causing otir retrograde moverureurt to be corrstrnred by the troops into a rccsrrerce of retreat, which worrld entail deser- tions and render the army of little or no irse ir its opposition to the enemy's march throrrgh Georgia. After two days' deliberation General Beauregard authorized me, on the evening of the 21st of (Oeto- her, to proceed to the execution of my plan of operations into Tennessee. General Bearrregard's approval of a forward movement into Tennessee was sonor made known to the army. The prospect of again entering that State created great en- thusiasm, and from the different encampments arose at intervals that genuine Confederate shout so familiar to every Southern soldier, and which then betokened an improved state of feeling among the troops. With twenty days' rations in the haversacks and wagons, we marched, on the 22d of Octoher, upon all the roads leading from Gadsden in the direc- tion of Guntersville, on the Tennessee River, and bivouacked that night in the vicinity of Bennetts- ville. I here received information that General For- rest was near Jackson, Tennessee, and could not reach the middle portion of this State, as the river was too high. It would, therefore, be impossible for him to join me if I crossed at Guntersville; as it was regarded as essential that the whole of Wheeler's cavalry should remain in Georgia, I de- cided to deflect westward, effect a junction with Forrest, and then cross the river at Florence. General Beauregard sent orders to him to join me without delay, and also dispatched a messenger to hasten forward supplies to Tuwcumbia. The saeuceeding day the movement was eontin- ued toward Florence, in lieu of Guntersville as I had expected. Lieutenant-General Lee's corps reached the Tennessee, near Florence. on the 30)th; [Edward] Johnson's division crossed the river and took possession of that town. -My head- quarters were during the 27th and 28th at the house of General Garth, near Decatur, where Gen- eral Beauregard also stopped. While the army turned Decatur. I ordered a slight demonstration to be made against the town till our forces pias-ed safely beyond, when I moved toward Tuscrimbia, at which place I arrived on the 31st of Octolber. Johnson's division, which held possession of Flor- ence, was reenforeed the same day by Clayton's division. ThustheConfederate armyrested upon the banks of the Tennessee one month after its departure from Palmetto. It had been almost continuously in motion during the interim; by rapid moves and manrvuvres, and with only a small loss, it had drawn Sherman as far north as he stood in the 427 THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. early spring. The killed and wounded at Allatoona had been replaced by absentees who returned to ranks, and, as usual in such operations, the num- her of desertions became of no consequence. Notwithstanding my request as early as the 9th of October that the railroad to Decatur be repaired, nothing had been done on the 1st of November toward the accomplishment of this important object. 1 had expected upon my arrival at Tus- cumbia to find additional supplies, and to cross the river at once. Unfortunately, I was constrained to tAJ('R-GENERAL " ILLIA Mt It. 11AT'., C. S. A. F11t131 A PIIOTIWItAPHI. await repairs upon the railroad before a sufficient amount of supplies could be received to sustain the army till it was able to reach middle Tennessee. General Beauregard remained two weeks at Tus- eumbia and in its vicinity, during which interval the inaugurated campaign was diseussed anew at great length. General Sherman was still in the neighborhood of Rome, and the question arose as to whether we should take trains and return to Georgia to oppose his movements south, or en- deavor to execute the projected operations into Tennessee and Kentucky. I adhered to the convic- tion I had held at Lafayette and Gadsden, and a second time desired General Beauregard to consult the corps commanders, together with other offleers, in regard to the effect a return to Georgia would produce upon the army. I also urged the consid- eration that Thomas would immediately overrun Alabama, if we marched to confront Sherman. I had fixedly determined, unless withheld by Bean- I" CsHuwosn, November 7tb. 18". - Via Meridian. GE"NlRAL J. B. HOOD: No troops can have been sent by Grant or Sheridan to Nashville. The latter bas at- tempted to reftforee the former, but Early's movements prevented it. That fact will asure you as to their con- dition and purpose. The policy of taking advantage of the reported division of his l[bermau'.l fores, where he cannot reunite his rmny, is too obvious to have been overlooked by you. I therefore take it for granted that regard or the authorities at Richmond, to proceed, as soon as supplies were received, to the execution of the plan submitted at Gadsden. At this juncture I was advised of the President's opposition to the campaign into Tennessee previous to a defeat of Sherman in battle. 4 The President was evidently under the impression that the army should have been equal to battle by the time it had reached the Alabama line, and was averse to my going intoTennessee. He was not, as were General Beauregard and myself, acquainted with its true condition. Therefore, a high regard for his views notwithstanding, I continued firm in the belief that the only means to checkmate Sherman, and colp- erate with General Lee to save the Confederacy, lay in speedy success in Tennessee and Kentucky, and in my ability finally to attack Grant in rear with my entire force. Although every possible effort was made to expedite the repairs upon the railroad, the work progressed slowly. Heavy rains in that section also interfered with the completion of the road. On the 13th I established my headquarters in Florence, upon the north branch of the Tennessee, and the following day General Forrest, with his command, reported for duty. On the 15th the re- mainder of Lee's corps crossed the river and bivouacked in advance also of Florence. Stewart's and Cheatham's corps were instructed to cross. About the time all necessary preparations verged to a completion, and I anticipated to move for- ward once more, heavy rains again delayed our supplies. Working parties were at once detailed and sent to different points on the railroad; wagons were also dispatched to aid in the trans- portation of supplies. The officer in charge was instructed to require the men to labor unceasingly for the accomplishment of this important object. In the meantime information had reached me that Sherman was advancing south, from Atlanta. He marched out of that fated city on the 16th. Thus were two opposing armies destined to move in opposite directions, each hoping to achieve glorious results. I well knew the delay at Tuscumbia would ac- crue to the advantage of Sherman, as he would thereby be allowed time to repair his railroad, and at least start to the rear all surplus material. I believed, however, that I could still get between Thomas's forces and Nashville, and rout them; furthermore, effect such manceuvres as to insure to our troops an easy victory. These convictions counterbalanced my regret that Sherman was per- mitted to traverse Georgia unopposed. General Beauregard had moved in the direction of Georgia to assemble all available forces to oppose Sherman's advance. you have not been able to avail yourself of that advan- tage during his march northward from Atlanta. Hope the opportunity will be offered before be ts extensively recrultd,. It you keep his communications destroyed, he will most probably seek to concentrate for an attack on you. But if. as reported to you, be haa sent a large part of bis force southward, you may frst beat him in detail, and, subsequently, without serious obstruction or danger to the country In your rear, advance to the Ohio River. pound;K"ER5oN DAv1s" 428 THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. On the 19th the cavalry was ordered to move forward. The succeeding dayLee's corps marched to the front about ten miles on the Chisholm road, between the Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro' roads. On the 20th of November, Stewart's corps having crossed the Tennessee and bivouacked sev- eral miles beyond on the Lawrenceburg road, orders were issued that the entire army move at an early hour the next morning. Lee's and Stewart's corps marched upon the Chisholm and the Lawrenceburg roads, and Cheatham's upon the Waynesboro' road. Early dawn of the 21st found the army in mo- tion. I hoped by a rapid march to get in rear of Schofield's forces, then at Pulaski, before they were able to reach Duck River. That night head- quarters were established at Rawhide, twelve miles north of Florence, on the Waynesboro' road. The march was resumed on the 22d and con- tinued till the 27th, upon which date the troops, having taken advantage of every available road, reached Columbia, via Mount Pleasant. Forrest operated in our front against the enemy's cavalry, which he easily drove from one position to another. The Federals at Pulaski became alarmed, and, by forced marches, reached Columbia, upon Duck River, in time to prevent our troops from cutting them off. Colonel Presstman and his assistants laid the pontoons [over Duck River] during the night of the 28th, about three miles above Columbia; orders to move at dawn the following day having been issued to the two corps and the division above mentioned, I rode with my staff to Cheatham's right, passed over the bridge soon after daybreak, and moved forward at the head of Granbury's Texas brigade, of Cleburne's division, with instruc- tions that the remaining eorps and divisions follow, and at the same time keep well closed up during the march. General Forrest had crossed, the evening previ- ous, and moved to the front and right. I threw forward a few skirmishers who advanced at as rapid a pace as troops could possibly proceed. During the march the Federal cavalry appeared on the hills to our left; not a moment, however was lost on that account, as the army was march- ilg by the right flank and was prepared to face at any instant in their direction. No attention, there- fore, was paid to the enemy, save to throw out a few sharp-shooters in his front. Thus I led the main body of the army to within about two miles and in full view of the pike from C'oluimbia to Spring Hill and Franklin. I here halted about 3 P. M., and requested General Cheathato, commatding the leading corps, and b In the " Suthiern Bivouac " for April. 1NS, General (Chebthammm. In an article dated Noveiber-30th. 1881, says, In remly to the above paragraph: ti loeroll Johnu e. Brown states that 'at or near near (r eek thle, romoinamid g general. apprehenilin a,, attack on "lir left tIatik, ord ered your (titathatos) corps in its marci from that tsoi,,t to move in two parallel -oliiommma, so that it ro lltl rome in.taetlylnto actioi I,, two lwi-ex of tattle.' e..- eraxl ltri nwo's.itivlsionniarrlwit ls ve nm-xlixn.illshen ogruyl iello 5,1, W'sstsD amial over roulgh em-ontl'x aomie roar liiiantts 3-arts to the riglt of the road. -ere--arily ca-isl- a more or less delay. General Nrown further states that about the com- Major-General Cleburne to advance to the spot where, sitting upon my horse, I had in sight the enemy's wagons and men passing at double-quick along the Franklin pike. As these officers ap- proached, I spoke to Cheatham in the following words, which I quote almost verbatim, as they have remained indelibly engraved upon my mem- ory ever since that fatal day: "General, do you see the enemy there, retreating rapidly to escape ust" He answered in the affirmative. "' Go," I continued, " with your corps, take possession of and hold that pike at or near Spring Hill. Accept whatever comes, and turn all those wagons over to our side of the house." Then, addressing Cle- burne, I said, "General, you have heard the orders just given. You have one of my best divi- sions. Go with General Cheatham, assist him in every way you can, and do as he directs."1 Again, as a parting injunction to them, I added, " Go and do this at once. Stewart is itear at hand, and I will have him double-quick. his mett to the front."k They immediately sent staff-officers to hurry the men forward, and moved off with teir troops at a quick pace in the dlirection of the ettemy. I sent several of my staff with orders to Stewart andl Johnson to make all possible haste. Mfeantime r rode to tote side and looked on at Cleburne'sdivi- sion, followed by the remaindler of Cheatham's corps, as it marched by, seemingly ready for battle. Within about one-half hourefrom the time Cheat- ham left me skirmnishing began with the enemy, when I rode forward to a point ttearer the pike, atid again setit a staff-officer to Stewart and Johnson to push forward. At the same time I dispatched a - 1 -ee of th e ., o m m n g g te a In s'-. . th e w h ole o t eliot' a. ,t siso it ,, e ,af, S tr- h i'. hega dl, v e l, t i f,,r1,irk.t dloy.'- RED TIM S. ",-1At the hour named. 3P. M.. there -a. no meve.'ntit of ' wagons and amen' In the vicinity of Spring Hill. Moreover, from the crossing at Duck River to the tpoint referred to by Oeueral Hood. the ti,rmpike asnever In view, nor -omld It 1e seeti untilt h laut moved mit, to with- In thrt-e-uarters of.a.mle of spring Hilli. Only a mirage ERAL CHEATHAM, pn the -' Divo A." 429 ( rq" ,0,0 (wl 4; I /' 4 At 4 p R, . a'... , -. r4'T sr rr b ni.W.r .-rt 1.- IV \d - I r, \ + ,,w,,, V, -\.R0 t /Rgc.y Cr i - "t S-r C l rp St3.Ctt r K) I / / SC 1t0r ,5 .1 t r " _, 1,"IB g MAP OF TE BATLE-FIELD OF FRNKLIN, TENNESSEE. FROM THE " BIVOUAC " FOR JUNE, 1885. 430 I I i QZ1 .r S ( t E =f THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. messenger to General Cheatham to lose no time in gaining possession of the pike at Spring Hill. It was reported back that he was about to do so. Listening attentively to the fire of the skir- mishers in that direction I discovered there was no continued roar of musketry, and being aware of the quick approach of darkness, about 4 o'clock at that season of the year, I became somewhat uneasy, and again ordered an officer to go to Gen- eral (Cheatham, inform him that his supports were very near at hand; that he must attack at once, if he had not already so done, and take and hold pos- session of the pike. Shortly afterward I intrusted another officer with the same message, and, if my memory is not treacherous, finally requested the governor of Tennessee, Isham G. Harris, to hasten forward and impress upon Cheatham the impor- tance of action without delay. I knew no large force of the enemy couldl be at Spring Hill, as couriers reported Schofield's main body still in front of Lee, at Columbia, up to a late hour in the day. I thought it probable that Cheatham had taken possession of Spring Hill without encounter- ing material opposition, or had formed line across the pike, north of the town, and intrenched with- out coming in serious contact with the enemy, which would account for the little musketry heard in his direction. However, to ascertain the truth, I sent an officer to ask Cheatham if he held the pike, and to inform him of the arrival of Stewart, whose corps I intended to throw on his left, in order to assail the Federals in flank that evening or the next morning, as they approached and formed to attack Cheatham. At this juncture the last messenger returned with the report that the road had not been taken possession of. General Stewart was then ordered to proceed to the right of Cheatham and place his corps across the pike north of Spring Hill. By this hour, however, twilight was upon us, when General Cheatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to halt, and, turning to Cheatham, I exclaimed with deep emotion, as I felt the golden opportunity fast slipping from me, " General, why in the name of God have you not attacked the enemy and taken possession of that pike !" He replied that the line looked a little too long for him, and that Stewart should first form on his right. J I could hardly believe it possible that this brave old soldier, who had given proof of such courage and ability upon so many hard-fought fields, would even make sueh a report. After lead- ing him within full i'ew of the enemy, and pointing - General Hood conveniently forgot to mention, in his aemounit of this htir, the faets as to his orders to mne at Rutherford's Creek. tSee p. 4i5.] And he also for- got that. at the very moment he claims to have sent tnif,-omeers to the rear with orders to Stewart and Jlhnson to make all poa-ible haste, stewart was forming line of battle on the south side of Rutherford' Creek. in pulrsuance of orders from him; nor did be remember that Stewart's corps was not ordered forward until about dusk."- GExNRAL CHEATIHAM, in the " BIVOUAC." ) - Here, again, General Hood's memory proved treacherous. A.s to the preliminary statements of this iaragraph, I refer to that po.rtton of my account [see p. 4381 which covers the doings of the hours from 4 to 6 P. K., during most of which time General Hood was on out to him the Federals retreating in great haste and confusion along the pike, and then giving explicit orders to attack, I would as soon have ex- pected midday to turn into darkness as for him to have disobeyed my orders. I then asked Gen- eral Cheatham whether or not Stewart's corps, if formed on the right, would extend across the pike. He answered in the affirmative. Gruides were at once furnished to point out Cheatham', right to General Stewart, who was ordered to form thereon, with his right extending across the pike. Dark- ntess, however, which was increased by large shade- trees in that vicinity, soon closed upon us, and Stewart's corps, after much annoyance, went into bivouac for the night, near, but not across, the pike, at about 1 l or 12 o'clock. It was reported to me about this hour that the enemy was marching along the road, almost under the light of the camp-fires of the main body of the army. I sent anew to General Cheatham to know if at least a line of skirmishers could not be ad- vanced, in order to throw the Federals in confu- sion, to delay their rharch, and allow us a chance to attack in the morning. Nothing was done. The Federals, with immense wagon-trains, were per- mitted to march by us the remainder of the night, within gunshot of our lines. I could not succeed in arousing the troops to action, when one good division would have sufficed to do the work. One good division, I reassert, could have routed that por- tion of the enemy which was at Spring Hill; could have taken possession of and formed line across the road; and thus could have made it an easy matter to Stewart's corps, Johnson's division, and Lee's two divisions, fromColumbia, tohave enveloped, routed, and captured Schofield's army that afternoon and the ensuing day. General Forrest gallantly op- posed the enemy farther down to our right to the full extent of his power; beyond this effort noth- ing whatever was done, although never was a grander opportunity offered to utterly rout and de- stroy the Federal army. Had I dreamed for one moment that Cheatham would have failed to give battle, or at least to take position across the pike and force the enemy to assault him, I would my- self have ridden to the front and led the troops into action. Z, In connection with this grave misfortune, I must here record an act of candor and nobility upon the part of General Cheatham, which proves him to be equally generous-hearted and brave. I was, neces- sarily, much pained by the disappointment suf- fered, anol, a few days later, telegraphed to Rich- the ground and in frequent personal comrlnurlcation with me. The dramatic scene with which he embellrshes his narrative of the day's operations only occurre-d in the imagination of General Hood."-GENERAL CIIEAT- HAM, In the " BIVOUAC." " isThe next order, in the lhape of a suggestion that I bad better have my pickets lre mupur str'0guziinu troopi passing along the pike ill front of rlly left, was received and was immediately communicated to Gen- eral Johnson, whosc division was on my left and near- est the pike. This note from Major Mason. received .bout mIdnight. was the only communicatin I had fro. General Hood after leaving him at his quarters at Captain Thompson's."-GENERAL CHEATiAM, in the - BIVOUAC." 431 THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. iond, to withdraw my previous recommendation for his promotion, and to request that another be assigned to the command of his corps. Before the receiptr o a reply, this offcver called at my head- quarters -then at the residence of Mr. Overton, six miles from Nashville-and, standing in my presence, spoke an honest avowal of hit error, in the acknowledgment that he felt we had lost a brilliant opportunity at Spring Hill to deal the enemy a crushing blow. and that be was greatly to blame. I telegraphed and wrote to the War 1)epartment to withdraw my application for his removal, in the belief that, inspired with an ambi- tion to retrieve his shortcoming, he would prove in the future doubly zealous in the service of his country. The following are thw dispathees above referred to: "EADQUUAQR2aRS six mites from Nashville, on FPranklin Pike, Ieemerber 7,1864. Ho . J. A. S IDwlth: I withdraw my recommendation in favor of the promotion of Major-General Cheatham, for reasons which I win write ore fully. "J. B. HOOD, Genea- " 1EADQUAirKre. di miles frome Nahillie, on Franklin Pike. December 8. 184. HoJ. .. A.PD otma .Secretary ofWr; GESEGALG. T. BEAUassGAotD, Macon G.n.: A good ieutentant-general should be sent here at once to eom-man the corps now commanded by Masjr-G.eneral Cheathan. I have no one to recommend t or the position. -J. HB. HOOD General.- UEADQUAURTR1, six miles fromt Nashville, on Franklin Pike. December 8,1864. How. J. A. S"wuo: Major-General Cheatham made a failure on the 30th of November which will be a lesson to him. I think it beat he should ruemu in hi. position for the present. I withdraw my ielegrams of yesterday and to-day on this subject. J. BB.HOOoD, Gelettea On the I 1 th of December I wrote the Hon. Mr. Seddon: .. . ' Mmjor-(leucrni Cheath an har-ukly onfess the gtreat error of which he was guilty, tool attaches 4 "In order to make clear what I have to say in this onnectlon I will quote Governor Isham G. harris: " itVERsXtSR J.AX.8 II. P-TFlt. - Da.. SIH . . u-e ,-eral ItI-sIm t he marI lm tI FraikIllft. s,.ke ti , time. in timeI lire te of M aj or - ii t .-' oto ue t A. P. I Mason [(AssisStant Amtjutammltionerai. Ar uimy of Ti-mmmmm-asel. of thl e Xtl are mt tienet-al th ,-tti1ab to t-akse tii- dg iglit attack at Slri i g lu ll. stl e emisre ], hi u i ii tv-r,-- t r ms f or Ihi itbt e i- e -Wee, rer-r. aOis after this, tiring sotoe with aJor Iaso- , t imel alt e rtri-mmarlle -ttl tat - t ie neralt ttieathlamn aas sot tntbia nie .ibim t ti -e i matter last ilsli t. I miut nt s-ott lid n ti me tinier- I s ki-t if i .e lhitd ......i.....rjti-l t.e fa rt tot.e tiera l itte mm. He a ums -t thliat lie 1i-tl i.t. I el lt-it t hat it is iur ;ru- eral titeItt ma.ii that thii ttiahtiatiil ittotitl tie ma tle. h There - mimiuml t a lite Mt. msmim J mmim,- ml tel m,-ra i itisa t mmi iiz g-ave k i nt ti me intorio i sti-i. A fier narl ant t ra t IIsat -a id t i si lust le hail Itmie itijitauhee tim t ietir si titestima m- .n al . emi. ie- te d nie t o i torum hi nt that lie imeii b h itt, blm mele sa for time Isilri- at s:WiKim lHill. -md itim time lay fll hit i time batt le of Framiki m I w as laft ti-it tIy Cien-e l itim.m1 tl, t te lia h ad M re-d at miit' to (ie u erai Chliatimam- a- 1im mit mg him. timat lie dii tit e m- misi him.with the faitne- tintt-ik. . - eer r i-a ti -tfiiiie. isti i fxt:. hIA mtsts. '-'" "Y'-yIS TE-AMFF. 5ta In.A18. . Xlrmimtmn.wTC 31.yi.a20. 1177.1 -The first intimaition masie to niw, from any source, that my .et...lit-t at spring 1l1l. moml the 29th of Noveumber. 1S. ,r mdurhig the night of that day, w.a the subject of critiism, was. the r-eiipt oft a note from- T e.ernl Hood. written and receiv-ed on the nioruting mi the 3d mt De- cember. This Is the eommttie-tiomu referred to in the letter of Govermor Harris. aimimve qttotm'd. This title wvas read. so far it I botiw, by only four persous besides myself- my chief-of-staff, James D. Porter, Governor much blame to himself, While his error lost so much to the country, It abe been a severe te-sot to him, by which he will profit in the future .In ID tnaideration of this, and of his previous conduut, I think that It t. best that hee shonld retain for thbe tbreseot tie command he now holda."4 The best move in my career as a soldier I was thus destined to behold come to naught. The tdiscovery that the army, after a forward march of one hundred and eighty miles, was still, seem- ingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to expe- rience grave concern, In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil, It seemed to me I had ex- hausted every means itt the power of one man to remove this stumbling-block to the Army of Ten- nessee, On the morning of the 30th of Novem- ber, Lee was on the march up the Franklin pike, when the main body of the army, at Spring Hill, awoke to find the Federals had disappeared. I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to reach his stronghold at Nashville, to make that same afternoon another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive him into the Big Harpeth River at Franklin, since I could no longer hope to get between him and Nashville, by reason of the ahort distance from Franklir to that city, and the advantage which the Federals enjoyed in the possession of the direct road. At early dawn the troops were put in motion in the ditection of Franklin, marching as rapidly as possible to overtake the enemy before he crossed the Big Harpeth, eighteen miles from Spring Hill, Lieutenant-General Lee had crossed Duck River after dark the night previous, and, in order to reach Franklin, was obliged to march a distance of thirty miles. The head of his column arrived at Spring Hill at 9 A. m. on the 30th, atid, after a short rest, followed in the wake of the mait botly. Isham (.. Gnrris, MaiJr J. F. CuInminig, of Georgia, amid Juihtt C. Burbh. Not havimig been In thi- habit of carry- tug a et'rtificate of military etmraeter I attacbd nt slmet'imi value to the ltnIer, and it wa s lo st sotutewh ere dturing the camlpaign, in North Ctirolina. Governor Por- ter and Ma.jor Cuti..niug agree with tue that the follow- ing was the substance of the note: -i Deeeut-Ir 3di, 18f4. "'. Y D.A . (OaX rItAm: I iti- unt _en amre y _u ftim time fatiu re at Slicin g Hill. I a ma stWtIMIe ym., a.i- mmit te atin -imlu e tr, it. w it-sse mi time tite mmiti mia imner 1i w hiil t yW Itmitriiv te-e m ba t- tle a t F rankito mmmi the 130 th ult. I m w it. mmav imsler e atitmmate f y.,i aa.as otlier- thln I ever-iahd. t !a- erly ynmnn- ft -e m-is tmi i. Itittes v-er trily. J. B . II mO0i. Uteneral. "-'T.O mFXmat. B. F. Ci...r.iAn: t t)n the torrtlng of the 4th of Decetmber I went to tbe mendquarters of Gtieral Hmslod. ant, referring to hli note and the criticism of ummy cond-tet that had evidently been made by simne .e. I said to hin: ' A great otuportituity was lost at Ppring Hil llimt yon knomw that I obeyed your mirders there, as eerywhere,. literally -id promptly.' ienetal Hoot not tolty did not diaisemit frout whmmt I sid, but exhibited the nmot -ordfil mianumer, emiupled with eonfidenc e and frh-ndship. The snbject was Imever agui alludedl to by General Hois to ,iyself. nor, io far as I know. to atny one. When lie writte, under date of De- cemuber 11th. ig6t. to Mr. 14eddo.t, that Major-General C(theatham has frankly i-nfeesed the great error of hbieh he was gitilty. and att mltes mth blaumme to him- self," he moade a tatemnent for which there wa tot the slightest foundation."- GwiERAL CZlIATHAM, in the " BIVoUAc." 4;2 THE INVASiON OF TENNESSEE. Stewart's corps was first in order of march; Cheatham fol - lowed immediately, and Lieu- tenant-General Lee in rear. Within about three miles of Franklin, the enemy was dis- covered on the ridge over which passestheturnpike. A.soonas the Confederate troops began to deploy, and skirmishers were thrown forward, the Federals withdrew slowly to the environs of the town. It was about 3 P. Mv . when Lieutenant -General Stewart moved to the right of the pike and began to establish his posi- tion in front of the enemy. Ma- jor-Genieral Cheatham's corps, as it arrived in turn, filed off to the left of the road, and was also disposed in line of battle. The artillery was instructed to take no part in the engagement, on account of the danger to which women and children in the vil- lage would be exposed. h Gen- eral Forrest was ordered to post cavalry on both flanks, and, if the assault proved successful, to complete the ruin of the enemy by capturing those who attempted to escape in the direction of Nashville. Lee's corps, as it arrived, was held issAforactioL in reserve, owing to the lateness t f of the hour and my inability, coaseqently, to post it on the extreme left. Schofield's position was rendered favorable for defense by open ground in front, and temporary intrenchments which the Fedcrals bad had tiue to throw up, notwith- standing the Confederate forces had marched in pursuit with all possible speed. At one or two points, along a short space, a slight ahatis had been hastily constructed, by felling some small locust saplings in the vicinity. Soon after Cheatham's corps was massed on the left, Major-General Cleburne came to me where I was seated on my horse iii rear of the line, and asked permission to form lils division in two, or, if I remember correctly, three lines for the assault. I at once granted his request, stating that I de- sired the Federals to be driven into the river in their immediate rear, and directing him to advise me as soon as lie hal completed the new disposi- tion of his troops. Shortly afterward Cheatham and Stewart reported all in readiness for action, and received orders to drive the enemy from his position into the river at all hazards. About that time Cleburne returned, and, expressing himself with an enthusiasm which he had never before be- trayed in our intercourse, said, "General, I am ready, and have more hope in the final success of 1..AT11C IL LEBUlRNF._ a. -,. A., KILLEAD AT F 1AsKLLN, )VENLItLiR 30, 1864. F11O0I A PIOVT WRAIPllil. our cause than I have had at any time since the first gun was fired." I replied, "God grant it!" He turned and moved at once toward the head of his division; a few moments thereafter he was lost to my sight in the tumult of battle. These last words, spoken to me by this brave and distin- gutished soldier, I have often recalled; they can never leave my memory, as within forty minutes after he had uttered them he lay lifeless upon or near the breastworks of the foe. The two corps advanced in battle array at about 4 P. m1., and soon swept away the first line of the Federals, who were driven back upon the main lihe. At this moment resounded a concentrated roar of musketry which recalled to me some of the deadliest struggles in Virginia, and which now proclaimed that the possession of Nashville uwas once more dependent upon the fortunes of war. The conflict continued to rage with intense fitry; otur troops succeeded in breaking the main lint at one or more points, capturing and turning some of the guns on their opponents. Just at this critical moment of the battle, a brigade of the enemy, reported to have been Stan- ley's,N gallantly charged, and restored the Federal line, capturing at the same tine about one thou- sand of our troops within the intrenclineuuts. Still I Genera J. D. Cox has i..lnted nut that the reports '\ Opdycke's brigade of Stanley's Fourth Corp, and cunflrna hi own observation that Hood's artillery was the secujud line of ROcilly's brigade of Cox's Twenty- used in the hattlet-EntroaIs. third Corps.-EnITOaS. 433 1-1THE BA1L -FII I.D ( (j N \SAHIVIL.I Dec. 15 -I6th. 1864. ,lj O EC.I W..O b WM- F 1I" l- GERELDi LE ht l .'fi ' 2aO-rlai EXPLANATIONS, __- V- /,,,XJ4verLgt - I -fXCIMw."2 - -.lr, I ef Afire5. t (I I S- 'e ofM il . 4.:A t - . I\,f r. 1-, r e ( Is. t.t.Ja,1,A t i 3 P. g"vlt. 1 .4 t r 4 rrzirw 4 . Af.,lc. -.MA f 4,k3 434 THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE OVERTON'5 HOtUSE , HODS HlEADUARTERS AT NASHVILLE. FROMS A PHOTOGRAPI TAKEN IN 1. the ground was obstinately contested, and at several points upon the immediate sides of the breastworks the combatants endeavored to use the musket upon one another, by inverting and raising it perpendicularly, in order to fire ; neither antagonist, at this juncture, was able to retreat without almost a certainty of death. It was re- ported that soldiers were even dragged from one side of the breastworks to the other by men reach- ing over hurriedly and seizing their enemy by the hair or the collar. Just before dark Edward Johnson's division of Lee's corps moved gallantly to the support of Cheat- ham; although it made a desperate charge and succeeded in capturing three stand of colors, it did not effect a permanent breach in the line of the enemy. Unfortunately, the two remaining divisions could not become engaged owing to the obscurity of night. The struggle continued with more or less violence until 9 P. s., when skirmish- ing and much desultory firing followed until about 3 A. M1. the ensuing morning. The enemy then withdrew, leaving his dead and wounded upon the field. Thus terminated one of the fiercest con- flicts of the war. Nightfall, which closed in upon us so soon after the beginning of the battle, prevented the forma- tion and participation of Lee's entire corps on the extreme left. This, it may safely be asserted, saved Schofield's army from destruction. I might, with equal assurance, assert that had Lieutenant-Gen- eral Lee been in advance at Spring Hill the pre- vious afternoon Schofield's army never would have passed that point. As shown by Colonel Mason's officIal report, made on the 10th of December, ten days after the battle, our effec- tive strength was: Infantry, 18,.42; artillery, 2405; cav- aIry, 230,- total, 23,053. This last number, subtracted from 30o 00, the strength of the army at Florence, shows a total los ftrm all causes of 7547, from the 0th of No- veneber to the 10th of December, which period includes the engagements at Columbia, Franklin, and of Forrest's cavalry. The enemy's estimate of our losses, as Mwell as of the number of Confederate colors captured, is errone- Major-General Cleburne had been distinguished for his admirable conduct upon many fields, and his loss at this moment was irreparable. e nwas a man of equally quick perception and strong character, and was, especially in one respect, in advance of many of ourpeople. He possessed theboldness and the wisdom earnestly toadvocate, at an early period of the war, the freedom of the negro and the enroll- ment of the young and able-bodied men of that race. This stroke of policy and additional source of strength to our armies would, in my opinion, have given us our independence. After the failure of my cherished plan to crush Schofield's army before it reached its strongly fortified position around Nashville, I remained with an effective force of only 23,053. I was therefore well aware of our inability to attack the Federals in their new stronghold with any hope of success, although Schofield's troops had abandoned the field at Franklin, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession, and had hastened with considerable alarm into theirfortifications-which latter information, in regard to their condition after the battle, I obtained through spies. I knew equally well that in the absence of the prestige of complete victory I could not venture with my small force to cross the Cumberland River into Kentucky, without first receiving reenforeements from the Trans-Mississippi Department. I felt convinced that the Tennesseans and Kentuckians would not join our forces, since we had failed in the first instance to defeat the Federal army and capture Nashville. The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transference of ons, as will be seen by my telegram of Decemtner 15th to the Secretary of War: "The ene-y calniy t that we lust thirty c-lors in the fight at Franklin. Wse lt tharteen, -apturing nearly the name number. Thle men who hocr- noes were killedl on or M ithi,,l thle ca-my's interior line of workoA." J. B. H. General J. D. C.u states in his - Franklin and Na.h- ville" that the capture of 22 rotors by Reilly and 10 by Opdyeke was officlally reported and verified at the time.-Eolvoas. 435 THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. troops to the Army of Tennessee from Texas, and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage across the Mississippi River. Thus, unless strengthened by these long-looked- for rednforcements, the only remaining chance of success in the campaign, at this jueture, was to take position, intrench about Nashville, and await Thomas's attack, which, if handsomely re- pulsed, might afford us an opportunity to follow up our advantage on the spot, and enter the city on the heels of the enemy. I could not afford to turn southward, unless for the spedal purpose of forming a junction with the MAJOtRI-GENAL .. JI STEOMASN. F ROM A \ cTTOO expected regnforeements from Texas, and with the avowed intention to march back again upon Nashville. In truth, our army was in that colmdi- tion which rendered it more judicious the men should face a decisive issue rather than retreat- in other words, rather than renounce the honor of their cause, without having made a last and ma,,- ful effort to lift up the sinking fortunes of the Confederacy. I therefore determined to move upon Nashville, to intrenclh, to aecept the chances of reenforce- ments from Texas. and, even at the risk of an attack in the meantime by overwhelming numbers, to adopt the only feasible means of defeating the enemy with my own reduced numbers, viz., to await his attack, and, if favored by success, to follow him into his works. I was apprised of each accession to Thomas's army, but was still unwill- ing to abandon the ground as long as I saw a shadow of probability of assistance from the Trans- Mississippi Department, or of victory in battle; and, as I have just remarked, the troops would, I believed, return better satisfied even after defeat if, in grasping at the last straw, they felt that a brave and vigorous effort had been made to save the eountry from disaster. Such, at the time, was my opinion, which I have since had no reason to alter. In accordance with these convictions I ordered the army to move forward on the 1st of Decem- ber in the direction of Nashville; Lee's corps marched in advance, followed by Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and the troops bivouacked that night in the vicinity of Breutwood. On the morning of the 2d the march was resumed, and line of battle formed in front of Nashville. Lee's corps was placed in the center and across the Franklin pike; Stewart occupied the left and Cheatham the right-their flanks extending as near the Cumberland as possible, whilst Forrest's cavalry filled the gap between them and the river. General Rousseau occupied Murfrees- boro' in rear of our right, with about eight thousand men, heavily intrenched. Gen- eral Bate's division and Sears's and Brown's brigades were ordered, on the 5th, to re- port at that point to General Forrest, who was instructed to watch closely that de- tachment of the enemy. The same day information was received of the capture of 100 prisoners, two pieces of artillery, 20 wagons and teams by Forrest's cavalry at La Vergne; of the capture and destruction of three block houses on the Chattanooga Railroad by Bate's division; and of the seizure the day previous by Chalmers of two transports on the Cumberland River with 300 mules on board. We had in our possession two engines and several cars, which ran as far south as Pulaski. Dispatches were sent to Generals Beauregard and Maury to repair the rail- road from Corinth to Decatur, as our trains would be running in a day or two to Li' "+ the latter point. This means of trans- portation was of great service in furnish- ing supplies to the army. When we reached middle Tennessee our troops had all abundance of pro- vision.s, altbough sorely inl need of shoes andl clothing. General Bate's division was ordered to return to the army; Forrest was instructed to direct Palmer's and Mercer's infantry brigades to thoroughly in- trench on Stewart's Creek, or at La Vergne, accord- ing as he might deem more judicious, to constitute, with these troops and his cavalry, a force in ob- servation of the enemy at Murfreesboro', and, lastly, to send a brigade ,,f cavalry to picket the river at Lebanon. The Federals having been reported to be mass- ing cavalry at Edgefield, Forrest was instructed to meet and drive them back, if they attempted to eros4 the Cumberland. The same day, the 10th of December, Generals Stewart and Cheatham were directed to construct detached works in rear of their flanks, which rested near the river, in order to protect these flanks against an effort by 436 THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. the Federals to turn them. Although every possi- ble exertion was made by these officers, the works were not colnpletel when, on the 1 5th, the Federal army moved out and attacked both flanks, whilst the main assault was directed against our left. It was my intention to have made these defenses self-sustaining, but time was not allowed, as the enemy attacked on the morning of the 15th. Throughout that day they were repulsed at all points of the general line with heavy loss, and only succeeded toward evening in capturing the infantry outposts on our left, and with them the small force together with the artillery posted in these unifinished works. Finding that the main movement of the Federals was directed against our left, the chief engineer was iustructed care- fully to select a line in prolongation of the left flank; Cheatham's corps was withdrawn from the right during the night of the 15th and posted on the left of Stewart - Cheatham's left resting near the Breutwood Hills. The men were ordered to con- struct breastworks there during that same night. The morning of the 16th found us with Lee's right on Overton's Hill. At an early hour the en- emy made a general attack along our front, and were again and again repulsed at all points with heavy loss, especially in Lee's front. About 3:34) P. m. the Federals concentrated a number of guns against a portion of our line, which passed over a mound on the left of our center, and which had been occupied during the night. This point was favorable for massing troops for an assault under cover of artillery. Accordingly the enemy availed himself of the advantage presented, massed a body of men- apparently one division -at the base of this mound, and, under the fire of artillery, which prevented our men from raising their heads above the breastworks, made a sudden and gallant charge up to and over our intrenehments. Our line, thus pierced, gave way; soon thereafter it broke at all points, and I beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion. I was seated upon my horse not far in rear when the breach was effected, and soon discovered that all hope to rally the troops was vain. I did not, I might say, anticipate a break at that time, as our forces up to that moment had re- pulsed the Federals at every point, and were waving their colors in defiance, crying out to the enemy, "Come on, come on." Just previous to this fatal occurrence I had matured the move- ment for the next morning. The enemy's right flank, by this hour, stood in air some six miles from Nashville, and I had determined to with- draw my entire 4orce during the night, and attack this exposed flank in rear. I could safely have done so, as I still had open a line of retreat. The day before the rout, the artillery posted in the detached works had been captured; a number of guns in the main line were abandoned for the reason that the horses could not be brought for- ward in time to remove them. Thus the total number of guns captured amounted to fifty-four. We had fortunately still remaining a sufficient number of pieces of artillery for the equipment of the army, since, it will be remembered. I had taken with me at the outset of the campaign a large reserve of artillery to use against gun-boats. Our losses in killed and wounded in this engage- ment were comparatively small, as the troops were protected by breastworks. Order among the troops was in a measure re- stored at Breutwood, a few miles in rear of the scene of disaster, through the promptness and gallantry of Clayton's division, which speedily formed and confronted the enemy, with Gibson's brigade and McKenzie's battery, of Fenner's bat- talion, acting as rear-guard of the rear-guard. General Clayton displayed admirable coolness and courage that afternoon and the next morning in the discharge of his duties. Gibson, who evinced conspicuous gallantry and ability in the handling of his troops, succeeded, in concert with Clayton, in checking and staying the first and most dangerous shock which always follows immediately after a rout. The result was that even after the army passed the Big Harpetb, at Franklin, the brigades and divisions were marching in regular order. General S. D. Lee displayed his usual energy and skill in handling his troops on the 17th, whilst protecting the rear of ovur army. Unfortunately, in the afternoon he was wounded and forced to leave the field. General C. L. Stevenson then assumed command of Lee's corps, and ably dis- charged his duties during the continuance of the retreat to and across the Tennessee River. General Walthall, one of the most able division commanders in the South, wAs here ordered to form a rear-guard with eight picked brigades and For- rest's cavalry; the march was then resumed in the direction of Columbia, Stewart's corpwmoving in front, followed by those of Cheatham and Steven- son. The army bivouacked in line of battle near Duck River on the night of the 18th. The following day we crossed the river and pro- ceeded on different roads leading toward Bain- bridge on the Tennessee. I entertained but little concern in regard to being further harassed by the enemy. I therefore continued to march leisurely, and arrived at Bainbridge on the 25th of Decem- ber. The following day the march was continued in the direction of Tupelo, at which place Cheat- ham's corps, the last in the line of march, went into camp on the 10th of January, 1865. On the 13th of January I sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War: " I request to be relieved from the command of this army." Upon General Beauregard's arrival at Tupelo, on the 14th of January, I informed him of my application to be relieved from the command of the army. I again telegraphed the authorities in Richmond, stating that the campaigns to the Ala- bama line and into Tennessee were my own con- ception; that I alone was responsible; that I had striven hard to execute them in such manner as to bring victory to our people, and at the same time repeated my desire to be relieved. The President finally complied with my request, and I bade fare- well to the Army of Tennessee on the 23d of January, 1865, after having served with it some- what in excess of eleven months, and having per- formed my duties to the utmost of my ability. 437 GENERAL CHEATHAM AT SPRING HILL.) BY B. F. C'HEATHAM, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A. IN pursuance of orders my command [formerly Harlee's] crossed Duck River on the morning of the 29th of November, IS64, the division of Major-General [P. R.] Cleburne in advance, fol- lowed by that of Major-General [W. B.] Bate, the division of Major-General [J. C.] Brown in the rear. The march was made as rapidly as the condition of the roads would allow, and without occurrence of note, until about 3 o'clock P. U., when I arrived at Rutherford's Creek, two and one-half miles from Spring Hill. At this point General Hood gave me verbal orders as follows: That I should get Cle- burne across the creek and send him forward toward Spring Hill. with instructions to communi- cate with General Forrest, who was near the vil- lage, ascertain from him the position of the enemy, and attack immediately; that I should remain at the creek, assist General Bate in crossing his di- vision, and then go forward and put Bate's com- mand in to support Cleburne; and that he would push Brown forward to join me. [See p. 432.] As soon as the division of General Bate had erossed the creek, I rode forward, and at a point on the road about one and a half miles from Spring Hill I saw the left of Cleburne's command just disappearing over a hill to the left of the road. Halting here, I waited a few minutes for the arrival of Bate, and formed his command with his right upon the position of Cleburne's left, and ordered him forward to the support of Cleburne. Shortly after Bate's division bad disappeared over the same range of hills, I heard firing toward Cle- burne's right, and just then General Brown's divi- siou had come up. I thereupon ordered Brown to proceed to the right, turn the range of hills over which Cleburne and Bate had crossed, and to form line of battle and attack to the right of Cleburne. The division of General Brown was in motion to execute this order, when I received a message from Cleburne that his right brigade had been struck in the flank by the enemy and had suffered severely, and that he had been compelled to fall back and re-form with a change of front. It so happened that the direction of Cleburne's advance was such as had exposed his right flank to the enemy's line. Whei his command was formed on the road by which he had marched from Rutherford's Creek, neither the village of Spring HiU nor the turnpike could be seen. Instead of advancing directly upon Spring Hill his forward movement was a little south of west and almost parallel with the turnpike toward Columbia, in- stead of north-west upon the enemy's lines south and east of the village. General Cleburne was killed in the assault upon Franklin the next day, and I had no opportunity to learn from him how it was that the error of direction occurred. Mean- while, General Bate, whom I had placed in po- sition on the left of Cleburne's line of march, continued to move forward in the same direction until he had reached the farm of N. F. Cheairs, one and a half miles south of Spring Hill. After Brown had reached the position indicated to him and had formed a line of battle, be sent to inform me that it would be certain disaster for him to attack, as the enemy's line extenAed be- yond his right several hundred yards. I sent word to him to throw back his right brigade and make the attack. I had already sent couriers after General Bate to bring hini balk and direct him to join Cleburne's left. Going to the right of my lihe, I found Generals Brown and Cleburne, and the latter reported that he had re-formed his division. I then gave orders to lBrown and Cle- burne that, as soon as they could connect their lines, they should attack the enemy, who were then in sight; informing them at the same time that General Hood had just told me that Stewart's column was close at hand, and that General Stewart had been ordered to go to my right and place his command across the pike. I further- more said to them that I would go myself and see that General Bate was placed in position to con- nect with them, and immediately rode to the left of my line for that purpose. During all this time I had met and talked with General Hood repeatedly, our field headquarters being not over one hundred yards apart. After Cleburne's repulse I had been along my line, and had seen that Brown's right was outflanked sev- eral hundred yards. I had urged General Hood to hurry up Stewart and place him on my right, and had received from him the assurance that this would be done; and this assurance, as before stated, Ihad communicated toCleburne and Brown. When I returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in posi- tion to support them. Stewart's column had al- ready passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right. On reaching the road where General Hood's field headquarters had been established I found a courier with a message from General Hood re- questing me to come to him at Captain Thompson's house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Rutherford's Creek. I found General Stewart with General Hood. The commanding general there informed me that he had concluded to wait until the morning, and then directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at day- light. I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open - orders to remain quiet until morning- and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin. About 11 o'clock that night General Hood sent ) Reprinted from the - Southern Bivonac" for April. 18ss. Dated November 30th, 1881. 438 THE DEATH OF GENERALS CLEBURNE AND ADAMS. Major-General [Edward] Johnson, whose division had marched ill rear of Stewart'. corps, to report to Inc. I directed1 Major flostick, of my staff, to place Johnson on my extreme left. About mid- nlight Major lostick returned and reported that he hI.d Ieeii near to the turnpike, and could hear straggling troops passing northward. While he wias talking about this to Colonel Porter, my chief- of-staff, a courier from headquarters brought a note from Major [A. P.] Mason [Assistant-Adju- tant tierieral], to the effect that General Hood had just learned that stragglers were passing along the road in front of my left, and " the com- manding general says you had better order your pieket line to fire on them." Upon reading the note I ordered Major Bostick to return to Gen- eral Johnson, whose command was on my left ail nearest the pike, and say to him that he must take a brigade, or, if necessary, his whole division, and go on to the pike and eut off anything that might be passing. Major Bostick afterward in- formed me that General Johnson commenced com- plaining bitterly at having been " loaned out," and asked why General Cheatham did not order one of his own divisions to go in; but at length ordered his horse and rode with Major Bostick close up to the turnpike, where they found everything quiet and no one passing. General Jobnson came with Major Bostick to my quarters, and informed me of what they had done. It was now about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 30th. This suggestion that I had better order my pickets to fire upon stragglers passing in front of my left was the only order, if that can be called an order, that I received from General Hood after leaving him at his quarters early in the night, when he had informed me of his determination to wait until daylight to attack the enemy. What reason General Stewart gave for not reaching the turnpike I do not know. As I have already stated, General Hood said to me repeatedly, when I met him between 4 and 6 o'clock in the after- noon, "Stewart will be here in a few minutes.' Stewart's column did not come up until about dark. General Stewart says he was at Rutherford's Creek before General Brown's division crossed that stream. He also says that General Hood there ordered him to form line of battle on the south side of the creek, and that he was not allowed to move thence until dusk. If General Stewart had followed Brown he would have been in position on my right, across the turnpike, before dark. That he would have executed an order to make such dis- position of his command, no one who knows that officer will doubt; and he would have done it in the darkness of midnight as surely and as cer- tainly as in the day. THE DEATH OF GENERALS CLEBURNE AND ADAMS. IN the "Bivouac" forOctober, 18 5,James Barr, of Company E, 65th Illinois Volunteers, writ- ing from Barwell, Kansas, said: w Ias somewhat interetedIn that terrible affairat Frlnklin. I was a prisoner near the cotton-gin for aboult three or four minutes, was ordered to the rear by alone of the Confederates, and would have had a trip to AndersonvMile had It not been for that I devil-may-are ooliter-charge made by illnoisans and Kentuckians. Our Colonel Stewart (65th Illinois) tried bard to save the life of General John Adans, of Mis-isippi. colonel Stewart called to our men not to fire on him. but it was too late. Adams rode his horse over the ditch to the top of the parapet, undertook to grasp the 'old fla.g' fromn the hands of our color-sergeant. when he fell, horse and all, shot by the color-guard. a I was a reenlsted veteran, and went through twenty- seven general engagements, but I am sure that Franklin was the hardest-fought field that I ever stood upon. General J. D. Cox [tin his' Franklin and Nashyille ] cen- salres General Wagner for holding to his advanced posi- tiol too long, calls his action a gross blunder, ete.; lit, as onu of Cox's men, I looked upon. the matter in a dif- ferent light. I think if Cleburne had not struck Wag- ner'- two brimades as he did that his brave lads would have broken our line suoeessfnlly; btt, as It was, his me- were badly winded with his work with Wagner, whihlh gave Oplycke's and White's men a better chance to eheek him at thecotton-gln. The vay I saw it was this: I Woas acting as orderly and standing a few paces east of the cotton-gin. The first Confederate troops that aname in view were Stewart's corps on our left with (Cheatham's corps to the left of Stewart. The Confeder- ate line moved easily and steadily on, until Cleburne was checked for the time by Wagner. The short time lost by Cleburne threw Stewart's line too far in ad- vance. Stewart was first to receive the fire from our main line, and was enable to carry our works, his men who were not killed or wounded being compelled to re- tire. Now Cleburne, who had been delayed by Wagner, caine up just in time to receive a heavy right oblique fire from the men who had repulsed Stewart's corps. I never saw ican put in auch a terrible position as Cle- one's division wans In fursa few minutes The wonder is that any of them escaped death or capture." In the "Bivouac" for November, 1885, John McQuaide, of Vicksburg, Miss., wrote: ',Some time since I called attention to the Inaeccra- cles of current history In regard to the manner of Gten- eral Patrick Cleburue's death at Franklin. The ultject has been brought to my mind again by Mr. Janiee Barr' letter. It has been stated that Cleburle and horse were killed on top of the works, which is incorrect. It was General John Adam., of Loring's divison, Stewart's corps. Early next morning I assisted In putting lila body in an ambulance also the body of General Cle- burne. Adams'. horse was a bay. It was dead upon the works, with its front legs toward the inner sile of the works. Adams's body was lying outside, at the base of the works, when I helped to pick It up. (lelburne's bstly was not less than fifty or sixty yards from the works, and on nearly a straight line from where Ad.,,is fell. This may appear strange, as the two generals lie- hinmged to different divisions and different Corps; lint there were repeated charges made upon the works. When one command was repulsed another would be thrown forward." 439 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. BY HENRY STONE. BREVET COLONEL, 1'. . V., MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF GENERAL THOMAS. ON September 28th, 1864, less than four weeks from the day the Union forces occupied Atlanta, General Sherman, who found his still uncon- quered enemy, General Hood, threatening his communications in Georgia, and that formidable raider, General Forrest, playing the mischief in west Tennessee, sent to the latter State two divisions - General Newton's of the Fourth Corps, and General J. D. Morgan's of the Fourteenth -to aid in destroying, if possible, that intrepid dragoon. To make assurance doubly sure, the next day he ordered General George H. Thomas, his most capable and experienced lieutenant, and the commander of more than three-fifths of his grand army, " baek to Stevenson and Decherd . . . to look to Tennessee." No order could have been more unwelcome to General Thomas. It removed him from the command of his own thoroughly organized and harmonious army of sixty thousand veterans, whom he knew and trusted, and who knew and loved him, and relegated him to the position of super- visor of communications. It also sent him to the rear just when great preparations were making for an advance. But, as often happens, what seemed an adverse fate opened the door to great, unforeseen opportunity. The task of expelling Forrest and reopening the broken communications was speedily completed, and on the 17th of October General Thomas wrote to General Sherman, " I hope to join you very soon." Sherman, however, had other views, and the hoped-for junction was never made. On the 19th he wrote to General Thomas: "I will send back to Tennessee the Fourth Corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all incumbrances whatever except what I can haul in our wagons. . . . I want you to remain in Tennessee and take command of all my [military] division not actually 44e REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. present with me. Hood's army may be set down at forty thousand (40,000) of all arms, fit for duty. . . . If you can defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three (3) months, it is all I ask." With such orders, and under such circumstances, General Thomas was left to play his part in the new campaign. General Hood, after a series of daring adventures which baffled all Sher- man's calculations (" he can turn and twist like a fox," said Sherman, "and wear out my army in pursuit"), concentrated his entire force, except For- rest's cavalry, at Gadsden, Alabama, on the 22d of October, while General Sherman established his headquarters at Gaylesville,- a "position," as he wrote to General Halleck, "very good to watch the enemy." In spite of this " watch," Hood suddenly appeared on the 26th at Decatur, on the Tennessee River, seventy-five miles north-west of Gadsden. This move was a complete surprise, and 6vidently "meant business." The Fourth Corps, numbering about twelve thousand men, commanded by Major-General D. S. Stanley, was at once ordered from Gaylesville, to report to General Thomas. On the 1st of November its leading division reached Pulaski, Tennessee, a small town on the railroad, about forty miles north of Decatur, where it was joined four (lays later by the other two. Making a slight though somewhat lengthened demonstration against Decatur, General Hood pushed on to Tuscumbia, forty-five miles west. Here he expected to find -what he had weeks before ordered-ample supplies, and the railroad in operation to Corinth. But he was doomed to disappoint- ment. Instead of being in condition to make the rapid and triumphant march with which he had inflamed the ardor of his troops, he was detained three weeks, a delay fatal to his far-reaching hopes. Placing one corps on the north side of the river at Florence, he waited for supplies and for Forrest, who had been playing havoc throughout west-Tennessee, from the line of the Mississippi border, northward to Kentucky, and was under orders to join him. Convinced now of Hood's serious intentions, General Sherman also ordered the Twenty-third Corps, ten thousand men, under command of Major-General J. MI. Schofield, to report to General Thomas. Reaching Pulaski, with one division, on the 14th of November, General Schofield, though inferior in rank to Stanley, assumed command by virtue of being a department commander. The whole force gathered there was less than 18,000 men; while in front were some 5000 cavalry, consisting of a brigade of about 1500, under General Croxton, and a division of some 3500, under General Edward Hatch, the lat- ter being fortunately intercepted while on his way to join Sherman. The Confederate army in three corps (S. D. Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and B. F. Cheatham's) began its northward march from Florence on the 19th of November, in weather of great severity. It rained and snowed and hailed and froze, and the roads were almost impassable. Forrest had come up, with about six thousand cavalry, and led the advance with indomitable energy. Hatch and Croxton made such resistance as they could; but on the 22d the head of Hood's column was at Lawrenceburg, some 16 miles due west of Pulaski, Ten- nessee and on a road running direct to Columbia, where the railroad and turn- VOL. IV. 29 441 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. MAJO:-4ENIREUAL GEORG(E 1(. THOMAS. FROM A PIIOTQGUAPII. pike to Nashville cross Duck River, and where there were less than 800 men to guard the bridges. The situation at Pulaski, with an enemy nearly three times as large fairly onl the flank, was anything but cheering. Warned by the reports from General Hateh, and by the orders of General Thomas, who, on the 20th, had directed General Schofield to prepare to fall back to Columbia, the two divisions of General J. D. Cox and General George D. Wagner (the latter Newton's old division) were ordered to march to Lynnville-about half-way 442 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. 443 to Columbia-on the 22d. On the 23d the other two (livisions, under General Stanley, were to follow with the wagon-trains. It was not a moment too soon. On the morning of the 24th General Cox, who had pushed on to within nine mniles of Columbia, was roused by sounds of conflict away to the west. Taking a cross-road, leading south of Columbia, he reached the Mount Pleasant pike just in time to interpose his infantry between Forrest's cavalry and a hapless 1brigade, uider command of Colonel Capron, which was being handled most unceremoniously.) In another hour Forrest would have been in possession of the crossings of Duck River, and the only line of communication with Nash- ville would have been in the hands of the enemy. General Stanley, who had left Pulaski in the afternoon of the 23d, reached Lynnville after dark. Rousing his command at 1 o'clock in the morning, by 9 o'clock the head of his column connected with Cox in front of Columbia-having marched thirty miles since 2 o'clock of the preceding afternoon. These timely movements saved the little army from utter destruction. When General Sherman had finally determined on his march to the sea, he requested General Rosecrans, in Missouri, to send to General Thomas two livisions, under General A. J. Smith, which had been lent to General Banks for the Red River expedition, and were now repelling the incursion of Price into Missouri. As they were not immediately forthcoming, General Grant had ordered General Rawlins, his chief-of-staff, to St. Louis, to direct, in per- son, their speedy embarkation. Thence, on the 7th of November, two weeks before Hood began his advance from Florence, General Rawlins wrote to General Thomas that Smith's command, aggregating nearly 14,000, would begin to leave that place as early as the 10th. No news was ever more anxiously awaited or more eagerly welcomed than this. But the promise eould not be fulfilled. Smith had to march entirely across the State of Mis- souri; and instead of leaving St. Louis on the 10th, he did not arrive there until the 24th. Had he come at the proposed time, it was General Thomas's intention to place him at Eastport, on the Tennessee River, so as to threaten Hood's flank and rear if the latter advanced. With such disposition, the bat- tles of Franklin and Nashville would have been relegated to the category of " events which never come to pass." But when Smith reached St. Louis, Hood was threatening Columbia; and it was an open question whether he would not reach Nashville before the reeuforoetients from Missouri. ) Major Henry C. Counelly, of the 14th Illinois arrive and get In position. I replied, w ,.ared.lestr.Byd cavalry, on August 8th, 1887, wrote to the edi- andcaptureditfweremainhere.' Atthismoment .en- tors as follows: eral Capron gave the older to retire. While passing through a long lane south of Columbia, Forrest's foces " When General hood advanced from the Teunessee charged the brigade in rear and on I.,th flanks with River General Capron.' brigade was on the extreme intrepid courage. Our command was coniln'd to a nar- right of our army, and from the 19th of November until row lane, with men and hor ses in the highest state of tih-' 24th, the dtiy Columbia was reached, we fought For- exeitement. We were armed with Springfield ritles, rest's cavalry. I was with the rear-guard on the occa- which after the first volley were about as servieablle to 'ion referred to; it fell back and found the brigade in a cavalryman thushemmed in as a genii club. The -en wood position in line of battle. I rode to General Capron could not reload while mounted, In the excitemneut of and expressed the opinion that he could not hold his horses as well as soldiers. The only thing that could ismHition a moment against the troops pressing us in be done was to get out as promptly as possible, and t he rear and on the fHanks, which we could easily see before Forrest's forces should close in and capture the al lvancing rapidly to attack us. General Capron replied command. that he had been ordered to make a decided stand If It "This was done suceessfulty. The brigade was com- sucril-ed every man in hisibrigade; that we must hold posed of the 14th and 16th IllinoIs cavalry and the 8th the advancing forees in cheek to enable the infantry to Michigan cavalry." REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. As fast as the Union troops arrived at Columbia, in their hurried retreat from Pulaski, works were thrown up, covering the approaches from the south, and the trains were sent across the river. But the line was found to be longer than the small force could hold; and the river could easily be crossed, above or below the town. Orders were given to withdraw to the north side on the night of the 26th, but a heavy storm prevented. The next night the crossing was made, the railroad bridge was burned, and the pontoon boats were scut- tled. This was an all-night job, the last of the pickets crossing at 5 in the morning. It was now the fifth day since the retreat from Pulaski began, and the little army had been exposed day and night to all sorts of weather except sunshine, and had been almost continually on the move. From deserters it was learned that Hood's infantry numbered 40,000, and his cavalry, under Forrest, 10,000 or 12,000. But the Union army was slowly increasing by con- centration and the arrival of recruits. It now numbered at Columbia about 23,000 infantry and some 5000 cavalry - of whom only 3500 were mounted. General James H. Wilson, who had been ordered by General Grant to report to General Sherman,- and of whom General Grant wrote, " I believe he will add fifty per cent. to the effectiveness of your cavalry,"- had taken command personally of all General Thomas's cavalry, which was trying to hold the fords east and west of Columbia. [See article by General Wilson, to follow.] In spite of every opposition, Forrest succeeded in placing one of his divi- sions on the north side of Duck River before noon of the 28th, and forced back the Union cavalry on roads leading toward Spring Hill and Franklin. At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 29th General Wilson became convinced that the enemy's infantry would begin crossing at daylight, and advised General Schofield to fall back to Franklin. At 3:30 the same morning General Thomas sent him similar orders. Daylight revealed the correctness of Wilson's infor- mation. Before sunrise Cheatham's corps, headed by Cleburne's division,- a division unsurpassed for courage, energy, and endurance by any in the Confederate army,- was making its way over Duck River at Davis's Ford, about five miles east of Columbia. The weather had cleared, and it was a bright autumn morning, the air full of invigorating life. General Hood in person accompanied the advance. When General Schofield was informed that the Confederate infantry were crossing, he sent a brigade, under Colonel P. Sidney Post, on a reconnoissance along the river-bank, to learn if the report was true. He also ordered General Stanley to march with two divisions, Wagner's and Kimball's, to Spring Hill, taking the trains and all the reserve artillery. In less than half an hour after receiving the order, Stanley was on the way. On reaching the point where Rutherford Creek crosses the Franklin Pike, Kimball's division was halted, by order of General Schofield, and faced to the east to cover the cross- ing against a possible attack from that quarter. In this position Kimball remained all day. Stanley, with the other division, pushed on to Spring Hill. Just before noon, as the head of his column was approaching that place, he met "a cavalry soldier who seemed to be badly scared," who reported that Buford's division of Forrest's cavalry was approaching from 444 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. the east. The troops were at once double-quicked into the town, and the leading brigade, deploying as it advanced, drove off the enemy just as they were expecting, unmolested, to occupy the place. As the other brigades came up, they also were deployed, forming nearly a semicircle,-Opdycke's brigade stretching in a thin line from the railroad station north of the village to a point some distance east, and Lane's from Opdycke's right to the pike b)elow. Bradley was sent to the front to occupy a knoll some three-fourths of a .ile east, commanding all the approaches I-)V 'OF TIlE WINSTEAID nitLLt, FRA'KLIN, 'IIBE iiUit OD FORME)il ii [I I'' t)F BX Th LF. 1RO)M A 41-10T1GR.-I'I The right of Wtg.-irr too O tlet. inl the advauoMed oluntion, ov l dt,,l t hind the otie wall in tin foi- gniotii The( otoinin Pike ix IIhonv n pmxill .i over ti htills1 lon let(I f O tt lt' putoros from that direction. Most of the artillery was placed on a rise south of the town. The trains were parked within the semicircle. From Spring Hill roads radiate to all points, the turnpike between Colum- bia and Franklin being there intersected by turnpikes from Rally Hill and Mount Carmel, as well as by numerous country roads leading to the neigh- boring towns. Possession of that point would not only shut out the Union army from the road to Nashville, but it would effectually bar the way in every direction. Stanley's arrival was not a moment too soon for the safety of the army, and his prompt dispositions and steady courage, as well as his vigorous hold of all the ground he occupied, gave his little command all the moral fruits of a victory. Hardly had the three brigades, numbering, all told, less than four thousand men, reached the positions assigned them, when Bradley was assailed by a force which the men declared fought too well to be dismounted cavalry. At the same time, at Thompson's Station, three miles north, an attack was made on a small wagon train heading for Franklin; and a dash was made by a detachment of the Confederate cavalry on the Spring Hill station, north-west of the town. It seemed as if the little band, attacked from all points, was threatened with destruction. Bradley's brigade was twice assaulted, but held its own, though with considerable loss, and only a single regiment could be spared to recnforce him. The third assault was more successful, and he was 445 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. driven back to the edge of the village, Bradley himself receiving a disabling wound in rallying his men. While attempting to follow up this temporary a(Ivantage, the enemy, in crossing a wide corn-field, was opened upon with spherical ease-slhot from eight guns posted on the knoll, and soon scattered in econsiderable coiifusion. These attacks undoubtedly came from Cleburne's division, and were made under the eye of the corps commander, General Cheathamn, and the army commander, General Hood. That they were not successful, especially as the other two divisions of tle same corps, Brown's and Bate's, were close at hand, an(d Stewart's corps not far off, seems un- accountable. Except this one small division deployed ill a long thin line to cover the wag- ons, there were no Union troops within striking distance; the cavalry were about Mount Car- mel, five miles east, fully occu- pied in keeping Forrest away from Franklin and the Harpeth iUi i Hi River crossings. The nearest aid was Kimball's division, seven miles south, at kuther- ; fiford CreTk. The other three ; t550702; 0:\th soitrydivisions of infantry which made up Schofields force - 4 Wood's, Cox's, and Ruger's (in part) -were still at Duck River. Thus night closed down upon the solitary division, on whose IMw' 'M'AJW(WUA Ea''i-ME00 OOC boldness of action devolved the TW)M APIRYTOIRAPTLsafety of the whole force which Sherman had spared from his march to the sea to breast the tide of Hood's invasion. When night came, the danger increased rather than diminished. A single Confederate brigade, like Adams's or Cockrell's or Maney's,- veter- ans since Shiloh,- planted squarely across the pike, either south or north of Spring Hill, would have effectually prevented Schofield's retreat, and day- light would have found his whole force cut off from every avenue of escape by more than twice its numbers, to assault whom would have been madness, and to avoid whom would have been impossible. Why Cleburne and Brown failed to drive away Stanley's one division before dark; why Bate failed to possess himself of the pike south of the town; why Stewart failed to lead his troops to the pike at the north; why Forrest, with his audacious temper and his enterprising cavalry, did not fully hold Thompson's Station or the crossing of the West Harpeth, half-way to Franklin: these are to this day disputed questions among the Confederate commanders; and it is not proposed to discuss them here. The afternoon and night of November 29th, 1864, may well be set down in the calendar of 446 417 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. lost opportunities. The heroic valor of the same troops the next day, and their frightful losses as they attempted to retrieve their mistake, show what might have been. By 8 o'clock at night - two hours only after sunset, on a mnoonless night - at least two corps of Hood's army were in line of battle facing the turnpike, and not half a mile away. The long line of Confederate camp-fires burned bright, and the men could be seen standing around them or sauntering about in groups. Now and then a few would come almost to the pike and fire at a passing Union sq1uad, but without provoking a reply. (leneral Schofield, who had remained at Duck River til day, reached Spring Hill about 7 P. Ai., with Huger's division aiid Whitakers brigade. Leaving the latter to cover a X l g l I f cross-road a mile or two below the towml, lhe started with Ruger about 9 P'. At. to force a passage at Thompson's Station, supposed to be in the hands of the en- 3-AJtE.1 1.Stemy. At 11 P. -a. General Cox arrived FROM A 1 TOli AP14.WU with his division, and soon after Scho- field returned to Spring Hill with the welcome news that the way was open. From Thompson's Station he sent his engineer officer, Captain William J. Twining, to Franklin, to telegraph the situation to General Thomas, all com- munication with whom had been cut off since early morning. Captain Twining's dispatch shows most clearly the critical condition of affairs: "The general says he will not be able to get farther than Thompson's Station to-night. ... He regards his situation as extremely perilous. ... Thinking the troops under A. J. Smith's command had reached Franklin, General Schofield directed me to have them pushed down to Spring Hill by daylight to-morrow." This was Tuesday. The day before, General Thomas had telegraphed to General Schofield that Smith had not yet arrived, but would be at Nashville in three days-that is, Thursday. The expectation of finding him at Franklin, therefore, was like a drowning man's catching at a straw. Just before midnight Cox started from Spring Hill for Franklin, and was ordered to pick up Ruger at Thompson's Station. At 1 A. M. he was on the road, and the train, over five miles long, was drawn out. At the very outset it had to cross a bridge in single Mfie. So difficult was this whole movement, that it was 5 o'elock in the morning before the wagons were fairly under way. As the head of the train passed Thompson's Station, it was attacked by the Con- federate cavalry, and for a while there was great consternation. Wood's divi- sion, which had followed Cox from Duck River, was marched along to the east of the pike, to protect the train, and the enemy were speedily driven off. It was near daybreak when the last wagon left Spring Hill. Kimball's division 448 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. followed Wood's, and at 4 o'clock Wagner drew in his lines, his skirmishers remaining till it was fairly daylight. The rear-guard was commanded by Colonel Emerson Opdycke, who was prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice the last man to secure the safety of the main body. So efficiently did his admi- rable brigade do its work, that, though surrounded by a cloud of the enemy's cavalry, whieh made frequent dashes at its lines, not a straggler nor a wagon was left behind. The ground was strewn with knapsaeks cut from the shoulders of a lot of raw re- cruits weighed down with their unaccustomed f burden. The head of the column, un- der General Cox, rece teot skirts of Frank- renached the ot Sallle horta lin about the saine hour that the rear-guard was leaving Spring Hill. Here the tired, sephungry I. TIE CARTER! HOUSIE, FROMl THlL SIDE TOWARD TII)lE TOWN!. 2. THlE CA(RTER HOUStE. FROM)! THlE CON.-1 1FlIEDRT lIIIE. 3. FRONT VIE! OIF THlE CARTER HOUSE.- FROMl PHOITOGRIAPII TAKEl I 1- men, who had fought and marched, day and night, for nearly a week, threw up a line of earth-works on a slight eminence which guards the southern approach to the town, even before they made their coffee. Then they gladly dropped anywhere for the much-needed " forty winks." Slowly the rest of the weary column, regiment after regiment of worn-out men, filed into the works, and continued the line, till a complete bridge-head, from the river-bank above to the river-bank below, encircled the town. By noon of the 30th all the troops had come up, and the wagons were crossing t he river, which was already fordable, notwithstanding the recent heavy rain- falls. The rear-guard was still out, having an occasional bout with the enemy. [See map of the field, p. 430.] The Columbia Pike bisected the works, which at that point were built just in front of the Carter house, a one-story brick dwelling west of the pike, and a large gin-house on the east side. Between the gin-house and the river the works were partly protected in front by a hedge of Osage orange, and on the knoll, near the railroad cut close to the bank, were two batteries belonging to the Fourth Corps. Near the Carter house was a considerable thicket of locust trees. Except these obstructions, the whole ground in front was entirely 449 REPELLING HOOD'S INV4SION OF TENNESSEE:. unobstructed and fenceless, alnd, from the works, every part of it was in plain sight. General Cox's division of three brigades, commanded that day, in o)rder from left to right, by Colonels Stiles and Casement and General Reilly, oveupied the ground between the Columbia Pike and the river above the town. The front line consisted of eight regiments, three in the works and one in reserve for each of the brigades of Stiles and Casement, while Reilly's bri- gade nearest the pike had but two regiments in the works, and two in a seconltd line, with still another regiment behind that. AVest of the lpike, reach- ing to a rav'ine through which passes a road branching from the Carter's Creek Pike, was Ruger's division of two brigades - the third, -under General Cooper, not having come up from Johnsonville. Strickland's brigade, of four regi- nments, had two in the works and two in reserve. Two of these regiments, the 72d Illinois and 44th Missouri, belonged to A. J. Smith's corps, and had reported t' General Sehofiell only the day before. A third, which was in reserve, the 1 931 Ohio, was a large and entirely new regiment, having been mustered into service onl three weeks before, and having joined the army for the first tilme on the 28th. Moore's brigade, of six regiments, had four in the works and two in reserve. Bevand Ruger, reaching from the ravine to the river below, was Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps,- all veterans,- consisting of three brigades commanded by Generals William Grose and Walter C. Wliitaker and Colonel Isaac M1. Kirby. All the troops in the works were ordered to report to General Cox, to whom was assigned the command of the defenses.1 ('general Wood's division of the Fourth Corps had gone over the liver with the trains; and two brigades of Wagner's division, which had so valiantly stood their ground at Spring Hill and covered the rear since, were halted on a slope about half a mile to the front. Opdyc ke had brought his brigade within the works, and hield them massed, near the like, behind the Carter house. Besides the guns Eon the knoll, near the railroad cut, there were six pieces in Reilly's works; four on Striekland's left; two on Moore's left, and four on Grose's left-in all, twenty-six gunls in that part of the works, facing south, and twelve more in reserve, on or near the Columbia Pike. As the bright autumn day, hazy with the golden light of an Indian sum- mer atmosphere, wore away, the troops that had worked so hard looked hopefully forward to a prospect of ending it in peace and rest, preparatory either to a night march to Nashville, or to a re-nforcement by Smith's corps and General Thomas. But about 2 o'clock, some suspicious movements on the hills a mile or two away-the waving of signal flags and the deployment of the enemy in line of battle-caused General Wagner to send his adjutant- g neral, from the advanced position where his two brigades had halted, to his commanding general, with the information that Hood seemed to be pre- paring for attack. In a very short time the whole Confederate line could be ZGenera1 D. S. Stanley. who commanded the ing Waguer's brigades, of his eorps, during which Fourth Corps, takes exception to this statement. he waswounded. General Sehofieldsaidinbisre- Some of his troops as they arrived were assigned port of December 31st, 1864: " The troops were to positions by General Cox. General Stanley, in placed in position and intrenched wnder him [Cox's] the performance of his duty, went with General immediate direction, and the greater portion of Schofield to the north side of the river, but re- the line engaged was under his command during turned when the firing began and assisted in rally- the battle."- EDITOR. 4;0 REPELLING. HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. seen, stretching in battle array, from the dlark fringe of chestnuts along the river-bank, far across the Columbia Pike, the colors gayly fluttering and the nuskets gleaming brightly, and advancing steadily, in perfect order, dressed oji the venter, straight for the works. Meantime General Schofield had retiredl to the fort, on a high bluff on the other side of the river, some two inilcs away, fly the road, and had taken General Stanley with him. From the fort the whole field of operations was plainly visible. Notwithstanding all these demonstrations, the two bri- gades of Wagner were left on the knoll where they had been halted, and, with scarcely an . 4 t m0; apology for works to tr it llIen Wy evverA upSim Cub Ii h till i"tithi l l"i t tlt kIet. Iitt uitfitf the) ee. al ittle to theright, -tsttleve v II :: for in i tie iar er pl11w. frolit l ltztlreatH Ttle ," ln it it4t Pe X: 'tl lSXt. 'E4TIw1F protect them, had waited until it was too late to retreat without (danger of degenerating into a rout. On came the enemy, as steady and resistless as a tidal wave. A couple of guns, in the advance line, gave them a shot and galloped back to the works. A volley from a thin skirmish-line was sent into their ranks, but without causing any delay to the massive array. A moment more, and with that wild "rebel yell" which, once heard, is never forgotten, the great human wave swept along, and seemed to inguif the little fore e that had so sturdlily awaited it. The first shock came, of course, upon the two misplaced brigades of Wag- nier's division, which, through some one's blunder, had remained in their false position until too late to retire without disaster. They had no tools to throw up works; andl when struck by the resistless sweep of Cleburne's andl Brown's divisions, they had only to make their way, as best they could, back to the works. In that wild rush, in which friend and foe were intermingled, and the piercing "rebel yell" rose high above the "Yankee cheer," nearly seven hundred were made prisoners. But, worst of all for the Union side, the men of Reilly's and Steickland's brigades dared not fire, lest they should shoot down their own comrades, and the guns, loaded with grape and canis- ter, stood silent in the embrasures. With loud shouts of "Let's go into the 451 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. works with them," the triumphant Confederates, now more like a wild, howl- ing mob than an organized army, swept on to the very works, with hardly a cheek from any quarter. So fierce was the rush that a number of the fleeing soldiers-offieers and men-dropped exhausted into the ditch, and lay there while the terrific contest raged over their heads, till, under cover of darkness, they could crawl safely inside the intrenchments. On Strickland's left, close to the Columbia Pike, was posted one of the new infantry regiments. The tremendous onset, the wild yells, the whole infernal din of the strife, were too much for such an undisciplined body. As they saw their comrades from the advance line rushing to the rear, they too turned and fled. The contagion spread, and in a few minutes a dis- orderly stream was pouring down the pike past the Carter house toward the town. The guns, posted on each side the Columbia Pike, were aban- doned, and the works, for the space of more than a regimental front, both east and west of the pike, were de- serted. Into the gap thus made, with- out an instant's delay, swarmed the IM:T:RlM AT FttANNIth OVERl Tilt. tt.hP'UlIX ttMt JAXshl'6' UP-STRUA-W jubilant Confederates, urged on by Thelerftu eft.el1 tre.iM.- t. i thlReud Mr-m Cleburne and Brown, and took pos- Fminklift is napu1 the, -th hasuk. F Gti raluger. whets, Get-al SFhutu ld W14 h.e llmdt trters, lo mpiet( th, session of both works and guns. For Ani h itiRtlnutt tyrtie llrt .u;lk a moment it looked as though these two enterprising divisions, backed by the mass of troops converging toward the pike, would sweep down the works in both directions, and, taking Strick- land and Reilly on the flank, drive them out, or capture them. Fortunately, there were at hand reserves of brave men who were not demoralized by the momentary panic. Colonel Emerson Opdycke, of Wagner's division, as already stated, had brought his brigade inside the works, and they were now massed near the Carter house, ready for any contingency. Two regiments of Reilly's brigade, the 12th and 16th Kentucky, which had reached Franklin about noon, had taken position a little in rear of the rest of the brigade, and thrown up works. As soon as the break was made in the lines all these reserves rushed to the front, and, after a terrific struggle, succeeded in regain- ing the works. Opdycke's brigade, deploying as it advanced, was involved in as fierce a hand-to-hand encounter as ever soldiers engaged in. The two Kentucky regiments joined in the fight with equal ardor and bravery. A large part of Conrad's and Lane's men, as they came in, though wholly dis- organized, turned about and gave the enemy a hot reception. Opdycke's horse was shot under him, and he fought on foot at the head of his brigade. General Cox was everywhere present, encouraging and cheering on his men. General Stanley, who, from the fort where he had gone with General Schofield, had seen the opening clash, galloped to the front as soon as possible and did all that a brave man could until he was painfully wounded. Some of Opdyeke's men manned the abandoned guns in Reilly's works; others filled the gap in Strickland's line. These timely movements first checked and then 41,2 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. repulsed the assaulting foe, and soon the entire line of works was reoccupied, the enemy sullenly giving up the prize which was so nearly won. Stewart's corps, which was on Cheatham's right, filling the space to the river, kept abreast of its valiant companion, and, meeting no obstacle, reached the works near the Union left before Cheatham made the breach at the Columbia Pike. Owing to the peculiar formation of the field, the left of Stewart's line was thrown upon the same ground with the right of Cheatham's; the two commands there became much intermingled. This accounts for so many of General Stewart's officers and men being killed in front of Reilly's and Casement's regiments. Where there was nothing to hinder the Union fire, the muskets of Stiles's and Casement's brigades made fearful havoc; while the batteries at the rail- road cut plowed furrows through the ranks of the advancing foe. Time after time they came up to the very works, but they never crossed them except as prisoners. More than one color-bearer was shot down on the parapet. It is impossible to exaggerate the fierce energy with which the Confederate soldiers, that short November afternoon, threw themselves against the works, fighting with what seemed the very madness of despair. There was not a breath of wind, and the dense smoke settled down upon the field, so that, after the first assault, it was impossible to see at any distance. Through this blinding medium, assault after assault was made, several of the Union officers declaring in their reports that their lines received as many as thirteen distinct attacks. Between the gin-house and the Columbia Pike the fighting was fiercest, and the Confederate losses the greatest. Here fell most of the Confederate generals, who, that fateful afternoon, madly gave up their lives; Adams of Stewart's corps-his horse astride the works, and himself within a few feet of them. Cockrell and Quarles, of the same corps, were severely wounded. In Cheatham's corps, Cleburne and Granbury were killed near the pike. On the west of the pike Strahl and Gist were killed, and Brown was severely wounded. General G. W. Gordon was captured by Opdycke's brigade, inside the works. The heaviest loss in all the Union regiments was in the 44th Missouri, the advance guard of Smith's long-expected reen- forcement, which had been sent to Columbia on the 27th, and was here sta- tioned on the right of the raw regiment that broke and ran at the first onset of the enemy. Quickly changing front, the 44th held its ground, but with a loss of 34 killed, 37 wounded, and 92 missing, many of the latter being wounded. In the 72d Illinois, its companion, every field-officer was wounded, and the entire color-guard, of one sergeant and eight corporals, was shot down. Its losses were 10 killed, 66 wounded, and 75 missing. While this infantry battle was going on, Forrest had crossed the river with his cavalry some distance east of the town, with the evident purpose of get- ting at Schofield's wagons. But he reckoned without his host. Hatch and Croxton, by General Wilson's direction, fell upon him with such vigor that he returned to the south side and gave our forces no further trouble. At nightfall the victory was complete on every part of the Union lines. But here and there on the Confederate side desultory firing was kept up till long after dark, though with little result. 453 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNISSEE. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, as the Confederate lines were forming for their great assault, General Schofield, in reply to a telegram from General Thomas, asking him if he could "hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer," replied, "I do not think I can. . . . It appears to me I ought to take position at Brentwood at once." Accordingly General Thomas, at 3:30U, directed him to retire to Brentwood, which he did that night, bringing away all the wagons and other property in safety. Among the spoils of war were thirty-three Confederate colors, captured by our men from the enemy. The morning found the entire infantry force safe within the friendly shelter of the works at Nashville, where they also welcomed the veterans of A. J. Smith, who were just arriving from Missouri. Soon after, a body of about five thousand men came in from Chattanooga, chiefly of General Sherman's army. too late for their proper commands. These were organized into a pro- visional division under General J. B. Steedman, and were posted between the Murfreesboro' Pike and the river. Cooper's brigade also came in after a miar- row escape from capture, as well as several regiments of colored troops from the railroad between Nashville and Johnsonville. Their arrival completed the force on which General Thomas was to rely for the task he now placed before himself-the destruction of Hood's army. It was an ill-assorted and heterogeneous mass, not yet welded into an army, and lacking a great propor- tion of the outfit with which to undertake an aggressive campaign. HorseF, wagons, mules, pontoons, everything needed to mobilize an army, had to be obtained. At that time they did not exist at Nashville. [See map, p. 434.] The next day Hood's columns appeared before the town and took up their positions on a line of hills nearly parallel to those occupied by the Union army, and speedily threw up works and prepared to defend their ground. Probably no commander ever underwent two weeks of greater anxiety and distress of mind than General Thomas during the interval between Hood's arrival and his precipitate departure from the vicinity of Nashville. The story is too painful to dwell upon, even after the lapse of twenty-three years. From the 2d of December until the battle was fought on the 15th, the general- in-chief did not cease, day or night, to send him from the headquarters at City Point, Va., most urgent and often most uncalled-for orders in regard to his operations, culminating in an order on the 9th relieving him, and direct- ing him to turn over his command to General Schofield, who was assigned to his place -an order which, had it not been revoked, the great captain would have obeyed with loyal single-heartedness. This order, though made out at the Adjutant-General's office in Washington, was not sent to General Thomas, and he did not know of its existence until told of it some years later by General Halleck, at San Francisco. He felt, however, that something of the kind was impending. General Halleck dispatched to him, on morning of the 9th: "Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy." His reply shows how entirely he under- stood the situation: " I feel conscious I have done everything in my power, and that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this. If General Grant should order me to be relieved, I still submnit without a nturmur." As he 4S4 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. was writing this,-2 o'clock in the af- ternoon of December 9thr-a terrible storm of freezing rain had heen pour- w teg flown since daylight, and it kept on pouring and freezing all that day and a part of the next. That night t General Grant notified him that the order relieving him -which he had di- vinedl-was suspended. But he did not s know who had been designated ah his glL m NEAR hiL time was successor. With this threat hanging l ry. Now, it"E w v r d over him; with the utter impossibil- FROM 4 PH)OTGk4PH TAKE 11 I'8I S. ity, in that weather, of making any movement; with the prospect that the labors of his whole life were about to end in disappoint ent, if not disas- ter,- lie never, for an instant, abated his energy or his work of preparation. Not an hour, day and night, was he idle. Nobody-not even his most trusted staff-officers-knew the contents of the telegrams that came to him. But it was very evident that something greatly troubled him. While the rain was falfing and the fields and roads were ice-bound, he would sometimes sit by the wishow for an hour or more, not speaking a word, gazing steadily out upon the forbidding prospect, as if he were trying to will the storm away. It was curious and interesting to see how, in this gloomy interval, his time was occupied by matters not strictly military. Now, it was a visit from a delega- tion of the city government, in regard to some municipal regulation; again, somebody whose one horse had been seized and put into the cavalry; then, a committee of citizens, begging that wood might be furnished, to keep some poor families from freezing; and, of evenings, Governor Andrew Johnson- then Vice-President eleet-would unfold to him, with much iteration, his fierce views concerning secession, rebels, and reeonstruction. To all he gave a patient and kindly hearing, and he often astonished Governor John- son by his knowledge of constitutional and international law. But, under- neath all, it was plain to see that General Grant's dissatisfaction keenly affected him, and that only by the proof which a successful battle would furnish could he hope to regain the confidence of the general-in-chief. So when, at 8 o'clock on the evening of December 14th, after having laid his plans before his corps commanders, and dismissed thenm, he dictated to General Halleck the telegram, " The ice having melted away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning," he drew a deep sigh of relief, and for the first time for a week showed again something of his natural buoyancy and cheerfulness. He moved about more briskly; he put in order all the little last things that remained to be done; he signed his name where it was needed in the letter-book, and then, giving orders to his staff-officers, to he ready at 5 o'clock the next morning, went gladly to bed. The ice had not melted a day too soon; for, while he was writing the tele- gram to General Halleck, General Logan was speeding his way to Nashville, with orders from General Grant that would have placed him in command REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. of all the Union forces there assembled. General Thomas, fortunately, did not then learn this second proof of General Grant's lack of confidence; and General Logan, on reaching Louisville, found that the work intended for him was already done- and came no farther. At the very time when these orders were made out at Washington, in obedience to General Grant's direc- tions, a large part of the cavalry was unmounted; two divisions were absent securing horses and proper outfit; wagons were unfinished and mules lacking or unbroken; pontoons unmade and pontoniers untrained; the ground was covered with a glare of ice i which made all the fields and hillsides impassable for horses and scarcely pass- able for foot-men. The natives declared that the Yankees brought their weather as well as their army with them. Every corps commander in the ary protested that a movement under such con- eIitions would be little short of madness, and certain to result in disaster. A very considerable re- Strong worka. set with caut-u, inloola the foandations of the Capi- organization of the army tol. Mtesrn-rit-in the building held a bountiful supply of water, also took place during this Owrinrg tcb It. espaity and the Mivene.ae of the lwe.r storie. th1e Capitol was regarded a a ditadel, in which a few thousand men coult enforced delay. General maintaiu theniaelvea against an ar.n. Stanley, still suffering from his wound, went North, and General T. J. Wood, who had been with it from the beginning, succeeded to the command of the Fourth Corps. General Ruger, who had commanded a division in the Twenty-third Corps, was also disabled by sickness, and was succeeded by General D. N. Couch, formerly a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, and who had recently been assigned to duty in the Department of the Cumberland.4 General Wagner was retired from command of his division, and was succeeded by General W. L. Elliott, who had been chief of cavalry on General Thomas's staff in the Atlanta campaign. General Kenner Garrard, who had commanded a cavalry division during the Atlanta campaign, was assigned to an infantry division in Smith's corps. In all these cases, except in that of General Wood succeeding to the command of the Fourth Corps, the newly assigned officers were entire strangers to the troops over whom they were placed. On the afternoon of the 14th of December General Thomas summoned his corps commanders, and, delivering to each a written order containing a 4 General Couch was in command of the Department of the Susquehanna from June 11th, 1883, to December 1st, 1884. On December 8th, 1864, he took command of the Second Division of the Twenty-third Corps- EmToBs. 456 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. detailed plan of the battle, went with them carefully and thoroughly over the whole ground, answering all questions and explaining all doubts. Never had a commander a more loyal corps of subordinates or a more devoted army. The feeling in the ranks was one of absolute and enthusiastic confi- dence in their general. Some had served with him since his opening triumph at Mill Springs; some had never seen his face till two weeks before. But there was that in his bearing, as well as in the confidence of his old soldiers, which inspired the new-comers with as absolute a sense of reliance upon him as was felt by the oldest of his veterans. The plan, in general terms, was for General Steedman, on the extreme left, to move out early in the morning, threatening the rebel right, while the cav- alry, which had been placed on the extreme right, and A. J. Smith's corps were to make a grand left wheel with the entire right wing, assaulting and, if possible, overlapping the left of Hood's position. Wood was to form the pivot for this wheel, and to threaten and perhaps attack Montgomery Hill; while General Schofield was to be held in reserve, near the left center, for such use as the exigency might develop. It was not daylight, on the morning of the 15th of December, when the army began to move. In most of the camps reveille had been sounded at 4 o'clock, and by 6 everything was ready. It turned out a warm, sunny, winter morning. A dense fog at first hung over the valleys and completely hid all movements, but by 9 o'clock this had cleared away. General Steedman, on the extreme left, was the first to draw out of the defenses, and to assail the enemy at their works between the Nolensville and Murfreesboro' pikes. It was not intended as a real attack, though it had that effect. Two of Steed- man's brigades, chiefly colored troops, kept two divisions of Cheatham's corps constantly busy, while his third was held in reserve; thus one Confederate corps was disposed of. S. D. Lee's corps, next on Cheatham's left, after send- ing two brigades to the assistance of Stewart, on the Confederate left, was held in place by the threatening position of the garrison troops, and did not fire a shot during the day. Indeed, both Cheatham's and Lee's corps were held, as in a vise, between Steedman and Wood. Lee's corps was unable to move or to fight. Steedman maintained the ground he occupied till the next morn- ing, with no very heavy loss. When, about 9 o'clock, the sun began to burn away the fog, the sight from General Thomas's position was inspiring. A little to the left, on Montgomery Hill, the salient of the Confederate lines, and not more than six hundred yards distant from Wood's salient, on Lawrens Hill, could be seen the advance line of works, behind which an unknown force of the enemy lay in wait. Beyond, and along the Hillsboro' Pike, were stretches of stone wall, "with here and there a detached earth-work, through whose embrasures peeped the threatening artillery. To the right, along the valley of Richland Creek, the dark line of Wilson's advancing cavalry could be seen slowly making its difficult way across the wet, swampy, stumpy ground. Close in front, and at the foot of the hill, its right joining Wilson's left, was A. J. Smith's corps, full of cheer and enterprise, and glad to be once more in the open field. Then VOL. IV. 30 457 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. VIEWS O(F FORT 'F.OLEY 0N THE LEFT O Tilts UNION ENTHiENCIt.NTR.X NASUVILLE, BETWCeN TItF,' FUXlJI,.lo AND NOLENSVILLE PIra. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS. - The lower pieture showe a e-elate protected with railroati troun. The hills in the distanee were the Conftderate center and left at the opelning of the tight. came the Fourth Corps, whose left, bending back toward the north, was hid- den behind Lawrens Hill. Already the skirmishers were engaged, the Confed- erates slowly falling back before the determined and steady pressure of Smith and Wood. Bv the time that Wilson's and Smith's lines were fully extended and brought up to within striking distance of the Confederate works, along the Hillsboro' Pike, it was noon. Post's brigade of Wood's old division (now commanded by General Sam Beatty), which lay at the foot of Montgomery Hill, full of dash and spirit, had since morning been regarding the works at the sum- mit with covetous eyes. At Post's suggestion, it was determined to see which party wanted them most. Accordingly, a charge was ordered - and in a moment the brigade was swarming up the hillside, straight for the enemy's advanced works. For almost the first time since the grand assault on Mis- sionary Ridge, a year before, here was an open field where everything could be seen. From General Thomas's headquarters everybody looked on with breathless suspense, as the blue line, broken and irregular, but with steady persistence, made its way up the steep hillside against a fierce storm of mus- ketry and artillery. Most of the shots, however, passed over the men's heads. 458 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. It was a struggle to keep up with the colors, and, as they neared the top, only the strongest were at the front. Without a moment's pause, the color- bearers and those who had kept up with them, Post himself at the head, leaped the parapet. As the colors waved from the summit, the whole line swept forward and was over the works in a twinkling, gathering in prisoners and guns. Indeed, so large was the mass of the prisoners that a few minutes later was seen heading toward our own lines, that a number of officers at Gen- eral Thomas's headquarters feared the assault had failed and the prisoners were Confederate reserves who had rallied and retaken the works. But the fear was only momentary; for the wild outburst of cheers that rang across the valley told the story of complete success. Meanwhile, farther to the right, as the opposing lines neared each other, the sound of battle grew louder and louder, and the smoke thicker and thicker, until the whole valley was filled with the haze. It was now past noon, and, at every point the two armies were so near together that an assault was inev- itable. Hatch's division of Wilson's cavalry, at the extreme right of the continuous line, was confronted by one of the detached works which Hood had intended to be "impregnable "; and the right of McArthur's division of A. J. Smith's infantry was also within striking distance of it. Coon's cav- alry brigade was dismounted and ordered to assault the work, while Hill's infantry brigade received similar orders. The two commanders moved for- ward at the same time, and entered the work together, Colonel Hill falling dead at the head of his command. In a moment the whole Confederate force in that quarter was routed and fled to the rear, while the captured guns were turned on them. With the view of extending the operations of Wilson's cavalry still farther to the right, and if possible gaining the rear of the enemy's left, the two divi- sions of the Twenty-third Corps that had been in reserve near Lawrens Hill were ordered to Smith's right, while orders were sent to Wilson to gain, if possible, a lodgment on the Granny White Pike. These orders were promptly obeyed, and Cooper's brigade on reaching its new position got into a hand- some fight, in which its losses were more than the losses of the rest of the Twenty-third Corps during the two days' battle. But though the enemy's left was thus rudely driven from its fancied security, the salient at the center, being an angle formed by the line along Hillsboro' Pike and that stretching toward the east, was still firmly held. Post's successful assault had merely driven out or captured the advance forces; the main line was intact. As soon as word came of the success- ful assault on the right, General Thomas sent orders to General Wood, com- manding the Fourth Corps, to prepare to attack the salient. The staff-officer by whom this order was sent did not at first find General Wood; but seeing the two division commanders whose troops would be called upon for the work, gave them the instructions. As he was riding along the line he met one of the brigade commanders -an officer with a reputation for excep- tional courage and gallantry-who, in reply to the direction to prepare for the expected assault, said, " You don't mean that we've got to go in here and 459 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. attack the works on that hill " " Those are the orders," was the answer. Looking earnestly across the open valley, and at the steep hill beyond, from which the enemy's guns were throwing shot and shell with uncomfortable frequency and nearness, he said, " Why, it would be suicide, sir; perfect sui- cide." "Nevertheless, those are the orders," said the officer; and he rode on to complete his work. Before he could rejoin General Thomas the assault was made, and the enemy were driven out with a loss of guns, colors, and prisoners, and their whole line was forced to abandon the works along the Hillsboro' Pike and fall back to the Granny White Pike. The retreating line was followed by the entire Fourth Corps (Wood's), as well as by Y the cavalry and Smith's troops; but night soon fell, and the whole army went into bivouac in the open fields wherever they chanced to be. At dark, Hood, who at 12 VIEW OF A PART OF THE UNION LINES AT WASUILLIL o'clock had held an unbroken, F ROM A 1VOTOGRtAM. kfortified line from the Murfrees- boro' to the Hillsboro Pike, with an advanced post on Montgomery Hill and five strong redoubts along the Hillsboro' Pike, barely maintained his hold of a line from the Murfreesboro' Pike to the Granny White Pike, near which on two large hills the left of his army had taken refuge when driven out of their redoubts by Smith and Wilson. These hills were more than two miles to the rear of his morning position. It was to that point that Bate, who had started from Hood's right when the assault was first deliv- ered on the redoubts, now made his way amidst, as he says, " streams of stragglers, and artillerists, and horses, without guns or caissons -the sure indications of defeat." General Hood, not daunted by the reverses which had befallen him, at once set to work to prepare for the next day's struggle. As soon as it was dusk Cheatham's whole corps was moved from his right to his left; Stewart's was retired some two miles and became the center; Lee's also was withdrawn and became the right. The new line extended along the base of a range of hills two miles south of that occupied during the day, and was only about half as long as that from which he had been driven. During the night the Confederates threw up works along their entire front, and the hills on their flanks were strongly fortified. The flanks were also further secured by return works, which prevented them from being left "in the air." Altogether, the position was naturally far'more formidable than that just abandoned. At early dawn the divisions of the Fourth Corps moved forward, driving out the opposing skirmishers. The men entered upon the work with such ardor that the advance soon quickened into a run, and the run almost into a 46o REPELLNG HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. SOTH-WEST FiROnT OF THE CAPITOL AT NASHVILLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. The view is toward the battle-field. Near the hase of the tirst eolumn is seen in the diatanee the flag of Fort Negley. charge. They took up their posi- tions in front of the enemy's new line, at one point coming within 250 yards of the salient at Overton's Hill. Here they were halted, and threw up works, while the artillery on both sides kept up a steady and accurate fire. Steed- man also moved forward and about noon joined his right to Wood's left, thus completing the alignment. On his way to the front General Thomas heard the cannonading, and, as was his custom, rode straight for the spot where the action seemed heaviest. As he was passing a large, old-fashioned house, his attention was attracted by the noise of a window closing with a slam. Turning to see the cause, he was greeted by a look from a young lady whose expression at the moment was the reverse of angelic. With an amused smile, the general rode on, and soon forgot the incident in the excitement of battle. But this trifling event had a sequel. The young lady, in process of time, became the wife of an officer then serving in General Thomas's army,-though he did not happen to be a witness of this episode. The ground between the two armies for the greater part of the way from the Franklin to the Granny White Pike is low, open, and crossed bv frequent streams running in every direction, and most of the fields were either newly plowed or old corn-fields, and were heavy, wet, and muddy from the recent storms. Overton's Hill, Hood's right, is a well-rounded slope, the top of which was amply fortified, while hills held by the left of his line just west of the Granny White Pike are so steep that it is difficult to climb them, and their summits were crowned with formidable barricades, in front of which 46i REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE were abatis and masses of fallen trees. Between these extremities the works in many places consisted of stone walls covered with earth, with head-logs on the top. To their rear were ample woods, sufficiently open to enable troops to move through them, but thick enough to afford good shelter. Artillery was also posted at every available spot, and good use was made of it. The morning was consumed in moving to new positions. Wilson's cav- alry, by a wide detour, had passed beyond the extreme Confederate left, and secured a lodgment on the Granny White Pike. But one avenue of escape was now open for Hood-the Franklin Pike. General Thomas hoped that a vigorous assault by Schofield's corps against Hood's left would break the line there, and thus enable the cavalry, relieved from the necessity of operating against the rebel flank, to gallop down the Granny White Pike to its junction with the Franklin, some six or eight miles below, and plant itself square across the only remaining line of retreat. If this scheme could be carried out, nothing but capture or surrender awaited Hood's whole army. Meantime, on the National left, Colonel Post, who had so gallantly carried Montgomery Hill the morning before, had made a careful reconnoissance of Overton's Hill, the strong position on Hood's right. As the result of his observation, he reported to General Wood, his corps commander, that an assault would cost dear, but he believed it could be made successfully; at any rate he was ready to try it. The order was accordingly given, and everything prepared. The brigade was to be supported on either side by fresh troops to be held in readiness to rush for the works the moment Post should gain the parapet. The bugles had not finished sounding the charge, when Post's brigade, preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, moved forward, in perfect silence, with orders to halt for nothing, but to gain the works at a run. The men dashed on, Post leading, with all speed through a shower of shot and shell. A few of the skirmishers reached the parapet; the main line came within twenty steps of the works, when, by a concentrated fire of musketry and artillery from every available point of the enemy's line, the advance was momentarily checked, and, in another instant, Post was brought down by a wound, at first reported as mortal. This slight hesitation and the disabling of Post were fatal to the success of the assault. The leader and animating spirit gone, the line slowly drifted back to its original position, losing in those few minutes nearly 300 men; while the supporting brigade on its left lost 250. Steedman had promised to cooperate in this assault, and accordingly Thompson's brigade of colored troops was ordered to make a demonstration at the moment Post's advance began. These troops had never before been in action and were now to test their mettle. There had been no time for a reconnaissance, when this order was given, else it is likely a way would have been found to turn the enemy's extreme right flank. The colored brigade moved forward against the works east of the Franklin Pike and nearly parallel to it. As they advanced, they became excited, and what was intended merely as a demonstration was unintentionally converted into an actual assault. Thompson, finding his men rushing forward at the double-quick, gallantly led them to the very slope of the intrenchments. But, in their advance across 462 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE. the open field, the continuity of his line was broken by a large fallen tree. As the men separated to pass it, the enemy opened an enfilading fire on the exposed flanks of the gap thus created, with telling effect. In consequence, at the very moment when a firm and compact order was most needed, the line came up ragged and broken. Meantime Post's assault was repulsed, and the fire which had been concentrated on him was turned against Thomp- son. Nothing was left, therefore, but to withdraw as soon as possible to the original position. This was done without panic or confusion, after a loss of 467 men from the three regiments composing the brigade. When it was seen that a heavy assault on his right, at Overton's Hill, was threatened, Hood ordered Cleburne's old division to be sent over to the exposed point, from the extreme left, in front of Schofield. About the same time General Couch, commanding one of the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, told General Schofield that he believed he could carry the hill in his front, but doubted if he could hold it without assistance. The ground in front of General Cox, on Couch's right, also offered grand opportunities for a successful assault. Meantime the cavalry, on Cox's right, had made its way beyond the extreme left flank of the enemy, and was moving northward over the wooded hills direct to the rear of the extreme rebel left. General Thomas, who had been making a reconnaissance, had no sooner reached Schofield's front than General McArthur, who commanded one of Smith's divisions, impatient at the long waiting, and not wanting to spend the second night on the rocky hill he was occupying, told Smith that he could carry the high hill an front of Couch,-the same that Couch himself had told Schofield he could carry,-and would undertake it unless forbidden. Smith silently acquiesced, and McArthur set to work. Withdrawing McMillen's (his right) brigade from the trenches, he marched it by the flank in front of General Couch's position, and with orders to the men to fix bayonets, not to fire a shot and neither to halt nor to cheer until they had gained the enemy's works, the charge was sounded. The gallant brigade, which had served and fought in every part of the South-west, moved swiftly down the slope, across the narrow valley, and began scrambling up the steep hillside, on the top of which was the redoubt, held by Bate's division, and mounted also with Whitworth guns. The bravest onlookers held their breath as these gal- lant men steadily and silently approached the summit amid the crash of musketry and the boom of the artillery. In almost the time it has taken to tell the story they gained the works, their flags were wildly waving from the parapet, and the unmistakable cheer, " the voice of the American people," as General Thomas called it, rent the air. It was an exultant moment; but this was only a part of the heroic work of that afternoon. While MeMillen's brigade was preparing for this wonderful charge, Hatch's division of cavalry, dismounted, had also pushed its way through the woods, and had gained the tops of two hills that commanded the rear of the enemy's works. Here, with incredible labor, they had dragged, by hand, two pieces of artillery, and, just as McMillen began his charge, these opened on the hill where Bate was, up the opposite slope of which the infantry were scrambling. At the same time 463 REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSME. Coon's brigade of Hatch's division with resounding cheers charged upon the enemy and poured such volleys of musketry from their repeating-rifles as I have never heard equaled. Thus beset on both sides, Bate's people broke out of the works, and ran down the hill toward their right and rear as fast as their legs could carry them. It was more like a scene in a spectacular drama than a real incident in war. The hillside in front, still green, dotted with the boys in blue swarming up the slope; the dark background of high hills beyond; the lowering clouds; the waving flags; the smoke slowly rising through the leafless tree-tops and drifting across the valleys; the wonderful outburst of musketry; the ecstatic cheers; the multitude racing for life down into the valley below,- so exciting was it all, that the lookers-on instinctively clapped their hands, as at a brilliant and successful transformation scene, as indeed it was. For, in those few minutes, an army was changed into a mob, and the whole structure of the rebellion in the South-west, with all its possibilities, was utterly overthrown. As soon as the other divisions farther to the left saw and heard the doings on their right, they did not wait for orders. Every- where, by a common impulse, they charged the works in front, and carried them in a twinkling. General Edward Johnson and nearly all his division and his artillery were captured. Over the very ground where, but a little while before, Post's assault had been repulsed, the same troops now charged with resistless force, capturing fourteen guns and one thousand prisoners. Steedman's colored brigades also rallied and brought in their share of prison- ers and other spoils of war. Everywhere the success was complete. Foremost among the rejoicing victors was General Steedman, under whose command were the colored troops. Steedman had been a life-long Democrat and was one of the delegates, in 1860, to the Charleston convention, at which ultimately Breckinridge was nominated for President. As he rode over the field, immediately after the rout of the enemy, he asked, with a grim smile, as he pointed to the fleeing hosts, " I wonder what my Democratic friends over there would think of me if they knew I was fighting them with ' nigger' troops " I have not space to tell the story of the pursuit, which only ended, ten days later, at the Tennessee River. About a month before, General Hood had triumphantly begun his northward movement. Now, in his disastrous retreat, he was leaving behind him, as prisoners or deserters, a larger num- ber of men than General Thomas had been able to place at Pulaski to hinder his advance - to say nothing of his terrific losses in killed at Franklin. The loss to the Union army, in all its fighting,- from the Tennessee River to Nashville and back again,- was less than six thousand killed, wounded, and missing. At so small a cost, counting the chances of war, the whole North- west was saved from an invasion that, if Hood had succeeded, would have more than neutralized all Sherman's successes in Georgia and the Carolinas; saved by the steadfast labors, the untiring energy, the rapid combinations, the skillful evolutions, the heroic courage and the tremendous force of one man, whose name will yet rank among the great captains of all time. 464 THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN. BY JAMES HARRISON WILSON, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V., AND DREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A. - NTIL after Sheri- U dan's victory of the Opequon, Sep- tember 19, 1864, I had led the Third Cavalry DI- vision. Toward the close of October, 1864, I reported to Sherman at Gaylesville, Ala- bama, at which place the latter had suspended his northward pursuit of Hood, and after a full and in- teresting conference I was announced, on October 24th, as chief-of-cavalry, and placed in absolute command of all the mounted forces of the three armies, only a small proportion of which were actu- ally with the colors for duty. This force was by the same orderdetached entirelyfrom the control of the army commanders and designated as the Cavalry Corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi. General Sherman, after issuing all the necessary instructions and unfolding his plans for the opera- tions of the army, and especially of this new corps, generously added: " Do the best you can with it, and if you make any reputation out of it I shall not undertake to divide it with you." Thus the paper organization had its origin; but inasmuch as most of the force was dismounted and detach- ments of it were scattered from east Tennessee to south-western Missouri, much the greater part of the real work of reorganization had yet to be done. By special orders Kilpatrick's division of some- thing over five thousand men, and a full eomple- ment of horses taken from other divisions and brigades, was detached from the corps and marched down to the sea with Sherman, while the nuclei of the six other divisions into which the corps was divided, commanded then or afterward by Generals E. M. McCook, Eli Long, Emory Up- ton, Edward Hatch, R. W. Johnson, and Joseph F. Knipe, in the order named, took part in the campaign against Hood and in the final overthrow of the rebellion. Meanwhile the work went on of collecting, remounting, and reequipping these troops and disposing them so as to cover the operations of the Federal infantry and to develop the plans and movements of Hood. On the 30th of October, 1864, Hood's army crossed the Tennessee on its northward march, three miles below Bainbridge, and this circum- stance was promptly detected by General Croxton, commanding the First Brigade of McCook's divi- sion, lately remounted at Louisville, and was re- ported at once to General Thomas, who had just taken post at Nashville. Without waiting for orders Croxton then made haste to collect his brigade and lead it against the enemy; but as he could not muster over a thousand troopers for duty, he failed to cheek the rebel advance and was soon forced to take up a position of observation behind Shoal Creek, where he was joined on the 5th of Novem- ber by General Hatch, with the Fifth Division, which had but recently come from west Tennessee. A few days later these united forces, under Hatch, with not over 3000 men in the saddle, took the offensive, recrossed Shoal Creek, and drove the rebel cavalry sharply back upon the infantry at Florence, capturing a part of the unfinished field- works at that place. By great activity and vigi- lance, General Hatch discovered every movement of the enemy and promptly and correctly reported every indication of his intentions to Stanley, Scho- field, or Thomas, or to me. After becoming con- vinced that Hood would soon advance, Hatch employed his force in felling trees in the roads and obstructing the fords so as to delay his march as much as possible. I arrived at Nashville on the 6th of November, and by the aid of a large staff, mostly from the regular army, pressed forward the preparations of the corps for the campaign which it was now evident that the resolute Hood was about to be- gin for the capture of Nashville and the posses- sion of middle Tennessee. The Federal forces in that region, infantry as well as cavalry, were widely scattered. They were the remnants of three armies, and although the supreme command had been con- ferred on Thomas, a host in himself, aided by such able lieutenants as Generals Stanley, Schofield, Steedman, Cox, and Thomas J. Wood, and finally by A. J. Smith, it was by no means certain that their forces could be welded into an efficient army in time to cheek the onset of Hood's fleet-footed and fiercely aggressive veterans. On the 19th of November the enemywas reported by the cavalry pickets as marching north in force on the west side of Shoal Creek, and this was con- firmed without delay by a cavalry reconnoissance in force, which resulted in the capture of the head- quarters trainsbelongingtoChalmers's andlBuford's divisions, and in a severe engagement with those commands. Constant marching, accompanied by heavy fighting and many skirmishes, followed. The Federal cavalry, underthe immediate direction of Hatch, who showed great coolness and steadi- ness, slowly fell back through Lexington. Law- renceburg, Pulaski, and Lynnville to Columbia, where all its detachments then in that theater of operations were for the first time collected under my command. Having as far as possible eom- pleted my arrangements at Nashville, I had taken the field in person a few days before. At this juncture Hatch's division had been reduced to 2500 men and horses for duty, Croxton's brigade to about 1000, and Capron's to 800-in all only 4300 men. After the concentration of the National forces in the strongly fortified camp at Columbia, where Schofield had paused to give the army a breathing- 466 466 THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN. spell and to insure the safety of its satkIriel, the cavalry withdrew to the north side of Duck River, and was so disposed as to watch the enemy's move- ments either to the right or the left. It was here strengthened by the arrival of several regiments from the remount eamp at Louisville, and not- withstanding the terrible work avid waste of the campaign that followed, it grew stronger and stronger till after the battle of Nashville. At noon of November 2Sth the pickets of Crox- ton's and Capron's brigades gave notice of the appearance of the Confederate cavalry at the vari- ous fords of the Duck River between Columbia and the crossing of the Lewiaburg turnpike. Shortly afterward the pickets were driven in, and at 2: 1(1 P. m., on the same day, I notified General Schofield of the enemy's determined advance anid that I should therefore concentrate the cavalry that night on the Lewisburg turnpike near Rally Hill. so as to prevent the enemy from occupying that highway and marching rapidly to Franklin, at the crossing of the Harpeth River, and also at the junction of the Lewisburg and the Columbia turnpikes. I assumed, as a matter of course, that Schofield would fall back on the last-men- tioned turnpike, and that thin arrangement would force the enemy to advance slowly and with cau- tion, by either of these roads, or still move slowly by the dirt road, from Huey's Mills to Spring Hill. By 7 P. m. the entire cavalry, after much skirmish- ing and rapid marching, was concentrated at Hurt's Cross-roads, near Rally Hill, and by mid- night it had become certain that Forrest's entire command, followed by the infantry of Hood's army, were crossing at Hupy's Mills, and would probably move at early dawn toward Spring Hill. Accordingly, at 1 A. m. of that night, I sent a dis- patch by courier to General Schofield informing him of these facts, and suggesting that he should reach Spring Hill, only twelve miles away. with the infantry of his army, by 10 A. U., be- cause Hood's advance-guard would probably get there by noon. This dispatch was received at daylight on the 29th, and thereupon Stanley, with one division, was ordered to march at once to that place, while the remainder of the army held on at Columbia, and in its vicinity, till the next night. Mleanwhile Hood had marched in the direction anld by the road indicated in my dispatch, but fortunately he was met by the gallant and eapa- ble Stanley already in position covering Spring Hill and field at bay till Schofield, under cover of darkness, was enabled to rescue his imperiled command and make good his retreat into the for- tified camp at Franklin. Forrest followed me along the Lewisburg turnpike, as had also been foreseen, but, thanks to the steadiness of the imperturbable Croxton (who declined all assist- anee from Hatch, and coolly declared that he needed nobody's help to cover a retreat, if the rest of the corps would only get out of the way and give him a clear road), the Confederate cavalry commander not only gained no advantage but was foiled in all his efforts to overthrow the rear- guard. or to strike the retreating column in flank. The battle of Franklin occurred the next day, and, as is well known, resulted in a signal victory for the National arms, and also in irreparable loss of men and officers to Hood's gallant army. On the Union side the heroes were Stanley and Cox and Opdycke. Their promlpt action neutralized the faults of others, and wrested victory from the intrepid Cleburne and his no less intrepid com- panions. One important circumstance connected with this battle has been persistently dwarfed or neg- lected altogether by historians. Simultaneously with Hood's infantry assault, his cavalry under Chalmers advane!d to the attack, driving back Croxton and his pickets from the Lewisburg turn- pike to the north side of the Harpeth River, where Hatch, Johnson, aneI Harrison's troopers had been disposed so as to cover and watch the fords and protect the heft and rear of Schofield's army. Realizing the importance of holding this position, as soon as the rebel cavalrymen had made their appearance on the north side of the river, which properly formed the real line of defense for the Union army, I ordered Hatch and Croxton to attack with vigor, and drive the enemy into the river if possible, while Harrison with Capron's old brigades would look well to the left and rear. The field was broken by hills, cov- ered with woods and small cleaeings, not specially unfavorable to mounted men; but the occasion was a grave one. It indicated either the advance of Hood's whole army, as at Duck River, or a turning movement by his cavalry; and in either case, from the fact that the National infantry and artillery were still on the south side of the river, it was absolutely necessary for their safety that my orders should be carried out to the letter. My subordinate commanders dismounted every man that could be spared, and went in with a rush that was irresistible. The fight was at first somewhat desultory, but toward the middle of the afternoon it became exceedingly sharp. The enemy's troop- ers fought with their accustomed gallantry, but the Union cavalrymen, outnumbering their antag- onists for the first time amid skillfully directed, swept everything before them. So closely did they press the enemy that they drove them into the water wherever they reached it. No time was allowed them to find the fords, and no rest was given them till the last man was driven to the south side of the river. Upon this occasion Hood made a fatal mistake, for it will be observed that he had detached Forrest with two divisions of his corps on a side operation, which left him only Chalmers's division to cooperate as described with the main attack of his infantry. Had his whole cavalry force advanced against me it is possible that it would have sueeeded in driving us back. Immediately after the close of the cavalry bat- tle, and when it was certain that there was no further attack to be expected that night, I rode to General Schofield's headquarters, which I found in the square redoubt on the north side of the river. It was then dark and the arrangements for the withdrawal of the army to Nashville had been completed. Schofield and Stanley, the latter severely wounded, were together discussing the THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN. events of the day. After I had made my report Sehofleld thanked me for my services, and added: Your success is most important; it insures the safety of this army, for, notwithstanding our great victory to-day over Hood, we should not have been able to withdraw from Franklin, or to main- tami ourselves there, bitt for the defeat and repulse of Forrest's cavalry, which was evidently aiming to turn our left flank and throw itself upon our lihe of retreat." Ie then gave me orders to hold the position till ilaylight the next morning, after whici I should withdraw, covering the rear and flanks of the infantry as it marched toward Nash- ville. This duty was successfully performed with but little skirmishing. The infantry had already oecupied the fortifications at Nashville, and, there being no room for the cavalry immediately behind them, late on the evening of December 2d it crossed the Cumberland and went into camp at Edgefield. For forty days my force had been constantly engaged it, marching and fighting or in watching the enemy, and therefore it was in great need of rest. It had lost heavily, especially in horses. Many troopers had been dismounted, and many more were coming from furlough or detached service without horses or equipments; hence it was necessary to make the most extraordinary efforts to obtain remounts and otherwise to fit the corps for the field. General Thomas now resolved to take a few days for repairing the losses and perfecting the organiza- tion of his hastily improvised army, especially the cavalry, upon which so much depended. He frankly made his plans and views known to the War Department and to the general-in-chief, but without receiving their proper sympathy and support. [See p. 4.54.] General Grant issued positive orders to mareh out and attack Hood in his intrenched position without further delay. In spite, however, of the doubts at first, and of the urgent orders afterward, Thomas stood fast be- hind his intrenchments. I sent out through Ten- nessee and Kentucky to impress horses, which the Secretary of War had cheerfully and promptly authorized me to do at the first intimation of a necessity for such an extreme measure. The cav- alry officers did their duty well and rapidly, spar- ing no man's horses provided they were fit for cavalry service. Governor Johnson, then vice- president elect, no less than the farmers, the street-car companies, and the cireuses, was called upon to give up his horses, and did so without a murmur. It was a busy time for the division, bri- gade, and regimental commanders as well as for the cavalry corps staff. Every man and offier did his best. A. J. Alexander, chief-of-staff; E. B. Beaumont, the adjutant-general; L. M. Hosea, the mustering officer; E. B. Carling, the quartermas- ter; J. C. Read, the commissary of subsistence; Bowman, Green, and H. E. Noyes, the inspectors; J. N. Andrews, W. W. Van Antwerp, G. H. Knee- land, Webster, and Pool, the aides-de-camp,-all officers of rare experience and intelligence,-threw themselves into the work and kept it up night and day till it was completed. Clothing was drawn for the men, the horses were shod, extra shoes were fitted, and every horse in the corrals or hos- pitals fit for service, or that could be found in the country, cities, towns, and villages, was taken and issued to the troopers, who were now flocking in from all quarters. In just seven days the effective force of the corps was reported to General Thomas at 12t,04)0 men, mounted, armed, and equipped, besides about :3000 for whom it was impossible to find remounts, but who were organized as in- fantry. They were all present for the impending struggle, except the brigades of La Grange and Watkins, which had been sent to drive a raiding party under Lyon and Crossland out of Kentucky. At a meeting of the corps commanders, called by General Thomas the nMt of the _oth, the feasi- bility of carrying out General Grant's urgent orders to fight was fully considered. The plan of battle, which had already been outlined by General Thomas, involved a granA turming movement by the cavalry, and the active cooperation of that arm with the infantry at every stae othe engagement. I fully understood this, when, as the junior officer present, I was asked to speak first. I gave it as my decided opinion that it was folly to jeopard the chances of success by moving in such a storm and over tha-ground covered, as it then was, by a continuous glare of ice. I added that if the move- ment were delayed till the thaw, which in that climate might be expected soon, had set in, success was certain, and, in conclusion, declared that if I were occupying such an intrenched line as Hood's, with my dismounted cavalrymen, each armed with nothing more formidable than a basket of brick- bats, I would agree to defeat the whole Confederate army if it should advance to the attack under such circumstances. At this remark the assembled offi- cers, including Thomas, broke into a smile, where- upon the veteran Thomas J. Wood, commanding the Fourth Corps, a mach older and more experienced cavalryman of the regular army than I, expressed his hearty concurrence. This was also entirely in accord with Thomas s own opinion, and, inasmnc h as no one in that meeting expressed a different one or made a different suggestion, the meeting was dismissed with the information that no move- ment would be made for the time being. I was asked to remain after the others had gone, and it was upon that occasion that General Thomas, after repeating the orders he had received and the reply he had made to them b'eore he had consulted his officers, added, with a depth of feeling and emotion which he did not attempt to conceal: "Wilson, they [meaning General Grant and the War Department] treat me as though I were a boy and incapable of planning a campaign or fighting a battle. If they will let me alone I will fight this battle just as soon as it can be done, and will surelv win it: but I will not throw the victory away nor sacrifice the brave men of this army by mov- ing till the thaw begins. I will surrender my com- mand without a murmur, if they wish it; but I will not act against my judgment when I know I am right, and in sueh a grave emergency." Fortunately for him andl for the country the thaw set in on the night of the 13th, and had so 467 468 THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN. far progressed that the action was begun on the morning of the 1i th, just as he had planned it. The story of what followed has been told and re- told many times, and never better than by Colonel Stone [see p. 451(1], but even he has failed, for want of space, to set forth the decisive part per- formed by the cavalry corps in the great events which followed. The official reports reveal how it was arranged on the night of the 14th that the cavalry, which had reerossed to the south side of the river and en- camped in the suburbs of the city, behind the right wing of the infantry, should sally from the fortified line against the Confederate left as soon as it was light enough to see, and how A. J. Smith's veterans of the Sixteenth Corps should move to their posi- tion in line of battle by the rear of the cavalry rather than across its front, so as not to delay it, but failed to carry out the arrangement, and thereby delayed the beginning of the battle an hour and a half longer than the time of delay due to the fog which prevailed in the early morning. Fortunately, however, this did not derange the plan of operations, though it cut an hour and a half off the period of daylight in which to press the advantages of the first day, and the pursuit after Hood's lines were broken and put to flight on the evening of the second day. Most historians of the Rebellion have followed the official reports of the great battle which ensued, but these reports were written too soon afterward, especially that of General Thomas, to give a strictly accurate account of the various movements, and of the results produced by them, or to consider prop- erly the delay caused by the fog, and by Smith's movement. They have also fallen into error in giving M.cArthur's gallant infantry credit for en- tering the Confederate works on the first day, simultaneously with or ahead of the dismounted cavalry, while the fact is that the infantry joined in the charge against the works because they saw Hatch's men on their right advancing gallantly and successfully to the assault. The conduct of the infantry on that occasion was all that could be de- sired; it did not hold back for orders, but led by the intrepid MeArthur it sprang gallantly to the attack, and did its best to overtake and outstrip the dismounted cavalrymen, as they swept up the steep hillsides and over the enemy's works, after having broken through and driven back his attenu- ated left wing. The race for victory which fol- lowed between rival arms of the service was an unusual scene in that or any other army. Up to that time the cavalry in the West had been re- served for independent operations, and had rarely been seen assaulting fortified positions. Such work had been, by common consent, left for the in- fantry; but now, under the influence of organiza- tion and discipline, the cavalry, with their Spencer repeating rifles, felt themselves equal to any task. And so well did they perform the one before them that MeArthur and his gallant men, in the heat and exultation of the moment, were loud in their praises of the dismounted cavalrymen, and generously awarded them the trophies of victory, together with the honor of being first to enter the works. It is impossible within the limits of a single chapter to give any adequate account of the gal- lant deeds of Hatch, Croxton, Hammond, Johnson, Knipe, Coon, Stewart, Spalding, and their name- less but invincible followers upon that glorious day. Using the horses, which they had called for so lust- ily, for the purpose of moving the fighting force of the corps with celerity, but without fatigue, across the hills and plowed fields, now softened by thaw- ing weather, to the vital points in the enemy's line, they were everywhere successful. Neither artil- lery nor musketry, nothing but darkness, could stay their onward progress, and after their first onset they looked upon fortifications and breast- works, abatis and entanglements, as new incite- ments to victory. Night found the bulk of their force a united and compact mass, bivouacked in the left and rear of the enemy's position, six miles from Nashville, and facing that city, with a firm grip on the Harding and Hillsborough turnpikes, and ready to press on toward the Granny White turnpike and the enemy's left center and rear at dawn the next day. They had captured sixteen field-guns from behind breastworks and redoubts and had taken many flags and prisoners. Early on the 16th the cavalry resumed its operations in accordance with General Thomas's original plan; Hatch continuing to press the en- emy's extreme left and rear, Hammond moving farther to the right, and Croxton in position to support either, as might be required, while John- son was sweeping in the same direction from the Charlotte turnpike on a wider circle. The country was still more hilly and densely covered with timber, and the enemy's line more compact and better able than the day before to resist attack from any quarter. As a consequence it was again necessary for the National cavalry to dis- mount and fight on foot, and its progress was correspondingly slow, except in Hammond's front. Indeed, Hood, discerning at an early hour that his principal danger lay in the direction of the cavalry attack, made extra exertions to hold it in cheek, and so stubbornly did his men bar the way that it seemed for a while impossible to advance farther. The exact dispositions made by Hood were con- cealed by the thick woods and undergrowth of the Brentwood Hills, and it was surmised that his new position might be found to be impregnable. To meet this contingency I suggested to General Thomas, about 10 A. M., that it might be well to transfer the whole or a part of the cavalry corps to the left, to see what effect it could produce upon the enemy's right flank. General Thomas agreed to the proposition, should another determined push from the various positions then occupied bythe cav- alry not be followed by satisfactory results. For- tunately, however, while this suggestion was being considered, the dismounted men, urged on by their gallant officers, continued their pressure, and by noon had driven the skirmishers close in upon Hood's main line, and had formed a continuous line Bee General Wileon' report. R- eport of the Congressional Conunittee on the Conduct of the War," Supplement, Part I., pp. 40e-422.-J. H. W. THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN. from the right of Schofield's corps to and beyond the granny White turnpike, which passed north and south through Hood's left center. Thus it will be seen that Hood's entire left wing was enveloped front and rear, and would be obliged to give way whenever it was vigorously and simultaneously assailed from opposite sides. Riding close up to the front, and perceiving the advantageous position which my men had gained, I sent my staff-offieers, one after another, to Gen- erals SchoIteld and Thomas with infor- Ration of the success, accompanied by suggestions that the infantry should at- tack with vigor. It was during this stage of the battle that a most important dis- patch from Hood to Chalmers (Forrest was still ablsent) was captured and brought to me, and forwarded by me at once to (General Thomas. This dispatch seems to have been lost after the battle; at all X events it has disappeared, but its charac- ter impressed it upon the memory of all who saw it. It ran, in substance, as fol- lows: "For GoPs Sake drive the Yankee cavalry from our left and rear, or all is lost." I found Thomas with Schofield in rear of the right of the line, and explained to them the situation, which was fortu- nately made entirely clear to them by the sight of the dismounted cavalrymen in ,r, full view, skirmishing heavily with the Confederate left, and also by the fire of a sec- tion of horse artillery, which had been dragged up the steep hillsides to a commanding position in rear of the Confederate works, and was pouring a heavy fire into them. Occasionally a shot would pass over the heads of the enemy and fall into our own lines. Seeing all this Thomas turned to Scho- field and indicated that the time had come for the infantry to advance. This was between half-past three and four o'clock. Schofield ordered his men forward at once, and as they charged the Confederate lines in front Hatch's dismounted cavalrvmen entered them from the rear. Pressed on all sides, and perceiving that further resistance was futile if not impossible, the Confederates broke and fled in confusion from the field, leaving nearly all their artillery and many prisoners to fall into our hands. The cav- alrymen had, however, become separated from their horses by an unusual distance, and, although the latter were hurried forward as rapidly as pos- sible, and Croxton, who was most available, was ordered to mount and push without delay through Brentwood, to be followed by Hatch and Ham- mond as soon as they could mount, it had become so dark before they were well under way in pur- suit that the men could scarcely see their horses' ears. It was a rainy and disagreeable night, but nevertheless Hatch, Knipe, Croxton, Hammond, Coon, and Spalding dashed forward, each vying with the other for the advance, and each doing his best to reach the Franklin turnpike that night so as to drive the now thoroughly disorganized -M-.R)It J.AMES H. WILSOiN Fi)oMA enemy from his last line of retreat. Orders were also sent to Johnson to move rapidly by the Hills- borough turnpike, and after crossingthe Harpeth to turn up its south bank and fall upon the enemy at or near Franklin. Every one obeyed orders with alacrity, but darkness and distance were against them. Hatch's column had not gone more than two miles when its advance under Colonel Spaldl- ing encountered Chalmers's cavalry strongly posted across the roa i behind a fence-rail barricale. They charged it at once, and a spirited hand-to- hand melee ensued, in which many men were killed and wounded on each side. Colonel Spald- ing had the honor of capturing Brigadier-General Rucker, in a personal encounter, in which each had seized and wrested the other's saber from him, and used it against its owner. It was a scene of pandemonium, in which every challenge was answered by a saber stroke or pistol shot, and the Hash of the carbine was the only light by which the combatants could recognize each others position. The gallant Confederates were driven in turn from every fresh position taken up by them, and the running fight was kept up till nearly midnight. Chalmers had, however, done the work cut out for him gallantly and well. He was overborne and driven back, it is true, but the delay which le forced upon the Federal cavalry by the stanl he had made was sufficient to enable the fleeing Von- federate infantry to sweep by the danger-point that night, to improvise a rear-guard. and to make good their retreat the next day. During the hurrying night ride down the Granny 469 470 THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN. White turnpike I was overtaken by General Thomas after it was so dark that men could reeog- ilize eaeh other ontly by their voices. Thomas, rid- ing up on my right, exclaimed iIL a tone of ex1ultai- tion never to be forgotten: ' Didn't I tell yon we conld lick 'em didn't I tell you we could lick 'em, if they would only let us. alone I" (referring of course to the Washington authorities). After a few words of congratulation hie turned about and leisurely rode back into camp. The pursuit was resumed at the earliest dawn next morning and was kept up throughout the day, with a succession of sharp engagements, in which the Union cavalry was always victorious. Late in the evening, apparently exhausted with rapid marching, the enemy took up a strong posi- tion in the open fields about a mile north of the West Harpeth River. It was then so dark from fog and approaehing night that the men of Hateh's division, who had become somewhat intermingled with the sullen and taciturn Confederate stragglers, began to doubt that the ranks which were now looming up in their front were really those of the enemny's rear-guard. The momentary hesitation caused by this doubt gave Forrest an opportunity to straighten his lines and to post his single remaisn- ing battery in position so as to sweep the turnpike. Hatch on the left and Knipe on the right were at once ordered to charge the enemy's flaunks, while the Fourth regular cavalry, under-Lieutenant Hedges, was directed straight against his center. Seeing what was about to burst upon him, the battery commander opened with canister at short range, but had hardly emptied his guns before the storm brokeupon him as well as upon the entire rebel line. Forrest did his best to hold his ground, but it was impossible. Hedges rode headlong over the bat- tery and captured a part of his guns, while Hatch's horsemen, under a eounter-fire from their own guns, with irresistible fury swept everything before them. Before the fight was over night closedin and covered the field with a pall of impenetrable darkness. The scene, like that of the night before, was one of great confusion, but every musket-flash and every defiant shout was a guide to the gallant and unrelenting pursuers. Hammond, passing around the enemy's left, forded the West Harpeth, and with the Tenth Indiana Cavalry, Lieutenant- Colonel Ben. (Gresham commanding, struck a new line, formed a short distance south of the river, and in a desperate hand-to-hand fight, mounted men against footmen, saber and pistol against stout hearts and clubbed muskets, with the pall of dark- ness still over all, again seattered the enemy, capturing their remaining guns, and spreading confusion and terror throughout the retreating mass of now completely disorganized Confeder- ates. It was 10 o'clock before the National cavalry ceased the pursuit, and an hour later before order could be restored to its ranks. Men and horses were ravenously hungry and almost worn out with three days of continuous marching and fighting, and there was nothing left them but to bivouac on the field. At early dawn the next morning, the 1 9th, the cavalry corps, although entirely out of rations, resumed the pursuit, Hatch and Knipe pressing close upon the enemy's rear-guard, which had again been formed and was now commanded by Forrest in person, while Croxtoni and Johnson endeavored to reach around it and strike the re- treatinig Confederates at Sprinlg Hill. The d-nsely wooded hills, the muddy roads, the plowed lhlls, rendered almost impassable. by the constant rains, and, above all, the now rapidly rising streams1K made it impossible for the flanking columns travel- ing through the open country to overtake the enemy and again bring him to actionl. Late in the after- noon, ili a violent winter rain-storm, the advanced guard was halted at Rutherford ('reek, a conit- siderable stream, now full to the hills on either sile. The enemy had succeeded in destroying the bridges. The country had been entirely denuldld of supplies for both men and horses; the haver- stacks and forage-bags were empty, and there was no alternative but to wait for the suipply trains which had been ordered forward, and which joined late ill the night. But dluring the night the rain turned into a snow-storm, and by order of tGeneral Thomas the larger part of the cavalry corps re- mained in bivouac the next day, while Hatch was trying to repair the railroad bridge. The pontoon-train was also behind, anld didl not arrive till the next day. Meanwhile the pioneers of the cavalry were not idle. Those of Hatch's division, by dint of hard work, soon made the rail- road bridge passable for skirmishers, and by the morning of the 211th had built a floating bridge out of the debris of another railroad bridge. This enabled him to cross the creek with his whole command, but a few miles beyond he was again stopped by the Duck River, which was also at flood. The delay of the pursuit at Rutherford Creek was short, but it gave the enemy a breath- ing-spell, which was of great value to him. It en- abled him to get safely across the last considerable river between him and the Tennessee, to destroy the bridges which he had maintained at Columbia for the purpose of keeping communication open with the South, and, what was of still greater im- portance, to form all of his infantry that had not thrown their arms away into an effective rear- guard of eight brigades, each about five hundred strong. The Duck River proved impassable for the National cavalry till the single pontoon-train of the army could be brought forward, and this, owing to the condition of the roads and a mistake which had started it in the wrong direction, involved a further delay of twenty-four hours. However, the bridge was completed by the even- ing of the 23d, and that night the whole corps, except the dismounted men who had been sent back to Nashville, crossed to the south side of the river, and early next morning resumed the pursuit. Hood's reorganized rear-guard, under the redoubt- able Forrest, was soon encountered by the cav- alry advanced guard, and he was a leader not to be attacked by a handful of men, however bold. The few remaining teams and the rabble of the army had been hurried on toward the Tennessee, marching to Pulaski by turnpike and thence to Bainbridge by the dirt roads of the country. The rear-guard had thus a clear road, and when hard THE UNION CAVALRY IN THE HOOD CAMPAIGN. pressed could fall back rapidly. The open coun- try to the right and left of the turnpike was much broken, heavily wooded, and almost impassable, white the turnpike itself, threading the valleys, ,lepressions, and gorges, offered many advanta- geous po1itioIIs for defense; hence witll, a few men the pursuing force could 1i madle to develop a front almost anywhere, and henlec its progress was at times comparatively slow. But, withal, the enetmy was closely pressed anid every opportunity VIs seized upon to bring him to bay. In the vicinity of Lynuville, the country being somewhat nimure open, he was (triven back rapidly, and at Iluf'rd's station, while General Hatch was en- gaging him upon the turnpike, General Crouxton struck him in the flank, captured one flag and a n.mber of prisoners, wounded General Abram Buford, and drove his canvalry rapidly beyond hi-liland Creek. Just luefore sundown on Christmas day Forrest, in, a fit of desperation, made a stand on a heavily wooded ridge at the head of a ravine, and by a ralpidl and savage counter-thrust drove back the skirisihers of Thomas Harrison's brigade, captur- ihg else gun, which he succeeded in carrying away, as the smole trophy of that desperate eampaig.. This was the last flicker of aggressive temper shown by any part of Hood's beaten and demoralized army. Hammond, Hatch, and C'roxton hastened to the front, and falling upon the flanks of the gallant confederates drove them from the field into the cover and safety of darkness. From that time till the Tennessee River was reached Forrest made a frequent show of resist- ance, each of which ended with nothing more serious than an insignificant skirmish. The weather had become worse and worse; it was cold and freezing during the nights, and followed by days of rain, snow, and thaw. The country, which was poor and thinly settled at best, had been absolutely stripped of forage and provisions by the march of contending armies. The men of both forces suffered dreadfully, but the poor cavalry horses fared still worse than their riders. Scarcely a withered corn-blade could be found for them, and thousands, exhausted by overwork, famished with hunger, or crippled so that death was a mercy, with hoofs dropping off from frost and mud, fell by the roadside never to rise again. By the time the corps found rest on the Tennessee River it could muster scarcely 7000 horses fit for service. The failure of the light-draught gun-boats on the Tennessee River to reach and destroy the pon- toon-bridge which Hood had kept in position in- sured his safe retreat. The cavalry advanced 4 When Hood reached Tupelo his whole army num- bered about 2ieeo. Forrest took his cavalry to Misls- sip1PI. and the infantry brigades of Gibson, Holtzclaw, Ecitor, Cockrell, and Sears, with some batteries of artil- lery, went to General Maury, at Mobile. Of the re- guard, under the active and enterprising Spalding, reached the north bank of the river just as the bridge had been swung to the south side and the last of the rebels were disappearing in. the dis- tance. Another part of the cavalry corps unde r General W. J. Palmer sallied olt from l)ecator with General Steedman and finally overtook the remnant of Hood's army, destroyed his pontdon- train, with all of his remaining wagons, and eap- tbired several hundred prisoners. The report of the provost-marshal shows that, during the operations beginning at Nashville on the 1.3th, and ending at the Tenn"essee River I 75. miles south, on the 28th of December, the cavalry corps captured 32 field-guns, I I caissons, 1 2 colors, :1:332 prisoners, including one general officer, one train of 80 pontoons, and 1 25, wagons, and compelled the enemy besides to abandon or destroy a large number of wagons. Its own losses were one field-gun, 122 d0lcers and men killed, 521 wounded, and 2n59 missing. It may be fairly claimed that the organization of the cavalry corps of the 'Military Division of the Mlississippi, during the progress of an active -am- paign, and in the presence of an invading army, the increase of that part of its force left in Tennessee from 4500 to 12,000 mounted men, the increase of its effective horses by impress- ment, the successes it gained in battle, and the persistencywith which it pursued the flying enemy, are without a parallel in the history of this or any other war. It may also be fairly claimed that there was no success gained over the enemy's left wing on either the first or second day of the battle of Nashville which was not primarily and directly due to the operations of the cavalry, and this is particularly true of the final assault which broke the enemy's lines and sent his army to the rear in confusion. It has been said in criticism of General Thomas, whose reputation as a great general as well as a winner of battles is more firmly founded upon his defeat of Hood at Nashville than upon any other event in his glorious career, that he made a mis- take in waiting to rest and especially to remount bis cavalry. The same writer also cites the fact that the cavalry fought mostly on foot as full justification for this remarkable criticism. It is sufficiently answered by the statement that the horses were used upon that occasion, as in all mod- erm wars where cavalry has appeared, mainly for the transportation of the fighting men, and not to fight themselves, and by the further and conclus-ive fact that Hood's army was effectually destroyed by the defeat at Nashville and. the subsequent pursuit. 4 malnder, perhaps five thousand Joined General John- ston in North Carolila the next spring. General Hood 01 Advance and Retreat," p. 514e says that nine thousand left the ranks between Tupelo and North Carolina.- EDrroR. 471 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NASHVILLE, DEC. 15-16, 1864. THE UNION ARMY, Major-General George H. Thomas. FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood. FIRST DIVISIoN, Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball. First Brigade, CoL Isaac2 M. Kirby: 21st 111.. Capt. William R. Jambon; sth III., Capt. Andrew M6. Pol- lard; 31st Ind., Col. John T. Smith; Slat Ind., Msj. Ed- ward G. Mathey; 90th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Samuel N. Yeoman; 101st Ohio, Lleut.-Col. Bedan B. MeDanald. Brigade loss: k, 20; w. 100 = 120. Second Brigade, Brig.-(en. Walter C. Whitaker: 96th Ill., Maj. George Ricks; 115th Iml., CaI. Jesse H. Moore; 35th Ind., Lient.- CoL. Augustus G. Tassin; 21st Ky., Col. James C. Evans; 2ad Ky., Lieut.-Col. George W. Northup: 45th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John H. Humphrey; Slat Ohio. LleAut.-Col. Charles H. Wood. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 38; mn, 1=49. Third Brigade, Brig.-Oen. William (irose: 75th Ill., Col. John E. Bennett; 80th Ill., Capt. James Cunningham; Bath 1ll., Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Morton; 9th Ind., Col. Isaae C. B. Susno; S0th Ind.. Capt. Henry W. Lawton; 6th Ind. (1 eo.), Lieut. Jobn P. SwIsher; 84th Ind.. Maj. John C. Taylor; 77th Pa., Lieat.-Col. Thomas E. Rose. Brigade los: k. 6; w, 75; m, I = ft ECOND DIVISIOx. Brig -.en. Washington L. Elliott. Firsd Brigade, Col. Emerson Opdycke: 36th Ill., Msa. Levi P. Holden; 44th flL, Capt. Alonzo W. Clark; 7Sd Ill., Capt. Wilson Burroughs; 74th and 8gth Ill.. Lieut.- Col. George W. Smith; 125th Ohlo, Maj. Joseph Bruff; 24th Wis, Capt. Willlam Kennedy. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 39; m, 4 = 51. Secod Brigade, CoL John Q. Lane: 100th Ill., Lteut.-CoL. Charles M. Hammond; 40th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Henry Leaming; 57th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Willis Blanch; 28th Ky., Lent.-Col. J. Rowan Boone; 16th Ohio, Capt. illtam Clark; 97th Ohio, Lient.-Col. Milton Barnes. Brigade loss: k. 4; w, 57; m, I= 62. Third Brigade, Col. Joseph Conrad: 42d Ill., Lieat-Col. Edgar D. Swain; 1.at Il., Capt. Albert M. Tilton; 79th 111., Col. Allen Buckner; 15th Mo.. Capt. George Ernst; 64th Ohio. Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Brown; 65th OhI., Maj.f Or- low Smith. Brigade loss: k. 8; . 47; m,2= 57. TuItD DIV18iso. Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty. First Brigade, Cl.. Abel D. Streight: 89th 11l., Lieut.- CoL William D. Williams; 51t Ind., Capt. Willam W. Seearee; 8th Kan.. Lieut.-CoL John Conover; 15th Ohio, Cal. Frank Askew, Lieut.-Col. John MeClenahan; 49th Ohio, Maj. Lnther M. Strong. Capt. Daniel Hart- Sough. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 20 = 24. Beeaad Bri- gade. CoL. P. Sidney Post. Leut.-Col. Robert L. Kim- berly: 59th nL, Maj. James M. Stookey; 41st Ohio, Lient.-CoL Robert L. Kimberly, Capt. Ezra Dunham; 71st Ohio, Lient.-Col. James H. Hart, Capt. William H. McClure; 93d Oho., Leut.-Col. Daniel Bowman; 124th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. James Pickanda. Brigade loss: k, 32; w, 26; m. 13 = 312. Third Brigade, CoL Frederitk Knefler: 79th Ind., Lteut.-CoL. George W. Parker; 85th Ind., Cal. George F. Dick; 13th Ohio (4 eo'.), Msj. Joseph T. Snider; 19th Ohio, Lieut.-CoL Henry G. Stratton. Brigadeloas: k,l; w.7=8. ARTIL.LERT. Maj. Wilbur P. Goodapeed: 25th Ind., Capt. Frederick C. Sturm; 1et Ky., Capt. T. S. Thomas- son; E. 1st Mich.. Capt. Peter De Vries; G, let Ohio, Capt. Alexander Marshall; 6th Ohio. Lieut. Aaron P. Baldwin; B, Pa.. Capt. Jaeob Ziegler; M. 4tb U. B., Lieut. Samuel Canby. Artillery loss: k,2; w, 4=6. TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. John M. Schofield. sECOXD DIvISIOW. j.-Gen. Dari.a N. Couch. Pirct Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph A. Cooper: 130th Ind., Col. Charles S. Parrish; 26th Ky.. Cal. Cicero Maxwell; 25th Mich., Capt. Samuel L. Demarest; 99th Ohio, Lieut.- Cot. John E. Cummnins; 3d Tenn.. Col. William Cross; 6th Tenn., Lient.-Col. Edward Maynard. Brigade loss: k. 7; w, 82 = 89. Send Brigade, Col. Orlando H. Moore: 107th Ill.. Capt. John W. Wood; 80th Ind., Lieut.-CoL. Alfred D. Owen; 129th Ind., Cot. Charles A. 472 Zollinger; 23d Mich.. Col. Oliver L. Spaulding; 111th Ohio, Col. Isac R. Sherwood; 118th Ohio, Maj. Edgar Sower.. Brigade Ioss: k, 2; w, 34 = 36. Third Brigade, Col. John Mehrtnger: 91st Ind.. Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Butterfield; 123d Ind.. Col. JohIn C. MeQu1iston; 60th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Hamluton S. Slillespie; 1824 Ohlo, Col. George W. Rage. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 20=22. Ar- tillerv: 15th Ind., Capt. Alonzo D. Harvey; 19th Ohio, Capt. Frank Wilson. TIllRD vIvIsION, Brig.-Gen. Jacob D. Cox. Fis Brigade. Co.a Charles C. Doolittle 12th Ky., Col. Laurenee H. Rousseau; 16th Ky., Capt. Jacob 2lillr; 100th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Edwin L. Hayes; 104th Ohio, Lieut.Col. Oscar W. Sterl; 8th Tenn., Capt. James W. Berry. Brigade loss: w, 5. econd Brigade, Col. John S. Casement: 66th Ill., Lieut.-CoI. W. Scott Stewart; 65th Ind., Lleut.-Col. Jobn W. Hammond; 124th Id.. Col. John M. Orr; 102d Oho., Capt. Henry S. Pick- ands; 5th Tenn., Ieut.-Col. Nathaniel Witt. Bri- gade Iss: w, 9. Third Brig.de, Cal. Israel N. StiWes: 112th Il., Maj. Tristam T. Dow; 63d ISd., Lieut.-Cal. Daniel Morris; 120th Ind.. MaJ. John M. Barcus; 128th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Jasper Packard. Brigade loss w, S. Artillery: 23d Ind., Llent. Aaron A. Wilber; D, 1st Ohio, Capt. Giles J. Cackerill. ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE (Detachment), daj.- GeOm Andrew J. Smith. FIRST DMsIoN, BrIg.-Gen. John McArthur. Prsi Brigade, Col. William L. MeMillen: 114th Ill., Capt. John M. Johnson; 93d Ind., Col. De Witt C. Thomas, Capt. Charles A. Hubbard; 10th Minn., Lient.- Col. Samuel P. Jennison, Capt. Edwin C. Sanders; 72d Ohio, Lleut.-Col. Charles G. Eaton; 95th Ohio, Lieut.- CoLa Jefferson Brumback; 111. Battery (Cogswell'.), Lieat. S. H. MeClaury. Brigade loss; k. 22; w, 96 = 118. Second Brigade, Col. Lucius F. Hubbard: 6th Minn., Lieut.-CoL. William B. Gere; 9th Minn., Cal. Jodsh F. Marsh; ltb Mo., Lient.-Col. Eli Bowyer, MaJ. Modesta J. Green; ath Wig., Leut.-Col. William B. Britton; 2d Iowa Battery, Capt. Joseph R. Reed. Brigade loas: k, 33; w,281; m,1=315. ThirdBride,Coal.SylvesterG. Hill, Col. William I. Marshall: 12th Iowa, Lieut.-C.ol. John H. Stibba; 35th Iowa, Maj. William Dill, Capt. Abraham N. Snyder; 7th Minn., CoL. William R. Mar- shall, Lieut.-Col. George Bradley; 3ld Mo., Lieut.-Col. William H. Heath; 1,2d Mo. Artly, Capt. Stephen H. Julian. Brigade loss: k, 12; W, 133 = 145. SucOND nIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Kenner Garrard. First Brigade, Col.DavidMoore: 119th Ill., Cal.Thomas J. Kinney; 122d Ill., Lieut.-Col. James F. Drish; H9th Ind.. Lieut.-CIE Hervey Craven; 21st Mo. tdetachment u4th Mo. attached), Lieut.-Col. Edwin Moore; 9th Ind. Battery, Lieut. Samuel G. Calfee. Brigade IOss: k, 2; W, 47 = 49. Becond Brigade, Col. James I. Gilbert; 58th Ill., Maj. Robert W. Healy; 27th Iowa, Lleut.-Col. Jed. Lake; 32d Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Gustavus A. Eberhart; 10th Kan. (4 eoWs), Capt. William C. Jones; 3d Ind. Bat- tery, Lieut. Thomas J. Ginn. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 62 = 63 Third Brigade, Col. Edward H. Wolfe: 49th IIL, Col. Phineas Pease; 117th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Jonathan Merriam; 52d Ind., Lieut.-Col. Zalmon S. Main; 178th N. Y.. Capt. John B. Gandolfo; G. 3d Ill. Artly, Capt. John W. Lowell. Brigade los: k, 6; W, 46; m, 1 = 52. TIRiD DIVISION, Col. Jonathan B. Moore. Ffrst Brigade, Col. Lyman M. Ward: 72 Ill., Capt. James A. Sexton; 40th Mo., Col. Samuel A. Holmes; 14th Wi., MaJ. Eddy F. Ferris; 334 Wis., Lieut.-Col. Frederick S. Lovell. Brigade IaS: w, 3. Seond Bri- gade, Col. Leander Blanden: 81st m11., Lieut.-Col. An- drew W. Rogers; 96th III., Leut.-Col. William Avery; 44th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Andrew J. Barr. Brigade loss: w, 1. Artlilery: 14th Ind., Capt. Francis W. Morse; A, 2d Mo., Lieut. John Zepp. Artillery loss: k, 1. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NASHVILLE. PROVISIONAL DETACHMIENT, MaJ.-Gen. James B. Steedman. PROVISIONAL DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Craft. p(,rsi Brigade, Col. Benjamin Harrison. Second Bri- gade,. CoL John G. Mitchell. Third Brigade, Lleut.-CoL. Charles H. Grosvenor. Loss in these three brigades: k, 19; w. 68: 1i1, 32 =119. Sond Brigade (Army Tenj.), Col. A. G. Baloy. fiscellaneous: 68th Ind. (attached to Third Brigne), Uieut--Col. H. J. Espy; loth Ohio, Capt. Ebeuezer G(rosVdor, Capt. J. M. Benedict, Lieut. Chas. Grant. Loss: k,l2; w,47; m,.9=68. Artillery: 20thInd., Capt. M. A. Osbomne; lath Ohio, Capt. Chas. C. Aleshire. Artilil-ry loss: w, 8. First Colored Brigade, Col. Thos. J. Morgan: 14th U. S. C. T., Lieut.-Col. H. C. Corbin; 16th U. S. C. T., CoL William B. Gaw; 17th U. S. C. T., Col Wi. R. Shafter; 18th U. S. C. T. (battalion), Maj. Lewis D. Joy; 44th U. S. C. T., Col. Lewis Johnson. Brigade loss: k, 21; w, 118; In, 23=162. Sceond Col- ored Brigade Col. Chas. B. Thompson: 12th U. S. C. T, LIbt.-Col. Wm. R. Bellon. C.apt. Henry Hegner; 13th U. S. C(. T., Col. J. A. llottenstein; 160th U. S. C. T., Maj. Collin Ford; l1t Kan. Battery, Capt. Marcus D. Tenney, Brigade loss: k, 77; w, 390; It, 1=468. POST OF NASHVILLE, Brlg.-Gen. John F. Miller. Seeond Brigade, Forth Dietaon, ',-eetieh Corp, Col. Edwin C. Maeon;: 14d Iud., Col. John M. CMoparet; 46th N. Y., Col. Adolphus Dobke; 176th Ohio, Lieut.- Col. William B. Nesbitt; 179th Ohio, Col. Harley H. Sage; 182d Ohio, Col. Lewis Butler. Unattached: 3d Ky.-; 28th Mich., Col. William W. Wheeler; 173d Ohio, Col. John R. Hord; 78th Pa. (detachment), Lieut.- Col. Henry W. Torbett; Veteran Reserve Corps, Col. Frank P. Cahill; 44th Wi. (battalion), U1eAt.-Col. Oliver C. Bissell; 46th Win. (battalion), -. OABR18ON ARTILLRYr, Maj. John J. Ely: 2d Ind., Capt. James S. Whirher; 4th Ind., Capt. Bejam-in F. John- son; 12th Ind.. Capt. James E. White; M1st Ind., Capt. Abram P. Andrew; 22d Ind., Capt. Edward W. Nichol- Son; 24th Ind., Lient. Hiram Allen; F, 1st Mich., Capt. Byron D. Paddock; E, 1st Ohlo, Lieut. Frank B. Reeck- ard; 20th Ohlo, Capt. William Backus; C, 1.t Tenn., Lieut. Joseph Grigsby; D. 1st Tenn., Capt. Samuel D. Leinart; A, 2d U. S. Colored. Capt. Josiah V. Meigs. QUARTERMASTER'S DIVISION (composed of quarter- -oster's employees). Col. James L. Donaldson. CAVALRY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. James H. Wilson. Ecrt: 4th U. S., Lieut. Joseph Hedges. FIRST DIVIsION (Second and Third Brigades, under Brig.- Gen. E. M. McCook, absent in western Kentucky). First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton: 8th Iowa, Cot. Joseph B. Dorr; 4th Ky. (mounted Infantry). Col. Robert M. Kelly; 2d Mich., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin Smith; 1st Tenn. Lient.-Col. Calvin M. Dyer; Ill. Battery, Capt. George I. Robinson. Brigade loss: w, 2. FIFTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Edward Hatch. First Brigade, CoL. Robert ]E Stewart: 3d Ill., Lient.- CoL Robert H. Carnahan; 11th Ind., Lient.-Col. Abram Sharra; 12th Mo., Cot. Oliver Welts; 10th Tenn., Maj. William P. Story, Maj. James T. Abernathy. Brigade loss : k, 14; w, 10H= 122. Second Brigade, Cot. Datum E. Coon: 6th lI., Lieut.-CoL. John Lynch; 7th lIt., Maj. John M. Graham; Rth III., Capt. Joseph W. Harper; 2d Iowa, Maj. Charles C. Horto,; 12th Tenn., Col. George Spalding; I,1 t Ill. Artly, Lieut. Joseph A. MeCartney. Brigade loss: k, 14; w, 90; m, I = 113. sIXTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Richatd W. Johnson. First Brigade, Col. Thomas J. Harrison: 16th 111., Maj. Charles H. Beeres; 6th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Harlon Baird; 7th Ohio,Col. IsraelGarrard. Brigade lose: k, 2; w, 9; In, 9=20. Second Brigade, Col. James Biddle: 14th Ill., MAj. Haviland Tompkins; 6th Ind., Maj. Jacob S. Stepbmns; 8th Mich., CoL Ellsha Mix; 3d Tenn., Maj. Benjamin Cunningham. Brigade loss: w, 7; m, 1 = 8. Artillr-y: 1, 4th UI. S., Lieut. Frank G. Smith. SEVENTH DIVIsION, Brig.-Gen. Joseph F. Knipe. First Brigade, Brevet Brig.-Gen. John H. Hammond: 9th Ind., CoL. George W. Jackson; 10th Ind., Lient.-Col. B. Q. A. Gresham; 19th Pa., Lteut.-Col. Joseph C. Hess; 2d Tenn., Lilut.-CoL William R. Cook; 4th Ten... Liet-t.- Cot. Jacob M. Thornburgh. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 42; In 10=17. Sed Brigade,Col. Gilbert M. L. Johnson: 12th Ind., Col. Edward Anderso-; 13th Ind., Lieut.-CoL William T. Pepper; 6th Tenn., Col. Fielding Hurst. Bri- gade loss: k, 1; w, 4; in, 2=7. Artillery: 14th Ohio, Capt. William C. Myers. Total Union loss: killed, 387; wounded, 2668; captured or mlsaing, 112=3057. The casualties at Franklin, November 30th, amounted to IS9 killed; 1603 wounded; and 1104 captured or mlimlng= 2326. General Thomas reported that the losses of his army in the entire cam- paign did not exceed 10,000 in killed, wounded, and missing. According to ollleial returns the effective force of Thomass wAo.e command was as follows: October 31st, 63.415; November 26th, 190,34; Novem- ber 30th, 71,452; December 10th. 70,272. In his official report, General Thomas says that his effective force early in November '1 consisted of the Fourth Corps, about 12,000, under General D. S. Stanley; the Twenty- third Corps, about 10,000, under General J. M. Scho- field; Hatch's division of cavalry. about 4000; Croxton's brigade, 2600, and Capron'. brigade of about 1200 [total, 29,7001. The balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Murfreesboro', Steven- son. Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our commanications and hold the posts above named. if attacked, until they ecold be re;n- forced, as up to this time It was Impossible to determine which course Hood would take -advance on Nashville, or torn toward Huntsville. It is estimated that the asailable Union force of all arms in and about Nashville on December 11th aggregated at least 86.000. CoL. Henry Stone, ofGeneraloThons' staff, furnishes the following estimate of the numberof Union troops actualUy engaged in the battle (not including the garrison force and dis- mounted cavalry),vi.; Fourth Corps, 13.390; Twenty- third Corps, 880o ; Detachment Army of the Tennesee, 9210: Steedman's Detachment, 5270; Cavalry Corps (moanted men), 6800. or an aggregate, including artil- ery, of 43,260. General J. H. Wllson says the cavalry numbered 12.000. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. ARMY OF TENNESSEE.- General John B. Hood. LEE'S CORPS (Hood's), Lieut.-Gen. S. D. Lee. JOHNSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson. Dtse. Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Z. C. Deas: 19th Ala., Lient.- CoL. R. Kimbroagh; 22d Ala., Capt. H. W. Henry; 26th Ala., Capt. N. B. Rouse; 39th Ala., Lleut.-EoL W. C. Clifton; 10th Ala., Col. J. G. Coltart. lfanaigtt's Bri- gade, Lieut.-CoI. W. L. Butler: 24th Ala., Capt. T. J. Kimball; 28th Ala., Capt. W. M. Nabors; 34th Ala., Lleut.-Col. J. C. Carter; loth S. C., Lieut.-Col. C. Irvin Walker; 19th S. C., Capt. T. W. Getzen. Sharp's Bri- gade, Brig.-Gea. J. H. Sharp: 7th and 9th Miss., Maj. H. Pope; 10th and 44th Miss., and gth Miss. Batt'n Sharp- shooters. Capt. R. A. Bell; 41st Miss., Capt. J. M. Hicks. Brantly'a Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. F. Bruntly: 24th and 34th Mtss., Capt. C. Dancy; 27th Miss., Capt. S. M. Pegg; 29th and 30th Miss.. Capt. R. W. Williamson; Dismounted Cavalry, Capt. D. W. Aleander. ARTILLERY, Lieat.-CoI. L. Hoxton (Chief Corps Art'y). Courtley's Battalion, Capt. J. P. Douglas: Ala. Bat- tery, Capt. S. H. Dent; Ala. Battery, Lieut. H. F-re1; Tex. Battery, Lieut. Ben. Hardin. srvEaxson's DivisION, Maj.-Gan. C. L. Stevenson. Cemmiag's Brigade, Col. E. P. Watkins: 34th Ga., Capt. R. A. Jones; 36th Ga., Col. Charles E. Broyles; 39th Ga., J Composed mainly of tclhments belonging to the 14th, 15th, 17th, mnad 20t11 corps, whclh had been unable to rejoin their proper commads serving with Sherants armty on the mach through Georgi. VOL. IV. 31 473 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NASHVILLE. Capt. W. P. Milton; 6fth (ia., ('apt. B. T. Spearutan. )Wt.tu'. Briade. Brig.-tten. E. W. Pettila: 20th Ala.. ('ol. J. N. Dedlman; 221 Ala.. Llent.-Col. J. B. 1HIM,: 3oth Ala., Lieat.-Vil. J. R. Ellihtt; 314t Ala., Lleut.-t'ol. T. M5. Arriltgton; 46th Ala., ('apt G. E. Brewer. Artil- l-y B a1ttalio (Joiii pto i . ('alit. J. B. R -wan: (:i. B:it'v, IAeut. W. S. Hoge; tOia. Bat'y. Lieut. W. I- Xittbr. I..SV8i-i DtVI91ON. M aj.-ien. 11. 1). CIayton. S-toralt. ltrigidte. Brig.-(;Gii. M. A. Ktiivalt: 40th GIa., (Coli. A. JotisotII; 41st (;Ia. tCapt. J. h. Stalling,; 42d (tO., V.l. R. J. lt,'n birsott; 43d1 tla, Col. 11. C. Kellogg; 52h Ua., C(alt. R. R. Astbury. t;iban'n Bridoe Brtg.-Gl'. Randall L. tithn-: 1st It.. CapIt. J. C(. Staffrd -l 4th Il.. ('ut. S E. Ilituter; 13tb la., Col. F. I CiouphleU; lfth La1.. IAeot.-Cnl. R. It. Lindl ay; 19th La.. 3I:,). C. Flour- a.y; 20th 10t., tI.Capt. A. Dreael; 25th 1a.. Col. F. 1'. Za-hulae; B0th La.. Mai. A. Picoh't; 4th La. Battalion, Capt. T. A. Iialatud; 14th La. Rattalton Sharp-shooters, Lient. A. T. Martin. Hletiegdlas Brigde. Brig.-Gen. J. T. Holtzclaw: 18th Ala.. Liet.-Col. P. F. Hunley; 321 nad 5eth Air,. Col. Bushrnd Jones; 3WIt Ala.. Capt. N. M. Carpenter; lltth Ala., Capt. C. E.: Buaey. Artillery Battalion (Eldridge's). Capt. C. E. Fenner: Ala. Battery, Capit. W. J. McKenzie; Mts. Bt'y. Iient. J. S. McCall. STEWART'S CORPS iPolk'-h Lieut.-(Gen. A. P. Stewart. LwItRimi DIvislo,. Ms.j.ten. W. W. Loing. Fethersloa'a Brigade, Brig.4;en. W. S. Featheratot: lst IlsA., Capt. 0. D. Hughes; 3d Miss., Capt. 0. H. Johnston; 29d Mils.. Mitt. M. A. OatIt; SIt Mtiss., Capt. t. A. Coliln; Sad Mt-. Capt. T. L. Cooper; 40th Ml-., CoL W. B. Coltert; ltt Mia Batt'n. Maj. J. M. Stlgler. A dssa' Brigade. Col. Robert Lowry : 6th Mti-.. Lietit.- Col. Thomas J. Borde.n; 14tb Miss.. Col. W. L. D)oss; lth Mitu.. Lieit.-CnI. J. I. Blnford; 20th Mst-., Maj. Thomas B. GCrbam; Zhl Mis.. Maj. G. W. B. tlarrett; .1I MIa.. Col. Riehard Harrisol. s-tra Brigade. Ctl. Jolh Snodgraa: 5ath Al... Maj. J. B. I Wiekey; b7th Ala.. MNti. J. H. Wiley; 27th. 3ith. and 49th Ala.. Lieut.C.ol. J. D. Wee-ena; 12th La., Capt. J. T. IDnvia. A.tTII.LEIET. LUcot.-Col. S. 4'. Williams WChief Corps Art'y-. )X.yr.e Battalion: 1-. Battery (Rouatwehand'rt: Mtis Battery Cowan's ; Miss. Battery tardeunsl. FlSEit t ItIVUltON ftemporarily attached to Walthbal's diiii a.. .(u.aa's Brde, Brig.-Gen. (. W. Sears: 4th Mis.. : 25th Sla - ; 36th Mi--.. ; 39th Miss., 44th Miss..-- ; 7th Mis-. Battalion. Fetora. Brigade. Col. 1). Colemuan: 29th N. C.. Maj. E. B. Hampton: 39th S. C.. Capt. J. G. Crawford; sth Texa., Maj. J. H. MWeReyaold.; 10th Tex. dis-mounted eavairy), Cotl. C'. R. Harp,: 14th Tex. dismounted eavalry. ('apt. K. 11. Harkey: r224 Texas Idin...u.ted alvalry), Maj. W. E. Hates. .4 rtilery Battaio (tiorr.'s): Ala. Battery alolls Miss. Battery (Hoskins'ti MN,. Bat'y (clnubor's. W.I.TuA LL. DIVI1l1t). N4.-(.en. E. C. Wullthlall. tsaarerh Brigde. Brig.-(Gen. George D. Johnston: lt Ala.. Lieut. C. M. MeRac. 42d. 46th. 49th. 52d, and 55th Tenn.., Capt. A. 3. Duncan; 48th Tenn., Col W. M. Voorhies. C-nMey' Brigade. Brig.-Gen. C. M. Shelley: 17tb Ala.. Capt. Jobn Balling; 26ti Ala., Capt. D. M. Gideon: 29th Ala.. Capt. S. Abernathy; 37th Miss.. Maj. S. H. Teral. Reyolds'. Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. H. Rey- nolds: lot Ark. Mounted Riles (dismounted), Capt. I. P. Parks; 2d Ark. Mounted Rifles (dismountedt. Maj. J. P. Eagle; 4th Ark.. Maj. J. A. Ross; 9th Ark., Capt. W. IO Phefer; 25th Ark.. Iient. T. J. Edwards. Artillery Bat- talt. (Truebart'-): Ala. Battery tLnmnden-'); Ala. Battery (Selden'.s; Ala. Battery (Tarrant'-s. CHEATHAM'S CORPS (foruerly Hardee'.), Lleut.- Ge.a. B. F. Cheatllam. DROWN's DIVIsION. Gist' Brigade. Lleut.-Col. Z. I Walters: 46th Ga., Capt. Malcolm GilIs; 65th Ga. and 8th Ga. Battalion. Capt. W. W. Grant: 2d Ga. Battalion Shrp-ahooters, Capt. William H. Brown; 16th S. C.. Capt. J. W. Boling; 24th S. C.. Capt. W. C. Griffith. Masys Brigade, Col. 'H. K. Fetid: 4th Conaed., atid 6th. 9th. and 50th Tenn.. LAeut.-CoL .G W. Pease; lit and 27th Tent., lAeut.-Col. J. L. Ho-e 9th, 16th, and 28th Tenn., CoL J. H. Ander- -t.li. Strahr. Brigade, C0l. A. J. Kellar: 4th, 5th, 31st, 33d, and 32th Teti..., Lhbnt.-Cil. L. W. SFinlay; 19th, W4lt. aid 41tt Teama., Capt. D). A. Kennedy. Barighatalt,'i- gad., Co. W. 3M. Watkitns: tIlth and 29th Tein., Maj. J. H. Blirims; 12th nad 47tb T ii., Capt. C. N. X.Wad.i; 1Mtb, 5It. 52d. and 1U4th Tenn,., Ma)i. J. F. Willtanin. A"TILI.AsY. (C.,I. 'lo;icl tonis S Illth (l ' li' t i..rp. Art y 1. Artiller-y Batali-o: hla. IBaittery 11helaa's; ; Fta. Bat- Wry Mi.,rr , 'atM4s. Btatwi'rytT ii.r's). e I.ER tR"E , Dl g,I-, IIrig.-4;euX. J A. S Ilel,. Lottre's Brigade, Blrig.-t;eii. 31. r. Lvowrey: 16th, 33.1, and 45tt Ala., Lie-t.-'ol. R. It. Ah'rcrmahtc; ltilt MIs.. and 3d Miss. Battaliit. C('alit. F. 2M. Woolwnrd; 8th alsd 3241 MIss-, MaJ. A. E. MImd.y. (i.-n s. Brigfade, Brig.- Gten. H). C. (;oCati, ( Pii. Peter V. (ir-e': It, 2d, 5th. 1:t0b, 15th. and 24th Ark.. (VL. riter V. Streen; 6th and 7111 Ark.. Lient. -Cot. P. Sftyder; 9th and 19th Ark.. Makj. iD. It. Hamiter. (Graabary's Brigade, (apt. F. T. Broagh- ton: 35th Ten... -; 6th and .Sth Tex., Capt. B. it. Tyus: 7th Tex., ('apt. 0. i1. Forrest; 10th Te-., Capt. it. D. Kennedy; 17th and lath Te. tditimoitned eavalry). Capt. F. L. MeKnight; 24th and 25th Texas (diamlounted eavalry), ('apt. J. F. Matthews; La. Cay-. Co.. (.apt. L. M. Nutt. ArtUlery Battalion iHlotcbkits's): Ala. Bat- tery (tGoldthwalte't)s Ark. Battery tKey't ; Mo. Biut. tery lBledWoe.). DATZ'S ivistblON, Maj.--Ge. Willian B. Bate. sE-'V., Capt. J. H. Bitek. Tyler. Brigade, Brig.-G-en. T. B. Smith: 37tb tin., Capt. J. A. Sanders; 4th (a. Battalion Sharp-hooters, Maj. T. D. Casswell; td, l1th, 15th. 20th. 30th. a.d 32th Tent.. C.ol. W. M. Shy, Maj. H. C. Lucas. FISuey'. Bri- gad,. Maj. 0. A. Ball: at and 3d Fla., Capt. M. 11. Strati.; 6th Fla., Capt. A. M. Wtlliams; 7th Fln., C(alt. B. It. Smith; let Fla. Civ. (distnmoutntl) and 4th Fhn., Slal. Jaeob A. Lash. Iaeksos's Brigde,. Brig.-(en. It. R. Jaek-oii: 1st G-a. Conetfet. itnd ta6th G(i., Ielit.-C.ol. 3. C. Gordon; 25th (Ga., Capt. J. E. Falton; 29thnI ...t. Hu (a., Col. W.D. Mltcbhell; 21.t 4l. Battalion Stinrl-ishiter., Lleot. R. C. King. Artillery BattalioN. (apt. It. T. Beauregard: La. Battery (Sloeoomibs`; S. C. B;"i"ry (Ferguou's); Teni. Battery (Meban-s0). CAV'ALRY lil"-ION. Brig.- teti. James R. R 'hahn, ma. Fseorl. Capt. C. T. St..iti. R-kJer'. Briga.e. C11. E. W. RHteker, Lteut.-t('1l. It It. White: 7th Ali.. ; 5tb Mi"s.. -; 7tb Tenn.. 1Ith T,'nu., Lietit.-CtI. R. R. White; 15th Te ti.., ; 26th Tena. Botttallonl, -. Biffle', Brigatde. C il. J. B. Biflie: 9th T.-n..,- ; l1tlTehn.. At the time of the battle of N.a.hilI'. Forr.'st, ,ith Jacekson' a tnd Bnforti s di-islians of cavalry andz Mrcir'sr and Paltier'. bricades of Infantry, was detacliitd from the main army and operating on its flanks. Hool re- ported that be be-gun the -atpnaig.n with '1 anleetive total'oft ,0403." On Ntivertber 6th hIs streaigth was 44.729. By the arrival of Forrest'sceavalry-, on Itovemlselr 15th. the army aggregated 51,925. Ecelusive of Pal ...r'a brigade ot .Ae.'s corps, Mercer's brigade of Cheathani' corps, and Seatrs'. and Coekrell's brigades of Stewart's corps, anid Forreat s cavalry (not IncluIded iii Hood's re- turn), tbe "present for duty" on December loth was 26,877. These omitted commands probabily n.i.iibcred 1210, which would give Hood asi aggregate effective foree at that date of nearly 39,000. But Col. Henry Stone estimates that Hood's army at Nasbville num- bered 27,937, Includtng soiiie who were reported as on ,,extra duty," but who he (Stone) claims were with theircommandsand (Hoodbtingon thedefensive) were, as occasion required, put in the ranks to tight. Accord- ingto Hood's offial report his loss at Franklin In killed, wonnded, and prisoners was 4500. The loss at Nashville is not stated. He reached Tupelo, at the close of the campaigui with about 21,000. General Hood reported oflicially: "Lose ,including prisoners, during the entire campaign do not exceed 10,00 nien." On the other hand, General Thomas states In hIs official report that during the campaign be - captured 13.189 prisonert of war," and that " during the same period over 2000 deserters from the enemy were received." 474 OPERATriONS IN EAST TENNESSEE AND SOUTH-WEST VIRGINIA. BY THE REV. EDWARD 0. GUERRANT. ASSISTANT AflDtTANT-GENERAIL TO GENERIIA ;U)MPHREY 34ARSHALL., C. S. A. BETWEEN the two great Confederate armies in Virginia and Teiinessee lay a long stretch of country, principally covered by the Allegliany and ('Cmberland mountains. The only means of direct communication and trans- portation between these armies was the East Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia Railroad. Near this road were the great King's salt-works, in Smyth County, and the lead mines of Wythe County, Virginia, and along this route lay nianv very fertile valleys and rich uplands, which furnished the Confederate armies a large part of their provisions. For these and other reasons the defense of this line was a matter of the first importance to the Confederate Government, and its control of equal importance to the Federal armies. As the mountainous nature of the country rendered its occupation by a large army impracticable, numerous invasions by smaller forces, principally of cavalry, were made in order to destroy the salt-works and the railroad communications. The very extent of the frontier and its broken surface imade it difficult of defense, and rendered necessary a larger force of occupation than was generally available. General Garfield's campaign early in 18462 against General Humphrey Marshall has already been described in this work. [See Vol. I., p. 393.] In December, 1862, General Samuel P. Carter, of Tennessee, and Colonel T. T. Garrard, of Kentucky, crossed the Cumberland Mountains from Ken- tfleky with a large force of Federal cavalry and made a raid upon the railroad in east Tennessee, and destroyed the bridges over the Holston and Watauga rivers. General Humphrey Marshall was at that time in command of the Department of Western Virginia and Eastern Kentucky. His troops were widely scattered over the country in order to obtain subsistence, and before 475 47b OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE AND SOUTH-WEST VIRGINIA. they could lbe concentrated the enemy had retreated across the mountains into Kentucky. The raiders were prevented from occupying Bristol and doing further damage by the timely arrival of General Marshall's force, which pursued to Jonesville. In 'May, 1862, a much larger invading force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, numbering several thousand, was led up the Kanawha and New rivers, West Virginia, by (General J1. 1). (1ox. This column was met at Princeton, in Mercer County, aiid arrested ay General Alarsliall in an engage- ment on the 16th of May, which resulted in the repulse and retreat of the invaging fores, whose killed and wounded were left behind. [See Vol. H., P. 280.] On the 3d of September, 1863, Burnside oeeu- f : 'p0 . ied Knoxville, Tennessee, with his army corps.J Nearly all the available (-Confederate forces had been ordered to reinforee Bragg at Chattanooga. A small force under Brigadier-General Alfred E. ORiG 01FURt-1Ml'Al .i. M. SUAKE't- Jackson occupied the upper portion of east Ten- F '"1- Ul- A PMI(' nessee. Marshall had been transferred to the Western army, and Colonel Henry L. Giltner, of the 4th Kentucky Cavalry, with a handful of troops, occupied the Department of South-western Virginia. On the 7th of September about five hundred of Burnside's infantry advanced as far east as Telford's Depot, in Washington County. On the 8th they were attacked by about an equal force, under General Jackson and Colonel Giltuer. After a short engagement the Federals retreated to Limestone Depot, where, after a stubborn resistance, 350 surrendered, about 100 escaped, and 60 were killed and wounded. The Federal forces, under Colonel Foster, advancing again into upper east Tennessee, were met by Colonel James E. Carter, of the 1st Tennessee Cavalry, at Blouutsville, where a stubborn fight ensued on the 22d of September. The Federal batteries shelled the town, and by superior numbers compelled the withdrawal of Colonel Carter's force. In the latter part of September, 1863, Brigadier-General John S. Williams assumed command of the Confederate forces in east Tennessee and advanced as far as Blue Springs. Burnside's forces occupied Bull's Gap, nine miles in front. Williams was ordered " not to give up an inch of ground until driven from it." He had only about seventeen hundred effective men, with two bat- teries of artillery. Brigadier-General Alfred E. Jackson, with about five hundred men, mostly recruits, was at Greenville. There was no other sup- port within nearly one hundred miles. To maintain his ground against a force so largely superior, General Williams took a strong position on a ridge crossing the road east of Blue Springs. By multiplying camp-fires and beat- ing drums he made an exhibition of force he did not possess. But this rase de ygterre did not hold the enemy in check. On the 10th of October they ) General J. M. Shackelford commanded Burnside's cavalry force in the Knoxville campaign.-EDITORS. OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE AND SOUTH-WEST VIRGINIA. 477 advanced in force and attacked General Williams's position. Every inch of ground was stubbornly disputed, but the greater number of the Federals .ompelled the lengthening of the Confederate lines until they became little more than a skirmish-line. About 3 P. m. a heavy column of infantry broke the center of Williams's line, but was arrested by a heavy fire of artillery from the high ridge. The engagement lasted until dark, with but little eclange of position. To avoid capture by a force probably treble his own, General Williams withdrew during the night and retired toward Virginia. The next morning at daylight he was intercepted at Henderson's Mill by a large force of Federal cavalry, which had passed around him the day before. By a gallant charge this force was driven from the field, but continued to pursue and attack the Confederates until they reached the neighborhood of Leesbhrg. On the 4th of November, 1863, General Williams, at his own request, was relieved of the command, and the brigade was placed under Colonel Henry L. (riltner. Major-General Robert Ransom, who was then in command of the department, ordered Colonel Giltner to eooperate with Brigadier-(General William E. Jones in an attack upon General Carter, whose brigade was camped at Big Creek, near Rogersville, Tennessee. On the night of the 5th of November Colonel Giltner's brigade crossed the Holston River at Kings- port and advanced to Big Creek. This brigade numbered 1063 men, besides Lowry's battery. General Jones's command, probably, was not so large. At daylight next morning Colonel Giltner attacked General Carter's brigade, consisting of about one thousand men, and captured most of the force with all their camp-equipage, horses, artillery, and transportation. General Jones, who had gone around to the rear of the Federals, intercepted some two hundred fugitives. A few escaped across the river. In May, 1864, a formidable force under General Crook advanced up the Kanawha and New rivers and reached the railroad at Dublin, in Pulaski County. An inferior force, commanded by General Albert G. Jenkins, engaged the advancing Federals on the 9th of May at Cloyd's Mountain, and Jenkins was mortally wounded and his force defeated. General Crook de- stroyed the depot at Dublin aiid the large FRGD O"l"I RAL J41YI1MMF\. 1 bridge over New River. Genernd Aumwiv, eiu-aidld tlte 141-tz+it f Ea- t On the 10th of May a large cavalry Ttne.,,e. April 101`4t.JAR-'tr1,1,5 force, under General Averell, made an advance on Wytheville, but was met at Crockett's Cove by General John H. Morgan and defeated, leaving forty (lead on the field. In June, 1864, Colonel E. F. Clay, of the 1st Kentucky Mounted Rifles, in command of a small brigade of Confederate cavalry, was sent into Kentucky 478 OPFRATIONIS IN EAST TENNESSEE AND SOUTH-WEST VIRGINI. A::AX " III1 TUA 0U I I A MA P' iii 4I0EkATINI 4AINST Tiji, 'I iGINI AN!) TENNESSEE RAII.Rt(AD, L N IIBI'R, "A.,, TI, XN0X II' . TENN. from the Department of South-western Virginia to secure forage and cover other military movements. Colonel Clay first advanced upon Paintsville, with a view of capturing some four hundred Federals who were camped there. Difficulties in the way of his advance delayed his arrival until the enemy had received large reenforeements, which deterred him from making an attack. Retiring upon Licking River, he camped in the narrow valley of a little stream known as Puncheon. Though he had taken every precaution to guard against surprise, an important order had not been executed, and at 2 P. x. the enemy in force surprised his camp, attacking it from the surround- ing mountains. After a desperate resistance he was forced to withdraw, leaving thirty-seven prisoners in the enemy's hands - nine wounded, two of them mortally. Colonel Clay lost his right eye during the engagement. Late in September, 1864, General Stephen G. Burbridge, with a force esti- mated at 5000 men, advanced upon King's salt-works, through eastern Ken- tueky, and up the Big Sandy River. He was met at Liberty Hill, Virginia, by Colonel H. L. Giltner, in command of a small brigade of cavalry. At that time not over 1000 men interposed between General Burbridge and the salt- works, only about 23 miles distant. But by dint of strategy and stubborn resistance Giltner detained the Federal army two days on the road, so that when Burbridge arrived there about an equal force confronted him, com- manded by General John C. Breckinridge. On October 2d Burbridge attacked the forces at the salt-works. A battalion of Virginia Reserves (the 13th), OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE AND SOUTH-WEST VIRGINIA. 479 Xeolmposedl of boys andl o1( men, received the first shock of battle at " Cov- ertior" Samnders's house, in advance of the main line. This little company fought desperately and suffered severely before being dIriven hack. The eligagemllnlit ontinued with varying fortunes during the dlay, and when night NaWe Burbridge was not if sight at the salt-works. The next morning he was 20 miles away. He left Colonel Charles S. Hanson (wounded) and many othefr woulkdedl men and prisoners in the hands of the Confederates. Gen- 4,l'l Williams and Colonel (Giltner pursued him to the head of the Louisa fork of the Big Sandy. The 10th Kentucky Cavalry (Confederate) lost its colonel, Eldwini Trimble, and nearly every officer above lieutenant was either killed or Woziilded. It had borne the brunt of battle at the ford of Holston River. In I)ecember, 1864, General Stoneman, with a force of cavalry estimated at four thousand, entered south-west Virginia through east Tennessee, and pro- (efeded to take possession of the country. The department had been drained of iiiost of its troops by increasing demands from the armies east and west, so that Breekinridge found himself in command of only about 1000 or 1500 mnch in at department large enough to require an army corps to defend it. This handful was concentrated at the salt-works in hopes of defending a posi- tion naturally very strong, even against so large an opposing force. Stone- mnati, doubtless aware of this fact, and knowing the defenseless condition of thle country, changed the ordinary tactics and devoted himself to (capturing the towns and destroying the railroad. He occupied Bristol and Abingdon, and passing by the salt-works advanced upon Wytheville and the lead-mines. In hopes of arresting his course Breckinridge moved from the salt-works to Marion, on the railroad, where he intercepted Stoneman on Sunday, the 18th of December, and fought an engagement whieh lasted through the day and resulted in a substantial victory for the Confederates, who held their position against largely superior numbers. But during the day Stoneman sent a force (lowli another road to the salt-works, now without defenders, except a few militia and teamsters, and destroyed as much of the works as possible before Breckinridge's forces could reach there. Having accomplished this long- desired object, the Federal forces withdrew across the mountains.1 The weather was very cold and wet, and all the troops suffered great hardships and privations. During the engagement at Marion on the 17th and 18th of December they stood in the rain and mud, without fire, food, or shelter, for over thirty-six hours. Yet they bore it all uncomplainingly and heroically. Z On the 27th of February, 1 86.5, General Grant and Tennessee Railroad from Wvtheville nearly to instructed General Thomas, commanding the De- Lynchburg. On the 9th of April Stoneman moved partment of the Cumberland, to direct General again into North Carolina, via Jacksonville, Tav-' Stoneman "1 to repeat the raid of last fall, destroy- lorsville, and Germantown. At Germantown the ilg the railroad as far toward Lynchburg as he force divided, Palmer's brigade going to Salem, cal." Stoneman set out from Knoxville about the and the main bodv to Salisbury. Palmer destroyed 20th of March, and moved, via Morristown and the railroad between Greensboro' and Danville, Bull's Gap, across Iron Mountain to Boone, North Virginia, and also south of Greensboo'. The main Carolina. Stoneman's force consisted of General body entered Salisbury on the 12th of April, cap- A. C. Gillem's division. The brigade commanders turing 14 pieces of artillery and 1364 prisoners. were Colonels S. B. Brown, W. J. Palmer, and J. General Stoneman now returned to Tennessee with K. Miller. From Boone the command crossed the the artillery and prisoners. leaving the force. under Blle Ridge to Wilkesboro', and then turned toward command of General Gillem, to do scouting service south-western Virginia, destroying the Virginia on the east side of the mountains.- EDITORS. THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET, VA., MAY 15TH, 1864. BY JOHN D. INBODEN, BRIGADIEBR-GEERAL, C. S. A. ON the retreat of General Lee Adfrom Gettysburg, in July, 1863, he was not punsued by the Federal army into the Shen- t t SAW: andoah Valley. After resting v there and recuperating his shattered forces for a short time he erossed to the east Xide of the Blue Ridge. On the 21st of July, 1863, he as- signed me to the command of "the Valley District," compris- ing the country west of the Blue Ridge and as far south as James River in Botetourt County. This district had been constituted a separate terri- torial command in 1861-62 for "' Stonewall" Jackson, and itsboundarieswerenotchanged during the war. When I took the command it was so little menaced that I had only my own brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry and General Gabriel C. Wharton's infantry brigade, McClanahan's six-gun battery, McNeill's Rangers, and two small battalions of cavalry under major Harry Gilmor and Major Sturgis Davis, of Mary- land; in all not exceeding three thousand effective men of all arms. I was a native of the valley, acquainted with nearly all its leading inhabitants, and perfectly familiar with the natural features and resources of the entire district. After General Lee retired to the Upper Rappa- hannock in the latter part of July, 1863, the Fed- eral troops that were left in my front were posted to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and rarely ventured more than a few miles from it. In this state of quietude General Lee shortly or- dered General Wharton with his brigade to rejoin his division east of the Blue Ridge. During the fall of 1843 and winter of 1863-64 nothing of much importance occurred in the valley. We frequently raided the railroad, destroying bridges and trains as we could, and capturing some small detachments posted and fortified on the rail- road or found scouting too far from it. In Decem- ber, 1863, General Averell made a daring raid from New Creek with about four thousand cavalry. We prevented his getting into the Shenandoah Valley to strike at Staunton. But in "shying" him off from that point we caused him to sweep on behind the North Mountain range, where he struck the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad sixty odd miles west of Lynchburg, and destroyed the army stores A sA the war progressed conscription had to be re- sorted to to Aill the Confederate ranks. It embraced all elasesbet.een eighteen sandforty-fiveyearsof age. Con- wriptiun was therefore. for the time. almost fatal to the colleges and the institutes. Colonel Smith. however, resolved to keep open hbi school. He reduced the regu- accumulated there, and then made his escape back to his base. By the month of April, 1864, information reached us that General Sigel had established himself at Winchester, and was preparing for a forward movement with over eight thousand infan- try, twenty-five hundred cavalry, and three or four field-batteries. On the 2d of May I broke camp at Mount Crawford, in Rockingham County, some- thing over seventy miles from Winchester, and moved to meet Sigel and find out as far as possible his strength and designs and report the facts to General Lee. I had with me the 62d Virginia In- fantry, mounted, Colonel Geo. H. Smith; the 23d Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Robert White; the 1 8th Virginia Cavalry, Colonel George W. Imboden; Ma- jor Harry Gilmor's Maryland battalion of cavalry; a part of Major Sturgis Davis's Maryland battalion of cavalry, Captain J. H1. McNeill's Rangers, Cap- tain J. IE. McClanahan's excellent six-gun battery of horse artillery, and Captain Bartlett's Valley Dis- trict Signal Corps. I had ordered General Wm. H. Harman at Staunton to notif; the "reserves" (militia) of Rockingham and Augusta Counties, consisting of men over forty-five and boys between sixteen and eighteen years of age, and all detailed men on duty in shops, at furnaces, etc., to be ready to move at a moment's notice. A similar notifica- tion was sent to General Francis H. Smith, Com- mandant of the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, where there were about three hundred cadets under eighteen years of age at school. ) My veteran troops, " effective present," numbered but 1492 men when we left Mount Crawford on the 2d of May, to which should be added about 100 men scouting either in front of or behind Sigel. Har- man's "reserves" did not amount to one thou- sand men, and these were undisciplined and armed mostly with hunting-rifles and shot-guns. This was the total scattered and incongruous force in front of Sigel in the valley the first week in May. The 1500 or 1600 veterans, with their horses, were in splendid condition for hard service. On May 5th we reached Woodstock, Sigel then being at Strasburg, only about twelve miles distant. By the aid of my scouts and the citizens, almost the exact strength of Sigel had been ascertained, and all his preparations made known to us; these were very fully and promptly reported by wire from New Market to General Lee. I also made the most earnest appeals to him to send more troops to the valley at once. About eleven thousand men were reported in my front. The Signal Corps in the mountains west of us reported a force of 7000 men at Lewisburg, only a little over 100 miles lation age for admission from eighteen to sixteen years. This was below the conscript age, and soon the Insti- tute was Hilled to repletion with three hundred boys, all it would hold. But under State laws even they were a part of the "1 reserves," a militia force liable to be called out In emergeucies.-J. D. L. THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET. west from Staunton, apparently awaiting Sigel's movements to cooperate with him. General Lee's reply was to the effect that he was sorely pressed by Grant and needed all his men, at least for a few days, and he ordered me to retard Sigel's advance in every way I could, taking care not to be surrounded and captured. But fortune favored us in a most unexpected way. Early in the after- noon of Sunday, the 8th of May, Captain Bartlett announced from his signal station on top of the Massanutten Mountain, overlookingStrasburg, that two bodies of cavalry, which he estimated at one thousand men each, had left General Sigel's camp in the forenoon, the one moving across the North Mountain westward on the Moorefield road, and the other eastward through Front Royal, passing that town and taking the road leading through Chester Gap in the Blue Ridge. These facts con- vinced me that Sigel, before venturing to advance, meant to ascertain whether he had enemies in dangerous force within striking distance on either flank; an investigation which would consume sev- eral days. As there were no troops, except mylittle band, nearer than General Lee's army, it was man- ifestly important to attack these detachments as far from Strasburg as possible and delay their return as long as possible. I summoned Colonel Smith, of the 02d, to my headquarters, and informed him confidentially of my intention to take the 1 8th Reg- iment, Colonel Imbodeni's, MeNeill's Rangers, and two guns of McClanahan's battery and that night cross the North Mountain through a pass called "The Devil's Hole," and intercept the enemy on the Moorefield road on Lost River in HardyCounty, more than twenty miles from Strasburg, and either capture or defeat them; knowing that in the latter event we could drive them via Romney across the Potomac and into Maryland. Leaving Colonel Smith in command at Woodstock, it was given out that I was about to move camp some five or six miles back toward the North Mountain in search of bet- ter grazing for our horses. This ruse was practiced to prevent any Union man (and there were plenty around us) from taking the information of the move- ment to Sigel that night. We set out from Wood- stock about 4 P. m. on Sunday across the North Mountain, and, having accomplished the purposes of the expedition, on Monday, late in the night, reached Mount Jackson, where I found Colonel Smith, who, in the exercise of a sounddiscretion, had fallenbackfromWoodstock, leavingonly amounted picket at Fisher's Hill, and relays of couriers to report any advance by Sigel. Immediately on my return to Mount Jackson I learned from Major Harry Gilmor, who had been sent across by Luray to get tidings of the other body of cavalry that had left Sigel on Sunday morning. that he had been to the top of the Blue Ridge and had there met fleeing citizens from Rappahannock County who said that this expedi- tion consisted of the 1st New York Cavalry under Colonel Boyd, five hundred strong, and that they had been taking things leisurely and without molestation, on the east side of the mountain, and had stated to citizens where they camped that they were coming on to New Market by the middle of the week to rejoin General Sigel at that place. Upon this information we laid a trap for Colonel Boyd, and on Wednesday we captured 464 men, nearly all of this force. (See p. 488.] These mis- haps to General Sigel's flanking parties of cavalry, sent out the previous Sunday, secured us the all- important few days' respite from his dreaded ad- vance, and enabled General John C. Breekinridge, from south-western Virginia, to reach the valley with something over 2300 of his best veteran troops to be united with mine for a battle with Sigel wherever we might chance to meet him. In 1864 the village of New Market had a pop- ulation of about one thousand. Its site is one of the most beautiful in the far-famed Shenandoah Valley. The north fork of the Shenandoah River flows behind a range of hills that rise gently to a height of perhaps four hundred feet north-west of the town. These hills were cleared and in cultiva- tion on their slope facing the town, and at their foot runs the valley turnpike, the main street of New Market and the great highway of the valley during the war. About a mile east and south of the tarnpike flows Smith's Creek, a mill-stream, at the foot of the rugged Massanutten Mountain, which, from Strasburg to near Port Republic, sep- arates the Luray or Page Valley from the Shenan- doah Valley for a distance of over forty miles. Luray and New Market are connected by a mud- pike which crosses the Massanutten Mountain throngh a slight depression or gap four miles from New Market. Five miles north-east of New Mar- ket the valley turnpike crosses the north fork of the Shenandoah, on the boundary of the cele- brated " Meem Plantation." Rude's Hill. one mile nearer New Market than the river at the bridge, overlooks the whole of the Meem bottoms from an elevation of perhaps seventy-five or one hundred feet. No place in the great valley was the scene of more conflicts than the Meem bottoms and Rude's Hill. From this bill to New Market, four miles, the country is undulating, and was cleared and in a high state of cultivation. Between New Market and Smith's Creek, where the road to Luray crosses it, there was in 1864 a body of perhaps one hundred acres or more of woodland, and the town and its outskirts were ornamented with many orchards. From about the center of the town a deep little valley, or rather ra- vine, leads to the north fork of the Shenandoah River, and cuts the range of hills back of the town at right angles, the hills being higher on the south-west side of this ravine than those on the north-east side. This description of the town and coantry is necessary to a clear understanding of the movements on both sides in the battle of May 15th. On Thursday, the 12th, General Breckinridge telegraphed me his arrival at Staunton on his way to my assistance, and sent forward a staff- officer to inform me more fully of his strength and movements. We spent Thursday and Friday in perfect quiet at New Market, awaiting Sigel from the north-east and Breckinridge from the south-west, being well-informed of the movements of each. 48i THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET. General Sigel's advanee was so slow and cautious that on Saturdsa morning, the 14tb, information from the front indicated that be would not attempt to pass Meem's bottom.s o- Rude's Hill that day. learning abont It1 t'eloek that Breckinridge anid his staff woulil reacht Lacy Springs, ten niles from New Market, by noon. I titounted and rode there to uieet and confer with hint, leaving Colonel Smith of the ti2d it, coi-tuaid durinig my ab.e.... . Th. general eami as expeetid unid invited me to remaini for diliner. Whilht we were at table a c-onrier arrived with a miessage from Colonel smith to me that Sigel's cavalry, 2.(5b atrong, had rea1hed lnde'a Hill, and that Colonel Imbolen of the I tQh was falling back skirmishing, but was so vigoronsly pressed that be, Smith, had formed line of battle just west of the town to cover the I 8th in its retreat. The conrier had eome rapidly, but before we left the table the booming of MeCtlanahan's guns broke upon us, and a mo- ment afterward the roar of an, opposing battery was distinctly heard. I instantly mounted to go to my men, with orders from Breekinridge to hold New Market at all hazards till dark, and then fall back four miles to the position nientioned above, where he woild join me during the 7 night with his troops. thne otf his staff accompanied me, and in, an hour we had ridden the ten miles, stimulated at every jump by the rapid ar- tillery tiring" indicating. asR we had bitt siX guns there. that they were opposed by at least double their number. Arriving on the field I found that Colonel George H. Smith had made an admirable di,- position of the little command / on the west ,.ide of the townt, forming it in single ratiks, and not too close, so as to present the ap- pearance of a mitch larger force than it was in reality. His line extnledm from about half-way tip the hillsile west of the towil, away across the turnpike toward Smith's Creek, his right beitig co-teesled by the forest in its front. McItainalian was posted on the e-xtreme left, near the top of the htill, which gave- him a plunging fire across the town atid dowit uipotin the ieiemy's guns occupying ground from one to twt hImudred feet lower, put- ting them to the disadvantage of having to shoot tip, at a high angle, to reac h him at all. tht tirriv- ing at his battery I had a full view of the enemy for a long distance, and from what I saw felt to apprehension of any attempt to dislodge us that evening, and that nothing mire serious than at, artillery duel was impetuditig. Except their ad- vanced cavalry and artillery no troops had been formed in line. It was afterward reported that a negro from beyond ILacy Spritigs hail made his way down Smith's Creek, and informed General Sigel of the rapid approaeh of alt army front Staunton. H- had seen Breekinridge's brigade., atln exaggerated their nuimbers. This false information woult naturally have caused Gen- eral figel to advance with great caution after passing Ruide's Hill. Night terminated the ar- tillery firing. and with ito serious damage to either side. We still hell the town. A rain coming up, it became intensely dark, anti favora- ble to our withdrawal. Un- der cover of the darkness Sigel moved a large body of bhis infatitry to a plateau north-west of the town, and beyond the ravine running from it to the river. Their campfires disclosed their exact position to us. About two hours before L W v at daybreak Iwas aroused by the light of a tin lantern Fj, SY ai 0 , Hshining in my face. It was carried by one of the camp guard, who knew where to allow \ find me ott the roadside. I was immediately accosted by General Breckinridge. He itiformed ne that his troops would reach that poitit be- fore sunrise. About daylight Breckin- ridge's troops cameup weary, 4V wet, aid muddy, and were halted for rest. The general looked over the ground, se- lected his line of battle, and intended to await Sigel's assault there, expecting, of 482 THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET course, it would occur early in the day. Whilst our horses wire feeding, and the men getting something to eat, the general explained to me his plan of the approaching battle. Hle had hirtiught with him two small infantry brigades, commtlllded respectively by Brigadier-Generals .Johln Ehuols and Gabriel C. Wharton. These were veteran troops, and equal to any ill the Confeder- ate army, and were ably commanded. He also hald Major William McLaughlin's artillery-six gilts - and at section of the cadet battery from the Virginia Military Institute, temporarily at- tawhedl to McIaughlin. Hle had also ordered ont the full corps of cadets,-boys from 1t; to 18 vears old,-and they were present to the number af 225, under command of Colonel Ship, one of their professors, and an excellent soldier in every sense. The "reserves" from Augusta and Rock- inghnim Counties had also been ordered out, but had not had time to assemble from their Neat- teretd homes, and were not tip. The entire force, above enumerated and present, tif all arms, did not exceed three thousand men. My whole effective force, then present, did not exceed 1 600 addi- tional men. My largest regiment, the 62d Vir- ginlia infantry, mounted, had present that day not qttuite 550 men. They were nearly all three-years' veterans, and never had been whipped, though they hiad been in many a hard fight. General Breck- inritlgo ordered me to dismount them for the day's work, and said that he would place them and the Cadet Corps together, on the flank of either Bchols's or Wharton's brigade, in the center of his infantry line of battle. :; The rest of my command of about one thousand cavalry and MeClanahan's horse artillery were to form the extreme right wing south of the turnpike, and near Smith's Creek. An hour afterdaybreak hadpassed, andthereport from New Market was that only a desultory cavalry skirmish was going on in and around the town. The whole country for two or three miles lay be- fore and below, like a map, and a few words of explanation from me as to roads, streams, etc., enabled General Breckinridge to grasp it all; and he remarked after five minutes' study of the scene, " We can attack and whip them here, and I'll do it." He sent orders at once for all the troops to advance as rapidly as possible, and for Major McLaughlin not to wait for the infantrv, but to bring on his guns to the hill where we were. I was ordered, as soon as the artillery and infantry came up, to concentrate all my cavalry and with McClanahan's battery take position on our extreme right text to Smith's Creek, to cover that flank. Within little more than an hotLr theseCispositions Were all made and 'MeLaughlin "opened the ,all." The left flankof our infantryline was welluponthe hillside south-west of the town, and probably about -5th) mci-. infantry and artillery, formed the line on that side of the turnpike, and 1040') on the lower side, McLaughlin's eight gnulls being oh the hillside, or on its summit. With something under one thousand cavalry and MeClanahan's battery, I was still nearer Smith's Creek, forming the extrente right, and conc.ealed from the enemy by the woods in our front, which I took ,are to till pretty well with mounted skirmishers several hIt....lred varils in advance of ',hr main line. The battle began in earnest. McPLaughlin was workitig his guns for all they wert worth " aunder a tremendous tire from the other side. At this stage of the fight the town lay betw-een the -on- tendinkg forces, bitt owing to its low situatioti the shot and shells passed over it. For an hour. per- huaps, no sinall-armns were used. Breckinrilge was steadily advancing his infantry line in spd-indid rtler notwithstanding an occasional gap miade in it by a solid shot or an exploding shell. Sigel had brought tip his infantry steadily into line on his side of the little valley or ravine running from the town to the river, where he occupied a wile and high plateau, and from which his artillery was playitig upon our line. Whilst General Breckinridge was advaneting the brigades of Fehols and Wharton, and the 432d Virginia under Colonel Smith and the catlets tinder Colonel Ship, and in the face of a most gall- ing artillery fire steadying them everywhere lby lis personal presenee, we on the extreme tight were only treated to an occasional randoim shell thrown through the woods from an invisible battery. When the infantry had reached the edge of the town, I rode into the woods in my front to aveer- tain what force, if any, the enemy had immediately beyond the woods, with which we would have to cope when Breckinridge passed beyond the town, as it was evident he would do ill the ntext half hour. I was rewarded by the discovery of Sigel's entire cavalry force massed in very close order in the fields just beyond the woods. It was from a battery of theirs that the few stray shots, aimed at random, had reached its through the woods. I moved my command at a "' trot march." We swept down Smith's Creek to the bridge on the Litray road, MeClanahan's battery following. Moving down the east side of the creek we gained the top of a little hill [see map, p. 482] and unlimbered " in battery" before we were discovered, or at least before a shot was fired at us. The position was a magnificent one for our purpose. It was less than one thousand yards from the enemy's cavalry. and a little in rear of the prolongation of his line. A large part of his cavalry. and that nearest to its, was massed in column, close order. squadron front, giving our gunners a target of whole acres of men and horses. The guns were rapidly worked. ushilst my cavalry kept on slowly dlown the creek as if aiming to get iii the entemy's rear. The effeet Ivas magieal. The first discharge of the gutis threw his whole laody of cavalry into confusion. They could not change front and face its without great slaughter. They did the itext best thing. Being igitorant that the woods itt their front were only held by a skirmish-line, they titritei to the right Sithi ipiel thip states Ill his oMelial rtport that wheti wish to put the caulet. in if he could avotut it. hut that :-iuertl Breckitnridge was expeethng to be attacked he ahoauld oc-asiit require it, he would use them very Pisted the corps hi reserve, saying "that he did not freely.-EDiTosa. 483 THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET. about and retired rapidly till beyond our range. In doing this they uncovered one of their batteries. which changed front to the left and exchanged a few rounds with McClanahan. But the rapid retrograde movement of the discomfited cavalry and our flank tire was observed by General Breck- inridge, who immediately pushed forward his infantry with great energy under cover of the excellent service of !lnnnghlin's guns, aided by MeClanahan, whose shot alld shell, now that the a orel rT 1a1m1n1uu Nel.'.- L. wXX nA ,i W. AVEREn I.11. FRO M A PHOTOG;RAPHI. cavalry were out of the way, began to fall upon Sigel's infantry flank. Thus pressed in front, and harassed in flank. General Sigel retired his whole line to a new position half a mile farther back, pressed all the time by Echols's and Wharton's brigades, Smith's 62d, ansi the Cadet Corps. The town was thus passed by our troops, and a little after noon Mlebaughlin occupied the ground on which the enennvys batteries had been planted the day before, and from which they had been gal- lantly served all that forenoon. Every moment the conflict became more desper- ate. There was one six-gun battery on elevated ground west of the turnpike that was particularly destructive in its fire upon Breckinridge's infantry, and he decided to dislodge or capture it. Its posi- tion was directly in front of Smith's 62d regiment of my brigade and the Cadet Corps, and it fell to their lot to silence it by a charge in the very face of its terrible guns. The order to advance upon it was given by Breckinridge to Colonels Smith and Ship. It so happened that when they came to within about three hundred yards of the 4 Colonel Linc.oln had been caught under his horse, which was killed. The colonel in thRt sad predicament tried to use his pistol, and only desited when a cadet threatened to plunge a bayonet through him.-J. D. L. battery they had to cross a deep rocky gulch, grown up with scrub cedars, thorns and briers, and filled here and there with logs and old stumps. Many men had fallen before Smith and Ship had reached this gulch, but whilst in it they were sheltered by its banks. As it was difficult to get through, Smith and his veterans took their time, gaining thereby a slight breathing-spell before making the deadly run necessary to reach the hostile battery. The boys from the Military Insti- tute were more agile andl ardent than Smith's veterans, and got out on the bank first. They suf- fered severely in the two or three minutes while Smith was getting the i2d out of the gulch, but still they kept their formation till the order was given to charge at "double-quick.' The work was then soon done. The guns were captured and also most of the g ..nners, who stood to them till overpowered. Lienntenant-tolonel W. S. Lincoln, of the 34th Massachusetts, was terribly wounded and fell into our hands. 4 A wild yell went up when a cadet mounted a caisson and waved the Institute flag in triumph over it. The battery was taken, but at a fearful cost. Neither the 62d nor the cadets had suffered very much loss during the day till that terrible charge. Then the ground was soon strewn with their dead and wounded. The cadets lost 8 killed and 46 wounded, out of 225. 1 Colonel Smith went into action with about 550 men of the 62d. Seven of his ten captains fell be- tween the gulch and the battery, four of whom were instantly killed and three crippled for life. He reported the next day the total casualties of his regiment at 241 officers and men killed and wounded; and nearly all these fell in passing over that deadly three hundred yards up "to the can- non's mouth." My recollection is distinct that the losses in killed and wounded of the 62d and the Cadet Corps constituted over one-half of the casu- alties of the day in the whole of our little army of about 4500 men. McLaughlin ran his guns through the town on the smooth, hard macadamized main street, loaded with canister ready for emergencies, and it was well they were loaded, for a cavalry charge was made upon him before the enemy had all left, under MeClanahan's fire from across the creek. In an instant as they charged McLaughlin came " into battery," and gave them a blizzard that sent them back hastily to their comrades. Simultaneously with the eapture of the battery on the hill, Echols and Whartoin charged the whole infantry line, and it gave way. From that time on till night the fighting was desultory and at long range. When Breckinridge had pursued the enemy about three miles and had come in sight of Rude's Hill, General Sigel halted his batteries on its crest and began s.elling our advancing lines. Breckin- ridge ordered a halt and stationed his batteries in ann orchard, on the right of the pike, to return the fire. It was then perhaps i, P. n. As I had not I I had a boy brother, J. P. Iuboden, in that corps who wias knioked down and disabled for the tinoc by a spent canister-shot as the comnuand advanced from the gulch.- J. D. L 484 THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET seen General Breekinridge since the fight began, I rode to the left in search of him. He was soon found at about one hundred yards immediately in rear of McLaughlin's glans, on foot and muddy to the waist. I learned that he had been much of the time off hlis horse during the whole day, min- gling with and cheering his brave, tired, hungry, drenched, and muddy infantry and artillery, to whose lot had fallen the hard fighting all the day long. The general explained the reason for his balting. Nearly every cartridge-box had been empty for an hour. He had sent back for the ordnance-wagons, but kept on pursuing the enemy till the wagons should overtake him. The wagons had come up and the line was halted, and the men were engaged in filling their cartridge-boxes, pre- paratory to a final charge on Rude's Hill. Whilst we were talking over the events of the day, several shells, aimed at McLaughlin, passed over him and exploded in the orchard near us. I expostulated with the general for so unnecessarily exposing himself, when, by moving one hundred yards to the right or left, he would be out of the line of fire. He laughed and said it was too muddy any- where else than in that orchard, where the ground was covered with a dense, closely grazed green- sward, and that he would rather risk stray shells than wade in the mud again, and that he had sent for his horse to be brought to him there. At this moment he was informed that all his men had been supplied with ammunition and at once ordered the whole line forward, directing me to oblique the cavalry to the left and move toward Rude's Hill, to which he ordered McClanahan's battery to proceed rapidly down the turnpike. As soon as Sigel discovered this general forward movement on our side his troops disappeared over Rude's Hill and were lost to view in Meem's Bot- toms. McClanahan's battery, under Lieutenant Carter Berkeley, charging like cavalry, on the hard road, reached the hill first and was unsupported for some time, we having a greater distance to go, all the way up to our horses' knees in the mud. When his battery reached the hill the enemy's rear-guard was crossing the bridge over the river. He fired a few times at them, but it was getting too dark to see with what effect. In a little while flames shot up from dry combustibles that had been brought to the bridge and set on fire. The bridge was completely destroyed and further pur- suit rendered impossible that night. If Sigel had beaten Breckinridge on the 15th of May General Lee could not have spared the men to check his progress (as he did that of Hunter, a month later) without exposing Richmond to imme- diate, and almost inevitable, capture. In view of these probable consequences, there was no see- ondary battle of the war of more importance than that of New Market. The necessities of General Lee were such, that on the dav after the battle he ordered Breckinridge to join him near Richmond with the brigades of Echols and Wharton and what remained of my 02d regiment, leaving me with but about one thousand men at New Market to con- front the foree we had with so much difficulty defeated on the 15th, causing it to fall back to Strasburg, where, however, it began to reorganize and recuperate for a more formidable advance two weeks later. We picketed on lIude's Hill, but sent small scouting parties as far as Strasburg, and even be- yond. On the 21st General Hunter had super- seded Sigel, and at the close of May his advince appeared at Mount Jackson just beyond the burnt bridge at Meem's Bottoms. The enemy placed a picket at the river. On the 1st of June Hunter, with his army reen- forced to at least eleven thousand \ men of all arms, drove me out of New Market with my hand- ful of cavalry and six guns. I again reported the perils of the valley to General Lee. Over eleven thousand men were driving me before them up the valley. Generals (rook and Averell, with ten thousand more, were known to be rapidly coming down upon my rear from Lewisburg, and would form a junction with Hunter at Staunton within five or six days unless sufficient relnforcements were sent to the valley at once to defeat one or both of these columns. General Lee replied, as he had done in May, that he could not immediately spare any troops. He directed me again to call out all the " reserves," and to telegraph Brigadier- General William E. Jones, then in south-west Vir- ginia, beyond Lynchburg, to come to my aid with all the men he could collect from that part of the State or in east Tennessee. Jones responded promptly that he would join me via Lynchburg and Stauntonbythe 4thwith about three thousandmen. Late in the afternoon of June 2d I was driven through Harrisonburg with some loss. That night I took position on the south bank of the North River fork of the Shenandoah River at Mount Craw- ford, eight miles from Harrisonburg and seventeen from Staunton. On the 3d Hunter rested at Har- risonburg. That night Jones's troops began to ar- rive in small detachments, just as they had been posted at many points along the line of the Vir- ginia and Tennessee Railroad west of Lynchblurg. My staff and I were sip nearly all night organizing these detachments into two small brigades. At sunrise of the 4th General Jones and staff rode up, having traveled from Staunton aluring the night. An hour or two later Brigadier-Genieral J. C. Vaughn came up with less than one thousand of his Tennessee brigade of eavalrv. The reserves of Augusta and Rockingham eounties had assem- bled to the number of five or six hundred. We thus had, of all sorts of troops, veterans and militia, something less than 4500 men. Of artillery, we had lMcClanahan's six guns, and al improvised battery of six guns from Staunton, manned by a company of reserves under Captain J. C. Marqluis. On comparing dates of eommission with Jones and Vaughn they were both founld to be my seniors. Jones, holding the oldest commission, took --ou- mand. On the 5th our fortes were coneentrtatfl about half a mile northeast of the v-illage of Pied- mont. Without going into details it suffiees to say \ The ofl(tal reco-rds say 8500.- EDITOR. 6th: - Went into the tight yesterday with an aggregate But General Vaughn telegraphed to Bragg on June of 560).,'-EDrrORS. 485 THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET. MAJtOr-1 N ftERAt ( 014,L tf"ItOuu. IrOeM A PH OTOGRAPH. now that battle was jointed. After repelling two assaults on his left wing, in which the brigade led by Brigadier-Geueral R. B. Hayes, afterward President of the United States, bore a most con- spieuous part, that wing was doubled up by a Hank attack, Jones was killed, and we were disastrously beaten. Our loss was not less than fifteen hundred men. O((r defeat opened the way to Hunter to effect a junction with ('rook and Averell at Staunton on the tth. Their combined forces numbered about I Si,000 men of all arms. Vaughn and I fell back in good order, and on the t6th occupied Waynes- boro', eleven miles east of Staunton, and the neigh- boring (RIoekiSlh) gap in the Blue Ridge, where the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad passes through the mountain. Hunter remnainued two or three days at Stau...ton resting his troops and burning both public and private property, especially the latter. On hearing of our defeat General Lee again sent Breekinridge to our aid. He brought but few trops, and with these tecupied the defensive posi- tiorn of Roekfish Gap, thus interposing a barrier to Hunter' direct mareh on Lynchburg. Hunter decided to push his column forty or fifty miles farther up the great valley, and then, crossing the Blue Ridge, swoop down upon Lynchburg from the west. Suecessful resistance to his progress in the valley being impossible, Breekinridge directed Brigadier-General MeCausland to take position in Hunter's front and obstruct his march as much as possible, and report his daily progress, while Breek- inridge moved all the rest of his troops directly to Lynehburg to defend the place. Hunter threw a brigade of cavalry aeross the Blue Ridge from Staunton, through an unfrequented gap, at the head of Back Creek, twelve or fifteen miles south- west of Roekfish Gap. To my command wag as- signed the ditty of looking after this brigade. With the exception of one or two light skirmishes, no collision occurred betwee us. Our rapid move- merit on Lynehburg donbtl-ss saved it from capture by this cavalry for--, a. the town was then virtu- ally defensele ss. The seeond day after reaching the eastern base of the Blue Ridge in Nelson County this brigade retired through White's (Sap, and rejoined Hunter at Lexington about the I 2th of June. Hunter halted at day at Lexington to burn the Virginia Military Institute, Governor Letcher's residence, and other private property, and ordered the torch to be applied to Old Washington College, that had been endowed by the " Father of His Country." This was too much for many of his officers, and they protested, and thus the old col- lege was saved, and is now " The Washington and Lee University," where General R. E. Lee quietly ended his days as its President. From Lexington Hunter proceeded to Buchanan in Botetourt County, only slightly impeded by MeCausland, who gallantly fought his advance at almost every mile as best he could. At Buchanan the torch again did its work. Colonel John T. Art- derson, an old gray-haired man, with his aged wife, occupied a palatial irick mansion a mile above the town. The grand old house, its splendid library and collection of pictures, the furniture and all the family wearing-apparel, made a bonfire that was seen for many a mile around. From Buchranan Hunter crosed the Blue Ridge via the lofty Peaks of Otter, and moved by the shortest route direct to Lynchburg. To defend that place and drive Hunter hack General Lee had sent there the Second Corps of his army, ' Stonewall " Jackson's old corps, undler Lieutenant-General Jubal A. Early. Breckinridge was already there with his small force fromn Rock- fish Gap, when (ont Friday, June I 7th) Early made his appearance with the advance division of his arnuy corps. That day I had been ordered, with my own and Brigadier-General William L. Jackson's brigade of cavalry, to go ten miles out to New London, reenforce MeCausland, and as- sume command of the three brigades, and retard Hunter as much as possible, to give time for the whole of Early's corps to come up by rail from Richmond. About sunset we had a skirmish at New London, and that night fell back to the "Quaker Meeting House," four miles out from Lynchburg on the Salem or Liberty turnpike, upon which the enemy was approaching. In the after- noon of Friday we were attacked in this position, and after a sharp resistance, entailing a loss on our side of overonehundred men in killed and wounded, fell back upon the fortifications of the city unpur- sued by the enemy. [See p. 493.] 486 SIGEL IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY IN 1 864. BY FRANZ Sil8F, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V. O N tle 8th of March. 1 864, while in command t of the l)istrict of Lehigh, with headquarters at Iteading, Pennsylvania, I received an order from this Presidelit appointing mre to the command of the- Impartmneit of West Virginia, and on the I 0th of the same mouth I arrived at C0imberland, the h,'adjltarters of the department. AS. this was the time when General Grant assumed the chief command of the armies and began his preparations for the campaign of 1 -('4, it seemed to me necessary to subordinate all military arrangements in the department to the paramount object of making the bulk of our fores available as an auxiliary force in the pro- splective campaign. It was also necessary to pro- tect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the shortest line of communication between Washington and Cin-innati. To reach these ends a system of defensive measures was applied to the line of that road, and the troops were concentrated at certain points on the road to be reorganized, dis- ciplined, and provided with all the necessary ma- terial for active service. The intrenchments at Harper's Ferry were extended and strengthened, and the construction of detached works was begun at Martinsburg, Cumberland, Grafton, and Clarks- burg, to protect these places against raiding parties. There were block-houses at the most important points on the Baltimore and Ohio, and iron-clad railroad cars were brought into requisi- tion, each of them armed with a small piece. A pontoon-bridge was laid over the river at Falling Waters, between Harper's Ferry and Williamsport. At the middle of March there were about 24,000 men in the department, most of them guarding the railroad from Monocacy and Harper's Ferry to Parkersburg and Wheeling, while about 3500 under General Crook were in the Kanawha Valley. Amid great difficulties the work of organization went on tolerably well, so that I expected to have, after the middle of April, a force of about 20,000 men ready for "active service ill the field." On the 29th of March General E. 0. C. Ord arrived at my headquarters at Cumberland with a let- ter from General Grant, saying in substance that I should immediately assemble 8000 infantry, 1500 cavalry ("picked men"), besides artillery, provided with ten days' rations, at Beverly, for the purpose of marching by Covington to Staunton; the troops to be under the command of General Ord, who supplemented the letter by saying, on the authority of General Grant, that the column should start within ten days. General Crook was to move from Charleston against the Virginia and Tennes- see Railroad, destroy as much of it as possible, and then turn toward Lynchburg or await further orders. Crook had been summoned to Grant's headquarters about a week before, where this "raid" had been discussed and decided upon. In another letter I was directed to have a large train reaily and to move up the Valley and meet the ex- pedition of Ord and Crook as soon as it should reach Staunton. The most energetie measures were im- mediately taken to put this plan into operation. All the troops that could be spar d were con- centrated at Webster and C'larksbrg to move to lBeverlyas soon as the necessary material should le,+ collected at that point. But continuous rains had made the roads so bad that it was almost impo-si- ble to move even empty wagons to Beverly, -amd only about 3500) troops could he assembled for the expedition, unless the whole region from Harper's Ferry and Martinshurg to Cumberland and Parkers- burg were to be left unprotected and exposed to hb"- tile enterprises. Of all these cireiumstances Geiu- eral Grant was informed, and General Ord, who was every day in my headquarters, became so diffident in regard to the whole matter that he asked Gemi- eral Grant to be relieved. His request was granted on the 1 7th of April, and on the same day Colonel 0. E. Babcock arrived with instructions from General Grant to confer with me about the best way of solving the "raiding " problem. It was ule- cided that General Crook should move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and New River Bridge with the best and strongest part of o,.r forces. about 10,000 men, while the remaindedr, about 7000, should advance in the Shenandoah Valley, at least as far as Cedar Creek, with the double object of protecting the eastern part of the department, from Harper's Ferry to 0'i-mberlan.l, and at the same time facilitating the opperations 'if General Crook by inducing his opponent to detach a part of his forces from south-west Virginia against the troops advancing in the Shenanmoalu Valley. This arrangement was approved by Gen- eral Grant. Reenforcements of infantry and the. best mounted cavalry were sent to General ('rook on the Kanawha by way of Parkersbuirg and the Kanawha River; one division of infantry of eight regiments, besides the remnants of General Aver- ell's cavalrv division anul three batteries (later on increased to five), was concentrated at Martins- burg and put under the command of General Julius Stahel. the senior officer. Besides these troops there remained on the Baltimore and Ohio, from Monocacy and Harper's Ferry to Parkers- burg and Wheeling. a total distance of 300 miles, for local defense and other duties, seven regiments of infantry, several batteries, and a few hundred cavalry. It was understood that Crook should commence his movement on the 2d of May, while the troops in the Shenandoah should start a few days earlier to divert the enemy's attention from south-west Virginia. General Averell, who had distinguished himself by his successful raid against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, in December, 1863 [see p. 480], was especially assigned by General Grant to the command of the cavalry division to operate with General Crook. In conformity with these arrangements I left Cumberland on the 25th of April for Martinsburg, inspected the troops assembled the-e, and moved to 487 S/GEL IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. Bunker Hill on the 29th, and to Winchester on the lt of May, while the cavalry advanced to Cedar ('reek and Strasburg. To meet the wishes of lien- eral Crook, the cavalry force left at Beverly was s-lt forward into Pocabiontas County, spreading false rumors as to our strength and movements. Gieneral Crook, with the principal force, of from d0110 to Soot) men, left Fayette, not far from the month of New River, otn the 2d of May, moving by Raleigh Court House and Princeton toward New- bern, meeting and beating" the enemy at Cloyd's Mountain, then again near Dublin and Newbern, and after destroying the bridge over New River and the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad for a consid- erable distance, returned by Union and Lewisburg to Meadow Bluff, where he arrived on the 19th of May. General Averell, at the head of two thousand cavalry, moved on a more western line against Saltville, with the intention of destroying the salt- works at that place, but, in spite of fighting bravely at that point and at Wytheville, was forced to withdraw, and followed Crook on his homeward march to Union. The expedition from the Kanawha, although not attaining all that was proposed, was ex- cellently planned and executed, and its moral effect was great; but it would have been of much greater importance if it had been undertaken be- fore Longstreet had rejoined Lee's army. About the time that Babcock arrived at my headquarters at Cumberland the two divisions of Longstreet passed over the Virginia and Tennessee road and New River bridge to the east, and took their posi- tion at Gordonsville, forming the extreme left of the Army of Northern Virginia. From our position at Winchester and Cedar Creek we learned that there was no hostile force in the Shenandoah Valley, except General Imboden's cavalry and mounted infantry, reported to be about 3000 strong. It seemed to me, therefore, neces- sary to advance farther south toward Staunton, in order to induce Breckinridge to send a part of his forces against us, and thereby facilitate the opera- tions of Crook and Averell. Before leaving Win- chester, a force of 500 cavalry, under Colonel Jacob Higgins, was sent toward Wardensville to protect our right flank, and Colonel William H. Boyd, with 300 select horsemen, into the Luray Valley to cover our left lank, especially against Mosby; but Colonel Higgins was attacked and beaten by a detachment of Imboden's brigade between War- densville and Moorefield on the 9th of May, and pursued north toward Romney. Colonel Boyd was ambuscaded on his way from the Luray Valley to New Market on the 13th and defeated, suffering a loss of 125 men [General Imboden, p. 481, says 464 men] and 200 horses. Meanwhile Sullivan's division at Winchester joined the troops at Cedar Creek on May 9tb, and on the 10th our cavalry, after some skirmishing, occupied Woodstock. Here the whole telegraphic correspondence between Breckinridge and Im- boden and the commander of Gilmor's cavalry, sta- tioned at Woodstock, fell into our hands. Among the dispatches was one signed by Breckinridge, and dated Dublin Station, May 5th, saying that 4000 men were en rouate for Jackson Riverdepot; also that the quartermaster should furnish transportation for Breckinridge and staff anal 1 horses. Another and laterdispatch, dated Staunton, and signed by Breck- inridge, directed Captain Davis, at Woodstock, to find out the strength of our forces. A third dis- patch directed Captain l)avis to watch particularly any movement of ours in the direction of Glrant's army. Another dispateh, dated Staunton, May 10th, also to Captain Davis, stated that General Lee was driving the enemy at every point. The anxiety of Dreckinridge to know whether there was any movement in the direction of (irant's army suggested such a movement on our part, while the unfavorable news relative to the great struggle between Grant and Lee could not fail to prompt me to energetic aetion. To gain more detailed information,two regiments of infantry, under Colonel Augustus Mloor, assisted by five hundred of the 1at New York (Lincoln) Cavalry, under Major Timothy Quinn, were sent forward on the 13th. This force met a part of Imboden's troops near Mount Jackson on the 1 4th, forced them across the Shenandoah, took posses- sion of the bridge, and, animated by this success, followed them as far as New Market, seven miles beyond Mount Jackson, or nineteen miles from the position of our forces at Woodstock. Having received information of this little exploit late at night of the 14th, and also that Breckinridge was on his march down the Valley, and considering that in case of an attack the position of Mount Jackson would afford many advantages as a de- fensive point, I ordered the troops to move at 5 A. M. on the 15th. They arrived at Mount Jack- son at about 10 o'clock A. M. I rode forward to reconnoiter the ground and to decide whether we should advance farther or meet the enemy's at- tack at Mount Jackson. During this time I re- ceived information from Colonel Moor that he was in a very good position. Major T. F. Lang,-an officer of General Averell's staff, and temporarily attachedto myheadquarters,-whom I had ordered to the front, sent me a note, saying that our troops were in a good position and " eager for the fight." Captain Carl Heintz, of the staff of General Stahel, reported to me that Breckinridge was in force in our front, and that " if I would send two batteries they would be of excellent use." Believing that a retreat would have a bad effect on our troops, and well aware of the strategical value of New Market, commanding, as it did, the road to Luray, Cul- peper, and Charlottesville, as well as the road to Brock's Gap and Moorefield, I resolved to hold the enemy in check until the arrival of our main forces from Mount Jackson and then accept battle. We had 5500 infantry and artillery, with 28 guns and 1000 cavalry. Breckinridge's and Im- boden's force I estimated, from what we could 3know, at 5000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. [See p. 491.] We were about equal, and from what had happened the day before I thought that the advantage was on our side. I therefore has- tened forward to New Market, with Captain Alex- ander and Major T. A. Meysenburg (of my staff), where I arrived about noon, and before the enemy 488 SIGEL IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. began his attack. It now became clear to me that all the troops could not reach the position close to New Market. I therefore ordered Colonel Moor to evacutate his position slowly, covered by cav- alry, under Captain J. C. Battersby, and to fall back into a new position, which was selected about three-quarters of a mile north of New Market, right and left of the pike leading to Mount Jackson. During this time I sent two officers, Captain Me- Entee andut Captain T. (;. Putnam, back to General Sullivlan, with orders to bring forward all his troops without delay; atnd at the same moment, when Colonel Moor was approaching tdre new line from his position in adlvance, it was reported to me by Cap- laiin R. G. i'rendergast, commander of my escort, that all the infantry and artillery of General Sulli- van had arrived, the head of the columnt being inl sight, and that they were waiting for orders. Sup- posing this report to be correct, two batteries- Captain Carlin's and Captain Snow's -were posted on. the extreme right of the line [see map, p. 482], Thoburn's brigade (34th Massachusetts, 1 at West Virginia, and 54th Pennsylvania) was deployed on the left of the batteries, while Colonel Moor was ordered to form on the left of Thoburn; but unfor- tunlately only two of his regiments (the 18th Con- riecticut and 123d Ohio) came into position on the right and left of Von Kleiser's battery, and a short distance in advance of Thoburn's line. The 12th West Virginia and Dii Pont's battery took position behind the right of Thoburn's brigade as a reserve, and four companies of that regiment were posted behind the batteries on the right for their support. One company of the 34th Massachusetts was placed on the extreme right, between the bat- teries and the river, to watch any movement of the enemy through the woods and along the river. Ewintg's battery was on the extreme left, and some distance behind it the cavalry. Skirmishers were deployed in our front. I personally directed and superintended this arrangement of the right wing, and was about to proceed to the left to see whether all the troops were in their proper positions, when my attention was directed to the approach of the enemy, whose lines appeared on the crest of the hills opposite our front, north-west of New Market. Our skirmishers began to fall back, and fire was opened by Snow's battery on our right. I ordered the 34th Massachusetts to kneel down and deliver their fire by file as soon as the enemy came near enough to make it effective. A very se- vere conflict now followed at short range, the enemy J During the battle rain fell in torrents and the wind drove cloud, of smoke from our own and the enemy's lilies against us, giving the latter the advantage in dis- tlgiuglathlng our position and rendering his fire more effective, th..s acio tintg In part for the greater num- ber of killed on our aide.- F. S. I was chained to my advanced position on the right by a eircumstance that Is unpleasant to record. DesirIng to know what was going oti to the left. I soon turned to ride o-t of the smtoke, and to gain a survey of the w bole field. As I did so, the compauie placed be- ,ind the batteri-s quickly rose from the ground and followed e, as If ly conmmand. I lmmediately turned around, brought them back to their position, aid re- Iained it lily post. In spite of the eriousness of the situation, it seemed tom e almost comical that a major- VOL. IV. 32 charging repeatedly and with great determination against our line of infantry and the batteries, and being repulsed by the coolness and bravery of the 34th Massachusetts, I1t WVest Virginia, and 54th Pennsylvania, and the batteries. The smoke from the infantry fire on the left and the batteries on the right became so dense that I could not distinguish friend from foe.) There wasan interruption of a few minutes, when the enemy's lines recoiled, and our men cheered; then the fire began again and lasted about thirty minutes; the enemy again charged, this time especially against our batteries; he came so near that Lieutetuant Ephraim Chalfant of (Carlin's battery rode up to me and said that he comld not hold his position. Iimmediatelyordered two companies of the 12th West Virginia to ad- vance ald protect the pieces, but to my surprise there was no disposition to advance; in fact, in spite of entreaties and reproaches, the men could not be moved an inch! At this moment Major Meysen- burg of my staff came tip to me, Z, and, to save the gius, I determined to make a counter-charge of the whole right wing, and requested him to transmit the order to Colonel Thoblurn, who was not far from me toward the left. Bayonets were fixed and the charge was made in splendid style, but the enemy rallied, received our line with a destructive fire, and forced it back to its posi- tion. Before the charge was made, our extreme left wing had given way; two pieces of Von Kleiser'8 battery fell into the enemy's hands, and a part of his forces moved against the left and rear of Thoburn's brigade. When Thoburn's regi- ments came back, strewing the ground with their killed and wounded, the enemy, close on their heels, now again turned against the batteries on the right, filling the air with their high-pitched yells. I saw that the battery would be lost, as men and horses were falling. I therefore reluctantly gave orders to Captain Carlin, through Lieutenant Chalfant, who was nearest to me, to withdraw his pieces successively, by sections from the right, and take position on an eminence, a short distance in the rear. Sud- denly Carlin, who acted as chief-of-artillery, gal- loped back in hot haste, and his whole command followed him immediately. As some of the horses of two pieces had been killed, the guns were abandoned. Our whole position IIow became un- tenable, and the infantry retreated, pursued for a short distance by the enemy. 4 During the re- treat, and while the artillery were crossing a general commanding lb department and an ,army" was coudemued to the function of a w- atchman." Then canle the charge I ordered froi o-r right. The disagreeable incident mentioned prevented me from performing an important duty.- F. S. 4 The battle Was well foug.ht by the Southern troops. pleelally as to the timely and skillful manrnevre of Ituboden, by which he gained a Position with his hat- tery, which enfiladed our line on the left, without a chance on ourside, on acotmunt of the intervening creek. to attack or dislodge him. But better fighting was "ever done than by the 34th Ma3Ineaisett8. under Colonel Wells and Lieutenant-Colonel Lineoln. who were both wounded il the battle; and by the It West Virginia, slid by the 34th Pennllsylvania under Colonel CampbelL The 34th Malachsvetts lost 202 489 SIGEL IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. creek, another piece had to be abandoned, the horses being unable to bring it along. I tried my best to save it, and was nearly made a prisoner by the enemy's skirmishers who followed us. There was some confusion and scattering of our retreat- ing forces, but very soon order was restored. They rallied again and formed a line opposite the Dunker Church, and west of the turnpike leading to Mount Jackson, about three-quarters of a mile from the battle-field. Here we could see a dark line on Rude's Hill, and discovered that it was the line of the 28th and 1 16th Ohio, the two regiments that were unfortunately not with us during the battle. After remaining in our position about half an hour, we marched beck toward Rude's Hill, and the whole command formed in line, with the 28th and 11 6th Ohio on its extreme left. When this new sad last line was forming I met General Sullivan, and after some consultation we came to the conclusion not to await another attack, for the reason that our losses were severe; that the regiments that had sustained the brunt of the fight were nearly out of ammunition and would have no time to receive it from the train, which was in the rear, beyond the bridge; that our position was not a good one, being commanded by the enemy's guns, posted on the hill in front of our left; and that in case of defeat we could not cross the swollen river, except by the bridge. There was some cannonading, but nothing else was under- taken by the enemy for at least half an hour. I therefore directed the troops to withdraw to Mount Jackson, which was done slowly and in perfect order, under the immediate supervision of Gen- erals Sullivan and Stahel, Captain Battersby's com- pany being the last to cross the bridge. We would have remained at that place, but since the cavalry on our flank, under Colonels Boyd and Higgins respectively, had been beaten, flanks and rear were unprotected. We had a supply train of two hundred wagons with us, destined for General Crook in case we should have joined him. All our ambulances and a part of the train were filled with wounded, who could not have been sent back without being protected by a large detachment. It was therefore thought best to bring our little army back to Cedar Creek, disengage it from its impediments, receive the reenforeements that were expected and on their way, and, according to cir- eumstanees, remain there or advance again. As to General Crook, the battle of New Market did not affect his movements at that time, since, after his raid against the Virginia and Tennessee Rail- road, he fell back to Lewisburg and Meadow Bluff, where, on the 19th of May, he found my dispatch, saying that he should advance to Staunton. We arrived with all our troops behind the Shen- andoah, at Mount Jackson, a little before 7 o'clock in the evening, and took position behind Mill Creek. We were perfectly safe there, as the creek was high and could not be forded, nor could the enemy venture to pass it in the face of our line; but in order to retard his forward movement, if he should try it, to give our troops the necessary rest, without molestation, to gain time for preparation after our arrival at Cedar Creek, and also for the purpose of deceiving Breckinridge in regard to our intention to come back, the bridge over the north branch of the Shenandoah was destroyed. We remained in our position for two hours, during which time (to use the words of Lieutenant- Colonel Lincoln in his " Life with the 34th Massachusetts Regiment"): "the men ate their suppers, while the Injured were looked up, their wounds examined and dresed, and the sflghtly wounded placed in ambulances for transporta- tion. Those more severely wounded were disposed of in the hospital buildings at Mount Jackson, and left under charge of Assistant Surgeon Allen, of the 34th. These arrangements completed, at about 9 p. x., the col- umn was again put In motion, the 34th bringing up the rear." It will be seen from these statements that we did not "flee in disorder" from our position at Rude's Hill to Mount Jackson and Cedar Creek, nor lose or burn any wagons, nor "forsake " our sick and wounded, as was publicly proclaimed at the time, and often repeated, but we deliberately retreated to Mount Jackson in perfect order. All our wounded, with the exception of those that could not be carried away from the battle-field or transported from Mount Jackeon, were with us on the retreat to Cedar Creek. The enemy captured no muskets, except those of our killed and severely wounded, left on the field; and of the five pieces of artillery, two (of von Kleiser's battery) were taken in the first attack on our left -the other three were abandoned and taken on account of the horses having been killed or being unable to bring them along. The losses on both sides [seep. 491] were great in proportion to the forces engaged, which shows that the struggle was severe and was maintained with courage and tenacity. From Mount Jackson we reached Edinburg by a night's march at 7 o'clock in the morning of the 16th, and after a two-hours' rest proceeded to Strasburg, where we arrived at 5 o'clock in the evening. Early in the morning of the 17th we crossed Cedar Creek and encamped on the same heights we had left just a week before. The troops were disappointed, but not the least "de- moralized." The commanderof the 12thWestVir- ginia acknowledged the bad conduct of a part of his troops that failed to do their duty; but this regiment, under the same commander, redeemed its honor by its gallant behavior in the battle- of Piedmont, and on other occasions. On the 1 8th a detachment of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, under Colonel Wells of the 34th Massachusetts, was sent to Strasburg and the cavalry advanced to Fisher's Hill, the pickets of the enemy retiring before them. The Union flag was hoisted in the little fort at Strasburg, and patriotic speeches were made by Colonel Wells and others. On the 19th, at Cedar Creek. I received two dispatches, one from General Crook and the other from General Averell, bringing the news of officers and men in killed and wounded, the let West differently it the two regiments, which I bad good Virginia 55, and the 54th Pennsylvania 132; 1 there- reason to believe were near, had arrived in time to fore have no doubt that the battle would have ended assist us.- F. S. 490 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MARKET. their exploits, which of course created much en- thusiasm. As I had already instructed General Weber at Harper's Ferry to send all the troops that were not absolutely necessary for the defense of the forts, and also those that were stationed at Martinsburg, to Cedar Creek, I now telegraphed to General Crook to march to Staunton, while I would advance again and try to meet him as soon as he was ready for coilperation. \ He answered on the 19th from Meadow Bluff, that on account of certain difficulties he could not move before a week, but that he would move on the 1st of June and be in Staunton in six days. On the same day I was informed that General Hunter had been assigned to the department and would take com- inand of the troops. This he did at Cedar Creek on the 21st of May. After a friendly conversa- tion with him in which he expressed his desire that I should remain in the department and accept either the command of the Infantry Division or of the Reserve Division, comprising all the troops at Harper's Ferry and the lines of the Baltimore and Ohio, the matter was deferred to the next day, when I accepted and was assigned to the latter command. I took leave of the troops on the same day and proceeded to Martinsburg, where the headquarters of the division were established. Considering the different raids, and minor enter- prises in West Virginia and the Shenandoah Val- ley, from the beginning of the campaign of 1864 until the appearance of Early before Washington, andincludingthesubsequentengagementsat Snick- er's Gap and Bunker Hill, they represent in their totality, and in spite of partial successes of Aver- ell, Crook, and Hunter, an utter failure, because Lee, having the advantage of a central position be- tween the Army of the Potomac and the Shenan- doah Valley, was always ready and able to turn the scales in his favor, whenever his eommunica- tions leading west and north-west were seriously threatened; and so it came to pass that finally an army of at least 40,000 had to be applied to a problem that could not be solved by 5000 or 10,000. What should have been done at the begin- ning of the campaign in May, 1864, with a foree of 20,000, in August demanded twice as many. . A dispatch from General Grant was received in the evening of that day, saying that I should march to Staunton.- F. S. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MARKET. VA., MAY 15, 1864. THE UNION ARMY.- Major-General Frauz Sigel. FIRST INFANTEY pIVIsIN, Brig.-Gen. Jeremiah C. Sullivan. First Brigade, Col. Augustus Moor: 18th Conn., Maj. Itenry Peale; 25th Ohio, Lleut.-Col. Gottfried Becker; 116th Ohio, Col. Jamea Washburn; 123d Ohio. MaJ. Horace Kellogg. Second Brigade, Col. Joseph Thoburn: lot W. Va., Lieut.-CoL Jacob Weddle; 12th W. Va., Col. William B. Curtis; 34th Mass., Col. George D. Wells; 54th Pa., (Col. Jacob M. Campbell. FIaST CAvALRY uistoN, Maj.-Gen. Julius Stahel. First Brigade. Col. Wflllam B. Tlbbit.: lst N. Y. (Vet- -.raw), Col. B. F. Taylor; lst N. Y. (Lincoln), Llent-Col. Alonzo W. Adnms; 1st Md., P. H. B. (detachment), Maj. J. T. Daniel; 21st N. Y., Maj. C. G. Otis; l4th Pa. (detach- ment), Capt. Ashbel F. Dnean., Lieut.-CoI. William Blakely. .Seeod Brigade, Col. John E. Wynkoop: S-al1. detachments of the lth N. Y., ; 20th Pa.. -; 22d Pa., . Total strength of the two cavalry lri- gades about 1000 men. ARTILLERY: B. Md., Capt. Alonzo Snow; -0th N. Y.. Capt. Albert von Klelser; D. 1st W. Va., Capt. John Carlin; G, let W. Va., Capt. C. T. Ewing; B, 5th U. S., Capt. Henry A. Du Pont. The ffetive strength of Sigel's command was about 60e0, about 5150 men and 22 guns beings available In the battle. (The 28th and 116th Ohio w.ere not engaged.) The losses were 93 killed, 502 wounded, and 186 captured or mnissing =831. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.- Major-General John C. Breckinridge. ckhoiga Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John Echols: 22d Va.. ; 23d Va., - ; 26th Va., - . Wharton'a Bri- gade, Brig.-Gen. G. C. Wharton: 48th Va., ; 51st V-., ; 30th Va. Battalion, . Cadet Corps (four -ompanies from the Virginia Military Institute), Lient.- ('0. Scott Ship. Artillery. McLaughlin's Battalion, Maj. William McLaughlin; Cadet Battery Section, Lieut. C. H. Minge. Cavalry, Imuboden's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John D. Imnboden: s2d Va. (mounted infantry). Col. George H. Smith; 2ad Va., Col. Robert White; 18th Va., Col. George W. Imboden; Glamore Maryland Battallon, MaJ. Harry Gilmor; Davis's Maryland Battalion detachment), MaJ. Sturgis Davis; Partisan Rangers, Capt. John H. MeNeill; MeClanahan's Va. Battery, Capt. J. H. MeClanahan. In an address delivered at the anniversary celebration of the battle General Echols referred to the bravery of a company of Missourians who were in the battle. They were 70 ia number, and, according to the 1Rocking- ham Register" of May 20th, 1864, they lost 47 in killed and wounded. The strength of Breekinridge's forees was about t'000. General Sigel, In an estimate based on the otiel re- ports, places Breckinridge's strength at 4816, as follows: Wharton's brigade, 1578; Echols's brigade, 1122; engineer co., 86; cadet corps, 227; company of Missourians, 70; Jackson's battery, 100; Chapman's battery, 136; Calla- han's battery, 93; cadet's section. 35; Imbode-' .cavalry (not Including the 62d Va.. with Wharton), 900. The losses were 42 killed, 122 wounded, and 12 3,isaing=577. These tigures include the losses of the cadet corps, which numbered 225, and sustained a loss of 8 killed and 46 wounded. 491 THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE LYNCHBURG EXPEDITION. THE UNION ARMY.- Maj.-Gen. David Hunter. FtIk.T INFANTHY DIVIt1i4-. Brig.-(en. Jeremiah C. Sulei- First Brigade, (Wl. Auguswin. Moor, ('l. Iee. V. Wells: 34th Mass (transferred from 2d Brigade June sthi, Col. t(eorge D. Well.. Capt. George W. Thomlson; th Oh.io (sent to the rear with prisoner, cit., June 8th), Lteut.- ('Ci. (Gotttried Beelker; 116th Ohio, Col. James Wash- ern o: 123d Ohlo., Co. Willian T. Wils-n; A, B. C. and 1), 5th N.Y. Hy. Arty., Liecit.-CotI.Edwar. lMurray. 8reaid Brigade, Col. Joseph Tholhurn: 18th Conn. htrnferrtd freoe. 1tt Briga4e Juume Sthi. Col. Willian, (1. Ely; tat W. Va.. Lient.-Cl. Jacob Weddle; 12th W. Va.. Ccl. William B. Curtis. uosuigsad: 2d Md. E.a-tern Shore,, Col. Riobtert S. Bedgers; 2d Md. (Potomae Bo-ue Brigade), iehni.-Col. It. Ellis Porter. SECONTD INFANtTRY DtIVISION, BrigG-len. (teorge Crook. First Brigade, Cel. RBtherford B. Hayes: 23d Ohio, LUe.tt.-Col. Jamea M. Coumly; 36th Ohio, Col. Hirami F. Dutval: 5th W. Va., t'ol. A. A. T..mlilnen; 13th W. Va., Col. William ]. Brown. Xwond Brigade, Col. Cnrr B. White: 12th Ohio, Lieut.-t,,l. Jonathan D. Hinea; 91at Ohio, Cel. John A. Turley, Lie-t.-Cot. Benjaumin F. Coate.; 9th W. Va., Col. Isaac H. Dulval; t4th W. Va.. Col. Daniel 1). Jb.sbhnse rhird Brigade, Col. Jaeob M. Campbell: 54th Pa. itransferred frote 2d Brigade, I-t Division, Juie VIthM. Col. Jacol, M. Campbell, Maj. E-och t. Yutzy; 3d and 4th Pa. Reservea (battalielnt, (aCpt. Abel T. Sweet; 11th W. Va. ts e.-,, C'ol. Daniel Froat; 15th W. Va., LUeut.-Cl. Thomas Morris. ArilUler. tat Ky., Capt. Daniel W. (Giase.e; 1st OhIo, Lient. (Georga. P. Kirtland. ARTILLERY, Capt. Henry A. Du Pont: D, Md., 30th N. Y., Capt. Alfred von ileiser; D, lat W. VS., (apt John Carlin; B. 5th b. S., -. YIRST CAVATLRY DivisloN, Maj.-ten. Jnlius StahOet, Brig.- (ten. Alfred N. Dicili6. First Brigade, COl. Wilihnt B. Tibbita: let N. Y.-(Ll,- a-otI). ; tst N. Y. (Veteral.a, ; 21st N. Y., -; lat Md., P. B. B.,- Brigade, Ccl. John E. Wynkoop- 15th N. Y., ; 20th Pa., 22d Pa.,- SECOND CAVALRY DIVIsiON. Brig.-tcen. William W. Averell. First Brigade, Col. James N. Scheoonttaker: 8th Ohio, CoL. Alpheta 8. Moore; i4th Pa.,- . fie-,d Brigade. Col. John H. Oley: 24t1 Ohio (m't'd Infantry), ; 2,1 W. Va., -; 5tb W. Va., -; 7th W. Va., - Third Brige, Col WUlia-ia H. Powell: tet W. Va.. ; 2d W. Va.. Hunter started ol this expedition with about 8500 taten of all arms. After uniting with Crook and Amerell at Staunton hia force was asout 18,00 ktrong. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. The forces retiatiutg 1lanter's advance were eom- 1). Itnboden. General Jalhu C. Breckinridge's diviaton ntanded by Generals W. E. Jones (killed at Pidmont), and Juba] A. Early's corps arrived at Lynchburg in time J. C. Vaughn, Jonb MeCauistand. W. L. Jacksn, and J. to defttd the ple agaita Hunter's meditate attack. EARLY'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN 1864.J BY JHBAL A. EARLY, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A. ON the 12th of June, 1864, while the Second Corps (Ewell's) of the Army of Northern Virginia was lying near Gaines's Mill, in rear of Hill's line at Cold Harbor, I received orders from General Lee to move the corps, with two of the battalions of artillery attached to it, to the Shen- andoah Valley; to strike Hunter's force Zs in the rear and, if possible, destroy it; then to move town the valley, cross the Potomac near Leesburg, in Loudoun County, or at or above Harper's Ferry, as I might find most practicable. and threaten Washington city.4 I was further directed to com- munieate with General Breckinridge, who would cooperate with me in the attack on Hunter and the expedition itito Maryland. The Second Corps now numbered a little over eight thousand muskets for duty. It had been on active and arduous service in the field for forty days. Divisiotts were not stronger than brigades ought to have beeat. nor brigades than regiments. (h, the morning of the 13th. at 2 o'clock. we JConudeusesl (rei Gleneral Enrl5 a" M(emoir ot the Lat Year of the War frr Independence itt the Confederate States of Ameriea." Lynchburg: Ptablished by Charles W. Button far the Virginia Memtrial Assoctiaton, 1867; here printed by peersilon of the author. 9cee p. 486. et eq. commenced the march, and on the 16th arrived at the Bivanna River, near Charlottesville, having marched over eighty miles in four days. At Char- lottesville I received a telegram from Breckinridge, dated at Lynchburg, informing me that Hunter was then in Bedford County about twenty miles from that place and moving on it. The railroad and telegraph between Charlottesville and Lynch- burg had been, fortunately, but slightly injured by the enemy's cavalry, and had been repaired. I ordered all the trains of the two roads to be sent to me withall dispatch, forthe purpose of transporting my troops to Lynchburg. The trains were not it readiness to take the troops on board until sunrise on the morning of the 17th, and then only enough were furnished to transport about half my in- fantry. I accompanied Ramseur's division, going on the front train; but the road and rolling stock were in such bad condition that I did not reach Lynchburg until about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and the other trains were much later. 4 In a letter to the editors under date of November 23d, 9885, General Early says: sGeneral Lee did not expect me to be able to enter Washlngtom. His or- ders were merely to threaten the ety, and when I sug- gested to him the idea of capturing It he said it would be Impossible." 42 EARLY S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN 1864. As (General Breekinridge was in bed, suffering from an injury received near Cold Harbor, at his V ,eqitmet General D. H. Hill, who happened to be in townil, had inade arrangements for the defense of the eity with such troops as were at hand. Slight works had beei hastily thrown up on College Hill, ,overing tills turnpike and Forest roads from Lilt- -rty, manied by Breekinridge's infantry and the lisinoitlited cavalry of the command [Jones's and Vaughn's brigatles] which hadl been with Jones at Piedmont. The reserves, invalids from the hos- pitals, and the cadets from the Military Institute at Lexington occupied other parts of the line. My troops, as they arrived, had lefet ordered in front of the works to bivouac, and I immediately sent orders for them to move out on the turnpike, and two brigades of ianmsear's division arrived just in time to be thrown acriasH the road at a redoubt about two miles from the city as Imboden's com- nnand was driven back by vastly superior numbers. These brigades, with two pieces of artillery in the redoubt, arrested the progress of the enemy, and Rlamseur's other brigade, and the part of Gordon's division which had arrived, took position on the sanie line. The enemy opened a heavy fire of ar- tillery on us, but as night soon came on he went into camp on our front. Orders had been given for the immediate return ttf the trains for the rest of my infantry, but it did not get to Lynchburg until late in the afternoon of the 18th, and meanwhile I contented myself with acting on the defensive. There was artil- lery firing and skirmishing along the line, and ill the afternoon an attack was made to the right of the turnpike, which was handsomely repulsed with considerable logs to the enemy. A demon- stration of the enemy's cavalry on the Forest road was checked by part of Breckinridge's infantry rnuder Wharton, anal Mc(ausland's cavalry. As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by the railroad, though none of my artillery had got- tell up, arrangements were made for attacking Hunter at daylight on the 19th; but after mid- night it was discovered that he was moving, and at light it was observed that he was in retreat, and pursuit commenced. The enemy's rear was over- taken at Liberty, twenty-five miles from Lynch- burg, just before night, and driven through that place, after a brisk skirmish, by Ramseur's division. The day's march on the old turnpike,which was very rough, had been terrible. The pursuitwas resumed early on the morning of the 20th, and the enemy was pursued into the mountains at Buford's Gap, but he had taken possession of the crest of the b Grant, in his report. says `General Hunter, owing tam a want of anmunition to give battle, retired from before the plae" AdLyn-hbnrgl. This is a little remark- able, as it appears that this expedition had been long contemplated and was one of the prominent features of the campaign itf 1554. Sheridan, with his cavalry, wat to have united with Hunter at I.ynchburg, and the two together were to have destroyed Lee'. communications aud depots of supplies. and then have joined Grant. Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so important au expedition with an insu-licient supply of ammni- tion I Had Sheridan defeated Hampton at Trevillan's, he would have reached Lynchburg after destroying the Blue Ridge, and pI.t batteries in position com- imianding a gorge through which the road passes. (n the 21st the pltrstlit was resimed very shortly after sunrise. The enemy hadl turned off from Salem toward Lewismlrg, and Me'atisland had struck his eoluin andl eaptlruld ten pieces ,f artillery, but was eo-npelhld to fall 1,uc-k, carrying off, however, the prisoners an.d alno a part of the artillery, taid disabling the rest. As the emiwmtn had got into the mountains, wvhwre enothring useful c-uld be aecomplished by pl-r,.it. I lid nast lcen, it proper to eontinue it farther. A great part of mily commamid had had nothing to eat f or the la.t two days, except a little bacon which wvas olitaiwed at Liberty. It hadl marched sixty uniles in the three days' pursuit, over very rough roads. I ie- termined, therefore, to rest on the 2 2d, so as to enable the wagons and artillery to get tip, and pre- pare the men for the long march before them. ; At Lynchburgl hadreceivedatelegram fromGen- eral Lee, directing me, after disposing of Hunter, either to return to his army or to carry out the orig- inal plan, as I might deem most expedient. After the pursuit had ceased I received another dispatch from him, submitting it to my judgment whether the condition of my troops would permit the expedi- tion across the Potomac to be carried out, and I determined to take the responsibility of continil- ing it. On the 23d the march was resumed, and we reached Buchanan that night. On the 2iith I reached Staunton in advance of the troops, and the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing transportation anid getting provisions from Waynesboro'. The official reports at this place showed about two thousand mounted men for ditty in the cavalry, which was composed of four small brigades, to wit: Imboden's, MeCaus- laid's, Jackson's, and Jones' .(now Johnsol's ). The official reports of the infantry showed teil thousand musakets for duty, including Vaughn's dismounted cavalry. Besides Breekinridge's owi infantry divi- sion, under Elzey (row under Vaughn, afterward under Echols), Gordon's division of the Second Corps was assigned to General Breekinridge, in order to give him a command commensurate with his proper one. Nearly half the troops were bare- foot, or nearly so. ansl shoes were sent for. But without waiting for them the march was resumed on the 28th, with live days' rations in the wagons and two days' in haversacks. Imboden was sent through Broek's Gap to the South Branch of the Potomac to destroy the railroad bridge over that stream, and all the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from that point to Martinsburg. On railroad on the way, and I could not have reached there in time to do any good. But Hampton dtefsted Sheri- dae. Had Hunter moved on Lynchhurg with energy, that place would have fallen before it was possible for moe to get there.-J. A. E. The notiflu-ation of Secretary Stanton to General Stahel on the subjeet was as follows: - General Sheridan, who was sent by General Grant to open communiea- tion with General Hunter by way of Charlottesville, has just returned to York River without effecting his object. It is therefore very probable that General Hunter wlil be compelled to fall back Into West Vir- ginia." -EDrrons. 493 E94RLY'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN 1864. jI lx Nt N H1 gI lx ; I S , NIl' lA-lb N I N , .. ,s 4 "' tS '4 iN 4 LI ' 4: ,ZC 4 rtL gF yg b ga k , I,0 s ,; 0 0 gE g E_0 r tf gz .e.sl,"9 f.gs3,, 1 gKgx.'5 g g jSs 4 Q 7 ; 2, N '4:Rritr-zw A '+m ,'/f;0 7v A '' t lI l ' .\ P ] 4_ f MAP OPF Tt VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS OF 1964. the 2d of July we reached Winchester, and here I received a dispatch from General Lee, directing me to remain in the lower valley until everything was in readiness to eross the Potomac, and to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesa- peake and Ohio Canal as far as possible. This was in accordance with my previous determination, and its policy was obvious. My provisions were nearly exhausted, and if I had moved through Loudoun it would have been necessary for me to halt and thresh wheat and have it ground, as neither bread nor flour could be otherwise obtained; which would have caused much greater delay than was required on the other route, where we could take provisions from the enemy. Moreover, unless the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was torn up the enemy would have been able to move troops from the West over that road to Washington. On the morning of the 3d Sigel, with a con- siderable force, after slight skirmishing, evacuated Martinsburg, leaving considerable stores in our hands. McCausland burned the bridge over Back Creek, capturing the guard at North Mountain depot, and succeeded in reaching Hainesville; but Bradley T. Johnson, after driving Mulligan, with hard fighting at Leetown, across the railroad, was himself forced back, when Sigel united with Mulligan, upon Rodes's and Ramseur's divisions, -7 , ' I ' k -:-" "11 T 'R _-' AP4,_ 494 X t F i il I ,i'_, " ' " - '-" 'e 'I,.-- EARLY'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN 1864. which arrived at Leetowia after a march of twenty-four miles. During the night Sigel retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdatown to Mary- land Heights. During the night of the 4th the enemy evacuated Harper's Ferry, burning the railroad and pontoon bridges across the Potomac. It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's Ferry, except with skirmuishers, as it was thoroughly commanded by the heavy gunas ott Maryland Heights; and the 5th was spent by Rodes's and Ramseur's divisions in demoistrating at that place. In the afternoon Bre-kinridge's command moved to Shepherdstown and crossed the Potomac, followed by Rodes's anal Ritneteur's divisions early on the 6th. Gordon's division. advanced toward Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into his works. Working parties webre employed in destroying the aqueduct of the canal over the Antietam, and the locks and canal- boats. On the 7thl Rodes moved through Rohrers- ville on the road to Crampton's Gap in South Mloun- tain, and skirmished with a small force of the enemy, while Breckinridge demonstrated against .Maryland Heights. McCausland had occupied Hagerstown and levied a contribution of 20,000, and Boonsboro' had been occupied by Johnson's cavalry. A letter fronm General Lee had informed me that an effort would be made to release the prisoners at Point Lookout, and directing me to take steps to unite them with my command. My desire had been to mancouvre the enemy out of Maryland Heights, so as to move directly to Wash- ington; but he had taken refuge in his strongly fortified works, and I therefore determined to move through the gaps of South Mountain north of the Heights. On the 7th the greater portion of the cavalry was sent in the direction of Frederick; and that night the expected shoes arrived and were distributed. Early on the morning of the 8th the whole force moved: Rodes through Crampton's Gap to Jefferson; Breckinridge through Fox's Gap; and Ramseur, with the trains, through Boonsboro' Gap, followed by Lewis's brigade, which had started from Harper's Ferry the night before, after burn- ing the trestle-work on the railroad and the stores which had not been brought off. Early on the 9th Johnson, with his brigade of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, moved to the north of Frederick, N\tn his `Pernal Memoirs " n Vo. It., pp. 304), General Grant writes as follows of the battle of Mon- ocacy and its effect: 1. the absence of Heater,. Geeral Lew Wallace, with heatlq-trters at Baltimore. c.m.,at..ed tile department in which the Shenan.inah lay. His -tirplus of troops with wi tici to move against the enemy was small in onader. Most at these were raw. ani., consequently, very much inferior to nler veterans a.,o to the veterans which Early hail with him; but thle sitation if washington was precarious. s-it Wallace mo-e- with commenulatue promptitude to meet the enemy at thle iouncacy. Ste could luardly imave expected to defeat 1dtm badly, bht he l]opeut to cripple anil delay him tuntil Washing- ton c blit he pot Witt a state of preparation for tis reception. I had previonsiy orcereut General Meade to send a diviatn to Baltimore for the porpse oa a.ldinjr to the defenses of W.as- tnata,, and tie had sent Rtikette's -ltrlnion or the SixlhCarps (Wrtgibtt). which arrived in Baltimore an tie 8th at J.ly. Filnuing that Wsallae had gone to the fraut with his cam. manut, Rickett. immeiUately took the ears aol followed him with orders to strike the railroads from Baltimore to Harrisburg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gunpowder, also to cut the railroad be- tween Washington and Baltimore, and threaten the latter place; and thet to move toward Point Lookout for the purpose of releasing the prisoners. if we should succeed in getting into Washington. The other troops also moved forward toward Mon- ocacy Junction, and Ramoseur's division passed through Frederick, driving a force of skirmishers before it. The enemy in considerable foree, under Gen- eral Lew Wallace,\ was found strongly posted MAP OF TtHE BATTLE OF THtE MONOCACY. to tile Ntonoeaey with hid entire divi-i-n. They nmet the enemy, saul. as mtiglt lhave been expectedt, wvere defeateul hut they encieede in stopping hint fto the day on which the biat. tie Imuk place. Ttle next suoroluigi Earlys tartedt on his march to tie capital of hue natai arrvitbg ttefore it an the I Ilt. Learning ot thle gavity ft thie ttoation, I haul .turectcd General -teaute to also order Wfrigt. wilt, tle rest .f his carps", uircetly to Washington for the rlietf ,that place, and the totter reachedt there tihe very day that Forly arribed he. fore it. ite Ni neteenth Corps, whichI lh.a been statione4i in Loti.siana, having been orerct l up to rei4nforce tie armies aluott Rictumondl, 1h5.1 .bottt tlhm time arritied at Fortress Monroe, an tiucir way to Jilu Iis. I ,I-verlel them from that point to WVasuiognton., which Ilace they reache't aintoat simttltanetslyv ewith Wrigitt. on the lilth. Th.e Nii-Wtecath Corps wvas cusmanuleut luay 3or...encrral E-ory, Farl malte hi reconnoisoace- with a v-ew of attieking on the tuulow tg m ing. the l2tb: I tt tte .vet teaming ht foaudt one -ntrenchmenta. whi-lu were very atr-m-. folly manned. He at once rommence4i to retreat. W-riuttt fol- lonwing. [The retreat began en the night of the 12th. See 495 EARLY'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN 1864. on the eastern bank of the Mmnoeacy, hear the juie- tion, with an earth-work and two block-houses commanding both the railroad bridge and the bridge on the Georgetown pike. McCausland, crossing the river with his brigade, dismounted his men and advanced ralidly against the enemy's left flank, which he threw in to confusion, but he was then gradually forced back. MeCausland's movement, which was very brilliantly executed, solved the problem for me. and orders were sent to Breekinridge to move up rapidly with Gordon's division to MeCausland's assistance, and, striking the enemy's left, to drive him from the positions commanding the crossings in Ramseur's front, so iju titattim tr ots teuter at Ottint a reletet ii r Wtatiou I tn hi .- air i.I E-1arly's withltrawai. fist-titte. p. 499.-EbiToUi.] T h.ere is a, tsliit.g Itti .-ntei this result watt - terbuteil ti Ity (Geterat Lew Wallace's I-ailil Iiat isld.t well be eoo- aiterei1 almntat a ftt:lnrh.lsu mie. t Farlty iatt b ie o bitt o-ie ilay earlier. lie ight Iave entered the capital before tle that the latter might cross. This division crossed under the personal superintendence of General Breckinridge, and while Ramseur skirmished with the enemy in front, the attack was made by Gordon in gallant style, and with the aid of several pieces of Kiug's artillery, which had been crossed over, and Nelson's artillery from the opposite stide, lhe threw the enemy into great confusion and forced him from his position. Ramaeur immedi- ately crossed on the railroad bridge and pursued the enemy's flying forces, and Rodes crossed on the left and joined in the pursuit. Between 601) and 700 unwounded prisonersfell into theirhands, and the enemy's lo.s in killed anid wounded arrival of thte Ieeenfor ttitait slt, !W ltetiterttiiiiI.ay easie. t by the battle sittotiste'i t. , a lay ti mit, tesieril W et- la e e tiittiteti iii tbit bters tli , iy the lete tit itt the triteji tinder hI.m a greater bet'ett t tthe ease than ilt falls t.. tlieiittitt acon maftler .,t af et. ttial force r to eitdlrl by yletii of a viettiry." 49b VS1 4l \4t k't '" -7.. +4:: 4K fIN KNC" N . i.WA T7 O'C' PLOM EARLY'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN 1864. FloKTsrP.slNS, .ti- HNIAro'.- 1.on.4A T .I. -Tlii1,5.115 . was very heavy. Our loss in killer and wounded was about 700. The action closed about sunset, and we had marched about fourteen miles before it commenced. All the troops and trains were crossed over the Monocacy that night, so as to re- sume the march early the next day. During the operations at Monocacy, a contribution of 200,- OttO0 in money was levied on the city of Frederick, and some much-needed supplies were obtained. On the 10th the march was resumed at day- light, and we bivouacked four miles from Rock- ville, on the Georgetown pike, having marched twenty miles. McCausland, moving in front, drove a body of the enemy's cavalry before him, and had a brisk engagement at Roekville, where he encamped after defeating and driving off the enemy. We moved at daylight on the I I th. MufibCausland oit. the Georgetown pike, white the infantry, preceded by Imboden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the left at Rockville. so as to reach the 7th street pike which runs by Silver Springs into Washington. Jaeksou c'savalrymoved on the left flank. The previons day had been very warm, and the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain for several weeks. The heat during the night bad been very oppressive, and but little rest had been obtained. This day was an exceedingly hot oue, and there was no air stirring. While marching. the meii were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaustion. Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I pushed in as rapidly as possible. hoping to get into the fortifications around Washington before they couldl be manned. Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the works on the 7th street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed them as skirmishers. I rode ahead of the infantry. and arrived in sight of Fort Steveiis on this road a short time after iioon, when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned. Rodes, whose division was in front, was imme- diately ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skirmishers, and move into the works if he could. My whole column was then moving by flank, which was the only practicable mode of marching on the road we were on, and he- fore Rodes s division could be brought up we saw a cloud of dust in the rear of the works toward Washington. and soon a column of the enemy tiled into them on the right and left, and skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery tire was openedl on us from a number of batteries. This defeated our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became necessary to reconnoiter. Rodes's skirmishers were thrown to the front. driving those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to examine the fortitica- tions in order to ascertain if it was practicable to arry them by assault. They were found to be ex- eedingly strong, and consistel of what appeared to be inclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in front of each, pierced for an in- -ne-se number of guns, the whole being connecte d by curtains wsith ditches in front, anil strength- enell by palisades and abatis. The timber had been felled within cannon range all around anl left on the ground, making a formidable obstaele, and every possiblo approach was raked. by artil- lery. Ont the right was Rock C reek, running through a deep ravine which haul been renleredl impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, andI beyond were the works on the George- town pike which had been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as the eye eould reach, the works appeared to he of the same 497 EARLY 'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON IN 1864. impregnable character. This reconnoissanee consumed the balance of the day. The rapid marching and the losses at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Monocacy had reduced my infantry to about 8ti)0 muskets. 4 Of these a very large number were greatly ex- hausted by the last two days' marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and not more than one-third of my force could have been carried into action. I had about forty pieces of artillery, of which the largest were 1 2-pounder Napoleouns, besides a few pieces of horse-artillery with the cavalry. MeCausland reported the works onl the Georgetown pike too strongly manned for him to assault. After dark onl the I 1 th I held a consul- tation with Major-Generals Breckinridge, Rodes, Gordon, and Ramseur, in which I stated to them the necessity of doing something immediately, as the passes of South Mountain and the fords of the Upper Potomae would soon be closed against us. After interchaniging views with them, I deter- mined to make an assault on the enemy's works at daylight next morning. But during the night a dispatch was received from General Bradley T. Johnson from near Baltimore, that two corps had arrived from General Grant's army, and that his whole army was probably in motion. As soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front, and found the parapet lined with troops. I had, there- fore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the Capitol, and given the Federal au- thorities a terrible fright. Some of the Northern papers stated that, be- tween Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the city; but on Saturday I was fighting at Mon- ocaey, thirty-five miles from Washington, a force which I could not leave in my rear; and after dis- posing of that force and moving as rapidly as it was possible for me to move, I did not arrive in front of the fortifications until after noon on t (General Barnard. in bis Defencesof Wasbington," thus describes the works (see map, p. 496): Every pronlinemt a.-nt. at intervals of eight handre-l to one thousand yatls. was oncupted by an inclot flet-fort; everv It portant appr-ach or depresson o grounat, uneen from tihe forts, swept by a battery for tlelb-gu.s sod tihe whole eounectert by riile-trnncbes wbltch were in fact lines of inifantry ptralets. furnishing emplaeement for two ranks of men. anst satiming eovereIl cotuamunication slanx the line, while roa1ts were openedt wherrvcr necesary. -o that troops and artiltery enulI be move.l rapidly fron nile point of the immense paripbiery to another. or. nuder coer frornm pOint to point alonx the liie. Ttie coonteracarpa were snrroamnled by abatis; hosb-proofa were proviital to nearly all the torts: alt guns not sloely intenidel for distant fireplseed In ebtrastres ant wvelt traver-eil. All eonmsmnaling points on wich an etiemy wool be likely Iss eoncentrate artillery to overpower that of one or two of our forts or batteries were solectei not only to the fire. ilirect no. cross, of ninny point. along the lIne. but Iao fromo heavy rifleet gusa from distant points un- attainable by lb.e enemy's field.gnus. With all lh.. die- velopments. the lIne certainly approxlmated to the maxi- mum degree of strength which can be attained from ourevetteit eart-work.. Inadeqallyti manneil as they were, the fortifiattlons compelled at leat a cnncentratiiu ind an arraying o force on the part of the aesstnts, and tbus gave timne for the arriva of .n-eor."' General Barnard gives this acount of the local forces prior to the arrival of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps: "The eTh ective forces were 1819 infantry. 1834 artillery, ad Monday, and then my troops were exhausted, and it required time to bring tbem up into line. I had theli made a march, over the circuitous route by Charlottesville, Lynehbturg, atid Salem, dowti the valley alid through the poases of the South Moult- taill, which, notwithstanding the delays ill deal- ing with Huniter's, Sigel's, and Wallace's forces, is, for its lenigth antd rapidity, I believe, without a parallel in this or any other moderti war. My small force had been tilrowli tip to the very walls of the Federal capital, north of a river which cotuld not be forded at any point withilt forty miles, and with a heavy force anti the South Moutitain in my rear-the passes through which moutitain could be held by a stuall nituber of troops. A glance at the map, wheit it is recollected that the Potomac is a wido river, and tiavigable to Washington for tle largest vessels, will cause the intelligent reader to wotider, not why I failed to take Washinigton, btut why I had the audacity to approach it as I did, with the small force un- der my commaid. It was supposed by some, who were not iniformiet of the facts, that I de- layed in the lower valley longer than was neces- sary; but an examimiatiomi of the foregoing nar- rative will show that not one moment was Spent in idleness. I could hot move across the Potonlac and through the passes of the South Moutitain, with any safety, utitil Sigel was driven from, or safely housedl in, the fortifications at Maryland Heights. After abandoning the idea of capturing Wash- ington I detennitued to remain in front of the forti- fications during the 12th, atod retire at night. Johnson hail burtied the bridges over the Gult- powder. o01 the Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened Baltimore, and started for Point Look- out; but the attempt to release the prisoners was not made, as the enemy had received notice of it in some way. On the afternoott of the 12th a heavy reconnoitering force was sent out by the t63 cavalry north ut I tle Potonasc, and 4064 infantry, 1772 artillery, anol 51 cavalry -iatli therrof. There were bealilen li, W5ihintim , atd Alenandria, aboot 3900 e nectIves sld sboot 4400 lola reginient.) of Veteran aeser-es. The t.ire. goinggeoustsIite a total of about 20.400 men. of tbat uitnmlier, hoever,. but 9flOo, mostly perfectly raw troops constituted the igarfa-n of tle itefemises. Of t. e other tr Hips a ciisimler- able pnrtiiil were .ans ailable, .a.l the whole would form but an iteficient farce for service O tihe ines." Of the troops sent by Grant, Rteketta's division of the Sixth Corps was with Wallace at Baltimore: the other two divisions, under General Wright, and the first steamer-load. amoun-tIng to Sf0 men, of the Nileteenth Corps, reached Washington before 2 P. m. of the 11th. At 4:10P.M. of that day Wright sent this dispatch to General Augur from Fort Stevens: "The head of my eotlnun has nearly reached the front." That night the Sixth Corps relieved the provisional forces on the tlieket line. The remainder of Emory's division of the Nineteenth Corps continued to come by install- ments.- EDITORS. 4 Writing on November 2ad, 1888, General Early adds: A considerable number of my men had broken down on the march. from e.haistl.n ant want of shne., sid on my return to tte valley tI foou some 1800 or 2000 collectedi at Wlnchester by CoIonel 0iodwin. nil others who hail been temporarily disabled in the camp1ign from the Wilderness to Richond alao returned." EDITORS. 498 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE MONOCACY. enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, was driven back by Rodes's division with but slight loss to u8.k About dark we commenced retiring, and did so without molestation. Passing through liockville and Pooleaville, we crossed the Potomac k Grant say.: -On the 12th a reconnoisance was ltrown out in1 fr.,nt of Fort Stevens to ascertain the ,nety's psotItiotn and force. A severe skirmish eastued. in which we lost 280 i killed ti.d wounded. The enemy's b YH was protbibly greater H.e comenced retiring luritig the night. The above 1i correct, with the ex- .- ptionuof the estimate placed on oar lo].-J. A. E. \ General Wright, with almout 15,0oo men of the sixth tid ineteenith. corps, follow ed by several tbousand inre, tin.der Ritketts and Kelily. pursued (teneral Early, who, however, after resting on the 14th and l1th at Lees- burg, reached the Shenandoah Vailey safely through at White's Ford, above Leesburg, in Loudoun County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisotiers captured at Monocacy, and our cap- tured beet cattle and horses, and everything else, in safety. Snickera' Gap, losng neone loaded wagons at Pur- celiville to the cavalry of Hulnter's iiehl forces. These latter had returned fro- the Kaaawha Valley to Har- per's Ferry, and moved out under Crook against the flank of Early's colien. Thohbr'la division of Cro.ok' command, reasing at Snicker'sC. Gap, wa rl lIsed hy Early with a loss of 4220o1 the. ltl of Jily. On the 20th Averell, with a mixed infantry and cavalry force, 2350 strong, attacked and defeated Ramseur's division near Winchester, inflicting a loss of about 400, and suffering a lohs of 214. On July 22d General Early established himself at Strasburg.- EDITORS. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE MONOCACY, MD. July 9th, 1864. THE UNION ARMY.-Major-General Lewis Wallaee. First Separate Brigade (Eighth Army Corps), Brig.- Get,. Erastus B. Tyler: Ist Md., Potomac Home Bri- gadte (5 -'s), Capt. Charles J. Brown; 3d Md., P. H. It.. Col. Charles Gilidn; 11th Md., Col. Willila. T. Land- .treet; 144th Ohio (3 ceo') aud 149th Ohio (T7 co's), Col. Alflisn L. Brown; Baltimore (Md.) Battery, Capt. F. W. Alexander. C'aralry, Lleut.-Col. D. R. Clenddenin: 8th Ill., Lient.- Col. D. B. Clendenin; Detachment 169tb Ohio m't'd let.), Capt. Edward H. Leib and Capt. H1enry S. Allen; Detachment Mixed Cavalry, Maj. Charles A. Wells; Loudoun (Va.. tangers. THIRD DIVIsION (Sixth Corps), Brig.-Gen. James B. Rlcketts. First Brigade, Col. William S. Truex: 14th N. J., Lient.- CoI. C. K. Hall; 106th N. Y., Capt. Edward M. Paine; 151st N. Y.. Col. William Emerson; 87th Pa., Lient.-Col. James A Stable; leth Vt., Col. Williatw W. [Henry. See- oad Brigade, Col. Matthew R. MeClennan: 9th N. Y. IHeavy Art'y, Col. WillIam H1. Seward; 110th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Otho H. Blnkley; 122d Ohlo idetaehneet), Lient. Charles J. Gibson ; 126th Ohlo, Lient.-Col. Aaron W. Ebright; 138th Pa.. Maj. Lewis A. May. The 6thl Md., 67th Pa., and part of the 122d Ohlo, of thIs brigade, did not reach the battle-field. Union loss: k, 98; w, 564; mn, 1188 = 1880. Effective strength (estimated): Eighth Corps troops. 2700; Ricketts's division (on the field), 3350=6050. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.-Lieutenant-General Jubal A. Early. IIORDON's DIVIssNJ MaJ.-Gen. Jobn B. Gordon. Emaae's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. C. A. Evans, Col. E. N. Atkinson: 13th Ga., -; 26th Ga., Col. E. N. Atkin- son; 31st Ga., -; 38th Ga., ; 60th (Ga., 61st Ga.. Col. J. H. Lamar; 12th Ga. Battalion, flays's Brigade, Col. W. R. Peck: 5th La., ; 6th La., ; 7th La., ; 8th La., - ; sth La.,- Stafford's Brigade, lst La., ; 2d La., -: 10th La., - ; 14th La., - ; 15th La., - . Terrys Brigade, 4 Brig.-Gen.. William Terry: 2d, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33d Va. (Stonewall Brigade), Col. J. H. S. Funk; 21st, 25th, 42d, 44th, 48th, and 50th Va. (J. M. Jones's brigader, Col. R. H. Dungan; 10th, 23d, and 37th Va. Steuart's brigade), Lleut.-Col. S. H. Saunders. sEEctINRlt)E'8 DIVItstot, t Brig.-Gen. John Ecehol. (Consisted of Ecotls's. Wharton's, and Vaughn's bri- gades. the latter being dlsmounted cavalry.] tODEs'S DIVISION, alJ.-Ge.. 1R. E. Rodea. Grintess Brigade. 32d N. C., ; 43d N. C., 45th N. C., ; 53d N. C., -; 2d N. C. Batt'n, Cook's Brigade. 4th Ga., -; 12th Ga., ; 21st Gal., ; 44th Ga.,--. Coe's Brigade: Ist N. C., ;2d N. C.. ; 3d N. C., ; 4th N. C., -; 14th N. C.,-; 30th N. C., . Battle's Brigade: 3d MVInj.-.Csn. Jalmn C. Breckinridige comnd.edl Gordon's and Echlol' tIsvisoins. 10ited antler the comm and of Brigadier-General Zeb- 0l-n York. Ala., - 6th Ala.. 6th Ala., ; 12th Ala., 6; st Ala., RAMS4EUR'S DIVIYIO!I, Maj.-Gen. S. D. Ramsenr. Lilley's Brigade: 13th Va., - ; 31st Va., ; 49th Va., ; 52d Va., ; 58th Va., . Jositota' Brigade. 5th N. C., ; 12th N. C.. ; 20th N. C., 23d N. C.,-. LeWie' Brigade: 6th N. C., 21st N. C., ; 54th N. C., ; 67th N. C., ' 1st N. C. Batt'n,- CAVALRY, 11aJ.-Gen. Robert Ransomi. [Composed of the brigades of MeCausland, ImbodeM, W. L. Jackson, and Bradley T. Johnson. The latter brigade was sent before the battle " to cut the North- ern Central and the Philadelphia and Baltimore rail- roads."] ARTILLERY. Lieut.-Col. J. Floyd King. (Composed of Nelson's, Braxton's, and McLaughlin's battalions.] With the forces above enumerated General Early continued his movement on Washington. In his olelal report he says that In the action at the Mnnocacy '1 our entire loss was betwveen 00 and 700. including the cav- alry," and that when In front of Wasbington my in- fantry force did not exceed 1o,000." 4c Cempoacd of' tIme franentar- remain t forteen, " the reginment of E 1war-l Jahnh-'s ,tl0isiaa, most of which was cal-rem- l tir th e enemy May 12th, 1864. C.mpoaition not clearly Indticated. 499 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. sY WESLEY MERRITT, MAJOR-(4EXERAI 1'. H. V., BR1'AlIER-(:ENERA1., 1. S. A. P to the suinmer of S164 the Shenandoah Valley had not been to the V Tnion armies a fortunate place either for battle or for strategy. A glance at the map will go far toward explaining this. The Valley has a general direction from southwest to north-east. The Blue Ridge Mountains, forming its eastern barrier, are well defined from the James River above Lynehburg to Harper's Ferry onl the Potomac. Many passes (in Virginia called "gaps") made it easy of access from the Confederate base of opera- tions; and, bordered by a fruitful country filled with supplies, it offered a tempting highway for an army bent on a flanking march on Washington or the invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania. For the Union armies, while it was all equally practicable highway, it led away from the objective, Rich- mond, and was exposed to flank attacks through the gaps from vantage- ground and perfect cover. It was not long after General Grant completed his first campaign in Vir- ginia, and while he was in front of Petersburg, that his attention was called to this famous seat of side issues between Union and Confederate armies. With quick military instinct he saw that the Valley was not useful to the Government for aggressive operations. He decided that it must be made untenable for either army. In doing this he reasoned that the advantage would be with us, who did not want it as a source of supplies, nor as a place of arms, and against the Confederates, who wanted it for both. Accord- ingly, instructions were drawil up for carrying on a plan of devastating the Valley in a way least injurious to the people. These instructions, which were intended for Hunter, were destined to be carried out by another, and how well this was accomplished it is my purpose to recount. Hunter's failure to capture Lynehburg in the spring of 1864 [see p. 492] and his retreat by a circuitous line opened the Valley to General Early, who had gone to the relief of Lynchbourg. Marching dowin the Valley and taking possession of it without serious opposition, Early turned Harper's 511 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. Ferry, which was held by a Union force under Sigel, and crossed into Mlaryland at Shepherdstown. The governors of New York, Pennsylvania, ,11d -Massachusetts were called on for hundred-days men to repel the invasion, and later the Army of the Potomac sulpplie(d its quota of veterans as a nuileus around which the new levies could rally. General Early mnarched on Washington, and on the I Ith of July was in front of the gates of the capital. The Following day, after a severe engagement in which the guns of Fort Stevens took part, he withdrew his forces through Rockville ;,mid IPoolesville, and, crossing the Poto- imac ab)ove Leesburg, entered the Val- ley of Virginia through Snicker's Gap. ,tfterward, crossing the Shenandoah at the ferry of the same name, he moved to Berryville, arld there awaited devel- After the ininnediate danger to Wash- itlgton had passed it became a question with General Grant and the authorities in Washington to select an officer who, t'ommanding in the Valley, would pre- vent further danger from invasion. After various suggestions,) Major-Gen- 4'ral Philip 11. Sheridan was selected MAJOll4VIVRAt. WESLEY MEURI. temporarily for this command. His per- .X Itff-1APH. nianent occupation of the position was opposed by Secretary Stanton on the ground that he was too young for such important responsibility. Onl the 7th of August, 1864, Sheridan assumed command of the Middle Mili- tary Division and of the army for the protection of the Valley, afterward known as the "Army of the Shenandoah." Naturally, on assuming command, Sheridan moved with caution. He was inctited to this by his instructions, and inclined to it by his unfamiliarity with the country, with the command. and with the enemv he had to deal with. Oil the other hand, Early, who had nothing of these to learn, save the mettle of his new adversary, was aggressive, and at once manaeux-red with a Hold front, seemingly anxious for a battle. The movements of the first few days showed, however, that Early was not ilisposed to give battle unless he could do so oil his own conditions. Oin the morning of the 10th of August Sheridan, who had massed his army at Halltown, in front of Harper's Ferry, marched toward the enemy's com- maunications, his object being to occupy Early's line of retreat and force him to fight before reenforcements could reach him. The march of my cavalry toward the Millwood-Winehester road brought us in contact with the On the ISth of Juiv General Grant suggested proposed the assign-ent of Mteade, with Hancock Pranklin for the command of the projected Middle to comimand the Aknny of the Potomac and Gibbon Military Division, and, on this being objected to, for the Second Corps.-EDITORS. SHEHRIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. enemy's cavalry on that road, and it was driven toward Kernstown. At the same time a brigade under Custer, making a reeonnoissance onl the Berryville- Winchester road, came on the enemy holding a defile of the highway while " his trains and infantry were marching toward Strasburg." As soon as the retreat of the enemy was known to General Sheridan the cavalry was ordered to pursue and harass him. Near White Post, Devin came upon a strongly posted force, which, after a sharp fight, he drove from the field, and the (livision took position on the Winchester-Front Royal pike. The same day my division had a severe affair with infantry near Newtowim, in which the loss to my Second Brigade was considerable. Onl the 12th o f August, the enemy having retired the nlight before, the cav- alry pursued to Cedar Creek, when it came up with Early's rear-guard and continued skirmishing until the arrival of the head of the infantry column. The day following, the reconnoissanee of a brigade of cavalry discovered the enemy strongly posted at Fisher's Hill. About this time Early received his expected reinforcements. General Sheridan, being duly informed of this, made preparations to retire to a position better suited for defense and adapted to the changed conditions of the strength of the two armies. On the 13th of August General Dcvin's brigade of the First Division was ordered to Cedarville on the Front Royal pike, and oil the 14th I marched with the rest of my division to the same point, Gibbs taking posi- tion near Nineveb. On the arrival of his renforeements Early had requested General R. H. Anderson, in command, to take station at Front Royal, it be- ing a convenient point from which to make a flank movement in case of attack on Sheridan's command, which Early undoubtedly contemplated. At the same time it constituted a guard 1 1. to the Luray Valley. About 2 P. ma a . on the 16th an attack was made by this command on the First Cavalry Division, which resulted in the battle of Cedarville. A force of BREVET 1141JORG ERAL DI1VIID A, IU-iFI L, KILLED .al AT THUE BATrUL 41WF 1C111'.LTER. -FPTE9BEH cavalry under Fitz Lee, supported by a 19, 18.4. FR1m A P1lOTO4GAPii. brigade of Kershaw's division, made a descent on Deines brigade. General Fitz Lee drove in the cavalry pickets and attacked Devin with great violence. This force was scarcely repulsed when a brigade of infantry was discovered moving on the opposite bank of the Shenandoah River toward the left of the cavalry position. One regiment of Custer's brigade, dismounted, was moved up to the crest of a hill near the river-bank to meet this force, while the rest of the brigade, mounted, was stationed to the right of the hill. At the same time the Reserve Brigade under General Gibbs was summoned to the field. The enemy advanced boldly, 1,02 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. wadilng the river, and X when within short car- gane range was met by a murderous volley from the dismounted men, while the remaind6er of the command charged mounted. The Confed- erates were thrown into cOnthfusion and retreated, leaving 300 prisoners, together with two stand of colors. Anderson hurried reenforcements to his beaten brigades, P hut no further attempt to cross the river was made. The loss to f the Union cavalry was about 60 in killed and p wounded. The loss to the enemy was not less ' than 500. These affairs between the Union cavalry and thce enemy's infantry ' were of more impor- tance than might appear 6EKIA MII . SHERIDAN IO P 0TGRP TAE IN14. at first glance. They gave the cavalry increased confidence, and made the enemy correspondingly doubtful even of the ability of its infantiry, in any thing like equal numbers, to contend against our cavalry in the open fields of the Valley. On the iiight of the 16th Sheridan withdrew towai d his base, and on the following day the cavalry marched, driv ing all the cattle and liv e stock in the Valley before it, and burning the grain from Cedar Cieek to Berryville. No other private property was injuied, nor were families molested. On the afternoon of the 17th the Third Division of cav airy, under General James H. Wilson, reported to Genei al Torbert, chief-of-i avalry, who with it and Lowell's brigade and the Jersey brigade (Penrose's) of the Sixth Corps was ordered to cover the flank of the army which niarched and took position near Berryville. General Early, who on the inoi iug of the ii thi discovered the wvithdrawal of Sheridan's foice, pursued iapidly, Anderson adv ancing from Front Royal with his command. Eaily struck Toibert's force with such vigor and with such overwhelming numbeis as completely to oveithirow it, with con- siderable loss, and drive it from Winchester. In this affair Peniose's brigade lost about 300 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and Wilson's cavalry lost :;03 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH V4LLFY. N NCH STE S 7 .e (),, 1 _,E Rz 86t6"S h 6 9 f/ 46 4 4 7zzR, ,0 Cj.h', pound;, E0 F.N I _ F'.. A S \4 ii S - 1 MiAl 1' Till.' hA L l. M iF I l. F'TEll. '.ihl1311II RI . 1",1414. inl prisonlers somne 50 menl. At this timle, informationl havinlg reached Sheridanl that the reenforeemenlts that had eome to Early- under Anderson were onlly part of what might he excpected, SheridanI concluded still further to solidify his linles. 0On the 21st of August Early- moved with his army to attack S7heridanl. His own commandt marched through Smithfield toward Charles- townl, and Anldersonl onx the direct road throughi Sumlmit Point. Rodes's and Ramsenlr's inlfanltry were advanlced to the at-tack, and heavy- skirmishing was onltinlued fbr somle time Withl a loss to thle Sixth Coerps, princeipally Getty's division, of' 2(ia killed amid wounded. In the mleanltime Andersonl was so retarded lby the Unlion eavalry that he did nsot reach the field, anld miight over- takinlg hliml at Sumlmit Poinlt, he there wvent inltO canp. That nlight Shler idanl drew inl thle cavalry, and, carryinlg out thle resolutionl already formled, with- drewv his army to Hallttownl. Durinlg the three days follownvsg the C'onfederates dlemlonstratedl inl fronst of Sheridan's linles, but to little purpose except to skirmlish with C'rook's anld Emlory's pickets. O)n the 25.th,7 leaving Anlder- son's force inl fronlt of Shleridan, Early movedl with hlis four divisions anld Fitz- hugh Lee's cavalry to Leetown, from which place he dispatched Lee towardl Williamsport while hle crossedl the railroad at Kearuceyaville anld moved ;04 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. SPR1 T1S Sl'RINGt MILL. PEQ90IN R\IVEt, VA., fUt)PITA'O X F 11F T ISTXI AMIllY CI PtI, 1RI'L TIlM 1A110r,,vE 'IF WVXCII,'TII'i, 9III 11111.1t I', I F 111t . IX AX 't-1'7 . ,lF TII. toward Shepherdstowii. Betwoeen Kearnlesville and Loetown hle was met by rorbert with the cavalry. .A sharli fight followed, in the first shock of whicih Early's advanev, consisting of Wharton's division, was driven b);ac-k in confuision, but upon tliseovcning the strength of the oneini, Torbert with- drew in good order, though Custer's brigade was pressed so closely that he was forced to cross the Potomac. A charge on the flank of the pursuing, infantry relieved Cnster from danger, and the Inext morning he returned, as ordered, via flarper's Ferry to the armny at Halltown. Early's mnoverment n(lend with this affair, and during the following two (lays lie rethrnril to the vicinity of Winchester. Dining the absence of Early, R. H. Anderson's position was reconnoitered by Crook with two divisions and Lowell's cavalry brigade, who carried Anderson's lines, driving two brigades from their earth-works and capturing a nunmber of officers and men, after which Anderson withdrew from Sheridan's front. Iit a dispatch to Halleek Sheridan said: "I have thought it best to he pl- dlent, everything considered." Grant commended Sheridan's conduct of affairs iII general terms, and predicted the withdrawal from the Valley of all of Early's reenforcements. This the pressure of (Grant's lines at Peters- burg finally accomplished. On the 28th of August Sheridan moved his army forward to (harlestown. My division of cavalry marched to Leetown, and drove the enem-y's eavalry to Simithfield and across the Opequou. The next day Early's infantry. in turn, drove my division from Smithfield; whereupon Sheridan, adlvaneing with Ricketts's division, repoulsed the eneniv's infantry, which retiretd to the west bank of the Opequon. On this day the cavalry had sonie severe fight- illg with Early's infantry, but not until in hand-to-hand fighting the Con- federate cavalry had been driven from the field. On the 3d of September Rodes's Confederate division proceeded to Bunker Hill, and in conjunction with Lomax's cavalry made a demonstration which VO1.. IV. 33 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. was intended to cover the withdrawal of Anderson's force from the Valley. But on marching toward the gap of the Blue Ridge, via Berryville, Anderson came upon Crook's infantry just taking station there. The meeting was a surprise to both commands and resulted in a sharp engagement which con- tinued till nightfall. On the following morning Early moved with part of his infantry to Anderson's assistance, and demonstrating toward the right of Sheridan's lines, he made show of giving battle, but only long enough to extricate Anderson and his trains, when the entire command retired to the country near Win- chester. On the 14th Anderson withdrew 44 A d VEX from Early's army, and this time unmo- -Y: 4 5 ! + lested pursued his march through the Blue X Ridge to Culpeper Court House. Fitzhugh FAC-SIML.E (REDUCED) OsF PlUFlIRI s Lee's cavalry remained with Early. . IFTFR TO IMAIEUM SHEA About this time General Grant visited the Valley and found everything to his satisfaction. Sheridan was master of the situation, and he was not slow in showing it to his chief. On the 12th of September Sheridan had telegraphed Grant to the effect that it was exceedingly difficult to attack Early in his position behind the Opequon, which constituted a formidable barrier; that the crossings, though numer- ous, were deep, and the banks abrupt and difficult for an attacking force; and, in general, that he was waiting for the chances to change in his favor, hoping that Early would either detach troops or take some less defensible position. His caution was fortunate at this time, and his fearlessness and hardihood were sufficiently displayed thereafter. In the light of criticisms, then, it is curious that the world is now inclined to call Sheridan reckless and foolhardy. At 2 A. M1. of September 19th Sheridan's army was astir under orders to attack Early in front of Winchester. My cavalry was to proceed to the fords of the Opequon, near the railroad crossing, and, if opposed only by cavalry, was to cross at daylight and, turning to the left, attack Early's left flank. Wilson's division was to precede the infantry and clear the crossing of the Opequon, on the Berryville road, leading to Winchester. The infantry of the army, following Wilson, was to cross the Opequon, first Wright and then Emory, while Crook's command, marching across country, was to take position in reserve, or be used as circumstances might require. South of Win- chester, running nearly east and emptying into the Opequon, is Abraham's Creek, and nearly parallel to it, on the north of Winchester, is Red Bud Creek. These two tributaries flanked the usual line of the Confederates, when in position, covering Winchester, and on this line, across the Berry- ville-Winchester road, Ramseur was stationed with his infantry, when Sheridan's forces debouched from the defile and deployed for attack. Sheri- dan's plan was to attack and overthrow this part of Early's force before the rest of the army, which a day or two before was known to be scattered to the north as far as Martinsburg, could come to its assistance. At daylight Wilson sob SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. advanced across the Opequon, and carried the earth-work which covered the defile and captured part of the force that held it. The infantry followed- Wright's corps first, with Getty leading, and Emory next. Between two and three miles from the Opequon, Wright came up with Wilson, who was wait- ilng in the earth-work lie had captured. There the country was suitable for the deployment of the column, which commenced forming line at once. Ramseur, with the bulk of the Confederate artillery, immediately opened on Wright's troops, and soon the Union guns were in position to reply. Wilson took position on the left of the Sixth Corps. Then followed a delay that thwarted the part of the plan which contemplated the destruction of Early's trmy in detail. Emory's command was crowded off the road in its march, and so delayed by the guns and trains of the Sixth Corps that it was slow getting on the field, and it was hours before the lines were formed. 1 This delay gave the Confederates time to bring up the infantry of Gordon and Rodes. Gordon, who first arrived, was posted on Ramseur's left near the Red Bud, and when Rodes arrived with three of his four brigades, he was given the center. This change in the situation, which necessitated fighting Early's army in his chosen position, did not disconcert the Union corn- miander. He had come out to fight, and though chafing at the unexpected delay, fight he would to the bitter end. In the meantime the cavalry, which had been ordered to the light, had not been idle. Moving at the same time as did the rest of the army, my division reached the fords of the Opequon near the railroad crossing at early dawn. Here I found a force of cavalry supported by Breckinridge's infantry. After sharp skirmishing the stream was crossed at three different points, but the enemy contested every foot of the way beyond. The cavalry, however, hear- ing Sheridan's guns, and knowing the battle was in progress, was satisfied with the work it was doing in holding from Early a considerable force of infantry. The battle here continued for some hours, the cavalry making charges on foot or mounted according to the nature of the country and steadily though slowly driving the enemy's force toward Winchester. Finally Breckinridge, leaving one brigade to assist the cavalry in retarding our advance, moved to the help of Early, arriving on the field about 2 P. ir. It was 11:30 A. M. before Sheridan's lines were ready to advance. When they moved forward Early, who had gathered all his available strength, met them with a front of fire, and the battle raged with the greatest fury. The advance was pressed in the most resolute manner, and the resistance by the enemy being equally determined and both sides fighting without cover, the :i In an unpublished narrative, addressed to the not having passed yet; that the subsequent march Adjutant-General, and dated May 30th, 1872, was obstructed by the trains of the Sixth Corps Emory states that all the infantry was placed [see above]; that, hearing a lively cannonade, under command of Wright; that Wright ordered after sending forward all his ,taff-oflicers in sue- the column to march at 2 A. M., the Sixth Corps cession for instructions, he finally disregarded the leading, followed by its train, the Nineteenth order of march, and putting his corps in motion Corps next, followed by its train, then the Eighth rode on to General Sheridan, who at once eon- (C'orps; that he (Emory) moved with the Nine- firmed his action. The Sixth Corps was still en- teenth Corps at the appointed hour, and at the gaged in crossing the Opequon. Owing to these crossing of the Opequon was halted by General delays, it was midday before the Nineteenth Corps Wright in person, the head of the Sixth Corps reached its position.- EDITORS. ;(7 I A r 0 .4 .P i 3 = i ffi I I a aI SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. ('aslialties were very great. Wright's infantry forced Ramseur and Rodes stea(lily to the rear, while Emory on the right broke the left of the enemy's lil' attnd threw it into eonfusion. At this time the Confederate artillery opened with eianister at short range, doing fearful execution. This, eoupled with the weakening of the center at the junction between Emory and Wright, an(l with a charge delivered on this junction of the lines by a lpart of Roes's 4 omnlaild, just arrived on the field, drove baek the Utnioii center. At this eritieal moinent Russell's division of Wright's (orps moved into the breaclh (onl Emory's left, and, striking the flank of the Confederate troops who were loursuing (Irover, restored the lines anl stayed the Clonfederate advance.4 Tlie loss to both sides had been heavy. General Russell of the Union arnly and Oenerals Rodes and G4odwin of the Confederate were among the killed. A lill in tile hattle now followed, which General Sheridan improved to i'estore his lines and to bring up ('rook, who had iiot yet been engaged. It liad been the original purpose to use Crook on the left to assist Wilson's cavalry in cutting off Early's retreat toward Newtown. But the stress of lhattle compelled Sheridan to bring his reserve in on the line, and accordingly ('rook was ordered up on Emory's right, one brigade extetiding to the north of Red Bud Creek. At the same time Early re-formed his lines, placing lireckinridge's eoinmand in reserve. At this time Merritt, who with his cavalry had followed Breckinridge closely to tile field. approached on the left rear of the Confederates, driving their flying and broken cavalry through the infantry lines. The cavalry then c harged repeatedly illto Early's infantry, first striking it in the rear, and afterward face to face as it changed front to repel the attack.t These attacks were made by the cavalry without any knowledge of the state of the battle exeept what was apparent to the eye. First Devin charged with his brigade, returning to rally, with three battle- flags and over three hundred prisoners. Next Lowell charged with his 4 General Emory, in his official narrative, says of the action on the right at this point: - Grovers division was placed In Itne of battle on the right ot the Sixth Corps, and Dwight's division was placed In 6cbelon On the right of Grover's. Not many binutes elapsed before receiving orders to charge the -nemy. I ordered Grover's dIvision to charge, holding Dwight's in reserve. Tie charge was made with great ihravery, dispersing the enemy's tirst line. but this first .uess- - eemed to throw our men off their guard. ann give th-un too mnuch confidence. and they rushed, with- ,,Ut orders, with impetuosity upon thle seoud line of thc enemy, which had the protection of woods and stone wail, and they iet with a bloody repule. Si,--ltaneouiy with this repulse, and a moment or two preceding it, I saw that the charge of the Sixth torps, on my left, had been repulsed. Quickly drawing a brigade of Dwight's division from the right, I pilaced It on the line occupied by Gtro-er-' diviston, behind which that division rallied in good order, considering the terrible repulse they had joet. The enemy ruoe fronu their sheltered position and char.edin mass on our lilles, A small point of wofix projected at right angles tr,.u the right of wy line,; in this I posted Colonel Nicholas W. Day, 131st New Yolk Volunteers, with his regiment, and as the enemy came down on our lines with lud yells they received the fire of this regiment In the flank and rear, and at the same time receiving a very spiritedfirein rout, theybroke andfle ,l" EDITORS. Breckinridge was scarcely ill position before our cavalry on the left was discovered coming hack in great confusion followed by tbe enemy's, and Breckinridge's force was ordered to the left to re- pel this cavalry force, which had gotten in rear of my left, and this with the assistance of the artillery he sueeeded in doing. But as soon0 as the tiring was heard in rear of our left flank the infantry commenced falliun back along the whole line, aind it was very liflicult to stop them. I succeede'l. however, ill stopping enough of them in the old rifle-pits, constructed by General Johnston. to arrest the progress of the enemy's infantry, which commenced advancing again when confusion ift our ranks was discovered, anid would still have won the day if our cavalry would have stopped the enemy's; but so overwhelming was the latter, and so demoralized was the larger part of ours, that no assistance was received from it. "The enemy's eavalry again charged around my left flank and the men began to give way again, so that it was necessary for me to retire through the town."-LETTER FROM GENERAL EARLY TO GENERAL LEE, DATED OCTOBER 9TH, 1864. so9 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. brigade, capturing flags, prisoners, and two guns. After this the entire division was formed and charged to give the final coup.\ At the time of this last charge the Union infantry advanced along the entire line and the enemy fled in disorder from the field, and night alone (for it was now dark) saved Early's army from capture. At daylight on the morning of the 20th the army moved rapidly up the main Valley road in pursuit of the enemy. Early had not stopped on the night of the battle until he reached the shelter of Fisher's Hill. This is admirably situated for defense for an army resisting a movement south. Here the Valley is obstructed by the Massanutten Mountains and its width virtually reduced to four or five miles. In this position Early's right was protected by impassable mountains and by the north fork of the Shenandoah, and he at once took means to protect his left artificially. "On the evening of the 20th," reports Sheridan, "Wright and Emory went into position on the heights of Strasburg, Crook north of Cedar Creek, the cavalry on the right and rear of Emory, extending to the back road." On the 21st Sheridan occupied the day in examining the enemy's lines and improving his own. Accompanied by General Wright, he directed changes in the lines of the Sixth Corps, so that it occupied the high lands to the north of Tumbling Run. Wright did not secure this vantage-ground without a severe struggle, in which Warner's brigade was engaged, finally holding the heights after a brilliant charge. Sheridan decided on turning Early's impregnable position by a movement on the Little North Mountain. On the night of the 21st he concealed Crook's command in the timber north of Cedar Creek. In making his disposition Sheridan did not attempt to cover the entire front, it being his intention to flank the enemy by Crook's march, and then, by advancing the right of Wright's and Emory's line, to form connee- tion and make his line continuous. On the morning of the 22d, Crook, being still concealed, was marched to the timber near Little North Mountain and massed in it. Before this, Torbert, with his two divisions of cavalry, except one brigade (Devin's), was ordered via Front Royal into Luray Val- ley, with a view to reentering the Valley of the Shenandoah at New Market. This design was not accomplished. Not long before sundown Crook's infantry, which had not yet been discov- \ An officer who was in this last charge, and who while six men in great alarm were carrying to it had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the the body of General Rodes." General Torbert, enemy in consequence of the breaking of his bridle- chief of cavalry, also says in his report of the bat- curb, says: 'The confusion, disorder, and actual tle of Winchester: "This day the First Division rout produced by the successive charges of Mer- (Brigadier-General Merritt) alone captured 775 ritt's division would appear incredible did not the prisoners, about 70 officers, seven battle-flags, and writer actually witness them. To the right a bat- two pieces of artillery."-W. M. tery with guns disabled and caissons shattered It may be here remarked that Sheridan was, was trying to make to the rear, the men and as a rule, opposed to combinations involving long horses impeded by broken regiments of cavalry marches. He had no faith in their successful ac- and infantry; to the left, the dead and wounded, complishment. It is therefore easytobelieve that in confused masses, around their field-hospitals- he looked upon this movement of the cavalry as a many of the wounded, in great excitement, seeking means of turning the Confederates out of the posi- shelter in Winchester; directly in front, an ambu- tion at Fisher's Hill, provided his infantry was not lance, the driver nervously clutching the reins, successful in the present project- W. M. Sjo SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 1/ 0 Sherdan' troos,er ,unitin in theG atak That nght,4 :ethough the0 dakns made the marching difficult, Sheridan followed Early as far as Woodstock, some fifteen miles, and the following day up to Mount Jackson, where he drove the enemy, now to some extent reorganized, from a strong position on the opposite bank of the river. From this point the enemy retreated in line of battle. But every effort to make him fight failed. No doubt Sheridan in this pursuit regretted the absence of his cavalry, which, with Torbert, was striving, by a circuitous and obstructed march, to reach the enemy's rear. A few miles beyond New Market Early abandoned the main road, which leads on through Harrsonburg; turning to the east, he pursued the road that leads thence to Port Republic. This dirction was taken to receive the reenforcements which we-re to reach him through one of the gaps of the Blue Ridge. For it appears that Kershaw and his command had not proceeded beyond Culpeper in his march to Lee's army before he was ordered to return to Early, the news of whose overthrow at Winchester, and afterward at Fishers Hill, had reached the authorities at Richmond. On the 25th of September Torbert with the cavalry rejoined General S3heri- dan, and was at once put to work doing what damage was possible to the 5 11 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. TIIE IUEAXl:t tARt-4.ENELAR)AL rUSTEile iVIMON RIETIRULN6 PRIM IMOUNT JACK)N'. S1WV0IR T. 18A4. FRO:M A WARTIMIE SKUT. IH. Central Railway. After proceeding to Staunton and destroying immense quantities of army stores, Torbert moved to Waynesboro', destroying the railway track, and after burning the railway bridges toward the Blue Ridge, and on being threatened by Early's forces, which had moved thither to attack him, he retired to Bridgewater. Naturally a question now arose between Sheridan, the authorities in Washington, and General Grant as to the future theater of the campaign and the line of operations. Sheridan was opposed to the proposition submitted by the others, whitch was to operate against Central Virginia from his base in the Valley. The general reasons for his opposition were the distance from the base of supplies, the lines of communication, which in a country infested by guerrillas it would take an army to protect, and the nearness, as the campaign progressed, if successful, to the enemy's base, from which large reeuforcements could easily and secretly be hurried and the Union army be overwhelmed. But before the plan was finally adopted a new turn was given to affairs, and the plan originally formed was delayed in its execution if not changed altogether. 'When the army commenced its return march, the cavalry was deployed aeross the Valley, burning, destroying, or taking away everything of value, or likely to become of value, to the enemy. It was a severe measure, and appears severer now in the lapse of time; but it was necessary as a measure of war. The country was fruitful and was the paradise of bushwhackers and guerrillas. They had committed numerous murders and wanton acts of 512 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. cruelty on all parties weaker than themselves. Officers and men had been murdered ill cold blood on the roads, while proceeding without a guard through an apparently peaceful country. The thoughtless had been lured to houses only to find, wheli too late, that a foe was concealed there, ready to take their lives if they did not surrender. It is not wonderful, then, that the cavalry sent to work the destruction contemplated did not at that time shrink from the (duty. It is greatly to their credit that no personal violence on any inhabit- ant was ever reported, even by their enemies. The Valley from Staunton to Winclhester was conmpletely d(evastated, and the armies thereafter occupying that couintry had to look elsewhere for their supplies. There is little doubt, however, that enough was left in the country for the subsistence of the pleople, for this, besides being contemplated by or lers, resulted of necessity froin the fact that, wwhile the work was done hurriedly, the citizens had ample time to secrete supplies, and did so. The imovement north was conducted without interrulption for two days, except that the enemy's cavalry, made more bold by the accession to its strength of a conamand under General T. L. Rosser, followed our cavalry, dis- persed a( ross the Valley as already described. On the Sth of Oetober the enemny's cavalry harassed Custer's division on the baek road (luring the (lay, taking from him some battery-forges and wagons. The cavalry also showed itself on the main road upon which Merritt was retiring, but dispersed upon being charged by a brigade which was sent to develop their strength. That night Sheridan gave orders to his chief-of-cavalry, Torbert, to attack and beat the enemy's cavalry the following day " or to get wvhipped himself," as it was expressed. On the morning of the 9th Torbert's cavalry moved out to fight that of the enemy under Generals Rosser and Lomax. Merritt's division moved on the pike and extended across to the back road where Custer was concentrated. A stubborn cavalry engagement commenced the (lay, but it was not long before the Confederate cavalry was broken and routed, and from that time till late in the lay it was driven a distance of twenty-six miles, losing everything on wheels, except one gun, and this at one time was in possession of a force too weak to hold it. At one time General Lomax was a prisoner, but made his escape by personally overthrowing his captor. In this affair the advantage of pluck, dash, andI confidence, as well as of numbers, was on the Union side. From the time of the occupation of the Valley by Sheridan's force the cavalry had been the active part of his command. Scarcely a day passed that they were not engaged in some affair, and often with considerable loss, as is shown by the fact that in twenty-six engagements, aside from the battles, the cavalry lost an aggregate of 3205 tmen and officers. In reporting the result of the cavalry battle of October 9th, Early says: "This is very distressing to me, and God knows I have done all in my power to avert the disasters which have befallen this command; but the fact is the enemy's cavalry is so much superior to ours, both in numbers and equipment, and the country is so favorable to the opera- tions of cavalry, that it is impossible for ours to compete with his." :;1 3 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. He further says in this same connection: " Lomax's cavalry is armed entirely with rifles and has no sabers, and the consequence is they cannot fight on horseback. and in this Open country they cannot stuecessfully fight on foot against large bodies of cavalry." This is a statement on which those who think our cavalry never fought mounted and with the saber should ponder. The cavalry bad scant justice done it in reports sent from the battle-field; and current history, which is so much made up of first reports and first impressions, has not to a proper extent been impressed with this record. On the return of the army after the pursuit of the scattered remnants of Early's force, General Sheridan placed it in position on Cedar Creek north of the Shenandoah, Crook on the left, Emory in the center, and Wright in reserve. The cavalry was placed on the flanks. The occupation of Cedar Creek was not intended to be permanent; there were many serious objections to it as a position for defense. The approaches from all points of the enemy's stronghold at Fisher's Hill were through wooded ravines in which the growth and undulations concealed the movement of troops, and for this reason and its proximity to Fisher's Hill the pickets protecting its front could not be thrown, without danger of capture, sufficiently far to the front to give ample warning of the advance of the enemy. We have already seen how Sheridan took advantage of like conditions at Fisher's Hill. Early was now contem- plating the surprise of his antagonist. On the 12th of Oetober Sheridan received a dispatch from Halleck saying that Grant wished a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for operations upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville. On the 13th and the 16th he received dispatches from the Secretary of War and from General Halleck pressing him to visit Washington for consultation. On the 15th General Sheridan, taking with him Torbert with part of the cavalry, started for Washington, the design being to send the cavalry on a raid to Gordonsville and vicinity. The first camp was made near Front Royal, from which point the cavalry was returned to the army, it being con- sidered safer to do so in consequence of a dispatch intercepted by our signal officers from the enemy's station on Three Top Mountain, and forwarded to General Sheridan by General Wright. This dispatch was as follows: " To LIECTENSANT-GENERAL EARLY: Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.- LOXGSTREET, Lieutenant-General.' In sending back the cavalry General Sheridan wrote to General Wright, directing caution on his part, so that he might be duly prepared to resist the attack in case the above dispatch was genuine.) Sheridan continued to Washington, and the cavalry resumed its station in the line of defense at Cedar Creek. At this time everything was quiet -suspiciously so. ) General Wright wrote to General Sheridan, deal of trouble. . . . I shall only fear an attack on October 16th, inclosing Longstreet's intercepted my rghi ' message, and adding: To this Sheridan replied, the same day, from -fI the enemy should be strongly reenforeed in cav- Front Royal: alry he might, by turning our right, give us a great " The cavalry is all ordered back to you. . . . Close ',14 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. TIHE SUItRPtRIE AT CEDIAR1 fCR.EEK. FRI'M1 A WA.-TIME AK1ETIJt Vic right of thie 10tu Aihow. this Ce otra;t, ii kiweatmer; Ut,;ti;;i thes teft Cf th i;eecii; (';rps fLet;; the refe. Tble 'onl pt.. t f- r :Jt- ad;; eloi;;e en-dintnee took p;w;;;; R t flee iter tid lt t heir Eitle pity. On the 16th Custer made a reconnoissance in his front on the back road, but found no enemy outside the lines at Fisher's Hill. This absence of the enemy's cavalry was accounted for the next morning just before daylight by the appearance of Rosser in the rear of Custer's picket line with his cavalry and one brigade of infantry. Rosser calTying the infantry behind his eav- alry troopers had made a march of thirty-two miles to capture an exposed brigade of Custer's division on the right; but a change in the arrangements of the command (the return of Torbert) thwarted the scheme, and it resulted only in the capture of a picket guard. On the 18th reconnoissances on both flanks discovered no sign of a movement by the enemy. The result of the destruction of supplies in the Valley was now being felt by Early's troops. About this time he writes: "I was now compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from it; and I determined to attack." From reports made by General Gordon and a staff-officer who ascended Three Top Mountain to reconnoiter the Union position, and the result of a in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point. . . . Look as to drive in his outposts, invade his camp. and turn well to your ground, and be well prepared." his position. Thi surprise was owing, prolably, to not closing i, Powell, or that the cavalry diviions of Mer- In hi8 official report of the campaign General ritt and Custer were placed on the rigt of our line., Sheridan says: where, it had always occurred to me, there was hut "During my absence the enemy had gathered all his little danger of attack." strength, . . . striking Crook, who held the klt of The italics in these quotations are not in the our line, In flank and rear, so unexpectedly and forcibly originals. -EDITORS. 5 15 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. HILL AT C1i.VAU kItlEEK (WCI'PtED By SHI 1DAN'S LEFT, OCT(IBEI 19 118 1, AS SEE"N FRIOM KLJI.IAW'. F.IhI'l. FlII M A PIIIITIGRAI'PH TAIKEN IN 18;. reeonuoissance madel at the same time by General Pegram toward the right flank of the tUion army, General Early concluded to attack by secretly moving a force to turn Sheridan's left flank at Cedar Creek. The plan of this attack was carefully made; the routes the troops were to pursue, even after the battle had commenced, were carefully designated. [See General Early's article, p. 526.] The attack was made at early dawn. The surprise was complete. Crook's camp, and afterward Emory's, were attacked in flank and rear and the men and officers driven from their beds, many of tbemn not having the time to hurry into their clothes, except as they retreated half awake and terror-stricken from the overpowering numbers of the enemv. Their own artillery, in conjunction with that of the enemy, was turned on them, and long before it was light enough for their eyes, unatcustoined to the dim light, to distinguish friend from foe, they were hurrying to our right and rear intent only on their safety. Wright's infantry, which was farther removed from the point of attack, fared some- what better, but did not offer more than a spasmodic resistance. The cavalry on the right was on the alert. The rule that in the immediate presence of the enemy the cavalry must be early prepared for attack resulted in the whole First I)ivision being up with breakfast partly finished, at the time the attack commenced. A brigade sent on reconnoissance to the right had opened with its guns some minutes before the main attack on the left, for it had met the cavalry sent by Early to make a demonstration on our right. sib SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 517 N ,,vI' DAR CREEK" 2pound; A, it ,d __N i X ;Ph With a oc fteenm asn hou2scm fsleigmn n another powerful olumn wel totherreariwasnotwonderfuthatth men as -tshwrakebtniobteh only o v t l fT e d e rt n t r e over- S. to thry ThediintgrtiooCoks"comn i o ccp aymnts Wiha oceo teenm psin hru'7t cm ofBATleepn OF, n ante oeflclm el oterrai a notCEDAdrCREE thth menasfas a thy ereawkeed y he oie o btteLthugh firt an onyfavngtemelesfrmetrctonTedane5f oro delcedti feig hog rmth an odtoterer ndtepse ovrtote ihto heamyad ldaln tebakrad moymaea SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. attempt to form line facing along the main road, but the wave of Gordon's advance on his left, and the thunders of the attack along the road from Strasburg, rendered the position untenable, and he was soon obliged to with- draw to save his lines from capture. I, At this time there were hundreds of stragglers moving off by the right to the rear, and all efforts to stop them proved of no avail. A line of cavalry was stretched across the fields on the right, which halted and formed a respectable force of men, so far as numbers were concerned, but these fled and disappeared to the rear as soon as the force which held them was with- drawn. By degrees the strength of the battle died away. The infantry of the Sixth Corps made itself felt on the advance of the enemy, and a sort of confidence among the troops which had not fled from the field was being restored. A brigade of cavalry was ordered to the left to intercept the enemy's advance to Winchester. Taylor's battery of artillery, belonging to the cavalry, moved to the south, and, taking position with the infantry which was retiring, opened on the enemy. The artillery with the cavalry was the only artillery left to the army. The other guns had either been captured or sent to the rear. This battery remained on the infantry lines and did much toward impeding the enemy's advance until the cavalry elhanged position to the Winchester-Strasburg road. This change took place by direction of General Torbert about 10 o'clock. In making it the cavalry marched through the broken masses of infantry direct to a point on the main road north-east of Middletown. The enemy's artillery fire was terrific. Not a man of the cavalry left the ranks unless he was wounded, and everything was done with the precision and quietness of troops on parade. General Merritt informed Colonel Warner of Getty's division, near which the cavalry passed, and which was at that time following the general retreat of the army, of the point where the cavalry would take position and fight, and Warner promised to notify General Getty, and no doubt did so, for that division of the Sixth Corps advanced to the position on the cavalry's right. Then Devin and Lowell charged and drove back the advancing Confederates. Lowell dismounted his brigade and held some stone walls whose position was suited to defense. Devin held on to his advance ground. Here the enemy's advance was checked for the first time, and beyond this it did not go. The enemy's infantry sheltered themselves from our cavalry attacks in the woods to the left, and in the inclosures of the town of Middletown. But they opened a devastating fire of artillery. This was the state of affairs when Sheridan arrived. Stopping at Winchester over night on the 18th, on his way from Washing- ton, General Sheridan heard the noise of the battle the following morning, i, General Emory states in his ' Narrative " that Wright fell back in perfect order, about a mile, the Nineteenth Corps promptly repulsed the first when "the Nineteenth Corps was again halted, attack on them but, the enemy having gained their and the men immediately facing about commenced rear through the capture of Crook's camps, then throwing off their kits and stripping to renew the fell back about a mile and a half to a new line that light." About noon General Emory says he was "under the circumstances would have done honor again ordered by General Wright to retire to the to the best regular troops in the world." They position in which General Sheridan found the army were not again attacked, but by order of General on his arrival.-EDITORS. 5 18 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 519 and hurried to the field. His coming restored confidence. A cheer from the cavalry, which awakened the echoes of the valley, greeted him and spread the good news of his coming over the field. 4 He rapidly made the changes necessary in the lines, and then ordered an advaitee. The cavalry on the left chargedl down on the enemy in their front, scattering them in all directions. The infantry, tot to e outdone by t mounted niel, moved forward in quit time and charged impetuously the lin of Gordon, which broke and fled.- took less time to drive the enemy fro the field than it had for them to take They seemed to feel the changed co ditions in the Union ranks, for the divisions broke one after another ay disappeared toward their rear. The ea, alry rode after them and over them, uni 4 In his "Personal Memoirs I (New York: C. L. Webster Co., 1888), Vol. II., General Sheridan says that toward 6 A. M. of October 19th word was brought to him (at Winchester) of the artil- lery firing at Cedar Creek. Between half-past 8 and 9 o'elock, while he was riding along the main street of Winchester, toward Cedar Creek, the de- meanor of the people who showed themselves at the windows convinced him that the citizens had received secret information from the battle-field, "and were in raptures over some good news." The narrative continues: "For a short distance I traveled on the road, but soon found it so blocked with wagons and wounded men that my progress was Impeded, and I was forced to take to the adjoining fields to make haste.... "My first halt was made just north of Newtown, where I met a chaplain digging his heels into the aides of his jaded horse, and making for the rear with all pos- sible speed. I drew up for an Instant, and inquired of hh-ii how matters were going at the front. He replied. Everything is lost; but all will be right when you get there'; yet, notwithstanding this expression of confi- decee in me, the parson at once resumed his breathless pace to the rear. At Newtown I was obliged to make a cireuit to the left, to get around the village. I could not pass through it, the streets were so crowded, but meeting on this detour Major McKinley, of Crook's staffhe spread the news of my return through the motley throng there. "When nearingthe Valley pike,just north of Newtown, I saw about three-fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which proved to ioe ticketts's and Wheaton's divisionsof the Sixth Corps,andthenlearned that the Nineteenth Corps had halted a little tothe right and rear of these; but I did not stop, desiring to get to the extreme front. Continuing on parallel with the pike, about midway between Newtown and Middietown I crossed to the west of it, and a little later came up in rear of Getty's division of the Sixth Corps. When I ar- rived, this division and the cavalry were the only troops in the presence of and resiting the enemy; they were apparently acting as arear-goard at a point about three miles north of the line we held at Cedar Creek when the battle began. General Torbert was the first offleer to meet me, saying as he rode up, 'My God I I am gtad you've come.' "Jumping my horse over the line of rails, I rode to the ihe es It 4. 6 it. f e Kd n- +4A S id a- RlEDUOCi EDI FAC-5lMILE '1F PRE8111ENT LINCOLE'S CON- GRATUTLATIOS TO 6iNERAL HISiHAN ON Ltii TIHE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. crest of the eletation, and there, taking off my hat, I he s.en rose up from behind their barricade with cheers of recognition. . . . I then turned back to the rear of Getty'X division, and as I came behind It a Itne of regi- mental flags rose up out of the ground, as It seemed, to welcome me. They were mostly the colors of Crook's troops, who had been stampeded and scattered In the surprise of the morning. The color-bearers, having with- stood the panic, had formed behind the troops of Getty. The line with the colors was largely composed of oflicers, among whom I recognized Colonel R. B. Hayes, since President of the United States, one of the brigade com- manders. At the elose of this incident I crosed the lit- tle narrow valley, or depression, in rear of Getty's line, and, dismounting on the opposite crest, established that point as my headquarters. . . . Returning to the place where my headquarters had beenestablished, I met near them Riekett's division, -nder General Kelfer, and General Frank Wheaton's division, both marehing to the front. VW hen the men of these divisions saw me they be- gan cheering and took up the double-quik to the front. while I turned back toward Getty's line to point out where these returning troops should he placed. "All this had eonsumed a great deal of time, and I concluded to visit again the point to the east of the Val- ley pike, from where I had first observed the enemy, to see what he was doing. Arrived there, I could plainly see him getting ready for attack, and Major Forsyth now suggested that it would be welt to ride along the line of battle before the enemy assailed us, for although the troops had learned of my return, but few of them had seen me. Following his suggestion I started in behind the men, but when a fewpaces had been taken I crosed to the front, hat in hand, passed along the entire length of the infantry line; and It Is from this circumstanee that many of the officers and men who then received me with such heartiness have since supposed that that was my first appearance on the field. But at least two bours had elapsed sinle I reached the ground, for it was after midday when this incident of riding down the front took place, and I arrived not later, certainly, than half- past ten o'elock. EDITORS. I General Emory says in his " Narrative ": "This electric mesage from General Sheridan put every man on hbi feet.... Very soon the pickets came In, quickly followed by the enemy's infantry. Our first line [Grover] then rose up ea snee and delivered their fire, and the enemy disappeared. There was not a sound of musket or gun for twenty minutes following. The SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. night fell and en(Ied the fray at the foot of Fisher's lill. 'Tlhree l)attle-flags aZlid twenty-two gUIns Were added to the trophieis of th, eaalry that dlay. Early lost almost till his artillery anid trains, lbesides everything that was captured from the Union army in the morning. I The victory was dearly bought. The , killed or mortally womnded included (ell- eral Bidwell and Colonels Thoburn and Kitehling, 1 esidles manl other offieers ain d mien. Aniong the killedl in the filtal charge by the cavalry at Cedar Creek was Ct'oloel Charles Russell Lowell. Hle had been wounded earlier in tlle day, hnut had d(eclined to leave til field. The battle of (Cedar C!reek has been. inm- 000f m tlilortalized lby poets aid historians. The transition from defeat, rout, and clonifusiont to order and victory, and all this depend- ing on one man, mnade the country wild with enthusiasm. The victory was a fitting sequel to Will- I.t11- A1 el-T P.I. helester, a glorious prelude to Five Forks and Appomattox. In this battle fell mior- tally wounded onl the tonfederate side Major-(General Stephen D. Raamseur, folur years 1 efore a elassmate of the witer at West Point. A Union officer- a friend-watched by his side in his last moments and conveyed to his southern home his last words of affection. There is little niore to reeord of events in the Vallev. Part of the night after its defeat Earlv's army restel in the intrenehments on Fisher's Hill, liut before dawn the next day it retreated to New Market. Rosser, with the Confederate cavalry, acted as rear-guard, and was driven by the Union cavalry beyond Wxoodstock. While Early remained at New Market reenforcements were sent him in the way of convalescents and one brigade from south-western Virginia. He contented himself, however, with remaining on the defensive. The winter of 18G45 was passed by Sheridan's command at Kernstown, where better protection could lbe given the troops and a short line of supplies secured. He moved to this position in November. About this time I moved under orders with my division of cavalry into Loudoun Valley and reduced it to a state of destitution, so far as supplies for the enemy were concerned, as had been done iln other parts of the valley. On December 19th Torbert with two divisions of cavalry marched throuvh Chester Gap in another raid on First Divsiono waP deploehley to the right of the Second. I It may be here remarked of this battle, as well and the charge eueuced. . .The ene-y resiSted as that at Winchester that General Early [see at every etrong fen-ce and dith aud ,ther obstacle with _ t ,reat irave'r., htiot till tibe Iti swept on. The First pp. 523 and 528] speaks of the repulse of cav- Brigade X4lu el Edwi., 1'. Dl.de of the First Division alry charges where no repulse occurred. Cavalry, (Dwights'. which wa- on the extreme rigit. with unpar- even after successful charges, from the nature of ulleled intrcpidity and . leettess eompletely enveloped the arm, is oftentimes obliged to retire and re- tbe enesiwy, an that one hour before the sun set . . . the troops were to complete eommand ... of the camp form preparatory to making a new charge, or they had oecupied il the tu.lrning." .. allowing other cavalry to charge.-W. M. ;20 SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. the Virginia Central Railway; but this attempt, like the others, was unsuc- (eessful. The local troops and Valley cavalry succeeded in delaying Torbert until infantry was hurried by rail from Richmond, when he was forced to retire. As a diversion in favor of Torbert's expedition Custer's cavalry was itioved up the Valley to engage the cavalry of Early. Near Harrisonburg he was attacked and surprised and was forced to retreat. In making these expeditions the troops suffered intensely from cold, bad roads, and miserable camps. This was especially so with Torbert's column in crossing the mountains. It is difficult to imagine a more disagreeable duty for a mounted soldier than marching over sleety, slushy, snowy or icy roads in winter, and bivouacking without the means of protection. It is demoralizing to men and ruinous to horses. After the failure of these expeditions no further movements were attempted in the Valley, and most of the infantry of Sheridan's army was sent either to the Army of the Potomac at Petersburg, or elsewhere where it was needed. In February Sheridan made arrangements to march from the Valley with the cavalry with a view to interrupting andl destroying, as far as pos- sil)le, the lines of supply through central Virginia. After accomplishing this it was intended that he should either move west of Richmond and join Sherman's army, or return to the Valley, or join Meade's army in front of Petersburg, as might be most practicable. February 27th the movement commenced, the command consisting of two superb divisions of cavalry which had been recruited and remounted during the winter, undermyself, as chief-of-cavalry. The march to Staunton was made without noticeable RlRIGDIEU-GENERAL BRADt.40 T, opposition. On the morning of March 2d C. S. A. FROMI An t"IIOT0".RAP1. Early was found posted on a ridge west of Waynesboro'. The veteran soldier was full of pluck and made a bold front for a fight, but his troops were overcome, almost without even perfunctory resistance, by the advance regi- ments of the column, and Early, with a few general officers, barely escaped capture by flight. All Early's supplies, all transportation, all the guns, ammunition and flags, and most of the officers and men of the army were captured and sent to the rear. From this point Sheridan moved unmolested to the Virginia Central Rail- road, which was destroyed for miles, large bridges being wrecked, the track torn up, and the rails heated and bent. The command was divided and sent to the James River Canal, which was destroyed as effectually as the railroad. This done, the cavalry proceeded to White House, on the Pamunkey River, where it arrived on March 19th, 1865. VOL. ORE. 34 521 WINCHESTER, FISHER'S HILL, AND CEDAR CREEK.) BY JURAL A. EARLY, LIUTEINAFT-GENIRAL, C. S. A. T object of my presence in the lower valley during the two months after our return from Washington was to keep up a threatening atti- tude toward Maryland and Pennsylvania, and pre- vent the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as well as to keep as large a force as possible from Grant's army to defend the Federal capital. Had Sheridan, by a prompt movement. thrown his whole force on the line of my communications, I would have been compelled to attempt to cut my way through, as there was no escape for me to the right or left, and my force was too weak to cross the Potomac while he was in my rear. If I had moved up the valley at all, I could not have stopped short of New Market, for between that place and the country in which I was there was no forage for my horses; and this would have enabled the enemy to resume the use of the railroad and canal, and return all the troops from Grant's army to him. ) Condened from( General Early's" IMemolirof the Last Year of the War for Independence in the Confederate States of America" (Lynchburg: Published by Charles W'. Button for the Virginia Memorial Association, 1867); here printed by permiiou of the author.-EnrToas. The chiet events of the-e two months, as described by Geaeral Early in his ,Memoir," to which readers are referred for much that is here necessarily omitted or summarized, were his defeat of Crook and Averell with heavy los at Kernstown, July 24th; his cavalry expedition under M)tCausland into Pennsylvania and burning of Chambersburg in retaliation for Hunter's burning of houses in the valley; Averell's surprise and Being compelled to occupy the position where I was, and being aware of its danger as well as apprised of the fact that very great odds were opposed to me, my only resource was to use my forces an as to display them at different points with great rapidity, and thereby keep up the im- pression that they were much larger than they really were. The events of the last mouth had satisfied me that the commander opposed to me was without enterprise, and possessed an exces- sive caution which amounted to timidity. Having been informed that a force was at work on the railroad at Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of September, with Rodes's and Gordon's divisions and Braxton's artillery, to Bunker Hill, and on the morning of the 18th, with Gordon's division and a part of the artillery, to Martinsburg, preceded by a part of Lomax's cavalry. Averell's division of cavalry was driven from the town across the Opequon in the direction defeat of MeClasland's and Bradley Johnson' cavalry at Moorefield, August 7th; Sheridan's arrival in com- Mand with large reituforenmeuts, August 7th, whieh necessitsted Early's withdrawal to Fisher's Hill, vwhen Sheridan advanced; Sheridan's withdrawal in turn to Halltown, near Harper's Ferry when General Early received at Strasburg re'nforeements of Kershaw's division of infantry and Fitz Lee's of cavalry; finally, General Early's stay of a month, from August 17th to September 17th. in the lower valley, at and near Win- chester, keeping the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the canal obstructed, and threatening Maryland and Pennylvania.-EDnrroas. 2 WINCHESTER, FISHER'S HILL, AND CEDAR CREEK. of Charlestown, and we then returned to Bunker Hill. Gordon was left at Bunker Hill, with orders to move to Stephenson's Depot by sunrise next morning, and Hodes's division moved to the latter plltee that ,light, to which I also returned. At ,Nhartinsbuirg, where the enemy had a telegraph ollice, I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that dIty, and I expected an early move. At light on the morning of the 19th our cavalry pickets at the crossing of the Opequon on the lierryville road were driven in, and Ramseur's tro(op, whilh were in line across the Berryville road about one anil one-half miles out from Win- hester, on an elevated plateau between Abra- lain's ('reek and Red Bud Run, were soon skirmishing with the enemy. Nelson's artillery was on llamseur's line, and Lomax's cavalry occupied the right and Fitz Lee the left. I sent orduers for Breckinridge and Bodes to move up as rapidly as possible. Gordon's division arrived first, at a little after 1 0 A. am., and was placed on Bamseur's left, and Bodes was then placed on tGor)don's right, both under cover of woods. While this movement was being executed, we discovered very heavy columns of the enemy, which had been massed under cover between the Red Bud and the Berryville road, moving to attack Ramseur on his left flank, while another force pressed him in front. Bodes and Gordon were ordered forward and attacked with great vigor, while Nelson's artillery on the right and Braxton's on the left opened a destructive fire. But Evans's brigade of Gordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our infantry, received a check from a column of the enemy, and was forced back through the woods from behind which it had advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the woods, and to within musket range of seven pieces of Braxton's artillery which were without support. This caused a pause in our advance, and the position was most critical, for it was ap- parent that unless this force were driven back the day was lost. Braxton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood their ground, and under the personal superintendence of Lieutenant- Colonel C. M. Braxton and Colonel T. H. Carter, then my chief-of-artillery, opened with canister on the enemy. This fire was so rapid and well-directed that the enemy staggered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle-flag on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister shot. Just then Battle's brigade of Bodes's division, which had arrived and been formed in line for the purpose of advancing to the support of the rest of the division, moved forward and swept through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans's brigade was rallied and brought back to the charge. Our advance, which had been sus- pended for a moment, was resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns were thrown into great confusion and driven from the field. Lomax and Lee had aided, while Ramseur had received the enemy's shock and recovered. This affair had occurred about 11 A. m., and a splendid victory had been gained. But on our side Major-General Bodes had been killed, in the very moment of triumph, while conducting the attack of his ,hivi- sion with great gallantry and skill, and this was at heavy blow to me. Brigadier-General A. C. wodl- win of Ramseur's division had been killed, and Brigadier-General Zebulon York of Gordonls'divi- sion had lost an arm. When the order was sent for the troops to move from Stephenson's Depot, General Breckinridge had moved to the front, with Wharton's division and King's artillery, to meet a cavalry force which hadl driven our pickets from the Opequon on the Charles- town road, and that division had become heavily engaged with the enemy, and had sustained and re- pulsed several determined charges of his cavalry, while its own flanks were in great danger froml the enemy's main force on the right, and a coluni.. of his cavalry moving up the Martinsburg road on the left. Aftermuch difficulty andsome hard lighting t ;en- eral Breckinridge succeeded in extricating his force and moving up the Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the field until about 2 o'clock. Late in the afternoon two divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which had been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's corps, which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time on that flank, on the north side of the Red Bud, and before this overwhelming force Patton's brigade of infantry and Payne's brigade of cavalry, under Fitz Lee, were forced back. A considerable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along the Martinsburg road to the very skirts of Winchester, thus getting in the rear of our left flank. Wharton's two other brigades were moved in double-quick time to the left and rear, and twice repulsed the cavalry. But Crook ad- vanced against our left, and again the enemy's cavalry succeeded in getting around our left, so that nothing was left for us but to retire through Winchester; and Bamseur's division, which main- tained its organization, was moved on the east of the town to the south side of it, and put in posi- tion, forming the basis for a new line, while the other troops moved back through the town. Wick- ham's brigade, with some pieces of horse artillery on Fort Hill, covered this movement and checked the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. When the new line was formed the enemy's advance was checked until night-fall, and we then retired to Newtown without serious molestation. Lomax had held the enemy's cavalry on the Front Royal road in check, and a feeble attempt at pursuit was repulsed by Ramseur near Kernstown. A skillful and energetic commander of the en- emy's forces would have crushed Ramseur before any assistance could have reached him, and thus insured the destruction of my whole force; and, later in the day, when the battle had turned against us, with the immense superiority in cav- alry which Sheridan had, and the advantage of the open country, would have destroyed my whole force and captured everything I had. As it was, considering the immense disparity in numbers and equipment, the enemy had very little to boast of. I had lost a few pieces of artillery and some very valuable officers and men, but the main part of my 523 524 WINCHESTER, FISHER 'S H-LL, AND CEDAR CREEK. force and all my trains had been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater than mine. When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent. 4 At light on the morning of the 20th my troops moved to Fisher's Hill without molestation, and the cavalry of Fitz Lee (who was severely wounded at Winchester), now under Wickham, was sent up to Millford Pass to holl Luray valley. In the afternoon Sheridan's forces appeared ilu the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's Hill, and the 21st, and the greater part of the 22d, were consumed by him in reconnoitering and gradually moving his forces to my front under cover of breastworks. After some skirmishing he attained a strong position immediately in my front and fortified it, and I began to think he wast satis- fled with the advantage he had gained and would not probably press it further; but on the afternoon of the 22d I discovered that another attack was contemplated, and orders were given for mytroops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force wras not strong enough to resist a determined assault. Just before sunset, however, Crook's corps, which had moved to our left on the side of Little North Mountain, and, under cover of the woods, had forced back Lomax's dismounted cavalry, ad- vaneed against Ramseur's left. Ramseur made an attempt to meet this movement by throwing his brigades successively into line to the left, and Wharton's division was sent for from the right, but it did not arrive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown into line in the same manner as Ram- seurs., but the movement produced some dlisorder in both divisions, and as soon as it was observed by the enemy he advanced along his whole line, and the mischief could not be remedied. After a very brief contest my whole force retired in 4 The battle ofWinehester, or of the Olpequon. as Glen- eral Sheridan calls It, was fought September 91th. The strength of Early's infantry Auguat 31st. exclusive of Iershaw (who was not engaged atWinchester), sashown by the abstract from monthly returns, was as follows: Present for duty, 1rt oftlcers and 9570 men,-aggre- gate present for duty. 10,564. Fitz I'e' (cavalry) strength on July 1th was 115 ofceers and 1I91 men; but it had probably been decreased by over two months of hard ervie, and General Early's "Memoir" gives Its number of mounted men on September 19th a. about 12W0," and also the mounted men of Lo-ax as abn'ut 174ut." To the artillery are ascribed on Septem- ber 10th. in the best available returns, 29 officers and Big men. Taking the offiial figures for the infantry, Gen- eral Early's figures for the cavalry, and the indicated returns for the artillery, the total .1 present for duty" with his army would be about 13.288 enlisted men of all three arms, with, in round numbers, about 1200 ofleers. But for the infantry only do we tlnd the " War Records" statistics vouching. General Early, in a note to the editors, dated Novem- ber 9th, 1888, says, regarding the returns of 9570 men, August 1Sot, that between that time and September 19th "there bad been considerable loss in several engage- ments, which, ith the men who had broken down and given out, and with the men required to guard the trains, etc., reduced my available force to 8880 muskets." The "Geld return of troops in the field" of Sheridan's command for September 10th is as follows: Present for duty, 43,28 enlisted men. 222 officers. In signing and forwarding this field return, General Sheridan wrote: considerable confusion, but the men and officers of the artillery behaved with great coolness, fighting to the very last, and I had to ride to some of the officers and order them to withdraw their guns be- fore they would move. In some cases they had held out so long, and the roads leading from their positions into the p ike were so rugged, that eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy. Vigor- ous pursuit was not made, anal my force fell back through Woodstock to a place called the Narrow Passage, all the trains being carried off in safety. b We moved up the valls'y during the succeeding days, followed by the enemy,Wickham,with his own and Payne's brigades, having detained the enemy at Millford Pass until we had passed New Market in safety. On the 25th, between Port Republic and Brown's Gap, Fitz Lee's and Lomax's cavalry joined us, and on the 26th Kershaw's division with Cutshaw8's battalion of artillery came up, after having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and en- countered and repulsed, below Port Republic, a body of the enemy's cavalry. There was likewise heavy skirmishing on my front on the 26th with the enemy's cavalry, which made two efforts to advance toward Brown's Gap, both of which were repulsed after brisk fighting in which artillery was used. Thence I moved for Waynesboro' and tockfish Gap, where the enemy was engaged in destroying the railroad bridge and tunnel, and Wickham Irove the enemy's working parties from Waynesboro'. On the 1 st of October I moved my whole force across the country to Mount Sidney on the valley pike. e On the 5th Rosser's brigade arrived, but it did not exceed sax hundred mounted men for duty when it joined me. Kershaw's division numbered 27(00 muskets for duty, and he had brought with him Cutshaw's battalion of artillery. These reenforce- " The Inelosed return does not include the cavalry under Averell, about 2248, or the troops of the Departments of Washington, Musquehanna, or Middle." Sheridan's re- turn includes 204 officers and 4011 men, ascribedto the Military District, Harper's Ferry," who were not in the battle at Winchester. The Confederate losses in the battle were about 4000; the Union losses about 5eee. The Confederate losses were more than half in prisoners and missing; but the Union losses showed nearly b0o killed and wounded and only about 600 missing.- ErTroas. I Early's dispatch to Lee as to his looss at Fisher's Hill says: "The Ioss in the infantry and artillery was 30 killed, 210 wounded, and 995 missing,- total, 1235. I have been able to get no report of the low in the cav- alry. but it was slight." Sheridan's loss was 92 killed. 431 wounded, and 19 captured ormising,- a total of 115 Making aliowance for the slight cavalry loss of Early, his total loses in the two battles of Winchester and Fisher's Hill were about 5300, and those of Sheridan In the same two battles were 749 killed, 4440 wounded, and 357 captured or wisning=-544. In the two battles Sheridan captured twenty-one guns.-EurrORs. \ Grant says that, after the fight at Fisher's Hill, "Sheridan pursued hint [Early] with great energy through Harrisouhbrg, Staunton, and the gpsn of the Blue Ridge." I did not leave the valley at all. Had Sheridan moved his infantry to Port Republie, I would have been compelled to retire through Brown's Gap, to get provisions and forage, and it would have been im- possible for me to return to the valley until he evacu- ated the upper part of it.-J. A. E. WINCHESTER, FISHER'S HILL, AND CEDAR CREEK. LIEtTENANT-GENERAL JOHN B. GORDON, c. S. A. FROX A PRBT XR. I!. ments about made up my losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and I determined to attack the en- emy in his position at Harrisonburg, and for that purpose made a reconnaissance on the 5tb, but on the morning of the 6th it was discovered that he had retired during the night down the valley. When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring, I moved forward at once and arrived at New Market with my infantry on the 7th. Rosser pushed forward on the back and middle roads in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, which was engaged in burning houses, mills, barns, and stacks of wheat and hay, and had several skirmishes with it, Wbile Sheridan's fores were near Harrisonburg, and Hnnne were watching them, three of our cavalry scouts, in their uniforms and with arms, got around his lines near a little town called Dayton, and encountered Lieutenant lJohn R.] Meigs, a Federal engineer officer, with two soldiers. These parties caine upon eachother suddenly, and Lieutenant Meigs was ordered to surren- der by one of our scouts, to which he -plied by shooting and wounding the scout, who in his turn fired and killed while Lomax also moved forward on the valley pike and the roads east of it. I halted at New Market with the infantry, but Rosser and Lomax moved down the valley in pursuit, and skirmished suc- cessfully with the enemy's cavalry on the Sth; but on the 9th they encountered his whole cav- alry force at Tom's Brook, in rear of Fisher's Hill, and both of their commands were driven back in considerable confusion, with a loss of some pieces of artillery; nine were reported to me as the num- her lost, but Grant claims eleven. Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send part of his troops to Grant, I moved down the lieutenant. One of the men with Lieutenant Meigs was captured and the otter escaped. For this act sher- idan ordered the town of Dayton to be burned, but for some reason that order was countermanded and another substituted for burning a large numberof private houses in the neighborhood, which was executed, thus inflicting on non-combatant8 and women and children a umost wanton and cruel puishment for a justifiable act of war.-J. A. E. 525 526 WINCHESTER, FISHER'S HILL, AND CEDAR CREEK. the valley again on the 12th. On the morning of the 13th we reached Fisher's Hill, and there re- mained until the 16th. The enemy was found posted on the north bank of Cedar Creek, in a very strong position and in strong force. I was now compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from it, and I deter- mined to attack. General Gordon and Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, my topographical engineer, were sent to the signal station on the end of Massanutten Moun- tain, which had been reestablished, for the pur- pose of examining the enemy's position from that point, and General John Pegram was ordered to go as near as he could to Cedar Creek on the enemy's right flank and see whether it was practicable to surprise him on that flank. Captain Hotchkiss re- turned to my headquarters after dark and reported the result of his and General Gordon's examina- tion, and he gave me a sketch of the enemy's posi- tion and camps. He informed me that the enemy's left flank, which rested near Cedar Creek, a short distance above its mouth, was lightly picketed, and that there was but a small cavalry picket on the north fork of the Shenandoah, below the mouth of the creek, and he stated that, from information he had received, he thought it was practicable to move a column of infantry between the base of the mountain and the river to a ford below the mouth of the creek. He also informed me that the main body of the enemy's cavalry was on his right flank on the back road to Winchester. The sketch made by Captain Hotchkiss, which proved to be correct, designated the roads in the enemy's rear, and the house of a Mr. Cooley as a favorable point for forming an attacking eolumn, after it crossed the river, in order to move against the en- emy and strike him on the valley pike in rear of his works. The next morning General Gordon confirmed the report of Captain Hotehkiss, ex- pressing confidence that the attack could be sue- cessfully made on the enemy's left and rear, and General Pegram reported that a movement on the enemy's right flank would be attended with great difficulty, as the banks of Cedar Creek on that Blank were high and precipitous and were well guarded. General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss were then sent to examine and ascertain the practicabil